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Partisan Polarization in the US Electorate

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Mar 12th, 2016
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  1. Introduction
  2.  
  3. The literature on party polarization in American politics focuses on two distinct (though related) topics, elite polarization and mass polarization. The literature began at the elite level, focusing on the divisions between the parties as captured in roll-call voting behavior in Congress (though there is a small literature looking at elite institutions beyond Congress). At the elite level, there is little debate: elites have become more divided since midcentury, and today are as polarized as they have been in living memory (though levels of polarization in the 19th century were higher). The debate at the elite level centers primarily on the causes of this polarization, with five related main arguments: changing party strategies, redistricting, primary elections, activists, and changes in the mass public. With the exception of redistricting, which finds only very limited empirical support in the literature, there is solid evidence supporting each of the other explanations. Determining the relative importance and contribution of each factor, however, is somewhat more complicated and remains an open question. While it is clear that elites are polarized, the state of affairs for the mass public is somewhat muddier. After the disputed 2000 election, electoral polarization became the conventional wisdom. While some scholars agree with this popular consensus, others do not, and argue that Americans have not become more divided over the past generation. What is clearer, on the other hand, is that the mass public has become better sorted—citizens have aligned their partisanship and ideology so that Democrats are more likely to be liberals and Republicans are more likely to be conservatives. Elite polarization drove this party sorting: as elites polarized, they clarified where the parties stood on the issues, which made it easier for citizens to align their party and issue positions. Another portion of the literature also addresses the consequences of these mass and elite changes. Scholars are essentially unanimous that polarization harms the policy process by fostering gridlock, leading to suboptimal policy outcomes. There is more debate, however, about whether polarization (at either the mass or elite level) harms the electoral process. While some argue that it leads to a harmful disconnect between voters and elites, others claim it allows voters a clearer choice between the parties, which boosts participation. It is also worth mentioning that various authors operationalize the concept of “polarization” differently. Some authors conceptualize polarization as a static construct: are Democrats and Republicans polarized (that is, divided) at a particular point in time? Others refer to polarization over time: have Democrats and Republicans become more divided over a period of years? In each work, readers should pay close attention to determine exactly how the author is using “polarization” in a particular work.
  4.  
  5. Elite Polarization
  6.  
  7. Nearly all scholars agree that elites (members of Congress) are more polarized today than they were a generation ago. While this trend was first identified a quarter century ago (Poole and Rosenthal 1984), this literature has only taken off in the last ten to fifteen years. Most of the debate centers on the relative importance of the various mechanisms (detailed in Explanations for Elite Polarization) that might explain polarization.
  8.  
  9. Background, Overview, and Broader Historical Context
  10.  
  11. Much of the initial work on party polarization focused on the elite level, noticing the ideological divergence between the Democratic and Republican parties in Congress beginning in the 1970s. While Poole and Rosenthal 1984 initially showed that the parties were polarizing over two decades ago, most of the literature on polarization is much more recent (Nivola and Galston 2008). Hacker and Pierson 2005 shows that this polarization has been asymmetric, with more polarization occurring on the Republican side. Other works here look at the various policy areas that have generated polarization. McCarty, et al. 2006 argues that economic policy has contributed to polarization, while King and Smith 2011 argues that racial policy plays a more central role. Brady and Han 2006 and Han and Brady 2007 put the contemporary polarization over the past century into a broader historical context, arguing that over the course of American history, polarization was the norm rather than the exception. Finally, Karol 2009 suggests that perhaps to talk about “polarization” in such general terms is misleading; because the issue space changes so much over time, talking about polarization—especially with broad summary measures—may not be accurate.
  12.  
  13. Brady, David, and Hahrie Han. “Polarization Then and Now: A Historical Perspective.” In Red and Blue Nation? Characteristics and Causes of America’s Polarized Politics. Edited by Pietro S. Nivola and David W. Brady, 119–151. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2006.
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  15. Argues that congressional polarization in the contemporary era is not exceptional when viewed through a historical lens. If anything, polarization seems to be the norm throughout American political history. Copublished with Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace.
  16. Find this resource:
  17. Hacker, Jacob, and Paul Pierson. Off Center: The Republican Revolution and the Erosion of American Democracy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005.
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  19. Much of the elite polarization has been concentrated among Republicans, and this has real and important consequences for American politics.
  20. Find this resource:
  21. Han, Hahrie, and David Brady. “A Delayed Return to Historical Norms: Congressional Party Polarization after the Second World War.” British Journal of Political Science 37 (2007): 505–531.
  22. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123407000269Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  23. Expands on the argument in Brady and Han 2006, arguing that the unique period of American history was the era of bipartisan cooperation following World War II. Argue that the period of bipartisanship broke down due to shifts in party strategy and the decline of the personal vote, but that an explanation of the origins of the postwar cooperation is still needed.
  24. Find this resource:
  25. Karol, David. Party Position Change in American Politics: Coalition Management. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
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  27. Argues that the issue space of American politics changes over time, so what the ideological “poles” mean is not constant. Given this, speaking about a trend in “polarization,” especially from a summary measure aggregate across issues, may not be accurate.
  28. Find this resource:
  29. King, Desmond, and Rogers Smith. “Racial Policy Alliances and Partisan Polarization: A Synthetic Analysis.” Paper presented at the workshop on Race, Gender, and Sexuality in Law and American Political Development, Athens, OH, 20–21 May 2011.
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  31. Arguably the first work to argue for an explicit link between racial issues and elite polarization. Debates between race-conscious and color-blind policies have contributed to elite polarization and to electoral divisions.
  32. Find this resource:
  33. McCarty, Nolan, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006.
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  35. Extends the analysis in their earlier work on polarization (Poole and Rosenthal 1984), and outlines a theory of polarization linking immigration, income inequality, and polarization (especially on economic issues).
  36. Find this resource:
  37. Nivola, Peitro, and William Galston. “Delineating the Problem.” In Red and Blue Nation? Characteristics and Causes of America’s Polarized Politics. Edited by Pietro Nivola and David Brady, 1–47. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2008.
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  39. A broad overview covering the debates over the causes of both mass and elite polarization. Copublished with Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace.
  40. Find this resource:
  41. Poole, Keith T., and Howard Rosenthal. “The Polarization of American Politics.” Journal of Politics 46 (1984): 1061–1079.
  42. DOI: 10.2307/2131242Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  43. Arguably the first scholarly work to notice the growing divergence between Democrats and Republicans in Congress (as measured by roll-call voting). Also valuable for being an early discussion of NOMINATE, their algorithm for measuring congressional ideology. NOMINATE is the standard metric for polarization in the literature on Congress.
  44. Find this resource:
  45. Key Data Sources
  46.  
  47. The study of elite polarization was really made possible by Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal’s efforts to clean and standardize the congressional roll-call record. Poole and Rosenthal’s website Voteview is an invaluable resource to download roll-call data and various versions of their NOMINATE estimates (as well as to find relevant documentation). Boris Shor’s web page provides a way to download the estimates in Shor and McCarty 2011 (cited under Elite Polarization Beyond Congress) for state legislative ideology. Adam Bonica’s Ideological Cartography discusses his work to put campaign donors, interest groups, and elites on a common ideological scale by using campaign donations.
  48.  
  49. Boris Shor’s Web page.
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  51. Contains the link to download the Shor and McCarty 2011 estimates of state legislative ideology.
  52. Find this resource:
  53. Ideological Cartography.
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  55. Reports Adam Bonica’s results using his data on campaign contributions to measure polarization. By looking at which candidates groups and individuals support, he can obtain estimates of donors, interest groups, and candidates on a common scale.
  56. Find this resource:
  57. Voteview.
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  59. The website run by Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal. It contains cleaned roll-call data matrices for both historical and contemporary Congresses, as well as various versions of their NOMINATE measure of congressional ideology, which is typically how scholars measure polarization (and relevant documentation).
  60. Find this resource:
  61. Elite Polarization Beyond Congress
  62.  
  63. While the vast majority of the literature focuses on Congress, there is some evidence that other institutions—most notably, the Supreme Court and state legislatures—have similarly polarized along ideological lines. Clark 2009 reviews much of the relevant literature and discusses the empirical operationalization of “polarization” with respect to the Supreme Court. Shor and McCarty 2011 is not on polarization per se, but discusses a massive data effort to map the roll-call records of state legislatures and reports some preliminary findings about polarization. Shor, et al. 2010 shows how to connect these state-level ideology estimates to estimates of congressional ideology, thereby allowing scholars to compare polarization in Congress to polarization in state legislatures. Wright and Schaffner 2002 compares Kansas and Nebraska (one of which has a partisan legislature, one of which does not) to show how parties, and party strategy, contribute to polarization in state legislatures (and presumably Congress).
