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Remdesivir Dr. Peter McCullough

Dec 30th, 2023 (edited)
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  1. I'm Dr. Peter McCullough, and I'm an internist and cardiologist and academic physician, professor
  2. of medicine at Texas A&M College of Medicine on the Baylor Dallas campus.
  3. And in February of 2020, like many physicians, I was really taken by storm with the news that a
  4. tremendously contagious virus was emanating out of Wuhan, China, and it looks like the United States
  5. was in the crosshairs. In the beginning, in my clinical practice, I really didn't have any
  6. viewpoint about prior viral pandemics, and some had mentioned prior influenza pandemics. If we go
  7. back to the 1300s, there was, you know, plagues that occurred across Europe. But point in fact,
  8. we were largely and very quickly thrown into emergency mode. And so what happened was a whole
  9. series of communications within health systems that really dealt with protection of the doctors
  10. and nurses, and Americans were introduced to a term called PPE, or personal protective equipment.
  11. And most of our task force meetings and calls really didn't have to do with sick patients. It
  12. had to do with protection of the health care workers and doctors. So I got a sense early on
  13. that fear, group fear, was a major driver in behavioral response to the pandemic.
  14. My research endeavors and my research life before COVID-19 centered on the interface between
  15. heart and kidney disease. I'm the president of the Cardio-Reno Society of America. I'm considered
  16. the most published person on this topic in the world in history. I chair many FDA-approved
  17. clinical trial data safety monitoring boards. In fact, I've probably seen and examined more
  18. safety trial data than any doctor in current American medicine. So I'm well grounded
  19. in chronic disease, epidemiology, and randomized trials. But for COVID-19, our major viewpoint
  20. that we had early on, or at least for me with my prior Cardio-Reno collaborations was with
  21. Italian doctors. And so we were starting to email each other in terms of what is going on
  22. in the metro Milan area. And Milan and then down to Siena and Tuscany. And we quickly started to
  23. get an understanding that this illness was like a upper respiratory infection, like a common cold.
  24. And for a majority of individuals, it was like the common cold. However, in some individuals,
  25. it could progress to what we call the adult respiratory distress syndrome, where there's an
  26. overwhelming attack against the lungs. Patients lost their ability to breathe and exchange
  27. oxygen and carbon dioxide, and then required mechanical intubation. So this was unlike any
  28. common cold. And it appeared to be very different than influenza. Influenza in elderly people can
  29. also cause the adult respiratory distress syndrome, but it's almost always because of a secondary
  30. bacterial infection like Staphylococcal infection. So SARS-CoV-2, the virus in COVID-19,
  31. appeared to have these special features. And then within a few weeks, we understood
  32. pretty clearly that the illness had three major biological features to it. One was early viral
  33. replication, where the virus replicates exponentially as other viral infections do. And that it has
  34. a second phase where the immune system is tipped off into a very abnormal, maladaptive pattern.
  35. So instead of the immune system defending the body, the immune system sends out signals that
  36. begin to damage organs, including the heart, the lungs, the kidneys, the brain, the blood system.
  37. And then very importantly, the virus itself, through the spike protein or the dangerous
  38. spicule on the surface of the ball of the virus, the spike protein itself caused coagulation or
  39. blood clotting in a unique type of coagulation. It caused the red blood cells to stick together.
  40. At the same time, the platelets stick together. So this is a very different type of blood clotting
  41. that we would see with major blood clots in the arteries and veins. For instance,
  42. blood clots involved in stroke and heart attack, blood clots involved in major blood vessels in the
  43. legs. This was a different type of clotting. And in fact, the Italians courageously did some
  44. autopsies and found micro blood clots in the lungs. And so we understood in the end,
  45. the reason why the lungs fail is not because the virus is there, it's because micro blood clots are
  46. there. The waves of reports and published medical literature originally emanated out of China.
  47. And the public should understand that the typical publication cycle for an academic paper that's
  48. peer reviewed and published can be anywhere from nine months to two years. So what happened was the
  49. publication cycles were too long to get any rapid information out. So immediately our system collapsed
  50. into what's called preprints. So publications would be submitted, papers would be submitted
  51. for publication, but the preprint would come out basically telling the world that the paper had not
  52. yet undergone peer review, but we need to get this information out now because people need to
  53. understand what's going on. So we had a wave from China originally, which was difficult to interpret
  54. because of English writing, because the Chinese population is just so different in terms of its
  55. structure. And it was hard to make much out of what was coming out of China outside of in some
  56. cases it could be fatal. Italy was much more like the United States. That was the next big wave.
  57. And we just collaborate more freely with the Italians. And what I had done is I reached out
  58. to what's called the coracle network in Italy as an American doctor. And I, you know, freely said,
  59. listen, I am not a virologist or an immunologist, but I can tell you every infectious disease doctor
  60. in America is completely subscribed to inpatient care of patients with COVID-19. And there's nobody
  61. able to kind of think their way through what's going on in the pandemic. And so what we learned
  62. relatively early is that this illness was clearly and strongly amenable to risk stratification
  63. or that baseline risks were very, very strong determinants, even more so than the virus itself
  64. for mortality. So what that meant is the strongest determinant of mortality is age.
  65. And age itself is an underlying determinant or a cause of death, if you will, in the general
  66. population. Then we start adding on the typical things that put people at risk for death of other
  67. causes, heart disease, lung disease, kidney disease, cancer, obesity, diabetes. The interesting thing
  68. is that obesity appeared to be a super loaded factor. And so the virus seemed to really prey
  69. upon patients, particularly who were obese. And there are some reasons for this in terms of how
  70. the cytokines and immune factors are generated in response to the virus that could explain it. But
  71. we understood quickly that individuals under age 50, for example, with no major medical problems
  72. could ride through this illness very easily. And in fact, the Swedes figured this out very quickly
  73. and said, you know what, we're not going to shut down. This is sufficiently understood
  74. that we can simply protect the individuals at risk the best we can, the best that any protection
  75. measure can, and then we'll just have our economy and our schools move along in a usual fashion.
  76. With the pandemic, what happened is there was a global shutdown on travel and a global shutdown
  77. in academic meetings. So for the first time in my career, we could no longer meet with our colleagues
  78. in the United States or overseas. In academic medicine, its lifeblood is meeting an interchange
  79. of ideas. And so for the first time, we could not freely interchange ideas as a group. In fact,
  80. I recall a teleconference early on held by the National Institutes of Health, strictly actually
  81. by the Division of Diabetes and Kidney Disease. It was that institute that I'm aligned with in terms
  82. of clinical trials. And it was led by Dr. Robert Starr, a terrific scientist. And as I recall,
  83. there were hundreds of people on that call to just learn about what was going on in other centers.
  84. And people were asking each other, well, what are you seeing out at UCLA? What are you seeing at
  85. Taylor? What are you seeing at Harvard? And so we were literally just communicating to try to
  86. understand what in the world is going on with this virus. Who needs to be hospitalized? What
  87. happens when they're hospitalized? Who needs mechanical ventilation? All of these interactions
  88. had us settle on the idea that this was enormously amenable to risk stratification. People under age
  89. 50 without any medical problems, unless they presented with severe symptoms, they were going
  90. to be fine. Honestly, it was going to be like a head cold. But over age 50, there became a real
  91. risk of hospitalization and death. And the two important endpoints, the two important endpoints
  92. were hospitalization and death. You ask Americans, what are you afraid of? Are you afraid of getting
  93. a cold and being at home for a few days or a few weeks? No. I'm definitely afraid of being
  94. hospitalized and obviously afraid of dying. Why was the hospitalization so frightening?
  95. Because for the first time, patients would be hospitalized. They were put into isolation. They
  96. could never see their loved ones again. Those who died actually never did see their loved ones again.
  97. The workers were terrified. They were wearing personal protective equipment. They had very
  98. reduced visitation to patients in rooms. They started using telemedicine services where the
  99. poor patients were in glass rooms. No one was coming in and seeing them. And the care that
  100. offered was modest. Honestly, it was supportive care until patients needed to go on the respirator.
  101. So to sit in the hospital on oxygen, terrified day by day by day, knowing being able to come in
  102. the room, not being able to see the family, these messages got out to other family members and it
  103. put America on watch with extraordinary fear. Now over the last year, I've published, and I've
  104. managed to get this out despite our incredibly difficult publication cycles, I've published
  105. 40 peer-reviewed papers on COVID-19. That may be more than anybody in America. One of my very
  106. first papers, the title of it, and the paper dealt with what are the important outcomes.
  107. That's hospitalization and death. And when I started to see that scoreboard come up on the
  108. major media channels where it listed positive cases and death, and all Americans remember this,
  109. this was up there almost instantaneously. It came from Johns Hopkins. Instantaneously, it was
  110. cases and deaths. And I kind of wondered, how did they get that information so quickly? That was
  111. amazing. We don't have death certifications and other things that are very rapid at all,
  112. and who could be determining this? But at any rate, it was up there. And what I said was,
  113. I said, what really what we need to know is who's being hospitalized. Because if we can't figure out
  114. who's being hospitalized, and we can't figure out where the hospitalizations are occurring,
  115. we don't know where to allocate resources. So I published a paper on this in the journal that I
  116. edit reviews in cardiovascular medicine. I immediately wanted to reach the American public.
  117. I published an op-ed in The Hill, which is a newsletter out of Washington. And I said,
  118. listen, there's an emergent need. We need the hospitalizations. And I screamed as loud as I
  119. to the administration to say, listen, get an executive order to get the US hospital census
  120. every day so we could see what was going on. It never happened. We got an executive order
  121. to get the positive test results to come in from all the major laboratories and through the hospital
  122. laboratories, because all the tests for the virus were under the emergency use authorization. So it
  123. Johns Hopkins Center. So we knew who was test positive. There was no control over duplicates,
  124. by the way. So if a patient had one or two or three tests, unless the system had a way of
  125. actually filtering out these duplicates, those piled on. And it really didn't take into consideration
  126. who was sick and who wasn't sick. So we just had test positive. And then we had the deaths,
  127. which started to take on a cadence of trailing by about four weeks after the positive test cases.
  128. But that whole death ascertainment was a real mystery to Americans. And what I said,
  129. I think was around March or April, I basically made the statement relatively publicly. I said,
  130. listen, there are two bad outcomes, hospitalization and death. I'm going to put together a team of
  131. doctors and figure out how to stop these hospitalizations and death. I felt compelled
  132. as an academic leader in medicine, if no one in the White House could say that,
  133. no one in the White House task force could say that, if no one in the FDA could say that,
  134. or the NIH or the CDC, and Americans were pouring into hospitals and dying,
  135. no one could make that courageous statement uniquely, and individually, and alone,
  136. I made that statement.
  137. We had, as our country's leadership, an inability to frame the problem. The problem was there was a
  138. virus. It was popping up in clusters in the United States. And most people was causing a cold and
  139. got through it just fine. And other people, it was leading to hospitalization and death.
