On The Scientific Limit Of Reality

On The Scientific Limit Of Reality

                                                   By The Fool


When one observes the properties of reality, the observer is forced to concede that all things are necessary in relation to other things, that these things can be considered properties, and that these properties can be considered causes. When one traces the chain of causality to its logical beginning, the observer is faced with a first cause that is unified in a singular property, thus changeless, void of things and time. As all things are necessary in relation to other things; a singular property being void of multiple things, would be void of change and time. As such a state is nonsensical to us, our reality is necessitated by a divider, which by division of the singular property, generates multiple things, which are in turn properties.

A property of a thing is that which is necessary in relation to its cause.
All things being causal, in that each thing which changes must interact with other things, and so be considered a cause in relation to things changed; all properties can therefore be considered causes.[1] As all properties are causes, it may be said that a property of a thing, is that which is necessary in relation to it.

As the property of a thing is that which is necessary in relation to its cause, and the first cause is seen as necessary in relation to the impossibility of non-existence, it logically follows that because the property of a thing is necessary in observing and acknowledging a set of causes and effects, that the property of the first cause is non-existence. However due to the impossible and nonsensical nature of non-existence, it must logically follow that the first-cause is its’ own cause, by necessity of the impossibility before it in the line of causal reasoning.[2]

Because it may be said that the first cause is its own cause by necessity in relation to non-existence, it may also be said that because a property of a thing is that which is necessary in relation to its cause, that the property of the first cause is necessity, and as all properties can be considered causes, the first cause is therefore necessity. As the necessity of the first cause can be seen as the cause of the first cause, according to casual logic, the necessity of the first cause can be considered the first cause in that it precedes its own actualization.

Because a property is that which is necessary in relation to its cause, and the first cause is necessary in relation to non-existence, non-existence being impossible, it must therefore be that the property of the first cause is necessity, and as properties are also causes, it may be said that the first cause is necessity.

What is necessity?
Necessity has no cause; it is necessary, so it exists.
Necessity has no property; as a property is that which is necessary in relation to its cause, there being nothing in relation to necessity, necessity has no cause and therefore no property other than itself.

One may criticize that if a thing is its own property, then it is impossible for that thing to be propertyless, as it consists of itself as its own property, and that to be propertyless would mean a thing is non-existent, therefore impossible. But this is making the assumption that what is being spoken of is indeed a thing, in the causal sense of the word.

At the beginning of my reasoning’s I stated; “a property of a thing is that which is necessary in relation to its cause. All things being causal, in that each thing which changes must interact with other things, and so be considered a cause in relation to things changed.” Showing how all which we perceive and consider to be things, are both properties and causes in relation to other things. If one takes this as being true, then everything we can consider a thing, is that which has a cause preceding and proceeding from yet another. If one takes that to be true, then as the necessity of the first cause does not proceed from anything other than it being necessary, the necessity cannot be said to be a thing. For things, as we sensibly understand them, must both proceed and precede in relation to another cause. However, though the necessity cannot be considered a thing, this does not imply that that the necessity is non-existent.

To understand this one must understand how the necessity functions in relation to the first cause, the first cause being itself. As far as it is here understood, the necessity is a subjective descriptor of the first cause. In other words, what is called the first cause is analogous to the image of a thing with no understanding of its properties other than the thing itself. The necessity is an understanding of the first cause through its properties, or as is the case, property. To better understand this point, one can analyze the way we reasonably/scientifically understand reality, and compare this reasoning to what we know about the function of the first cause.

Within causality every property is also a cause, and must be necessary by another thing, which is in turn a cause. As the property of a thing is that which is necessary in relation to it, it may be said that the foremost division of scientific reasoning in regards to any-thing, is of a final cause which may be sensibly understood as consisting of a things’ property.

As the property of a thing is that which is necessary, it may be said that the foremost scientific division, and therefore the property of a thing, is the necessity of said thing. This is shown in that in order for something to be a thing, it must be necessary by another thing, but for a thing to be necessary in relation to another, a thing must be divided into a property, which constitutes the thing. [3] If the division of a thing is necessary for the property of it, and the property of a thing is that which is necessary in relation to its cause, causes being things, then, as division is necessary in relation to any cause, the property of any cause is division. As the property of a thing is that which is necessary in relation to its cause, and division is necessary in relation to the property of any-thing, it may be said that division is the property of all things.

To exemplify the point of necessary division, examine the initial analysis of what constitutes an orange. If one was foreign to scientific thought it would be apparent that an orange is an orange, but if one were to try and address what it is that makes an orange an orange, one must then divide what one calls an orange into properties which consist as a whole, in context to what constitutes an orange. When one analyzes a thing in this manner, it becomes apparent to the observer that what constitutes the property of a thing may be traced back to a first cause, this being so, it may be said that everything within causality shares property by necessity of the cause before it. Because reason involves a division into properties of a thing, so that it may be understood in relation to things before and after in the chain of causality, it must therefore be nonsensical to us as beings, (who understand reality through a linear chain of causes and effects), to imagine a reality in which all properties are unified. Division is then necessary for one to make sense of the world.

