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The US Presidency

Dec 13th, 2015
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  1. Introduction
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  3. Perhaps no other government official commands the attention, stirs the imagination, and generates the emotions as the American president. The American presidency is a diverse field of study. Scholars seeking to understand the institution and its occupants adopt a wide range of approaches, including legal, institutional, power, and psychological. Their methods include quantitative analysis, documentary and interview-based research, formal modeling, and, of course, the techniques of the historian. The focus in this article is on the primary relationships and responsibilities of the office, including dealing with the public and the media, making decisions, influencing Congress, populating the federal judiciary, and implementing policy. Relationships are stressed because we want to explain why presidents and their aides and other appointees act as they do and why these actions have the consequences they have.
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  5. General Overviews
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  7. There are two volumes that provide overviews of the literature on the presidency and methods and approaches for studying it. Edwards, et al. 1993 has four chapters on assessing research on presidential selection, presidential personality and leadership style, advising the president, and presidential policymaking. It also contains chapters on approaches to studying the presidency, including leadership, cognitive theory, organizational theory, formal theory, institutional theory, and quantitative analysis. Finally, it includes work on viewing the presidency from a comparative perspective and on evaluating presidents. Edwards and Howell 2009 has more recent analyses of quantitative, game theoretic, and historical institutionalism approaches to studying the presidency. It then includes chapters on precursors to governance such as presidential transitions and agenda setting. Numerous chapters focus on presidential relations with the public, Congress, courts, and the executive branch. There are also sets of chapters on unilateral action, decision making, and international politics. The volume ends with reflections on studying the presidency by four senior scholars.
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  9. Edwards, George C., III, and William G. Howell, eds. The Oxford Handbook of the American Presidency. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
  10. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199238859.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  11. This volume represents the most extensive treatment of research on the American presidency. Nearly three dozen chapters authored by leading scholars critically assess the major contributions to the literature, identify weaknesses in this work, and suggest productive lines of future inquiry.
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  13. Edwards, George C., III, John H. Kessel, and Bert A. Rockman, eds. Researching the Presidency: Vital Questions, New Approaches. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993.
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  15. This collection includes both presidency scholars and specialists in cognitive psychology, formal theory, organization theory, leadership theory, institutionalism, and methodology. The former group assesses the state of the literature on the presidency while the latter applies their expertise in an effort to generate innovative approaches to presidential research.
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  17. Journals
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  19. Quality research on the presidency appears in most general purpose journals in political science as well in a few specialty journals. Three journals, Congress and the Presidency, Presidential Studies Quarterly, and Rhetoric & Public Affairs stand out as outlets for quality work on the chief executive.
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  21. Congress and the Presidency. 1984–.
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  23. Published three times a year, this journal is an outlet for good work on both the Congress and the presidency. It also has book reviews on works in these fields.
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  25. Presidential Studies Quarterly. 1976–.
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  27. A quarterly, PSQ publishes work on the presidency in political science, history, rhetoric, and related fields. It also contains features on the law, polls and elections, the historical presidency, and the contemporary presidency. There are frequent special issues focused on a particular aspect of the presidency, and each issue contains numerous book reviews of works on the chief executive.
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  29. Rhetoric & Public Affairs. 1998–.
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  31. This quarterly is a primary outlet for research on the rhetorical presidency and publishes book reviews on works on public discourse.
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  33. Studying the Presidency
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  35. There are numerous approaches to studying the presidency, but research on the presidency was late to consider explicitly the utility and implications of tools and approaches to studying the person and the institution. More recently, scholars have produced useful essays on applying various theoretical approaches and methods. Canes-Wrone 2009 explains the advantages and limitations of game theory while Howell 2009 does the same for quantitative analysis. Ragsdale 2008 provides data for scholars interested in doing quantitative studies. James 2009 argues that the historical institutionalism and American political development approaches have and can continue to make important contributions to understanding the presidency. Greenstein and Immerman 1992 illustrates the challenges of trying to accurately portray historical events.
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  37. Canes-Wrone, Brandice. “Game Theory and the Study of the American Presidency.” In The Oxford Handbook of the American Presidency. Edited by George C. Edwards III and William G. Howell, 30–50. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
  38. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199238859.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  39. The author shows how game theory has contributed to our understanding of presidential vetoes, public opinion, and Supreme Court nominations as well as several additional areas that seem especially suitable for new game theoretic analysis. She also devotes special attention to discussing the advantages and the limitations of game theory.
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  41. Greenstein, Fred I., and Richard H. Immerman. “What Did Eisenhower Tell Kennedy about Indochina? The Politics of Misperception.” Journal of American History 79.2 (1992): 568–587.
  42. DOI: 10.2307/2080047Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  43. This article focuses on a meeting between President Dwight Eisenhower and President-elect John F. Kennedy. It illustrates the challenge of using even eyewitness statements to establish an accurate historical record. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
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  45. Howell, William G. “Quantitative Approaches to Studying the Presidency.” In The Oxford Handbook of the American Presidency. Edited by George C. Edwards III and William G. Howell, 9–29. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
  46. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199238859.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  47. The author surveys the state of quantitative research on the presidency and reviews the substantive contributions of quantitative studies to long-standing debates regarding the presidency. He pays particular attention to how scholarship has addressed traditional methodological challenges to studying important questions related to the presidency.
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  49. James, Scott C. “Historical Institutionalism, Political Development, and the Presidency.” In The Oxford Handbook of the American Presidency. Edited by George C. Edwards III and William G. Howell, 51–81. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
  50. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199238859.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  51. The author introduces historical institutionalism and American political development (APD) as analytic approaches to the study of politics and identifies streams of research in APD studies that have made significant contributions, especially in exploring the broader significance of the presidency in American politics.
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  53. Ragsdale, Lyn. Vital Statistics on the Presidency: The Definitive Source for Data and Analysis on the American Presidency. 3d ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2008.
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  55. This volume is a useful source of quantitative data, reflecting a broad view of the presidency. The author puts the data into context with essays explaining key statistical patterns.
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  57. The Presidency in Systemic Perspective
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  59. Most work on the presidency focuses on a particular aspect of the office or relationship with another element of American politics. A few scholars have taken a broader view of the president in the political system. Three works stand out, the first two of which focus on leadership. Neustadt 1990 represents the most influential statement of the president’s overall position in American government. It emphasizes the challenges he faces and how the Constitution does little more than ensure that he will be a chief clerk, forcing him to try to persuade others to do what he wishes. Edwards 2009 focuses on Neustadt’s famous statement that presidential power is the power to persuade and argues that presidents rarely persuade and thus have to rely on recognizing and exploiting opportunities that already exist. Skowronek 1997 is a sweeping history of the presidency that emphasizes the impact presidents have on American politics, although if it is often unintended, and the president’s dependency on the contemporary state of elite and public opinion.
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  61. Edwards, George C., III. The Strategic President: Persuasion and Opportunity in Presidential Leadership. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009.
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  63. The author presents an alternative view of presidential leadership, arguing that presidents may need to persuade but they rarely succeed in doing so. Instead of creating opportunities for change, successful presidents exploit existing opportunities. Edwards focuses on leading the public and Congress and uses best-test cases to illustrate his argument.
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  65. Neustadt, Richard E. Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan. New York: Free Press, 1990.
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  67. The classic work on the presidency, arguing that because of the decentralization of power in American government and politics, presidents lack the power to rely on command to accomplish most of their goals. Thus, they must use their resources to try to persuade others to obtain their support.
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  69. Skowronek, Stephen. The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton. Rev. ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997.
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  71. The leading work on the presidency in the American political development mode. Skowronek shows that presidents are persistent agents of change, continually disrupting and transforming the political landscape, often in ways they do not anticipate. Presidential success is dependent on reconciling their goals with the prevailing tide of politics.
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  73. Unilateral Power
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  75. Because presidents function in a system of separated powers, they find it convenient to exercise power on their own discretion. There are prerogative powers inherent in the presidency and powers delegated to the president by Congress. Often there is considerable ambiguity and controversy surrounding unilateral action. Nevertheless, they play an important role in presidential governance. Cooper 2002 provides a good introduction to what the author terms executive direct action. Mayer 2001 and Warber 2006 focus on executive orders, with Mayer emphasizing specific areas of presidential action and applying a soft rational choice approach and Warber examining all the executive orders in the modern presidency through the date of publication. The treatment of the use of executive orders in Howell 2003 is more sophisticated and theoretical. In Mayer 2009, the author offers a broad critique of research on unilateral power and raises important questions for future research. Pious 2009 focuses on prerogative powers inherent in the presidential office. Pious 2006 explores the use and consequences of prerogative powers in all their ambiguities and suggests directions for future research. War powers, perhaps the most important of the president’s unilateral powers, are controversial. They are discussed in the section on The President, Congress, and National Security Policymaking.
  76.  
  77. Cooper, Phillip J. By Order of the President: The Use and Abuse of Executive Direct Action. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002.
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  79. The author offers a guide to unilateral powers, including executive orders, presidential memoranda, proclamations, national security directives, and signing statements, and shows how presidents have used them in a wide range of policy areas. He also assesses the costs and benefits of these executive actions.
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  81. Howell, William G. Power without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003.
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  83. The author argues that presidents regularly set public policies, even some landmark policies, over the vocal objections by Congress, interest groups, and the bureaucracy. Drawing on game theory and the new institutionalism, he examines the political conditions under which presidents can change policy without congressional or judicial consent.