  140. But we couldn't frame the problem that the virus in some people causes hospitalization and death.
  141. Let's stop it. Let's stop the hospitalizations and death. Let's treat the virus. We could not
  142. frame that problem. Our leaders couldn't frame the problem. I personally didn't have any problem
  143. framing the problem. It's a bad thing. If there was another form of pneumonia out there,
  144. I would have said the same thing. Another form of newly acquired asthma, another form of a
  145. urogenital infection or gastrointestinal infection. Ebola had just been actually in Dallas
  146. a few years earlier. And I think Ebola hurt us in terms of our thinking because Ebola was so
  147. terribly contagious and so quickly fatal that the fear that Ebola created in Dallas was extraordinary.
  148. I forget at our medical center, one time I tried to get in one of the usual doors that I go into
  149. and there was a police officer there. I said, what's going on? He goes, we're here to block
  150. anybody with Ebola from coming in our hospital. We're going to shunt them to Presbyterian Hospital
  151. north of us. When do we shunt patients away from one hospital? The fear that Ebola created because
  152. this idea was terribly contagious and fatal quickly, I think set us on edge. With SARS-CoV-2
  153. virus, what we learned is the average person sits at home for two weeks. There's no immediate
  154. lethality to the virus. In fact, we've got a long window of time to make a diagnosis, organize
  155. treatment and prevent hospitalization and death. SARS-CoV-2 was very different from Ebola.
  156. But we look at other conditions where we readily accept the fact that somebody can fall ill at
  157. home, but if we start treatment early with an infection, we can save the patient. That exists
  158. for community-acquired demonias. It occurs for various forms of staph infection, including
  159. estaphylococcal toxic shock syndrome. It occurs for diverticulitis and abdominal conditions.
  160. It occurs for skin infections, various forms of cellulitis. It occurs for meningitis.
  161. For instance, if someone had a form of meningitis, we wouldn't say, listen, sit at home for two weeks
  162. and then if you're really, really bad and you're having seizures and you can't even
  163. breathe anymore, then come in the hospital and we'll start treatment. So the different,
  164. unique aspect of the medical response to SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19 was for the first time we had an
  165. infectious disease where the medical community settled into a group think, and this was supported
  166. by the NIH, the CDC, the FDA, the American Medical Association, all the medical societies.
  167. It was supported by these societies to tell doctors, don't touch this virus. Let patients stay at home,
  168. let them get as sick as humanly possible, and then when they can't breathe anymore,
  169. then go to the hospital. In fact, it was shocking October 8th when the National Institutes of Health
  170. came out with their first set of treatment guidelines because prior to that, none of the
  171. societies had any treatment guidelines. They actually didn't tell doctors how to treat the
  172. illness. Now, there were suggestions about what should be done in the hospital, but Americans
  173. cared about what was going on when they got sick at home, and the first set of guidelines said,
  174. you get sick at home, don't do anything. Don't do anything. Come into the hospital when you really
  175. can't breathe. Still don't do anything until a patient needs oxygen, then start doing something,
  176. like then actually give the first antiviral drug, which was remdesivir. Well, that's 14 days after
  177. the virus had already started replicating. By that time, the virus is long gone. When people
  178. can't breathe, the problem is micro blood clotting in the lungs. So the federal agencies, the CDC,
  179. the NIH, and FDA were enormously inept in terms of perceiving what this problem was, incredibly
  180. inept in applying any type of judgment or direction to doctors, and what had happened among the doctors
  181. was, we're so terribly frightened, we're not going to do anything unless we have the intellectual
  182. support from our associations, from our federal agencies, from our medical societies, and it was
  183. the opposite of what medicine had always been. Medicine had always been early innovation by
  184. doctors, empiric treatment, small studies, randomized trials, and then sponsored large
  185. randomized trials in that order, and then after large randomized trials, then guidelines bodies
  186. would then look at all those large randomized trials, make determinations of what should be
  187. done, and then those guidelines bodies would issue guidelines, and then the federal agencies
  188. would follow the guidelines. That's exactly what we do for mammography, colonoscopy, treatment of
  189. myocardial infraction, treatment of pneumonia. It always started out with early empiricism,
  190. then getting to guidelines and agency statements years later.
  191. It was a dangerous assumption. To assume there's nothing that one can do for a fatal infection
  192. is an enormous blunder. It's a blunder by citizens. It's a blunder by health responders,
  193. and it's a massive blunder by agencies. Can you imagine, let's make an assumption,
  194. and could our assumption lead to the absolute worst possible outcome, which would be
  195. hospitalization and death? Or we can make another assumption and say, you know what, it's treatable.
  196. We're going to try to treat it. Which assumption is more dangerous? Absolutely. The dangerous
  197. assumption is to do nothing. You could take any example. Let's make an assumption on
  198. traffic safety. You can assume that traffic safety rules and lines and stop signs and seatbelts
  199. do something, or you can assume they don't. Let's try, and let's have a free-for-all out on the
  200. streets right now and see what happens versus pay attention to some rules. We never make
  201. assumptions that are dangerous to people, and the thing that really worried me about this whole
  202. thing is this series of extraordinarily dangerous assumptions. Can you imagine a senior citizen
  203. who has heart and lung disease, who recovered from cancer, has some kidney disease, is handed
  204. a diagnostic test result and says, here, you have COVID-19. Now you have your fatal diagnosis.
  205. Our recommendations, based on the assumption we can't do anything, is go home and wait it out.
  206. When that panic and that fear and that breathlessness and that fever is so overwhelming,
  207. when you can't bear it anymore, then go to the hospital. How do people go to the hospital?
  208. They call family members. They contaminate all their family members. They call EMS,
  209. Uber drivers, taxi drivers. Every hospitalization in America was a super spreader event.
  210. This assumption that there's nothing we could do in giving somebody a fatal diagnosis with no
  211. instructions led to a massive amplification of cases. What we could have assumed and what I did
  212. assume was that there are some principles we can adopt from other precedents. For example,
  213. every form of pneumonia known to man does better if treated early, even influenza.
  214. That's the reason why Tamiflu, as an example, and there's an analogous product,
  215. are FDA approved for the treatment of influenza. They have some partial effect.
  216. Now, do we ever use Tamiflu alone? No, we typically combine it with other drugs
  217. to get patients through the illness. There are supportive respiratory drugs. There are forms of
  218. inhalers, what's called beta agonist inhalers and steroid inhalers. We use those liberally
  219. in forms of emphysema, pneumonia, asthma, allergic pneumonitis. There's other things
  220. that we can do to help patients get through the syndrome. The inflammatory nature of the syndrome
  221. became very interesting. We understand that antihistamines, as an example, Montelucast,
  222. aspirin, steroids, corticosteroids play an important role. If I had an asthmatic at home,
  223. I wouldn't say, listen, sit at home for two weeks until you can't breathe anymore
  224. and then go into the hospital. Are you kidding me? I'd put that asthmatic on inhalers. I probably
  225. would use some empiric antibiotics in that patient and then some steroids and I'd prevent the
  226. hospitalization to the best I could. I approached COVID-19 respiratory illness like any other
  227. with the following thought and we had pretty quickly put together our approach based on
  228. other precedents, including influenza, including asthma, including bacterial pneumonia,
  229. as follows, that this was going to be amenable to risk stratification. Those under age 50 who had
  230. no pulmonary symptoms, they could simply ride through the illness. We had data suggesting that
  231. nutritional deficiencies seem to increase the risk for hospitalization and death.
  232. And so that's where the nutraceuticals came in early on, that there was supportive data,
  233. not curative, but supportive data for zinc, for vitamin D, vitamin C, and interestingly a
  234. polyphenol substance called curcetin or curcetin. There were some others that were considered,
  235. including lysine and N-acetylcysteine. They became what we call the nutraceutical bundle.
  236. So is it kind of reasonable to do that in patients? We'd say, yeah, if it's linked to
  237. mortality, we don't know anything else. There's no harm in these supplements. They're readily
  238. available. People can buy them. So we recommended the nutraceutical bundle for those under age 50
  239. and really no medical treatment. That amounted to roughly of people getting ill at the time,
  240. probably two-thirds to three-quarters of patients really needing no treatment.
  241. However, if someone below age 50 or medical problems presented with severe symptoms or
  242. over age 50 with medical problems, it became clear that the rates of hospitalization and death
  243. were greater than 1%. That was enough. Greater than 1% is kind of a magic number in this whole
  244. equation. That's enough to do something. That's enough to do something. We knew somebody at age
  245. 60, for instance, would face about an 18% chance of hospitalization and death. 18% chance. It's too
  246. In my field, cardiology, our guidelines say anything more than 5% is high risk.
  247. 1% to 5% is moderate. Less than 1% is low risk. In general, for anything less than 1%,
  248. we don't go after it. So in this low risk group, we didn't go after it. But age over 50,
  249. young people presenting with severe symptoms, we went after it. So it was nutraceutical bundle.
  250. What did we know next? The timeline was very interesting. We knew from SARS-CoV-1,
  251. SARS-1, that's 80% similar to SARS-CoV-2. We knew from studies dating back to 2006,
  252. that hydroxychloroquine, a drug that's used for lupus, it's used for rheumatoid arthritis,
  253. it's used for other rheumatologic conditions, including dry eyes, as well as malaria, safe,
  254. was effective in reducing the viral replication of SARS-CoV-1. We knew that.
  255. United States knew that. In fact, that drug was stockpiled by the United States government,
  256. Australian government, some European government. So hydroxychloroquine was onboarded appropriately
  257. and ready to rock and roll. In fact, many countries frontlined hydroxychloroquine for
  258. high risk patients and still do so today. If you go to Athens, Greece, Rome, Italy,
  259. across all of Eastern Europe, Central and South America, hydroxychloroquine is the lead drug.
  260. India and East Asia, hydroxychloroquine is the lead drug. So hydroxychloroquine played a role.
  261. We also knew that by the summer, we knew that ivermectin played a role. This is an anti-parasitic
  262. drug used for scabies and other illnesses, safe and effective. So these drugs, the reason why they
  263. work against the virus is they get inside cells. A lot of antibiotics like penicillin doesn't get
  264. inside the cell, but these what's called intracellular anti-infectives do. Japan had an
  265. influenza drug that had the exact same activity as remdesivir, the first U.S. approved inpatient
  266. IV drug. That drug's called favipiravir. And the Japanese had data to suggest that favipiravir,
  267. like oral remdesivir, would play a role early on. And it was readily approved by five countries,
  268. FDA approved, FDA equivalent approved in those countries to treat COVID-19. So we had hydroxychloroquine,
  269. we had ivermectin, favipiravir. We combine it with either doxycycline or azithromycin.
