Beijing’s six strategies for neutralizing Occupy Central

Beijing’s six strategies for neutralizing Occupy Central with Love and Peace

by Benny Tai, Occupy Central with Love and Peace organizer

(translation Friday, August 15, 2014)

(original published in Apple Daily on Tuesday, August 12, 2014:
http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/news/art/20140812/18829436)


Ever since Occupy Central with Love and Peace was proposed last year, Beijing has been working on the strategies to deal with this democratic movement in Hong Kong.

The first strategy is restraining.  At the very beginning, I was the only one proposing Occupy Central.  Although the idea was echoed by quite a few people, it was basically just a scholar's proposal floating in the sky.  The movement started to take shape only after Prof. Chan Kin-man and Pastor Chu Yiu-ming joined me in officially launching the Occupy Central with Love and Peace movement in March last year following a number of deliberation forums.  Although the movement had managed to gather social forces that support universal suffrage, including pan-democratic parties, civil society organizations and citizens, it had yet to become a tangible political force.  At this stage, Beijing's main strategy was to restrain the growth of the OCLP movement by forming anti-Occupy Central organizations and mobilizing pro-Beijing chambers of commerce, bodies, mass media and individuals in criticizing and discrediting OCLP through public speeches, newspaper articles and advertisements.

But all these actions appeared to be in vain.  800,000 people voted in the civil referendum in June, of which 700,000 clearly expressed their unwillingness to accept a chief executive electoral method that does not offer real choices to the voters.  The result gave a clear mandate to the pan-democrats to veto in the Legislative Council any proposal that does not meet international standards.  After 510,000 citizens participated in the July 1 demonstration asking for genuine universal suffrage, and the student sit-in on July 2 that gave a perfect demonstration of nonviolent direct action, OCLP finally developed into a full-fledged movement.

The second strategy Beijing could have employed is to kill the movement while it was still in embryo.  They could simply have arrested the three OCLP organizers so that we could no longer promote and organize any OCLP activities.  I keep saying that I would have disappeared right after my article was published if I were teaching in Beijing University instead of Hong Kong University.  I would not have had the opportunity to nourish OCLP and foster its growth in Hong Kong civil society.  Fortunately, Hong Kong is not the mainland, and Hong Kong University is not Beijing University.  We are still protected by the rule of law: Until we take concrete action of civil disobedience, we have not violated any law in Hong Kong and our personal freedom and freedom of speech are still protected by law.  As such, the strategy of elimination does not work in Hong Kong; besides, the movement has already taken shape.  Arresting the three of us now will not stop Occupy Central from happening and would more likely lead to an unforeseeable and uncontrollable situation.

The third strategy Beijing could use, once OCLP has already taken shape, is to undermine the movement.  Undermining resembles the first strategy of restraining except it is done on a much larger scale and with stronger organizational power.  Like OCLP, they are also trying to shape public opinion and seem to have gained a lot of momentum.  However, such opinion, no matter how substantial, only serves to counter the pro-Occupy Central opinion.  It will not change the opinion of those who support the aim of OCLP to fight for genuine universal suffrage.  Neither will it make that opinion simply disappear.

Once the government submits an electoral reform proposal that does not meet public expectations of universal suffrage or violates the will of those 700,000 citizens who have voted for a proposal that meets international standards, the voice of opposition will be strong and firm.  There should be enough people participating in the nonviolent direct action of Occupy Central.  There is no way to undermine OCLP once the movement has taken shape.  It would be really naive and even foolish of Beijing to think that a sufficiently large number of people against Occupy Central could end the action.

The fourth strategy, something Beijing is still using, is to intimidate the supporters of OCLP.  This strategy, which was used even before OCLP had taken shape, has become all-pervasive and extreme.  The act of intimidation can be against a supporter directly or against his relatives or friends who in turn exert pressure on him.  This strategy has actually been working and creating the kind of white terror that has caused some OCLP supporters to withdraw from the movement or keep a low profile.

