Advertisement
xdxdxd123

Untitled

Aug 13th, 2017
131
0
Never
Not a member of Pastebin yet? Sign Up, it unlocks many cool features!
text 40.72 KB | None | 0 0
  1. 1
  2. 00:00:00,589 --> 00:00:04,290
  3. okay we have a different speaker<font color="#CCCCCC"> that's</font>
  4.  
  5. 2
  6. 00:00:04,290 --> 00:00:06,839
  7. <font color="#E5E5E5">going to cover security server and I'll</font>
  8.  
  9. 3
  10. 00:00:06,839 --> 00:00:08,730
  11. let Paul introduce themselves<font color="#CCCCCC"> say hello</font>
  12.  
  13. 4
  14. 00:00:08,730 --> 00:00:10,320
  15. <font color="#E5E5E5">and</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> then we'll go ahead</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> and get started</font>
  16.  
  17. 5
  18. 00:00:10,320 --> 00:00:21,210
  19. here my name<font color="#E5E5E5"> is Paul Crutzen</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> I work in</font>
  20.  
  21. 6
  22. 00:00:21,210 --> 00:00:24,900
  23. the I see here in Dallas<font color="#E5E5E5"> actually I'm</font>
  24.  
  25. 7
  26. 00:00:24,900 --> 00:00:28,740
  27. I'm<font color="#E5E5E5"> actually remote</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> I work a live in</font>
  28.  
  29. 8
  30. 00:00:28,740 --> 00:00:30,689
  31. Tyler which is about<font color="#E5E5E5"> a hundred miles</font>
  32.  
  33. 9
  34. 00:00:30,689 --> 00:00:32,850
  35. east<font color="#E5E5E5"> of Dallas but I've worked with the</font>
  36.  
  37. 10
  38. 00:00:32,850 --> 00:00:37,170
  39. group since<font color="#E5E5E5"> about 2000 so</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> I've</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> been here</font>
  40.  
  41. 11
  42. 00:00:37,170 --> 00:00:40,860
  43. <font color="#CCCCCC">quite some time my primary role is with</font>
  44.  
  45. 12
  46. 00:00:40,860 --> 00:00:44,329
  47. early test programs as Paul said so we
  48.  
  49. 13
  50. 00:00:44,329 --> 00:00:47,129
  51. we work with<font color="#CCCCCC"> free generally available</font>
  52.  
  53. 14
  54. 00:00:47,129 --> 00:00:50,730
  55. code for ISPs that<font color="#E5E5E5"> want to prepare their</font>
  56.  
  57. 15
  58. 00:00:50,730 --> 00:00:54,329
  59. products<font color="#E5E5E5"> before we actually release the</font>
  60.  
  61. 16
  62. 00:00:54,329 --> 00:00:58,829
  63. <font color="#CCCCCC">GA release of</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> z/os and some of the other</font>
  64.  
  65. 17
  66. 00:00:58,829 --> 00:01:00,750
  67. one of the<font color="#E5E5E5"> other things that I that</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> I've</font>
  68.  
  69. 18
  70. 00:01:00,750 --> 00:01:05,309
  71. done quite<font color="#E5E5E5"> a lot of in our environment</font>
  72.  
  73. 19
  74. 00:01:05,309 --> 00:01:10,049
  75. is work with<font color="#E5E5E5"> the security settings or</font>
  76.  
  77. 20
  78. 00:01:10,049 --> 00:01:12,299
  79. for what we are<font color="#E5E5E5"> required</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> to</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> do within</font>
  80.  
  81. 21
  82. 00:01:12,299 --> 00:01:16,890
  83. <font color="#E5E5E5">IBM to protect our systems</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> as</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> you might</font>
  84.  
  85. 22
  86. 00:01:16,890 --> 00:01:25,500
  87. imagine the bringing outside<font color="#CCCCCC"> sessions</font>
  88.  
  89. 23
  90. 00:01:25,500 --> 00:01:28,170
  91. <font color="#E5E5E5">into from the internet into</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> our</font>
  92.  
  93. 24
  94. 00:01:28,170 --> 00:01:30,840
  95. environment<font color="#E5E5E5"> does require quite a lot of</font>
  96.  
  97. 25
  98. 00:01:30,840 --> 00:01:33,960
  99. management<font color="#E5E5E5"> of security so we deal with</font>
  100.  
  101. 26
  102. 00:01:33,960 --> 00:01:36,810
  103. <font color="#E5E5E5">that quite you know very much all the</font>
  104.  
  105. 27
  106. 00:01:36,810 --> 00:01:42,420
  107. <font color="#CCCCCC">time we'll just</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> move on forward with</font>
  108.  
  109. 28
  110. 00:01:42,420 --> 00:01:45,049
  111. with this<font color="#E5E5E5"> presentation this is</font>
  112.  
  113. 29
  114. 00:01:45,049 --> 00:01:49,979
  115. specifically about the feature<font color="#E5E5E5"> product</font>
  116.  
  117. 30
  118. 00:01:49,979 --> 00:01:53,040
  119. <font color="#CCCCCC">the optional product called racket</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> part</font>
  120.  
  121. 31
  122. 00:01:53,040 --> 00:01:57,560
  123. <font color="#E5E5E5">of the security server of z/os</font>
  124.  
  125. 32
  126. 00:02:00,430 --> 00:02:05,770
  127. so the unit objectives<font color="#CCCCCC"> first we're going</font>
  128.  
  129. 33
  130. 00:02:05,770 --> 00:02:07,600
  131. <font color="#E5E5E5">to describe the racket authentication</font>
  132.  
  133. 34
  134. 00:02:07,600 --> 00:02:09,820
  135. process<font color="#E5E5E5"> a little</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> bit about racket in</font>
  136.  
  137. 35
  138. 00:02:09,820 --> 00:02:13,270
  139. general<font color="#CCCCCC"> we'll talk</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> about sap which</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> is</font>
  140.  
  141. 36
  142. 00:02:13,270 --> 00:02:15,540
  143. <font color="#E5E5E5">the security authorization facility</font>
  144.  
  145. 37
  146. 00:02:15,540 --> 00:02:18,850
  147. which<font color="#CCCCCC"> is a base element where racket is</font>
  148.  
  149. 38
  150. 00:02:18,850 --> 00:02:22,300
  151. an optional feature<font color="#CCCCCC"> we'll look at</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> some</font>
  152.  
  153. 39
  154. 00:02:22,300 --> 00:02:23,680
  155. <font color="#E5E5E5">of the right depth commands that you can</font>
  156.  
  157. 40
  158. 00:02:23,680 --> 00:02:27,340
  159. <font color="#E5E5E5">use</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> we'll also look at</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> the options</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> that</font>
  160.  
  161. 41
  162. 00:02:27,340 --> 00:02:30,360
  163. <font color="#E5E5E5">you can set for racket for the</font>
  164.  
  165. 42
  166. 00:02:30,360 --> 00:02:35,620
  167. environment itself<font color="#CCCCCC"> we will talk a little</font>
  168.  
  169. 43
  170. 00:02:35,620 --> 00:02:38,340
  171. <font color="#E5E5E5">bit about protect all which is a</font>
  172.  