  270. Those are antibiotics Americans know about. They get inside of cells. They're also intracellular
  271. anti-effectives. And they were slightly assistive in a couple ways. They cut down on some of the
  272. bacterial super infection that would occur in the sinuses and respiratory tract. And we knew from
  273. studies that there was about a 3% overlap between COVID-19 and what's called atypical
  274. pneumonias, which would be mycoplasma, chlamydia, pneumonia. And these would also be responsive to
  275. these. So quickly, hydroxy and azithro, ivermectin and doxy, these were a common favipiravir and doxy
  276. outside the United States, became common intracellular anti-infectives. But those alone
  277. didn't carry the day. Because what happened is the viral replication tipped off what's called
  278. cytokine storm or the immune system going haywire. And so doctors early on in the hospital
  279. started using steroids. And we had some confusing literature. Are they hurting? Are they helping?
  280. And the British helped out a lot with a study, an inpatient study, called the recovery trial.
  281. And the recovery trial picked an odd corticosteroid, which is dexamethasone, in an odd
  282. dose, six milligrams a day. We typically use like 10 milligrams four times a day. So an odd dose,
  283. but did show a small reduction in mortality. And there was a meta-analysis published looking at
  284. hydrocortisone, prednisone. It turned out any steroid worked in some reasonable dose. So in
  285. the United States, we quickly adopt using prednisone, which we use in asthma frequently.
  286. And then another trial in the UK was done called the Stoic trial using inhaled budesonide. Now that
  287. was a very interesting development because there was a maverick doctor, former military doctor,
  288. Richard Bartlett from West Texas. He made the national news by saying, you know what, I think
  289. inhaled budesonide works. And he said this early in the spring. And he was on national news. He
  290. said, you know, I'm trying it. I'm a doctor. I'm trying to help my patients. I am using
  291. empiric treatment. I know there's no randomized trials, but he was doing the right thing.
  292. That's what American doctors all should have been doing is trying to help their patients by
  293. taking empiric choices on drugs that made clinical sense. And he tried it. And indeed,
  294. it worked. The British did the Stoic trial. And sure enough, there was over an 80% reduction in
  295. hospitalization if we just used inhaled budesonide in outpatients with COVID-19. So that made it
  296. on board. Montreal Heart Institute, one of the leading overall randomized controlled trial
  297. centers in the world, got funding from the National Institutes of Health, Gates Foundation,
  298. Canadian authorities, and tested a gout drug, which works against the immune system,
  299. particularly works against the white blood cells and their ability to proliferate
  300. toxic granules and assemble microtubules. That drug is called colchicine. So Americans will
  301. recognize this as a gout drug. They carried out and conducted a prospective randomized trial,
  302. double blind for 30 days, the best quality trial done in all of COVID-19. And they demonstrated
  303. that there was a market reduction in hospitalization and death. So colchicine
  304. came on board. And so the last thing that we really had to look at was blood clotting.
  305. And to this day, there has not been a single outpatient study of drugs to impair platelet
  306. aggregation or antithrombotics. However, we can learn from inpatient studies. And there's been
  307. very good analyses. They all agree. The use of full dose aspirin in the hospital is associated
  308. with reductions in mortality. And the use of full dose anticoagulation, whether that be
  309. injectable, low-molecule heparin, full heparinization, or we can even use oral
  310. anticoagulants as an outpatient, is associated with reductions in mortality.
  311. So what I had been doing is I was working with the Italians, looking at how these concepts are
  312. coming together. And I published a paper in the American Journal of Medicine in August of 2020.
  313. And I have to tell you, when I looked at the literature through the spring, working with
  314. Italians, there had been, when at the time I submitted the paper on July 1st, there were 55,000
  315. papers in the peer-reviewed literature. Not a single one taught doctors how to put drugs in
  316. combination and treat the virus. And it seemed so odd to me. We knew this was a fatal viral
  317. infection. In fatal viral infections, single drugs never work. We knew this in HIV. We knew
  318. we needed multiple drugs in HIV. We knew this for hepatitis C. We knew this for all the other fatal
  319. viral infections. We use drug combinations, never single drugs. And the only thing we could do at
  320. that time is look at studies of single drugs and find signals of benefit, acceptable safety,
  321. and then assemble them into regimens. The clinical trials testing a four to six drug regimen,
  322. those haven't even been planned yet. I mean, the mortality rate would have been astronomical
  323. if somebody didn't step forward and have the courage to publish the concepts.
  324. And I guess that's what my role is in world's history for this. I published a paper called
  325. The Pathophysiologic Rationale for Early Ambulatory Treatment of COVID-19. And it
  326. was published in the August issue of 2020 of the American Journal of Medicine. To this day,
  327. that's the most widely downloaded paper from that journal of all topics. And it went viral.
  328. And literally, it went viral because the world was thirsting for an approach to COVID-19.
  329. Now, quickly after that was published, I was managing all different types of communications
  330. regarding the paper, scientific and then also media related. And we had supportive data now
  331. coming in strong for ivermectin, for colchicine, for inhaled steroids. And Operation Warp Speed
  332. had delivered monoclonal antibodies directed against the spike protein, the pathogenic part
  333. of the virus. And they included a product from Lillie and another one from Regeneron.
  334. So I needed to update the algorithm. And I put that together and published that in the journal
  335. that I edit, Reviews in Cardiovascular Medicine, but with a separate issue and a separate unbiased
  336. editor that I didn't have influence on to make sure that was fully peer-reviewed and vetted in
  337. which it was. And that was published in Reviews in Cardiovascular Medicine in August of 2020.
  338. By that time, there was 100,000 papers in the literature. And outside of my first paper,
  339. there wasn't a single other paper that actually proposed a regimen or a protocol
  340. to treat patients with COVID-19. It was almost extraordinary that we were over nine months into
  341. a fatal pandemic influencing the world, and no one could come up with an original idea
  342. of how to put drugs in combination to treat the virus. We didn't have the Harvard Protocol.
  343. We didn't have the Johns Hopkins Protocol. We didn't have UCLA. We didn't have a World Health
  344. Protocol. So this was extraordinary that all the firepower we had in academic medicine
  345. they just drew a blank. Matter of fact, if you look at these centers across the United States
  346. and across the world, they never opened up COVID treatment centers. They didn't have outpatient
  347. COVID treatment centers. They didn't attempt to study or help a single outpatient with COVID-19.
  348. My contribution was, I think, the ability to publish the ideas. This is very important.
  349. Others had the ideas. Vladimir Zelenko in New York City, an Orthodox Jew, stepped out of the box. He
  350. said, listen, we need to treat this. We can use some drugs in combination, hydroxychloroquine,
  351. ethomyosin, steroids, other drugs. And he started putting drugs into combination. Richard Bartlett
  352. in West Texas, Brian Tyson and George Freed, former NIH scientist, George Freed came out
  353. of retirement. They went to really the crucible of COVID-19 down in the California-Mexico border
  354. and just opened up a clinic and had opened up a tent. People started walking up and they started
  355. treating him. Didier Rayault in Southern France said, listen, we can treat this. Him and a group
  356. of courageous French doctors opened up large clinics in Southern France and started treating
  357. patients. We had Yvette Lozano in Dallas. She took her general practice building by White Rock Lake
  358. and turned it into a COVID treatment center. She converted all her rooms to treating patients with
  359. COVID. Oxygen concentrators had all the drugs. There's pictures of patients lining up on the
  360. to receive treatment. So it was interesting how the innovators were all independent, courageous
  361. doctors, and the academic medical centers drew a blank. They couldn't even pitch a tent to help
  362. people. And to me, it was stunning that the academic medical centers or even the large
  363. community centers couldn't help a single outpatient. They couldn't even provide a patient
  364. of what should be done. The CDC offered guidance like take some Tylenol and if you get really sick,
  365. go to the hospital. The response to a treatable outpatient problem that gave us two weeks of
  366. opportunity to do something, the lack of that response was stunning. And it had to do, in my
  367. view, because of a whole timeline of events that put a chill on the attempts to treat COVID-19.
  368. Doctors in health systems and others, I think, in a relatively short order became actively
  369. discouraged from treating COVID-19. I can tell you I never got an encouraging email or phone call
  370. saying, you know what, do the best you can for your patients. Try to help them. These
  371. hospitalizations are terrible. Please, we support you in using your best judgment.
  372. Or here's a few suggested things that you could do. I never got any of those emails from medical
  373. societies, from others. In fact, there was only one medical organization, just like there's
  374. a few courageous medical doctors, there was one courageous medical organization,
  375. the Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, that saw what was going on.
  376. Interestingly, that organization is an organization that represents independent doctors, not those
  377. employed by hospitals or big medical groups or medical schools, but independent doctors.
  378. They saw what was going on. The first thing that they attacked was the stockpile of
  379. hydroxychloroquine. What happened was the U.S. had an ample supply of hydroxychloroquine.
  380. The only issue was start using it and start putting it into combination with other drugs
  381. to treat COVID-19. It seemed terrific. The first event in the timeline was the FDA
  382. emergency use authorization for hydroxychloroquine. The listeners should understand that an emergency
  383. use authorization would be for a brand new drug or product where there is a great unmet need,
  384. there's not enough time to do all the testing, and that we would do an EUA for that. There's
  385. a government mechanism for that. It's under emergency circumstances. That wouldn't apply
  386. to hydroxychloroquine. It was already fully FDA approved. It was out for 65 years. It was safe.
  387. We had used it in pregnancy. We knew all of its safety profile. Doctors knew how to use
  388. hydroxychloroquine. I used it in my practice. It was just not a big deal. It didn't need an
  389. EUA. The EUA went out on hydroxychloroquine and said this EUA with language in it says
  390. restricting hydroxychloroquine to inpatient use. One of the first big studies out of the block was
  391. done in thousands of patients out of Henry Ford. It was great news that hydroxychloroquine was
  392. associated with a large reduction in mortality if applied early, but the later it was applied
  393. in the hospital stay, it didn't look like the patients were too far gone. I wrote the
  394. response to that in several publications across the United States. One was an op-ed in the Hill
  395. because as I saw this, I basically made the case that emergency use authorization was an
  396. effective restriction. It should be lifted and we should use hydroxychloroquine wide open.