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  85. Mayer, Kenneth R. With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential Power. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001.
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  87. In this path-breaking study of executive orders, the author shows how presidents have used them to wield their inherent legal authority and pursue policy without congressional agreement. He also analyzes the pattern of presidents’ use of executive orders and the relationship of those orders to the presidency as an institution.
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  89. Mayer, Kenneth R. “Going Alone: The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action.” In The Oxford Handbook of the American Presidency. Edited by George C. Edwards III and William G. Howell, 427–454. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
  90. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199238859.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  91. The author sets out the logic of the unilateral powers model, assesses the empirical work on the model’s predictions, and identifies unresolved questions for future research. He also analyzes the implication of unilateral action theory that presidents will increasingly use unilateral action to expand presidential authority and centralize power.
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  93. Pious, Richard M. The War on Terrorism and the Rule of Law. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
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  95. Pious questions the premise that the government’s obligation to protect Americans from terrorist acts leads to an inevitable tradeoff between constitutional and legal guarantees of due process. Instead, Pious argues that bringing terrorists to justice through the due process of law provides more rather than less security.
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  97. Pious, Richard M. “Prerogative Power and Presidential Politics.” In The Oxford Handbook of the American Presidency. Edited by George C. Edwards III and William G. Howell, 455–476. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
  98. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199238859.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  99. The author adopts a broad view of presidential prerogative powers and explores their constitutional ambiguities and presidential claims about them. He also analyzes presidential governance through prerogative powers and the outcomes of it. Finally, he presents an agenda for research on prerogative powers.
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  101. Warber, Adam L. Executive Orders and the Modern Presidency: Legislating from the Oval Office. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2006.
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  103. The author offers an in-depth look at how modern presidents use executive orders. He addresses the questions of whether presidents use them to initiate major policies, the factors that affect their use, and the strategies presidents use to legitimate their orders and minimize challenges from Congress and the federal judiciary.
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  105. Agenda Setting
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  107. A key element of policymaking is setting the agenda. If the president’s proposals do not obtain space on Congress’s agenda, they have no chance of passing. If the press ignores the president’s calls for policy change, he is in a weakened position. Of course, the president often has to respond to the agendas of others. Cohen 2012 provides a comprehensive survey of the president’s legislative agenda and the interactions between Congress and the White House in making legislative proposals. Wood and Peake 1998 and Edwards and Wood 1999 apply sophisticated modeling techniques to determine who among the press, Congress, and the president is setting the other’s agenda. Wood and Peake focus on foreign policy issues while Edwards and Wood look at both domestic and foreign policy. Edwards and Barrett 2000 is concerned with whether the president’s proposals make it onto Congress’s agenda and whether they are more likely to pass than congressional initiatives.
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  109. Cohen, Jeffrey E. The President’s Legislative Agenda, 1789–2002. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
  110. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511998515Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  111. The author investigates the substance of the president’s legislative agenda, the reasons for his proposals, and Congress’s response to them. He argues that presidents often anticipate the congressional reaction to their legislative proposals and modify their agendas accordingly.
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  113. Edwards, George C., III, and Andrew Barrett. “Presidential Agenda Setting in Congress.” In Polarized Politics: Congress and the President in a Partisan Era. Edited by Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, 109–133. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2000.
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  115. The authors find that presidents almost always obtain space on the congressional agenda for their major initiatives. Once there, these initiatives must compete with congressional proposals, which compose the majority of the legislative agenda. Presidential proposals are more likely to pass, however, especially under unified government.
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  117. Edwards, George C., III, and B. Dan Wood. “Who Influences Whom? The President, Congress, and the Media.” American Political Science Review 93.2 (1999): 327–344.
  118. DOI: 10.2307/2585399Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  119. The authors explore the president’s success in focusing the issue attention of Congress and the mass media by evaluating time-series measures of presidential, mass media, and congressional attention to five issues. Most of the time the president reacts, responding primarily to fluctuations in media attention and world events. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
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  121. Wood, B. Dan, and Jeffrey S. Peake. “The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Agenda Setting.” American Political Science Review 92.1 (1998): 173–184.
  122. DOI: 10.2307/2585936Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  123. The authors theorize issue inertia, external events, and systemic attention to particular issues drive attention to foreign policy issues. They find that presidential and media attentions respond to issue inertia and exogenous events. Media attention also affects presidential attention, but the president does not affect issue attention by the media.
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  125. The Public Presidency
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  127. Perhaps the greatest challenge for any president is obtaining and maintaining public support. Presidents usually make substantial efforts to lead the public. Sometimes their goals are long-term personal support, while at other times they are more interested in support for a specific program. Often, of course, both goals are present. The White House also needs to respond to the public and deal with its high expectations.
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  129. Responding to the Public
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  131. In a democracy, the public expects leaders to respond to its wishes, and leaders have incentives to do so. However, leaders have their own policy preferences and may not wish to be responsive. Cohen 1997 finds presidents responsive only in attending to the public’s priorities and not the direction of policy while Wood 2009 finds little responsiveness to the public’s policy views. Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004 finds responsiveness varies by political conditions and on certain types of issues. Druckman and Jacobs 2009 provides a valuable analysis of the responsiveness literature and also address challenges in investigating responsiveness.
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  133. Canes-Wrone, Brandice, and Kenneth W. Shotts. “The Conditional Nature of Presidential Responsiveness to Public Opinion.” American Journal of Political Science 48.4 (2004): 690–706.
  134. DOI: 10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00096.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  135. The authors find that presidents are more responsive to mass opinion on issues familiar to citizens in their everyday lives. Reelection-seeking presidents are more responsive to public opinion when the election is imminent, and presidents with average approval ratings are most likely to adopt policy positions congruent with public opinion. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
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  137. Cohen, Jeffrey E. Presidential Responsiveness and Public Policy-Making: The Public and the Policies that Presidents Choose. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1997.
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  139. Cohen finds that presidents are responsive to the public in selecting issues on which to focus. Once having chosen to work on an issue, presidents pay less attention to public opinion when actually making policy.
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  141. Druckman, James N., and Lawrence R. Jacobs. “Presidential Responsiveness to Public Opinion.” In The Oxford Handbook of the American Presidency. Edited by George C. Edwards III and William G. Howell, 160–181. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
  142. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199238859.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  143. The authors examine the president’s emergence as a representative and examine research on the president’s responsiveness to public opinion. They also highlight a number of complications that scholars face in studying responsiveness.
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  145. Wood, B. Dan. The Myth of Presidential Representation. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
  146. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511818660Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  147. This volume focuses on the question of whether presidents are responsive to public opinion when making policy decisions. Using a large data set and advanced time-series analysis techniques, the author finds little presidential responsiveness. He also finds little leadership of public opinion.
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  149. Expectations of the President
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  151. Public evaluations of the president occur within an environment of the public’s demanding expectations of what presidents should be, how they should act, and what their policies should accomplish. The burden falls on chief executives to live up to these expectations. Jacobs and Shapiro 2000 finds that presidents are not responsive to public opinion and track it primarily to learn now to influence it. Waterman, et al. 2013 offers the best work on the development of expectations and, especially on testing the impact of expectations on public evaluations of the president. Simon 2009 does a good job of exploring the development and nature of public expectations of the president and of identifying avenues for further research on this underdeveloped area of presidency scholarship.
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  153. Jacobs, Lawrence R., and Robert Y. Shapiro. Politicians Don’t Pander: Political Manipulation and the Loss of Democratic Responsiveness. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000.
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  155. When not facing election, presidents routinely ignore the public’s policy preferences and follow their own views and those of their party’s activists, contributors, and interest group allies. Politicians track public opinion not to respond to the public but to determine how to win support for the policies they want.
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  157. Simon, Dennis M. “Public Expectations of the President.” In The Oxford Handbook of the American Presidency. Edited by George C. Edwards III and William G. Howell, 135–159. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
  158. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199238859.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  159. The author examines the origin and development, content, and consequences of expectations of the president. He focuses on both image-based and performance-based expectations. He also assesses existing research and identifies the questions most likely to animate future research on expectations of the president.
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  161. Waterman, Richard, Hank Jenkins-Smith, and Carol Silva. The Presidential Expectations Gap: Public Attitudes Concerning the Presidency. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2013.
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  163. The authors examine the expectations gap: the difference between what the public expects and what presidents actually can do. They employ a variety of techniques to examine the evolution and impact of the gap, including five original surveys.
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  165. Leading the Public
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  167. Public support can be a useful leadership resource for presidents, but are they in a position to call on it when needed? For decades commentators assumed that the White House can persuade or even mobilize the public, provided the president is a skilled enough communicator. However, the evidence is mounting that presidents rarely move the public in their direction. Tulis 1987 shows the changes in the norms of the use of presidential rhetoric to obtain public support, and Kernell 2007 highlights the evolution of modern presidential efforts to take their case to the public. Canes-Wrone 2006 finds that presidents typically go public only on issues already popular with the public. Edwards 2003 and Edwards 2009 show how presidents generally fail to move the public and explain why this is so. Edwards 2009 also shows how presidents might exploit existing opinion. Wood 2007 finds evidence that presidents influence thinking about economic matters. Zaller 1994 and Berinsky 2009 show how members of the public turn to elites of their party for cues about war policy.
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  169. Berinsky, Adam J. In Time of War: Understanding American Public Opinion from World War II to Iraq. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009.
