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- The Heysel Stadium
- 1.6 It was opened in 1930. It has been regularly used for football matches, including an international
- football match a few weeks before the 29 M ay, between Belgium and France, at which the attendance was
- about the same as at the Liverpool/Juventus game.
- 1.7 The Stadium is owned by the City of Brussels and leased to the Belgian Football Association. There
- had been no criticism by the Belgian Football Association nor by UEFA, who are the body controlling
- European football, of the facilities at the ground or of the structure.
- 1.8 A plan of the Stadium is at Appendix C. There are two open terraces at each end of the ground
- marked “X”, “Y ” and “Z” and “O”, “N” and “M ” respectively. Between the two sets of terraces are two
- stands. The stand marked Tribune 2 was built in about 1980. Apart from that, the Stadium is as it was
- constructed in 1930. It is the largest of its kind in Belgium and provides facilities not only for football
- matches but for athletics.
- 1.9 The terraces at “X”, “Y ” and “Z” were formed of a slope of approximately 1 in 10 at the shallowest
- and about 1 in 6 at the steepest. The surface of the terraces was earth with only the nosing of the steps
- being formed in concrete. Over the years the concrete nosing has deteriorated, and rusted re-inforcing bars
- have been exposed. The edges were uneven and jagged where pieces of concrete had broken off. The general
- condition of the terracing may be described as poor. The crush barriers showed signs of deterioration to
- both the concrete uprights and the re-inforcement. On the day of the match the perimeter fence consisted
- basically of two barriers. One was a brick structure; the other, on the terrace side, was wire fencing about
- two metres high.
- 1.10 There was a barrier dividing Block i4Y ” from Block “Z”. It consisted of two lines of tubular steel
- hand rail fixed by metal straps to the top of the existing concrete crush barrier uprights. It thus formed a
- passageway from top to bottom of the terrace. To one of the continuous hand rails were fixed fairly
- lightweight steel posts approximately 2.5-3 metres high. Tied to the steel posts was plastic coated wire
- 3
- mesh fencing. This composite construction, whilst forming a physical barrier, was not of sufficient strength
- to resist the determined efforts to breach it. It was removed by physical force during the charge by English
- fans from Block “Y ” into Block “Z”.
- 1.11 The flank wall where the disaster occurred was about three metres high at its maximum, reducing
- to just under two metres adjacent to the terrace. The brickwork wall did not appear to have been bedded
- in mortar nor fixed in any other way to the concrete wall. The buttresses of the wall were such that they
- would not assist in restraining the wall from movement when subjected to crowd pressure. It was not
- constructed as a crush barrier. Not surprisingly, it was not adequate to act as such. The wall and perimeter
- fence in front of the terrace were of fairly light construction which readily collapsed under the forward
- pressure of the crowd.
- 1.12 There were three places of entry and exit at the back of Blocks “X”, “Y ” and “Z” and three single
- access doors from the terraces onto the pitch. There were no turnstile controlled access points, but some
- control was exercised by gatemen. It was thus impossible to know the numbers going into each block or
- to prevent overcrowding in one block. In addition there were gaps in the boundary walls through which
- entry was effected by a number of spectators into Blocks “X” and “Y”.
- 1.13 Having regard to the state of the crush barriers and fences, and the general condition of the terraces
- it seems unlikely, had it been located in this country, that a certificate would have been issued under the
- Safety of Sports Grounds Act 1975 for this part of the ground. However, the poor state of the terraces
- played no part in the tragedy.
- The Arrangements for the Game
- 1.14 By 24 April 1985 the finalists were known. A meeting was held by the Belgian Football Association
- at its own Headquarters. There were present M. Roosens, the Secretary of the Belgian Football Association,
- a number of police officers, a member of the gendarmerie and representatives of Liverpool Football Club.
- 1.15 In Belgium the policing is carried out by both the local police force and by the gendarmerie, who
- are a national body organised on military lines. The Brussels police were to be responsible for the area
- including Blocks “O”, “N” and “M ”, and the gendarmerie for Blocks “X ”, “Y ” and “Z”.
