1. Neoconservatism is not at all hostile to the idea of a welfare state, but it is critical of the Great Society version of this welfare state. In general, it approves of those social reforms that, while providing needed security and comfort to the individual in our dynamic, urbanized society, do so with a minimum of bureaucratic intrusion in the individual’s affairs. Such reforms would include, of course, social security, unemployment insurance, some form of national health insurance, some kind of family assistance plan, etc. In contrast, it is skeptical of those social programs that create vast and energetic bureaucracies to “solve social problems.” In short, while being for the welfare state, it is opposed to the paternalistic state. It also believes that this welfare state will best promote the common good if it is conceived in such a way as not to go bankrupt.

2. ⁠Neoconservatism has great respect—it is fair to say it has learned to have great respect—for the power of the market to respond efficiently to economic realities while preserving the maximum degree of individual freedom. Though willing to interfere with the market for overriding social purposes, it prefers to do so by “rigging” the market, or even creating new markets, rather than by direct bureaucratic controls. Thus it is more likely to favor housing vouchers for the poor than government-built low-income projects.

3. ⁠Neoconservatism tends to be respectful of traditional values and institutions: religion, the family, the “high culture” of Western civilization. If there is any one thing that neoconservatives are unanimous about, it is their dislike of the “counterculture” that has played so remarkable a role in American life over these past fifteen years. Neoconservatives are well aware that traditional values and institutions do change in time, but they prefer that such change be gradual and organic. They believe that the individual who is abruptly “liberated” from the sovereignty of traditional values will soon find himself experiencing the vertigo and despair of nihilism. Nor do they put much credence in the notion that individuals can “create” their own values and then incorporate them into a satisfying “lifestyle.” Values emerge out of the experience of generations and represent the accumulated wisdom of these generations; they simply cannot be got out of rap sessions about “identity” or “authenticity.”

4. ⁠Neoconservatism affirms the traditional American idea of equality, but rejects egalitarianism—the equality of condition for all citizens—as a proper goal for government to pursue. The equality proclaimed by the Declaration of Independence is an equality of natural rights, including the right to become unequal (within limits) in wealth, or public esteem, or influence. Without that right, equality becomes the enemy of liberty. To put it in more homely terms: the encouragement of equality of opportunity is always a proper concern of democratic government. But it is a dangerous sophistry to insist that there is no true equality of opportunity unless and until everyone ends up with equal shares of everything.

5. ⁠In foreign policy, neoconservatism believes that American democracy is not likely to survive for long in a world that is overwhelmingly hostile to American values, if only because our transactions (economic and diplomatic) with other nations are bound eventually to have a profound impact on our own domestic economic and political system. So neoconservatives are critical of the post-Vietnam isolationism now so popular in Congress, and many are suspicious of “détente” as well. On specific issues of foreign policy, however, the neoconservative consensus is a weak one. In the case of Vietnam, neoconservatives went every which way.