  170. DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226043463.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  171. The author explores opinion on US wars stretching back to World War II and finds that public response to these crises has been shaped less by their defining characteristics than by elite discourse about them, similar to the interests and group affiliations that influence public opinion about domestic issues.
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  173. Canes-Wrone, Brandice. 2006. Who Leads Whom? Presidents, Policy, and the Public. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
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  175. The author employs institutional analysis and rational choice theory to find that presidents can increase their prospects for legislative success on domestic issues only by going public on issues that already enjoy public support. It is on such issues that presidents make both their domestic and foreign policy appeals.
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  177. Edwards, George C., III. On Deaf Ears: The Limits of the Bully Pulpit. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003.
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  179. The standard legislative strategy for recent presidents has been to move Congress by winning public support. Edwards shows that this strategy usually fails and, equally important, explains why presidents, even skilled communicators, typically fail to move public opinion to support their policies. The core book on presidential public leadership.
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  181. Edwards, George C., III. The Strategic President: Persuasion and Opportunity in Presidential Leadership. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009.
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  183. The author shows how even the most skilled communicators in the White House have been frustrated in shaping public opinion, and he explores how a president might exploit existing opinion. He also discusses how presidential assumptions of success at moving the public often leads to overreaching and electoral disaster.
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  185. Kernell, Samuel. Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership. 4th ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2007.
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  187. Presidents invest substantially in promoting themselves and the policies. The author details how this strategy continues to evolve given the intense polarization of Congress and the electorate as well as changes in communications technology.
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  189. Tulis, Jeffrey K. The Rhetorical Presidency. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987.
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  191. The path-breaking book on the study of presidential rhetoric. Presidents regularly appeal over the heads of Congress to the public to generate support for public policies. Tulis argues that this political development, born at the outset of the 20th century, fundamentally transformed the presidency and not necessarily for the good.
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  193. Wood, D. Dan. The Politics of Economic Leadership: The Causes and Consequences of Presidential Rhetoric. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007.
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  195. Using an impressive database and advance statistical analysis, Wood provides the first comprehensive effort to examine when, why, and how presidents talk about the economy. He also finds that presidential words affect perceptions of economic news, consumer confidence, consumer behavior, business investment, and interest rates.
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  197. Zaller, John. “Elite Leadership of Mass Opinion: New Evidence from the Gulf War.” In Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Gulf War. Edited by W. Lance Bennett and David L. Paletz, 186–209. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.
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  199. The author uses evidence from the Persian Gulf War to show that politically aware citizens are the most likely to support policy when elites are united, follow elites sharing their party and ideological inclinations when elites are divided, and follow elites’ lead when their opinions change.
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  201. Presidential Approval
  202.  
  203. Presidents’ efforts to understand and lead public opinion and their efforts to influence the media’s portrayal of them are aimed at achieving public support. This support may increase their success in dealing with others, especially the Congress. People constantly form and reform opinions about presidents and their policies. Foreign and domestic policies, rally events, the president’s personality and personal characteristics, and the public’s predispositions, especially regarding party identification, may influence their evaluations of the president. Kinder 1981 shows that people are more likely to evaluate the president’s performance on the economy in terms of the good of the nation rather than in terms of their own pocketbooks. Kriner and Schwartz 2009 explores the importance of partisan predispositions in presidential approval. Krosnick and Kinder 1990 investigates the role of media priming on the bases of evaluating the president, while Druckman and Holmes 2004 suggests that presidents can use their rhetoric to prime the criteria by which the public evaluates the president. Edwards, et al. 1995 shows the importance of the salience of issues in presidential approval. Baum 2002 explains who responds to rally events and why they do so, while Groeling and Baum 2008 explores the relative influence of media coverage and elite discourse on responses to rally events. Cohen 2004 argues that changes in the news media have both negative and positive consequences for the president’s approval.
  204.  
  205. Baum, Matthew A. “The Constituent Foundations of the Rally-Round-the-Flag Phenomenon.” International Studies Quarterly 46.2 (2002): 263–298.
  206. DOI: 10.1111/1468-2478.00232Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  207. The author finds variance in how Americans respond to rally events. Persons on the threshold between presidential approval and disapproval are most likely to change their opinion in response to external circumstances, and people have different propensities to being exposed to information and susceptibilities to being influenced by it. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
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  209. Cohen, Jeffrey A. “If the News Is So Bad, Why Are the Presidential Polls So High?” Presidential Studies Quarterly 34.3 (2004): 493–515.
  210. DOI: 10.1111/j.1741-5705.2004.00209.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  211. The news media are increasingly competitive and decentralized, reporting is softer and increasingly negative, the public consumes less news from traditional outlets, and public regard for the news media is low. This news environment insulates the president from bad news but also impedes the president’s ability to lead the public. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
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  213. Druckman, James N., and Justin W. Holmes. “Does Presidential Rhetoric Matter? Priming and Presidential Approval.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 34.4 (2004): 755–778.
  214. DOI: 10.1111/j.1741-5705.2004.00222.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  215. The authors focus on the impact of the president’s rhetoric on his approval by combining a content analysis, a laboratory experiment, and a national survey. They find that the president can have a substantial effect on his own approval by priming the criteria on which citizens base their approval evaluations. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
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  217. Edwards, George C., III, William Mitchell, and Reed Welch. “Explaining Presidential Approval: The Significance of Issue Salience.” American Journal of Political Science 39.1 (1995): 108–134.
  218. DOI: 10.2307/2111760Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  219. Using both aggregate approval data and individual-level poll data, the authors find that that issues vary over time in their salience to the public and in their impact on presidential approval. Moreover, the salience of issues to the public directly affects their impact on the public’s evaluation of the president. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  220. Find this resource:
  221. Groeling, Tim, and Matthew A. Baum. “Crossing the Water’s Edge: Elite Rhetoric, Media Coverage, and the Rally-Round-the-Flag Phenomenon.” Journal of Politics 70.4 (2008): 1065–1085.
  222. DOI: 10.1017/S0022381608081061Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  223. The authors find in influencing the public’s response to rally events, the nature and extent of elite debate matters less than media coverage of the debate and that these often systematically diverge. They also find that the persuasiveness of elite messages depends on their credibility. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  224. Find this resource:
  225. Kinder, Donald R. “Presidents, Prosperity, and Public Opinion.” Public Opinion Quarterly 45.1 (1981): 1–20.
  226. DOI: 10.1086/268631Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  227. The author analyzes the relationship between the economy and presidential approval. A president’s approval might decline when economic times are bad because citizens blame him for their personal hardships or because they see him as failing to cope adequately with national economic problems. The results support the latter hypothesis. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  228. Find this resource:
  229. Kriner, Douglas, and Liam Schwartz. “Partisan Dynamics and the Volatility of Presidential Approval.” British Journal of Political Science 39.3 (2009): 609–631.
  230. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123409000647Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  231. Using both aggregate approval data and individual-level panel data, the authors find that factors reinforcing a group’s partisan proclivities to support or oppose the president increase the stability of that group’s support while developments that conflict with a group’s partisan predispositions increase the volatility of approval. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  232. Find this resource:
  233. Krosnick, Jon A., and Donald R. Kinder. “Altering the Foundations of Support for the President through Priming.” American Political Science Review 84.2 (1990): 497–512.
  234. DOI: 10.2307/1963531Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  235. Using the Iran-Contra affair as a test, the authors explore whether media priming affects the weight of issues on presidential approval. They found that priming was most pronounced for aspects of public opinion most directly implicated by the news coverage, especially for those less interested in politics. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  236. Find this resource:
  237. Presidential Media Relations
  238.  
  239. The media act as the principal intermediary between the president and the public, and relations with the press are an important aspect of the president’s efforts to lead public opinion. It is the news media that provides people with most of what they know about chief executives, their policies, and their policies’ consequences. The media also interpret and analyze presidential activities, including even the president’s direct appeals to the public. Important issues deal with the nature and structure of presidential relationships with the press, the substance of the news media’s coverage of the president, and the effects of press coverage of the White House on public opinion.
  240.  
  241. Presidential Leadership of the Media
  242.  
  243. Because of the importance of the press to the president, the White House goes to great lengths to encourage the media to project a positive image of the president and the administration’s policies. These efforts include coordinating the news, holding press conferences, and providing a range of services such as formal briefings, interviews, photo opportunities, background sessions, travel accommodations, and daily handouts. Kumar 2007 provides a close-up view of presidency–media interactions. Cohen 2008 offers a broad perspective of changes in the news media and its impact on presidential communications with the public. Eshbaugh-Soha and Peake 2011 explores the president’s efforts to influence the public through the press, including White House attention to local media.
  244.  
  245. Cohen, Jeffrey E. The Presidency in the Era of 24-Hour News. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008.
  246. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  247. The author examines how changes in the news media have altered the way presidents communicate with the public and garner popular support. The news media’s influence over public opinion has decreased considerably as a result, and so has the president’s ability to influence the public through the news media.
  248. Find this resource:
  249. Eshbaugh-Soha, Matthew, and Jeffrey S. Peake. Breaking Through the Noise: Presidential Leadership, Public Opinion, and the News Media. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011.
  250. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  251. The authors find that when the president gives attention to an issue in which the public does not have a preexisting interest, he can expect, through the news media, to influence public opinion. They also discuss when presidents are likely to have their greatest leadership successes.
