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Apr 11th, 2021
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  1. Scarcely a day goes by on these here internets without some goddamn 14 year old telling you
  2.  
  3. that you don't understand economics. Well I'm here to say that these 14 year olds, are wrong.
  4.  
  5. But this video is about so much more than just arguing with children. The problem is that many
  6.  
  7. people in positions of power and influence, as well as parts of the economics profession,
  8.  
  9. share the view that 'economics 101' is the reason we can't improve the world, especially for poor people.
  10.  
  11. In some cases this seems like a genuine intellectual commitment by people who sincerely
  12.  
  13. believe economic theory helps us make sense of the world, but that it just leads us to unpalatable
  14.  
  15. conclusions. In a recent YouTube documentary about 
  16. the economist Thomas Sowell which mysteriously
  17.  
  18. appeared in everyone's recommendations, there 
  19. was a famous quote from the man himself
  20.  
  21. In other cases the same argument can seem like an 
  22. ideological commitment underpinned by nothing but
  23.  
  24. empty sociopathic tendencies. Not too long ago 
  25. noted personality vacuum Abby Shapiro tweeted that
  26.  
  27. Let's leave aside the question of what education Abby has actually had in economics.
  28.  
  29. Because it's not just for the extremely online 
  30. among us that economics makes its influence felt.
  31.  
  32. You can even see it pretty often in popular 
  33. culture: "I spend money to make money, economics
  34.  
  35. 101 dude" "What have we here? Oh, economics! Very 
  36. very interesting" "I'm confused" "It's a question of
  37.  
  38. economics" "I'm sorry boys, you just don't understand 
  39. economics" "Simple economics" The reality is that
  40.  
  41. economics is just a set of theories which may or 
  42. may not hold in the real world and over the past
  43.  
  44. few decades it has been shown time and time again 
  45. that the standard econ 101 story is misleading at
  46.  
  47. best and flatly contradicted by the evidence at 
  48. worst. Over the course of this video, I want to
  49.  
  50. detail both the theory and the evidence in this 
  51. debate, with some help from Mexie, who kindly agreed
  52.  
  53. to offer her views. And before loads of tedious 
  54. economists pop up in my mentions claiming that
  55.  
  56. I'm strawmanning them or that I should learn 
  57. economics before I unlearn it I'd like to
  58.  
  59. say that yes, the content of actual economics 
  60. 101 classes has changed recently. This video
  61.  
  62. is largely about how a selectively interpreted 
  63. version of this has been used in political debate
  64.  
  65. on issues spanning from minimum wages to rent 
  66. control to taxes and spending. Having said that,
  67.  
  68. I do think these ideas still exert something of a 
  69. grip on the profession of economics, as we'll see.
  70.  
  71. In the Thomas Sowell documentary they single out the 
  72. minimum wage as an example of how economics shows
  73.  
  74. you the true impact of well-intended policies. "One 
  75. of my biggest concerns was about minimum wages. At
  76.  
  77. first I thought this is good because all these 
  78. people are poor and they'll get a little higher
  79.  
  80. income and so that'll be helpful and then as I
  81. studied economics I began to say well there's a
  82.  
  83. downside, they may lose their jobs completely so 
  84. there's that." This reasoning is based on
  85.  
  86. standard demand-supply analysis which epitomises 
  87. the core of economics 101. When somebody tells
  88.  
  89. you to go and learn economics chances are this is 
  90. what they have in mind, so let's do what they say
  91.  
  92. and learn about it. Demand and supply is used to 
  93. represent a variety of markets, but the one we've
  94.  
  95. got here is the labour market. It shows how - in 
  96. theory - the market for labor will settle at a given
  97.  
  98. level of wages, on the y-axis, and employment, on the 
  99. x-axis. It can also show the effects of the minimum
  100.  
  101. wage on these quantities, but we don't want to get 
  102. ahead of ourselves so let's take demand and supply
  103.  
  104. one at a time. The demand for labour depicts 
  105. the willingness of business to employ workers
  106.  
  107. in the form of a relationship between wages and 
  108. employment. If the wage is high, say at the level W1,
  109.  
  110. businesses will not find it profitable to employ 
  111. many workers. On the graph if you travel right
  112.  
  113. from W1 until you hit the demand curve and then go 
  114. down until you hit the x-axis you will get to E1 -
  115.  
  116. the corresponding level of employment at this 
  117. wage. On the other hand, if the wage is lower at
  118.  
  119. W2 then businesses will employ more workers and 
  120. employment will be at E2. Generally speaking, the
  121.  
  122. lower the wage the more workers businesses 
  123. will want. The demand curve slopes downwards,
  124.  
  125. an expression you may well have heard before. So 
  126. what about the other side of the equation - supply?
  127.  
  128. Well here we are looking at the amount of 
  129. labour workers are willing to supply for a wage.
  130.  
  131. This is a strange way of putting it that 
  132. might not come naturally to most people,
  133.  
  134. but the important thing to know is that if the 
  135. wage is higher more people will want to work.
  136.  
  137. Which makes some sense, I guess. So if the wage 
  138. is high at W1, employment will be high at E3.
  139.  
  140. If the wage is lower at W2, employment will be low 
  141. at E4. The supply curve slopes upwards. I hope
  142.  
  143. you're ready because we're about to put the two 
  144. curves together. Demand curves depict the number of
  145.  
  146. workers businesses are willing to employ at a given
  147. wage. Supply curves depict the amount workers
  148.  
  149. are willing to work at a given wage. Where these 
  150. cross over, the decisions of the businesses balance
  151.  
  152. with the decisions of the workers and we get the 
  153. outcome of wages W-star and employment E-star: what
  154.  
  155. economists call an equilibrium. "You have a product, 
  156. they have no means of distribution. They have
  157.  
  158. demand, they- they don't have any product. That's 
  159. that's market equilibrium: yin and yang, ebony and ivory.
  160.  
  161. Tell me what the [ __ ] problem is." So how does 
  162. our minimum wage affect this happy depiction of
  163.  
  164. the labor market? The minimum wage is represented 
  165. by this god-awful ugly line MW that's interfering
  166.  