  64.  
  65. Clark, Tom S. “Measuring Ideological Polarization on the United States Supreme Court.” Political Research Quarterly 62 (2009): 146–157.
  66. DOI: 10.1177/1065912908314652Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  67. Reviews the relevant literature and operationalization of the concept of “polarization” in the context of Supreme Court decision making.
  68. Find this resource:
  69. Shor, Boris, Christopher Berry, and Nolan McCarty. “A Bridge to Somewhere: Mapping State and Congressional Ideology on a Cross-Institutional Common Space.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 35 (2010): 417–448.
  70. DOI: 10.3162/036298010792069198Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  71. Shows how to link measures of state legislative ideology (see Shor and McCarty 2011) with measures of congressional ideology (from NOMINATE) and explicitly compare them. This potentially allows scholars to directly compare congressional polarization to polarization in state legislatures.
  72. Find this resource:
  73. Shor, Boris, and Nolan McCarty. “The Ideological Mapping of American Legislatures.” American Political Science Review 105 (2011): 530–551.
  74. DOI: 10.1017/S0003055411000153Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  75. Reports on a massive effort to collect the roll-call records of the state legislatures and use them to generate estimates of the ideology of state legislators. Also presents some suggestive evidence on polarization in state legislatures.
  76. Find this resource:
  77. Wright, Gerald, and Brian Schaffner. “The Influence of Party: Evidence from the State Legislatures.” American Political Science Review 96 (2002): 367–379.
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  79. Compares the Kansas and Nebraska legislatures, which contrast a partisan (Kansas) and a nonpartisan (Nebraska) chamber, and finds that without party, politics is less ordered and less well structured, suggesting that parties, and party strategy, help to organize debate, and in turn, generate partisan polarization in state legislatures (and presumably Congress).
  80. Find this resource:
  81. Explanations for Elite Polarization
  82.  
  83. Because there is near-universal agreement that Congress is more polarized today compared to midcentury, much of the literature has focused on explanations for this shift. Each subsection outlines a different theoretical argument for elite polarization. While they are separated for analytical and organizational clarity, note that many of the mechanisms overlap (and many scholars argue for more than one of these mechanisms).
  84.  
  85. Party Strategy
  86.  
  87. This set of arguments claims that polarization is due largely to shifts in the party’s strategies inside Congress (voting rules, rules for offering amendments, etc.). Rohde 1991 on the role of party leadership (as well as the party cartel model of Cox and McCubbin 2005) helped to lay the theoretical groundwork for this literature, which was then engaged by a number of authors, analyzing the House (Roberts and Smith 2003), Senate (Lee 2008), or both (Sinclair 2006, Theriault 2008). Note too that the state legislative comparison discussed in Wright and Schaffner 2002 (cited above under Elite Polarization Beyond Congress) also shows how party strategy helps to generate polarization. Heberling, et al. 2006 shows that the fundraising system—which advantages extremists and helps them win leadership positions—also contributes to polarization. Finally, Krehbiel 1993 takes a contrarian view, arguing that ideological divisions within Congress are more the product of members’ preferences than of party strategy or party pressure.
  88.  
  89. Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
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  91. Another broad treatment of congressional parties; this book explains their “party cartel” model. Again, while not explicitly focused on polarization, it helps to explain party power, especially power over the agenda, which has obvious implications for polarization stemming from party strategy.
  92. Find this resource:
  93. Heberling, Eric, Marc Hetherington, and Bruce Larson. “The Price of Leadership: Campaign Money and the Polarization of Congressional Parties.” Journal of Politics 68 (2006): 992–1005.
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  95. The selection of congressional party leaders helps to explain the continuation of polarization. Extremists have an easier time raising money, which they then redistribute to their colleagues to help fund their campaigns. This helps extremists win elections for party leadership positions, ensuring continued polarization at the leadership level.
  96. Find this resource:
  97. Krehbiel, Keith. “Where’s the Party?” British Journal of Political Science 23 (1993): 235–266.
  98. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123400009741Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  99. Not on polarization per se, but a classic statement of Krehbiel’s view on party vs. preferences. Argues that to the extent that we see any partisan polarization, it is due more to member preferences than to party pressure.
  100. Find this resource:
  101. Lee, Francis. “Agreeing to Disagree: Agenda Content and Senate Partisanship, 1981–2004.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 33 (2008): 199–222.
  102. DOI: 10.3162/036298008784311000Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  103. Senate polarization is in part the result of procedural changes and the strengthening party leadership. Over time, polarizing issues are brought up more frequently, and stronger party leadership means these issues are framed and debated in ways that divide the parties.
  104. Find this resource:
  105. Roberts, Jason M., and Steven S. Smith. “Procedural Contexts, Party Strategy, and Conditional Party Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1971–2000.” American Journal of Political Science 47 (2003): 305–317.
  106. DOI: 10.1111/1540-5907.00021Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  107. Much of the rise in party polarization in the House of Representatives is due to shifting party strategies, especially the use of restrictive rules and other tactics to force the opposing party to take politically embarrassing votes. Argues that these shifts were made possible by voting reforms in the 1970s, and that this has been an especially important source of polarization beginning in the 1980s.
  108. Find this resource:
  109. Rohde, David W. Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
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  111. As the congressional parties become more homogeneous, they are more willing to cede power to the leadership. This homogenization of the parties is due in large part to the changing electoral bases of the parties (in response to factors like the Voting Rights Act). Though not explicitly about polarization, lays the foundations for much of the subsequent debate in this vein.
  112. Find this resource:
  113. Sinclair, Barbara. Party Wars: Polarization and the Politics of National Policy Making. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006.
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  115. Argues that shifts in party strategy are the root cause of much of the polarization in Congress; links these changes to shifts in the party’s electoral strategies, especially the decision by Republicans to mobilize conservative evangelical voters during the Reagan era.
  116. Find this resource:
  117. Theriault, Sean M. Party Polarization in Congress. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
  118. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511790652Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  119. Argues that there are two causes to polarization, constituency changes and leadership changes. Congressional constituencies have become more homogeneous (i.e., better sorted; see Party Sorting), which has some direct effect on member behavior and polarization. But it also causes members to cede more authority to party leaders, who then deploy legislative tactics that deepen polarization. Theriault argues that much congressional polarization is due to leaders’ procedural strategies.
  120. Find this resource:
  121. Redistricting
  122.  
  123. Among political journalists and the mass public, redistricting is the primary explanation for polarization. Mann 2006 and McCarty, et al. 2009, however, show little support for this explanation. Even works finding a larger role for redistricting, such as Carson, et al. 2007, argue that it has a modest (rather than a massive) effect.
  124.  
  125. Carson, Jamie, Michael Crespin, Charles Finocchio, and David Rohde. “Redistricting and Party Polarization in the U.S. House of Representatives.” American Politics Research 35 (2007): 878–904.
  126. DOI: 10.1177/1532673X07304263Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  127. Shows that districts that have been heavily redistricted are more likely to be polarized, suggesting that redistricting may play some role in polarization.
  128. Find this resource:
  129. Mann, Thomas. “Polarizing the House of Representatives: How Much Does Gerrymandering Matter?” In Red and Blue Nation? Characteristics and Causes of America’s Polarized Politics. Edited by Pietro Nivola and David Brady, 263–283. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2006.
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  131. Reviews the literature on gerrymandering and summarizes the conventional wisdom that gerrymandering per se cannot explain much of the observed congressional polarization. Copublished with Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace.
  132. Find this resource:
  133. McCarty, Nolan, Keith Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. “Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?” American Journal of Political Science 53 (2009): 666–680.
  134. DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00393.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  135. The definitive statement on this topic. They show that there is very little empirical evidence that redistricting causes polarization.
  136. Find this resource:
  137. Primary Elections
  138.  
  139. Primaries (and related arguments about activists) are perhaps the most common explanations for congressional polarization in the scholarly literature. The focus here is on the fact that primaries disproportionately attract the more engaged and ideological, which pulls candidates toward the extremes. Many works, like Gerber and Morton 1998 and Brady, et al. 2007, find a strong empirical effect of primary elections on candidate ideology, while Aranson and Ordeshook 1972, as well as Owen and Grofman 2006, provide formal models demonstrating this effect. Bullock and Clinton 2011, however, finds a more modest effect of primaries on polarization, and Hirano, et al. 2010 finds essentially null effect, suggesting that this is still an open area of research.
