Early Barbarossa Air Power

More belated than Goering's Pervitin supply, here’s a quick thing on early Barbarossa air power!

The blistering advance by Axis forces in the opening stages of Operation Barbarossa, (and as happening in the opening stages of the simulation), are due to many factors ranging from Axis strategic surprise to the transitional nature of  Soviet forces. Today we are going to briefly look at a major contributor to Axis air power in the very earliest stages of the war and how it helped Barbarossa to be so devastating to the Soviet Union.

At dawn June 21, 1941 over a thousand planes flew into the Soviet Union, and would destroy more than twelve hundred planes on the ground or in various states of unreadiness (Glantz, 49). The destruction of so much of the Soviet Air Force helped to keep the tempo of assault firmly on the side of the Axis, as the Soviet Union couldn’t concentrate enough air power to seriously threaten the hundreds of flights flown against them daily. With so many bombers and fighter bombers destroyed German Army units could attack without worry of annihilation by air, or risk their logistics behind them. Ammunition and fuel could reach the front allowing for the Axis forces to continue pushing ahead, capturing Soviet airfields and bases making the situation even more dire and putting German industry even further from any eventual Soviet bombings. And with so many fighters out of the Soviet arsenal, even older models, it was near impossible to deny German reconnaissance further hurting the Soviet ground effort. In one small example one of the most iconic aircraft of the war, the German Ju 87 Stuka dive bomber with it’s much discussed ability to be a precise dive bomber required at the very least local air control to function. Its ability to drop bombs precisely helping German ground forces, and itself benefiting immensely from the lack of credible Soviet threats.

Soviet issues with command and control due to their loss of experienced officers in the Great Purge is well known, and were only made worse due to the total German Air dominance in the early days of the offensive. Soviet commanders already struggling to communicate with disparate units had telephone lines bombed and couriers strafed, turning many Soviet units into isolated islands even before being cut off by advancing German forces.  Along with the German advantage in reconnaissance this allowed the Axis forces to maneuver and envelope huge volumes of men and materiel. Combined with the Soviet issue of Command and control issuing units that had ceased to exist into suicidal counter attacks and operating without understanding what was happening at the front. In just one example, within 3 days of the start of Barbarossa the Soviet 6th Cavalry Corps would take 50 percent casualties through counterattacks under harsh German controlled skies(Glantz, 52).

There are volumes filled with the details of the planes that fought in the early days of Barbarossa, discussing the personalities of those flying them, their doctrines, or even counting the rivets in their aircraft. This is just a small taste of what those aircrews accomplished in Barbarossa. Air power was still in its infancy in those days. Not even 50 years from the first powered flight, and it’s teething would continue as technology and doctrine advanced to meet political considerations. And, ultimately and most importantly of all is that talking professionally can be exhausting sometimes, so please have a great day and do tell me if something was far off wrong in this.