  167. with our precious market. It might seem odd that 
  168. with the name 'minimum' wage the line is high up on
  169.  
  170. the diagram. (Maybe it's just me that finds that 
  171. odd). But remember that the point of a minimum
  172.  
  173. wage is to increase wages above the level they're 
  174. currently at, so it has to be higher than where the
  175.  
  176. curves cross over to have any effect. Now how do we 
  177. work out the effects of this minimum on employment?
  178.  
  179. Well, no matter what the market wage is stuck 
  180. at MW so we need to ask where this crosses the
  181.  
  182. demand curve - how much labour businesses will hire 
  183. at MW - and also where it crosses the supply curve -
  184.  
  185. how much workers will want to work at MW. At the 
  186. minimum wage, businesses will only want to employ
  187.  
  188. the number of workers E-MW. More will want to work 
  189. because MW crosses the supply curve much further
  190.  
  191. to the right, at a higher level of employment E-star-S. But businesses are not willing to employ so
  192.  
  193. many workers at such a high wage, therefore the 
  194. employment level E-MW will be the one that is
  195.  
  196. realised. Notice that this is also lower than 
  197. the previous equilibrium E-star. The minimum
  198.  
  199. wage has reduced employment! [ __ ] what are we 
  200. going to do? It is important to remember that
  201.  
  202. this is a prediction of the model, not some kind of 
  203. logical necessity. And I actually don't think most
  204.  
  205. non-economists are aware of quite how convincing 
  206. the empirical evidence against standard theory
  207.  
  208. has been on this issue. For example, in a video on 
  209. the minimum wage the YouTuber Vaush makes some
  210.  
  211. good points about why the minimum wage could be 
  212. a positive thing and raises some valid questions
  213.  
  214. about a well-known Congressional Budget Office 
  215. study predicting that it would lead to job losses.
  216.  
  217. "How many of these are like real [ __ ] 40-hour 
  218. week proper jobs. I'd be willing to bet very few of
  219.  
  220. them. Most of these are cuck jobs and the loss of 
  221. these jobs could actually be a good thing because
  222.  
  223. it would mean the people who were otherwise 
  224. taking them can now afford to live off of only
  225.  
  226. one job instead of having to take two or three." But we can add a bit to what Vaush says- um, sorry,
  227.  
  228. scratch that. In a recent video on the minimum 
  229. wage 'manlet' Vaush shows how little he knows
  230.  
  231. about anything by failing to bring up well-known 
  232. studies on the minimum wage and accepting the
  233.  
  234. central finding of the CBO study like a cuck, even 
  235. though it's definitely false. To see why Vaush is
  236.  
  237. so hopelessly destroyed by facts and logic, we're 
  238. going to take a deep dive into the literature on
  239.  
  240. the minimum wage. Doing so will teach us not just 
  241. about why minimum wages are good, but also about
  242.  
  243. the kind of empirical studies that have shown this, 
  244. as well as the limitations of economics 101 itself.
  245.  
  246. Newly elected U.S. President Joe Biden promised 
  247. to introduce a 15 Federal minimum wage once
  248.  
  249. elected, which sparked a renewed debate over the 
  250. pros and cons of the policy. As I write this the
  251.  
  252. proposal has been voted down in the Senate, which 
  253. is extremely disappointing but shows that econ101-ism
  254.  
  255. is alive and kicking, I suppose. Since the 
  256. dawn of time the U.S.A.'s federal minimum wage has
  257.  
  258. stagnated or even fallen. As you can see here, in 
  259. the early 80s it was around three dollars an hour
  260.  
  261. and despite steady rises in the headline value 
  262. it has only kept pace with inflation since then -
  263.  
  264. barely changing in real terms. The U.S.A. lags behind 
  265. other rich countries and even many poorer ones in
  266.  
  267. its low minimum wage. As this table shows, the ratio 
  268. of minimum to median wages is only 33 percent for
  269.  
  270. the U.S. compared to 54 for my own country of the 
  271. U.K. or 69 for Chile and Costa Rica. The debate is
  272.  
  273. relevant to a broad range of countries: in the 
  274. U.K. we have had the living wage campaign, which
  275.  
  276. used social pressure to force companies to 
  277. increase their wages and eventually made its
  278.  
  279. way into policy for those aged 25 and over. There 
  280. is also the global living wage initiative which....
  281.  
  282. campaigns for a global living wage. So what does 
  283. the evidence say on minimum wage increases and
  284.  
  285. employment? Before we go into this I want 
  286. to define a crucial term: the elasticity.
  287.  
  288. "Yo, you know what we got here? We got an elastic 
  289. product! You know what that means? That means
  290.  
  291. when people can go elsewhere and get they printin' and copyin' done they're going to do it! You
  292.  
  293. acting like we got an inelastic product and we 
  294. don't!" In economics, this means the percentage
  295.  
  296. change in one thing because of a percentage 
  297. change in another thing. Stringer was talking about
  298.  
  299. the change in demand owing to the change in the 
  300. price of their product, but here we will mostly be
  301.  
  302. talking about the change in employment owing to a 
  303. change in the minimum wage. So an elasticity of -1
  304.  
  305. means that if the minimum wage increases by 
  306. one percent employment will fall by one percent.
  307.  
  308. An elasticity of minus 0.1 means that if 
  309. the minimum wage increases by one percent,
  310.  
  311. employment will fall by 0.1 percent. You can 
  312. see that the former would be hugely problematic
  313.  
  314. while the latter could easily be considered a 
  315. price worth paying for higher wages. For a long
  316.  
  317. time, economists accepted that the minimum wage 
  318. would be bad for employment based on the supply
  319.  
  320. and demand theory we've seen, as well as using what 
  321. are now seen as relatively crude tests that today
  322.  
  323. are not considered credible even by opponents 
  324. of the minimum wage. Except for the people in
  325.  
  326. the Thomas Sowell documentary, evidently. Beginning 
  327. with a famous paper by David Card and Alan Krueger
  328.  
  329. in 1994, a wave of studies sometimes dubbed the 
  330. 'New Minimum Wage Research' have used careful
  331.  
  332. empirical techniques to investigate the elasticity 
  333. of employment with respect to minimum wage changes.