  140.  
  141. Aranson, Peter, and Peter C. Ordeshook. “Spatial Strategy for Sequential Elections.” In Probability Models of Collective Decision Making. Edited by Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg, 298–331. Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill, 1972.
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  143. An early formal model of two-stage elections; it lays some important groundwork for the model of Owen and Grofman 2006, cited below.
  144. Find this resource:
  145. Brady, David W., Hahrie Han, and Jeremy C. Pope. “Primary Elections and Candidate Ideology: Out of Step with the Primary Electorate?” Legislative Studies Quarterly 32 (2007): 79–105.
  146. DOI: 10.3162/036298007X201994Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  147. Primary elections polarize members of Congress by pulling them away from the district’s median voter (more centrist) and toward the primary electorate (more extreme).
  148. Find this resource:
  149. Bullock, Will, and Joshua D. Clinton. “More a Molehill than a Mountain: The Effects of the Blanket Primary on Elected Officials’ Behavior from California.” Journal of Politics 73 (2011): 915–930.
  150. DOI: 10.1017/S0022381611000557Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  151. Using California’s switch to the blanket primary as a (quasi-)natural experiment, they argue that the switch from closed to open primaries does moderate members’ behavior, but only to a quite modest degree.
  152. Find this resource:
  153. Gerber, Elisabeth R., and Rebecca B. Morton. “Primary Election Systems and Representation.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 14 (1998): 304–324.
  154. DOI: 10.1093/jleo/14.2.304Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  155. Find that states with closed primaries tend to elect more extreme candidates. They argue this is a product of a more ideologically extreme electorate in closed primaries (because only party members can vote in a closed primary).
  156. Find this resource:
  157. Hirano, Shigeo, James M. Snyder Jr., Stephen Ansolabehere, and John Mark Hansen. “Primary Elections and Partisan Polarization in the U.S. Congress.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 5 (2010): 169–191.
  158. DOI: 10.1561/100.00008052Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  159. Find little relationship over time between primary elections and extremism, arguing that primaries are not strongly related to polarization.
  160. Find this resource:
  161. Owen, Guillermo, and Bernard Grofman. “Two-Stage Electoral Competition in Two-Party Contests: Persistent Divergence of Party Positions.” Social Choice and Welfare 26 (2006): 547–569.
  162. DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0087-1Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  163. A formal model demonstrating that when primary voters are more extreme than general election voters, candidates will adopt more extreme positions to win the primary.
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  165. Activists
  166.  
  167. This explanation works in tandem with the primary election explanation above. Because activists are more likely to participate in primary elections and to volunteer time and money to campaigns, representatives disproportionately respond to their wishes. Since activists are also more extreme, this helps to pull members of Congress away from the median voter and toward the ideological poles. While all of these authors make a similar substantive claim, they use a variety of different evidence to do so. Perlstein 2001, McGirr 2006, and Brownstein 2007 use qualitative historical data, while Masket 2007 uses a unique natural experiment from California. Layman 2001 and Layman, et al. 2010 use over-time panel data on convention delegates, and Aldrich 2011 draws on both formal models (developed in his earlier works) and a variety of different data sources.
  168.  
  169. Aldrich, John H. Why Parties? A Second Look. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011.
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  171. A book on the development and organization of political parties generally, relevant here for its discussion of the role of activists. Drawing on his earlier formal models, Aldrich argues that activists help to explain why US parties do not converge to the median voter (as the Downsian model would predict). Because activists are crucial to winning elections, they are able to pull candidates away from the center. He supports this argument with a variety of empirical evidence showing the more extreme preferences of activists.
  172. Find this resource:
  173. Brownstein, Ronald. The Second Civil War: How Extreme Partisanship Has Paralyzed Washington and Polarized America. New York: Penguin, 2007.
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  175. A popular exploration of polarization’s causes. The discussion of how social movements generated polarization by putting controversial issues like race, women’s rights, and abortion on the national agenda is lucid and especially accessible for undergraduate students.
  176. Find this resource:
  177. Layman, Geoffrey. The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in American Party Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.
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  179. A book on the role of religion in the party system more broadly, especially useful here for its focus on the Republicans’ strategy to recruit evangelical voters into their coalition in the 1970s and 1980s.
  180. Find this resource:
  181. Layman, Geoffrey, Thomas Carsey, John Green, Richard Herra, and Rosalyn Cooperman. “Party Polarization, Party Commitment, and Conflict Extension among American Party Activists.” American Political Science Review 104 (2010): 324–346.
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  183. Campaign activists and politicians dynamically polarize one another. As non-centrist activists enter politics, they pull candidates toward the extremes. But as that happens, party loyalty leads other activists to embrace these more extreme positions, which leads to further polarization.
  184. Find this resource:
  185. Masket, Seth E. “It Takes an Outsider: Extralegislative Organization and Partisanship in the California Assembly, 1849–2006.” American Journal of Political Science 51 (2007): 482–497.
  186. DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00263.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  187. Uses California’s natural experiment with cross-filing to study the effect of activists and party leaders on polarization. Cross-filing prohibited activists and party leaders from determining party nominees, and during this period (1914–1959), legislative polarization plummeted. But when cross-filing ended, polarization quickly returned, suggesting that activists induce much of the observed polarization.
  188. Find this resource:
  189. McGirr, Lisa. Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006.
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  191. Examines the rise of conservative movements in Orange County, CA, focusing on the 1960s. She shows how these movements, initially relatively fringe organizations focused on local anticommunist activity, eventually morphed into much more politically potent and broader conservative organizations.
  192. Find this resource:
  193. Perlstein, Rick. Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and the Unmaking of the American Consensus. New York: Hill and Wang, 2001.
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  195. Explains how right-wing movements that initially mobilized to elect Barry Goldwater in 1964 eventually came to be crucial to the Republican Party. While these groups were largely fringe organizations in 1964, they were central to the party by 1980.
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  197. Changes in the Mass Public
  198.  
  199. These arguments claim that shifts in the mass electorate have increased the parties’ ability to take extreme positions, leading to elite polarization. This can happen because of shifts in electorate preferences due to demographic changes (Stonecash, et al. 2003; Fleisher and Bond 2004), changes in the size/composition of the parties’ bases (Butler 2009), increases in the ideological homogeneity of the party’s electoral coalitions (Jacobson 2000), or the preferences of more extreme partisans (Harbridge and Malhotra 2011). Chen, et al. 2007 argues that mass preferences, even if they did not change, helped to drive apart the elite parties, at least on the issue of race. Ladewig 2010 argues that changes in the competitiveness of congressional districts are also to blame for increases in polarization. Note too that many of the works in the section Party Strategy make a similar claim, but argue that these electoral changes caused polarization largely indirectly, by centralizing power in the hands of party leaders (e.g., Sinclair 2006 and Theriault 2008, both cited under Party Strategy).
  200.  
  201. Butler, Daniel M. “The Effect of the Size of Voting Blocs on Incumbents’ Roll-Call Voting and the Asymmetric Polarization of Congress.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 34 (2009): 297–318.
  202. DOI: 10.3162/036298009788897763Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  203. Members face a positioning trade-off between appealing to the median voter and appealing to their party’s base. The growth in the parties’ bases (especially the Republican base) over time explains polarization.
  204. Find this resource:
  205. Chen, Anthony S., Robert W. Mickey, and Robert P. Van Houweling. “Explaining the Contemporary Alignment of Race and Party: Evidence from California’s 1946 Ballot Initiative on Fair Employment.” Studies in American Political Development 22 (2007): 204–228.
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  207. Using a little-known 1946 California ballot initiative, they argue that the contemporary polarization around racial issues owes less to elite choices than to the distribution of opinion within the mass parties. This suggests that, at least for the case of race, public opinion—rather than elite strategies—may be a key reason why the parties polarized in the way they did.
  208. Find this resource:
  209. Fleisher, Richard, and John R. Bond. “The Shrinking Middle in Congress.” British Journal of Political Science 34 (2004): 429–451.
  210. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123404000122Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  211. Argues that the disappearance of moderates in Congress (and hence, greater polarization) is due to electoral shifts.
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  213. Harbridge, Laurel, and Neil Malhotra. “Electoral Incentives and Partisan Conflict in Congress: Evidence from Survey Experiments.” American Journal of Political Science 55 (2011): 494–510.
  214. DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00517.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  215. Most citizens, especially moderates, reward their members for behaving in a bipartisan fashion. But strong partisans—the most active/engaged—punish their members when they engage in bipartisanship and cooperation with the other party. This gives members an incentive to be more polarized and partisan.
