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- I'm Dr. Peter McCullough, and I'm an internist and cardiologist and academic physician, professor
- of medicine at Texas A&M College of Medicine on the Baylor Dallas campus.
- And in February of 2020, like many physicians, I was really taken by storm with the news that a
- tremendously contagious virus was emanating out of Wuhan, China, and it looks like the United States
- was in the crosshairs. In the beginning, in my clinical practice, I really didn't have any
- viewpoint about prior viral pandemics, and some had mentioned prior influenza pandemics. If we go
- back to the 1300s, there was, you know, plagues that occurred across Europe. But point in fact,
- we were largely and very quickly thrown into emergency mode. And so what happened was a whole
- series of communications within health systems that really dealt with protection of the doctors
- and nurses, and Americans were introduced to a term called PPE, or personal protective equipment.
- And most of our task force meetings and calls really didn't have to do with sick patients. It
- had to do with protection of the health care workers and doctors. So I got a sense early on
- that fear, group fear, was a major driver in behavioral response to the pandemic.
- My research endeavors and my research life before COVID-19 centered on the interface between
- heart and kidney disease. I'm the president of the Cardio-Reno Society of America. I'm considered
- the most published person on this topic in the world in history. I chair many FDA-approved
- clinical trial data safety monitoring boards. In fact, I've probably seen and examined more
- safety trial data than any doctor in current American medicine. So I'm well grounded
- in chronic disease, epidemiology, and randomized trials. But for COVID-19, our major viewpoint
- that we had early on, or at least for me with my prior Cardio-Reno collaborations was with
- Italian doctors. And so we were starting to email each other in terms of what is going on
- in the metro Milan area. And Milan and then down to Siena and Tuscany. And we quickly started to
- get an understanding that this illness was like a upper respiratory infection, like a common cold.
- And for a majority of individuals, it was like the common cold. However, in some individuals,
- it could progress to what we call the adult respiratory distress syndrome, where there's an
- overwhelming attack against the lungs. Patients lost their ability to breathe and exchange
- oxygen and carbon dioxide, and then required mechanical intubation. So this was unlike any
- common cold. And it appeared to be very different than influenza. Influenza in elderly people can
- also cause the adult respiratory distress syndrome, but it's almost always because of a secondary
- bacterial infection like Staphylococcal infection. So SARS-CoV-2, the virus in COVID-19,
- appeared to have these special features. And then within a few weeks, we understood
- pretty clearly that the illness had three major biological features to it. One was early viral
- replication, where the virus replicates exponentially as other viral infections do. And that it has
- a second phase where the immune system is tipped off into a very abnormal, maladaptive pattern.
- So instead of the immune system defending the body, the immune system sends out signals that
- begin to damage organs, including the heart, the lungs, the kidneys, the brain, the blood system.
- And then very importantly, the virus itself, through the spike protein or the dangerous
- spicule on the surface of the ball of the virus, the spike protein itself caused coagulation or
- blood clotting in a unique type of coagulation. It caused the red blood cells to stick together.
- At the same time, the platelets stick together. So this is a very different type of blood clotting
- that we would see with major blood clots in the arteries and veins. For instance,
- blood clots involved in stroke and heart attack, blood clots involved in major blood vessels in the
- legs. This was a different type of clotting. And in fact, the Italians courageously did some
- autopsies and found micro blood clots in the lungs. And so we understood in the end,
- the reason why the lungs fail is not because the virus is there, it's because micro blood clots are
- there. The waves of reports and published medical literature originally emanated out of China.
- And the public should understand that the typical publication cycle for an academic paper that's
- peer reviewed and published can be anywhere from nine months to two years. So what happened was the
- publication cycles were too long to get any rapid information out. So immediately our system collapsed
- into what's called preprints. So publications would be submitted, papers would be submitted
- for publication, but the preprint would come out basically telling the world that the paper had not
- yet undergone peer review, but we need to get this information out now because people need to
- understand what's going on. So we had a wave from China originally, which was difficult to interpret
- because of English writing, because the Chinese population is just so different in terms of its
- structure. And it was hard to make much out of what was coming out of China outside of in some
- cases it could be fatal. Italy was much more like the United States. That was the next big wave.
- And we just collaborate more freely with the Italians. And what I had done is I reached out
- to what's called the coracle network in Italy as an American doctor. And I, you know, freely said,
- listen, I am not a virologist or an immunologist, but I can tell you every infectious disease doctor
- in America is completely subscribed to inpatient care of patients with COVID-19. And there's nobody
- able to kind of think their way through what's going on in the pandemic. And so what we learned
- relatively early is that this illness was clearly and strongly amenable to risk stratification
- or that baseline risks were very, very strong determinants, even more so than the virus itself
- for mortality. So what that meant is the strongest determinant of mortality is age.
- And age itself is an underlying determinant or a cause of death, if you will, in the general
- population. Then we start adding on the typical things that put people at risk for death of other
- causes, heart disease, lung disease, kidney disease, cancer, obesity, diabetes. The interesting thing
- is that obesity appeared to be a super loaded factor. And so the virus seemed to really prey
- upon patients, particularly who were obese. And there are some reasons for this in terms of how
- the cytokines and immune factors are generated in response to the virus that could explain it. But
- we understood quickly that individuals under age 50, for example, with no major medical problems
- could ride through this illness very easily. And in fact, the Swedes figured this out very quickly
- and said, you know what, we're not going to shut down. This is sufficiently understood
- that we can simply protect the individuals at risk the best we can, the best that any protection
- measure can, and then we'll just have our economy and our schools move along in a usual fashion.
- With the pandemic, what happened is there was a global shutdown on travel and a global shutdown
- in academic meetings. So for the first time in my career, we could no longer meet with our colleagues
- in the United States or overseas. In academic medicine, its lifeblood is meeting an interchange
- of ideas. And so for the first time, we could not freely interchange ideas as a group. In fact,
- I recall a teleconference early on held by the National Institutes of Health, strictly actually
- by the Division of Diabetes and Kidney Disease. It was that institute that I'm aligned with in terms
- of clinical trials. And it was led by Dr. Robert Starr, a terrific scientist. And as I recall,
- there were hundreds of people on that call to just learn about what was going on in other centers.
- And people were asking each other, well, what are you seeing out at UCLA? What are you seeing at
- Taylor? What are you seeing at Harvard? And so we were literally just communicating to try to
- understand what in the world is going on with this virus. Who needs to be hospitalized? What
- happens when they're hospitalized? Who needs mechanical ventilation? All of these interactions
- had us settle on the idea that this was enormously amenable to risk stratification. People under age
- 50 without any medical problems, unless they presented with severe symptoms, they were going
- to be fine. Honestly, it was going to be like a head cold. But over age 50, there became a real
- risk of hospitalization and death. And the two important endpoints, the two important endpoints
- were hospitalization and death. You ask Americans, what are you afraid of? Are you afraid of getting
- a cold and being at home for a few days or a few weeks? No. I'm definitely afraid of being
- hospitalized and obviously afraid of dying. Why was the hospitalization so frightening?
- Because for the first time, patients would be hospitalized. They were put into isolation. They
- could never see their loved ones again. Those who died actually never did see their loved ones again.
- The workers were terrified. They were wearing personal protective equipment. They had very
- reduced visitation to patients in rooms. They started using telemedicine services where the
- poor patients were in glass rooms. No one was coming in and seeing them. And the care that
- offered was modest. Honestly, it was supportive care until patients needed to go on the respirator.
- So to sit in the hospital on oxygen, terrified day by day by day, knowing being able to come in
- the room, not being able to see the family, these messages got out to other family members and it
- put America on watch with extraordinary fear. Now over the last year, I've published, and I've
- managed to get this out despite our incredibly difficult publication cycles, I've published
- 40 peer-reviewed papers on COVID-19. That may be more than anybody in America. One of my very
- first papers, the title of it, and the paper dealt with what are the important outcomes.
- That's hospitalization and death. And when I started to see that scoreboard come up on the
- major media channels where it listed positive cases and death, and all Americans remember this,
- this was up there almost instantaneously. It came from Johns Hopkins. Instantaneously, it was
- cases and deaths. And I kind of wondered, how did they get that information so quickly? That was
- amazing. We don't have death certifications and other things that are very rapid at all,
- and who could be determining this? But at any rate, it was up there. And what I said was,
- I said, what really what we need to know is who's being hospitalized. Because if we can't figure out
- who's being hospitalized, and we can't figure out where the hospitalizations are occurring,
- we don't know where to allocate resources. So I published a paper on this in the journal that I
- edit reviews in cardiovascular medicine. I immediately wanted to reach the American public.
- I published an op-ed in The Hill, which is a newsletter out of Washington. And I said,
- listen, there's an emergent need. We need the hospitalizations. And I screamed as loud as I
- to the administration to say, listen, get an executive order to get the US hospital census
- every day so we could see what was going on. It never happened. We got an executive order
- to get the positive test results to come in from all the major laboratories and through the hospital
- laboratories, because all the tests for the virus were under the emergency use authorization. So it
- Johns Hopkins Center. So we knew who was test positive. There was no control over duplicates,
- by the way. So if a patient had one or two or three tests, unless the system had a way of
- actually filtering out these duplicates, those piled on. And it really didn't take into consideration
- who was sick and who wasn't sick. So we just had test positive. And then we had the deaths,
- which started to take on a cadence of trailing by about four weeks after the positive test cases.
- But that whole death ascertainment was a real mystery to Americans. And what I said,
- I think was around March or April, I basically made the statement relatively publicly. I said,
- listen, there are two bad outcomes, hospitalization and death. I'm going to put together a team of
- doctors and figure out how to stop these hospitalizations and death. I felt compelled
- as an academic leader in medicine, if no one in the White House could say that,
- no one in the White House task force could say that, if no one in the FDA could say that,
- or the NIH or the CDC, and Americans were pouring into hospitals and dying,
- no one could make that courageous statement uniquely, and individually, and alone,
- I made that statement.