  173. 44
  174. 00:02:38,340 --> 00:02:41,290
  175. <font color="#E5E5E5">something</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> you should know about if</font>
  176.  
  177. 45
  178. 00:02:41,290 --> 00:02:43,690
  179. you're going<font color="#E5E5E5"> to be maintaining</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> a racket</font>
  180.  
  181. 46
  182. 00:02:43,690 --> 00:02:48,220
  183. environment<font color="#CCCCCC"> and also the there are</font>
  184.  
  185. 47
  186. 00:02:48,220 --> 00:02:51,240
  187. utilities that<font color="#CCCCCC"> can be used for</font>
  188.  
  189. 48
  190. 00:02:51,240 --> 00:02:55,740
  191. administrative<font color="#E5E5E5"> and auditing reports</font>
  192.  
  193. 49
  194. 00:02:55,740 --> 00:02:58,570
  195. <font color="#CCCCCC">there YouTube there are many</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> utilities</font>
  196.  
  197. 50
  198. 00:02:58,570 --> 00:03:00,820
  199. that<font color="#E5E5E5"> can be used that's specifically</font>
  200.  
  201. 51
  202. 00:03:00,820 --> 00:03:03,010
  203. we're going to<font color="#E5E5E5"> look a little bit at the</font>
  204.  
  205. 52
  206. 00:03:03,010 --> 00:03:07,510
  207. utilities<font color="#CCCCCC"> that you can use for auditor</font>
  208.  
  209. 53
  210. 00:03:07,510 --> 00:03:10,000
  211. and administrator reporting capabilities
  212.  
  213. 54
  214. 00:03:10,000 --> 00:03:14,019
  215. and then the last one<font color="#E5E5E5"> would be for a</font>
  216.  
  217. 55
  218. 00:03:14,019 --> 00:03:22,600
  219. little bit about<font color="#E5E5E5"> passwords so as the</font>
  220.  
  221. 56
  222. 00:03:22,600 --> 00:03:26,890
  223. name suggests the acronym is<font color="#CCCCCC"> RAC f it</font>
  224.  
  225. 57
  226. 00:03:26,890 --> 00:03:29,350
  227. stands<font color="#E5E5E5"> for resource access control</font>
  228.  
  229. 58
  230. 00:03:29,350 --> 00:03:32,050
  231. facility as you can see with the first
  232.  
  233. 59
  234. 00:03:32,050 --> 00:03:33,700
  235. <font color="#E5E5E5">bullet</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> there it's part of the security</font>
  236.  
  237. 60
  238. 00:03:33,700 --> 00:03:39,269
  239. server on z/os<font color="#E5E5E5"> but there are other</font>
  240.  
  241. 61
  242. 00:03:39,269 --> 00:03:42,730
  243. software vendors that have add-on
  244.  
  245. 62
  246. 00:03:42,730 --> 00:03:45,459
  247. products that can also be<font color="#CCCCCC"> used instead</font>
  248.  
  249. 63
  250. 00:03:45,459 --> 00:03:50,980
  251. <font color="#E5E5E5">of racket</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> the what I like to point out</font>
  252.  
  253. 64
  254. 00:03:50,980 --> 00:03:54,640
  255. about racket in general if<font color="#E5E5E5"> you look</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> at</font>
  256.  
  257. 65
  258. 00:03:54,640 --> 00:03:56,320
  259. the name it sort of tells<font color="#E5E5E5"> you</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> what the</font>
  260.  
  261. 66
  262. 00:03:56,320 --> 00:03:59,950
  263. design point was the resource in the
  264.  
  265. 67
  266. 00:03:59,950 --> 00:04:03,430
  267. name was was the part of<font color="#CCCCCC"> the</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> design</font>
  268.  
  269. 68
  270. 00:04:03,430 --> 00:04:09,850
  271. <font color="#E5E5E5">point of a racket was to as it says to</font>
  272.  
  273. 69
  274. 00:04:09,850 --> 00:04:11,590
  275. <font color="#E5E5E5">control access</font>
  276.  
  277. 70
  278. 00:04:11,590 --> 00:04:15,129
  279. <font color="#CCCCCC">two resources rather</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> than focus</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> on a</font>
  280.  
  281. 71
  282. 00:04:15,129 --> 00:04:19,000
  283. user<font color="#E5E5E5"> or a</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> group of</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> users so if you think</font>
  284.  
  285. 72
  286. 00:04:19,000 --> 00:04:21,880
  287. <font color="#E5E5E5">of racket you have to realize from a</font>
  288.  
  289. 73
  290. 00:04:21,880 --> 00:04:23,800
  291. design point<font color="#E5E5E5"> it was always about</font>
  292.  
  293. 74
  294. 00:04:23,800 --> 00:04:26,979
  295. <font color="#E5E5E5">defining resources and protecting those</font>
  296.  
  297. 75
  298. 00:04:26,979 --> 00:04:31,540
  299. resources<font color="#E5E5E5"> so</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> we we have gone to</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> quite</font>
  300.  
  301. 76
  302. 00:04:31,540 --> 00:04:36,389
  303. extensive<font color="#CCCCCC"> levels</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> of resource</font>
  304.  
  305. 77
  306. 00:04:36,389 --> 00:04:40,750
  307. identification<font color="#E5E5E5"> so that then we</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> can set</font>
  308.  
  309. 78
  310. 00:04:40,750 --> 00:04:42,880
  311. certain constructs in place to protect
  312.  
  313. 79
  314. 00:04:42,880 --> 00:04:46,030
  315. those<font color="#CCCCCC"> resources</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> once they are protected</font>
  316.  
  317. 80
  318. 00:04:46,030 --> 00:04:49,389
  319. you give access<font color="#E5E5E5"> control through racket</font>
  320.  
  321. 81
  322. 00:04:49,389 --> 00:04:51,490
  323. to those resources<font color="#CCCCCC"> so that's sort of</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> the</font>
  324.  
  325. 82
  326. 00:04:51,490 --> 00:04:55,630
  327. <font color="#E5E5E5">design point rather than focusing on</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> a</font>
  328.  
  329. 83
  330. 00:04:55,630 --> 00:05:01,210
  331. user and giving<font color="#E5E5E5"> access from a user</font>
  332.  
  333. 84
  334. 00:05:01,210 --> 00:05:09,060
  335. standpoint we obviously<font color="#E5E5E5"> we part of the</font>
  336.  
  337. 85
  338. 00:05:09,810 --> 00:05:13,150
  339. responsibility<font color="#E5E5E5"> of any security product</font>
  340.  
  341. 86
  342. 00:05:13,150 --> 00:05:14,800
  343. would be<font color="#E5E5E5"> to identify</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> on</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> authenticate</font>
  344.  
  345. 87
  346. 00:05:14,800 --> 00:05:20,530
  347. users<font color="#CCCCCC"> then we would authorize</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> users as I</font>
  348.  
  349. 88
  350. 00:05:20,530 --> 00:05:24,250
  351. said to those protected resources<font color="#E5E5E5"> but</font>
  352.  