  216. Find this resource:
  217. Jacobson, Gary. “Party Polarization in National Politics: The Electoral Connection.” In Polarized Politics: Congress and the President in a Partisan Era. Edited by Jon Bond and Richard Fleisher, 9–30. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2000.
  218. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  219. The increasing ideological homogeneity of the parties’ bases pushes members to take more extreme positions. So, as the parties’ electoral bases become more ideologically distinct, the positions taken by the parties in Congress respond in kind.
  220. Find this resource:
  221. Ladewig, Jeffrey W. “Ideological Polarization and the Vanishing of Marginals: Retrospective Roll-Call Voting in the U.S. Congress.” Journal of Politics 72 (2010): 499–512.
  222. DOI: 10.1017/S0022381609990934Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  223. Changes in members’ electoral margins (the decline of marginal districts) lead members to be more willing to take extreme positions and polarize. Members want to take off-center positions, but are constrained by the desire to win reelection. But with a larger electoral margin, they are more willing to take more extreme positions.
  224. Find this resource:
  225. Stonecash, Jeffrey M., Mark D. Brewer, and Mack D. Mariani. Diverging Parties: Social Change, Realignment, and Party Polarization. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2003.
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  227. Congressional polarization is the product of shifting district demographics. Liberal/Democratic members of Congress tend to be from urban, lower-income, and minority districts, whereas conservative/Republican members tend to represent suburban/rural, predominantly white districts.
  228. Find this resource:
  229. Polarization in the Mass Public
  230.  
  231. While there is broad consensus that elites have become more polarized, there is no such agreement about the mass public. Proponents and opponents of the mass polarization thesis are found in the literature, and a scholarly debate continues over the extent of polarization. What is clearer, however, is that the mass public has sorted—that is, voters’ policy positions are more closely aligned with their partisanship (see Levendusky 2009 in the section Party Sorting). While sorting is related to polarization (and can, in some circumstances, help to generate it), they are distinct theoretical and empirical concepts (Hetherington 2009, cited under Literature Reviews; Levendusky 2009). While a separate data section is not included here, the key datasets have largely been the standard public opinion datasets: the American National Election Studies, the General Social Survey, and so forth.
  232.  
  233. Literature Reviews
  234.  
  235. These pieces provide an excellent introduction and overview to many of the questions raised in this bibliography. Readers unfamiliar with this debate will likely want to begin here to get a broad overview of the various literatures and more specific debates in the field. Layman, et al. 2006 provides an overview of their model of conflict extension (originally discussed in Layman and Carsey 2002, cited under Party Sorting), while Fiorina and Abrams 2008 gives a broad overview of the debate on mass polarization. Finally, Hetherington 2009 gives the most recent overview, and does a particularly nice job of discussing the literature on the consequences of polarization.
  236.  
  237. Fiorina, Morris P., and Samuel J. Abrams. “Political Polarization in the American Public.” Annual Review of Political Science 11 (2008): 563–588.
  238. DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.053106.153836Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  239. A summary of the debate and evidence over mass polarization, concluding that there has not been much mass polarization, though there has been mass sorting.
  240. Find this resource:
  241. Hetherington, Marc J. “Putting Polarization in Perspective.” British Journal of Political Science 39 (2009): 413–448.
  242. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123408000501Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  243. The most up-to-date summary of the state of the literature, covering both mass and elite polarization. Also noteworthy for the discussion of the consequences of polarization.
  244. Find this resource:
  245. Layman, Geoffrey C., Thomas M. Carsey, and Juliana Menasce Horowitz. “Party Polarization in American Politics: Characteristics, Causes, and Consequences.” Annual Review of Political Science 9 (2006): 83–110.
  246. DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.9.070204.105138Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  247. Argues for the “conflict extension” perspective proposed by Layman and Carsey 2002, and explains the link between polarization at the mass, elite, and activist levels.
  248. Find this resource:
  249. Are Americans More Polarized?
  250.  
  251. At the elite level, scholars are almost completely in agreement that the mass public is divided. There is no such consensus about the mass public, with some arguing that changes have been quite pronounced, including Abramowitz and Saunders 2008 and Abramowitz 2010 (both cited under A Closer Look at Attitudinal Polarization), and others arguing that the changes are more limited, including Fiorina, et al. 2005 (also cited under A Closer Look at Attitudinal Polarization). For those unfamiliar with debate, the Literature Reviews provided in recent years are an especially good place to begin.
  252.  
  253. Sociological Exploration of Mass Polarization
  254.  
  255. The initial work on polarization in the mass public comes from sociology rather than from political science. These authors are interested in divisions based on class, gender, and so forth, rather than on divisions between mass Democrats and Republicans. Interestingly, the data here suggest very little growth in sociological polarization over time. Indeed, while DiMaggio, et al. 1996 found little polarization, Mouw and Sobel 2001 argues that they overstated the amount of polarization (at least in the case of abortion). Evans 2003 updates the original findings of DiMaggio, et al. 1996, and shows that there has been little increase in polarization in the ensuing years. Hunter 1991 on “culture wars” is also relevant here (cited under Culture Wars Debate).
  256.  
  257. DiMaggio, Paul, John Evans, and Bethany Bryson. “Have Americans’ Social Attitudes Become More Polarized?” American Journal of Sociology 102 (1996): 690–755.
  258. DOI: 10.1086/230995Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  259. An exploration of whether various social groups (racial groups, gender groups, etc.) have become more polarized over time. They find little evidence of polarization. Also noteworthy for its discussion of different ways of operationalizing the concept of “polarization.”
  260. Find this resource:
  261. Evans, John H. “Have Americans Attitudes Become More Polarized? An Update.” Social Science Quarterly 84 (2003): 71–90.
  262. DOI: 10.1111/1540-6237.8401005Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  263. Updates DiMaggio, et al. 1996 and finds that its conclusions largely still hold. The one change is that there is clearer evidence of partisan differences in issue positions (e.g., sorting).
  264. Find this resource:
  265. Mouw, Ted, and Michael E. Sobel. “Culture Wars and Opinion Polarization: The Case of Abortion.” American Journal of Sociology 106 (2001): 913–943.
  266. DOI: 10.1086/320294Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  267. Re-examines DiMaggio, et al. 1996 and finds even less evidence of polarization, especially on the case of abortion. The authors claim there has been little polarization on abortion of any kind, but it is unclear if this trend still holds in more recent years.
  268. Find this resource:
  269. A Closer Look at Attitudinal Polarization
  270.  
  271. While the literature on mass polarization is older in sociology, political scientists have also contributed to this literature in more recent years. This literature in political science was really sparked by Fiorina, et al. 2005. While Fiorina 1999 lays out the initial argument, Fiorina, et al. 2005 is really the launching point of this literature, arguing that Americans are not deeply polarized. The special issue (Shafer and La Raja 2005) of the Forum (including Abramowitz and Saunders 2005) discusses a variety of perspectives and reactions to this argument. Perhaps the main challenge to Fiorina, et al.’s argument has come from Abramowitz and Saunders 2008 and Abramowitz 2010; a reply is given in Fiorina, et al. 2008, as well as in Fiorina and Abrams 2009.
  272.  
  273. Abramowitz, Alan. The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010.
  274. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  275. Extends Abramowitz’s earlier works (e.g., Abramowitz and Saunders 2005, Abramowitz and Saunders 2008), and further develops the argument that the most engaged are also the most polarized. Elite polarization is therefore not a “disconnect” but rather reflects the responsiveness of elites to the politically engaged. Argues that polarization is good for democracy and strengthens accountability.
  276. Find this resource:
  277. Abramowitz, Alan, and Kyle L. Saunders. “Why Can’t We All Just Get Along? The Reality of a Polarized America.” The Forum 3.2 (2005): Article 1.
  278. DOI: 10.2202/1540-8884.1076Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  279. Abramowitz and Saunders’s first response to Fiorina, et al. 2005. All Americans—not just elites and activists—are deeply divided.
  280. Find this resource:
  281. Abramowitz, Alan I., and Kyle L. Saunders. “Is Polarization a Myth?” Journal of Politics 70 (2008): 542–555.
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  283. An extension and richer development of Abramowitz and Saunders 2005. Some Americans are moderate—the least engaged and least politically interested. As engagement increases, so does political extremism. Given this, the mass public is effectively deeply polarized.