- We had, as our country's leadership, an inability to frame the problem. The problem was there was a
- virus. It was popping up in clusters in the United States. And most people was causing a cold and
- got through it just fine. And other people, it was leading to hospitalization and death.
- But we couldn't frame the problem that the virus in some people causes hospitalization and death.
- Let's stop it. Let's stop the hospitalizations and death. Let's treat the virus. We could not
- frame that problem. Our leaders couldn't frame the problem. I personally didn't have any problem
- framing the problem. It's a bad thing. If there was another form of pneumonia out there,
- I would have said the same thing. Another form of newly acquired asthma, another form of a
- urogenital infection or gastrointestinal infection. Ebola had just been actually in Dallas
- a few years earlier. And I think Ebola hurt us in terms of our thinking because Ebola was so
- terribly contagious and so quickly fatal that the fear that Ebola created in Dallas was extraordinary.
- I forget at our medical center, one time I tried to get in one of the usual doors that I go into
- and there was a police officer there. I said, what's going on? He goes, we're here to block
- anybody with Ebola from coming in our hospital. We're going to shunt them to Presbyterian Hospital
- north of us. When do we shunt patients away from one hospital? The fear that Ebola created because
- this idea was terribly contagious and fatal quickly, I think set us on edge. With SARS-CoV-2
- virus, what we learned is the average person sits at home for two weeks. There's no immediate
- lethality to the virus. In fact, we've got a long window of time to make a diagnosis, organize
- treatment and prevent hospitalization and death. SARS-CoV-2 was very different from Ebola.
- But we look at other conditions where we readily accept the fact that somebody can fall ill at
- home, but if we start treatment early with an infection, we can save the patient. That exists
- for community-acquired demonias. It occurs for various forms of staph infection, including
- estaphylococcal toxic shock syndrome. It occurs for diverticulitis and abdominal conditions.
- It occurs for skin infections, various forms of cellulitis. It occurs for meningitis.
- For instance, if someone had a form of meningitis, we wouldn't say, listen, sit at home for two weeks
- and then if you're really, really bad and you're having seizures and you can't even
- breathe anymore, then come in the hospital and we'll start treatment. So the different,
- unique aspect of the medical response to SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19 was for the first time we had an
- infectious disease where the medical community settled into a group think, and this was supported
- by the NIH, the CDC, the FDA, the American Medical Association, all the medical societies.
- It was supported by these societies to tell doctors, don't touch this virus. Let patients stay at home,
- let them get as sick as humanly possible, and then when they can't breathe anymore,
- then go to the hospital. In fact, it was shocking October 8th when the National Institutes of Health
- came out with their first set of treatment guidelines because prior to that, none of the
- societies had any treatment guidelines. They actually didn't tell doctors how to treat the
- illness. Now, there were suggestions about what should be done in the hospital, but Americans
- cared about what was going on when they got sick at home, and the first set of guidelines said,
- you get sick at home, don't do anything. Don't do anything. Come into the hospital when you really
- can't breathe. Still don't do anything until a patient needs oxygen, then start doing something,
- like then actually give the first antiviral drug, which was remdesivir. Well, that's 14 days after
- the virus had already started replicating. By that time, the virus is long gone. When people
- can't breathe, the problem is micro blood clotting in the lungs. So the federal agencies, the CDC,
- the NIH, and FDA were enormously inept in terms of perceiving what this problem was, incredibly
- inept in applying any type of judgment or direction to doctors, and what had happened among the doctors
- was, we're so terribly frightened, we're not going to do anything unless we have the intellectual
- support from our associations, from our federal agencies, from our medical societies, and it was
- the opposite of what medicine had always been. Medicine had always been early innovation by
- doctors, empiric treatment, small studies, randomized trials, and then sponsored large
- randomized trials in that order, and then after large randomized trials, then guidelines bodies
- would then look at all those large randomized trials, make determinations of what should be
- done, and then those guidelines bodies would issue guidelines, and then the federal agencies
- would follow the guidelines. That's exactly what we do for mammography, colonoscopy, treatment of
- myocardial infraction, treatment of pneumonia. It always started out with early empiricism,
- then getting to guidelines and agency statements years later.
- It was a dangerous assumption. To assume there's nothing that one can do for a fatal infection
- is an enormous blunder. It's a blunder by citizens. It's a blunder by health responders,
- and it's a massive blunder by agencies. Can you imagine, let's make an assumption,
- and could our assumption lead to the absolute worst possible outcome, which would be
- hospitalization and death? Or we can make another assumption and say, you know what, it's treatable.
- We're going to try to treat it. Which assumption is more dangerous? Absolutely. The dangerous
- assumption is to do nothing. You could take any example. Let's make an assumption on
- traffic safety. You can assume that traffic safety rules and lines and stop signs and seatbelts
- do something, or you can assume they don't. Let's try, and let's have a free-for-all out on the
- streets right now and see what happens versus pay attention to some rules. We never make
- assumptions that are dangerous to people, and the thing that really worried me about this whole
- thing is this series of extraordinarily dangerous assumptions. Can you imagine a senior citizen
- who has heart and lung disease, who recovered from cancer, has some kidney disease, is handed
- a diagnostic test result and says, here, you have COVID-19. Now you have your fatal diagnosis.
- Our recommendations, based on the assumption we can't do anything, is go home and wait it out.
- When that panic and that fear and that breathlessness and that fever is so overwhelming,
- when you can't bear it anymore, then go to the hospital. How do people go to the hospital?
- They call family members. They contaminate all their family members. They call EMS,
- Uber drivers, taxi drivers. Every hospitalization in America was a super spreader event.
- This assumption that there's nothing we could do in giving somebody a fatal diagnosis with no
- instructions led to a massive amplification of cases. What we could have assumed and what I did
- assume was that there are some principles we can adopt from other precedents. For example,
- every form of pneumonia known to man does better if treated early, even influenza.
- That's the reason why Tamiflu, as an example, and there's an analogous product,
- are FDA approved for the treatment of influenza. They have some partial effect.
- Now, do we ever use Tamiflu alone? No, we typically combine it with other drugs
- to get patients through the illness. There are supportive respiratory drugs. There are forms of
- inhalers, what's called beta agonist inhalers and steroid inhalers. We use those liberally
- in forms of emphysema, pneumonia, asthma, allergic pneumonitis. There's other things
- that we can do to help patients get through the syndrome. The inflammatory nature of the syndrome
- became very interesting. We understand that antihistamines, as an example, Montelucast,
- aspirin, steroids, corticosteroids play an important role. If I had an asthmatic at home,
- I wouldn't say, listen, sit at home for two weeks until you can't breathe anymore
- and then go into the hospital. Are you kidding me? I'd put that asthmatic on inhalers. I probably
- would use some empiric antibiotics in that patient and then some steroids and I'd prevent the
- hospitalization to the best I could. I approached COVID-19 respiratory illness like any other
- with the following thought and we had pretty quickly put together our approach based on
- other precedents, including influenza, including asthma, including bacterial pneumonia,
- as follows, that this was going to be amenable to risk stratification. Those under age 50 who had
- no pulmonary symptoms, they could simply ride through the illness. We had data suggesting that
- nutritional deficiencies seem to increase the risk for hospitalization and death.
- And so that's where the nutraceuticals came in early on, that there was supportive data,
- not curative, but supportive data for zinc, for vitamin D, vitamin C, and interestingly a
- polyphenol substance called curcetin or curcetin. There were some others that were considered,
- including lysine and N-acetylcysteine. They became what we call the nutraceutical bundle.
- So is it kind of reasonable to do that in patients? We'd say, yeah, if it's linked to
- mortality, we don't know anything else. There's no harm in these supplements. They're readily
- available. People can buy them. So we recommended the nutraceutical bundle for those under age 50
- and really no medical treatment. That amounted to roughly of people getting ill at the time,
- probably two-thirds to three-quarters of patients really needing no treatment.
- However, if someone below age 50 or medical problems presented with severe symptoms or
- over age 50 with medical problems, it became clear that the rates of hospitalization and death
- were greater than 1%. That was enough. Greater than 1% is kind of a magic number in this whole
- equation. That's enough to do something. That's enough to do something. We knew somebody at age
- 60, for instance, would face about an 18% chance of hospitalization and death. 18% chance. It's too
- In my field, cardiology, our guidelines say anything more than 5% is high risk.
- 1% to 5% is moderate. Less than 1% is low risk. In general, for anything less than 1%,
- we don't go after it. So in this low risk group, we didn't go after it. But age over 50,
- young people presenting with severe symptoms, we went after it. So it was nutraceutical bundle.
- What did we know next? The timeline was very interesting. We knew from SARS-CoV-1,
- SARS-1, that's 80% similar to SARS-CoV-2. We knew from studies dating back to 2006,
- that hydroxychloroquine, a drug that's used for lupus, it's used for rheumatoid arthritis,
- it's used for other rheumatologic conditions, including dry eyes, as well as malaria, safe,
- was effective in reducing the viral replication of SARS-CoV-1. We knew that.
- United States knew that. In fact, that drug was stockpiled by the United States government,
- Australian government, some European government. So hydroxychloroquine was onboarded appropriately
- and ready to rock and roll. In fact, many countries frontlined hydroxychloroquine for
- high risk patients and still do so today. If you go to Athens, Greece, Rome, Italy,
- across all of Eastern Europe, Central and South America, hydroxychloroquine is the lead drug.
- India and East Asia, hydroxychloroquine is the lead drug. So hydroxychloroquine played a role.
- We also knew that by the summer, we knew that ivermectin played a role. This is an anti-parasitic
- drug used for scabies and other illnesses, safe and effective. So these drugs, the reason why they
- work against the virus is they get inside cells. A lot of antibiotics like penicillin doesn't get
- inside the cell, but these what's called intracellular anti-infectives do. Japan had an
- influenza drug that had the exact same activity as remdesivir, the first U.S. approved inpatient
- IV drug. That drug's called favipiravir. And the Japanese had data to suggest that favipiravir,
- like oral remdesivir, would play a role early on. And it was readily approved by five countries,
- FDA approved, FDA equivalent approved in those countries to treat COVID-19. So we had hydroxychloroquine,
- we had ivermectin, favipiravir. We combine it with either doxycycline or azithromycin.