  334.  
  335. Card and Krueger looked at the effect of a minimum 
  336. wage change using two adjacent U.S. states: New
  337.  
  338. Jersey and Pennsylvania. In 1992 New Jersey 
  339. increased its minimum wage, while Pennsylvania
  340.  
  341. did not. This is a kind of 'natural experiment' - 
  342. when the policy applied to one area is not
  343.  
  344. applied to a similar area, and comparisons between 
  345. the two approximate the ideal of a lab experiment.
  346.  
  347. The argument goes that if two areas differ only 
  348. in the policy - in this case, the minimum wage -
  349.  
  350. any difference in outcomes between them - in this 
  351. case, employment - can be attributed to that policy.
  352.  
  353. Since the U.S. has many state-level policies it is 
  354. fertile ground for these natural experiments.
  355.  
  356. Card and Krueger phoned fast food restaurants, 
  357. which employ a lot of minimum wage workers,
  358.  
  359. both before and after the change. "Can I help 
  360. you sir? My god you're greasy". What they
  361.  
  362. found was that far from reducing employment 
  363. in New Jersey, the minimum wage may actually
  364.  
  365. have increased it. That's right: for some of 
  366. their results, the elasticity was positive.
  367.  
  368. The study made quite an impact. Reid Garfield, 
  369. Senior Economist of the Joint Economic Committee,
  370.  
  371. commented in 1996:
  372.  
  373. Since this, thousands of papers have been written in the USA and elsewhere on the employment effects of the minimum wage. One of the most pertinent critiques
  374.  
  375. of Card and Krueger was how narrow their study 
  376. was: a single change in fast food restaurants
  377.  
  378. in two relatively small U.S. states should not 
  379. be generalized to minimum wages everywhere. More
  380.  
  381. recently, the frontier of minimum wage research 
  382. has been led by people like Arin Dube and his
  383.  
  384. co-authors. They have mostly followed in Card and Krueger's footsteps by taking advantage of natural
  385.  
  386. experiments, but have substantially broadened the 
  387. number of states they include as well as the time
  388.  
  389. frame of the studies and the depth they go into 
  390. estimating the effects. For example, in a 2010
  391.  
  392. paper Dube, Lester and Reich found no employment 
  393. effects of the minimum wage using adjacent pairs
  394.  
  395. of states. That's Card and Krueger times by hundreds! "My god. That's - I don't even know what that is!"
  396.  
  397. "Nobody does." A 2019 paper by Cengiz, Dube, Lindner and Zipperer estimated the effect of minimum wages
  398.  
  399. on the entire distribution of jobs using 138 
  400. different minimum wage changes in the U.S.A.
  401.  
  402. The x-axis here shows the part of the wage 
  403. distribution we're in relative to the minimum. 'Two'
  404.  
  405. means it's two dollars higher than the new minimum 
  406. wage. The y-axis shows the effect on employment at
  407.  
  408. a given part of the wage distribution. Just below 
  409. the minimum wage - zero on the x-axis - a substantial
  410.  
  411. number of jobs disappear, as shown by the negative 
  412. blue bar. Which makes sense as it's now illegal
  413.  
  414. to employ people at that wage. But this is offset 
  415. entirely by the appearance of jobs at or above the
  416.  
  417. new minimum wage, as shown by the positive blue 
  418. bar to its right. There are no effects anywhere
  419.  
  420. else in the distribution, so this gain in wages for 
  421. low income workers is not offset by other workers
  422.  
  423. losing out. The same paper looks at these effects 
  424. over the long term and it shows that the new jobs
  425.  
  426. which appear do not disappear after a few years. I favour this type of natural experiment approach.
  427.  
  428. It's transparent, and the core of close comparison 
  429. between pairs of real regions keeps the method
  430.  
  431. grounded in empirical reality - instead of 
  432. blinding us with complex statistical methods.
  433.  
  434. But I should say that it's not the case that 
  435. every study has found no effect like this. There
  436.  
  437. are dissenters within this literature, specifically 
  438. economists like David Neumark and his co-authors.
  439.  
  440. The details of this debate are too heavy for 
  441. this video, so maybe I'll leave a comment with
  442.  
  443. my thoughts if you'd like, along with their papers 
  444. in the references. Overall, though, most systematic
  445.  
  446. meta-analyses find a small but statistically 
  447. significant negative elasticity of employment
  448.  
  449. with respect to minimum wage changes. Having said 
  450. that, these studies also show evidence that there
  451.  
  452. is a bias towards publishing negative estimates. Why that's the case I'll leave you to figure out.
  453.  
  454. So how does one make sense of such a vast and 
  455. tricky literature? Well....not the way the CBO does it.
  456.  
  457. To give you some background, the Congressional 
  458. Budget Office is an official but non-partisan
  459.  
  460. entity in the USA which produces research on 
  461. important policy topics. Their recent report
  462.  
  463. claimed that raising the minimum wage to 15 would 
  464. lead to 1.4 million job losses, a pretty concerning
  465.  
  466. figure. Where did they get their estimates from? Vaush said that he'd have to get a textbook out
  467.  
  468. to understand this debate. I'd hate to be the 
  469. reason that anyone had to read an econometrics
  470.  
  471. textbook, so let's save him from having to do so... 
  472. Uh oh, too late brah! The first thing to say is that
  473.  
  474. this report was kind of opaque, even for someone 
  475. who is used to reading this type of thing. It's
  476.  
  477. full of phrases like "CBO concluded" and "In CBO's 
  478. estimation" often with little to no explanation.
  479.  
  480. They select 11 studies from the literature, but 
  481. why these 11 were chosen is not explained. The
  482.  
  483. CBO then computes the effect of minimum wages on 
  484. employment from an average of the 11 studies but
  485.  
  486. they increase the magnitude of the actual average 
  487. because of a really weird thing they do where they
  488.  
  489. randomly drop some of the studies they use and 
  490. recalculate the average with those studies missing.
  491.  
  492. I don't know why this method is chosen or how it 
  493. really works because again it isn't explained. "It's
  494.  
  495. garbage." Dube himself has commented to similar 
  496. effect, though in more measured academic terms.