  284. Find this resource:
  285. Fiorina, Morris P. “Whatever Happened to the Median Voter?” Paper prepared for the MIT Conference on Parties and Congress, Cambridge, MA, 2 October 1999.
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  287. The article that contains the seeds of Fiorina’s subsequent work on polarization and the mass-elite disconnect. The first argument that the mass public’s attitudes remained stable while elites’ preferences diverged.
  288. Find this resource:
  289. Fiorina, Morris P., and Samuel J. Abrams. Disconnect: The Breakdown of Representation in American Politics. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2009.
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  291. Explores how various social changes over the 20th century (suburbanization, the rise of single-issue interest groups, etc.) have contributed to mass polarization and sorting. Also noteworthy for its discussion of the disconnect between polarized elites and moderate voters, and what this means for American democracy.
  292. Find this resource:
  293. Fiorina, Morris P., Samuel J. Abrams, and Jeremy C. Pope. Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America. New York: Pearson Longman, 2005.
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  295. The book that launched the mass polarization debate in political science. Reviews a variety of evidence over time and concludes that Americans have not become more polarized in recent years. They argue that elections like 2000 give the appearance of deep polarization because voters are offered much more polarized choices by elites (though mass preferences have changed very little).
  296. Find this resource:
  297. Fiorina, Morris, Samuel Abrams, and Jeremy Pope. “Polarization in the American Public: Misconceptions and Misreadings.” Journal of Politics 70 (2008): 556–560.
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  299. A response to Abramowitz and Saunders 2008, arguing that their conclusions are not supported by data. They show new evidence to argue that while the mass public may have sorted, it has not polarized.
  300. Find this resource:
  301. Shafer, Byron, and Raymond J. La Raja, eds. Special Issue: Culture War in America: Myth or Reality? Forum 3.2 (2005).
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  303. A special issue of the Forum devoted to reactions to Fiorina, et al. 2005.
  304. Find this resource:
  305. Other Treatments of Mass Polarization
  306.  
  307. These works focus on other aspects of the mass polarization debate: how it occurs (from small shifts in opinion aggregated over time), how elite strategies matter to polarization, and different types of polarization beyond the attitudinal polarization considered above. Levendusky 2009 documents how small microlevel changes can generate more meaningful aggregate shifts, and Perlstein 2008 shows how elites often cultivate polarization because it can be electorally beneficial to do so. Finally, there is also more than one type of “polarization.” The works in the section A Closer Look at Attitudinal Polarization and Sociological Exploration of Mass Polarization are really focused on attitudinal polarization (i.e., the extremity of subjects’ attitudes). But this is not the only type of polarization possible. For example, Jacobson 2007 examines evaluative polarization—how divided are Democrats and Republicans in their evaluations of political leaders?
  308.  
  309. Jacobson, Gary C. A Divider, Not a Uniter: George W. Bush and the American People. New York: Pearson Longman, 2007.
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  311. Finds evidence of evaluative polarization: Democrats and Republicans diverge sharply in their approval of Bush. Argues that because Bush behaves in a polarizing fashion, the mass public responds along party lines.
  312. Find this resource:
  313. Levendusky, Matthew. “The Microfoundations of Mass Polarization.” Political Analysis 17 (2009): 162–176.
  314. DOI: 10.1093/pan/mpp003Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  315. Explores how smaller individual-level shifts in polarization and sorting can combine, over time and across individuals, to generate more meaningful aggregate polarization.
  316. Find this resource:
  317. Perlstein, Richard. Nixonland: The Rise of a President and the Fracturing of America. New York: Scribner, 2008.
  318. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  319. Nixon’s strategies, especially the Southern strategy and appeals to the “Silent Majority,” helped to transform and reshape political discourse, ideology, and the American electorate. Elites often cultivate polarization as a political strategy because it pays rewards at the ballot box.
  320. Find this resource:
  321. Geographic Polarization
  322.  
  323. After the red state vs. blue state maps of the 2000 election, there was concern about whether Americans were increasingly geographically divided. While some argued that red state and blue state voters were deeply divided (see Abramowitz and Saunders 2005 and Abramowitz and Saunders 2008, both cited under A Closer Look at Attitudinal Polarization), others argued they were not (see Fiorina, et al. 2005, cited under A Closer Look at Attitudinal Polarization). Klinkner 2004 and Klinkner and Hapanowicz 2005 argue that there is little geographic polarization, while Bishop and Cushing 2004 and Bishop 2008 argue that there is meaningful geographic polarization (though Abrams and Fiorina 2012 challenges this conclusion). Levendusky and Pope 2011 tries to cast this debate in a slightly different light, suggesting that once scholars include data on variance of opinion with states or districts, opinion is quite heterogeneous, thereby showing less polarization than many initially suspected. Gelman, et al. 2007 points out a micro-macro distinction between the relationship between income and voting, while Hopkins and Stoker 2011 shows the state-level variation in the strength of the relationship between party ID and vote choice over time.
  324.  
  325. Abrams, Samuel and Morris P. Fiorina. “The Big Sort that Wasn’t.: A Skeptical Re-Examination.” PS: Political Science and Politics 45.2 (2012): 203–210.
  326. DOI: 10.1017/S1049096512000017Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  327. A critical re-examination of Bishop 2008’s thesis of geographic polarization, arguing that the data do not support Bishop’s conclusions.
  328. Find this resource:
  329. Bishop, Bill. The Big Sort: Why the Clustering of Like-Minded America Is Tearing Us Apart. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2008.
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  331. An extension and less technical version of the argument in Bishop and Cushing 2004. Americans have become increasingly geographically divided by lifestyle preferences. Because these preferences are correlated with partisan and ideological values, this geographic sorting has political consequences.
  332. Find this resource:
  333. Bishop, Bill, and Robert Cushing. “Response to Phillip A. Klinkner’s ‘Red and Blue Scare: The Continuing Diversity of the American Electoral Landscape.’” Forum 2.2 (2004): Article 8.
  334. DOI: 10.2202/1540-8884.1038Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  335. Response to Klinkner 2004, argues that Americans are increasingly divided geographically. Klinkner also has a reply immediately following.
  336. Find this resource:
  337. Gelman, Andrew, Boris Shor, Joseph Bafumi, and David Park. “Rich State, Poor State, Red State, Blue State: What’s the Matter with Connecticut?” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 2 (2007): 345–367.
  338. DOI: 10.1561/100.00006026Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  339. Shows the geographic heterogeneity in how individual-level and state-level income map into vote choice. While high-income states vote Democratic, high-income voters vote Republican. Further, income is a less accurate individual-level predictor of vote choice in rich states.
  340. Find this resource:
  341. Hopkins, David, and Laura Stoker. “The Political Geography of Party Resurgence.” In Who Gets Represented? Edited by Peter Enns and Christopher Wlezien, 93–128. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2011.
  342. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  343. Shows that there is considerable heterogeneity across states in the strength of the relationship between party ID and presidential vote choice over time. While the national relationship between party ID and vote choice has strengthened over time, in some states it has gotten considerably stronger, whereas it has not changed much in other states.
  344. Find this resource:
  345. Klinkner, Phillip A. “Red and Blue Scare: The Continuing Diversity of the American Electoral Landscape.” Forum 2.2 (2004): Article 2.
  346. DOI: 10.2202/1540-8884.1035Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  347. There is little evidence to suggest that there is increasing geographic polarization in the mass public. See also McCarty, et al. 2006 (cited under Background, Overview, and Broader Historical Context) on this point.
  348. Find this resource:
  349. Klinkner, Phillip A., and Ann Hapanowicz. “Red and Blue Déjà Vu: Measuring Political Polarization in the 2004 Election.” The Forum 2.2 (2005).
  350. DOI: 10.2202/1540-8884.1079Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  351. An extension of the argument in Klinkner 2004, paying close attention to the 2004 election.
  352. Find this resource:
  353. Levendusky, Matthew S., and Jeremy C. Pope. “Red States vs. Blue States: Going Beyond the Mean.” Public Opinion Quarterly 75 (2011): 227–248.
  354. DOI: 10.1093/poq/nfr002Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  355. Argues for the importance of addressing the heterogeneity of public opinion. When just looking at mean differences, red states and blue states look to be somewhat polarized. When you include data on the variance of opinion within those states, they look much less polarized.
  356. Find this resource:
  357. Party Sorting
  358.  