- Those are antibiotics Americans know about. They get inside of cells. They're also intracellular
- anti-effectives. And they were slightly assistive in a couple ways. They cut down on some of the
- bacterial super infection that would occur in the sinuses and respiratory tract. And we knew from
- studies that there was about a 3% overlap between COVID-19 and what's called atypical
- pneumonias, which would be mycoplasma, chlamydia, pneumonia. And these would also be responsive to
- these. So quickly, hydroxy and azithro, ivermectin and doxy, these were a common favipiravir and doxy
- outside the United States, became common intracellular anti-infectives. But those alone
- didn't carry the day. Because what happened is the viral replication tipped off what's called
- cytokine storm or the immune system going haywire. And so doctors early on in the hospital
- started using steroids. And we had some confusing literature. Are they hurting? Are they helping?
- And the British helped out a lot with a study, an inpatient study, called the recovery trial.
- And the recovery trial picked an odd corticosteroid, which is dexamethasone, in an odd
- dose, six milligrams a day. We typically use like 10 milligrams four times a day. So an odd dose,
- but did show a small reduction in mortality. And there was a meta-analysis published looking at
- hydrocortisone, prednisone. It turned out any steroid worked in some reasonable dose. So in
- the United States, we quickly adopt using prednisone, which we use in asthma frequently.
- And then another trial in the UK was done called the Stoic trial using inhaled budesonide. Now that
- was a very interesting development because there was a maverick doctor, former military doctor,
- Richard Bartlett from West Texas. He made the national news by saying, you know what, I think
- inhaled budesonide works. And he said this early in the spring. And he was on national news. He
- said, you know, I'm trying it. I'm a doctor. I'm trying to help my patients. I am using
- empiric treatment. I know there's no randomized trials, but he was doing the right thing.
- That's what American doctors all should have been doing is trying to help their patients by
- taking empiric choices on drugs that made clinical sense. And he tried it. And indeed,
- it worked. The British did the Stoic trial. And sure enough, there was over an 80% reduction in
- hospitalization if we just used inhaled budesonide in outpatients with COVID-19. So that made it
- on board. Montreal Heart Institute, one of the leading overall randomized controlled trial
- centers in the world, got funding from the National Institutes of Health, Gates Foundation,
- Canadian authorities, and tested a gout drug, which works against the immune system,
- particularly works against the white blood cells and their ability to proliferate
- toxic granules and assemble microtubules. That drug is called colchicine. So Americans will
- recognize this as a gout drug. They carried out and conducted a prospective randomized trial,
- double blind for 30 days, the best quality trial done in all of COVID-19. And they demonstrated
- that there was a market reduction in hospitalization and death. So colchicine
- came on board. And so the last thing that we really had to look at was blood clotting.
- And to this day, there has not been a single outpatient study of drugs to impair platelet
- aggregation or antithrombotics. However, we can learn from inpatient studies. And there's been
- very good analyses. They all agree. The use of full dose aspirin in the hospital is associated
- with reductions in mortality. And the use of full dose anticoagulation, whether that be
- injectable, low-molecule heparin, full heparinization, or we can even use oral
- anticoagulants as an outpatient, is associated with reductions in mortality.
- So what I had been doing is I was working with the Italians, looking at how these concepts are
- coming together. And I published a paper in the American Journal of Medicine in August of 2020.
- And I have to tell you, when I looked at the literature through the spring, working with
- Italians, there had been, when at the time I submitted the paper on July 1st, there were 55,000
- papers in the peer-reviewed literature. Not a single one taught doctors how to put drugs in
- combination and treat the virus. And it seemed so odd to me. We knew this was a fatal viral
- infection. In fatal viral infections, single drugs never work. We knew this in HIV. We knew
- we needed multiple drugs in HIV. We knew this for hepatitis C. We knew this for all the other fatal
- viral infections. We use drug combinations, never single drugs. And the only thing we could do at
- that time is look at studies of single drugs and find signals of benefit, acceptable safety,
- and then assemble them into regimens. The clinical trials testing a four to six drug regimen,
- those haven't even been planned yet. I mean, the mortality rate would have been astronomical
- if somebody didn't step forward and have the courage to publish the concepts.
- And I guess that's what my role is in world's history for this. I published a paper called
- The Pathophysiologic Rationale for Early Ambulatory Treatment of COVID-19. And it
- was published in the August issue of 2020 of the American Journal of Medicine. To this day,
- that's the most widely downloaded paper from that journal of all topics. And it went viral.
- And literally, it went viral because the world was thirsting for an approach to COVID-19.
- Now, quickly after that was published, I was managing all different types of communications
- regarding the paper, scientific and then also media related. And we had supportive data now
- coming in strong for ivermectin, for colchicine, for inhaled steroids. And Operation Warp Speed
- had delivered monoclonal antibodies directed against the spike protein, the pathogenic part
- of the virus. And they included a product from Lillie and another one from Regeneron.
- So I needed to update the algorithm. And I put that together and published that in the journal
- that I edit, Reviews in Cardiovascular Medicine, but with a separate issue and a separate unbiased
- editor that I didn't have influence on to make sure that was fully peer-reviewed and vetted in
- which it was. And that was published in Reviews in Cardiovascular Medicine in August of 2020.
- By that time, there was 100,000 papers in the literature. And outside of my first paper,
- there wasn't a single other paper that actually proposed a regimen or a protocol
- to treat patients with COVID-19. It was almost extraordinary that we were over nine months into
- a fatal pandemic influencing the world, and no one could come up with an original idea
- of how to put drugs in combination to treat the virus. We didn't have the Harvard Protocol.
- We didn't have the Johns Hopkins Protocol. We didn't have UCLA. We didn't have a World Health
- Protocol. So this was extraordinary that all the firepower we had in academic medicine
- they just drew a blank. Matter of fact, if you look at these centers across the United States
- and across the world, they never opened up COVID treatment centers. They didn't have outpatient
- COVID treatment centers. They didn't attempt to study or help a single outpatient with COVID-19.
- My contribution was, I think, the ability to publish the ideas. This is very important.
- Others had the ideas. Vladimir Zelenko in New York City, an Orthodox Jew, stepped out of the box. He
- said, listen, we need to treat this. We can use some drugs in combination, hydroxychloroquine,
- ethomyosin, steroids, other drugs. And he started putting drugs into combination. Richard Bartlett
- in West Texas, Brian Tyson and George Freed, former NIH scientist, George Freed came out
- of retirement. They went to really the crucible of COVID-19 down in the California-Mexico border
- and just opened up a clinic and had opened up a tent. People started walking up and they started
- treating him. Didier Rayault in Southern France said, listen, we can treat this. Him and a group
- of courageous French doctors opened up large clinics in Southern France and started treating
- patients. We had Yvette Lozano in Dallas. She took her general practice building by White Rock Lake
- and turned it into a COVID treatment center. She converted all her rooms to treating patients with
- COVID. Oxygen concentrators had all the drugs. There's pictures of patients lining up on the
- to receive treatment. So it was interesting how the innovators were all independent, courageous
- doctors, and the academic medical centers drew a blank. They couldn't even pitch a tent to help
- people. And to me, it was stunning that the academic medical centers or even the large
- community centers couldn't help a single outpatient. They couldn't even provide a patient
- of what should be done. The CDC offered guidance like take some Tylenol and if you get really sick,
- go to the hospital. The response to a treatable outpatient problem that gave us two weeks of
- opportunity to do something, the lack of that response was stunning. And it had to do, in my
- view, because of a whole timeline of events that put a chill on the attempts to treat COVID-19.
- Doctors in health systems and others, I think, in a relatively short order became actively
- discouraged from treating COVID-19. I can tell you I never got an encouraging email or phone call
- saying, you know what, do the best you can for your patients. Try to help them. These
- hospitalizations are terrible. Please, we support you in using your best judgment.
- Or here's a few suggested things that you could do. I never got any of those emails from medical
- societies, from others. In fact, there was only one medical organization, just like there's
- a few courageous medical doctors, there was one courageous medical organization,
- the Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, that saw what was going on.
- Interestingly, that organization is an organization that represents independent doctors, not those
- employed by hospitals or big medical groups or medical schools, but independent doctors.
- They saw what was going on. The first thing that they attacked was the stockpile of
- hydroxychloroquine. What happened was the U.S. had an ample supply of hydroxychloroquine.
- The only issue was start using it and start putting it into combination with other drugs
- to treat COVID-19. It seemed terrific. The first event in the timeline was the FDA
- emergency use authorization for hydroxychloroquine. The listeners should understand that an emergency
- use authorization would be for a brand new drug or product where there is a great unmet need,
- there's not enough time to do all the testing, and that we would do an EUA for that. There's
- a government mechanism for that. It's under emergency circumstances. That wouldn't apply
- to hydroxychloroquine. It was already fully FDA approved. It was out for 65 years. It was safe.
- We had used it in pregnancy. We knew all of its safety profile. Doctors knew how to use
- hydroxychloroquine. I used it in my practice. It was just not a big deal. It didn't need an
- EUA. The EUA went out on hydroxychloroquine and said this EUA with language in it says
- restricting hydroxychloroquine to inpatient use. One of the first big studies out of the block was
- done in thousands of patients out of Henry Ford. It was great news that hydroxychloroquine was
- associated with a large reduction in mortality if applied early, but the later it was applied
- in the hospital stay, it didn't look like the patients were too far gone. I wrote the
- response to that in several publications across the United States. One was an op-ed in the Hill
- because as I saw this, I basically made the case that emergency use authorization was an
- effective restriction. It should be lifted and we should use hydroxychloroquine wide open.
- Then something really terrible happened. Keep in mind that the Henry Ford data was very positive.