  397. Then something really terrible happened. Keep in mind that the Henry Ford data was very positive.
  398. We had the EUA, the US had stockpiled it. The National Institutes of Health, the allergy and
  399. immunology branch had commissioned a several thousand prospective double blind randomized
  400. placebo control trial of hydroxychloroquine and azithromycin in outpatients with COVID-19.
  401. They had funded the trial. They got the drug supply. They got the placebos.
  402. They set up all the study centers in the United States. We were all ready to go. That was in the
  403. spring. Terrific. Everything is coming together. Then what happened was a fake paper was published
  404. in Lancet. A fake paper. Now, the listeners should understand that Lancet is like the New
  405. Journal of Medicine. It's one of the most prestigious medical journals in the world.
  406. When a paper is submitted, there are so many checks on validity. Where is the paper coming from?
  407. Where are the data coming from? Validating the data. Then it's sent out to peer reviewers who
  408. are independent. They check everything in the paper. They give comments about was this reported?
  409. Was that reported? What have you? There's so many checks on papers and then it comes back and then
  410. an editorial decision is made on a paper and then it's published. That's called peer review.
  411. That ensures to the public that papers are not fake. It's very important. It ensures to the
  412. public that things are not falsified. Well, this paper had authors from Harvard. It came from a
  413. company called Surgesphere that no one really understood what this company was about. The data
  414. large data set of inpatients with COVID-19 from all over the world that had in-depth drug exposure
  415. data. We didn't have that back then. That was from December, January, February. This was just
  416. emerging. We didn't have this. The average age in that paper was 49 years old and the paper implied
  417. that use of hydroxychloroquine was dangerous. Lancet published this falsified paper. Somehow
  418. it fell through all the other peer review and how could they possibly publish it? As soon as
  419. it came out, I knew in two seconds that it had to be wrong. We don't hospitalize people in their 40s
  420. and hydroxychloroquine in fact is associated with benefit not harm. This paper in Lancet
  421. frightened the entire world. It was like a shockwave and there was a whole series of reactions.
  422. People started publishing papers. Oh, hydroxychloroquine could be dangerous. All these
  423. doctors, case closed. Hydroxychloroquine doesn't work. Stop using it. Hospitals started pulling
  424. it off the formularies. It was extraordinary what happened with hydroxychloroquine. In fact,
  425. the U.S. FDA put out language that said hydroxychloroquine shouldn't be used, period.
  426. We're canceling the EUA for inpatient use and it shouldn't be used, period. So that FDA language
  427. then went to the AMA and the AMA says, well, don't use hydroxychloroquine, period. Inpatient
  428. or outpatient. That went to the pharmacy boards. Pharmacy boards said, oh, doctors shouldn't be
  429. using this. So as doctors were treating patients in the community prescribing hydroxychloroquine,
  430. next, you know, patients would show up to the pharmacy and the pharmacist said, sorry,
  431. I can't dispense it. My board says that I can't. And then doctor's licenses started to become
  432. threatened. And then, you know, then all of a sudden there was a cascade of events,
  433. hydroxychloroquine being the lead, that put a chilling effect on anybody's attempt to treat
  434. COVID-19 as an outpatient.
  435. Hydroxychloroquine, I think the fair statements are it's the most studied and utilized
  436. therapeutic in the world for COVID-19 today. There are hundreds and hundreds of studies.
  437. And hydroxychloroquine was appropriately acquired and stockpiled by the U.S. government.
  438. President Trump, who I personally think was very weak in the response, he could not articulate
  439. that hospitalizations and deaths were a serious problem. He could not assemble a team of doctors
  440. who were learning how to treat COVID-19. Neither could the NIH or the CDC or FDA.
  441. We had gross failures from U.S. presidents and the major agencies. Can you imagine today,
  442. to this day, we still have not had a doctor in any position of authority in the United States
  443. who's actually ever seen a patient with COVID-19 and treated them?
  444. None. It is extraordinary what's happened. So President Trump mentioned hydroxychloroquine.
  445. Let's try to give it a shot. And then immediately he was bashed down by his detractors. I thought
  446. it was a very weak statement to begin with, but he was bashed down and people have always held him
  447. up as, oh, it was Trump. If he hadn't mentioned hydroxychloroquine, none of this would have
  448. an enormous effort to suppress early treatment. Hydroxychloroquine was the initial lightning rod.
  449. Remember I mentioned that NIH trial? You know what they did after 20 patients?
  450. Disingenuously, they said they couldn't find COVID-19 patients and they shut down
  451. a several thousand patient trial. They shut it down after 20 patients. That never happens.
  452. They purchased the placebo. They found the study centers. They had the binders. They had the nurses
  453. hired. They had everybody ready to treat Americans with hydroxychloroquine azithromycin,
  454. and they gave up after 20 patients. That was extraordinary. The false paper published in
  455. Lancet was extraordinary. We started to have an array of incredibly flawed papers publishing
  456. exaggerating cardiac effects of hydroxychloroquine. Oh, it could cause dangerous arrhythmias.
  457. There was one that I mentioned in my US Senate testimony. It came from the Mayo Clinic.
  458. It said hydroxychloroquine could cause a scar in the heart. They actually had a heart and they
  459. showed a huge white scar. In fact, I ultimately hunted down that paper, hunted down the authors
  460. and the publisher, and I demanded a retraction. Ultimately, I got a conciliatory letter published
  461. saying, you know what, we're sorry. It doesn't really cause a scar in the heart. So people
  462. started to intentionally try to damage hydroxychloroquine so it would not be used in COVID-19.
  463. Yet other countries held with its steadfast. I mentioned all the countries to this day that
  464. use hydroxychloroquine. And now we have studies, for instance, a study from Iran in 30,000 patients.
  465. A massive study. And they treat about 25% of people appropriately with hydroxychloroquine
  466. in combination with other drugs. And it has a massive reduction in mortality.
  467. So hydroxychloroquine is a mainstay. The prospect of randomized trials, we just isolate on them.
  468. Pre-hospital studies are all positive. Now, is it a game changer? No, I'd say it's about a 25%
  469. reduction in endpoints. But it's a very useful drug to get started early. It's not a single drug.
  470. I wouldn't rely on it alone. But hydroxychloroquine itself, I think, is a poster child for what
  471. happened. Early on in this, I became of national attention. I received calls from the White House.
  472. I was contacted by the US Senate. I became known on social media, which I was never on social
  473. media before. I'm not an immunologist. I'm not a virologist. I'm not an infectious disease doctor.
  474. But I'm a good clinical doctor. And I understand drugs. And I understand drug safety very well.
  475. Hydroxychloroquine had a signal of benefit, acceptable safety. I was contacted by doctors
  476. in Africa that anonymously told me, Dr. McCullough, there are some bad guys raiding the pharmacies
  477. at night. And they're coming in and burning the hydroxychloroquine.
  478. I said, who are these bad guys? They said, we don't know. But they look like they're some type of
  479. mercenaries or operatives. Mysteriously, the second largest hydroxychloroquine producing
  480. plant outside of Taipei burned to the ground. So, hydroxychloroquine as a simple, safe,
  481. and effective drug to this day seems to be a poster child for
  482. worldwide comprehensive efforts to suppress early treatment. And of interest, as the data came on
  483. with ivermectin, ivermectin became the next drug. Now, of interest with ivermectin, there was an
  484. associated group that formed called the Frontline Critical Care Consortium, FLCCC. It was led by
  485. Corey. I identified him and Dr. Paul Merrick. I communicated with him. We had teleconferences,
  486. and I recommended Dr. Corey testify at the second U.S. Senate hearings in December. Also, Dr. J.J.
  487. Roshter from Florida. Dr. Roshter had tried ivermectin in all of his sick patients in
  488. Florida hospitals and was enormously successful in reducing mortality. He published his paper in
  489. one of the best pulmonary journals. So, I gave him tremendous credit for that. So, Dr. Corey and
  490. Dr. Roshter presented what became a very compelling case for ivermectin. If people were sufficiently
  491. turned off by hydroxychloroquine, we could focus on ivermectin. Dr. Tess Larrie, who's considered
  492. one of the world's most prominent analysts in the U.K. published, and Dr. Andrew Hill as well,
  493. published incredible analyses demonstrating that ivermectin reduced mortality in patient and
  494. outpatient. So, a little different than hydroxychloroquine. Hydroxychloroquine takes
  495. a little time to work and probably doesn't work at the very end of the illness, but ivermectin
  496. miraculously worked through the range of illness. And so, the data started coming on for ivermectin,
  497. and there was enough push power for emphasis on the National Institutes of Health guidelines where
  498. made a specific statement regarding ivermectin. They said, you know what, we understand the data
  499. with ivermectin, we can't be for it and we can't be against it. It's the same statement that they
  500. made for the emergency use of Regeneron and Lillie antibodies. The NIH said, we understand the data,
  501. we can't be for it or against it, but at least we got a neutral statement out of them. Hydroxychloroquine
  502. still to this day has a series of negative statements on this, and doctors have literally
  503. had to fight for their medical licenses in order to prescribe hydroxychloroquine. One by one by one,
  504. all of those licenses have been restored, all of those state rulings have been overturned,
  505. all the medical society's been overturned, and hydroxychloroquine is used today. Ivermectin is
  506. widely used today. Both drugs can not only treat the infection early, but they can prevent the,
  507. and there's prophylactic studies, they can prevent, if patients take these drugs periodically,
  508. typically once a week or so, they can prevent COVID-19 from becoming an illness. They are
  509. preventive. In fact, I led one of the very early studies of hydroxychloroquine here in Dallas to
  510. protect our healthcare workers. These drugs are about 90% effective. They are about as effective
  511. as the vaccines in preventing acquiring COVID-19. When someone's ill, I never prescribe these drugs
  512. alone, but I prescribe them in what I call sequence multidrug therapy. But that is the approach
  513. that independent doctors have taken in the United States, and uniquely not a single academic medical
  514. center today, or community medical center today, treats COVID-19 patients as an outpatient with the
  515. goal of reducing hospitalizations and deaths. Why would these centers not want to help their patients?
  516. You know, doctors clearly have a group think, and doctors want intellectual support for what they
  517. do. That's the reason why we meet all the time. That's the reason why we go on rounds together.
  518. That's the reason why we have conferences every day. We want to intellectually support each other
  519. for making decisions on patients for the assurances we're making the right decisions.
  520. And what happened was with the pandemic, all of our meetings were dissolved. We could not meet with
  521. each other anymore. There wasn't a chance to have much intellectual support, and each doctor one by
  522. one had to make a decision. When the next patient called and said, listen, I'm sick with COVID-19.
