"Trotsky and the Trotskyites negated the possibility of building socialism in conditions of capitalist encirclement. In foreign policy they put their stakes on the export of the revolution, and in home policy on the tightening of the screws on the peasants, on the city exploiting the countryside, and on administrative and military methods in running society. Trotskyism was a political trend whose ideologists took cover behind leftist pseudo-revolutionary rhetoric, and who in effect assumed a defeatist posture. . . .

In short, the Party's leading nucleus headed by Joseph Stalin had safeguarded Leninism in an ideological struggle. It defined the strategy and tactics in the initial stage of socialist construction, with its political course being approved by most members of the Party and most working people. An important part in defeating Trotskyism ideologically was played by Nicolai Bukharin, Felix Dzerzhinsky, Sergei Kirov, Grigori Ordjonikidze, Jan Rudzutak, and others.

At the very end of the 1920s a sharp struggle started over the ways of putting the peasantry on the socialist road. In substance, it revealed the different attitude of the majority in the Political Bureau and of the Bukharin group on how to apply the principles of the new economic policy at the new stage in the development of Soviet society.

The concrete conditions of that time—both at home and internationally—necessitated a considerable increase in the rate of socialist construction. Bukharin and his followers had, in their calculations and theoretical propositions, underrated the practical significance of the time factor in building socialism in the 1930s. In many ways, their posture was based on dogmatic thinking and a non-dialectical assessment of the concrete situation. Bukharin himself and his followers soon admitted their mistakes. . . .

And looking at history with a sober eye, considering the aggregate of internal and international realities, one cannot help asking whether a course other than that the Party chose could have been taken in those conditions. If we wish to be faithful to history and the truth of life, there can only be one answer: no other course could have been taken. In those conditions, with the threat of imperialist aggression building up visibly, the Party was increasingly convinced that it was essential not to just cover but literally race across the distance from the sledgehammer and wooden plough to an advanced industry in the shortest possible time, for without this the cause of the Revolution would be inevitably destroyed. . . .

At the same time, the period under review also saw some losses. They were in a sense connected with the successes I have just referred to. Some had begun to believe in the universal effectiveness of rigid centralisation, in that methods of command were the shortest and best way of resolving any and all problems. This had an effect on the attitude towards people, towards their conditions of life.

A system of administrative command in Party and government leadership emerged in the country, and bureaucratism gained strength, even though Lenin had warned about its danger. And a corresponding structure of administration and methods of planning began to take shape. In dustry—given its scale at the time, when literally all the main components of the industrial edifice were conspicious—such methods, such a system of administration generally produced reslts. However, an equally rigid centralisation-and-command system was impermissible in tackling the problems of refashioning rural life.

It must be said frankly: at the new stage there was a deficit of the Leninist considerate attitude to the interests of the working peasantry. Most important of all, there was an underestimation of the fact that the peasantry as a class had changed radically in the years since the Revolution. The principal figure now was the middle peasant. He had asserted himself as a farmer working the land he had received from the Revolution and he had, over a whole decade, become convinced that Soviet government was his kind of government. . . .

Today it is clear: in a tremendous undertaking, which affected the fate of the majority of the country's population, there was a departure from Lenin's policy towards the peasantry. This most important and very complex social process, in which a great deal depended on local conditions, was directed mostly by administrative methods. A conviction had arisen that all problems could be solved in a stroke, overnight. Whole regions and parts of the country began to compete: which of them would achieve complete collectivisation more quickly. Arbitrary percentage targets were issued from above. Flagrant violations of the principles of collectivisation occurred everywhere. Nor were excesses avoided in the struggle against the kulaks. The basically correct policy of fighting the kulaks was often interpreted so broadly that it swept in a considerable part of the middle peasantry too. Such is the reality of history.

But, comrades, if we assess the significance of collectivisation, it was in the final analysis a transformation of fundamental importance. Collectivisation implied a radical change in the entire mode of life of the preponderant part of the country's population to a socialist footing. It created the social base for modernising the agrarian sector. . . .

Quite obviously, it was the absence of a proper level of democratisation in Soviet society that made possible the personality cult, the violations of legality, the wanton repressive measures of the thirties. Putting things bluntly—those were real crimes stemming from an abuse of power. Many thousands of people inside and outside the Party were subjected to wholesale repression. . .