- We had the EUA, the US had stockpiled it. The National Institutes of Health, the allergy and
- immunology branch had commissioned a several thousand prospective double blind randomized
- placebo control trial of hydroxychloroquine and azithromycin in outpatients with COVID-19.
- They had funded the trial. They got the drug supply. They got the placebos.
- They set up all the study centers in the United States. We were all ready to go. That was in the
- spring. Terrific. Everything is coming together. Then what happened was a fake paper was published
- in Lancet. A fake paper. Now, the listeners should understand that Lancet is like the New
- Journal of Medicine. It's one of the most prestigious medical journals in the world.
- When a paper is submitted, there are so many checks on validity. Where is the paper coming from?
- Where are the data coming from? Validating the data. Then it's sent out to peer reviewers who
- are independent. They check everything in the paper. They give comments about was this reported?
- Was that reported? What have you? There's so many checks on papers and then it comes back and then
- an editorial decision is made on a paper and then it's published. That's called peer review.
- That ensures to the public that papers are not fake. It's very important. It ensures to the
- public that things are not falsified. Well, this paper had authors from Harvard. It came from a
- company called Surgesphere that no one really understood what this company was about. The data
- large data set of inpatients with COVID-19 from all over the world that had in-depth drug exposure
- data. We didn't have that back then. That was from December, January, February. This was just
- emerging. We didn't have this. The average age in that paper was 49 years old and the paper implied
- that use of hydroxychloroquine was dangerous. Lancet published this falsified paper. Somehow
- it fell through all the other peer review and how could they possibly publish it? As soon as
- it came out, I knew in two seconds that it had to be wrong. We don't hospitalize people in their 40s
- and hydroxychloroquine in fact is associated with benefit not harm. This paper in Lancet
- frightened the entire world. It was like a shockwave and there was a whole series of reactions.
- People started publishing papers. Oh, hydroxychloroquine could be dangerous. All these
- doctors, case closed. Hydroxychloroquine doesn't work. Stop using it. Hospitals started pulling
- it off the formularies. It was extraordinary what happened with hydroxychloroquine. In fact,
- the U.S. FDA put out language that said hydroxychloroquine shouldn't be used, period.
- We're canceling the EUA for inpatient use and it shouldn't be used, period. So that FDA language
- then went to the AMA and the AMA says, well, don't use hydroxychloroquine, period. Inpatient
- or outpatient. That went to the pharmacy boards. Pharmacy boards said, oh, doctors shouldn't be
- using this. So as doctors were treating patients in the community prescribing hydroxychloroquine,
- next, you know, patients would show up to the pharmacy and the pharmacist said, sorry,
- I can't dispense it. My board says that I can't. And then doctor's licenses started to become
- threatened. And then, you know, then all of a sudden there was a cascade of events,
- hydroxychloroquine being the lead, that put a chilling effect on anybody's attempt to treat
- COVID-19 as an outpatient.
- Hydroxychloroquine, I think the fair statements are it's the most studied and utilized
- therapeutic in the world for COVID-19 today. There are hundreds and hundreds of studies.
- And hydroxychloroquine was appropriately acquired and stockpiled by the U.S. government.
- President Trump, who I personally think was very weak in the response, he could not articulate
- that hospitalizations and deaths were a serious problem. He could not assemble a team of doctors
- who were learning how to treat COVID-19. Neither could the NIH or the CDC or FDA.
- We had gross failures from U.S. presidents and the major agencies. Can you imagine today,
- to this day, we still have not had a doctor in any position of authority in the United States
- who's actually ever seen a patient with COVID-19 and treated them?
- None. It is extraordinary what's happened. So President Trump mentioned hydroxychloroquine.
- Let's try to give it a shot. And then immediately he was bashed down by his detractors. I thought
- it was a very weak statement to begin with, but he was bashed down and people have always held him
- up as, oh, it was Trump. If he hadn't mentioned hydroxychloroquine, none of this would have
- an enormous effort to suppress early treatment. Hydroxychloroquine was the initial lightning rod.
- Remember I mentioned that NIH trial? You know what they did after 20 patients?
- Disingenuously, they said they couldn't find COVID-19 patients and they shut down
- a several thousand patient trial. They shut it down after 20 patients. That never happens.
- They purchased the placebo. They found the study centers. They had the binders. They had the nurses
- hired. They had everybody ready to treat Americans with hydroxychloroquine azithromycin,
- and they gave up after 20 patients. That was extraordinary. The false paper published in
- Lancet was extraordinary. We started to have an array of incredibly flawed papers publishing
- exaggerating cardiac effects of hydroxychloroquine. Oh, it could cause dangerous arrhythmias.
- There was one that I mentioned in my US Senate testimony. It came from the Mayo Clinic.
- It said hydroxychloroquine could cause a scar in the heart. They actually had a heart and they
- showed a huge white scar. In fact, I ultimately hunted down that paper, hunted down the authors
- and the publisher, and I demanded a retraction. Ultimately, I got a conciliatory letter published
- saying, you know what, we're sorry. It doesn't really cause a scar in the heart. So people
- started to intentionally try to damage hydroxychloroquine so it would not be used in COVID-19.
- Yet other countries held with its steadfast. I mentioned all the countries to this day that
- use hydroxychloroquine. And now we have studies, for instance, a study from Iran in 30,000 patients.
- A massive study. And they treat about 25% of people appropriately with hydroxychloroquine
- in combination with other drugs. And it has a massive reduction in mortality.
- So hydroxychloroquine is a mainstay. The prospect of randomized trials, we just isolate on them.
- Pre-hospital studies are all positive. Now, is it a game changer? No, I'd say it's about a 25%
- reduction in endpoints. But it's a very useful drug to get started early. It's not a single drug.
- I wouldn't rely on it alone. But hydroxychloroquine itself, I think, is a poster child for what
- happened. Early on in this, I became of national attention. I received calls from the White House.
- I was contacted by the US Senate. I became known on social media, which I was never on social
- media before. I'm not an immunologist. I'm not a virologist. I'm not an infectious disease doctor.
- But I'm a good clinical doctor. And I understand drugs. And I understand drug safety very well.
- Hydroxychloroquine had a signal of benefit, acceptable safety. I was contacted by doctors
- in Africa that anonymously told me, Dr. McCullough, there are some bad guys raiding the pharmacies
- at night. And they're coming in and burning the hydroxychloroquine.
- I said, who are these bad guys? They said, we don't know. But they look like they're some type of
- mercenaries or operatives. Mysteriously, the second largest hydroxychloroquine producing
- plant outside of Taipei burned to the ground. So, hydroxychloroquine as a simple, safe,
- and effective drug to this day seems to be a poster child for
- worldwide comprehensive efforts to suppress early treatment. And of interest, as the data came on
- with ivermectin, ivermectin became the next drug. Now, of interest with ivermectin, there was an
- associated group that formed called the Frontline Critical Care Consortium, FLCCC. It was led by
- Corey. I identified him and Dr. Paul Merrick. I communicated with him. We had teleconferences,
- and I recommended Dr. Corey testify at the second U.S. Senate hearings in December. Also, Dr. J.J.
- Roshter from Florida. Dr. Roshter had tried ivermectin in all of his sick patients in
- Florida hospitals and was enormously successful in reducing mortality. He published his paper in
- one of the best pulmonary journals. So, I gave him tremendous credit for that. So, Dr. Corey and
- Dr. Roshter presented what became a very compelling case for ivermectin. If people were sufficiently
- turned off by hydroxychloroquine, we could focus on ivermectin. Dr. Tess Larrie, who's considered
- one of the world's most prominent analysts in the U.K. published, and Dr. Andrew Hill as well,
- published incredible analyses demonstrating that ivermectin reduced mortality in patient and
- outpatient. So, a little different than hydroxychloroquine. Hydroxychloroquine takes
- a little time to work and probably doesn't work at the very end of the illness, but ivermectin
- miraculously worked through the range of illness. And so, the data started coming on for ivermectin,
- and there was enough push power for emphasis on the National Institutes of Health guidelines where
- made a specific statement regarding ivermectin. They said, you know what, we understand the data
- with ivermectin, we can't be for it and we can't be against it. It's the same statement that they
- made for the emergency use of Regeneron and Lillie antibodies. The NIH said, we understand the data,
- we can't be for it or against it, but at least we got a neutral statement out of them. Hydroxychloroquine
- still to this day has a series of negative statements on this, and doctors have literally
- had to fight for their medical licenses in order to prescribe hydroxychloroquine. One by one by one,
- all of those licenses have been restored, all of those state rulings have been overturned,
- all the medical society's been overturned, and hydroxychloroquine is used today. Ivermectin is
- widely used today. Both drugs can not only treat the infection early, but they can prevent the,
- and there's prophylactic studies, they can prevent, if patients take these drugs periodically,
- typically once a week or so, they can prevent COVID-19 from becoming an illness. They are
- preventive. In fact, I led one of the very early studies of hydroxychloroquine here in Dallas to
- protect our healthcare workers. These drugs are about 90% effective. They are about as effective
- as the vaccines in preventing acquiring COVID-19. When someone's ill, I never prescribe these drugs
- alone, but I prescribe them in what I call sequence multidrug therapy. But that is the approach
- that independent doctors have taken in the United States, and uniquely not a single academic medical
- center today, or community medical center today, treats COVID-19 patients as an outpatient with the
- goal of reducing hospitalizations and deaths. Why would these centers not want to help their patients?
- You know, doctors clearly have a group think, and doctors want intellectual support for what they
- do. That's the reason why we meet all the time. That's the reason why we go on rounds together.
- That's the reason why we have conferences every day. We want to intellectually support each other
- for making decisions on patients for the assurances we're making the right decisions.
- And what happened was with the pandemic, all of our meetings were dissolved. We could not meet with
- each other anymore. There wasn't a chance to have much intellectual support, and each doctor one by
- one had to make a decision. When the next patient called and said, listen, I'm sick with COVID-19.