  353. 89
  354. 00:05:24,250 --> 00:05:27,070
  355. <font color="#E5E5E5">you also need</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> to</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> be able to log and</font>
  356.  
  357. 90
  358. 00:05:27,070 --> 00:05:31,650
  359. report unauthorized access so that
  360.  
  361. 91
  362. 00:05:31,650 --> 00:05:35,080
  363. <font color="#E5E5E5">auditors administrators can maintain the</font>
  364.  
  365. 92
  366. 00:05:35,080 --> 00:05:37,800
  367. system and<font color="#CCCCCC"> also report</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> potential</font>
  368.  
  369. 93
  370. 00:05:37,800 --> 00:05:41,229
  371. violations<font color="#E5E5E5"> one thing that it doesn't say</font>
  372.  
  373. 94
  374. 00:05:41,229 --> 00:05:44,710
  375. here is that<font color="#E5E5E5"> you can also report on</font>
  376.  
  377. 95
  378. 00:05:44,710 --> 00:05:49,380
  379. authorized access<font color="#CCCCCC"> and some auditing</font>
  380.  
  381. 96
  382. 00:05:49,380 --> 00:05:54,669
  383. firms and internal auditing groups they
  384.  
  385. 97
  386. 00:05:54,669 --> 00:05:57,880
  387. want to know at<font color="#E5E5E5"> 11:00 a certain level</font>
  388.  
  389. 98
  390. 00:05:57,880 --> 00:06:02,340
  391. <font color="#E5E5E5">what actually the authorized access was</font>
  392.  
  393. 99
  394. 00:06:02,340 --> 00:06:07,210
  395. so it is another<font color="#E5E5E5"> level of reporting</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> it's</font>
  396.  
  397. 100
  398. 00:06:07,210 --> 00:06:09,000
  399. not something that<font color="#E5E5E5"> we typically get</font>
  400.  
  401. 101
  402. 00:06:09,000 --> 00:06:11,800
  403. involved in<font color="#E5E5E5"> but an auditor likes to see</font>
  404.  
  405. 102
  406. 00:06:11,800 --> 00:06:16,360
  407. those kinds<font color="#E5E5E5"> of reports</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> and we obviously</font>
  408.  
  409. 103
  410. 00:06:16,360 --> 00:06:18,250
  411. <font color="#E5E5E5">you know we control the means of access</font>
  412.  
  413. 104
  414. 00:06:18,250 --> 00:06:20,820
  415. <font color="#CCCCCC">to these resources</font>
  416.  
  417. 105
  418. 00:06:23,110 --> 00:06:26,840
  419. just a little<font color="#E5E5E5"> bit of overview about how</font>
  420.  
  421. 106
  422. 00:06:26,840 --> 00:06:30,199
  423. <font color="#CCCCCC">rap</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> is put together as you can see in</font>
  424.  
  425. 107
  426. 00:06:30,199 --> 00:06:31,990
  427. the middle<font color="#CCCCCC"> of the screen</font>
  428.  
  429. 108
  430. 00:06:31,990 --> 00:06:36,470
  431. this represents<font color="#E5E5E5"> the racket feature and</font>
  432.  
  433. 109
  434. 00:06:36,470 --> 00:06:40,550
  435. you see there<font color="#E5E5E5"> is a racket database</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> the</font>
  436.  
  437. 110
  438. 00:06:40,550 --> 00:06:42,889
  439. racket database contains the constructs
  440.  
  441. 111
  442. 00:06:42,889 --> 00:06:46,130
  443. <font color="#CCCCCC">for the protected</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> resources and</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> also it</font>
  444.  
  445. 112
  446. 00:06:46,130 --> 00:06:51,979
  447. <font color="#E5E5E5">contains the user ID identification</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> and</font>
  448.  
  449. 113
  450. 00:06:51,979 --> 00:06:54,500
  451. the rules that<font color="#E5E5E5"> are</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> in place for</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> each of</font>
  452.  
  453. 114
  454. 00:06:54,500 --> 00:06:59,810
  455. <font color="#CCCCCC">those in this</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> particular diagram</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> at the</font>
  456.  
  457. 115
  458. 00:06:59,810 --> 00:07:02,510
  459. <font color="#CCCCCC">top you see</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> that there is</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> a security</font>
  460.  
  461. 116
  462. 00:07:02,510 --> 00:07:04,520
  463. administrator the security administrator
  464.  
  465. 117
  466. 00:07:04,520 --> 00:07:08,840
  467. is<font color="#CCCCCC"> responsible for making the</font>
  468.  
  469. 118
  470. 00:07:08,840 --> 00:07:12,850
  471. definitions that that a customer<font color="#CCCCCC"> has</font>
  472.  
  473. 119
  474. 00:07:12,850 --> 00:07:15,470
  475. defined<font color="#E5E5E5"> either with their</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> management or</font>
  476.  
  477. 120
  478. 00:07:15,470 --> 00:07:19,130
  479. their security team about<font color="#E5E5E5"> what how the</font>
  480.  
  481. 121
  482. 00:07:19,130 --> 00:07:22,840
  483. system needs to<font color="#E5E5E5"> be</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> implemented from</font>
  484.  
  485. 122
  486. 00:07:22,840 --> 00:07:25,340
  487. which which<font color="#E5E5E5"> resources need to be</font>
  488.  
  489. 123
  490. 00:07:25,340 --> 00:07:30,039
  491. <font color="#E5E5E5">protected and at what level users are</font>
  492.  
  493. 124
  494. 00:07:30,039 --> 00:07:35,360
  495. <font color="#E5E5E5">given access</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> to</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> the resources on this</font>
  496.  
  497. 125
  498. 00:07:35,360 --> 00:07:38,389
  499. side you see that<font color="#CCCCCC"> there's a user that</font>
  500.  
  501. 126
  502. 00:07:38,389 --> 00:07:40,599
  503. <font color="#CCCCCC">needs</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> some sort</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> of authentication</font>
  504.  
  505. 127
  506. 00:07:40,599 --> 00:07:44,930
  507. <font color="#E5E5E5">obviously they interact with the racket</font>
  508.  
  509. 128
  510. 00:07:44,930 --> 00:07:47,060
  511. system based on what the<font color="#E5E5E5"> system</font>
  512.  
  513. 129
  514. 00:07:47,060 --> 00:07:49,490
  515. administrator has<font color="#CCCCCC"> set up</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> for the</font>
  516.  
  517. 130
  518. 00:07:49,490 --> 00:07:52,280
  519. protection<font color="#CCCCCC"> of that resource</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> and what the</font>
  520.  
  521. 131
  522. 00:07:52,280 --> 00:07:54,080
  523. management<font color="#E5E5E5"> team has defined for this</font>
  524.  
  525. 132
  526. 00:07:54,080 --> 00:07:58,220
  527. particular user<font color="#E5E5E5"> we give</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> for refused</font>
  528.  
  529. 133
  530. 00:07:58,220 --> 00:08:01,550
  531. access<font color="#E5E5E5"> to</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> the resource and at the end of</font>
  532.  