There is now much discussion about the role of Stalin in our history. His was an extremely contradictory personality. To remain faithful to historical truth we must see both Stalin's inconstestable contribution to the struggle for socialism, to the defence of its gains, and the gross political errors, and the abuses committed by him and by those around him, for which our people paid a heavy price and which had grave consequences for the life of our society. It is sometimes said that Stalin did not know about instances of lawlessness. Documents at our disposal show that this is not so. The guilt of Stalin and his immediate entourage before the Party and the people for the wholesale repressive measures and acts of lawlessness is enormous and unforgivable. This is a lesson for all generations.

Contrary to the assertions of our ideological opponents, the personality cult was certainly not inevitable. It was alien to the nature of socialism, represented a departure from its fundamental principles, and, therefore, has no justification. At its 20th and 22nd Congresses the Party severely condemned the Stalin cult itself and its consequences. We now know that the political accusations and repressive measures against a number of Party leaders and statesmen, against many Communists and non-Party people, against economic executives and military men, against scientists and cultural personalities were a result of deliberate falsification.

Many of the accusations were later, especially after the 20th Party Congress, withdrawn. Thousands of innocent victims were completely exonerated.

But the process of restoring justice was not carried through and was actually suspended in the middle of the sixties. Now, in line with a decision taken by the October 1987 Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee, we are having to return to this. The Political Bureau of the Central Committee has set up a commission for comprehensively examining new and already known facts and documents pertaining to these matters. Appropriate decisions wil lbe taken on the basis of the commission's findings. . . .

In drawing up a general balance sheet of the period of the twenties and thirties after Lenin, we can say that we have covered a difficult road, replete with contradictions and complexities, but a truly heroic one. Neither gross errors, nor departures from the principles of socialism could divert our people, our country from the road it embarked upon by the choice it made in 1917. . . .

It is said that the decision taken by the Soviet Union in concluding a non-aggression pact with Germany was not the best one. This may be so, if in one's reasoning one is guided not by harsh reality, but by abstract conjectures torn out of their time frame. . .

The USSR made great efforts to build up a system of collective security and to avert a global slaughter. But the Soviet initiatives met with no response among the Western politicians and political intriguers, who were coolly scheming how best to involve socialism in the flames of war and bring about its head-on collision with fascism.

Outcasts already by virtue of our socialist birth, we could under no circumstances be right from the imperialist point of view. As I said, the Western ruling circles, in an attempt to blot out their own sins, are trying to convince people that the Nazi attack on Poland and thereby the start of World War II was triggered by the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939. As if there had been no Munich Agrement with Hitler signed by Britain and France back in 1938 with the active connivance of the USA, no Anschluss of Austria, no crucifixion of the Spanish Republic, no Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia and Klaipeda, and no conclusion of non-aggression pacts with Germany by London and Paris in 1938. By the way, such a pact was also concluded by pre-war Poland. All this, as you see, fitted neatly into the structure of imperialist policy, and is considered to be in the nature of things.

It is known from documents that the date of Germany's attack on Poland ('not later than September 1') was fixed as early as April 3, 1939, that is, long before the Soviet-German pact. In London, Paris, and Washington it was known in minute detail how the preparations for the Polish campaign were really proceeding, just as it was known that the only barrier capable of stopping the Hitlerites could be the conclusion of an Anglo-Franco-Soviet military alliance not later than August 1939. These plans were also known to the leadership of our country, and that was why it sought to convince Britain and France of the need for collective measures. It also urged the Polish Government of the time to cooperate in curbing aggression.

But the Western powers had different designs: to beckon the USSR with the promise of an alliance and thereby to prevent the conclusion of a non-aggression pact we had been offered, to deprive us of the chance to make better preparations for the inevitable attack by Hitler Germany on the USSR. Nor can we forget that in August 1939 the Soviet Union faced a very real threat of war on two fronts: in the west with Germany and in the east with Japan, which had started a costly conflict on the Khalkhin-Gol."
(Gorbachev, Mikhail. October and Perestroika: The Revolution Continues. 1987. pp. 20-30.)