- Can you help me? There was a binary choice. The choice was, no, I'm not going to help you.
- Nothing works. There's nothing I can do. Just wait until you get hospitalized. Or the answer
- could be, you know what, let me try. And what we found is that binary choice was the biopsy
- of who really had courage and who really had excellent clinical judgment. And doctors who
- were not confident in their clinical judgment quickly said, you know what, there's nothing you
- can do. And they got into that group think. And that could have been 90% plus of doctors had,
- A, a lack of clinical judgment and a lack of courage. And what I found in this whole thing is
- those two things are rare. And for me, it was just very natural. It was very natural. My father was
- one of the first nursing home COVID-19 patients in Dallas. He was the very first one in Presbyterian
- Village. He got COVID-19. Had pelvic fracture. He's flat on his back. Then a scared PA says,
- your dad's got COVID. He's in a unit. We don't know what's going to happen. His mortality
- being completely bedridden with dementia and now COVID, I can tell you he was facing an 80% mortality
- of just having COVID just ravage him. So what did I do? Did I make that binary decision of doing
- nothing? Of course not. Of course not. If I could ever message any American doctor or any doctor in
- the world right now, have some courage and trust your clinical judgment. I did. And that's what real
- doctors do. And I will never apologize for that. Of course, my dad was treated with hydroxychloroquine.
- He was treated with azithromycin. He was treated with aspirin. We put him on Lovenox is a blood
- thinner. The full nutraceutical bundle. Zinc, vitamin C, vitamin D, curcetin. Open the windows.
- Get that virus aired out there. And he got really sick as expected. He had dementia. His wishes were
- to not go to the hospital, not go on a mechanical ventilator. We treated him right there. It took
- 60 days and it was a long illness, but he survived. And that was early. And that taught
- me that if I'm willing to do that for my father, I have a Hippocratic oath. And I have a fiduciary
- responsibility to my patients. And I refuse to let my patients die of this illness. And when I
- the U.S. Senate, I told the American people, I have always treated my high risk patients.
- Always. And at the end of my opening statement, I held up the protocol and I told the American
- people, I'm not asking for permission to do this. I'm not. But I'm asking for your help.
- It's a very, very important statement. Because my patients were appropriately treated to the best
- of my ability. And we have 600,000 dead Americans that were not treated appropriately and not
- treated to the best of the ability of their doctors. And that will go down in historical
- shame for our country. I think it's a travesty that we have 600,000 dead Americans. Vast majority
- of them didn't get an ounce of treatment. In fact, there were medical groups that adopted policies
- that they weren't going to even answer the calls of COVID-19 patients. And there were millions of
- patients needlessly hospitalized. We had data that came in later from Dr. Zelenko in New York
- City, Dr. Proctor here in Dallas, who did the same exact thing, showing that our methods could reduce
- hospitalization and death by 85%. And I'm sorry, there are no prospective randomized trials of
- four to six drugs. There are none planned. So therefore, without any large trials, there
- were not going to be any guideline statements. And without any guideline statements, we'll never
- have any agency support for this. But this is about courageous doctors saving Americans.
- And I would go farther than this. This is about courageous doctors saving the world.
- So now we have the Association of American Physicians and Surgeons. We have FLCC
- in the United States. We have 250 treating doctors. We have four national telemedicine
- services, 15 regional telemedicine services. We're treating 10,000 to 15,000 patients a day.
- Forget the U.S. government. Forget what anybody says about this. Americans are getting treatment.
- That once our message on early treatment came with two U.S. Senate hearings headed by Senator Ron
- Johnson, the hospital started clearing out in the end of December, early January, because early
- treatment markedly reduces spread and dramatically reduces hospitalization and death. It's the only
- thing that does that. The hospital doesn't save all the patients. I'd say the hospital honestly
- has a very modest impact on anything with COVID-19. It's all about early treatment.
- The hospital started clearing out. The curves came way down in the United States. That's before
- anybody was fully vaccinated. And I testified in the Texas Senate on March 10th. I said,
- listen, by standard CDC equations, we're at herd immunity by March 10th. No vaccine effect.
- That's actually just treating patients. In Texas, we had 35 treatment centers. Our protocols and
- methods work. And I have learned over time, there are so many ways to treat the virus.
- I've had a seminar with Dr. Sankaran Chetty in South Africa. He said that hydroxychloroquine
- and ivermectin, just like in the United States, have become so politically charged,
- doctors were losing their license. In fact, some doctors were jailed and trying to help patients
- with COVID-19. He gave up on them. He's treated 4,000 patients, fewer than 10% got hydroxychloroquine
- or ivermectin. He treats them. He times the illness. He waits to day eight, and then he
- starts inhaled in oral steroids. He starts aspirin, other anti-inflammatories, montelucast,
- and the high-risk patients he uses anticoagulants on the back end. And he saved virtually everyone
- outside of a handful of patients out of 4,000 sick patients in South Africa. So what I've learned
- about this virus is if doctors do anything to try to help patients, they can reduce hospitalizations
- and death. And the only reason why this is such a horrible thing in American history is because
- doctors fail to act.
- The U.S. FDA puts out thousands of drug warnings per year. In fact, Americans know this because
- they see a drug advertised on TV and it says, well warnings may cause death, may cause whatever.
- So we get thousands of warnings per year. FDA recalls drugs, put black box warnings on drugs.
- Doctors still use these drugs. They understand the warnings. About 40% of drugs are used off the
- advertising label. So once a drug is older, its original advertising label doesn't really apply.
- So we use drugs quote off label all the time. That's common. But what happened in COVID-19
- is because of the tremendous fear that settled in over our country, whatever statements came out by
- U.S. FDA, the NIH, and the CDC started to take more weight than they ever would in the past.
- So if those agencies said something like, don't use hydroxychloroquine,
- that emanated down through the AMA and each of the pharmacy boards where they actually
- denied patients hydroxychloroquine. In fact, there are probably patients who died
- because the pharmacy did not dispense the hydroxychloroquine to patients or the ivermectin.
- There are doctors who started getting warning letters stating Dr. Richard Erso from Houston and
- another doctor stepped out of his role like I did to treat the virus, got warning letters from the
- Texas Medical Board. We're going to examine your license. We understand you're prescribing
- hydroxychloroquine trying to help COVID patients. These doctors, Dr. Robin Armstrong,
- in Texas, saved dozens of nursing home patients with hydroxychloroquine, azithromycin,
- steroids, and blood thinners. The families think he's a hero. The Texas Medical Board
- tried to take away his license and so he had to go through hearings and reviews and ultimately
- he was restored, although his practice was just damaged, if not destroyed. Emails started coming
- down through big medical organizations, don't use hydroxychloroquine. They later on came down and
- said don't use ivermectin. In fact, it was flat out, don't do it. We were getting official messages
- that basically said don't take care of COVID-19. These are codified in policies and emails by major
- medical organizations and it went counter. Can you imagine getting an email saying don't treat
- pneumococcal pneumonia, just let him die. Don't treat meningitis, let him die. We've never seen
- this. The term that applies to what's going on is wrongdoing by those in positions of authority.
- It's called malfeasance. We don't put down a chilling negative message that's going to result
- in harm. We don't do that. We don't do that in a civil society. It happened from the NIH, the CDC,
- the FDA, major medical groups, these chilling messages. But at the same time, you had AAPS
- saying no, this is wrong, treat patients. You had FLCC, a group that became very strong, saying no,
- treat patients. In the UK, we had the BIRD group that said, you know what, treat patients. Use
- ivermectin-based protocols. We had PANDA develop in South Africa. We had the COVID medical network
- develop in Australia. We had treatment domiciliary develop in Italy. So listen, the counter argument
- to this of no, we should treat the virus, that counterweight was there. It's one of the reasons
- why you're talking to me today. You're not talking to some FDA official who basically wanted
- to throw a call on our things. You're talking to me today because you're getting a sense
- of truth. You're getting a sense of reality that this virus is treatable. Everything that we've
- done for this virus, we've made it far worse by not treating it, keeping patients in fear,
- isolation. We've done multiple things that have promoted hospitalization and we've done multiple
- things that have actually promoted excess mortality, and it's a shameful time in America
- and in the world. Under the dark cloud of fear, the medical administrations
- defer to the FDA, the NIH, and the CDC, our three governmental agencies. They defer to that. In
- we're following the policy. So let's pick something less charged, like wearing masks.
- What sets the mask wearing policy? What the CDC says? Well, they say this, let's follow it.
- Same thing is true. If the agencies say don't use hydroxychloroquine or ivermectin, if that's
- what they say, that quickly gets down to medical administration and they'll float out an email
- saying don't do it. In fact, in a country, we can pick on it, Australia, they have the TGA.
- That's the equivalent of the FDA. They have guidelines where they literally have dozens
- and dozens of negative statements. Don't do this, don't do that, don't do this, don't do that.
- Interestingly, none of these groups actually say what to do. So if you were to take any major
- hospital and ask them what email or what policy came down that told doctors what to do, you gave
- warnings on what not to do, but what did you tell them to do to take care of clinic patients with
- COVID-19? Most of them would say nothing. We don't have, in fact, I testified in the Texas
- Senate on this topic and within, on March 10th and within 48 hours, there was draft legislation
- to at least give patients some information. Say listen, if the hospitals and doctors aren't going
- to do anything, we're going to give you some information. When you get your positive test
- result, here is some information on what you can do. Here are the treatment protocols. Here are the
- EUA monoclonal antibodies. And again, if hydroxychloroquine or ivermectin is controversial,
- okay. But what about the monoclonal antibodies? We haven't talked about these. These are high
- tech. They're produced by big pharma. It's big money. It was all NIH funded. They're emergency
- authorized by the US FDA. How come America has no window to that? How come there's no updates on how
- we're doing with that? How come there's no 1-800 numbers? How sick patients can't find out where
- these antibodies are? So it is a global suppression of early treatment, whether they're generic drugs
- or newly approved drugs. There is a global suppression on early treatment. Americans will
- know. They watch the TV every night. The initial dialogue was, we're scared, wear masks, go in
- lockdown, hand sanitizer, okay. Then there were some reports about terrible things going on in
- the hospital. Then the reports later on were, wait for a vaccine. There were never regular reports
- or updates from any local or national TV source that gave regular updates. This is what you should
- do when you get COVID-19 at home. Here are the drugs at work. Here are the protocols. Here are
- hotlines so you can get an antibody infusion, which is approved by the FDA. Here are the hotlines so
- you can get in research. Research is important. There's still no hotline for Americans to get
- in COVID-19 research at a state or a federal level. Stunning. There's been no updates.