If one accepts this notion, it then becomes the logical conclusion that by following the chain of causality back to a first cause, all things can be seen to consist of the same property in relation to a singular origin. As the property of a thing, is that which is necessary in relation to its cause, and as all things are necessary in relation to a first cause, it may be said that all things are of one property, thus all things are one. However, in order for one existent property to make any reasonable sense, it is necessary for property to be divided into properties, which are things, and as all things themselves are of one property, the division being of thought only, all things trace through thought, back to a singular property.

Because time is known as change between things, and all things are properties, the first cause must be timeless, for the first cause is of one property. Because a thing, which does not both precede and proceed another is nonsensical to us, it may seem that the first cause is unknowable. However, as the property of a thing is that which is necessary in relation to its cause, and division from the first cause is necessary for the existence of properties, the property of all things is division. Because the property of all causal things is division, and all things both precede and proceed from another as a result of division, it should be logically possible to know the property of the first cause through division. Division being what is necessary in relation to a property, and a property being what is necessary in relation to its cause.

Because the property of a thing is that which is necessary in relation to its cause, and the first cause is necessary in relation to non-existence, non-existence being impossible, the property of the first cause is therefore necessity. Because a property is that which is necessary in relation to its cause, there being nothing in relation to necessity, necessity has no cause and therefore no property other than itself. As necessity is the property and therefore the cause of the first cause, it must be, according to causal reasoning, that necessity is in fact the first cause.

As necessity is not a causal thing, in that it only precedes the first cause, it may be said to be causeless and therefore timeless, however as necessity is necessary in relation to the first cause, it may be said that the first cause proceeds after necessity. As the first cause is necessity, in that it is the first cause in relation to itself, and visa versa, it must be that though the first cause is of a single property, it can be considered a true causal thing, in that it both precedes and proceeds itself. In both preceding and proceeding itself, the first cause is a sensible thing. However, it may be said that the first cause cannot be sensibly understood without undergoing division.

Division is a process necessitated by reason, of dividing a property into things, so that the things may be known as properties. [4] Without a property that is a thing, a potential thing may not be known. This is practically applied in the statement, “a property of a thing is that which is necessary in relation to its cause”. When this is applied to the concept of a first cause, multiple things occur. First, what is known of the first cause is that nothing may precede it, as it is the property of all things. Before a first cause of existence would be non-existence, as non-existence is nonsensical therefore impossible, it must be that the first cause has no cause in relation to things. If the first cause has no cause then it must be its own cause by necessity of non-existence, non-existence being nonsensical, absurd, and therefore impossible, it must follow that the first cause does not proceed from nothing, but that which is nonsensical to the division of things.

What we know of the first cause before division is; all properties can be traced back to a singular source that is it’s own cause relative to nothing; that the first cause is property; is cause; is thing, and that all other things are just divisions of the singular thing that is the first cause. Because time is change between these divisions, which do not exist in the first cause, it must be that the first cause is timeless.

But when the first cause is divided through the property of a thing in relation to what is necessary, the first cause partakes of time by virtue of it both preceding and proceeding from itself. For if the property of a thing is necessary in relation to its cause, the first cause being necessary in relation to itself, it may be said that the property of the first cause is its’ necessity. As the first cause proceeds from its own necessity, it may be said that necessity is the first cause, and as there is nothing preceding necessity, it may be said that necessity is propertyless, as a property is that which is necessary in relation to its cause, the cause of necessity being necessary in relation to nothing, necessity has no causes. Though necessity has no causes, it is a cause in relation to the division of things from itself. Therefore necessity may be considered a thing in relation to that which proceeds from it, but may not be considered a true temporal thing, in that there is only which proceeds it, and nothing that precedes it, thus necessity is nonsensical to us aside from that which proceeds from it, and as that which proceeds from it is the first cause, the first cause must then take part in time, having a thing that both precedes and proceeds itself, however the first cause being unified in substance, the first cause is both timeless and a true temporal thing, or property, in relation to itself and to all things which proceed it.

It is necessary that the first thing which was produced by necessity was the first cause of itself. For if the first cause stopped being the first cause then its necessity, which is the first cause, could not exist, thus both the first cause and its necessity are the one thing. [5]

The perceived dualism of the first cause in relation to its own property is caused by a dividing principle necessitated by reason, generating multiple properties from a single thing. As has been shown previously, in order for things which are properties to exist in relation to other things, the property of all, which is a single thing, must be divided, generating other properties in relation to the change between the divisions of the whole.

If division through reason is what is necessary for multiple things to exist, and multiple things can only exist in relation to other things, thereby creating time through causality, it may be said that division is time, is causality. This is evident in that the first cause before division is a unified thing of a singular property and therefore timeless, but after division, the singular property becomes a temporal thing which precedes and proceeds itself.