  533. 134
  534. 00:08:01,550 --> 00:08:04,550
  535. <font color="#E5E5E5">the day some reports may be generated</font>
  536.  
  537. 135
  538. 00:08:04,550 --> 00:08:08,270
  539. that an auditor can look at and see what
  540.  
  541. 136
  542. 00:08:08,270 --> 00:08:12,250
  543. kind of violations might occurred
  544.  
  545. 137
  546. 00:08:15,680 --> 00:08:18,490
  547. just a<font color="#E5E5E5"> little bit more about how that</font>
  548.  
  549. 138
  550. 00:08:18,490 --> 00:08:21,169
  551. this is put together within<font color="#E5E5E5"> the system</font>
  552.  
  553. 139
  554. 00:08:21,169 --> 00:08:23,120
  555. and<font color="#E5E5E5"> we'll talk a</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> little</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> bit more</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> about</font>
  556.  
  557. 140
  558. 00:08:23,120 --> 00:08:25,759
  559. the security<font color="#E5E5E5"> authorization facility this</font>
  560.  
  561. 141
  562. 00:08:25,759 --> 00:08:29,810
  563. <font color="#E5E5E5">is called SAP</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> and it is not an optional</font>
  564.  
  565. 142
  566. 00:08:29,810 --> 00:08:33,830
  567. feature<font color="#E5E5E5"> as you can see it sits in the</font>
  568.  
  569. 143
  570. 00:08:33,830 --> 00:08:36,620
  571. <font color="#E5E5E5">middle of this chart this</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> is part of</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> the</font>
  572.  
  573. 144
  574. 00:08:36,620 --> 00:08:42,490
  575. base<font color="#CCCCCC"> operating system and as this chart</font>
  576.  
  577. 145
  578. 00:08:42,490 --> 00:08:48,950
  579. suggests<font color="#E5E5E5"> a request comes in for</font>
  580.  
  581. 146
  582. 00:08:48,950 --> 00:08:51,890
  583. permission<font color="#E5E5E5"> it goes through some resource</font>
  584.  
  585. 147
  586. 00:08:51,890 --> 00:08:56,300
  587. manager that has the this is<font color="#E5E5E5"> making a</font>
  588.  
  589. 148
  590. 00:08:56,300 --> 00:08:59,570
  591. standard call to the security
  592.  
  593. 149
  594. 00:08:59,570 --> 00:09:01,610
  595. <font color="#E5E5E5">authorization facility those calls are</font>
  596.  
  597. 150
  598. 00:09:01,610 --> 00:09:04,240
  599. standard the security authorization
  600.  
  601. 151
  602. 00:09:04,240 --> 00:09:06,770
  603. facility sits here if rack F is
  604.  
  605. 152
  606. 00:09:06,770 --> 00:09:11,020
  607. installed it will<font color="#E5E5E5"> access racket through</font>
  608.  
  609. 153
  610. 00:09:11,020 --> 00:09:16,640
  611. system<font color="#E5E5E5"> authorization and</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> rack F will do</font>
  612.  
  613. 154
  614. 00:09:16,640 --> 00:09:19,279
  615. a database<font color="#CCCCCC"> query give the results back</font>
  616.  
  617. 155
  618. 00:09:19,279 --> 00:09:22,130
  619. to<font color="#CCCCCC"> the of</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> the query back to SAP SAP</font>
  620.  
  621. 156
  622. 00:09:22,130 --> 00:09:26,390
  623. makes<font color="#E5E5E5"> a standard return back to the</font>
  624.  
  625. 157
  626. 00:09:26,390 --> 00:09:29,810
  627. caller and the<font color="#E5E5E5"> permission is either</font>
  628.  
  629. 158
  630. 00:09:29,810 --> 00:09:32,330
  631. denied or permitted based on what the
  632.  
  633. 159
  634. 00:09:32,330 --> 00:09:36,200
  635. recommendation was if racket is not
  636.  
  637. 160
  638. 00:09:36,200 --> 00:09:39,800
  639. present this may be another<font color="#E5E5E5"> security</font>
  640.  
  641. 161
  642. 00:09:39,800 --> 00:09:44,060
  643. product there<font color="#E5E5E5"> are exits that and I think</font>
  644.  
  645. 162
  646. 00:09:44,060 --> 00:09:45,589
  647. <font color="#CCCCCC">it's on may be</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> on the</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> net one of the</font>
  648.  
  649. 163
  650. 00:09:45,589 --> 00:09:48,950
  651. next<font color="#E5E5E5"> boils or charts here but there are</font>
  652.  
  653. 164
  654. 00:09:48,950 --> 00:09:53,089
  655. exit points that are available<font color="#E5E5E5"> from SAP</font>
  656.  
  657. 165
  658. 00:09:53,089 --> 00:09:57,920
  659. <font color="#CCCCCC">so that another vendor security product</font>
  660.  
  661. 166
  662. 00:09:57,920 --> 00:10:00,079
  663. can<font color="#CCCCCC"> be plugged in if</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> if that was</font>
  664.  
  665. 167
  666. 00:10:00,079 --> 00:10:06,650
  667. preferred by<font color="#CCCCCC"> the customer</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> and this gives</font>
  668.  
  669. 168
  670. 00:10:06,650 --> 00:10:08,029
  671. you a little<font color="#E5E5E5"> bit more information on</font>
  672.  
  673. 169
  674. 00:10:08,029 --> 00:10:12,920
  675. outside it<font color="#E5E5E5"> is part of z/os once again as</font>
  676.  
  677. 170
  678. 00:10:12,920 --> 00:10:15,649
  679. I said<font color="#E5E5E5"> if</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> bracket is</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> there it will use</font>
  680.  
  681. 171
  682. 00:10:15,649 --> 00:10:19,060
  683. <font color="#CCCCCC">rack F to do the authorization checks</font>
  684.  
  685. 172
  686. 00:10:19,060 --> 00:10:23,420
  687. <font color="#E5E5E5">but it can use an optional extra routine</font>
  688.  
  689. 173
  690. 00:10:23,420 --> 00:10:26,990
  691. which there are these there are<font color="#E5E5E5"> standard</font>
  692.  
  693. 174
  694. 00:10:26,990 --> 00:10:27,950
  695. places that
  696.  
  697. 175
  698. 00:10:27,950 --> 00:10:32,470
  699. that can be connected to other<font color="#E5E5E5"> products</font>
  700.  
  701. 176
  702. 00:10:32,470 --> 00:10:37,100
  703. <font color="#E5E5E5">and once again it gives us a layer that</font>
  704.  
  705. 177
  706. 00:10:37,100 --> 00:10:40,130
  707. enables resource management to<font color="#E5E5E5"> make</font>
  708.  
  709. 178
  710. 00:10:40,130 --> 00:10:44,090
  711. standard calls so<font color="#CCCCCC"> that they're there</font>
  712.  
  713. 179
  714. 00:10:44,090 --> 00:10:46,060
  715. <font color="#E5E5E5">don't have to</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> be</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> direct calls or</font>
  716.  
  717. 180
  718. 00:10:46,060 --> 00:10:49,820
  719. <font color="#E5E5E5">customized calls made</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> to a</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> product</font>
  720.  