- 1.16 It was agreed that the distribution and the positioning of spectators should be organised so that
- English fans would be positioned in Blocks “X” and “Y ” of the terraces, in “U ”, “V” and “W ” (in Tribune
- 2) and in “A”, “F”, "B” and “D” (in Tribune 1). Juventus were to be accommodated in Blocks “O” and
- “N” of the terraces, in “Q”, “P” and “W ” (in Tribune 2) and in “G”, “L”, “I” and “K” (in Tribune 1).
- It was agreed that each side would be issued with some 14,500 tickets of which 11,000 were for the terraces.
- 1.17 It was arranged by the Belgian Football Association that Block “Z” and Block “M ” would be
- allocated to neutral spectators, and Liverpool Football Club officials were told that a maximum of five
- tickets per person would be sold to spectators. There was agreement that there should be a barrier put up
- between Block “Y ” and Block “Z’\ and another barrier between Block “N” and Block “M ”. The Belgian
- Football Association had agreed with the authorities that there should be at least one gendarme on each
- of the steps of the segregation gangway between Block “Z” and the English fans in Block “Y ”. These and
- other matters were discussed, including the times of opening the ground and how English fans should
- arrive. There were further meetings during M ay in Belgium and England. One matter which was agreed
- was that there should be a ban on the sale of alcohol around the ground.
- 1.18 Thus it was hoped that the English fans and Juventus supporters would be properly segregated and
- that they would be physically prevented from being able to get at or to throw missiles at each other. They
- would be contained within their own areas. However, the officer-in-charge of the gendarmerie at the ground
- did not fully understand what his instructions were, nor unfortunately had he attended any of the meetings
- preceding the game. In the result, for a number of different reasons, the gendarmerie presence between
- Blocks “Y ” and “Z” was insufficient.
- 1.19 The advance intelligence was, broadly, that the English fans would present little or no trouble. This
- had a marked effect on the precautions which were taken. Liverpool have a good record, so far as European
- competitions, in which they have played for some 22 years, are concerned. Their management has long
- experience and they sought to take the normal precautions to prevent the unauthorised acquisition of
- tickets, to co-ordinate travel arrangements and to liaise with the Belgian authorities.
- 4
- 1.20 So far as the sponsored travel arrangements were concerned, supporters were accompanied by
- officers of the British Transport Police. That generally seems to have gone off without difficulty. However,
- one group of unsponsored supporters were refused passage by a Belgian vessel and there was a further
- group of 400 unsponsored coach travellers who had apparently had a great deal too much to drink.
- The Sale of Tickets for Block “Z”
- 1.21 There were various alarms about the sale of black market tickets and forged tickets. One of the
- matters of concern for the Liverpool Club was the sale of tickets for Block “Z”. By the UEFA instructions,
- no blocks of tickets were to be sold at the venue of the match except in small quotas. What happened to
- the sale of some of the tickets for Block “Z” was described by M. Roosens. He said that there were some
- 3,000 tickets available for sale on the first day and they were put in the hands of a M. Desment who had
- been selling tickets for the last twenty years. The sale took place at the Heysel Stadium, and a notice was
- put up saying that they were available for 300 Belgian francs each and that the maximum which could be
- purchased was five per person. When the staff arrived there was already a massive queue before sales had
- started. M. Desment later walked through the crowds and noticed that there were more tickets being sold
- to foreigners than to Belgians. He enquired from M. Roosens whether the sale should be stopped. The sale
- was in fact stopped. By then they had sold 2,000 to 3,000 tickets.
- 1.22 Because tickets were being sold from five different windows it was impossible to control who bought
- them. It was quite clear from all the evidence that some organisations had been buying large quantities of
- tickets. They did this by using a large number of their employees to take it in turns to go to the ticket
- windows. M. Roosens agreed in evidence that people had left the Stadium with whole rolls of tickets.
- Additionally, M. Roosens allowed 1,000 tickets to be sold to a director of a sports club committee who
- apparently sold them to an insurance company which sponsored the club. One witness spoke of a travel
- agent from Sicily with 60 tickets for Block “Z” which he was selling outside the ground at 100 times the
- official price.