  523. Can you help me? There was a binary choice. The choice was, no, I'm not going to help you.
  524. Nothing works. There's nothing I can do. Just wait until you get hospitalized. Or the answer
  525. could be, you know what, let me try. And what we found is that binary choice was the biopsy
  526. of who really had courage and who really had excellent clinical judgment. And doctors who
  527. were not confident in their clinical judgment quickly said, you know what, there's nothing you
  528. can do. And they got into that group think. And that could have been 90% plus of doctors had,
  529. A, a lack of clinical judgment and a lack of courage. And what I found in this whole thing is
  530. those two things are rare. And for me, it was just very natural. It was very natural. My father was
  531. one of the first nursing home COVID-19 patients in Dallas. He was the very first one in Presbyterian
  532. Village. He got COVID-19. Had pelvic fracture. He's flat on his back. Then a scared PA says,
  533. your dad's got COVID. He's in a unit. We don't know what's going to happen. His mortality
  534. being completely bedridden with dementia and now COVID, I can tell you he was facing an 80% mortality
  535. of just having COVID just ravage him. So what did I do? Did I make that binary decision of doing
  536. nothing? Of course not. Of course not. If I could ever message any American doctor or any doctor in
  537. the world right now, have some courage and trust your clinical judgment. I did. And that's what real
  538. doctors do. And I will never apologize for that. Of course, my dad was treated with hydroxychloroquine.
  539. He was treated with azithromycin. He was treated with aspirin. We put him on Lovenox is a blood
  540. thinner. The full nutraceutical bundle. Zinc, vitamin C, vitamin D, curcetin. Open the windows.
  541. Get that virus aired out there. And he got really sick as expected. He had dementia. His wishes were
  542. to not go to the hospital, not go on a mechanical ventilator. We treated him right there. It took
  543. 60 days and it was a long illness, but he survived. And that was early. And that taught
  544. me that if I'm willing to do that for my father, I have a Hippocratic oath. And I have a fiduciary
  545. responsibility to my patients. And I refuse to let my patients die of this illness. And when I
  546. the U.S. Senate, I told the American people, I have always treated my high risk patients.
  547. Always. And at the end of my opening statement, I held up the protocol and I told the American
  548. people, I'm not asking for permission to do this. I'm not. But I'm asking for your help.
  549. It's a very, very important statement. Because my patients were appropriately treated to the best
  550. of my ability. And we have 600,000 dead Americans that were not treated appropriately and not
  551. treated to the best of the ability of their doctors. And that will go down in historical
  552. shame for our country. I think it's a travesty that we have 600,000 dead Americans. Vast majority
  553. of them didn't get an ounce of treatment. In fact, there were medical groups that adopted policies
  554. that they weren't going to even answer the calls of COVID-19 patients. And there were millions of
  555. patients needlessly hospitalized. We had data that came in later from Dr. Zelenko in New York
  556. City, Dr. Proctor here in Dallas, who did the same exact thing, showing that our methods could reduce
  557. hospitalization and death by 85%. And I'm sorry, there are no prospective randomized trials of
  558. four to six drugs. There are none planned. So therefore, without any large trials, there
  559. were not going to be any guideline statements. And without any guideline statements, we'll never
  560. have any agency support for this. But this is about courageous doctors saving Americans.
  561. And I would go farther than this. This is about courageous doctors saving the world.
  562. So now we have the Association of American Physicians and Surgeons. We have FLCC
  563. in the United States. We have 250 treating doctors. We have four national telemedicine
  564. services, 15 regional telemedicine services. We're treating 10,000 to 15,000 patients a day.
  565. Forget the U.S. government. Forget what anybody says about this. Americans are getting treatment.
  566. That once our message on early treatment came with two U.S. Senate hearings headed by Senator Ron
  567. Johnson, the hospital started clearing out in the end of December, early January, because early
  568. treatment markedly reduces spread and dramatically reduces hospitalization and death. It's the only
  569. thing that does that. The hospital doesn't save all the patients. I'd say the hospital honestly
  570. has a very modest impact on anything with COVID-19. It's all about early treatment.
  571. The hospital started clearing out. The curves came way down in the United States. That's before
  572. anybody was fully vaccinated. And I testified in the Texas Senate on March 10th. I said,
  573. listen, by standard CDC equations, we're at herd immunity by March 10th. No vaccine effect.
  574. That's actually just treating patients. In Texas, we had 35 treatment centers. Our protocols and
  575. methods work. And I have learned over time, there are so many ways to treat the virus.
  576. I've had a seminar with Dr. Sankaran Chetty in South Africa. He said that hydroxychloroquine
  577. and ivermectin, just like in the United States, have become so politically charged,
  578. doctors were losing their license. In fact, some doctors were jailed and trying to help patients
  579. with COVID-19. He gave up on them. He's treated 4,000 patients, fewer than 10% got hydroxychloroquine
  580. or ivermectin. He treats them. He times the illness. He waits to day eight, and then he
  581. starts inhaled in oral steroids. He starts aspirin, other anti-inflammatories, montelucast,
  582. and the high-risk patients he uses anticoagulants on the back end. And he saved virtually everyone
  583. outside of a handful of patients out of 4,000 sick patients in South Africa. So what I've learned
  584. about this virus is if doctors do anything to try to help patients, they can reduce hospitalizations
  585. and death. And the only reason why this is such a horrible thing in American history is because
  586. doctors fail to act.
  587. The U.S. FDA puts out thousands of drug warnings per year. In fact, Americans know this because
  588. they see a drug advertised on TV and it says, well warnings may cause death, may cause whatever.
  589. So we get thousands of warnings per year. FDA recalls drugs, put black box warnings on drugs.
  590. Doctors still use these drugs. They understand the warnings. About 40% of drugs are used off the
  591. advertising label. So once a drug is older, its original advertising label doesn't really apply.
  592. So we use drugs quote off label all the time. That's common. But what happened in COVID-19
  593. is because of the tremendous fear that settled in over our country, whatever statements came out by
  594. U.S. FDA, the NIH, and the CDC started to take more weight than they ever would in the past.
  595. So if those agencies said something like, don't use hydroxychloroquine,
  596. that emanated down through the AMA and each of the pharmacy boards where they actually
  597. denied patients hydroxychloroquine. In fact, there are probably patients who died
  598. because the pharmacy did not dispense the hydroxychloroquine to patients or the ivermectin.
  599. There are doctors who started getting warning letters stating Dr. Richard Erso from Houston and
  600. another doctor stepped out of his role like I did to treat the virus, got warning letters from the
  601. Texas Medical Board. We're going to examine your license. We understand you're prescribing
  602. hydroxychloroquine trying to help COVID patients. These doctors, Dr. Robin Armstrong,
  603. in Texas, saved dozens of nursing home patients with hydroxychloroquine, azithromycin,
  604. steroids, and blood thinners. The families think he's a hero. The Texas Medical Board
  605. tried to take away his license and so he had to go through hearings and reviews and ultimately
  606. he was restored, although his practice was just damaged, if not destroyed. Emails started coming
  607. down through big medical organizations, don't use hydroxychloroquine. They later on came down and
  608. said don't use ivermectin. In fact, it was flat out, don't do it. We were getting official messages
  609. that basically said don't take care of COVID-19. These are codified in policies and emails by major
  610. medical organizations and it went counter. Can you imagine getting an email saying don't treat
  611. pneumococcal pneumonia, just let him die. Don't treat meningitis, let him die. We've never seen
  612. this. The term that applies to what's going on is wrongdoing by those in positions of authority.
  613. It's called malfeasance. We don't put down a chilling negative message that's going to result
  614. in harm. We don't do that. We don't do that in a civil society. It happened from the NIH, the CDC,
  615. the FDA, major medical groups, these chilling messages. But at the same time, you had AAPS
  616. saying no, this is wrong, treat patients. You had FLCC, a group that became very strong, saying no,
  617. treat patients. In the UK, we had the BIRD group that said, you know what, treat patients. Use
  618. ivermectin-based protocols. We had PANDA develop in South Africa. We had the COVID medical network
  619. develop in Australia. We had treatment domiciliary develop in Italy. So listen, the counter argument
  620. to this of no, we should treat the virus, that counterweight was there. It's one of the reasons
  621. why you're talking to me today. You're not talking to some FDA official who basically wanted
  622. to throw a call on our things. You're talking to me today because you're getting a sense
  623. of truth. You're getting a sense of reality that this virus is treatable. Everything that we've
  624. done for this virus, we've made it far worse by not treating it, keeping patients in fear,
  625. isolation. We've done multiple things that have promoted hospitalization and we've done multiple
  626. things that have actually promoted excess mortality, and it's a shameful time in America
  627. and in the world. Under the dark cloud of fear, the medical administrations
  628. defer to the FDA, the NIH, and the CDC, our three governmental agencies. They defer to that. In
  629. we're following the policy. So let's pick something less charged, like wearing masks.
  630. What sets the mask wearing policy? What the CDC says? Well, they say this, let's follow it.
  631. Same thing is true. If the agencies say don't use hydroxychloroquine or ivermectin, if that's
  632. what they say, that quickly gets down to medical administration and they'll float out an email
  633. saying don't do it. In fact, in a country, we can pick on it, Australia, they have the TGA.
  634. That's the equivalent of the FDA. They have guidelines where they literally have dozens
  635. and dozens of negative statements. Don't do this, don't do that, don't do this, don't do that.
  636. Interestingly, none of these groups actually say what to do. So if you were to take any major
  637. hospital and ask them what email or what policy came down that told doctors what to do, you gave
  638. warnings on what not to do, but what did you tell them to do to take care of clinic patients with
  639. COVID-19? Most of them would say nothing. We don't have, in fact, I testified in the Texas
  640. Senate on this topic and within, on March 10th and within 48 hours, there was draft legislation
  641. to at least give patients some information. Say listen, if the hospitals and doctors aren't going
  642. to do anything, we're going to give you some information. When you get your positive test
  643. result, here is some information on what you can do. Here are the treatment protocols. Here are the
  644. EUA monoclonal antibodies. And again, if hydroxychloroquine or ivermectin is controversial,
  645. okay. But what about the monoclonal antibodies? We haven't talked about these. These are high
  646. tech. They're produced by big pharma. It's big money. It was all NIH funded. They're emergency
  647. authorized by the US FDA. How come America has no window to that? How come there's no updates on how
  648. we're doing with that? How come there's no 1-800 numbers? How sick patients can't find out where
  649. these antibodies are? So it is a global suppression of early treatment, whether they're generic drugs
  650. or newly approved drugs. There is a global suppression on early treatment. Americans will
  651. know. They watch the TV every night. The initial dialogue was, we're scared, wear masks, go in
  652. lockdown, hand sanitizer, okay. Then there were some reports about terrible things going on in
  653. the hospital. Then the reports later on were, wait for a vaccine. There were never regular reports
  654. or updates from any local or national TV source that gave regular updates. This is what you should
  655. do when you get COVID-19 at home. Here are the drugs at work. Here are the protocols. Here are
  656. hotlines so you can get an antibody infusion, which is approved by the FDA. Here are the hotlines so
  657. you can get in research. Research is important. There's still no hotline for Americans to get
  658. in COVID-19 research at a state or a federal level. Stunning. There's been no updates.