- When I've dealt with multiple congressional and senate offices, I say, listen, weekly updates
- to the American people so they know what to do so they're not so in fear when they're getting
- these results. Weekly updates through all public channels. Weekly updates on treatment and then
- monthly updates to the guidelines. We have none of that. We are over a year of this and the Americans
- have been absolutely let down by the government agencies, by the media. The media, why wouldn't
- it come into any local broadcasters' thought process to give their listeners an update on
- early treatment? It's a stunning oblivion.
- For products to actually be officially advertised, they have to have somebody who's going to pay for
- which is a drug company and they have to be FDA approved and they actually have to have an FDA
- advertising label and because of the monoclonal antibodies that, as an example, don't have an
- advertising label, they can't be, Lilly and Regeneron can't go out and advertise for them.
- But because they're EUA, from a public health messaging perspective, they should be equally
- featured as vaccines. Now, vaccines are emergency use authorized. All we hear about is vaccines
- morning, noon, and night. Why do we hear a massive messaging about vaccines? Americans
- ought to think about this. Why are vaccines featured by the CDC, NIH, and FDA morning, noon,
- and night, by the media morning, noon, and night, by every medical center morning, noon, and night?
- I can tell you, as a doctor in a medical center, all our emails are about vaccination.
- Why are they featured in every single public health communication? Needles in all the arms.
- In fact, shockingly, in the Dallas area, in October, this is long before the vaccine trials were
- ever completed, if you were to call CVS or Walgreens, the answering machine would say,
- to offer the COVID-19 vaccine when it comes available. We have never advertised for a product
- before it comes available. In fact, it's against the U.S. laws regarding drugs and biological
- products. So things started to go off the rails very early on. And it seems like there was a
- playbook. The playbook was to suppress any hope of treatment, a complete oblivion to treatment
- through all the entities we've mentioned, and at the same time, prepare the population for mass
- vaccination. These two are very tightly linked. And now with mass vaccination, we see things we
- have never seen. Advertising the vaccine before it's even available. Massive messaging for the
- vaccine, far out of proportion to treatment. You have two EUA products. One you never hear about.
- Americans are starved of these monoclonal antibodies. In fact, they're grossly underused.
- They could have saved probably tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of lives,
- and they're being squashed. The Lilium Regeneron products are being squashed, but the Pfizer,
- Moderna, and J&J products are being massively promoted and advertised. Americans ought to be
- kind of wondering, why is that happening? Why are we defocusing on the sick patient and focusing
- on well people? All the messaging about contagion control and vaccines are about well people. Why
- can we not focus on the sick COVID patient? That was my message to the Department of Health and
- Human Services in Texas. But it goes further than that. It goes further than that.
- The vaccine registrational trials strictly excluded pregnant women, women of childbearing
- potential, COVID recovered patients, patients who had prior COVID antibodies. Strictly excluded them.
- By regulatory science, if all the registrational trials excluded a group of patients, we would
- never use that product in that group once it gets on the market. Never. Never. We never violate that.
- Why? Because we don't know if it's going to work, and we don't know if it's going to be safe. We
- never do that. There's another level. With pregnant women, our special group in research
- and medicinal products. It's very important for Americans to know this. In pregnant women,
- for vaccination, we only vaccinate with safe, inactive products. Inactive flu, tetanus,
- diphtheria, and pertussis. That's it. We would never inject a biologically active substance
- in a pregnant woman's body. That could be dangerous. Never. And with the vaccines,
- as soon as they came out, the CDC, FDA, media, everybody said vaccinate them. Vaccinate them.
- Well, the U.S. FDA regulatory guidance and vaccines, and there have been modern vaccines,
- you don't have to pick the old ones. I mean, we've had modern vaccines, shingles vaccines,
- hepatitis B, meningococcal vaccines, demand a minimum of two years of safety data. Two years.
- Bi-regulatory. In fact, these are kind of written and codified into the regulatory rules for the
- manufacturers. That was all thrown out and said two months. For COVID, two months. So two months
- of observational data. This idea that we could vaccinate people that were not even tested
- in the trials, that has never been done before. We have never just thrown a vaccine at somebody
- without having any data. None. So the very first pregnant woman that was vaccinated here in the
- United States, it was done with no knowledge of safety and no knowledge of efficacy. And the
- argument that we've heard, the argument that we've heard is, well, COVID-19 is a bad illness.
- 600,000 people have died. The vaccine could help them. We should give it a shot. Come on,
- we should just give it a shot. While that 600,000 died, I've already told you 85% of that was
- preventable with early treatment, which was actively suppressed and squashed. And not only that,
- is if this vaccine can help them, the vaccine better be safe. It better be safe. And my comments
- on the vaccine are safety, safety, safety. Let's see it. Let's see it. And Americans, just like
- should have been getting weekly updates on treatment innovations, Americans should have
- been getting weekly updates on vaccine safety. Very important. Weekly updates from our federal
- officials on safety. Super important. Those two things are probably the two largest acts of
- malfeasance in all of medical regulatory history. It will go down in the history of malfeasance,
- wrongdoing by those of authority. How come there was no updates on treatment and no
- promotion of early treatment to reduce hospitalization and death? And now when we
- release the vaccine, why are there no safety updates? Why are there no attempts for risk
- mitigation in terms of making the vaccine program safer? How do we have all these vaccines? How do
- we know we can vaccinate pregnant women? We know because of years and years and years of safety data.
- Before a vaccine has ever been injected into a pregnant woman, it's probably been tested for
- decades before we try it in a pregnant woman. We would never out of the box take a brand new
- technology that's never been tested before, ever. And we know that the vaccine technology produces
- the dangerous spike protein. It produced the Wuhan spike protein, the spicule on the ball of the
- virus itself, which damages blood vessels and causes blood clotting. And all of them do. We
- would never unleash that into a pregnant woman's body. Americans have to understand something is
- very wrong what's going on, what's going on now in the world. These are examples, are clear-cut
- examples of wrongdoing that is at such a high level. The group think is in the wrong direction
- in such a consistent and overwhelming way that people are being harmed in an extraordinary fashion.
- Well, when I published the first paper in the American Journal of Medicine taught doctors how to treat COVID-19.
- Now it could have been somebody else. If Dr. Zelenko had the publication power, he could have
- done it. Or Dr. Proctor could have done it. Or Dr. Didier Rialt could have done it. Or Brian Freed,
- Brian Tyson or George Freed. It turned out that I was the person who had sufficient academic authority
- to do this. And I have authority. I take complete responsibility for doing this. I did it uniquely,
- the only person in the world to do this. Others actually may have been trying and those papers
- may have been suppressed by editors. They probably were, because we found suppression of early
- literature all over. It became impossible to publish papers. It was really hard. I may have
- just been the strongest and the most courageous doctor in the world to do that. But I did it.
- And the feedback I was getting was tremendous. It's like, of course, this makes sense. I'm so glad
- this got into the literature. It came out in electronic print in August and then it came into
- hard print in January. When it hit January and it landed in all the medical libraries in the world,
- that's when things really heated up. And I do have to tell you that I got letters to the editor
- that came into the American Journal of Medicine. And Dr. Joe Alpert out of Arizona is the editor.
- Joe has let every one of those letters come to me for a response. The tenor of the letters is
- quite interesting. And they've come from Duke University. They've come from McGill, from
- Monash University in Australia. They've come from Brazil. The tenor of the letters is,
- Dr. McCullough, you can't do this. You can't treat COVID-19 patients.
- And it's the most interesting. My response is, doctor, please have courage.
- Let's do away with therapeutic nihilism. Let's join together and treat COVID-19 patients
- compassionately to reduce hospitalization and death. And we can do this and I can do it. And
- we even have more supportive data. So every time they say, oh, this drug doesn't work,
- and I'll say, well, here's five more studies that do. Hydroxychloroquine, we're up to hundreds of
- studies that shows that it works. Ivermectin, hundreds of studies. Steroids, dozens of studies.
- Anticoagulants, at least a dozen studies. We are so well supported in the concepts
- of treating COVID-19 that every time one of these letters comes in, I have a little fun with it
- because the position of strength is enormous. My thoughts and my positions and my statements over
- time are becoming progressively stronger and progressively more powerful. And the detractors
- sense that. The feeling of fear, intellectual fear from my adversaries is palpable. I feel it
- every day. And when that first paper came out in the American Journal of Medicine,
- my daughter said, Daddy, why don't you make a YouTube video? I said, I don't want to do
- social media. That's for kids. I just, I don't have time for this. She taught me how to do it.
- It was PowerPoint. I literally just recorded my face down the lower corner. I wore a tie, four
- slides saying, listen, it's Americans, it's Italians. We looked at safety. We looked at
- efficacy. We looked at all the available data. We think this is the best way to put together the
- drugs. We had four slides on this. It got up on YouTube. It went absolutely viral, went absolutely
- viral. And then I got a message that said, you violated terms of the community and it was struck
- down. Then I got a call from the US Senate. So I told you, I knew something was going on because
- I'd never been called by the White House before. I'd never been called by the Senate before.
- People in Washington were following this. They were stakeholders in Washington who, in a sense,
- knew that something is going wrong here, that this viral infection could be treated,
- but they were kind of waiting for someone in the academic community to step forward and literally
- say it can be treated. I was the first one to say, we can treat this. We can do this. It's very
- important to be able to make this statement. We can do it. Based on what? Based on my judgment.