  721. 181
  722. 00:10:49,820 --> 00:10:52,370
  723. either<font color="#CCCCCC"> a</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> cap or one of the other</font>
  724.  
  725. 182
  726. 00:10:52,370 --> 00:10:55,190
  727. <font color="#CCCCCC">security products we don't have to we</font>
  728.  
  729. 183
  730. 00:10:55,190 --> 00:10:58,580
  731. you<font color="#E5E5E5"> don't have to make a different call</font>
  732.  
  733. 184
  734. 00:10:58,580 --> 00:10:59,960
  735. <font color="#E5E5E5">depending on the product that's</font>
  736.  
  737. 185
  738. 00:10:59,960 --> 00:11:07,220
  739. installed<font color="#E5E5E5"> okay</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> we'll talk</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> a little bit</font>
  740.  
  741. 186
  742. 00:11:07,220 --> 00:11:11,980
  743. about<font color="#E5E5E5"> racket administration</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> there are</font>
  744.  
  745. 187
  746. 00:11:11,980 --> 00:11:31,430
  747. I'm sorry I'm sorry<font color="#E5E5E5"> there was</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> a question</font>
  748.  
  749. 188
  750. 00:11:31,430 --> 00:11:34,160
  751. <font color="#E5E5E5">in the room about</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> PKI services and</font>
  752.  
  753. 189
  754. 00:11:34,160 --> 00:11:35,870
  755. whether<font color="#E5E5E5"> or not that</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> was a separate</font>
  756.  
  757. 190
  758. 00:11:35,870 --> 00:11:39,770
  759. capability or or it was something that
  760.  
  761. 191
  762. 00:11:39,770 --> 00:11:42,520
  763. <font color="#E5E5E5">is controlled by racket and we do have</font>
  764.  
  765. 192
  766. 00:11:42,520 --> 00:11:45,800
  767. <font color="#CCCCCC">bracket</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> does</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> store certificates and can</font>
  768.  
  769. 193
  770. 00:11:45,800 --> 00:11:49,210
  771. provide that level of authentication
  772.  
  773. 194
  774. 00:11:50,620 --> 00:11:55,640
  775. anything else all right
  776.  
  777. 195
  778. 00:11:55,640 --> 00:12:00,800
  779. um as I said<font color="#E5E5E5"> administration of racket</font>
  780.  
  781. 196
  782. 00:12:00,800 --> 00:12:03,890
  783. can happen in multiple<font color="#E5E5E5"> ways here there</font>
  784.  
  785. 197
  786. 00:12:03,890 --> 00:12:07,850
  787. is an<font color="#E5E5E5"> ispf interface that gives</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> a</font>
  788.  
  789. 198
  790. 00:12:07,850 --> 00:12:13,030
  791. <font color="#CCCCCC">full-screen</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> ispf panel administration</font>
  792.  
  793. 199
  794. 00:12:13,030 --> 00:12:16,280
  795. capability there are also racket
  796.  
  797. 200
  798. 00:12:16,280 --> 00:12:19,310
  799. commands<font color="#E5E5E5"> that can</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> be executed</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> either</font>
  800.  
  801. 201
  802. 00:12:19,310 --> 00:12:22,820
  803. through through TSO or through<font color="#CCCCCC"> batch</font>
  804.  
  805. 202
  806. 00:12:22,820 --> 00:12:25,190
  807. with a with<font color="#E5E5E5"> the terminal monitor</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> program</font>
  808.  
  809. 203
  810. 00:12:25,190 --> 00:12:29,900
  811. and also<font color="#CCCCCC"> the</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> console has some</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> specific</font>
  812.  
  813. 204
  814. 00:12:29,900 --> 00:12:31,910
  815. type commands<font color="#E5E5E5"> that</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> can be an issue</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> to</font>
  816.  
  817. 205
  818. 00:12:31,910 --> 00:12:34,160
  819. rack up and<font color="#E5E5E5"> I think we talked a little</font>
  820.  
  821. 206
  822. 00:12:34,160 --> 00:12:37,720
  823. bit about that<font color="#E5E5E5"> somewhere along the</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> way</font>
  824.  
  825. 207
  826. 00:12:37,720 --> 00:12:40,579
  827. there are also utilities that<font color="#E5E5E5"> are</font>
  828.  
  829. 208
  830. 00:12:40,579 --> 00:12:44,149
  831. provided with<font color="#CCCCCC"> the product</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> as again as I</font>
  832.  
  833. 209
  834. 00:12:44,149 --> 00:12:45,529
  835. <font color="#CCCCCC">said we'll look at a couple of these</font>
  836.  
  837. 210
  838. 00:12:45,529 --> 00:12:50,449
  839. that give<font color="#CCCCCC"> you detailed reports</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> on how</font>
  840.  
  841. 211
  842. 00:12:50,449 --> 00:12:53,740
  843. <font color="#E5E5E5">the database</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> has been</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> defined and also</font>
  844.  
  845. 212
  846. 00:12:53,740 --> 00:12:58,970
  847. <font color="#E5E5E5">on how the some some of the constructs</font>
  848.  
  849. 213
  850. 00:12:58,970 --> 00:13:01,130
  851. are put together for<font color="#E5E5E5"> different users</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> and</font>
  852.  
  853. 214
  854. 00:13:01,130 --> 00:13:08,779
  855. groups<font color="#CCCCCC"> I think this next charge</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> is an</font>
  856.  
  857. 215
  858. 00:13:08,779 --> 00:13:13,389
  859. example<font color="#E5E5E5"> of the primary racket</font>
  860.  
  861. 216
  862. 00:13:13,389 --> 00:13:19,149
  863. administration<font color="#CCCCCC"> panel on our system</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> the</font>
  864.  
  865. 217
  866. 00:13:19,149 --> 00:13:22,940
  867. <font color="#E5E5E5">verb to</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> use would be equal or if you're</font>
  868.  
  869. 218
  870. 00:13:22,940 --> 00:13:25,519
  871. on a panel you<font color="#E5E5E5"> can enter equal</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> R and</font>
  872.  
  873. 219
  874. 00:13:25,519 --> 00:13:28,370
  875. you'll see this primary option<font color="#CCCCCC"> menu</font>
  876.  
  877. 220
  878. 00:13:28,370 --> 00:13:31,250
  879. <font color="#CCCCCC">within racket as you can see there are</font>
  880.  
  881. 221
  882. 00:13:31,250 --> 00:13:35,630
  883. multiple selections that it's just it's
  884.  
  885. 222
  886. 00:13:35,630 --> 00:13:37,730
  887. similar<font color="#CCCCCC"> to other panels within ISPs</font>
  888.  
  889. 223
  890. 00:13:37,730 --> 00:13:42,260
  891. <font color="#E5E5E5">where you drill down and as you the</font>
  892.  
  893. 224
  894. 00:13:42,260 --> 00:13:44,120
  895. farther you drill the the more
  896.  
  897. 225
  898. 00:13:44,120 --> 00:13:45,800
  899. information<font color="#E5E5E5"> that you're required to</font>
  900.  