However, this strategy cannot stop OCLP from happening either when the moment comes.  It can only restrain the growth of the movement.  The reasons are as follows:
(1)  It is impossible for Beijing to get the personal information of all those who intend to participate in nonviolent direct action.  They can only target high-profile participants.
(2)  As mentioned, Hong Kong people are still protected by the rule of law, which limits the extent of intimidation.  Most of those who do not have close ties with China should be able to bear this kind of intimidation.
(3)  By now, many supporters of universal suffrage are prepared to risk everything for democracy in Hong Kong.  Having said that, under the rule of law in Hong Kong, they are not going to sacrifice their lives.

The fifth strategy that Beijing is trying to use is dividing the pan-democratic camp.  Beijing has already successfully divided the pan-democrats once before, during the political reform of 2010.  Before the emergence of OCLP, the radicals and the moderates were at odds with each other and were unlikely to work together to exercise their veto.  As veto is one of the pan-democrats’ most powerful weapons in regard to political reform, dividing the pan-democratic camp would greatly weaken it.

This is also the basic strategy Beijing intends to use in dealing with the 2017 chief executive electoral reform.  Looking at the number of seats of the pan-democrats in Legco, support from just four to five pan-democrats would be enough to pass the government’s proposal.  From Beijing's perspective, divide and rule is the most effective way of getting the proposal passed.  However, after OCLP has taken shape, and particularly when the results of the civil referendum are in favor of vetoing any proposal that does not conform to international standards, the pan-democrats are quite united.  Still, it remains a weak alliance as the radicals and moderates are very different in terms of strategy, pace, and the specifics of their proposals.

However, the political reality is that if the government proposal does not give voters a real choice, all pan-democrats will have to veto it in the Legco.  Not doing so would be tantamount to committing political suicide.  Perhaps in the next few months, Beijing will do whatever it takes to split the radicals and the moderates.  However, as long as the pan-democrats understand that unity is strength, and that the desire for genuine universal suffrage transcends their political differences, there is hardly any chance of Beijing dividing the pan-democratic camp.

The sixth strategy is smashing.  Beijing should know the above-mentioned methods of countering public opinion and intimidating supporters will not stop Occupy Central from happening.  They can at most minimize the impact of nonviolent direct action.  Perhaps Beijing is preparing for the eventual confrontation, and what they are doing now is just the groundwork.  Of course, Beijing is not afraid of smashing - forceful dispersion or even violent suppression if needed - and is prepared to pay any political price.  But is it necessary?

If this were to happen, the political consequences would be unpredictable.  Maybe there would be just one or two thousand people occupying Central to be arrested and prosecuted.  Public opinion would see these people as troublemakers.  Occupy Central would end miserably.  A few pan-democrats would change sides to support the government proposal.  Chinese-style universal suffrage would be successfully implemented in Hong Kong and bring about better governance.  Hong Kong people would learn to love the country, love Hong Kong, and live happily forever.

What is more likely is that Occupy Central, even if suppressed, will inflict irreparable harm to governance in Hong Kong.  The growing disobedience and resistance in society will render Hong Kong ungovernable.  This will hurt Hong Kong not only politically and economically but also socially and culturally.  "One country, two systems" will be proven to be a failure.  China may be strong enough to bear the costs, or perhaps does not even care about them, but the governance problem will keep on troubling Beijing in the years to come.  Beijing will be exhausted by the ever-increasing political conflicts.  It is not that Beijing cannot handle these issues, but why put Hong Kong in such a position?  Without genuine universal suffrage, the internal conflicts in Hong Kong will never be resolved and can be taken advantage by ‘foreign forces’ opposed to Beijing.  This could pose an even bigger threat to national security.

I hope Beijing, after making careful calculations and seeing it is unable to find any other solution than smashing OCLP, will positively address the demand of the movement for genuine universal suffrage.