- 1.23 It is quite clear that whether the tickets found their way onto the black market or not, a large
- number of tickets for Block “Z” came into the hands of Juventus supporters. The effect was, therefore,
- that all the careful preparations for the segregation of the English and Italian fans were rendered useless.
- The events of 29 May
- 1.24 It is not surprising that there is a great deal of conflicting evidence about the events of this day even
- from experienced witnesses such as police officers. Contradictions about the behaviour of the English fans
- before the game abound. I set out here as best I can some of the evidence presented to me.
- 1.25 Elaborate arrangements were made within the Belgian authorities for meeting and escorting the
- English supporters after their arrival in Belgium and on the train. Unfortunately, because of the timetable
- which the shipping companies operated, large numbers of English fans arrived in Brussels well before kick-
- off.
- 1.26 The behaviour of the English fans in the centre of Brussels gave a foretaste of what was to happen
- later in the day. It is only necessary to refer to one or two incidents so as to give an idea of how some,
- albeit a small minority of the English supporters, were behaving. It is said that about 2,000 supporters had
- taken over the Grand’ Place and the surrounding area. They were throwing beer bottles at the Belgian
- Police, they were spitting, they were hurling beer at cars. One witness described the Grand' Place as looking
- like a broken glass factory. One supporter, who had drunk too much and was wearing a toy British police
- helmet, stood at a nearby cross-roads directing traffic, thereby causing severe dislocation of traffic. A
- jeweller’s shop was robbed by English fans. Other fans were bathing in the fountains. A witness described
- a grocer’s shop being pillaged. The steps of the Stock Exchange were invaded. A number of English fans
- arrived at Jette from the train. They already had drink with them, although a good deal of it was
- confiscated. They tried to get into the buses provided for them without paying. In this they were unsuccessful
- because the bus driver simply refused to drive them. A very experienced senior British police officer
- described the conduct of the English fans as the worst he had ever seen.
- 1.27 Other witnesses, however, gave a totally different picture. Some supporters have written to say that
- while there was some noise, the general behaviour was good, the atmosphere friendly and relaxed, and that
- far from the police standing by while something akin to a riot was taking place, the police were heavy
- handed, interfering with people who were merely singing and enjoying themselves and treating both sets
- of supporters to an excessive display of authority.
- 5
- 1.28 Yet other witnesses talk of a carnival atmosphere with British and Italian fans fraternising freely
- with each other, taking photographs and exchanging mementoes and favours. This view was supported by
- a senior police officer to whom I spoke when I was in Belgium.
- Events at the Stadium
- 1.29 The first incident recorded in the Brussels Police Report took place at 3.55 pm when some of the
- temporary fencing, which had been erected all round the Stadium, was knocked down by Juventus
- supporters. It was erected to enable the Police more easily to search fans. It was about a kilometre long,
- comprising fifty sections. By about 4 pm about thirty or more sections had already been knocked down.
- This was not, apparently, considered serious by the police, because it was only intended to provide a buffer
- between ihe supporters and the ticket barrier. The police and gendarmes intended to search fans near the
- outside fence with a view to confiscating sticks or other weaponry. It is perfectly clear from all the evidence
- that there were insufficient police or gendarmes to search all spectators. Additionally it was wholly
- impossible to search people and at the same time to make sure that they did not retrieve weapons that had
- been confiscated.
- 1.30 There is a great body of evidence that the searching was perfunctory; that because of the absence
- of turnstiles and the presence of holes in the perimeter wall, a large number of people got into the Stadium
- without tickets; that those who had tickets inside were able to pass them back to those outside who did
- not. Weapons which were confiscated earlier were retrieved. The weapons varied. There were sticks used
- to carry flags, pieces of tree trunks, bottles and stones. Additionally, it is clear that a number of spectators
- had had too much to drink and a ban on the sale of alcohol outside the ground was not enforced. Bottles
- of drink were on sale at a number of stalls, thus providing more ammunition for the fans.