  901. 226
  902. 00:13:45,800 --> 00:13:48,740
  903. <font color="#E5E5E5">provide and we'll talk about some of</font>
  904.  
  905. 227
  906. 00:13:48,740 --> 00:13:50,839
  907. <font color="#E5E5E5">these</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> different capabilities</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> will also</font>
  908.  
  909. 228
  910. 00:13:50,839 --> 00:13:55,100
  911. look at them in command form<font color="#E5E5E5"> but</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> at the</font>
  912.  
  913. 229
  914. 00:13:55,100 --> 00:13:58,130
  915. <font color="#E5E5E5">very just mention here</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> that there are</font>
  916.  
  917. 230
  918. 00:13:58,130 --> 00:14:00,230
  919. different<font color="#E5E5E5"> types of profiles there</font>
  920.  
  921. 231
  922. 00:14:00,230 --> 00:14:02,300
  923. something here called data<font color="#E5E5E5"> set profiles</font>
  924.  
  925. 232
  926. 00:14:02,300 --> 00:14:05,740
  927. which we use<font color="#E5E5E5"> quite extensively</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> and it is</font>
  928.  
  929. 233
  930. 00:14:05,740 --> 00:14:10,569
  931. <font color="#E5E5E5">it's been provided as sort of a separate</font>
  932.  
  933. 234
  934. 00:14:10,569 --> 00:14:14,269
  935. resource profile function then<font color="#E5E5E5"> you see</font>
  936.  
  937. 235
  938. 00:14:14,269 --> 00:14:15,680
  939. <font color="#E5E5E5">something called</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> general resource</font>
  940.  
  941. 236
  942. 00:14:15,680 --> 00:14:18,800
  943. profiles<font color="#CCCCCC"> those are profiles that again</font>
  944.  
  945. 237
  946. 00:14:18,800 --> 00:14:20,510
  947. when you're talking<font color="#CCCCCC"> about protecting</font>
  948.  
  949. 238
  950. 00:14:20,510 --> 00:14:25,010
  951. <font color="#E5E5E5">resources there is</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> a vast array of</font>
  952.  
  953. 239
  954. 00:14:25,010 --> 00:14:27,529
  955. different<font color="#CCCCCC"> types of</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> resources</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> that we can</font>
  956.  
  957. 240
  958. 00:14:27,529 --> 00:14:29,720
  959. that we<font color="#E5E5E5"> can protect and we'll talk a</font>
  960.  
  961. 241
  962. 00:14:29,720 --> 00:14:31,370
  963. little<font color="#E5E5E5"> bit</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> about those but to give you</font>
  964.  
  965. 242
  966. 00:14:31,370 --> 00:14:35,569
  967. an example we can<font color="#E5E5E5"> protect hardware</font>
  968.  
  969. 243
  970. 00:14:35,569 --> 00:14:40,190
  971. resources at one time is<font color="#CCCCCC"> as you can</font>
  972.  
  973. 244
  974. 00:14:40,190 --> 00:14:44,209
  975. <font color="#CCCCCC">imagine we had physical terminals that</font>
  976.  
  977. 245
  978. 00:14:44,209 --> 00:14:46,370
  979. <font color="#E5E5E5">were attached to the system table</font>
  980.  
  981. 246
  982. 00:14:46,370 --> 00:14:48,860
  983. <font color="#E5E5E5">directly to a control unit</font>
  984.  
  985. 247
  986. 00:14:48,860 --> 00:14:52,010
  987. <font color="#E5E5E5">table</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> directly to the</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> processor before</font>
  988.  
  989. 248
  990. 00:14:52,010 --> 00:14:56,120
  991. we had tcp/ip before we had internet
  992.  
  993. 249
  994. 00:14:56,120 --> 00:14:57,560
  995. before<font color="#CCCCCC"> we had</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> all those kinds of</font>
  996.  
  997. 250
  998. 00:14:57,560 --> 00:15:00,350
  999. <font color="#E5E5E5">connections well in many</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> cases those</font>
  1000.  
  1001. 251
  1002. 00:15:00,350 --> 00:15:04,540
  1003. <font color="#E5E5E5">terminals</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> to give you a hardware example</font>
  1004.  
  1005. 252
  1006. 00:15:04,540 --> 00:15:07,190
  1007. <font color="#CCCCCC">depending</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> on where the physical terminal</font>
  1008.  
  1009. 253
  1010. 00:15:07,190 --> 00:15:10,280
  1011. <font color="#E5E5E5">was located if you take a for</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> example in</font>
  1012.  
  1013. 254
  1014. 00:15:10,280 --> 00:15:13,160
  1015. a bank<font color="#CCCCCC"> if there was a terminal the</font>
  1016.  
  1017. 255
  1018. 00:15:13,160 --> 00:15:14,810
  1019. physical terminal located<font color="#CCCCCC"> in a</font>
  1020.  
  1021. 256
  1022. 00:15:14,810 --> 00:15:18,550
  1023. particular<font color="#CCCCCC"> areas</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> it would it would be</font>
  1024.  
  1025. 257
  1026. 00:15:18,550 --> 00:15:21,410
  1027. defined<font color="#E5E5E5"> to</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> rack up at the terminal level</font>
  1028.  
  1029. 258
  1030. 00:15:21,410 --> 00:15:25,460
  1031. which will require<font color="#CCCCCC"> logon and based on</font>
  1032.  
  1033. 259
  1034. 00:15:25,460 --> 00:15:27,350
  1035. authentication you may or<font color="#CCCCCC"> may not be</font>
  1036.  
  1037. 260
  1038. 00:15:27,350 --> 00:15:28,850
  1039. able<font color="#CCCCCC"> to use that terminal another</font>
  1040.  
  1041. 261
  1042. 00:15:28,850 --> 00:15:31,610
  1043. example<font color="#CCCCCC"> would be in operations two even</font>
  1044.  
  1045. 262
  1046. 00:15:31,610 --> 00:15:34,280
  1047. <font color="#E5E5E5">today</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> you have a terminal that's sitting</font>
  1048.  
  1049. 263
  1050. 00:15:34,280 --> 00:15:38,000
  1051. <font color="#E5E5E5">in the tape library</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> many times</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> that's</font>
  1052.  
  1053. 264
  1054. 00:15:38,000 --> 00:15:40,490
  1055. separate from<font color="#CCCCCC"> the system console</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> area in</font>
  1056.  
  1057. 265
  1058. 00:15:40,490 --> 00:15:44,420
  1059. a customer environment so a tape
  1060.  
  1061. 266
  1062. 00:15:44,420 --> 00:15:46,940
  1063. <font color="#E5E5E5">operator doesn't have</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> necessarily the</font>
  1064.  
  1065. 267
  1066. 00:15:46,940 --> 00:15:50,960
  1067. same authentication<font color="#CCCCCC"> but doesn't</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> have the</font>
  1068.  
  1069. 268
  1070. 00:15:50,960 --> 00:15:54,110
  1071. <font color="#E5E5E5">same level of security that</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> a system</font>
  1072.  
  1073. 269
  1074. 00:15:54,110 --> 00:15:56,840
  1075. operator<font color="#E5E5E5"> would have so if a tape</font>
  1076.  