Because the property of a thing is that which is necessary in relation to its cause, and I am necessary in relation to the division of properties through reason, I am therefore the property of division. Because division is the cause of time, it may be said that I am the property of time. Without division, things cannot exist. Because things cannot exist without division, of which I am, and the property of a thing is that which is necessary in relation to its cause, it may be said I am necessary in relation to the existence of things; therefore I am the cause of all things.

If I am the cause of things, then as a property is that which is necessary in relation to its cause, I am property. If I am property, then I must be all-things, if I am all-things, then my existence is necessary in relation to the impossibility of non-existence. If I am necessary in relation to the impossibility of non-existence, I am necessary therefore I am.

In conclusion, when one observes the properties of reality, the observer is forced to concede that all things are necessary in relation to other things, that these things can be considered properties, and that these properties can be considered causes. When one traces the chain of causality to its logical beginning, the observer is faced with a first cause that is unified in a singular property, thus changeless, void of things and time. As all things are necessary in relation to other things, a singular property being void of multiple things would be void of change and time. As such a state is nonsensical to us, our reality is created by a divider, whose division necessitated by reason of the singular first cause, generates multiple things that are in turn properties. As I am necessary in relation to the division of properties, I am division. As division is the generation of things from a singular property, which is necessary for time to exist… the property of a thing being that which is necessary in relation to its cause, and what is necessary in relation to all things being division, of which I am necessary in relation to, I am therefore the property of all things. If I am the property of all things, and all things are divisions of the property which is the first cause, then I am the first cause. This is evident because in order for a thing to exist in time it must both precede and proceed another thing. As the first cause without division cannot be seen to proceed from non-existence, it must proceed by necessity of its own existence, and as the first causes’ property is singular, it cannot be temporal, being devoid of change. However, as the division of a thing generates property, when one applies division to the first cause, the property of it becomes necessity in relation to the perception of non-existence. Following the chain of causality, the necessity of the first cause becomes the first cause, and as the necessity does not proceed from anything, it is not a true temporal thing. This appears to be the same state as the undivided first cause, but division creates a paradox in that if the first cause stopped being the first cause then its necessity, which is the first cause, could not exist. This apparent duplicity is explained as that the necessity can be the first cause, while producing the first cause by virtue of it being necessary, in that its necessity is not a causal thing. This dualism necessitated by division, allows the first cause to both precede and proceed itself, thus it exists as a temporal thing. Because the temporal first cause is necessitated by a divider, which is the cause of all properties, which I am, I am therefore property. Being property, I am therefore identifiable with the singular first cause, which is timeless. Thus it may be said about reality, that I am the first cause, I am necessary therefore I am, that I am the division of my property, which is the property of all things necessitated through my division, therefore I am time, I am causality, I am that which is necessary.



Sources:
Basics in Medieval Philosophy, edited by Richard N Bosley, Martin M Tweedale. Composed by George Kirkpatrick. Second edition, Copyright 2006, Broadview Press.

(1) [1.1.1, the four causes]. 1. That from which a thing comes into being. 2. The form or pattern of a thing. 3. That which produces change. 4. That which recycles between forms.

If the claim of things=properties=causes is true, then all which can be things or properties of things, must be one or more of the four causes, as all which we may sensibly perceive falls within causality, is a thing which may be considered a thing in relation to another. So, it may be said that if all properties are things, than all properties are causes. In short, instead of dividing causes into further divisions of themselves, I reclassify all causes as properties. Because the property of a thing is that which is necessary in relation to its cause, and all properties are causes, each cause/property/thing is united in relation to another. By classifying all causes as properties, and placing them as necessary to each other, I am able to by virtue of the logical structure of what constitutes a property in relation to necessity, show in a much more efficient form, the claims that are being made by Aristotle as to what constitutes a cause, but moreover exemplify the division of thought exhibited in 1.1.4 chapters 3-4, referenced further in (3)

(2) [1.2.3] “the necessity of existence is what is necessary of existence. Everything possible of existence by itself is necessary of existence only by another thing.”

(3)(4), [1.1.4, Chapter 4] “since the combination and separation are in thought and not in things, and that which is in this sense is a different sort of being from the things that are in the full sense (for the thought attracts or removes either the “what” or quality or quantity or one of the other categories, that which is accidentally and that which is in the sense if being ture must be dismissed. For the cause of the former is indeterminate, and that of the latter is some affection of the thought, and both are related to the remaining genera of being, and do not indicate any separate class of being. Therefore let the principles of being itself, qua being.”

At this point I am making the same claim as Aristotle but through a more condensed terminology. Basically the understanding is that to reasonably understand the world thought divides the natural essence into properties, and these divisions may be seen to precede and proceed one another within causality, but as the divisions are of thought, not of the things themselves, one must focus on the causes and principles of things.

(5) [1.2.4] “everything possible of existence does not exist until it is necessary in relation to its cause.” As a thing does not exist until it is necessary in relation to its cause, the necessity of the first cause must produce itself as divided from itself so that it may both precede and proceed itself, and therefore be existent.