  497.  
  498. He says the CBO overemphasises the negative 
  499. estimates in what we already know is a literature
  500.  
  501. biased towards finding negative estimates. He points 
  502. out that more recent, better quality research has
  503.  
  504. found employment elasticities of the minimum wage 
  505. closer to zero. As an alternative he suggested his
  506.  
  507. own 2009 review for the U.K. Treasury. This only 
  508. includes studies which estimated the effect on
  509.  
  510. employment for the same workers whose wages are 
  511. increased by the minimum wage, which gives a clear
  512.  
  513. picture of the trade-offs faced by the workers 
  514. actually affected by the policy. This is known as
  515.  
  516. the 'Own Wage Elasticity'. Along the y-axis is the 
  517. study. The dots represent the estimated effect
  518.  
  519. size for that study, with the bars either side of 
  520. the dots representing the uncertainty surrounding
  521.  
  522. that estimate. Dube concludes that based on this 
  523. review ,the average elasticity is minus 0.04,
  524.  
  525. meaning that a 25% increase in average wages for a 
  526. group affected by the minimum wage should reduce
  527.  
  528. employment by one percent for that group. There's 
  529. a lot of debate over whether $15 an hour is enough
  530.  
  531. and Dube also comments on how high the minimum 
  532. wage could be:
  533.  
  534. Now, to return to demand  and supply. Strictly speaking this evidence alone doesn't contradict the supply and demand model; it
  535.  
  536. could just imply that the curves have a specific 
  537. shape - albeit an unlikely one that contradicts
  538.  
  539. other evidence, I'll provide a reference for that 
  540. below - but here's my bottom line. When effect sizes
  541.  
  542. are this small and uncertain, it's suggestive of 
  543. something that's just not that interesting, whether
  544.  
  545. theoretically or politically. As the economist 
  546. Thomas Leonard pointed out, this whole debate does
  547.  
  548. prompt the question "what evidence would convince 
  549. you that your theory is refuted?" Let me illustrate
  550.  
  551. this with one more recent study. This shows a bunch 
  552. of different elasticities for 16 to 19 year olds,
  553.  
  554. the group most likely to be affected by the policy. As you can see, in most cases the blue horizontal
  555.  
  556. lines cross zero, which is given by the red 
  557. vertical line, indicating that the effects
  558.  
  559. estimated are not statistically distinguishable 
  560. from none at all. As a contrast consider a more
  561.  
  562. straightforward question: what is the effect of the 
  563. minimum wage on wages themselves? this might seem
  564.  
  565. tautological, but if the minimum wage is low or is 
  566. not properly enforced we may not observe an effect.
  567.  
  568. unlike our previous figure the estimates here are 
  569. universally positive and statistically distinct
  570.  
  571. from zero. This is the pattern one would expect to 
  572. observe when the relationship one is estimating
  573.  
  574. is strong and reliable. The minimum wage effects do 
  575. not look like this. Higher labour costs as a result
  576.  
  577. of the minimum wage are obviously a thing. But 
  578. employers often have more bargaining power than
  579.  
  580. workers, so they can afford it. Increased pay can 
  581. motivate workers, leading to higher productivity.
  582.  
  583. It can make them more likely to stay, reducing 
  584. turnover costs from hiring and firing.
  585.  
  586. And at the economy-wide level, the minimum wage 
  587. increases the spending power of workers, which
  588.  
  589. will increase demand for businesses. I'm happy to 
  590. debate the importance of these different effects
  591.  
  592. but the standard economic approach only helps us 
  593. with a tiny part of them, if at all, and arguably
  594.  
  595. the effect on employment is so uninteresting 
  596. that it's distracted us from other questions
  597.  
  598. such as the effect of the minimum wage on mental 
  599. health or poverty. So now we know that the minimum
  600.  
  601. wage just doesn't have the kind of reliable 
  602. negative effect on employment we'd expect if the
  603.  
  604. theory were useful. But now i want to talk about 
  605. another, similar, prominent example: rent control.
  606.  
  607. It's no secret that both house prices and rents 
  608. in many countries have skyrocketed over the past
  609.  
  610. couple of decades, especially in Anglo countries. Housing is probably the main cost for most people
  611.  
  612. so this has prompted questions about whether 
  613. governments should do more to help people
  614.  
  615. cope with these costs. The most direct 
  616. policy to do this would be rent control.
  617.  
  618. Rent control isn't a hugely popular policy 
  619. although it exists in a few countries and
  620.  
  621. localities, for example New York City as 
  622. discussed by the friends in the popular sitcom
  623.  
  624. 'Friends'. "But more important because of 
  625. rent control it was a friggin' steal".
  626.  
  627. In their debate on housing, philosopher Ben 
  628. Burgess and streamer Destiny also discussed
  629.  
  630. the policy: "Rent control is like one of these few 
  631. issues that economists broadly agree is a garbage
  632.  
  633. policy. It doesn't help who we want it to help, it 
  634. usually hurts who we want to help and it just
  635.  
  636. doesn't usually get what you want done." Destiny was 
  637. correct: opposition to rent control is possibly the
  638.  
  639. area where economists agree the most. A 1990 
  640. poll had 93.5 percent agree that "a ceiling on
  641.  
  642. rents reduces the quantity and quality of housing 
  643. available". A 2012 poll asked for economists' views
  644.  
  645. on the statement "local ordinances that limit 
  646. rent increases for some rental housing units
  647.  
  648. such as in New York City and San Francisco have 
  649. had a positive effect over the past three decades
  650.  
  651. on the amount and quality of broadly affordable 
  652. rental housing in cities that have used them."
  653.  
  654. 81% of economists disagreed or strongly disagreed 
  655. with this statement with answers including "Next
  656.  
  657. question: does the sun revolve around the earth?" "Unless all the textbooks are wrong, this is wrong"
  658.  
  659. "The planets are lined up here: theory and 
  660. evidence point in the same direction". The award
  661.  
  662. for the strongest statement about rent control, 
  663. however, goes to the economist Assar Lindbeck
  664.  
  665. who claimed "In many cases rent control appears to 
  666. be the most efficient technique presently known to
  667.  
