Notes on Transitory Governments, first draft

In the days following a revolution, a balance of order and disorder must be maintained, in order to create and preserve the freedom of the populace.

A case could be made that the downfall of the Soviet Union, the cause for its descent into authoritarianism, was its inability to maintain a certain revolutionary spirit, that is to say, an inability to continue the revolution indefinitely, such that new tyrants cannot impose themselves on the people. An alternative case could be made, however, that the downfall of the communist forces in Spain (putting aside the various other factors, including active and deliberate sabotage from the Soviet Union and rampant infighting, going by Homage to Catalonia) was an inability to provide a properly cohesive front against the fascists.

So it is necessary, then, that a revolutionary government must be simultaneously be both strong and weak (as the fascists will nevertheless describe it to be, regardless of its inherent traits). Freedoms must be continually afforded to all people within said government's jurisdiction, and such freedoms must never be deprived from any person, if it can be helped. However, the government must also possess the necessary authority to organize militias or materials are necessary for the defense of the revolution.

The two ways, in this writer's mind, that this authority can be acheived (ignoring rampant and unaccountable dictatorship) are as follows:

The government sets out a specific agenda regarding their actions in the case of emergency, makes this agenda known to those outside the government, and ensures compliance with this agenda, without deviation. The lack of deviation ensures an orderly, if inflexible, response to crisis, while also limiting the power of the government by being clear, and well defined in scope. Actions outside the scope of this agenda should be obvious, and the people should thereby be able to recognize and oppose them.

Alternatively, the government could exist entirely by public mandate. Executive power could be delegated by frequent lottery or election, and all major executive acts are adopted by a vote of the affected parties. (barring, of course, circumstances where this would be absurd, such as having serial killers vote on whether to outlaw murder!) That is to say, legislation affecting one or two provinces need not concern voters on the other side of the nation, but a decision to nationalize a large industry, or build a large construction project likely would.

Of course, hybrids of these extremes are possible, such as having a civil government operating on public mandate within the bounds of a set agenda (no reinstating capitalism without unanimous approval, or somesuch), or a military-defensive branch might operate upon an agenda drafted and adopted by a public vote.
Indeed, it would be folly to run on a system entirely based on one but not the other. The agenda model leaves little room for reform, and runs the risk of ending up with "constitutionalists", who think the early revolutionaries omniscient, infallible gods of governance, while the public mandate model may lead to infighting and constant debate without action, which is obviously useless for any sort of government, be it a wartime or peacetime administration.

It is the author's opinion that an ideal sort of government would be one run as such:

A central agenda, drafted initially by whatever sort of revolutionaries are present, and able to be amended with a fairly large majority vote of all citizens, say, around 5/6ths. The scope of this agenda would be relatively simple laws, regarding the creation, amendment, and removal of existing laws, the method and varieties of votes that may be called, and the selection of a leader. This would contain only the most bedrock regulations and ideals, things which, under reasonable circumstances, will not need to be amended for the foreseeable future, hence the high required vote. This section would also, ideally, be a declaration of the rights of all people, in order to prevent the removal of these rights.

A secondary agenda, regarding common affairs of government, but is more open to amendment, at say a 2/3rds vote. This would include such things as the organization and maintenance of a defensive force, the number of representatives for each region, and perhaps the location and number of regions which are entitled to represent themselves nationally. (Though, for this last one, it should be easier to add a new region than to strike one from the list.)

Finally, a tertiary agenda, which covers general laws which cannot be left to regional government; laws regarding secession and trade with capitalists, official languages for the government, and other such matters.

Outside of the scope of the central government, each region and subregion should be generally allowed self-government, with relatively little intervention unless the rights of those regions residents are being violated. The recommended model, by the author at this time of writing, would be perhaps a bi-monthly election for the executive leader of a number of people no larger than, say, 100,000, with the leader's decisions having to be ratified by majority vote of residents.