  659. When I've dealt with multiple congressional and senate offices, I say, listen, weekly updates
  660. to the American people so they know what to do so they're not so in fear when they're getting
  661. these results. Weekly updates through all public channels. Weekly updates on treatment and then
  662. monthly updates to the guidelines. We have none of that. We are over a year of this and the Americans
  663. have been absolutely let down by the government agencies, by the media. The media, why wouldn't
  664. it come into any local broadcasters' thought process to give their listeners an update on
  665. early treatment? It's a stunning oblivion.
  666. For products to actually be officially advertised, they have to have somebody who's going to pay for
  667. which is a drug company and they have to be FDA approved and they actually have to have an FDA
  668. advertising label and because of the monoclonal antibodies that, as an example, don't have an
  669. advertising label, they can't be, Lilly and Regeneron can't go out and advertise for them.
  670. But because they're EUA, from a public health messaging perspective, they should be equally
  671. featured as vaccines. Now, vaccines are emergency use authorized. All we hear about is vaccines
  672. morning, noon, and night. Why do we hear a massive messaging about vaccines? Americans
  673. ought to think about this. Why are vaccines featured by the CDC, NIH, and FDA morning, noon,
  674. and night, by the media morning, noon, and night, by every medical center morning, noon, and night?
  675. I can tell you, as a doctor in a medical center, all our emails are about vaccination.
  676. Why are they featured in every single public health communication? Needles in all the arms.
  677. In fact, shockingly, in the Dallas area, in October, this is long before the vaccine trials were
  678. ever completed, if you were to call CVS or Walgreens, the answering machine would say,
  679. to offer the COVID-19 vaccine when it comes available. We have never advertised for a product
  680. before it comes available. In fact, it's against the U.S. laws regarding drugs and biological
  681. products. So things started to go off the rails very early on. And it seems like there was a
  682. playbook. The playbook was to suppress any hope of treatment, a complete oblivion to treatment
  683. through all the entities we've mentioned, and at the same time, prepare the population for mass
  684. vaccination. These two are very tightly linked. And now with mass vaccination, we see things we
  685. have never seen. Advertising the vaccine before it's even available. Massive messaging for the
  686. vaccine, far out of proportion to treatment. You have two EUA products. One you never hear about.
  687. Americans are starved of these monoclonal antibodies. In fact, they're grossly underused.
  688. They could have saved probably tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of lives,
  689. and they're being squashed. The Lilium Regeneron products are being squashed, but the Pfizer,
  690. Moderna, and J&J products are being massively promoted and advertised. Americans ought to be
  691. kind of wondering, why is that happening? Why are we defocusing on the sick patient and focusing
  692. on well people? All the messaging about contagion control and vaccines are about well people. Why
  693. can we not focus on the sick COVID patient? That was my message to the Department of Health and
  694. Human Services in Texas. But it goes further than that. It goes further than that.
  695. The vaccine registrational trials strictly excluded pregnant women, women of childbearing
  696. potential, COVID recovered patients, patients who had prior COVID antibodies. Strictly excluded them.
  697. By regulatory science, if all the registrational trials excluded a group of patients, we would
  698. never use that product in that group once it gets on the market. Never. Never. We never violate that.
  699. Why? Because we don't know if it's going to work, and we don't know if it's going to be safe. We
  700. never do that. There's another level. With pregnant women, our special group in research
  701. and medicinal products. It's very important for Americans to know this. In pregnant women,
  702. for vaccination, we only vaccinate with safe, inactive products. Inactive flu, tetanus,
  703. diphtheria, and pertussis. That's it. We would never inject a biologically active substance
  704. in a pregnant woman's body. That could be dangerous. Never. And with the vaccines,
  705. as soon as they came out, the CDC, FDA, media, everybody said vaccinate them. Vaccinate them.
  706. Well, the U.S. FDA regulatory guidance and vaccines, and there have been modern vaccines,
  707. you don't have to pick the old ones. I mean, we've had modern vaccines, shingles vaccines,
  708. hepatitis B, meningococcal vaccines, demand a minimum of two years of safety data. Two years.
  709. Bi-regulatory. In fact, these are kind of written and codified into the regulatory rules for the
  710. manufacturers. That was all thrown out and said two months. For COVID, two months. So two months
  711. of observational data. This idea that we could vaccinate people that were not even tested
  712. in the trials, that has never been done before. We have never just thrown a vaccine at somebody
  713. without having any data. None. So the very first pregnant woman that was vaccinated here in the
  714. United States, it was done with no knowledge of safety and no knowledge of efficacy. And the
  715. argument that we've heard, the argument that we've heard is, well, COVID-19 is a bad illness.
  716. 600,000 people have died. The vaccine could help them. We should give it a shot. Come on,
  717. we should just give it a shot. While that 600,000 died, I've already told you 85% of that was
  718. preventable with early treatment, which was actively suppressed and squashed. And not only that,
  719. is if this vaccine can help them, the vaccine better be safe. It better be safe. And my comments
  720. on the vaccine are safety, safety, safety. Let's see it. Let's see it. And Americans, just like
  721. should have been getting weekly updates on treatment innovations, Americans should have
  722. been getting weekly updates on vaccine safety. Very important. Weekly updates from our federal
  723. officials on safety. Super important. Those two things are probably the two largest acts of
  724. malfeasance in all of medical regulatory history. It will go down in the history of malfeasance,
  725. wrongdoing by those of authority. How come there was no updates on treatment and no
  726. promotion of early treatment to reduce hospitalization and death? And now when we
  727. release the vaccine, why are there no safety updates? Why are there no attempts for risk
  728. mitigation in terms of making the vaccine program safer? How do we have all these vaccines? How do
  729. we know we can vaccinate pregnant women? We know because of years and years and years of safety data.
  730. Before a vaccine has ever been injected into a pregnant woman, it's probably been tested for
  731. decades before we try it in a pregnant woman. We would never out of the box take a brand new
  732. technology that's never been tested before, ever. And we know that the vaccine technology produces
  733. the dangerous spike protein. It produced the Wuhan spike protein, the spicule on the ball of the
  734. virus itself, which damages blood vessels and causes blood clotting. And all of them do. We
  735. would never unleash that into a pregnant woman's body. Americans have to understand something is
  736. very wrong what's going on, what's going on now in the world. These are examples, are clear-cut
  737. examples of wrongdoing that is at such a high level. The group think is in the wrong direction
  738. in such a consistent and overwhelming way that people are being harmed in an extraordinary fashion.
  739. Well, when I published the first paper in the American Journal of Medicine taught doctors how to treat COVID-19.
  740. Now it could have been somebody else. If Dr. Zelenko had the publication power, he could have
  741. done it. Or Dr. Proctor could have done it. Or Dr. Didier Rialt could have done it. Or Brian Freed,
  742. Brian Tyson or George Freed. It turned out that I was the person who had sufficient academic authority
  743. to do this. And I have authority. I take complete responsibility for doing this. I did it uniquely,
  744. the only person in the world to do this. Others actually may have been trying and those papers
  745. may have been suppressed by editors. They probably were, because we found suppression of early
  746. literature all over. It became impossible to publish papers. It was really hard. I may have
  747. just been the strongest and the most courageous doctor in the world to do that. But I did it.
  748. And the feedback I was getting was tremendous. It's like, of course, this makes sense. I'm so glad
  749. this got into the literature. It came out in electronic print in August and then it came into
  750. hard print in January. When it hit January and it landed in all the medical libraries in the world,
  751. that's when things really heated up. And I do have to tell you that I got letters to the editor
  752. that came into the American Journal of Medicine. And Dr. Joe Alpert out of Arizona is the editor.
  753. Joe has let every one of those letters come to me for a response. The tenor of the letters is
  754. quite interesting. And they've come from Duke University. They've come from McGill, from
  755. Monash University in Australia. They've come from Brazil. The tenor of the letters is,
  756. Dr. McCullough, you can't do this. You can't treat COVID-19 patients.
  757. And it's the most interesting. My response is, doctor, please have courage.
  758. Let's do away with therapeutic nihilism. Let's join together and treat COVID-19 patients
  759. compassionately to reduce hospitalization and death. And we can do this and I can do it. And
  760. we even have more supportive data. So every time they say, oh, this drug doesn't work,
  761. and I'll say, well, here's five more studies that do. Hydroxychloroquine, we're up to hundreds of
  762. studies that shows that it works. Ivermectin, hundreds of studies. Steroids, dozens of studies.
  763. Anticoagulants, at least a dozen studies. We are so well supported in the concepts
  764. of treating COVID-19 that every time one of these letters comes in, I have a little fun with it
  765. because the position of strength is enormous. My thoughts and my positions and my statements over
  766. time are becoming progressively stronger and progressively more powerful. And the detractors
  767. sense that. The feeling of fear, intellectual fear from my adversaries is palpable. I feel it
  768. every day. And when that first paper came out in the American Journal of Medicine,
  769. my daughter said, Daddy, why don't you make a YouTube video? I said, I don't want to do
  770. social media. That's for kids. I just, I don't have time for this. She taught me how to do it.
  771. It was PowerPoint. I literally just recorded my face down the lower corner. I wore a tie, four
  772. slides saying, listen, it's Americans, it's Italians. We looked at safety. We looked at
  773. efficacy. We looked at all the available data. We think this is the best way to put together the
  774. drugs. We had four slides on this. It got up on YouTube. It went absolutely viral, went absolutely
  775. viral. And then I got a message that said, you violated terms of the community and it was struck
  776. down. Then I got a call from the US Senate. So I told you, I knew something was going on because
  777. I'd never been called by the White House before. I'd never been called by the Senate before.
  778. People in Washington were following this. They were stakeholders in Washington who, in a sense,
  779. knew that something is going wrong here, that this viral infection could be treated,
  780. but they were kind of waiting for someone in the academic community to step forward and literally
  781. say it can be treated. I was the first one to say, we can treat this. We can do this. It's very
  782. important to be able to make this statement. We can do it. Based on what? Based on my judgment.