  668. destroy a city, except for bombing." To understand 
  669. where all this strong opposition is coming from
  670.  
  671. let's return to our supply and demand diagram. Instead of the market for labor, we are now looking
  672.  
  673. at the market for houses. Apparently they work in 
  674. exactly the same way. We have rents on the y-axis
  675.  
  676. instead of wages. We also have quantity of houses 
  677. rented on the x-axis, instead of employment. Again
  678.  
  679. the supply and demand for houses should balance 
  680. with rents r-star and quantity at q-star. What does
  681.  
  682. rent control do in this situation? It's represented 
  683. by the horizontal line RC which forces rents down.
  684.  
  685. At this low rental rate, the quantity of houses 
  686. supplied is lower than the previous equilibrium
  687.  
  688. even though more people want to rent. We have a 
  689. shortage, and a fall in rented units compared to
  690.  
  691. the 'free market'. I want to say outright that there 
  692. is more evidence for the predictions of the supply
  693.  
  694. and demand model for rent control than for the 
  695. minimum wage, depending on how you interpret it.
  696.  
  697. But the blanket opposition to rent control that 
  698. derives from this is hugely overstated and econ
  699.  
  700. 101 reasoning is again more of a hindrance 
  701. than the help for understanding the debate.
  702.  
  703. First: what does it mean for the quantity of 
  704. housing to be reduced? I would contend that
  705.  
  706. the supply-demand model can mislead people into 
  707. thinking that the reduction is in housing supply
  708.  
  709. rather than the number of houses specifically used 
  710. for renting. The 1990 poll mentioned above failed
  711.  
  712. to distinguish these two clearly, and in the debate 
  713. with Destiny, Ben Burgis just largely accepted this
  714.  
  715. framing, contending that you could compensate by 
  716. building more housing. "Because if we just have rent
  717.  
  718. control there's going to be far less investment in 
  719. private housing, there's gonna be far less private
  720.  
  721. housing built, but if you're building a lot of 
  722. public housing to make up the shortfall then it's
  723.  
  724. literally- you could you could accept your premise 
  725. you can accept what the economists are saying
  726.  
  727. and still think that it's just irrelevant to that 
  728. package of policies." "Why not just build more houses?"
  729.  
  730. Building more housing is good. But a reduction in 
  731. rental housing doesn't mean that houses disappear;
  732.  
  733. there may just be a corresponding rise in 
  734. ownership. Our concern is surely whether people
  735.  
  736. are getting the houses they need, not whether 
  737. they're renting or owning them. We can have a
  738.  
  739. debate about the relative merits of renting 
  740. versus ownership and which demographics are
  741.  
  742. more likely to use one or the other, but it's not 
  743. immediately obvious to me which is more desirable.
  744.  
  745. Second: rent control captures a wide variety of 
  746. different policies. The standard demand-supply
  747.  
  748. analysis only depicts a straight-up cap on rents, 
  749. whereas modern rent control just limits increases
  750.  
  751. and allows for inflation in landlords' costs to 
  752. encourage maintenance. Such provisions are common
  753.  
  754. and common sense - for example, if you're worried 
  755. about rent control discouraging construction
  756.  
  757. exempt new buildings, like Berlin. Recently a 
  758. Bloomberg article that mysteriously appeared
  759.  
  760. in everyone's trends on Twitter discussed the 
  761. impact of rent control in Berlin, which froze
  762.  
  763. rents on older houses and allowed tenants to force 
  764. landlords to lower existing rents. True to form,
  765.  
  766. the article claims "if populism on the political 
  767. right corrupts democracies, populism on the left
  768.  
  769. ruins economies" It's based on a report which is in 
  770. German and fortunately I'm fluent so I was able to
  771.  
  772. consult the original document. Just kidding, I'm 
  773. English. We'll have to go on the article itself.
  774.  
  775. Some of the outcomes it chooses are kind of 
  776. strange. The results clearly show that rents
  777.  
  778. have plummeted for those affected, a huge benefit 
  779. which is downplayed. The article charges that rent
  780.  
  781. controls have reduced house prices, as if that's 
  782. definitely a bad thing or somehow unexpected.
  783.  
  784. It seems to me that both more affordable housing 
  785. and lower rents might be considered a good thing
  786.  
  787. by some people. The article uses a couple of graphs 
  788. which apparently show the policy has had negative
  789.  
  790. effects. One shows that prices in uncontrolled 
  791. units have risen since the policy, but from this
  792.  
  793. graph it's hard to see whether this is really a 
  794. change or just a continuation of a previous trend.
  795.  
  796. The graph doesn't go back far enough for us 
  797. to know - and even if it is true, it may just be
  798.  
  799. because the uncontrolled units are new. You could 
  800. say exactly the same thing for their graph showing
  801.  
  802. that the number of rental apartments has declined, 
  803. especially since they follow this up with a graph
  804.  
  805. showing that the supply of unregulated units has 
  806. outpaced other German cities. Somehow this is also
  807.  
  808. framed as a bad thing. As you're all now budding 
  809. natural experiment enthusiasts I know what you're
  810.  
  811. going to ask: is there any more credible evidence 
  812. than this...crap...on rent control, and the answer is:
  813.  
  814. some, but not enough, and it's mixed. One of the 
  815. most recent and commonly cited papers on this
  816.  
  817. topic is Diamond et. al, which uses the sudden 
  818. introduction of rent control to older houses in
  819.  
  820. San Francisco in 1994 and compares them with 
  821. more recently built units which were exempt.
  822.  
  823. Let's take an in-depth look at this paper as 
  824. I think it raises some interesting questions.
  825.  
  826. The paper claims that the policy led to a 15% 
  827. reduction in rental units, although if you unpack
  828.  
  829. this it's actually a combination of eight percent 
  830. being converted into owner-occupied buildings
  831.  
  832. with a further seven percent being converted into 
  833. rental units which were exempt from rent control.
  834.  
  835. Which isn't a 15 reduction in rental units. The 
  836. paper does show that residents of both owner
  837.  
  838. occupied and exempted units are likely to have 
  839. higher income, which is a cause for concern because
  840.  
  841. it favors richer residents. There are conflicting 
  842. effects, though. Part of the reason for the higher
  843.  