- Based on my judgment. Supported by the available science, but more importantly, based on my
- judgment. And so I ended up contracting COVID-19 myself in October. My wife came home with it.
- She got sick before I knew it got sick. It got into my lungs. I was in approved protocols.
- I quickly got into a protocol. It's hard, but I was able to find a protocol. I was on
- hydroxychloroquine, azithromycin, a nutraceutical bundle per the protocol. I later on needed
- steroids because of lung involvement. But I wanted to show America that you could get COVID-19
- and have some medical problems, which I do, and be able to get through it without being hospitalized.
- So on treatment day six, illness day eight, beautiful sunny day in Dallas, Texas, I went out
- far away from anybody else and I went jogging. And I was really short of breath. I'll tell you,
- I'm a pretty strong runner. I was short of breath because of the COVID involvement in my lungs,
- but I ran all the way to a park. I made a video in the park and then I made it all the way home.
- And I had fun with it. In fact, I played that M&M music that said, the recovery video, if any of you
- watch M&M, it said, I'm not afraid. And I just videoed myself and said, I'm not afraid of COVID-19
- and that video. That video was struck down and then ultimately had to get restored. I said,
- wait a minute. YouTube is playing a role here in addition to all the other stakeholders in suppressing
- any early treatment. In fact, the early treatment doctors started to become scrubbed from Twitter,
- from YouTube, from social media. And then ultimately YouTube came out with a very clear message.
- They said, listen, we are only going to have information that is in line with the CDC, NIH,
- and FDA, which say do nothing. And everything else is going to be considered misleading.
- And we're making the judgment. It's our call on what's misleading and what's not. But if it's
- pretty easy to be in line with the CDC, NIH, and FDA because they say to do nothing. So if the social
- media platform is to do nothing for early treatment and suppress early treatment, which it is,
- the major media is to suppress early treatment. So I still go back and say, who's responsible?
- I'd say the government agencies. In this period of crisis, if we're going to revert to our government
- agencies and our task force, and if our presidents can't be wise enough to even choose doctors who
- have ever even seen a patient and know how to treat it, if they're not wise enough to pick doctors
- who can treat COVID-19, we'll never have agencies that say we can treat COVID-19. And if we don't
- have agencies do that, then nothing else is going to follow. If the doctors and people we pick have
- never seen COVID-19, they're scared of it. They don't know how to treat it. And the only thing
- they can comment on is wearing masks and social distancing and vaccination. That's all that America
- is going to have. So America's response to COVID-19, the official response has basically been to well
- people. Wear masks, clean vaccinated, and America has offered nothing to the sick person. And when
- they get in the hospital, we haven't seen much feature on that. The drugs are pretty weak,
- remdesivir, convalescent plasma, tozolizumab, steroids, anticoagulants. You don't hear much
- about it, and it's honestly too late. Recently, a Harvard group, the Stop COVID group, had published
- those sick enough to get in the ICU. The 28-day mortality is 38%. Unacceptably high. Going into
- hospitals is a nightmare. I get desperate calls from all over the United States, thank goodness
- for the major telemedicine and regional telemedicine networks that basically have taken over.
- They're the real heroes of the COVID-19 pandemic. Hospitals are empty now.
- Hospitals here in Dallas used to have 200, 300 patients at a time. Now they've got 10, 5. The
- other day in Texas, we hit zero deaths. Zero. So early treatment is going to be one of the great,
- great stories that historians, and they'll reach out to Ben Marble, who started MyFreeDoctor.com.
- Ben Marble, that whole telemedicine is run strictly by charity. People donate money,
- and they get patients their drugs, and they prescribe hydroxychloroquine, ivermectin,
- steroids, and other drugs, and put them in the combination. They follow protocols. Terrific.
- They're seeing thousands of patients by telemedicine every day. So Americans are getting
- treated, and so the word is out. People talk to each other. Americans, it's interesting,
- they understand that the media and our agencies are not leveling with them. They understand that.
- I did a seminar early on because I had treated a very prominent African-American minister here in
- Dallas, and him and his wife were sick. He didn't tell me about his wife, and she was testing
- negative. She wasn't a patient of mine. He got what's called sequence multidrug therapy. He got
- really sick. He's got heart failure, diabetes, emphysema, obesity, kidney disease, survives at
- home sick for about 10 days. I'm not saying the drug therapy is perfect, but I saved him from
- being hospitalized or dying. His wife, no treatment, hospitalized, diagnosed late, was in the hospital
- for five weeks, came home on oxygen. That virus ravaged her lungs. It was awful. They had the same
- illness, and so he became activated. He said, Dr. McCullough, can you do a webinar for African-American
- churches nationwide? I did a webinar, and I presented my approach, and you know what the
- comments were? He said, Dr. McCullough, we knew the government was lying to us. We knew this was
- treatable. We knew it all along. People know this.
- It's the individual finance way. There are practices that have come on. I've gotten calls
- in Dallas. Dr. McCullough, can you share your protocols? We want to do this. The treating
- doctors really have interdigitated, and we informally formed a group called C-19,
- where we get about four to five email updates a day of really critical updates on treatment.
- It is international. We have former heads of state involved in C-19. We have Nobel Prize winners
- involved in C-19, hundreds and hundreds of American doctors. There now is a published list
- of treating doctors in the United States, 250 across all 50 states. Texas has 35 of them.
- Americans are finding their way despite suppression of early treatment. It's one of the great
- stories, and I'll never forget when I testified in the Texas Senate on March 10th. Myself and Dr.
- Richard Urso, another leading early treating doctor in Houston, the chairwoman of the committee at
- one of the side conversations said, yeah, my husband got COVID-19, and he got really sick,
- and I'm so glad he got early treatment. We found a doctor that was willing to prescribe
- any other drugs, and I didn't throw out the zinger in front of the Texas media,
- but I felt like saying, you know, do you have to be a chairperson of the Department of Health
- and Human Services to get some treatment? What about these poor people in South Dallas and San
- Antonio and Houston? What about people who are not so privileged? Do you know 85% of some of our
- patients hospitalized here are Black or Hispanic? Who's helping them out? We should be having early
- treatment centers. They've been denied treatment. It's heartbreaking. Hispanics and African
- Americans have double the mortality of Caucasians.
- We have actually a law in America. It's called the 21st Century Cures Act,
- and what this says is that the FDA and doctors and others trying to decide on treatment
- evaluate the totality of information, including that little anecdote about your mom and the
- caretaker, as well as case series, large prospective cohort studies, retrospective
- cohort studies, hospital studies, outpatient studies, and then large prospective randomized
- double-blind placebo-controlled trials. But in a virus, single drugs themselves are very difficult
- to prove. If we required that for HIV, we'd have no treatment. HIV, we quickly realized we need
- three or four or five drugs. Everyone understands this. With COVID-19, I never thought a single
- drug was going to work. Hydroxychloroquine? No, not alone, but in combination. And it was that
- thinking. It takes kind of superior thinking that somehow doctors just lost their ability to think.
- Think a cancer doctor would say, oh, there's one pill that cures cancer? Never. It's always
- combination cancer therapy. So with this, with hydroxychloroquine, we're now at this stage,
- obviously, we have hundreds and hundreds of trials. We even have large randomized trials.
- I've published with Dr. Joe Ladapo, only prospective randomized control trials show benefit.
- So at every level, we meet the evidence grade to use hydroxychloroquine. At every level,
- we meet the evidence grade to use ivermectin. Not so much evidence, but good enough in the
- antibodies. We have the same for steroids. The biggest and best trial in all of COVID-19 is
- colcarona. I mentioned the colchicine. Shockingly, colcarona, the best trial, 4,000 patients,
- double-blind randomized placebo-controlled trial, the best quality that exists, rejected by New
- England Journal of Medicine, rejected by JAMA, rejected by Lancet. There is a global suppression
- on any early treatment. I want the listeners to understand how global this is. If we were to go
- north into Canada, doctors are threatened that their licenses will be examined or take away
- if they attempt to treat an outpatient with COVID-19. They are told this in Canada. In
- northern EU, the same is true. Dr. Didier Rialt, who is trying to innovate with hydroxychloroquine
- in France in period times, has been under degrees of threat of arrest or partial arrest or house
- arrest, almost as if we're back in the dark ages. In Australia, in April, they put on the books in
- Queensland's Australia, a doctor who tries to help a patient with hydroxychloroquine could be
- penalized up until the point of going into jail for six months for helping in South Africa. They
- put some doctors in jail for trying to help patients with ivermectin. Listen, the powers
- that are out there that want to suppress early treatment and cause as much fear, suffering,
- hospitalization, and death are not by happenstance. These are powerful forces that have created such
- fear among doctors. People are fearful they're going to lose their careers, their livelihood,
- their medical license. People are afraid of going to jail
- and just helping their fellow man get through COVID-19. This is extraordinary. Historians should
- go look through the course of time. You know, the very first doctor who tried to help a polio
- patient survive polio with the iron lung machine, which became really a stable ICU device, was
- thrown off medical staff. Throw them off staff.
- I'd look very carefully at the work building upon other investigative reporters. So, Dr. Peter
- Bregan has a book called COVID-19, The Global Predators, We Are the Prey, and it has a living
- document. He's already pre-released the manuscript, and he's releasing updates. Now,
- he's older, and he's kind of worried the story won't get out at his age, but I believe he's up
- to 900 documents. The whole story is not put together, but it is substantial and shows the
- interconnections of the stakeholders involved. Dr. Nicholas Wade, who was featured on a recent
- Tucker Carlson as an investigative reporter, he has assembled quite a story. And then Whitney Webb,
- who's a young investigative reporter, has published some striking things. All three of these,
- and as well as many more, are linking two important concepts. The suppression of early treatment,
- and even probably the soft attenuation of in-hospital treatment
- to make the problem worse than what it is.