  252. Find this resource:
  253. Kumar, Martha J. Managing the President’s Message: The White House Communications Operation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007.
  254. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  255. Drawing on unprecedented first-hand observation, interviewing, and original scholarship, the author describes contemporary White House communications and media operations. She also analyzes White House media strategies and devotes special attention to presidential communications advisors, the press secretary, the gaggle, the daily briefing, and the use of press conferences.
  256. Find this resource:
  257. Media Coverage of the President
  258.  
  259. The other side of the relationship between the president and the media is the content of the news. Ultimately, it is the written and spoken word that concerns the president. Presidents commonly view the press as a major obstacle to their obtaining and maintaining public support. Most administrations criticize the media for its trivial coverage, for its distortions, and for violating confidences. Leaks of confidential information and what the White House sees as superficial or biased reporting exacerbate the tensions inherent in relations between the president and the press. The literature providing systematic data on coverage of the presidency in operation, as opposed to elections, is not substantial, but there are a few works that deserve attention. Groeling and Kernell 1998 provides an innovative study of media bias. Hallin 1989 focuses on media coverage of the Vietnam War and explains changes in the nature of its coverage.
  260.  
  261. Groeling, Tim, and Samuel Kernell. “Is Network News Coverage of the President Biased?” Journal of Politics 60.4 (1998): 1063–1087.
  262. DOI: 10.2307/2647731Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  263. The authors provide an innovative test for media bias of networks’ evening news programs. They find qualified support for the bias hypothesis but even more compelling evidence that changes in presidential approval, whether favorable or unfavorable, drive news coverage of the president’s public support. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  264. Find this resource:
  265. Hallin, Daniel C. The “Uncensored War”: The Media and Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.
  266. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  267. The author provides a detailed account of media coverage of Vietnam. He finds the media closely tied to official perspectives throughout the war and television presenting an idealized picture of the war in the early years, shifting toward a more critical view only after criticism of the war increased.
  268. Find this resource:
  269. Impact of the Media on Public Opinion
  270.  
  271. The most significant question about the substance of media coverage, of course, is about the impact it has on public opinion. Most studies on media effects have focused on attitude changes, especially in voting for presidential candidates, and have typically found little or no evidence of influence. Reinforcement of existing attitudes and opinions was said to be the strongest effect of the media. Althaus and Kim 2006 explores the priming effects of the media, and Miller and Krosnick 2000 investigates which types of citizens the media is most likely to prime. Shah, et al. 1999 studies the impact of media coverage on the criteria for evaluating the president. Baum 2003 focuses on the impact of “soft” news, news from television programs that are not explicitly news shows.
  272.  
  273. Althaus, Scott L., and Young Mie Kim. “Priming Effects in Complex Information Environments: Reassessing the Impact of News Discourse on Presidential Approval.” Journal of Politics 68.4 (2006): 960–976.
  274. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  275. Studying the dynamics of priming effects in complex information environments, the authors find these effects are not only a function of the volume of news coverage but also may result from changes in the applicability of relevant knowledge constructs and by cumulative as well as recent exposure to news coverage. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  276. Find this resource:
  277. Baum, Matthew A. Soft News Goes to War: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy in the New Media Age. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003.
  278. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  279. The author shows that television’s packaging traditional news into entertainment-oriented news programs and talk shows has led to an increase in the number of people following foreign policy. It has also had an influence on public opinion, such as reinforcing isolationism among many inattentive Americans.
  280. Find this resource:
  281. Miller, Joanne M., and Jon A. Krosnick. “News Media Impact on the Ingredients of Presidential Evaluations: Politically Knowledgeable Citizens Are Guided by a Trusted Source.” American Journal of Political Science 44.2 (2000): 301–315.
  282. DOI: 10.2307/2669312Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  283. Media coverage of an issue does not automatically prime citizens. Instead, politically knowledgeable citizens who trust the media infer that news coverage of an issue means it is an important matter for the nation, leading them to place greater emphasis on that issue when evaluating the president. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  284. Find this resource:
  285. Shah, Dhavan V., Mark D. Watts, David Domke, David P. Fan, and Michael Fibison. “News Coverage, Economic Cues, and the Public’s Presidential Preferences, 1984–1996.” Journal of Politics 61.4 (1999): 914–943.
  286. DOI: 10.2307/2647548Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  287. The authors find that campaign news coverage about the nation’s economic health provides cues to the public; in turn, these cues supply the criteria for sociotropic voting, thereby shaping presidential preferences during the course of campaigns. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  288. Find this resource:
  289. The Legislative Presidency
  290.  
  291. Working with Congress is at the core of presidential responsibilities. Because the US system of separation of powers is really one of shared powers, presidents can rarely operate independently of Congress. Although they require the cooperation of Congress, they cannot depend on it. Thus, one of the president’s most difficult and frustrating tasks is trying to persuade Congress to support his policies. Lines of research examine the president’s forma legislative powers, primarily the veto, and other potential sources of presidential influence in Congress, including party leadership, public support, and legislative skills. The impact of divided government, a frequent feature of American politics, also receives attention, as does the challenge of measuring presidential success in Congress.
  292.  
  293. The Veto
  294.  
  295. Sometimes, Congress passes legislation that the president opposes strongly. Because all bills and joint resolutions, except those proposing constitutional amendments, must be presented to the president for approval, he has another opportunity to influence legislation: the veto. Most writing on the veto is descriptive, but there are exceptions. Cameron 2000 provides the most rigorous and theoretically informed study of presidential use of vetoes and veto threats. Cameron 2009 offers an excellent analysis of the central issues with which scholars must deal in studying vetoes.
  296.  
  297. Cameron, Charles M. Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
  298. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511613302Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  299. The author combines game theory with unprecedented data to analyze how divided party presidents use threats and vetoes to wrest policy concessions from a hostile Congress. Case studies of vetoes add texture to the analysis. The first book-length analysis to bring rational choice theory to bear on the presidency.
  300. Find this resource:
  301. Cameron, Charles M. “The Presidential Veto.” In The Oxford Handbook of the American Presidency. Edited by George C. Edwards III and William G. Howell, 362–382. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
  302. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199238859.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  303. The author draws a distinction between “micro-politics” (the strategic logic of the veto regarding pieces of legislation or bargaining episodes between the president and Congress) and “macro-politics” (divided government, presidential approval, and bill content, productivity, and policy stability) and explores the theoretical and methodological issues regarding researching vetoes.
  304. Find this resource:
  305. Presidential Party Leadership in Congress
  306.  
  307. Political parties do not necessarily bridge the gaps left by the separation of powers, but a shared party identification lies at the core of most coalitions behind the president’s proposals. Thus, presidential party leadership is central to presidential success in Congress. They may do favors, help directly or indirectly in electing fellow party members to Congress, and do their best to mobilize their fellow partisans. Yet they face numerous challenges in party leadership. Berry, et al. 2010 investigates how presidents use federal spending to aid members of their party in Congress. Campbell and Sumners 1990 investigates the impact of presidential coattails in increasing the size of the president’s congressional party contingent. Cohen, et al. 1991 explores the impact of presidential campaigning in midterm elections on the success of the president’s party’s candidates. Herrnson, et al. 2011 studies the impact of presidential campaigning for members of Congress on the support they receive in the future. Edwards 1989 discusses the president’s strategic position as party leader and the dimensions of party leadership. Fleisher and Bond 2000 examines the impact of ideological diversity within the president’s party on his party leadership, and Lee 2009 shows how presidential leadership efforts antagonize the opposition party in the competition for power. Howell and Pevehouse 2005 shows how the partisan composition of Congress affects the president’s use of force.
  308.  
  309. Berry, Christopher R., Barry C. Burden, and William G. Howell. “The President and the Distribution of Federal Spending.” American Political Science Review 104.4 (2010): 783–799.
  310. DOI: 10.1017/S0003055410000377Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  311. The authors analyze the largest and most comprehensive panels of federal spending patterns ever assembled. They find that districts and counties receive systematically more federal outlays when legislators in the president’s party represent them. There is no evidence of committee influence and mixed evidence regarding majority party members. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  312. Find this resource:
  313. Campbell, James E., and Joe A. Sumners. “Presidential Coattails in Senate Elections.” American Political Science Review 84.2 (1990): 513–524.
  314. DOI: 10.2307/1963532Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  315. The authors investigate the extent to which presidential coattails are responsible for the association between a party’s presidential and the Senate vote in a state. They find that presidential coattails exert a modest but significant influence on the Senate vote, affecting the election outcomes in some cases. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  316. Find this resource:
  317. Cohen, Jeffrey E., Michael A. Krassa, and John A. Hamman. “The Impact of Presidential Campaigning on Midterm U.S. Senate Elections.” American Political Science Review 85.1 (1991): 165–178.
  318. DOI: 10.2307/1962883Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  319. The authors find that presidential campaigning in midterm elections is strategic. In addition, presidential campaign efforts have a positive impact on the vote through the mobilization of nonvoters. Finally, in a significant number of cases, presidential campaigning may have been the margin of victory for candidates of the president’s party. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  320. Find this resource:
  321. Edwards, George C., III. At the Margins: Presidential Leadership of Congress. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989.
  322. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  323. In chapters 3–5, the author presents the concept and dimensions of the president’s strategic position as party leader and examines aspects of presidential party leadership in Congress. He also examines the concept of the two presidencies and finds it a product of Democrats supporting Eisenhower’s foreign policy in the 1950s.