  359. While there is still debate about whether the mass public is more polarized, there is much less debate about whether the mass public has sorted. Sorting is the alignment of partisanship and ideology, so that liberals are more likely to be Democrats, and conservatives are more likely to be Republicans. Sorting is a changing correlation between partisanship and ideology, whereas polarization is a changing marginal distribution of ideology (movement from the center toward the extremes). While the two are related, they are distinct theoretically and empirically (for more on this distinction, see Levendusky 2009, cited under the Role of Elite Polarization, and Hetherington 2009, cited under Literature Reviews).
  360.  
  361. The Role of Elite Polarization
  362.  
  363. The common thread for these authors is the role of elite polarization. While they all treat it slightly differently, Abramowitz and Saunders 1998, Hetherington 2001, Layman and Carsey 2002, Levendusky 2009, and Bafumi and Shapiro 2009 all argue that the increase in elite polarization has caused the increase in sorting over the past thirty years in the United States. Adams, et al. 2012 has recently extended the underlying logic of this argument to the Netherlands.
  364.  
  365. Abramowitz, Alan I., and Kyle L. Saunders. “Ideological Realignment in the American Electorate.” Journal of Politics 60 (1998): 634–652.
  366. DOI: 10.2307/2647642Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  367. An early work demonstrating that partisanship and ideology have been increasingly related in the mass electorate across a variety of different issues.
  368. Find this resource:
  369. Adams, James, Catherine De Vries, and Debra Leiter. “Subconstituency Reactions to Elite Depolarization in the Netherlands: An Analysis of the Dutch Public’s Policy Beliefs and Partisan Loyalties, 1986–98.” British Journal of Political Science 42 (2012): 81–105.
  370. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123411000214Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  371. Extends the logic of party sorting outside of the US case. They show that as Dutch elites depolarized, the Dutch mass public followed suit.
  372. Find this resource:
  373. Bafumi, Joseph, and Robert Y. Shapiro. “A New Partisan Voter.” Journal of Politics 71 (2009): 1–24.
  374. DOI: 10.1017/S0022381608090014Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  375. Documenting a variety of evidence showing sorting over the past generation, both in terms of vote choice and issue positions.
  376. Find this resource:
  377. Hetherington, Marc J. “Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of Elite Polarization.” American Political Science Review 95 (2001): 619–631.
  378. DOI: 10.1017/S0003055401003045Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  379. Argues that elite polarization has led to a resurgence of mass partisanship in the electorate. As elites pull apart ideologically, this clarifies their positions for voters, which increases the importance/salience of partisanship at the mass level.
  380. Find this resource:
  381. Layman, Geoffrey C., and Thomas M. Carsey. “Party Polarization and ‘Conflict Extension’ in the American Electorate.” American Journal of Political Science 46 (2002): 786–802.
  382. DOI: 10.2307/3088434Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  383. As elites pull apart on a variety of issues, ordinary voters increasingly adopt their party’s position on racial, social welfare, and cultural issues. There has been conflict extension (mass divisions on multiple issues) rather than conflict displacement (the substitution of debate on one set of issues for another).
  384. Find this resource:
  385. Levendusky, Matthew. The Partisan Sort: How Liberals Became Democrats and Conservatives Became Republicans. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009.
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  387. Arguably the most comprehensive treatment of sorting. Shows (using over-time and experimental data) that elite polarization generates sorting. Also discusses and documents the consequences of sorting for voter behavior.
  388. Find this resource:
  389. Specific Explanations of Sorting
  390.  
  391. While these authors all agree with the authors above that elite polarization is an important cause of party sorting, they also focus on a particular mechanism or issue to explore sorting. Adams 1997 focuses on the particular case of abortion and shows that there has been considerable party sorting on that issue. Stoker and Jennings 2008 focuses on the role of cohort-based effects, while Valentino and Sears 2005 focuses on the particular role of race and racial resentment, especially in the South.
  392.  
  393. Adams, Greg D. “Abortion: Evidence of an Issue Evolution.” American Journal of Political Science 41 (1997): 718–737.
  394. DOI: 10.2307/2111673Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  395. Careful analysis of a single issue (abortion) to show how the mass public sorted on this issue in response to increasingly clear elite signals.
  396. Find this resource:
  397. Stoker, Laura, and M. Kent Jennings. “Of Time and the Development of Partisan Polarization.” American Journal of Political Science 52 (2008): 619–635.
  398. DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00333.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  399. Argues for the analysis of cohort-based effects when understanding how individuals respond to changing elite stimuli. Because different cohorts have different experiences with the parties, their patterns of sorting (called partisan polarization here) will differ.
  400. Find this resource:
  401. Valentino, Nicholas A., and David O. Sears. “Old Times There Are Not Forgotten: Race and Partisan Realignment in the Contemporary South.” American Journal of Political Science 49 (2005): 672–688.
  402. DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2005.00136.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  403. Argues that the growth of the Republican Party in the South is not simply due to sorting, but also to the role of racial resentment among whites.
  404. Find this resource:
  405. Social Versus Economic Issues
  406.  
  407. While economic issues divided the parties for much of the 20th century, more recently, social issues, such as abortion and gay marriage, have increasingly come to the fore (note that while these are called social issues here, others refer to them as moral issues or cultural issues). Some argue, as seen in Hunter 1991 (cited under Culture Wars Debate) and Frank 2004, that these issues are now the primary dividing line between the parties, but the empirical evidence suggests otherwise—economic issues remain the key division between the parties, though social issues are more important today than in the past (Ansolabehere, et al. 2006; Krasa and Polborn 2011), and there is heterogeneity in how voters respond to these issues (Ellis and Ura 2011). Miller and Schofield 2003 explains how the interaction of candidates and activists has helped to shape whether social or economic issues are more important at a particular point in time. Hetherington and Weiler 2009 demonstrates that personality factors (such as authoritarianism) might also play an important role in how citizens respond to and divide over these issues. There is also a related question about whether the rise of these social issues has pulled the white working class away from the Democrats, as seen in Frank 2004. The evidence suggests that it has not, as discussed in Bartels 2006.
  408.  
  409. Ansolabehere, Stephen, Jonathan Rodden, and James Snyder. “Purple America.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 20 (2006): 97–118.
  410. DOI: 10.1257/jep.20.2.97Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  411. Argues that social issues have become more important over time but voters still weigh economic issues more heavily when casting their ballots.
  412. Find this resource:
  413. Bartels, Larry. “What’s the Matter with Kansas?” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 1 (2006): 201–226.
  414. DOI: 10.1561/100.00000010Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  415. A critique of Frank 2004, showing that many of his claims do not survive empirical scrutiny.
  416. Find this resource:
  417. Ellis, Christopher R., and Joseph Ura. “United We Divide? Education, Income, and Heterogeneity in Mass Partisan Polarization.” In Who Gets Represented? Edited by Peter Enns and Christopher Wlezien, 61–92. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2011.
  418. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  419. Shows that while citizens have sorted on both economic and social issues over the past generation, the patterns differ by income and education.
  420. Find this resource:
  421. Frank, Thomas. What’s the Matter with Kansas? How Conservatives Won the Heart of America. New York: Metropolitan, 2004.
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  423. The most famous statement of the argument that Republicans have used social issues to garner votes among the white working class.
  424. Find this resource:
  425. Hetherington, Marc J., and Jonathan D. Weiler. Authoritarianism and Polarization in American Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
  426. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511802331Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  427. Because elites have divided over “hot button” social issues like abortion and gay marriage, authoritarian predispositions help to drive polarization. Offers an intriguing link to the growing literature on personality and politics that has blossomed in recent years.
  428. Find this resource:
  429. Krasa, Stefan, and Mattias Polborn. “The Relative Importance of Cultural and Economic Issues for the Polarization of the U.S. Electorate, 1972–2008.” Paper prepared for the Wallis Institute Conference, University of Rochester, 14–15 October 2011.
  430. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  431. The distribution of voter preferences has remained relatively constant over time, but especially in recent years, social issues have become more important. Social issues are now a key force behind increased sorting.
  432. Find this resource:
  433. Miller, Gary, and Norman Schofield. “Activists and Partisan Realignment in the United States.” American Political Science Review 97 (2003): 245–260.
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  435. A formal model demonstrating how the interaction between politicians and activists in a two-dimensional space can lead to a shift in the primary dimension of conflict. Argues that this explains why politics was primarily about social issues in the late 19th century, moved to economic issues for much of the 20th century, and then returned to social issues in more recent years.
  436. Find this resource:
  437. Culture Wars Debate
  438.  