  1077. 270
  1078. 00:15:56,840 --> 00:15:58,850
  1079. operator<font color="#E5E5E5"> is</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> in tape operations</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> and</font>
  1080.  
  1081. 271
  1082. 00:15:58,850 --> 00:16:01,280
  1083. they're<font color="#E5E5E5"> required to log</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> onto a console</font>
  1084.  
  1085. 272
  1086. 00:16:01,280 --> 00:16:03,530
  1087. <font color="#E5E5E5">they log on</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> with their credentials</font>
  1088.  
  1089. 273
  1090. 00:16:03,530 --> 00:16:05,690
  1091. <font color="#CCCCCC">they're able to</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> issue tape operator</font>
  1092.  
  1093. 274
  1094. 00:16:05,690 --> 00:16:08,900
  1095. commands and they're not allowed<font color="#CCCCCC"> to</font>
  1096.  
  1097. 275
  1098. 00:16:08,900 --> 00:16:10,940
  1099. issue some of the other types<font color="#E5E5E5"> of modify</font>
  1100.  
  1101. 276
  1102. 00:16:10,940 --> 00:16:12,590
  1103. commands<font color="#E5E5E5"> that</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> the</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> pilot has shown you</font>
  1104.  
  1105. 277
  1106. 00:16:12,590 --> 00:16:15,740
  1107. that our system type commands<font color="#CCCCCC"> command</font>
  1108.  
  1109. 278
  1110. 00:16:15,740 --> 00:16:17,660
  1111. <font color="#CCCCCC">line epaulet your explanation was really</font>
  1112.  
  1113. 279
  1114. 00:16:17,660 --> 00:16:19,280
  1115. good and<font color="#E5E5E5"> what I was thinking about was</font>
  1116.  
  1117. 280
  1118. 00:16:19,280 --> 00:16:22,790
  1119. we even<font color="#E5E5E5"> protect commands themselves so</font>
  1120.  
  1121. 281
  1122. 00:16:22,790 --> 00:16:25,910
  1123. for<font color="#E5E5E5"> example on our system here we</font>
  1124.  
  1125. 282
  1126. 00:16:25,910 --> 00:16:28,340
  1127. protect commands<font color="#E5E5E5"> and because we protect</font>
  1128.  
  1129. 283
  1130. 00:16:28,340 --> 00:16:31,040
  1131. commands<font color="#E5E5E5"> we can make a rack up statement</font>
  1132.  
  1133. 284
  1134. 00:16:31,040 --> 00:16:33,710
  1135. <font color="#E5E5E5">the resources the command and we can</font>
  1136.  
  1137. 285
  1138. 00:16:33,710 --> 00:16:36,140
  1139. make<font color="#CCCCCC"> statements and save you as a user</font>
  1140.  
  1141. 286
  1142. 00:16:36,140 --> 00:16:38,750
  1143. <font color="#E5E5E5">your user ID are allowed to do display</font>
  1144.  
  1145. 287
  1146. 00:16:38,750 --> 00:16:41,270
  1147. commands but you're not allowed<font color="#CCCCCC"> to do</font>
  1148.  
  1149. 288
  1150. 00:16:41,270 --> 00:16:43,790
  1151. <font color="#E5E5E5">commands that very</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> hard we're off</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> and on</font>
  1152.  
  1153. 289
  1154. 00:16:43,790 --> 00:16:47,800
  1155. or modify the environment<font color="#CCCCCC"> so</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> resources</font>
  1156.  
  1157. 290
  1158. 00:16:47,800 --> 00:16:50,120
  1159. <font color="#E5E5E5">commands</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> as a resource</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> and then we get</font>
  1160.  
  1161. 291
  1162. 00:16:50,120 --> 00:16:53,600
  1163. granularity within their display in<font color="#CCCCCC"> vs.</font>
  1164.  
  1165. 292
  1166. 00:16:53,600 --> 00:16:56,360
  1167. modified such would that be a pretty
  1168.  
  1169. 293
  1170. 00:16:56,360 --> 00:16:58,820
  1171. good<font color="#E5E5E5"> example</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> exactly in other types of</font>
  1172.  
  1173. 294
  1174. 00:16:58,820 --> 00:17:00,480
  1175. resources<font color="#CCCCCC"> for example</font>
  1176.  
  1177. 295
  1178. 00:17:00,480 --> 00:17:03,930
  1179. <font color="#E5E5E5">our UNIX system services</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> resources so</font>
  1180.  
  1181. 296
  1182. 00:17:03,930 --> 00:17:07,709
  1183. <font color="#CCCCCC">that they don't</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> fit into a category</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> of</font>
  1184.  
  1185. 297
  1186. 00:17:07,709 --> 00:17:10,949
  1187. data set it's a file<font color="#E5E5E5"> within unit system</font>
  1188.  
  1189. 298
  1190. 00:17:10,949 --> 00:17:15,829
  1191. services<font color="#CCCCCC"> you may have - the volumes that</font>
  1192.  
  1193. 299
  1194. 00:17:15,829 --> 00:17:19,679
  1195. <font color="#CCCCCC">are</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> physical volumes that we may or may</font>
  1196.  
  1197. 300
  1198. 00:17:19,679 --> 00:17:21,750
  1199. not allow certain users to<font color="#CCCCCC"> access</font>
  1200.  
  1201. 301
  1202. 00:17:21,750 --> 00:17:24,740
  1203. because<font color="#CCCCCC"> we don't want them to be able to</font>
  1204.  
  1205. 302
  1206. 00:17:24,740 --> 00:17:27,059
  1207. you know<font color="#E5E5E5"> make a change on the volume</font>
  1208.  
  1209. 303
  1210. 00:17:27,059 --> 00:17:30,120
  1211. <font color="#E5E5E5">there may be a different</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> level of</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> access</font>
  1212.  
  1213. 304
  1214. 00:17:30,120 --> 00:17:32,220
  1215. to<font color="#E5E5E5"> a volume where you could initialize</font>
  1216.  
  1217. 305
  1218. 00:17:32,220 --> 00:17:35,640
  1219. it versus<font color="#E5E5E5"> read it or write</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> it ok so</font>
  1220.  
  1221. 306
  1222. 00:17:35,640 --> 00:17:37,799
  1223. there's there is<font color="#CCCCCC"> a tremendous</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> amount of</font>
  1224.  
  1225. 307
  1226. 00:17:37,799 --> 00:17:43,290
  1227. <font color="#CCCCCC">control as you</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> can imagine but it gives</font>
  1228.  
  1229. 308
  1230. 00:17:43,290 --> 00:17:47,220
  1231. us the flexibility to protect the system
  1232.  
  1233. 309
  1234. 00:17:47,220 --> 00:17:51,390
  1235. adequately<font color="#CCCCCC"> the next thing that</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> you see</font>
  1236.  
  1237. 310
  1238. 00:17:51,390 --> 00:17:53,070
  1239. on this panel is something called group
  1240.  
  1241. 311
  1242. 00:17:53,070 --> 00:17:56,090
  1243. profiles and user<font color="#E5E5E5"> to group connections</font>
  1244.  