  324. Find this resource:
  325. Fleisher, Richard, and Jon R. Bond. “Partisanship and the President’s Quest for Votes on the Floor of Congress.” In Polarized Politics: Congress and the President in a Partisan Era. Edited by Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, 154–185. Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2000.
  326. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  327. The authors examine presidential party leadership in Congress with special attention to cross-pressured senators and representatives. They find considerable slippage in party support of the president, only partly the result of ideological diversity within the parties. Nevertheless, the party base is the key to presidential success.
  328. Find this resource:
  329. Herrnson, Paul S., Irwin L. Morris, and John McTague. “The Impact of Presidential Campaigning for Congress on Presidential Support in the U.S. House of Representatives.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 36.1 (2011): 99–122.
  330. DOI: 10.1111/j.1939-9162.2010.00005.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  331. The authors assess the effects of presidential campaigning on legislative support for two presidents who governed under extremely dissimilar circumstances: Bill Clinton in the 106th Congress and George W. Bush in the 108th Congress. They find evidence of campaign effects on congressional policymaking during both administrations. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  332. Find this resource:
  333. Howell, William G., and Jon C. Pevehouse. “Presidents, Congress, and the Use of Force.” International Organization 59.1 (2005): 209–232.
  334. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  335. Using a variety of measures and models, the authors show a clear connection between the partisan composition of Congress and major (but not minor) presidential uses of force. Thus, domestic political institutions, partisanship, and interbranch relations matter in the use of force. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  336. Find this resource:
  337. Lee, Frances E. Beyond Ideology: Politics, Principles, and Partisanship in the U.S. Senate. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009.
  338. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  339. Although the congressional agenda includes many issues about which liberals and conservatives generally agree, Democratic and Republican senators tend to fight with each other because many partisan battles are rooted in competition for power rather than disagreement over policy. Presidential leadership inherently polarizes legislators, increasing the polarization.
  340. Find this resource:
  341. Public Support and Presidential Leadership in Congress
  342.  
  343. Although congressional seats held by members of the president’s party may be a necessary condition for presidential success in Congress, they are not a sufficient one: The president typically needs public support as well. Mandates are one indicator of the public’s preferences. Presidential approval in the public is another. Edwards 1989 explores the conditions that give rise to perceptions of mandates, while Grossback, et al. 2006 shows how rare mandates are and investigates their impact on members of Congress. Edwards 2009 argues for a theoretical approach to studying the impact of presidential approval and shows it is of some significance with members of the president’s party, although the influence is modest. Cohen 2011 applies state-level data to the question and reaches similar conclusions.
  344.  
  345. Cohen, Jeffrey E. “Whose Approval Matters? Reelection, Constituency Approval, and Senate Support for President George W. Bush.” Congress & the Presidency 38.3 (2011): 253–270.
  346. DOI: 10.1080/07343469.2011.602041Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  347. Using state-level estimates for approval as well as breakdowns by partisanship, the author finds that state-level approval has a statistically significant, albeit marginal, impact on senator support for the president. Stronger effects on support are found for approval from the senators’ reelection constituency, defined as voters of the senators’ party.
  348. Find this resource:
  349. Edwards, George C., III. “Mandates and Misperceptions.” In At the Margins: Presidential Leadership of Congress. By George C. Edwards III, 144–166. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989.
  350. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  351. The author details the conditions that give rise to perceptions of mandates and analyzes the misperceptions of mandates that often occur.
  352. Find this resource:
  353. Edwards, George C. III. “Presidential Approval as a Source of Influence in Congress.” In The Oxford Handbook of the American Presidency. Edited by George C. Edwards III and William G. Howell, 338–361. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
  354. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199238859.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  355. The author focuses on the impact of presidential approval on congressional support for the White House. He argues that to determine the nature of this relationship, we need to reason more carefully about the theoretical underpinnings of the relationship and employ more rigorous designs for tests that evaluate this theorizing.
  356. Find this resource:
  357. Grossback, Lawrence J., David A. M. Peterson, and James A. Stimson. Mandate Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
  358. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  359. The authors focus on identifying perceived mandates and find they are rare. When they do occur, however, they have a profound if ephemeral impact on members of Congress, breaking the gridlock that prevents Congress from adopting major policy changes.
  360. Find this resource:
  361. Presidential Legislative Skills and Leadership in Congress
  362.  
  363. The White House attempts to persuade members of Congress to support the president’s legislative proposals. Some of these activities are aimed at building goodwill in the long run and others at obtaining votes from individual members of Congress on specific issues. Whatever the immediate goal, the nature of the legislative process in America demands that presidents apply their legislative skills in a wide range of situations. The question is: How important are they? Edwards 1989 discusses the strategic position of presidential legislative skills and shows the limitations of their influence on members of Congress. Fleisher, et al. 2008 finds that presidential legislative skills cannot explain the success of presidents in obtaining support in Congress. Similarly, Edwards 2009 analyzes presidents governing in a range of conditions and finds that it is exploiting existing opportunities rather than creating them through legislative skills that explains presidential success in Congress. Peterson 1990 shows that White House consultation with Congress, a potentially important legislative skill, is less useful and less common than pundits might expect.
  364.  
  365. Edwards, George C., III. At the Margins: Presidential Leadership of Congress. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989.
  366. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  367. In chapters 8–9, the author analyzes the strategic position of legislative skills among the factors influencing Congress and then evaluates the utility of various skills ranging from bargaining to presidential pleas for support.
  368. Find this resource:
  369. Edwards, George C. III. The Strategic President: Persuasion and Opportunity in Presidential Leadership. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009.
  370. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  371. In chapters 4–5, the author examines best-test cases of presidential success in Congress as well as presidents operating in less favorable contexts. For both sets of presidents, he finds that legislative skills cannot explain their success. Instead, successful presidents recognized the opportunities in their environments and fashioned strategies for exploiting them.
  372. Find this resource:
  373. Fleisher, Richard, Jon R. Bond, and B. Dan Wood. “Which Presidents Are Uncommonly Successful in Congress?” In Presidential Leadership: The Vortex of Power. Edited by Bert A. Rockman and Richard W. Waterman, 191–214. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
  374. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  375. In this innovative work, the authors create a baseline model of presidential success in Congress. They then determine which presidents were more successful than would be expected under the conditions in which they governed. Finally, they ask whether this success is related to legislative skills and find it is not.
  376. Find this resource:
  377. Peterson, Mark A. Legislating Together: The White House and Capitol Hill from Eisenhower to Reagan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990.
  378. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  379. The author employs interviews to evaluate the extent and utility of White House consultation with Congress on legislation. He finds it much less common and less useful than the conventional wisdom suggests and provides explanations for these unexpected findings.
  380. Find this resource:
  381. Impact of Divided Government
  382.  
  383. Divided government is common in the United States but uncommon in most other nations. It presents a formidable challenge to the president. Mayhew 2005 argues that significant legislation passes under divided government and Congress conducts major investigations of the executive branch under unified government. Edwards, et al. 1997, however, shows that much more significant legislation fails to pass under divided government than under unified government. Kriner and Schwartz 2008 finds that divided government encourages congressional investigatory activity. Binder 1999 shows the impact of a bicameral system and the distribution of preferences on gridlock. Coleman and Parker 2009 provides a useful overview of the consequences of divided government and a guide to future research.
  384.  
  385. Binder, Sarah A. “The Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947–96.” American Political Science Review 93.3 (1999): 519–533.
  386. DOI: 10.2307/2585572Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  387. The author investigates the effects of elections and institutions on policy outcomes to develop a theory of gridlock. She finds that distribution of policy preferences within the parties, between the two chambers, and across Congress more broadly is central to explaining gridlock. Intrabranch conflict is especially critical in shaping deadlock. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  388. Find this resource:
  389. Coleman, John J., and David C. W. Parker. “The Consequences of Divided Government.” In The Oxford Handbook of the American Presidency. Edited by George C. Edwards III and William G. Howell, 383–402. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
  390. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199238859.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  391. The authors analyze the role of political parties in a system of separated powers and then focus on the impact of party control of government.
  392. Find this resource:
  393. Edwards, George C., III, Andrew Barrett, and Jeffrey Peake. “The Legislative Impact of Divided Government.” American Journal of Political Science 41.2 (1997): 545–563.
  394. DOI: 10.2307/2111776Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  395. The authors find that presidents oppose significant legislation more often under divided government, and more of it fails and fails at higher rates than under unified government. However, they find no relationship between divided government and the amount of significant legislation the administration supports or that passes. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  396. Find this resource:
  397. Kriner, Douglas, and Liam Schwartz. “Divided Government and Congressional Investigations.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 33.2 (2008): 295–321.
  398. DOI: 10.3162/036298008784310993Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  399. The authors find that divided government strongly spurs congressional investigatory activity. Moreover, homogeneous majorities, especially in the House, are more likely to investigate the president in divided government and less likely to do so in unified government. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  400. Find this resource:
  401. Mayhew, David R. Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking and Investigations, 1946–2002. 2d ed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005.
  402. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  403. The author finds that unified as opposed to divided control makes little difference in the frequency of passing important laws or conducting major congressional investigations of the executive. He asserts that factors, including electoral incentives, presidential leadership skill, and public moods, negate conditions of party control in shaping government performance.
  404. Find this resource:
  405. Measuring Success
  406.  
  407. A key concern in studying the president and Congress is measuring the president’s success. Edwards 1989 provides a guide to thinking about appropriate measures.