  844. income residents is that rent control leads to 
  845. higher maintenance and upgrades so landlords can
  846.  
  847. increase rents. We can see on these graphs 
  848. that - top left - rents fell while - top right -
  849.  
  850. redevelopments rose and - bottom left - conversions 
  851. rose and - bottom right - repairs rose. This suggests
  852.  
  853. rent control does increase quality, in contrast 
  854. with economists' poll answers that we saw earlier.
  855.  
  856. Rent control also means existing tenants are 
  857. more likely to stay, which is more pronounced
  858.  
  859. for minority groups. The strangest spin in the 
  860. Diamond paper is to frame this as a bad thing too.
  861.  
  862. Keeping existing residents in the area while rich residents join is a bad thing! The solution is obviously to have only rich residents so the income inequality in
  863.  
  864. the area is low! "Look at this place. Somebody 
  865. ought to build a town that works"
  866.  
  867. "Somebody did"
  868.  
  869. I'm being facetious, but only a little. At other 
  870. times the paper argues that existing tenants
  871.  
  872. are ultimately forced into poorer areas and here 
  873. they frame gentrification as a good thing, saying
  874.  
  875. So it's bad when existing tenants stay but also bad when they 
  876. leave? Gentrification is good but also bad? I
  877.  
  878. found this paper quite confusing, and it seems to 
  879. be a go-to reference for opponents of rent control.
  880.  
  881. With such a variety of competing effects 
  882. the authors eventually conclude that the
  883.  
  884. overall effects of rent control are a wash. But the 
  885. important lesson here is that ultimately neither
  886.  
  887. theory nor empirical analysis are going to make 
  888. the issue of competing values and perspectives go
  889.  
  890. away. When considering the effects of rent control, 
  891. do we prefer rented or owned housing? Do we want
  892.  
  893. higher quality houses which are more expensive? Do 
  894. we want to favor existing residents over new ones?
  895.  
  896. I don't have easy answers to these questions but 
  897. econ 101 leads people to believe that they do.
  898.  
  899. The economist Josh Mason argues that rent control 
  900. research is in a similar place now to minimum wage
  901.  
  902. research in the 1990s: a few well-formulated 
  903. studies are displacing conventional wisdom
  904.  
  905. and this will likely expand as time goes on. He 
  906. summarises a few studies similar to the Diamond
  907.  
  908. one which you can look at if you're interested in 
  909. pursuing this topic further. So here we have two of
  910.  
  911. the most important markets - labour and housing - where 
  912. the crude econ 101 approach has failed to make
  913.  
  914. sense of hotly debated policies. But what about 
  915. more generally? Where has the influence of econ 101
  916.  
  917. come from, and how does it affect our understanding 
  918. of other policies like taxes and social spending?
  919.  
  920. I don't think i can answer this one so I'm 
  921. going to have to hand over to someone else.
  922.  
  923. The influence of basic economics is...everywhere. 
  924. Both pervasive and perverse, it really is why
  925.  
  926. we cannot have nice things. For every earnest 
  927. call to make our political economic system
  928.  
  929. ever slightly more just or livable for working 
  930. people or the planet there's a capitalist, an
  931.  
  932. economist, a politician, a corporate news outlet, or 
  933. an average joe saying "that's cute, but that's just
  934.  
  935. not how the economy works!" James Kwak calls the 
  936. reductive invocation of basic economics to explain
  937.  
  938. all social phenomena in our society 'economism'. Economism relies on the abstract concepts taught
  939.  
  940. in econ 101 classes to explain why things are 
  941. the way they are and why any attempt to redress
  942.  
  943. the externalities of capitalism is futile. This 
  944. is despite the fact that many of the concepts
  945.  
  946. taught in econ 101 textbooks assume that a 
  947. perfectly competitive model of capitalism
  948.  
  949. is possible, along with various other assumptions 
  950. that rarely, if ever, hold true in the real world.
  951.  
  952. UE covered how economism has worked to depress 
  953. wages while housing prices have skyrocketed
  954.  
  955. but the invocation of econ 101 has affected 
  956. nearly every other sphere of our lives too.
  957.  
  958. Provide universal health care as a basic human 
  959. right? Adorable! That will rob people of choice.
  960.  
  961. Prevent price gouging during natural disasters 
  962. so that poor people aren't unfairly served a
  963.  
  964. death sentence? How naive! That will prevent 
  965. the efficiency of the competitive market from
  966.  
  967. kicking in to save the day. Plus it'll mean 
  968. that life-saving materials will be sold to
  969.  
  970. people who don't value them as much as people 
  971. who are willing to pay three times the price.
  972.  
  973. Raise taxes on the ultra rich to redress the wage 
  974. theft inherent in their wealth and fund services
  975.  
  976. that will benefit everyone? So cute! Econ 101 says 
  977. that that will backfire and lead to a decrease in
  978.  
  979. productivity and available jobs, something that's 
  980. never mentioned in econ 101 textbooks when talking
  981.  
  982. about things like raising taxes on the rich or 
  983. the minimum wage etcetera is that the ultra rich are
  984.  
  985. hoarding money far and above what they actually 
  986. need and they're doing so off the backs of workers
  987.  
  988. who are the ones who actually produce the goods 
  989. and services that make money for the capitalists.
  990.  
  991. Workers who, like those who work for Walmart or 
  992. McDonald's, are encouraged to apply for food stamps
  993.  
  994. to survive. When workers are losing their homes or 
  995. are unable to access healthcare during a pandemic
  996.  
  997. the unwillingness of the capitalist class to pay 
  998. taxes or living wages is pretty hard to reconcile
  999.  
  1000. - that's a polite way of putting it. But that's just 
  1001. me, let's look at how taxation and inequality plays
  1002.  
  1003. out on the ground, outside of the classroom. 
  1004. Will increasing taxes on the ultra-rich
  1005.  
  1006. hurt us all? In the end it follows that when you 
  1007. tax a good depending on what the good is people
  1008.  
  1009. will buy less of it. But when you try to apply econ 
  1010. 101 supply and demand models to things like income
  1011.  