  439. This is related to the debates above about moral and economic issues, but is ultimately about a slightly different issue: whether or not there is a “culture war” over issues like abortion, gay marriage, and school prayer. Hunter 1991 initially argued that there was a culture war, but Wolfe 1998 and Baker 2006 argue there is limited evidence for these claims. Layman and Green 2006 show that there is a culture war, but it is confined to a relatively narrow and active segment of the public mobilized by elites, while most Americans are not so divided. Hunter and Wolfe 2006 provides a good overview of the debate.
  440.  
  441. Baker, Wayne E. America’s Crisis of Values: Reality and Perception. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006.
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  443. Examines whether or not there is a “culture war” in American politics, and finds that there is not. Americans largely agree on a set of core values, and that belief in traditional American values remains strong. The culture war debate reflects the fact that American society is undergoing fundamental changes (as are other post-industrial societies).
  444. Find this resource:
  445. Hunter, James Davison. Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America. New York: Basic Books, 1991.
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  447. The origins of the “culture war” thesis: society is now locked into a cultural conflict over social issues like abortion, gay rights, and funding for the arts. The key division, therefore, is between moral traditionalists (the religious) and moral relativists (the seculars).
  448. Find this resource:
  449. Hunter, James Davison, and Alan Wolfe. Is There a Culture War? A Dialogue on Values and American Public Life. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2006.
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  451. Readers wanting to get an overview of the competing perspectives should begin here. The book provides an accessible summary of each side’s position, as well as cogent commentaries by two outside scholars (Gertrude Himmelfarb and Morris Fiorina).
  452. Find this resource:
  453. Layman, Geoffrey C., and John C. Green. “Wars and Rumors of Wars: The Contexts of Cultural Conflict in American Political Behaviour.” British Journal of Political Science 36 (2006): 61–89.
  454. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123406000044Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  455. Shows that there is evidence for a “culture war,” but only in a very narrow sense. There is a deep conflict between certain groups (largely the religious) on very specific issues when they are mobilized by political elites. But for the remainder of the population, there is little to no evidence of a broader “culture war.”
  456. Find this resource:
  457. Wolfe, Alan. One Nation, After All: What Middle-Class Americans Really Think About God, Country, Family, Racism, Welfare, Immigration, Homosexuality, Work, the Right, the Left, and Each Other. New York: Penguin, 1998.
  458. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  459. Most Americans are ambivalent on the issues that define the culture wars, even on so-called “hot button” issues. Most ordinary voters have moderate views, and are not as deeply polarized as elites.
  460. Find this resource:
  461. Religion and Mass Polarization
  462.  
  463. This literature centers on the role of religion and religiosity in promoting polarization. There is no longer much religious polarization in American politics (i.e., there are fewer divisions than in the past between Catholics and Protestants). There is, however, a larger divide than in the past based on religiosity, with the highly religious divided from the more secular (Dionne 2006, Putnam and Campbell 2010). Much of this division stems from earlier elite decisions to mobilize groups (such as evangelicals) along religious and cultural lines; Layman 2001 (cited under Activists) also contains a discussion of this point. Domke and Coe 2008, as well as Campbell and Monson 2008, provide specific examples of how this sort of religious-based mobilization can help to generate polarization.
  464.  
  465. Campbell, David E., and J. Quin Monson. “The Religion Card: Gay Marriage and the 2004 Presidential Election.” Public Opinion Quarterly 72 (2008): 399–419.
  466. DOI: 10.1093/poq/nfn032Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  467. White evangelical Protestants had a higher level of mobilization for Bush in states with a gay marriage initiative, while secular voters were demobilized in these same states.
  468. Find this resource:
  469. Dionne, E. J. “Polarized by God? American Politics and the Religious Divide.” In Red and Blue Nation? Characteristics and Causes of America’s Polarized Politics. Edited by Pietro Nivola and David Brady, 175–205. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2006.
  470. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  471. There is only very limited religious polarization, and religion is not an especially salient division within the electorate when compared to other divisions such as race. There is, however, an increasing level of polarization by religiosity, with the more religious being more Republican. The brief commentaries following the chapter by Andrew Kohut and Alan Wolfe are also well worth reading.
  472. Find this resource:
  473. Domke, David, and Kevin Coe. The God Strategy: How Religion Became a Political Weapon in America. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
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  475. Not about polarization per se, but explains how religious appeals are used by candidates to mobilize and target certain voters, which helps to explain why religion and social issues are often polarizing.
  476. Find this resource:
  477. Putnam, Robert, and David Campbell. American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010.
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  479. A sweeping work summarizing the role of religion in politics across a variety of different dimensions. Chapters 11 and 12 are especially relevant for the polarization debate. Interestingly, churches themselves rarely engage in politicking, and to the extent that churches foster politicization, it is through peer groups rather than through preaching from the pulpit.
  480. Find this resource:
  481. Polarization and the Media
  482.  
  483. This literature covers two related subtopics. First, there is a literature explaining how mainstream media forces might increase polarization. These works review the mechanisms by which mainstream outlets can polarize viewers or limit that polarization. Second, there is a literature exploring how more recent partisan media outlets (Fox News, Rush Limbaugh, etc.) have increased polarization. As with nearly all studies of the media, a key concern is differentiating treatment effects from selection effects.
  484.  
  485. Mass Media Effects
  486.  
  487. The initial work on the media’s role in polarization focused on the mass media’s role. Mutz 2006 and Rosensteil 2006 are good overviews of the arguments for and against media’s polarizing effects; readers unfamiliar with this literature should begin with them. Prior 2007 argues that the mass media polarizes by changing the composition of the electorate, while Mutz 2007 shows how the presentation of political discourse can affect polarization. Bennett and Iyengar 2008 and Holbert, et al. 2010 debate how current shifts in the media environment might potentially impact polarization.
  488.  
  489. Bennett, W. Lance, and Shanto Iyengar. “A New Era of Minimal Effects? The Changing Foundations of Political Communication.” Journal of Communication 58 (2008): 707–731.
  490. DOI: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.2008.00410.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  491. Because of media choice, media’s impact should be smaller in the future: subjects select into the media they want to use, so there is little room for persuasion. Argues that reinforcement will be the dominant effect of media, leading to a new era of minimal media effects.
  492. Find this resource:
  493. Holbert, R. Lance, R. Kelly Garrett, and Laurel Gleason. “A New Era of Minimal Effects? A Reply to Bennett and Iyengar.” Journal of Communication 60 (2010): 15–34.
  494. DOI: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.2009.01470.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  495. Contra Bennett and Iyengar 2008, media will continue to exert a large influence on viewers. This is especially true for partisan media, which can polarize viewers.
  496. Find this resource:
  497. Mutz, Diana. “How the Mass Media Divides Us.” In Red and Blue Nation? Characteristics and Causes of America’s Polarized Politics. Edited by Pietro Nivola and David Brady, 223–248. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2006.
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  499. The most comprehensive statement of the mechanisms through which the mainstream mass media might polarize viewers.
  500. Find this resource:
  501. Mutz, Diana. “Effects of ‘In-Your-Face’ Television Discourse on Perceptions of a Legitimate Opposition.” American Political Science Review 101 (2007): 621–636.
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  503. Shows that uncivil discourse, when filmed with a close-up, tightly cropped camera angle, leads viewers to see disliked politicians as less legitimate. Shows how the presentation of the news—even without any actual changes to the content of news—can impact affective polarization.
  504. Find this resource:
  505. Prior, Markus. Post-Broadcast Democracy: How Media Choice Increases Inequality in Political Involvement and Polarizes Elections. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
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  507. Media polarizes elections not by changing attitudes but rather by changing the distribution of who participates. In a low-choice media environment (like the 1950s and 1960s), all viewers got some exposure to the news because there were few other options on TV. But in a high-choice environment, politically uninterested viewers will skip the news, be less well informed, and hence be less likely to vote.
  508. Find this resource:
  509. Rosensteil, Tom. “Comment.” In Red and Blue Nation? Characteristics and Causes of America’s Polarized Politics. Edited by Pietro Nivola and David Brady, 249–254. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2006.
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  511. This commentary immediately follows Mutz 2006, and is well worth reading. Rosensteil spells out the most cogent argument for the limits of media as a polarizing force for ordinary Americans. Copublished with Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace.
  512. Find this resource:
  513. Partisan Media Effects
  514.  
  515. This work focuses on “narrowcasting,” the targeting of messages to particular niche audiences, and how this might impact polarization (Mendelson and Nadeau 1996). Much of the early work, such as Barker and Knight 2000 and Jamieson and Cappella 2008, focused primarily on talk radio, especially Rush Limbaugh, arguing that these outlets help to polarize opinion. Later work explores two topics. Some build directly on this earlier work and argue that partisan television outlets, such as Fox News, polarize vote choice (DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007) or the decision to participate more generally (Dilliplane 2011). A second strand looks at selective exposure, and finds strong evidence of partisan selective exposure to this sort of media (Stroud 2008, Iyengar and Han 2009). Stroud 2011 links these two related strands of work.