  408.  
  409. Edwards, George C., III. 1989. At the Margins: Presidential Leadership of Congress. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
  410. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  411. The author discusses alternative measures of presidential success and support in Congress and shows the interrelationships among measures.
  412. Find this resource:
  413. The President, Congress, and National Security Policymaking
  414.  
  415. Making national security policy is perhaps the president’s most important responsibility, but it is one he shares with Congress. The Constitution is ambiguous regarding the president’s prerogatives. Fisher 2004 argues for a constrained view of presidential war powers, while Yoo 2009 advocates broad presidential authority. Edwards 1991 argues that Congress should play an important role in national security policy. Krutz and Peake 2011 explores the use of executive agreements, which are an alternative to treaties in many instances, while Auerswald and Maltzman 2003 investigates the Senate’s use of its ratification power to alter treaties. Howell and Pevehouse 2007 finds that Congress influences the use of military force through extraconstitutional means. Kriner 2010 also shows how Congress influences the president’s military actions. Howell and Johnson 2009 investigates the extent to which war increases presidential power more broadly.
  416.  
  417. Auerswald, David, and Forrest Maltzman. “Policymaking through Advice and Consent: Treaty Consideration by the United States Senate.” Journal of Politics 65.4 (2003): 1097–1110.
  418. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  419. The authors explore how the Senate uses treaty “reservations” to alter ratification documents and advance Senate policy views and find that conservative Senates and pivotal senators systematically exploit the right to add reservations, limiting the president’s autonomy in his conduct of foreign affairs. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  420. Find this resource:
  421. Edwards, George C., III. “Congress and National Strategy: The Appropriate Role.” In U.S. National Security Strategy for the 1990s. Edited by Daniel J. Kaufman, David S. Clark, and Kevin P. Sheehan. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991.
  422. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  423. The author argues that Congress has always been intimately involved in national security matters, and this is what the framers expected and the American people desire. In addition, national security policy benefits from a deliberative process, and presidents have not been constrained in an emergency because of systemic constraints.
  424. Find this resource:
  425. Fisher, Louis. Presidential War Power. 2d ed. rev. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004.
  426. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  427. The author traces the use of presidential war powers throughout American history. He challenges contemporary presidents’ expansion of the war power and grounds his analysis in constitutional and statutory law.
  428. Find this resource:
  429. Howell, William G., and Tana Johnson. “War’s Contributions to Presidential Power.” In The Oxford Handbook of the American Presidency. Edited by George C. Edwards III and William G. Howell, 724–746. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
  430. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199238859.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  431. The authors investigate whether war increases presidential power. They offer both theoretical and empirical evidence that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, it does not.
  432. Find this resource:
  433. Howell, William G., and Jon C. Pevehouse. While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on Presidential War Powers. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007.
  434. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  435. The authors find that presidents are systematically less likely to exercise military force, especially larger deployments and those directed at less strategically important locales, when their partisan opponents control Congress. Congressional influence is often achieved through engaging the media, raising public concerns, and stirring doubt about the country’s resolve.
  436. Find this resource:
  437. Kriner, Douglas L. After the Rubicon: Congress, Presidents, and the Politics of Waging War. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010.
  438. DOI: 10.7208/chicago/9780226453583.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  439. The author shows the diverse ways in which Congress influences the conduct of military affairs, including proposing legislation, holding investigative hearings, and engaging in national policy debates. These actions influence the president’s strategic decisions regarding the initiation, scope, and duration of major military actions.
  440. Find this resource:
  441. Krutz, Glen S., and Jeffrey S. Peake. Treaty Politics and the Rise of Executive Agreements: International Commitments in a System of Shared Powers. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011.
  442. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  443. The authors argue that the presidential preference for executive agreements is the result of a symbiotic evolution of the executive and the legislative branches. Nevertheless, the House continues to oversee particular policy areas, and presidents still submit the majority of the most significant international commitments to the Senate as treaties.
  444. Find this resource:
  445. Yoo, John. Crisis and Command: A History of Executive Power from George Washington to George W. Bush. New York: Kaplan, 2009.
  446. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  447. The author argues that the bold decisions made by Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, and Franklin D. Roosevelt as commander-in-chief transformed the role of the American president; that the founding fathers deliberately left the Constitution vague regarding the limits of presidential authority; and that the nation has benefited from a strong chief executive.
  448. Find this resource:
  449. The Presidency and the Judiciary
  450.  
  451. Chief executives have important relationships with the courts, and it is through their nominations to the bench that they have opportunities to influence public policy for years to come. The executive branch, operating through the solicitor general’s office, is also a frequent litigant in the federal courts, especially at the Supreme Court level, providing another opportunity for the president to influence judicial decisions. In addition, presidents may end up with responsibility for enforcing court decisions, some of which did directly involve them. Finally, the Constitution gives the president the right to exercise some judicial powers directly through the granting of pardons, amnesty, and clemency for individuals who are accused or convicted of federal crimes. Yalof 1999 studies the selection of Supreme Court nominees. Epstein and Segal 2009 explores the strategy of presidential judicial nominations and the results of that strategy. Goldman 1997 analyzes the selection of lower court judges and their backgrounds. Moranski and Shipan 1999 examines constraints on the president’s choice of Supreme Court nominees. Binder and Maltzman 2009 thoroughly examines the Senate confirmation process. Epstein and Segal 2005 explores all aspects of the politics of judicial selection. Cameron, et al. 1990 examines the explanations for senators’ voting on Supreme Court nominees. Whittington 2009 analyzes judicial checks on the executive.
  452.  
  453. Binder, Sarah A., and Forrest Maltzman. Advice & Dissent: The Struggle to Shape the Federal Judiciary. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2009.
  454. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  455. The authors explore the federal judicial selection system, providing historical perspective on confirmations as well as analysis of how senators influence lower court nominations, the dynamics of Senate confirmation, the politics of the creation of judgeships, and the consequences of the increasingly partisan and lengthy confirmation process.
  456. Find this resource:
  457. Cameron, Charles M., Albert D. Cover, and Jeffrey A. Segal. “Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees: A Neoinstitutional Model.” American Political Science Review 84.2 (1990): 525–534.
  458. DOI: 10.2307/1963533Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  459. The authors find that senators voting on Supreme Court nominees vote to establish an electorally attractive position and routinely support confirming nominees perceived as well qualified and ideologically proximate to their constituents. For other nominees, senators’ votes depend on the political environment, especially the status of the president. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  460. Find this resource:
  461. Epstein, Lee, and Jeffrey A. Segal. Advice and Consent: The Politics of Judicial Appointments. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
  462. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  463. The authors provide a broad overview of the process of judicial nominations and the participants in the process, including the media and interest groups. They also provide historical perspective on battles over the judiciary and offer suggestions for reforming the process.
  464. Find this resource:
  465. Epstein, Lee, and Jeffrey A. Segal. “Nominating Federal Judges and Justices.” In The Oxford Handbook of the American Presidency. Edited by George C. Edwards III and William G. Howell, 625–645. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
  466. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199238859.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  467. The authors argue that to achieve his objectives for judicial appointments, the president must act strategically, attending to the preferences and likely actions of the Senate and Senate norms. They explore these matters and also consider whether presidents get what they want in their judicial appointments.
  468. Find this resource:
  469. Goldman, Sheldon. Picking Federal Judges: Lower Court Selection from Roosevelt through Reagan. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997.
  470. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  471. The author explains how presidents have chosen federal judges, emphasizing their use of judicial appointments to further their policy, partisan, and personal agendas. He also analyzes how political and social changes have influenced the profile of nominees and provides statistical portraits of the backgrounds of each administration’s appointees.
  472. Find this resource:
  473. Moranski, Bryon J., and Charles R. Shipan. “The Politics of Supreme Court Nominations: A Theory of Institutional Constraints and Choices.” American Journal of Political Science 43.4 (1999): 1069–1095.
  474. DOI: 10.2307/2991818Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  475. The Senate and the median created by continuing justices may constrain the president in making Supreme Court nominations. The authors examine the conditions under which a president is constrained in his choice of a nominee and find that presidents behave strategically with respect to Supreme Court nominations. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  476. Find this resource:
  477. Whittington, Keith E. “Judicial Checks on the President.” In The Oxford Handbook of the American Presidency. Edited by George C. Edwards III and William G. Howell, 646–664. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
  478. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199238859.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  479. The author shows how judicial checks on the presidency provide a supplementary tool for limiting executive power. He first lays out the doctrinal framework within which the courts consider executive power and then considers the theoretical and empirical research on how these judicial checks operate in practice.
  480. Find this resource:
  481. Yalof, David A. 1999. Pursuit of Justices: Presidential Politics and the Selection of Supreme Court Nominees. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.
  482. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  483. The author focuses on Supreme Court nominees. He documents and analyzes their selection criteria, the pool of candidates from which they are chosen, and the strategies they employ and finds competing factions within the executive branch, organized interests, and the president’s close associates vying for influence.
  484. Find this resource:
  485. Decision Making
  486.  
  487. The essence of the president’s job is making decisions—about foreign affairs, economic policy, and literally hundreds of other important matters. The task is a difficult one, and there are many obstacles to making rational decisions. Presidents need to ensure that they have before them a full range of options and the appropriate information necessary for evaluating them. Effective decision making requires the establishment of a working relationship with subordinates and an organization in the White House that serves presidential decision-making needs. Often, presidents have to persuade their own appointees in the White House and the bureaucracy to provide the options and information that they require. However, these appointees have many incentives not to do so. Lack of time to consider decisions and previous commitments of the government may constrain a president’s decision making, as may the president’s own personal experiences and personality.