- 1.31 At 5.15 pm there was a police report that some of the perimeter fence in Block “N”, occupied by
- Juventus supporters, had been cut. At 5.46 pm there was a report that Italian supporters were beginning
- to vent their anger on the police. At 5.55 pm there was a report that there was general disorder in Block
- “O”, that supporters were becoming agitated and that 200 of them were beginning to get worked up,
- hurling insults at the police in the segregation gangway. A few minutes later there was a mass invasion of
- Block tfcM ” by supporters because Blocks “O” and “N” were full.
- 1.32 Commissioner Meura of the Brussels City Police said that some of his officers inside the stadium
- were pelted with missiles by the Italians, who were attempting to use riot tactics, surging forward en masse
- and retreating. He decided that what he must do was to protect the pitch and, although some of the
- perimeter fencing intended to protect the pitch was knocked over, he succeeded in preventing a pitch
- invasion. However, some 27 police were injured as a result of concrete and metal objects being thrown at
- the Juventus end of the ground.
- 1.33 The Police report records a request at 7.06 pm for re-inforcements in the gangway of Blocks “N”
- and “M ”, where the situation suddenly took a turn for the worse. And the report continues:
- “It should be noted that the relative calm in the upper parts of sections “N”, “M” and “O” only served
- to camouflage the jeers and provocation which a few hundred Juventus fanatics were directing at the
- police lower down. They began to cause trouble between 5.55 pm and 7.25 pm; initially in a fairly
- moderate way, there was a
- \
- hour during which insults were being hurled at the police and the supporters
- were trying to break through the fencing (Heras fencing shaken several times). The police in the gangway
- could not prevent 5 to 6 metres of fencing from being torn down at about 7 pm. Then 30 metres were
- forced and trampled down so as to give direct access to the track. All this despite the use of shields and
- truncheons by the police, several of whom were injured. It should also be noted that stones and/or lumps
- of concrete and some beer bottles, 20 in all, were raining down onto the track. Some hooligans from
- amongst the supporters were even running up to the police with sticks and iron bars.”
- 1.34 The report describes one hooligan at the Juventus end getting through the fencing and onto the
- pitch itself and sprinkling salt between the goal-posts; and there is a report of another incident when a pair
- of hand-cuffs were taken from a police officer by a hooligan who got onto the pitch; subsequently they
- were returned. Although it had been arranged that Juventus supporters should have Blocks “O” and “N”
- and that kkM ” should be allocated to neutral supporters, it is clear that Block “M ” was occupied by
- Juventus supporters. Both the police and the gendarmerie described to me the behaviour of the Italian fans
- up to this stage as worse than that of the English fans.
- 1.35 What meanwhile was happening at the other end of the ground, in Blocks “X”, “Y ” and “Z”? The
- first signs of unrest among the English fans appeared during the youth match which had been organised
- 6
- to keep the spectators occupied; this occurred somewhere between 6.15 pm and 6.30 pm. The English fans
- fired flares and rockets and threw stones into Block “Z”, which was beginning to be occupied by what
- were clearly Italian supporters. There was also a number of English fans in Block “Z” who sought to
- escape into Block “Y” . According to Captain Mahieu, who was in charge of the gendarmerie responsible
- for patrolling the area between Block “Y ” and Block “Z”, everything was calm between 6.15 pm and 7
- pm. Accordingly he had gone out of the Stadium; so too had Lieutenant Bonnet who was his second-in-
- command, to investigate a criminal complaint and to see about closing Block “X”. It appears there were
- about 15,000 spectators in Blocks “X” and “Y ” and about 5,000 in Block “Z”.
- 1.36 There is no doubt but that somewhere between 7.15 pm and 7.30 pm English fans charged Block
- “Z”. Preceding this there had been an exchange of missiles between Blocks “Z” and “Y”. There were three
- charges by English fans. The first two seemed to have been repulsed; the third resulted in the Italian
- supporters in Block “Z”, who were seeking to escape towards the perimeter, being squashed and suffocated
- by the press of large numbers.