- Many methods to make the case count look higher than what it is make the mortality
- numbers look worse than what they are. Many methods to create the reaction out of proportion
- to the reality, so lockdowns, fears, economic suffering, what have you. All of these things
- making the pandemic way worse than what it is to have that occur. More fear, suffering,
- hospitalization and death, loneliness, lockdown, in order to promote mass vaccination. These two
- mass vaccination at all costs. The world must be mass vaccinated and human beings on earth
- ought to understand at this point in time what we're seeing is unprecedented. It became known
- the virus was going to be amenable to a vaccine somewhere around April, May, and at that point
- in time therapy was suppressed. Everything, nothing could be published. Everything, the fake
- prepare the population for vaccination. Once the vaccines come out, they're short tracked,
- there's all kinds of enthusiasm regarding it. Needles in all the arms, trucks rolling, Americans
- cheering, and then the mass vaccination program starts off. And then before we know it, we're
- vaccinating pregnant women. Why are we doing that? That can't be safe. Now we're going to vaccinate
- COVID recovered patients. Wait a minute, they have complete and robust permanent immunity. No
- one's ever challenged the immunity of a COVID recovered patient. Why are we vaccinating them?
- And then it keeps going and going. At first we vaccinated high risk people. I didn't really
- understand vaccinating young healthcare workers because they weren't at risk. There were never
- any hospital outbreaks in the United States. The only thing that was clear nursing home workers
- gave it to nursing home patients. We knew that. So nursing home workers should have been vaccinated
- and that may be high risk people and we should call it a day. I always estimated maybe 20 million
- people need to be vaccinated, but that didn't seem to satisfy the vaccine stakeholders, which are
- Pfizer, Moderna, J&J, AstraZeneca, and any others that come forward, the CDC, the FDA, and the NIH,
- and the White House. Massive vaccine stakeholders. You could throw in Gates Foundation,
- World Health Organization. You could throw those in as well. Massive stakeholders and they wanted
- everybody to be vaccinated without exception. No one will escape the needle. We've actually never
- had this before and the vaccine process is extraordinary. There's a consent form. It says
- this is investigational. We don't know if it's going to work. There's only two months of data.
- The side effects could be a sore arm all the way to death and we don't know. Sign here. We need
- your identifying information. We need a barcode on the vial. We need you identified and now you're
- in a database. You're vaccinated. And so this mass vaccination is extraordinarily concerning.
- We never vaccinate into the middle of a pandemic. Never. We've never had an effective vaccine for
- respiratory virus, including influenza. It's only modestly effective. We knew from the published data
- that the attack rates in placebo and the vaccine arms were less than 1%. So we know that the vaccine
- can have a less than 1% effect in the population. Why would it be any different than the clinical
- trials? We knew from the clinical trials that it didn't stop COVID-19 so people can get COVID-19
- anyway. Why would be this incredible drive to vaccinate everybody? And now, oh my lord, now
- the vaccine within a few months has been completely weaponized. Now travel is related to the vaccine.
- People can't go to school without the vaccine. People are losing their jobs without the vaccine.
- Believe me, there is something very, very potent in this vaccine. It should be disturbing to
- everybody. The word vaccine ought to be the most disturbing word that they have seen. Now we have
- 12-year-old children who are told they can decide on their own whether or not they could take a
- vaccine. So about 70% of my patients are vaccinated. I'm very pro-vaccine. I've taken all the vaccines
- myself, about 70%, and they were all vaccinated in December, January, and February. But as we sit
- here today in May, we have over 4,000 vaccine-related deaths and over 10,000 hospitalizations. The limit
- to shut down a program is about 25 to 50 deaths. Swine flu, 1976, 25 deaths. They shut down the
- program. It's not safe. All the vaccines in the United States per year, what ambulance gets
- reported in the database is about 200. And we're talking about vaccinating probably 500 million
- injections. Here in the United States, at 100 million people vaccinated, this is far and away
- the most lethal, toxic, biologic agent ever injected into a human body in American history.
- And it's going strong with no mention of safety by our officials, with wild enthusiasm by our
- hospital administrators, with doctors supporting it. Doctors are saying now they won't see patients
- in their waiting room without the vaccine. This problem, COVID-19, was actually from the very
- beginning. That's what Whitney Webb said. She goes, COVID-19 is actually about the vaccine.
- It's not about the virus. It's about the vaccine.
- I think it's about what the vaccine means. And Whitney Webb gets credit for this. Back in April,
- she said, aha, I figured this out. This is what globalists have been waiting for. They've been
- waiting for a way of marking people. That you get in a vaccine, you're marked in a database. And this
- can be used for trade, for commerce, for behavior modification, all different purposes. And you've
- seen it right here in Dallas. You can't go to a Dallas Mavericks game unless you're vaccinated.
- You've had people say, listen, you have passports. You had colleges today announce that they're not
- going to give any credit to natural immunity. Every scientist in the world knows that the
- natural immunity is way better than the vaccine immunity. If it's about COVID, why don't we have
- recovered people freely go to college? Why do we have to have faulty vaccine immunity be the
- priority and have natural immunity not count? See, these types of things make me think that
- Whitney Webb is correct. This is actually about marking. The vaccine is a way of marking people.
- It's a way of starting to assert efforts to create compliance, behavior control. Don't forget,
- the vaccine is just a starter. Now there's going to be updates. There's going to be boosters that
- prepping people for this. There's going to be more. The vaccine manufacturers are all linked.
- They're all uniquely indemnified. What medical product is there indemnification where something
- happens to you? You don't have any recourse. You know, a woman gets vaccinated, a pregnant woman.
- She has no maternal fetal rights. Something happens to her or her baby. She's out of luck.
- This is extraordinary what Americans are doing. It's absolutely extraordinary what's being
- thrust upon us now.
- I think this whole pandemic from the beginning was about the vaccine. So I think all roads lead to
- the vaccine and what it means. There are already places in Southeast Asia and Europe, they're
- laying the groundwork for compulsory vaccination. I mean compulsory. That means somebody pins you
- down to the ground and puts a needle in you. That's how bad stakeholders want vaccination.
- Listen, that's not of cost. You don't have to pay for it. It's all provided.
- There are people or stakeholders, they do want a needle in every arm. This needle in every arm is
- a very important moniker. Why? Why do you want a needle in an arm? Let's take COVID recovered.
- Can't get the virus. Can't receive it. It has nothing new. Why would they ever want a needle
- in the arm of a COVID recovered patient? Why? Three studies show higher safety events.
- The tension that Americans are feeling right now as they're trying to keep their jobs and go to
- work is they know they can die of the vaccine. That's the problem. If the vaccine was like water
- and you just got it, no side effects, who wouldn't take it? Say, hey, I'll comply.
- They got my social security number anyway in a database. I'm already marked. I'll just get
- marked. But no, there's something very unique about this vaccine. It's something about injecting
- something into a body that is so important to stakeholders that it doesn't matter.
- Kids 12 years old told they can make their own decision on this and it could be their fatal
- decision? Think about that. North Carolina just passed that. Oh, kids 12 years old can
- decide on their own. There are over 4,000 dead Americans. There's over 10,000 dead people in
- Europe that die on days one, two, and three after the vaccine. Why are we pushing this in a way where
- people's jobs and their education and livelihood decide on a decision that's potentially fatal?
- The tension, you can cut it with a knife. There are parents that say, listen, I want my kid to
- go to college this year, but I don't want to lose him to the vaccine. They know what's going on.
- The internet is full of these cases. Blood clots, strokes, immediate death. Now, I'm fortunate I
- have not directly lost a patient to the vaccine. I told you most got vaccinated in December, January,
- February. Based on the safety data now, I can no longer recommend it. I can't recommend it.
- It's passed all the thresholds to being a safe product. It's not a safe product. None of them
- are. It's not just Johnson & Johnson. In fact, more of the safety events in the United States
- have occurred with Moderna and Pfizer. There are now papers written by prominent scientists
- calling for a worldwide halt in the program. There are prominent virologists, many of them,
- including Nobel Prize winners, who have said, listen, if we vaccinate people and we create a
- very narrow, incomplete library of immunity, which is what the vaccine is, the vaccines are
- all targeted to the original Wuhan spike protein, which is long gone. That's extinct. Patients are
- getting vaccinated to something that doesn't even exist anymore. That Wuhan spike protein is gone.
- We're hoping the immunity covers the other variants, but that narrow immunity is a setup.
- It's just like giving everybody a narrow spectrum antibiotic. If you did that, what would happen?
- We'd grow up superbugs. There are warnings out there saying, don't do this. Don't vaccinate
- the entire world. All we're going to do is set ourselves up for a superbug that's going to
- really wipe out populations. So for many reasons, the vaccine, indiscriminate vaccination, is a
- horrendous idea. It's a horrendous bioweapon that's been thrust onto the public and it's going to
- cause great personal harm, which it already has. Thousands of people have lost their lives. I've
- patients lose their family members, lots of them. I've filled out a safety report on a patient who
- developed blood clots after one of the Pfizer-Moderna vaccine. And I'm telling you, it took half an hour
- to do it. There was many pages and each page said, warning, federal offense punishable by
- severe fines and penalties if I falsified a report. All those thousands of Americans that
- have died with the vaccine and hospitalizations in the database, I think are real. And they are far
- beyond anything we've ever seen. And as a doctor and as a public citizen, I am extraordinarily
- concerned about the vaccine. The vaccine center right down the street here is empty. I drive past
- it every day. Americans know they're talking to each other. The vaccine's not safe. And now the
- effort is the vaccine stakeholders want kids without parental guidance and now they want to
- be in the church. Americans and people worldwide should be extraordinarily alarmed.
- My personal situation, professional situation, is a position of strength. And those who have
- attempted in any way to pressure, coerce, or threaten me with reprisal have paid an
- extraordinary price. And I think that's an important message to get out there. There is a
- of compassionate care and of the Hippocratic Oath and of the fiduciary relationship that a
- doctor has to a patient and a prominent doctor has to a population that supersedes all of those
- other ill intents. And what I say is bring them on.
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