There are also surveillance methods which track devices, including laptops, by using their MAC Address, and another device identification called IMSI (Integrated Circuit Card Identifier (“IMSI catchers”)).  In another application, the U.S. FBI’s and local police use its “Stingray” program equipment using “fake” cell phone towers which ping targets for location and other data), such as information on IMSI related “SIM” chips.  The device’s - International mobile Subscriber Identity (ICCID) identifies SIMs internationally, spurning millions of “fake” SIMs being sold internationally on the Web.  IMSI is used to identify the user of a cellular network and is a unique identification associated with all cellular networks. It is stored as a 64 bit field and is sent by the phone to the network). (https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-difference-between-ICCID-IMSI-and-IMEI-numbers ).  IMSI is one of the indexes now used to track devices, by also tricking billing systems.

        The media access control address (“MAC”) is usually hard coded in each device Input or Output system (i.e. modems, LAN connections, WiFi transceivers, and other emissions, and there are legal captions where the MAC address is the Defendant’s alias, such as when tracking a laptop, desktop, or iPad). (Media Access Control (MAC), 2018).

        As I have indicated, even the phone number alone enables one to at least track every device, worldwide.  The alleged extra judicial tracking is real time for locations and movements worldwide, using inherent systemic flaws in the SS7 and Diameter telephone switching and identifications systems, and that data is now available for commercial “intelligence-led policing” and Intelligence products for sale to anyone willing to pay for access.  (FCC advisory committee, Communications Security, Reliability, and Interoperability Council (CSRIC, 2018).  For illustration, there are many data access companies which are offering at least some of such tracking capabilities (i.e. Verint (as identified by German researchers), and Narus, recenltly acquired by Boeing and then by Symantec (2015)).  (https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2015/01/14/symantec-acquires-boeings-cybersecurity-unit-in-a-bid-to-boost-big-data-capabilities/#1dca9d1a7ec3 ),  which allegedly have current or past Israeli influences or designs.

It is possible that these methods at compromising telecommunications networks are increasing in use by governments, intelligence, and police, and now that internet based accesses are for sale, and not unexpectedly there are likely efforts underway for other actors to use the same vulnerabilities and exploits to serve criminal and commercial requirements and abuses.

        These revelations show that Intelligence agencies, and now criminal organizations or nation state proxies, have little reservation in using and exploiting crucial inherent data sources to obtain national intelligence operational products, where police would not likely be authorized to do so.

         Even a pervasive police state would have inherent inefficiencies, bottlenecks of data, significant errors, and false positives and negatives. This balancing of technology, process, and terrorism has even been the subject of popular cult movies, such as “Brazil”. (Stivers, 2006).

       Intelligence and Policing also should have only nominal overlaps in order to maintain a bicameral view of the world (including, keeping one eye on the other, and prevent use by organized crime and totalitarian regimes (Daniels, 2018).

        In addition to troves of personally identifiable information being indexed to telephone numbers, MAC addresses, carrier networked SS7 and Diameter based tracking and information resources worldwide and on the internet, there are new data collection (or transfer) efforts now in progress which are quietly associated with, or even operated by, the same entities which have been said or found to have been allegedly “hacked” by the theft of almost all of their extensive personal information (PII) (about 150 million people, just in the USA), such as Equifax.  (Krebs, 2018, May 9).  Krebs ( www.krebsonsecurity.com ) has reviewed some of the activities serviced by Equifax, such as the National Consumer Telecommunications and Utilities Exchange (NCTUE) ( www.nctue.com) (Krebs, supra, 2018, May 9).

        In my view here, the nexus of concern is that the NCTUE type databases might already be linked through phone device customer information to internally indexed databases of Equifax (and its other “customers”, or “hacked repositories”), and through multiple indexes and links to SS7 and/or Diameter databases worldwide, all of which have telecommunications identifiers in common (i.e. IMSI, IMEI, SIM chip S/N, telephone numbers and carrier switches, etc.).  My concern, and academic curiosity, is heightened by the opaque and evasive connections reported between entities involved with these large databases, which handle personally identifiable information (PII).