  488.  
  489. Rational Decision Making
  490.  
  491. Every president wants to act rationally, but all presidents and their advisers are limited by their own capabilities as well as numerous obstacles to rational analysis of problems and solutions to them. Allison and Zelikow 1999 lays out the rational actor model of decision making and an application of it. George 1980 discusses the efforts of officials to compensate for the limits of rational analysis.
  492.  
  493. Allison, Graham T., and Philip Zelikow. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. 2d ed. New York: Longman, 1999.
  494. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  495. In chapters 1 and 2 of this classic book, the authors present the rational actor model of decision making and applying it to the Cuban missile crisis.
  496. Find this resource:
  497. George, Alexander L. Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980.
  498. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  499. In chapter 2, the author discusses policymakers adapting to constraints on rational decision making.
  500. Find this resource:
  501. Organization and Style of Decision Making
  502.  
  503. Each president is unique and has broad discretion in structuring the decision-making process in the White House. There are many ways to do this, and each has consequences for the effectiveness of the advisory system. Scholars have explored the ways in which the organization and style of the presidential advisory process can affect the president’s consideration of options and information. George 1980 identifies possible malfunctions in presidential decision making and offers a means of combating them. Burke and Greenstein 1989 shows how different leadership styles and advisory systems can lead to different decisions. Haney 1997 evaluates crisis decision groups and their performance in high stakes situations. Burke 2009 provides a broad analysis of organization and decision making and offers guidance for future research. Walcott and Hult 1995 applies organization theory to the White House operation and explains why it has changed over time. Hult and Walcott 2004 examines the evolution of the institutional presidency. Rudalevige 2002 focuses on the centralization of policy formulation and its causes and consequences.
  504.  
  505. Burke, John P. “Organizational Structure and Presidential Decision Making.” In The Oxford Handbook of the American Presidency. Edited by George C. Edwards III and William G. Howell, 501–527. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
  506. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199238859.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  507. The author provides an excellent analysis of the relationship between organization and decision making, including the impact of structural arrangements, small groups, and bureaucratic routines and politics. He also raises important issues for scholars seeking to advance our understanding of these matters.
  508. Find this resource:
  509. Burke, John P., and Fred I. Greenstein. How Presidents Test Reality: Decisions on Vietnam, 1954 and 1965. New York. Russell Sage Foundation, 1989.
  510. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  511. In this important study of presidential decision making, the authors compare the decisions and decision making of Dwight Eisenhower and Lyndon Johnson on US military involvement in Vietnam. The two presidents’ leadership styles and advisory systems diverged sharply, and that made a difference in their decisions.
  512. Find this resource:
  513. George, Alexander L. Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980.
  514. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  515. In chapters 6–12, the author discusses presidential management styles, analyzes possible malfunctions in the presidential advisory process, and offers solutions to them, especially the use of multiple advocacy.
  516. Find this resource:
  517. Haney, Patrick J. Organizing for Foreign Policy Crises: Presidents, Advisers, and the Management of Decision Making. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997.
  518. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  519. The author explores how presidents have structured ad hoc crisis decision groups and their performance in providing presidents information, advice, and analysis. He also employs case studies to investigate the links between a president’s crisis management structure and the decision-making process that took place during a foreign policy crisis.
  520. Find this resource:
  521. Hult, Karen M., and Charles E. Walcott. Empowering the White House: Governance under Nixon, Ford, and Carter. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004.
  522. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  523. In this theoretically informed study, the authors examine how Richard Nixon changed the institutional presidency to augment the power of the White House and continues to influence how his successors have governed. More than any predecessor, Nixon expanded his staff and systematized outreach, legal advice, and policy formulation.
  524. Find this resource:
  525. Rudalevige, Andrew. Managing the President’s Program: Presidential Leadership and Legislative Policy Formulation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002.
  526. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  527. The author uses transaction cost theory to predict the level of centralization of presidential policy formulation and tests his hypotheses with quantitative analysis of policy proposals. He finds that the level of centralization depends on the nature of the issue and that centralization can imperil an item’s fate in Congress.
  528. Find this resource:
  529. Walcott, Charles E., and Karen M. Hult. Governing the White House: From Hoover through LBJ. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995.
  530. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  531. The authors offer the first systematic application of organizational governance theory to the structures and operations of the White House Office. They show that although staff structures evolve primarily from presidents’ strategic responses to external demands, those structures significantly influence how the executive branch perceives and responds to further demands.
  532. Find this resource:
  533. Relationships with and among Advisers
  534.  
  535. Presidents require the services of personal aides to carry out their duties. Yet the people they choose, the way they use them, and the interactions among them may have important consequences for the quality of their decisions. George 1980 applies small-group theories to the relationships between presidents and their advisors. Janis 1982 applies a specific pathology of group decision making to presidential decisions and illustrates it with numerous cases. Hult and Walcott 2009 provides a wide-ranging treatment of the influences, positive and negative, of presidential advisors and discusses many of the important challenges to studying presidential decision making.
  536.  
  537. George, Alexander L. 1980. Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice. Boulder, CO: Westview.
  538. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  539. In chapter 4, the author brings studies from sociology and psychology to bear on the relationships between presidents and their advisors.
  540. Find this resource:
  541. Hult, Karen M., and Charles E. Walcott. 2009. “Influences on Presidential Decision Making.” In The Oxford Handbook of the American Presidency. Edited by George C. Edwards III and William G. Howell, 528–549. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  542. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199238859.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  543. The authors explore the impact of presidential advisers, who help shape the agenda, frame many of the problems, and filter much of the information that goes to presidents in making decisions. The also provide a useful analysis of analytical, methodological, and prescriptive issues in studying presidential decision making.
  544. Find this resource:
  545. Janis, Irving L. Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes. 2d ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982.
  546. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  547. The author identifies a potential pathology in small-group interactions—groupthink—and argues that it has led to US foreign policy fiascoes. He details these failures in case studies but also offers suggestions on how to avoid groupthink.
  548. Find this resource:
  549. Bureaucratic Politics and Decision Making
  550.  
  551. A primary source of options and information for the president is the bureaucracy. It is not always a neutral instrument, however. Individuals and the agencies they represent have interests of their own to advance and protect and may not necessarily view issues from the president’s perspective. Moreover, the structure of the flow of information and the development of options in the White House may also hinder decision making. Allison and Zelikow 1999 offers a model of the impact of bureaucratic politics on decision making and shows how it can be applied. George 1980 shows how bureaucratic politics can impair decision making. Halperin and Clapp 2006 illustrates bureaucratic politics at work in the national security arena.
  552.  
  553. Allison, Graham T., and Philip Zelikow. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. 2d ed. New York: Longman, 1999.
  554. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  555. In chapters 5 and 6, the authors provide a model of bureaucratic politics and its effects on decision making; then they apply the model to the Cuban missile crisis.
  556. Find this resource:
  557. George, Alexander L. Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice. Boulder, CO: Westview. 1980.
  558. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  559. In chapter 5, the author discusses organizational behavior and bureaucratic politics as sources of impediments to information processing in presidential decision making.
  560. Find this resource:
  561. Halperin, Morton H., and Priscilla A. Clapp. 2006. Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy. 2d ed. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
  562. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  563. The authors focus on the role played by the federal bureaucracy—civilian career officials, political appointees, and military officers—in formulating US national security policy. They particularly emphasize how agencies and individuals work to preserve and promote their interests and how this activity affects policymaking.
  564. Find this resource:
  565. Psychopathology and Decision Making
  566.  
  567. Perhaps the most fascinating and popular studies of the presidency are those that approach the topic from the perspective of psychological analysis. Some of these take the form of psychobiographies of presidents; others attempt to categorize presidents on the basis of selected personality dimensions. The authors of all of these works base their analyses on the premise that personality is a constant and that personality needs may be displaced onto political objects and become unconscious motivations for presidential behavior. Barber 2009 claims to be able to categorize presidents in a way that will help us predict their performance in office. George and George 1998 critiques Barber 2009 and discusses the challenges of psychoanalyzing presidents, including its own efforts. Tucker 1977 offers an alternative explanation of Woodrow Wilson’s behavior to that provided in George and George 1956 and raises questions about psychobiography.
  568.  
  569. Barber, James D. The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House. 4th ed. New York: Pearson Longman, 2009.
  570. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  571. In this famous study, the author argues that certain behavior and attitudes allow us to categorize presidential character and that patterns in a president’s character, world view, and political style help us to predict his performance in office. He illustrates his points with case studies of modern presidents.
  572. Find this resource:
  573. George, Alexander L., and Juliette L. George. Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study. New York: J. Day, 1956.
  574. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  575. Perhaps the most lauded psychoanalytical interpretation of a presidency, this volume views the failure of the US Senate to accept the League of Nations and other of Wilson’s defeats through the lens of Wilson’s character and association with the House.
  576. Find this resource:
  577. George, Alexander L., and Juliette L. George. Presidential Personality and Performance. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1998.
  578. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  579. The authors offer a masterly critique of Barber 2009’s argument about the importance of presidential character and discuss the psychoanalysis of presidents, including their own work on Woodrow.