- Extreme Political Parties
- 1.37 There was evidence about the presence of supporters from the extreme right. The Mayor gave
- evidence at the Inquiry that he had seen British and Italian spectators wearing the political insignia of
- parties of the extreme right and carrying flags. One British supporter, himself a referee, said that the ground
- outside the Stadium was littered with British National Front leaflets, some overprinted by the British
- National Party with their address. One witness spoke of passengers on the boat crossing the Channel with
- National Front insignia singing songs of hatred and exhibiting violence.
- 1.38 Mr John Smith, Chairman of Liverpool Football Club, spoke of how six members of Chelsea
- National Front had boasted to him of their part in provoking the violence and said that they seemed proud
- of their handiwork. Mr Bob Paisley, a former manager of Liverpool Football Club, said that he was forced
- to leave the Directors’ Box at the start of the game as dozens of fans poured over the dividing wall and
- that the person next to him claimed that he was a Chelsea supporter and was wearing a National Front
- badge. A number of banners decorated with swastikas were recovered after the match, including one
- marked “Liverpool Edgehill”. There was also evidence that the flag of a right wing organisation, "New
- Order”, was being flown by a small group of Juventus fans. A banner with “England for the English” and
- “Europe for the English” was observed and a contingent of the National Front were clearly seen in Blocks
- “X” and “Y ”. One party leaving Brussels main station was observed to be Londoners wearing Liverpool
- colours, carrying Union Flags and having National Front and swastika tattoos.
- 1.39 Apart from their presence, there is very little hard evidence that they caused any of the violence.
- Commissioner Meura said that he had not seen anyone from any extreme right wing organisation wearing
- any insigna. On 5 July a press statement was issued by the Merseyside Police which said:
- “There is no evidence to suggest that any National Front members were involved in the riot at the Heysel
- Stadium in Brussels.”
- What lessons are to be learned?
- 1.40 A Parliamentary Commission of Enquiry was set up in Belgium on 12 June 1985. It reported on 9
- July 1985.
- 1.41 The Commission concluded in this way:
- “It should be emphasised from the outset that it was the British supporters who mounted the disastrous
- charge into Section “Z”. They bear the main responsibility for the terrible events that followed and this
- must remain the case for whatever blame might be attributed to others as having aggravated the matter.”
- An extract from their conclusions appears in Appendix D.
- 1.42 When I spoke with M. Collignon, the Chairman of the Parliamentary Commission of Enquiry in
- Brussels in November, he told me that the only matter in his report that on reflection he might like to alter
- was to make rather more criticism of the Belgian and European football authorities and less of the individual
- members of the gendarmerie.
- 1.43 In his principal statement to Parliament about the Heysel disaster, the Belgian Minister of the
- Interior said:
- 7
- “Everyone knows that those guilty of the violence, those responsible for the deaths of the victims, are
- the violent groups among the English supporters/’
- He also referred to the
- “collective responsibility of English society which tolerates this violence and tries to channel it without
- wanting to eliminate it.”
- He said that the organisers of the match were the second group of people responsible. With regard to
- the role of the police and gendarmerie, he said that the overall plan had been adequate. He acknowledged
- that there had been errors in execution and announced measures to improve training and equipment to
- remedy these deficiencies. He added that if in future a larger police deployment was necessary, he would
- prefer to ban matches. He did not want to turn Brussels, even for a day, into a police state, for the sake
- of those who liked to manifest their violence.
- 1.44 The lessons to be learned from the disaster can be summarised in this way:
- (a) It is essential that opposing fans at matches such as this should be properly segregated so that there
- is no possibility of their being within attacking distance of each other. Missiles from rival supporters
- caused enormous problems and contributed in no small way to the disorder which occurred. So far
- as domestic football is concerned, that means ensuring either that there is an unoccupied space
- between opposing factions or that the physical method of securing segregation is such that they are
- unable to attack or bombard each other with missiles.