  1012. tax the model shows us how out of touch it is with 
  1013. average working people. The model tells us that if
  1014.  
  1015. income taxes are raised people will 'choose' to work 
  1016. less and take more leisure time or simply retire.
  1017.  
  1018. The incentive for them to work additional hours 
  1019. is simply not there and so productivity plummets.
  1020.  
  1021. For anyone actually working to survive right now 
  1022. with depressed wages and a skyrocketing housing
  1023.  
  1024. market, you can see how this logic breaks down. 
  1025. People don't choose to work 60 hour work weeks;
  1026.  
  1027. they desperately need to. Anyway it is true that the rich are people who
  1028.  
  1029. can choose to work less if incentives aren't 
  1030. there because they are not working to survive and
  1031.  
  1032. many of them are making the bulk of their income 
  1033. through investments anyway which is basically just
  1034.  
  1035. sitting around and watching your assets 
  1036. grow. Taxes on capital gains and dividends
  1037.  
  1038. are already much lower than income taxes but 
  1039. politicians like Paul Ryan, Marco Rubio, and Ben
  1040.  
  1041. Carson invoking econ 101 want to reduce or 
  1042. eliminate taxes on investment income altogether.
  1043.  
  1044. The idea is that we need rich people to save their 
  1045. money so that it can be invested somewhere else
  1046.  
  1047. enabling the creation of new businesses and 
  1048. jobs. Over the past 70 years taxes on investment
  1049.  
  1050. income have plummeted, with no real increase in 
  1051. economic growth and with personal savings actually
  1052.  
  1053. declining. The economy expanded most rapidly in 
  1054. the 60s and 70s, when investment income tax was 70%
  1055.  
  1056. or higher. Zooming into more detailed studies, 
  1057. the evidence is mixed at best. In 1978, economist
  1058.  
  1059. Michael Boskin found that a tax cut that 
  1060. increases investment returns by 10 percent
  1061.  
  1062. tends to result in three to four percent more 
  1063. savings. However, later studies disputed this and
  1064.  
  1065. showed that those estimates depended heavily 
  1066. on contextual details. Eric Toder and Kim Rueben
  1067.  
  1068. conducted a review of existing research and 
  1069. determined that there was little evidence to
  1070.  
  1071. support the claim that lowering investment 
  1072. taxes increased savings. This was confirmed
  1073.  
  1074. by tax expert Leonard Burman, and a Congressional 
  1075. Research Service report stated that
  1076.  
  1077. This is fairly intuitive: at a certain level of wealth, people have very little else to do with their money other than invest it, regardless
  1078.  
  1079. if their profits might be slightly lower. There are 
  1080. actually games now where the challenge is to spend
  1081.  
  1082. all of Jeff Bezos' or Bill Gates' money, showing 
  1083. how completely impossible it is to actually buy
  1084.  
  1085. enough things with that gross excess. In terms of 
  1086. productivity, working people need to work to live, period.
  1087.  
  1088. But rich people - the 'job creators' - are also 
  1089. not less likely to work if income taxes are higher.
  1090.  
  1091. Robert Moffitt and Mark Wilhelm studied the 1986 
  1092. tax reform and found no change in hours worked by
  1093.  
  1094. high-earning men. This was confirmed by the CBO and 
  1095. economist Thomas Hungerford, who wrote:
  1096.  
  1097. Growing inequality leads to growing unrest, something also not addressed in econ 101 textbooks. Despite the ample empirical
  1098.  
  1099. evidence that contradicts these reductive and 
  1100. bewildering claims, economism survives and thrives
  1101.  
  1102. because it is incredibly politically useful to the 
  1103. most powerful people in our society. Whenever there
  1104.  
  1105. is political unrest, whenever there are militant 
  1106. movements against the violence of the status quo
  1107.  
  1108. the 1 percent, the 0.1 percent will come back and say these 
  1109. well-intentioned protesters just don't understand
  1110.  
  1111. basic economics. James Kwak writes that:
  1112.  
  1113. So how did this idealistic ideology become so popularly accepted? Well, people
  1114.  
  1115. like to point to Daddy Smith, who described the 
  1116. price mechanism and the
  1117.  
  1118. Wealth of Nations in 1776, but Smith discussed many 
  1119. reasons why this principle would not hold and did
  1120.  
  1121. not think that competitive market forces acting 
  1122. alone would produce the best of all possible
  1123.  
  1124. worlds. Antoine-Augustin Cournot first illustrated 
  1125. supply and demand curves which were popularized
  1126.  
  1127. in Alfred Marshall's 1890 textbook Principles 
  1128. of Economics. However, Marshall too rejected the
  1129.  
  1130. idea that the supposed perfect equilibrium that 
  1131. was assumed to result from perfectly competitive
  1132.  
  1133. markets would necessarily produce the best of all possible worlds because people will differ in wealth. He said:
  1134.  
  1135. At the time in the late 19th Century, unchecked markets were 
  1136. producing immense hardship and social instability,
  1137.  
  1138. leading to socialist and communist movements 
  1139. rather than any kind of embrace of pie-in-the
  1140.  
  1141. sky economism. When the Great Depression hit the 
  1142. idea that unregulated markets would maximise
  1143.  
  1144. universal prosperity seemed fully discredited, 
  1145. leading to a shift in economic thinking and an
  1146.  
  1147. embrace of the Keynesian demand-side economics 
  1148. of the New Deal. The New Deal worked to redress
  1149.  
  1150. the political conditions existing at the start of 
  1151. the 20th century, and the capitalist class started
  1152.  
  1153. to resent not being able to extract as much wealth 
  1154. as possible from working people. Moneyed interests
  1155.  
  1156. adopted economism and used their wealth and power 
  1157. to fund think tanks, buy politicians, buy media
  1158.  
  1159. outlets and influence education so that economism 
  1160. was taken up by the broader conservative movement
  1161.  
  1162. and later accepted by many liberals as well. Financing came from corporations such as General
  1163.  
  1164. Motors, Ford Chrysler, General Electric, and Procter 
  1165. & Gamble among others...and billionaire businessmen
  1166.  
  1167. like the Koch brothers. Ideas were derived from 
  1168. fanatic economists like Hayek, Mises, and Friedman,
  1169.  