  783. Based on my judgment. Supported by the available science, but more importantly, based on my
  784. judgment. And so I ended up contracting COVID-19 myself in October. My wife came home with it.
  785. She got sick before I knew it got sick. It got into my lungs. I was in approved protocols.
  786. I quickly got into a protocol. It's hard, but I was able to find a protocol. I was on
  787. hydroxychloroquine, azithromycin, a nutraceutical bundle per the protocol. I later on needed
  788. steroids because of lung involvement. But I wanted to show America that you could get COVID-19
  789. and have some medical problems, which I do, and be able to get through it without being hospitalized.
  790. So on treatment day six, illness day eight, beautiful sunny day in Dallas, Texas, I went out
  791. far away from anybody else and I went jogging. And I was really short of breath. I'll tell you,
  792. I'm a pretty strong runner. I was short of breath because of the COVID involvement in my lungs,
  793. but I ran all the way to a park. I made a video in the park and then I made it all the way home.
  794. And I had fun with it. In fact, I played that M&M music that said, the recovery video, if any of you
  795. watch M&M, it said, I'm not afraid. And I just videoed myself and said, I'm not afraid of COVID-19
  796. and that video. That video was struck down and then ultimately had to get restored. I said,
  797. wait a minute. YouTube is playing a role here in addition to all the other stakeholders in suppressing
  798. any early treatment. In fact, the early treatment doctors started to become scrubbed from Twitter,
  799. from YouTube, from social media. And then ultimately YouTube came out with a very clear message.
  800. They said, listen, we are only going to have information that is in line with the CDC, NIH,
  801. and FDA, which say do nothing. And everything else is going to be considered misleading.
  802. And we're making the judgment. It's our call on what's misleading and what's not. But if it's
  803. pretty easy to be in line with the CDC, NIH, and FDA because they say to do nothing. So if the social
  804. media platform is to do nothing for early treatment and suppress early treatment, which it is,
  805. the major media is to suppress early treatment. So I still go back and say, who's responsible?
  806. I'd say the government agencies. In this period of crisis, if we're going to revert to our government
  807. agencies and our task force, and if our presidents can't be wise enough to even choose doctors who
  808. have ever even seen a patient and know how to treat it, if they're not wise enough to pick doctors
  809. who can treat COVID-19, we'll never have agencies that say we can treat COVID-19. And if we don't
  810. have agencies do that, then nothing else is going to follow. If the doctors and people we pick have
  811. never seen COVID-19, they're scared of it. They don't know how to treat it. And the only thing
  812. they can comment on is wearing masks and social distancing and vaccination. That's all that America
  813. is going to have. So America's response to COVID-19, the official response has basically been to well
  814. people. Wear masks, clean vaccinated, and America has offered nothing to the sick person. And when
  815. they get in the hospital, we haven't seen much feature on that. The drugs are pretty weak,
  816. remdesivir, convalescent plasma, tozolizumab, steroids, anticoagulants. You don't hear much
  817. about it, and it's honestly too late. Recently, a Harvard group, the Stop COVID group, had published
  818. those sick enough to get in the ICU. The 28-day mortality is 38%. Unacceptably high. Going into
  819. hospitals is a nightmare. I get desperate calls from all over the United States, thank goodness
  820. for the major telemedicine and regional telemedicine networks that basically have taken over.
  821. They're the real heroes of the COVID-19 pandemic. Hospitals are empty now.
  822. Hospitals here in Dallas used to have 200, 300 patients at a time. Now they've got 10, 5. The
  823. other day in Texas, we hit zero deaths. Zero. So early treatment is going to be one of the great,
  824. great stories that historians, and they'll reach out to Ben Marble, who started MyFreeDoctor.com.
  825. Ben Marble, that whole telemedicine is run strictly by charity. People donate money,
  826. and they get patients their drugs, and they prescribe hydroxychloroquine, ivermectin,
  827. steroids, and other drugs, and put them in the combination. They follow protocols. Terrific.
  828. They're seeing thousands of patients by telemedicine every day. So Americans are getting
  829. treated, and so the word is out. People talk to each other. Americans, it's interesting,
  830. they understand that the media and our agencies are not leveling with them. They understand that.
  831. I did a seminar early on because I had treated a very prominent African-American minister here in
  832. Dallas, and him and his wife were sick. He didn't tell me about his wife, and she was testing
  833. negative. She wasn't a patient of mine. He got what's called sequence multidrug therapy. He got
  834. really sick. He's got heart failure, diabetes, emphysema, obesity, kidney disease, survives at
  835. home sick for about 10 days. I'm not saying the drug therapy is perfect, but I saved him from
  836. being hospitalized or dying. His wife, no treatment, hospitalized, diagnosed late, was in the hospital
  837. for five weeks, came home on oxygen. That virus ravaged her lungs. It was awful. They had the same
  838. illness, and so he became activated. He said, Dr. McCullough, can you do a webinar for African-American
  839. churches nationwide? I did a webinar, and I presented my approach, and you know what the
  840. comments were? He said, Dr. McCullough, we knew the government was lying to us. We knew this was
  841. treatable. We knew it all along. People know this.
  842. It's the individual finance way. There are practices that have come on. I've gotten calls
  843. in Dallas. Dr. McCullough, can you share your protocols? We want to do this. The treating
  844. doctors really have interdigitated, and we informally formed a group called C-19,
  845. where we get about four to five email updates a day of really critical updates on treatment.
  846. It is international. We have former heads of state involved in C-19. We have Nobel Prize winners
  847. involved in C-19, hundreds and hundreds of American doctors. There now is a published list
  848. of treating doctors in the United States, 250 across all 50 states. Texas has 35 of them.
  849. Americans are finding their way despite suppression of early treatment. It's one of the great
  850. stories, and I'll never forget when I testified in the Texas Senate on March 10th. Myself and Dr.
  851. Richard Urso, another leading early treating doctor in Houston, the chairwoman of the committee at
  852. one of the side conversations said, yeah, my husband got COVID-19, and he got really sick,
  853. and I'm so glad he got early treatment. We found a doctor that was willing to prescribe
  854. any other drugs, and I didn't throw out the zinger in front of the Texas media,
  855. but I felt like saying, you know, do you have to be a chairperson of the Department of Health
  856. and Human Services to get some treatment? What about these poor people in South Dallas and San
  857. Antonio and Houston? What about people who are not so privileged? Do you know 85% of some of our
  858. patients hospitalized here are Black or Hispanic? Who's helping them out? We should be having early
  859. treatment centers. They've been denied treatment. It's heartbreaking. Hispanics and African
  860. Americans have double the mortality of Caucasians.
  861. We have actually a law in America. It's called the 21st Century Cures Act,
  862. and what this says is that the FDA and doctors and others trying to decide on treatment
  863. evaluate the totality of information, including that little anecdote about your mom and the
  864. caretaker, as well as case series, large prospective cohort studies, retrospective
  865. cohort studies, hospital studies, outpatient studies, and then large prospective randomized
  866. double-blind placebo-controlled trials. But in a virus, single drugs themselves are very difficult
  867. to prove. If we required that for HIV, we'd have no treatment. HIV, we quickly realized we need
  868. three or four or five drugs. Everyone understands this. With COVID-19, I never thought a single
  869. drug was going to work. Hydroxychloroquine? No, not alone, but in combination. And it was that
  870. thinking. It takes kind of superior thinking that somehow doctors just lost their ability to think.
  871. Think a cancer doctor would say, oh, there's one pill that cures cancer? Never. It's always
  872. combination cancer therapy. So with this, with hydroxychloroquine, we're now at this stage,
  873. obviously, we have hundreds and hundreds of trials. We even have large randomized trials.
  874. I've published with Dr. Joe Ladapo, only prospective randomized control trials show benefit.
  875. So at every level, we meet the evidence grade to use hydroxychloroquine. At every level,
  876. we meet the evidence grade to use ivermectin. Not so much evidence, but good enough in the
  877. antibodies. We have the same for steroids. The biggest and best trial in all of COVID-19 is
  878. colcarona. I mentioned the colchicine. Shockingly, colcarona, the best trial, 4,000 patients,
  879. double-blind randomized placebo-controlled trial, the best quality that exists, rejected by New
  880. England Journal of Medicine, rejected by JAMA, rejected by Lancet. There is a global suppression
  881. on any early treatment. I want the listeners to understand how global this is. If we were to go
  882. north into Canada, doctors are threatened that their licenses will be examined or take away
  883. if they attempt to treat an outpatient with COVID-19. They are told this in Canada. In
  884. northern EU, the same is true. Dr. Didier Rialt, who is trying to innovate with hydroxychloroquine
  885. in France in period times, has been under degrees of threat of arrest or partial arrest or house
  886. arrest, almost as if we're back in the dark ages. In Australia, in April, they put on the books in
  887. Queensland's Australia, a doctor who tries to help a patient with hydroxychloroquine could be
  888. penalized up until the point of going into jail for six months for helping in South Africa. They
  889. put some doctors in jail for trying to help patients with ivermectin. Listen, the powers
  890. that are out there that want to suppress early treatment and cause as much fear, suffering,
  891. hospitalization, and death are not by happenstance. These are powerful forces that have created such
  892. fear among doctors. People are fearful they're going to lose their careers, their livelihood,
  893. their medical license. People are afraid of going to jail
  894. and just helping their fellow man get through COVID-19. This is extraordinary. Historians should
  895. go look through the course of time. You know, the very first doctor who tried to help a polio
  896. patient survive polio with the iron lung machine, which became really a stable ICU device, was
  897. thrown off medical staff. Throw them off staff.
  898. I'd look very carefully at the work building upon other investigative reporters. So, Dr. Peter
  899. Bregan has a book called COVID-19, The Global Predators, We Are the Prey, and it has a living
  900. document. He's already pre-released the manuscript, and he's releasing updates. Now,
  901. he's older, and he's kind of worried the story won't get out at his age, but I believe he's up
  902. to 900 documents. The whole story is not put together, but it is substantial and shows the
  903. interconnections of the stakeholders involved. Dr. Nicholas Wade, who was featured on a recent
  904. Tucker Carlson as an investigative reporter, he has assembled quite a story. And then Whitney Webb,
  905. who's a young investigative reporter, has published some striking things. All three of these,
  906. and as well as many more, are linking two important concepts. The suppression of early treatment,
  907. and even probably the soft attenuation of in-hospital treatment
  908. to make the problem worse than what it is.