- (b) Sales of tickets need to be properly controlled so that segregation can be effectively enforced. One of
- the problems of all-ticket matches is that ticket touts may be able to purchase numbers of tickets and
- sell them indiscriminately; the effect of this is to put the whole segregation policy at risk. Police need
- to be aware if this occurs. In Scotland any person who in a public place touts for the purpose of
- selling so as to give another person cause for annoyance commits a criminal offence under the Civic
- Government (Scotland) Act 1982.
- (c) It is clear that a large number of spectators, particularly the English, had consumed substantially too
- much drink, and that they were able to take drink into the ground. This is now covered by the
- provisions of the Sporting Events (Control of Alcohol etc) Act 1985 in England and Wales and by
- the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980.
- (d) In addition to the fact that a number of fans were able to get into the ground without paying, most
- of them were also able to get in without being effectively searched; if they were searched, they were
- able to recover weapons which they subsequently used. This is particularly relevant to the power of
- the police to search at sports grounds in the United Kingdom.
- (e) While the structure of the police in Belgium is different from that in Britain there was obviously a
- breakdown in communications and instructions both prior to and during the course of the match. It
- was accepted by the Commandant of the gendarmerie that mistakes had been made. The important
- lesson for us to learn is that there needs to be strict co-operation between the football club and the
- police; that the police need to lay down and observe fixed procedures and that the communications
- need to be efficient. There was also criticism at the lack of liaison between the Headquarters outside
- the ground and those inside the ground. There needs to be good early planning with close co-operation
- between all the relevant authorities and clear decisions made. Those who are to be in charge on the
- day need to have taken part in the planning and to clearly understand their role.
- (0 Another lesson which can be learnt is that in order to enforce segregation, apart from physical
- barriers, it is necessary to have present a sufficient number of properly instructed police to take
- effective action at the first sign of trouble. If there are perimeter fences, they should contain an
- adequate number of doors in them; they need to be manned and to be opened immediately in the
- event of an emergency.
- (g) It is clear that, notwithstanding the previous good record of any particular club, those who go to see
- that club play can readily behave like hooligans, particularly when affected by drink. Unfortunately
- a previous good record is no guarantee of good behaviour in the future.
- (h) The final and most important lesson, which I cannot too strongly or too frequently emphasise is that
- if hooligans did not behave like hooligans at football matches there would be no such risk of death
- or injury.
- 8
- EUROPEAN CONVENTION
- 1.45 In August 1985 “The European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports
- Events and in Particular at Football Matches” was agreed. It has at the moment been signed by ten of the
- parties. It has been ratified by four.
- 1.46 The key points are that the Contracting Parties shall:
- 1. co-ordinate the policies and actions of Government Departments and other public agencies against
- spectator violence and misbehaviour (Article 2);
- 2. secure that adequate public order resources are employed to counter outbreaks of violence and
- misbehaviour near and inside grounds and along transit routes used by spectators; and facilitate co
- operation and exchange of information between police forces of different localities (Article 3.1);
- 3. seek to ensure that offenders (especially visiting supporters) are identified, prosecuted and that they
- receive appropriate penalties (Articles 5 and 3.1(c));
- 4. encourage the co-ordination of travel arrangements to inhibit potential troublemakers from leaving to
- attend matches (Article 3.3);
- 5. introduce procedures to identify problem matches in advance and for effective co-operation between
- authorities and clubs on precautions and measures to be taken (Article 4);
- 6. encourage the use of stewards in supporters9 clubs for crowd control and information (Article 3.2);
- 7. press football and local authorities and stadium owners and clubs to take the necessary practical
- measures for problem matches, eg in the design, improvement and selection of stadia, segregation, alcohol
- control, ticket sales, the exclusion of drunks and troublemakers etc (Article 3.4);
- 8. encourage football authorities to review their regulations continuously (Article 6.3);
- 9. looking further ahead, take social and educational measures to promote the more positive side of
- sport, eg fair play and active participation (Article 3.5); and
- 10. establish a standing committee to police the operation of the Convention and to propose improvements
- (Article 8).
- 1.47 This is a blueprint for European football, which has lessons for our domestic game.
- 9
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