  1170. mouthpiece politicians included Reagan, Thatcher, 
  1171. Bush, Clinton - too many to name, honestly - and high
  1172.  
  1173. profile think tanks like the Heritage Foundation 
  1174. lobby to influence policy. Economism allowed
  1175.  
  1176. business people and politicians to say that they 
  1177. were pro-market instead of anti-government and
  1178.  
  1179. conveniently ensured that labour and environmental 
  1180. concerns would be suppressed so that capitalists
  1181.  
  1182. could extract more and more surplus. This is why 
  1183. David Harvey calls the neoliberal era that was
  1184.  
  1185. ushered in by Reagan and Thatcher a project to 
  1186. restore elite class power. The U.S., the IMF, and the
  1187.  
  1188. World Bank have also been pretty brazen in forcing 
  1189. global countries through violence and/or debt
  1190.  
  1191. to deregulate their markets further and implement 
  1192. a suite of free market policies such as lowering
  1193.  
  1194. or scrapping the minimum wage, which UE just 
  1195. explained makes little economic or moral sense.
  1196.  
  1197. This economic imperialism served the project 
  1198. to restore transnational ruling class power
  1199.  
  1200. and provided a spatial fix for capitalism. 
  1201. This is all getting into more complex
  1202.  
  1203. Marxist political economy though which I
  1204. personally think is key to understanding
  1205.  
  1206. all of this so if you would like to learn 
  1207. more, might I shamelessly plug my channel?
  1208.  
  1209. Why is economics 101 so pervasive as a set of 
  1210. propositions? It's kind of odd that an introductory
  1211.  
  1212. diagram, based on obscenely unrealistic assumptions, 
  1213. would have so much influence, right? Well it often
  1214.  
  1215. favours the rich and powerful which, as Mexie pointed 
  1216. out, isn't a bad feature for a theory to have
  1217.  
  1218. if it wants to be accepted and enacted as policy. But I also think there's a more subtle force at
  1219.  
  1220. play here. The reaction by Nobel Laureate James Buchanan to Card and Krueger's original finding -
  1221.  
  1222. which, to remind you, was that the elasticity 
  1223. of employment with respect to minimum wage
  1224.  
  1225. changes may be positive - could give 
  1226. us a clue as to what is going on:
  1227.  
  1228.  
  1229.  
  1230.  
  1231.  
  1232.  
  1233.  
  1234.  
  1235.  
  1236. This statement reveals what's at stake: not just 
  1237. what is actually a fairly minor concession to
  1238.  
  1239. government regulation versus the free market, 
  1240. but the very idea of economics as a science,
  1241.  
  1242. with general laws that cannot be violated. Buchanan 
  1243. is right accepting these findings does amount to
  1244.  
  1245. a denial that economics has scientific content 
  1246. because if markets do not obey supply and demand,
  1247.  
  1248. then what hope is there? A lot of people have 
  1249. asked me to discuss healthcare on this channel
  1250.  
  1251. and I'm sure I will at some point. Mexie and I have 
  1252. hopefully given you plenty of evidence that goes
  1253.  
  1254. against simplistic econ101 reasoning, but the 
  1255. healthcare debate provides yet another example of
  1256.  
  1257. how faulty econ101 reasoning pervades the world 
  1258. and I'm far from the only one to notice this. U.S.
  1259.  
  1260. representative Alexandria Occasio-Cortez made 
  1261. the link between the two not too long ago: "When
  1262.  
  1263. we talk about economics, there's something known 
  1264. as a demand curve within a elas- with elasticity.
  1265.  
  1266. And with every other commodity you can say 'how 
  1267. much is this phone worth to you?' And you can
  1268.  
  1269. say a hundred dollars, two hundred dollars, you can 
  1270. buy a Nokia phone, you can not have a phone at all.
  1271.  
  1272. But you cannot ask the question 
  1273. 'how much will you pay to be alive?'
  1274.  
  1275. 'How much will you pay to live?' Because the answer 
  1276. is everything." These kinds of examples illustrate
  1277.  
  1278. that there are many reasons markets will not be as 
  1279. well behaved as the standard econ101 story. When I
  1280.  
  1281. present them to economists they say a lot of words 
  1282. about how they don't really apply and that I've
  1283.  
  1284. misunderstood the niceties of the theory, usually 
  1285. by defining the theory so that it simply must be
  1286.  
  1287. true. But past a certain point these hypotheticals 
  1288. become useless for thinking about the real world
  1289.  
  1290. and in many cases they just provide a bulwark for 
  1291. bad ideas. I want to leave you with a lengthy but
  1292.  
  1293. typically eloquent quote from John Maynard Keynes 
  1294. during the Great Depression, a time when - as Mexie
  1295.  
  1296. mentioned - prevailing economic orthodoxy seemed 
  1297. to be on the wane. Commenting on his version of
  1298.  
  1299. economism, which he called Classical or Ricardian 
  1300. economics - after the 19th Century economist David
  1301.  
  1302. Ricardo - he reflected on how it had become so 
  1303. dominant, and its likely downfall in the future:
  1304.  
  1305. Thanks for listening everybody and WAIT
  1306. just one second, before you turn it off. This has
  1307.  
  1308. been a little bit of an experiment. A lot of 
  1309. people in my previous videos asked me to go
  1310.  
  1311. into a bit more detail they said they'd be happy 
  1312. with a bit more length...so, this is what I've done
  1313.  
  1314. in this video - it's a bit longer and it goes 
  1315. into some depth on the theory and evidence.
  1316.  
  1317. I'm not saying that every video I make will 
  1318. be like this from now on but I just want to
  1319.  
  1320. know what you guys think of it: was it too 
  1321. much? Do you want even more? I hope not but
  1322.  
  1323. please just let me know what you think.
  1324. And thank you to my Patrons as usual
  1325.  
  1326. um there's a whole bunch of stuff that's been 
  1327. set up there's like a Discord server and a Reddit
  1328.  
  1329. now if you want to discuss economics so uh 
  1330. please just get involved. See you later everybody!
  1331.  
  1332. Bye!
  1333.  
  1334.  
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