  909. Many methods to make the case count look higher than what it is make the mortality
  910. numbers look worse than what they are. Many methods to create the reaction out of proportion
  911. to the reality, so lockdowns, fears, economic suffering, what have you. All of these things
  912. making the pandemic way worse than what it is to have that occur. More fear, suffering,
  913. hospitalization and death, loneliness, lockdown, in order to promote mass vaccination. These two
  914. mass vaccination at all costs. The world must be mass vaccinated and human beings on earth
  915. ought to understand at this point in time what we're seeing is unprecedented. It became known
  916. the virus was going to be amenable to a vaccine somewhere around April, May, and at that point
  917. in time therapy was suppressed. Everything, nothing could be published. Everything, the fake
  918. prepare the population for vaccination. Once the vaccines come out, they're short tracked,
  919. there's all kinds of enthusiasm regarding it. Needles in all the arms, trucks rolling, Americans
  920. cheering, and then the mass vaccination program starts off. And then before we know it, we're
  921. vaccinating pregnant women. Why are we doing that? That can't be safe. Now we're going to vaccinate
  922. COVID recovered patients. Wait a minute, they have complete and robust permanent immunity. No
  923. one's ever challenged the immunity of a COVID recovered patient. Why are we vaccinating them?
  924. And then it keeps going and going. At first we vaccinated high risk people. I didn't really
  925. understand vaccinating young healthcare workers because they weren't at risk. There were never
  926. any hospital outbreaks in the United States. The only thing that was clear nursing home workers
  927. gave it to nursing home patients. We knew that. So nursing home workers should have been vaccinated
  928. and that may be high risk people and we should call it a day. I always estimated maybe 20 million
  929. people need to be vaccinated, but that didn't seem to satisfy the vaccine stakeholders, which are
  930. Pfizer, Moderna, J&J, AstraZeneca, and any others that come forward, the CDC, the FDA, and the NIH,
  931. and the White House. Massive vaccine stakeholders. You could throw in Gates Foundation,
  932. World Health Organization. You could throw those in as well. Massive stakeholders and they wanted
  933. everybody to be vaccinated without exception. No one will escape the needle. We've actually never
  934. had this before and the vaccine process is extraordinary. There's a consent form. It says
  935. this is investigational. We don't know if it's going to work. There's only two months of data.
  936. The side effects could be a sore arm all the way to death and we don't know. Sign here. We need
  937. your identifying information. We need a barcode on the vial. We need you identified and now you're
  938. in a database. You're vaccinated. And so this mass vaccination is extraordinarily concerning.
  939. We never vaccinate into the middle of a pandemic. Never. We've never had an effective vaccine for
  940. respiratory virus, including influenza. It's only modestly effective. We knew from the published data
  941. that the attack rates in placebo and the vaccine arms were less than 1%. So we know that the vaccine
  942. can have a less than 1% effect in the population. Why would it be any different than the clinical
  943. trials? We knew from the clinical trials that it didn't stop COVID-19 so people can get COVID-19
  944. anyway. Why would be this incredible drive to vaccinate everybody? And now, oh my lord, now
  945. the vaccine within a few months has been completely weaponized. Now travel is related to the vaccine.
  946. People can't go to school without the vaccine. People are losing their jobs without the vaccine.
  947. Believe me, there is something very, very potent in this vaccine. It should be disturbing to
  948. everybody. The word vaccine ought to be the most disturbing word that they have seen. Now we have
  949. 12-year-old children who are told they can decide on their own whether or not they could take a
  950. vaccine. So about 70% of my patients are vaccinated. I'm very pro-vaccine. I've taken all the vaccines
  951. myself, about 70%, and they were all vaccinated in December, January, and February. But as we sit
  952. here today in May, we have over 4,000 vaccine-related deaths and over 10,000 hospitalizations. The limit
  953. to shut down a program is about 25 to 50 deaths. Swine flu, 1976, 25 deaths. They shut down the
  954. program. It's not safe. All the vaccines in the United States per year, what ambulance gets
  955. reported in the database is about 200. And we're talking about vaccinating probably 500 million
  956. injections. Here in the United States, at 100 million people vaccinated, this is far and away
  957. the most lethal, toxic, biologic agent ever injected into a human body in American history.
  958. And it's going strong with no mention of safety by our officials, with wild enthusiasm by our
  959. hospital administrators, with doctors supporting it. Doctors are saying now they won't see patients
  960. in their waiting room without the vaccine. This problem, COVID-19, was actually from the very
  961. beginning. That's what Whitney Webb said. She goes, COVID-19 is actually about the vaccine.
  962. It's not about the virus. It's about the vaccine.
  963. I think it's about what the vaccine means. And Whitney Webb gets credit for this. Back in April,
  964. she said, aha, I figured this out. This is what globalists have been waiting for. They've been
  965. waiting for a way of marking people. That you get in a vaccine, you're marked in a database. And this
  966. can be used for trade, for commerce, for behavior modification, all different purposes. And you've
  967. seen it right here in Dallas. You can't go to a Dallas Mavericks game unless you're vaccinated.
  968. You've had people say, listen, you have passports. You had colleges today announce that they're not
  969. going to give any credit to natural immunity. Every scientist in the world knows that the
  970. natural immunity is way better than the vaccine immunity. If it's about COVID, why don't we have
  971. recovered people freely go to college? Why do we have to have faulty vaccine immunity be the
  972. priority and have natural immunity not count? See, these types of things make me think that
  973. Whitney Webb is correct. This is actually about marking. The vaccine is a way of marking people.
  974. It's a way of starting to assert efforts to create compliance, behavior control. Don't forget,
  975. the vaccine is just a starter. Now there's going to be updates. There's going to be boosters that
  976. prepping people for this. There's going to be more. The vaccine manufacturers are all linked.
  977. They're all uniquely indemnified. What medical product is there indemnification where something
  978. happens to you? You don't have any recourse. You know, a woman gets vaccinated, a pregnant woman.
  979. She has no maternal fetal rights. Something happens to her or her baby. She's out of luck.
  980. This is extraordinary what Americans are doing. It's absolutely extraordinary what's being
  981. thrust upon us now.
  982. I think this whole pandemic from the beginning was about the vaccine. So I think all roads lead to
  983. the vaccine and what it means. There are already places in Southeast Asia and Europe, they're
  984. laying the groundwork for compulsory vaccination. I mean compulsory. That means somebody pins you
  985. down to the ground and puts a needle in you. That's how bad stakeholders want vaccination.
  986. Listen, that's not of cost. You don't have to pay for it. It's all provided.
  987. There are people or stakeholders, they do want a needle in every arm. This needle in every arm is
  988. a very important moniker. Why? Why do you want a needle in an arm? Let's take COVID recovered.
  989. Can't get the virus. Can't receive it. It has nothing new. Why would they ever want a needle
  990. in the arm of a COVID recovered patient? Why? Three studies show higher safety events.
  991. The tension that Americans are feeling right now as they're trying to keep their jobs and go to
  992. work is they know they can die of the vaccine. That's the problem. If the vaccine was like water
  993. and you just got it, no side effects, who wouldn't take it? Say, hey, I'll comply.
  994. They got my social security number anyway in a database. I'm already marked. I'll just get
  995. marked. But no, there's something very unique about this vaccine. It's something about injecting
  996. something into a body that is so important to stakeholders that it doesn't matter.
  997. Kids 12 years old told they can make their own decision on this and it could be their fatal
  998. decision? Think about that. North Carolina just passed that. Oh, kids 12 years old can
  999. decide on their own. There are over 4,000 dead Americans. There's over 10,000 dead people in
  1000. Europe that die on days one, two, and three after the vaccine. Why are we pushing this in a way where
  1001. people's jobs and their education and livelihood decide on a decision that's potentially fatal?
  1002. The tension, you can cut it with a knife. There are parents that say, listen, I want my kid to
  1003. go to college this year, but I don't want to lose him to the vaccine. They know what's going on.
  1004. The internet is full of these cases. Blood clots, strokes, immediate death. Now, I'm fortunate I
  1005. have not directly lost a patient to the vaccine. I told you most got vaccinated in December, January,
  1006. February. Based on the safety data now, I can no longer recommend it. I can't recommend it.
  1007. It's passed all the thresholds to being a safe product. It's not a safe product. None of them
  1008. are. It's not just Johnson & Johnson. In fact, more of the safety events in the United States
  1009. have occurred with Moderna and Pfizer. There are now papers written by prominent scientists
  1010. calling for a worldwide halt in the program. There are prominent virologists, many of them,
  1011. including Nobel Prize winners, who have said, listen, if we vaccinate people and we create a
  1012. very narrow, incomplete library of immunity, which is what the vaccine is, the vaccines are
  1013. all targeted to the original Wuhan spike protein, which is long gone. That's extinct. Patients are
  1014. getting vaccinated to something that doesn't even exist anymore. That Wuhan spike protein is gone.
  1015. We're hoping the immunity covers the other variants, but that narrow immunity is a setup.
  1016. It's just like giving everybody a narrow spectrum antibiotic. If you did that, what would happen?
  1017. We'd grow up superbugs. There are warnings out there saying, don't do this. Don't vaccinate
  1018. the entire world. All we're going to do is set ourselves up for a superbug that's going to
  1019. really wipe out populations. So for many reasons, the vaccine, indiscriminate vaccination, is a
  1020. horrendous idea. It's a horrendous bioweapon that's been thrust onto the public and it's going to
  1021. cause great personal harm, which it already has. Thousands of people have lost their lives. I've
  1022. patients lose their family members, lots of them. I've filled out a safety report on a patient who
  1023. developed blood clots after one of the Pfizer-Moderna vaccine. And I'm telling you, it took half an hour
  1024. to do it. There was many pages and each page said, warning, federal offense punishable by
  1025. severe fines and penalties if I falsified a report. All those thousands of Americans that
  1026. have died with the vaccine and hospitalizations in the database, I think are real. And they are far
  1027. beyond anything we've ever seen. And as a doctor and as a public citizen, I am extraordinarily
  1028. concerned about the vaccine. The vaccine center right down the street here is empty. I drive past
  1029. it every day. Americans know they're talking to each other. The vaccine's not safe. And now the
  1030. effort is the vaccine stakeholders want kids without parental guidance and now they want to
  1031. be in the church. Americans and people worldwide should be extraordinarily alarmed.
  1032. My personal situation, professional situation, is a position of strength. And those who have
  1033. attempted in any way to pressure, coerce, or threaten me with reprisal have paid an
  1034. extraordinary price. And I think that's an important message to get out there. There is a
  1035. of compassionate care and of the Hippocratic Oath and of the fiduciary relationship that a
  1036. doctor has to a patient and a prominent doctor has to a population that supersedes all of those
  1037. other ill intents. And what I say is bring them on.
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