  1245. 312
  1246. 00:17:56,090 --> 00:17:59,059
  1247. <font color="#CCCCCC">we'll talk a little</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> bit</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> about groups</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> but</font>
  1248.  
  1249. 313
  1250. 00:17:59,059 --> 00:18:02,220
  1251. the option for there is user profiles
  1252.  
  1253. 314
  1254. 00:18:02,220 --> 00:18:07,620
  1255. <font color="#E5E5E5">and passwords and you would I would like</font>
  1256.  
  1257. 315
  1258. 00:18:07,620 --> 00:18:10,620
  1259. <font color="#CCCCCC">me I prefer</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> to talk about users first we</font>
  1260.  
  1261. 316
  1262. 00:18:10,620 --> 00:18:13,350
  1263. authenticate at the user ID level you
  1264.  
  1265. 317
  1266. 00:18:13,350 --> 00:18:17,100
  1267. can use passwords that we have<font color="#E5E5E5"> passwords</font>
  1268.  
  1269. 318
  1270. 00:18:17,100 --> 00:18:19,140
  1271. set up here that are<font color="#CCCCCC"> 8 characters you</font>
  1272.  
  1273. 319
  1274. 00:18:19,140 --> 00:18:21,990
  1275. can also use<font color="#E5E5E5"> passphrases</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> if you so</font>
  1276.  
  1277. 320
  1278. 00:18:21,990 --> 00:18:24,090
  1279. desire to set that<font color="#E5E5E5"> up</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> we don't</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> have that</font>
  1280.  
  1281. 321
  1282. 00:18:24,090 --> 00:18:29,179
  1283. <font color="#CCCCCC">turned on</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> in our system but groups</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> as</font>
  1284.  
  1285. 322
  1286. 00:18:29,179 --> 00:18:34,460
  1287. you might imagine<font color="#E5E5E5"> are groups of users so</font>
  1288.  
  1289. 323
  1290. 00:18:34,460 --> 00:18:37,260
  1291. there can be many<font color="#CCCCCC"> many group profiles</font>
  1292.  
  1293. 324
  1294. 00:18:37,260 --> 00:18:40,590
  1295. set up on the system groups<font color="#E5E5E5"> can</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> be you</font>
  1296.  
  1297. 325
  1298. 00:18:40,590 --> 00:18:42,929
  1299. <font color="#E5E5E5">can give</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> access to resources at the</font>
  1300.  
  1301. 326
  1302. 00:18:42,929 --> 00:18:45,120
  1303. group<font color="#CCCCCC"> level or are specifically</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> at the</font>
  1304.  
  1305. 327
  1306. 00:18:45,120 --> 00:18:50,100
  1307. user level<font color="#CCCCCC"> a user</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> may be</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> a</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> part of</font>
  1308.  
  1309. 328
  1310. 00:18:50,100 --> 00:18:53,130
  1311. <font color="#E5E5E5">multiple</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> groups</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> so you'll see some of</font>
  1312.  
  1313. 329
  1314. 00:18:53,130 --> 00:18:56,880
  1315. <font color="#CCCCCC">the some of the in some of the displays</font>
  1316.  
  1317. 330
  1318. 00:18:56,880 --> 00:18:59,610
  1319. <font color="#CCCCCC">that we show different names for groups</font>
  1320.  
  1321. 331
  1322. 00:18:59,610 --> 00:19:01,500
  1323. there's a group called sis<font color="#E5E5E5"> one there's a</font>
  1324.  
  1325. 332
  1326. 00:19:01,500 --> 00:19:03,480
  1327. group called<font color="#CCCCCC"> Group one there may be a</font>
  1328.  
  1329. 333
  1330. 00:19:03,480 --> 00:19:05,910
  1331. group called<font color="#E5E5E5"> Group Z you could be a</font>
  1332.  
  1333. 334
  1334. 00:19:05,910 --> 00:19:08,549
  1335. member<font color="#CCCCCC"> of</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> group one without being a</font>
  1336.  
  1337. 335
  1338. 00:19:08,549 --> 00:19:10,860
  1339. member<font color="#CCCCCC"> of group</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> two or vice versa</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> you</font>
  1340.  
  1341. 336
  1342. 00:19:10,860 --> 00:19:12,690
  1343. could be a member<font color="#CCCCCC"> of both group wanting</font>
  1344.  
  1345. 337
  1346. 00:19:12,690 --> 00:19:16,320
  1347. group<font color="#CCCCCC"> two group one could be assigned to</font>
  1348.  
  1349. 338
  1350. 00:19:16,320 --> 00:19:19,710
  1351. a resource<font color="#CCCCCC"> that group two does not know</font>
  1352.  
  1353. 339
  1354. 00:19:19,710 --> 00:19:23,130
  1355. anything<font color="#E5E5E5"> about and depending on what</font>
  1356.  
  1357. 340
  1358. 00:19:23,130 --> 00:19:26,130
  1359. <font color="#E5E5E5">users are in those groups they would</font>
  1360.  
  1361. 341
  1362. 00:19:26,130 --> 00:19:28,320
  1363. those those users would only get access
  1364.  
  1365. 342
  1366. 00:19:28,320 --> 00:19:30,870
  1367. <font color="#E5E5E5">to the resources</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> that those groups would</font>
  1368.  
  1369. 343
  1370. 00:19:30,870 --> 00:19:34,560
  1371. have access<font color="#CCCCCC"> to</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> okay the other things</font>
  1372.  
  1373. 344
  1374. 00:19:34,560 --> 00:19:39,420
  1375. here there's a system options<font color="#CCCCCC"> and we'll</font>
  1376.  
  1377. 345
  1378. 00:19:39,420 --> 00:19:41,010
  1379. talk a little<font color="#E5E5E5"> bit</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> about system options</font>
  1380.  
  1381. 346
  1382. 00:19:41,010 --> 00:19:43,920
  1383. those<font color="#E5E5E5"> are the</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> options that you</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> use to</font>
  1384.  
  1385. 347
  1386. 00:19:43,920 --> 00:19:47,880
  1387. customize<font color="#CCCCCC"> Rock F itself and the remote</font>
  1388.  
  1389. 348
  1390. 00:19:47,880 --> 00:19:49,530
  1391. sharing facility we're not going<font color="#CCCCCC"> to</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> get</font>
  1392.  
  1393. 349
  1394. 00:19:49,530 --> 00:19:52,380
  1395. <font color="#E5E5E5">into that too much just so you know that</font>
  1396.  
  1397. 350
  1398. 00:19:52,380 --> 00:19:55,910
  1399. it<font color="#E5E5E5"> is we do have the capability to</font>
  1400.  
  1401. 351
  1402. 00:19:55,910 --> 00:20:00,780
  1403. target other<font color="#CCCCCC"> RAC</font><font color="#E5E5E5"> F databases and</font><font color="#CCCCCC"> RAC F</font>
  1404.  
  1405. 352
  1406. 00:20:00,780 --> 00:00:00,000
  1407. systems
Advertisement
Add Comment
Please, Sign In to add comment
Advertisement