  580. Find this resource:
  581. Tucker, Robert C. “The Georges’ Wilson Reexamined: An Essay on Psychobiography.” American Political Science Review 71.2 (1977): 606–618.
  582. DOI: 10.2307/1978353Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  583. The author offers an alternative psychological explanation for Woodrow Wilson’s behavior to that offered in George and George 1956. More broadly, the author raises questions about psychobiography. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  584. Find this resource:
  585. Cognitive Processing and World View
  586.  
  587. Presidents and their advisors, no matter how accomplished, are human beings, subject to the same tendencies and limitations as less prominent people. They bring to office views about the nature of the problems the country faces and appropriate policies to deal with them. They also have cognitive needs that condition their processing of information, evaluating of options, and making decisions. George 1980 discusses the importance of cognitive processing and beliefs systems in decision making. Betts 1982 shows how officials’ beliefs affect their consideration of evidence. Jervis 1976 presents a classic discussion of the importance of perception and misperception in policymaking. Neustadt 1970 reveals how world views can lead to mistakes in decision making. Kahneman and Renshon 2009 offers a set of cognitive biases that encourage certain kinds of decisions. Khong 1992 shows how the use of historical analogies can distort officials’ decisions. Walker 2009 shows how a range of presidential psychological traits can affect decision making and suggests directions for future research.
  588.  
  589. Betts, Richard K. Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1982.
  590. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  591. The author analyzes the historical, psychological, political, diplomatic, and military aspects of surprise attacks during the mid-20th century, such as Pearl Harbor and Korea, and argues that they succeed not because intelligence services failed to warn leaders of the impending attacks, but because of political leaders’ disbelief of the evidence their advisors presented to them.
  592. Find this resource:
  593. George, Alexander L. Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective use of Information and Advice. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980.
  594. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  595. In chapter 3, the author discusses information processing from the perspective of cognitive psychology and the importance of beliefs and images in decision making.
  596. Find this resource:
  597. Jervis, Robert. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.
  598. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  599. In this landmark application of cognitive psychology to political decision making, the author describes the process of perception (e.g., how decision makers learn from history) and then explores common forms of misperception (such as overestimating one’s influence). Then he tests his ideas through numerous important events in international relations.
  600. Find this resource:
  601. Kahneman, Daniel, and Jonathan Renshon. “Hawkish Biases.” In American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation since 9/11. Edited by A. Trevor Thrall and Jane K. Cramer, 79–96. London: Routledge, 2009.
  602. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  603. The authors detail a set of seven cognitive biases and illustrate how they may affect the judgments of decision makers regarding international conflict.
  604. Find this resource:
  605. Khong, Yuen Foong. Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992.
  606. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  607. Relying on documentary research and cognitive psychology, the author shows how leaders used and misused historical analogies to justify policies and perform cognitive and information-processing tasks in their decision making regarding the war in Vietnam.
  608. Find this resource:
  609. Neustadt, Richard E. Alliance Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970.
  610. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  611. A study of Anglo-American relations that shows how the world views of highly educated, sophisticated representatives of closely allied nations led them to misunderstand each other, with important consequences for public policy.
  612. Find this resource:
  613. Walker, Stephen G. “The Psychology of Presidential Decision Making.” In The Oxford Handbook of the American Presidency. Edited by George C. Edwards III and William G. Howell, 550–574. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
  614. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199238859.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  615. The author analyzes where presidential personality traits, motivations, world views, and cognitive processes most directly influence decisions and the impact of rational decision making. He proposes marrying psychological theories and rational choice theories and focusing on decisions rather than individuals and on the psychological sources of risk orientation and strategic choice.
  616. Find this resource:
  617. Policy Implementation
  618.  
  619. Every president is dependent on the bureaucracy to achieve many of his goals. With divided government, the norm over the past three decades, presidents more than ever turn to the bureaucracy to accomplish changes in policy. Public policies are rarely self-executing, however. They require a staff of experts who have an understanding of the substantive issues, institutional processes, and political implications involved in turning statutes, executive orders, and the like into services and benefits for the nation. These are the people who work in the executive branch. Some are civil servants, while others are political appointees, but both groups implement public policy. Much of the literature focuses on the latter, but other streams of research focus on efforts to make the bureaucracy responsive to the president and the impact of organizations on policy implementation.
  620.  
  621. Presidential Appointments
  622.  
  623. Because the White House often distrusts the career bureaucracy, it invests a great deal of energy in its political appointments. A principal responsibility of political appointees is to elicit responsiveness of career officials to their directions. Lewis 2008 provides a thorough treatment of presidential appointments and shows where and why the White House politicizes them. Moe 1985 argues that presidents increasingly emphasize responsiveness over competence in their appointments. Edwards 2001 argues that presidents have no need to compromise quality in appointees to achieve bureaucratic responsiveness.
  624.  
  625. Edwards, George C., III. “Why Not the Best? The Loyalty–Competence Trade-Off in Presidential Appointments.” In Innocent until Nominated: The Breakdown of the Presidential Appointments Process. Edited by G. Calvin Mackenzie, 81–106. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2001.
  626. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  627. The author discusses the dimensions of quality appointments to the bureaucracy and the causes and costs of the frequent failure to appoint well-qualified people to bureaucratic posts. He also explores the sources of White House distrust of the bureaucracy and shows that bureaucracy is indeed responsive to the president.
  628. Find this resource:
  629. Lewis, David E. The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and Bureaucratic Performance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008.
  630. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  631. The author shows how agency missions and personnel and their compatibility with the president’s vision determine which agencies presidents target with appointees. He also explores the role of patronage in appointment decisions. He argues that presidents politicize even when it hurts performance because of a felt need for agency responsiveness.
  632. Find this resource:
  633. Moe, Terry M. “The Politicized Presidency.” In The New Direction in American Politics. Edited by John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, 235–271. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985.
  634. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  635. The author argues because presidents wish to succeed as leaders and value competence, they thrive on responsiveness. Thus, to control the executive branch, they increasingly centralize policymaking in the White House and politicize the bureaucracy through presidential appointments.
  636. Find this resource:
  637. Efforts at Bureaucratic Control
  638.  
  639. Presidents have a range of tools for eliciting bureaucratic responsiveness, and these may be especially important when the White House wishes to change the direction of policy. Durant 1992 analyzes efforts to limit government activity and the use and misuse of tools for doing so. Wood and Waterman 1994 examines efforts to obtain bureaucratic responsiveness, the tools most useful for obtaining it, and bureaucratic responses to these efforts. Whitford 2005 explores the tug of war between the president and Congress to influence bureaucratic behavior. Lewis 2003 focuses on the design of agencies and the efforts to use design to avoid presidential control.
  640.  
  641. Durant, Robert F. The Administrative Presidency Revisited: Public Lands, the BLM, and the Reagan Revolution. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992.
  642. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  643. The author focuses on Ronald Reagan’s efforts to deactivate government, illuminating the mechanisms of the administrative presidency and the manner of applying them to influence bureaucratic policy. He is also attentive to the limitations and disadvantages of various efforts at bureaucratic control.
  644. Find this resource:
  645. Lewis, David E. Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design: Political Insulation in the United States Government Bureaucracy, 1946–1997. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003.
  646. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  647. The structure of bureaucracies can determine the degree to which political actors can change the direction of agency policy. The author explains why, when, and how political actors create administrative agencies in such a way as to insulate them from political control, particularly presidential control.
  648. Find this resource:
  649. Whitford, Andrew B. “The Pursuit of Political Control by Multiple Principals.” Journal of Politics 67.1 (2005): 28–49.
  650. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  651. The author examines how Congress and the president sequentially enable and constrain agencies in a tug of war over the exercise of bureaucratic discretion, partly in response to past political interventions, and documents the mechanisms they use. He reveals a dynamic environment in which there is a move and countermove from these principals. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  652. Find this resource:
  653. Wood, B. Dan, and Richard W. Waterman. Bureaucratic Dynamics: The Role of Bureaucracy in a Democracy. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994.
  654. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  655. The authors use principal-agent theory to explain bureaucratic behavior. They find bureaucracies are highly responsive and adaptive to political leadership, with presidential appointments, reorganizations, budgets, congressional oversight, and the courts being important tools of political control. They also find that occasionally bureaucracies resist presidential control and respond to external signals.
  656. Find this resource:
  657. The Impact of Organizational Routines on Implementation
  658.  
  659. Policy implementers may be hampered by the structures of the organizations in which they serve. A prominent characteristic of bureaucracies are standard operating procedures that may hinder presidential policy implementation. Allison and Zelikow 1999 provides an model of organizational behavior and illustrates how routines affect implementation. McKeown 2001 provides a more benign view of the impact of organizational routines.
  660.  
  661. Allison, Graham, and Philip Zelikow. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. 2d ed. New York: Longman, 1999.
  662. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  663. In chapters 3 and 4, the authors outline a model of organizational behavior and apply it to actions taken during the Cuban missile crisis.
  664. Find this resource:
  665. McKeown, Timothy J. “Plans and Routines, Bureaucratic Bargaining, and the Cuban Missile Crisis.” Journal of Politics 63.4 (2001): 1163–1190.
  666. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  667. The author finds that organizational routines and plans did not significantly constrain US choices in the Cuban missile crisis and that they can be relatively plastic and subject to strategic alterations or misrepresentations. Plans and routines are both a response to and the context for strategic interaction by organizational participants. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  668. Find this resource:
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