  516.  
  517. Barker, David, and Kathleen Knight. “Political Talk Radio and Public Opinion.” Public Opinion Quarterly 64 (2000): 149–170.
  518. DOI: 10.1086/317760Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  519. Rush Limbaugh and other talk radio hosts have a large impact on issue positions. In particular, Limbaugh makes his listeners more conservative on a number of dimensions.
  520. Find this resource:
  521. DellaVigna, Stefano, and Ethan Kaplan. “The Fox News Effect: Media Bias and Voting.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 122 (2007): 1187–1234.
  522. DOI: 10.1162/qjec.122.3.1187Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  523. Biased media outlets—such as Fox News—can impact vote choice. Republican candidates in the 2000 election did better in towns that had access to Fox News.
  524. Find this resource:
  525. Dilliplane, Susanna. “All the News You Want to Hear: The Impact of Partisan News Exposure on Political Participation.” Public Opinion Quarterly 75 (2011): 287–316.
  526. DOI: 10.1093/poq/nfr006Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  527. Exposure to reinforcing partisan media leads viewers to be more likely to participate; exposure to counter-attitudinal partisan media makes them less likely to participate.
  528. Find this resource:
  529. Iyengar, Shanto, and Kyu S. Han. “Red Media, Blue Media: Evidence of Ideological Selectivity in Media Use.” Journal of Communication 59 (2009): 19–39.
  530. DOI: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.2008.01402.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  531. Uses experimental data to show that viewers prefer news from ideologically congenial outlets: Republicans and conservatives prefer information from Fox News, while Democrats and liberals prefer news from CNN.
  532. Find this resource:
  533. Jamieson, Kathleen Hall, and Joseph N. Cappella. Echo Chamber: Rush Limbaugh and the Conservative Media Establishment. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
  534. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  535. A comprehensive analysis of right-wing media, focusing primarily on Rush Limbaugh. Argues that Limbaugh and other right-wing hosts have a significant impact on American politics.
  536. Find this resource:
  537. Mendelson, Matthew, and Richard Nadeau. “The Magnification and Minimization of Social Cleavages by the Broadcast and Narrowcast News Media.” International Journal of Public Opinion Research 8 (1996): 374–389.
  538. DOI: 10.1093/ijpor/8.4.374Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  539. Not on polarization per se, but among the first works to argue that narrowcast media (such as partisan media) could exacerbate social divisions and foster polarization.
  540. Find this resource:
  541. Stroud, Natalie Jomini. “Media Use and Political Predispositions: Revisiting the Concept of Selective Exposure.” Political Behavior 30 (2008): 341–366.
  542. DOI: 10.1007/s11109-007-9050-9Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  543. Finds evidence for partisan selective exposure in the 2004 election: citizens select news outlets that reinforce their partisan and ideological predispositions.
  544. Find this resource:
  545. Stroud, Natalie Jomini. Niche News: The Politics of News Choice. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
  546. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  547. Building on her earlier work (Stroud 2008), shows support for both selection and treatment effects. Partisan preferences push readers toward partisan media outlets (selection effects), but exposure to partisan media outlets also polarizes viewers (treatment effects).
  548. Find this resource:
  549. Consequences of Polarization
  550.  
  551. Generally speaking, scholars consider the consequences of polarization from two different perspectives, the consequences for the mass public and the consequences for public policy. From the mass public’s perspective, some scholars are more positive, arguing that the clearer choices provided by polarized elites allow voters to make more coherent and informed choices (Hetherington 2008; Abramowitz 2010, cited under A Closer Look at Attitudinal Polarization). Others, however, are more pessimistic, focusing on the disconnect between polarized elites and moderate voters and what this means for democratic theory, as seen in Fiorina, et al. 2005 and Fiorina and Abrams 2009 (both cited under A Closer Look at Attitudinal Polarization). Carmines, et al. 2011 combines these perspectives, suggesting that elite polarization mobilizes some citizens while demobilizing others. For public policy, most scholars argue that polarization harms public policy in terms of the legislative process, as seen in McCarty, et al. 2006 (cited under Background, Overview, and Broader Historical Context), Sinclair 2006 (cited under Party Strategy), and McCarty 2007, though Mayhew 2011 does suggest that polarization and party discord need not necessarily harm policy. Binder 2008 documents negative consequences for the judiciary. There is more debate over the consequences for foreign policy; see Kupchan and Trubowitz 2007, as well as Parent, et al. 2008. Finally, Nivola and Galston 2008 suggests a number of potential policy solutions that would help to ameliorate the consequences of polarization.
  552.  
  553. Binder, Sarah. “Consequences for the Courts: Polarized Politics and the Judicial Branch.” In Red and Blue Nation: Consequences and Correction for America’s Polarized Politics. Edited by Pietro Nivola and David Brady, 107–133. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2008.
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  555. Documents how polarization can work to politicize the judiciary and judicial decisions. This connects with a broader literature on the legitimacy of the courts as an institution.
  556. Find this resource:
  557. Carmines, Edward G., Michael J. Ensley, and Michael W. Wanger. “Issue Preferences, Civic Engagement, and the Transformation of American Politics.” In Facing the Challenge of Democracy: Explorations in the Analysis of Public Opinion and Political Participation. Edited by Paul M. Sniderman and Benjamin Highton, 329–353. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011.
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  559. As elites have become more polarized, citizens whose preferences match those of elites (those with liberal [conservative] economic and social beliefs) are more likely to participate. But those citizens whose preferences do not match those of elites (citizens who are social liberals and economic conservatives, or are economic liberals and social conservatives) are less likely to participate.
  560. Find this resource:
  561. Hetherington, Marc. “Turned Off or Turned On? How Polarization Affects Political Engagement.” In Red and Blue Nation: Consequences and Correction for America’s Polarized Politics. Edited by Pietro Nivola and David Brady, 1–33. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2008.
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  563. The clearer choices provided by polarized elites benefit voters by signaling to them that there are real policy differences between the parties. This increases voters’ willingness to both vote and participate in politics more generally, leading to a more engaged electorate.
  564. Find this resource:
  565. Kupchan, Charles, and Peter Trubowitz. “Dead Center: The Demise of Liberal Internationalism in the United States.” International Security 32 (2007): 7–44.
  566. DOI: 10.1162/isec.2007.32.2.7Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  567. During the Cold War and its aftermath, there was bipartisan support for an active American foreign policy that balanced America’s military might with international cooperation through multilateral institutions. Polarization, however, has ended that bipartisan support, and foreign policy is now another arena for partisan combat. Beinart’s essay in Pietro Nivola and David Brady, eds., Red and Blue Nation: Consequences and Correction for America’s Polarized Politics (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2008) makes a similar point.
  568. Find this resource:
  569. Mayhew, David R. Partisan Balance: Why Political Parties Don’t Kill the U.S. Constitutional System. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011.
  570. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  571. Even in an era of political polarization, political parties (and the US government as a whole) are still capable of functioning effectively.
  572. Find this resource:
  573. McCarty, Nolan. “The Policy Effects of Political Polarization.” In The Transformation of American Politics: Activist Government and the Rise of Conservatism. Edited by Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol, 223–255. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007.
  574. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  575. A thorough survey of the effects of polarization on the legislative process. Polarization makes it more difficult to pass legislation, due to increased gridlock intervals. The increased difficulty in passing legislation can have both liberal and conservative policy consequences, depending on the issue area. Finally, polarization also alters the balance of power, giving more power to the courts and the president, since Congress often cannot (or will not) act.
  576. Find this resource:
  577. Nivola, Pietro, and William Galston. “Toward Depolarization.” In Red and Blue Nation: Consequences and Correction for America’s Polarized Politics. Edited by Pietro Nivola and David Brady, 235–284. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2008.
  578. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  579. Reviews a variety of proposed solutions that might help address or ameliorate the consequences of polarization.
  580. Find this resource:
  581. Parent, Joseph, Joseph Bafumi, Charles Kupchan, and Peter Trubowitz. “Correspondence: Of Polarity and Polarization.” International Security 33 (2008): 170–173.
  582. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  583. Exchange between Parent/Bafumi and Kupchan/Trubowitz debating the logic of Kupchan and Trubowitz 2007.
  584. Find this resource:
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