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  1. Can a confidant really keep the president’s secrets, or can
  2. he be compelled to testify about them by a prosecutor
  3. who is investigating the president? This lecture will explore
  4. the balance between finding the truth in an investigation and the
  5. president’s need for candid advice and a confidential sounding board
  6. for policy discussions. While the president is granted privacy in some
  7. situations, these testimonial privileges are not an unlimited, absolute
  8. protection. This helps to ensure that the people remain in control of
  9. their government.
  10. 66
  11. Investigating American Presidents
  12. Finding the Truth
  13. The American legal system is an engine for determining the truth and
  14. finding out what the facts are, but the truth is often obscured during
  15. a criminal investigation.
  16. American society often places a higher value on procedural protections
  17. that are designed to assist in the search for truth in the long term than on
  18. finding out the facts in every individual case. Because of those procedural
  19. impediments, the search for truth in particular cases often founders.
  20. In its search for truth, the judicial system uses two fundamentally competing
  21. paradigms. In general, all witnesses are under an obligation to testify
  22. truthfully, under pain of criminal prosecution for perjury. But we also have
  23. a structure of testimonial privileges that we have erected which sometimes
  24. permit witnesses to refuse to testify truthfully. These two strands of the
  25. law are in tension—not typically in an individual case, but as competing
  26. expressions of the goals of our judicial structure.
  27. 67
  28. Presidential Use and Abuse of Privileges Lecture 7
  29. In fact, our legal system provides not just one testimonial privilege, but
  30. many. Anyone who watches crime dramas is familiar with the Fifth
  31. Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination—the basis for the famous
  32. admonition that you have the right to remain silent. Beyond that privilege,
  33. our system also provides that wives cannot be compelled to testify against
  34. their husbands, and priests cannot be compelled to disclose what they learn
  35. in the confessional.
  36. These latter protections are based on our collective values. As a society, we
  37. say that marital communication is so important that we don’t want to pit
  38. husbands against wives. We say that confession is good for the soul—and
  39. so we don’t want to make a priest testify as to what someone has confided.
  40. Attorney-Client Privilege
  41. The first of two testimonial privileges that are typically relevant to the
  42. president is attorney-client privilege. Attorney-client privilege is the general
  43. idea that your lawyer is not permitted to and cannot be compelled to
  44. disclose whatever you tell her in confidence as part of her representation
  45. of you. In the interest of truth and justice, we want to foster candid
  46. communications between client and attorney. For that reason, the attorneyclient privilege usually protects lawyers from being forced to testify against
  47. their clients.
  48. Any American who hires a lawyer can rely on this privilege, which is
  49. generally thought to have two important grounds.
  50. The privilege encourages clients to be truthful with their lawyers.
  51. If a defendant thought that his attorney could be compelled to turn
  52. around and repeat what he had said, the defendant would be unlikely
  53. to tell his lawyer the unvarnished version of what happened.
  54. The second reason is closely related, but it applies only to the criminal
  55. side of an investigation; the privilege is an important adjunct to the
  56. Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. If a suspect
  57. cannot be compelled to testify against himself, the privilege would
  58. be strongly undercut if his attorney could be compelled to say what
  59. he had said. It is about protecting the rights of the accused.
  60. 68
  61. Investigating American Presidents
  62. There is a guide book prepared by the US Department of Justice, the United
  63. States Attorneys’ Manual (USAM), that serves as an internal set of rules that
  64. tell the lawyers who represent America in court how they are supposed to
  65. do their jobs. In short, it’s a procedural manual on the who, what, when,
  66. where, why, and how of prosecuting cases. It embodies what the government
  67. considers important and what it thinks is not.
  68. It is significant that the USAM has an entire section that limits what
  69. investigators may do regarding the attorneys of criminal suspects. It says,
  70. for example, that using a search warrant to search an attorney’s office is
  71. a serious impingement on the value of the attorney-client privilege. It’s
  72. not unheard of to do so, but when investigators think that a search in an
  73. attorney’s office is necessary, the manual requires high-level approvals. It
  74. requires investigators to exhaust other investigative avenues before they
  75. search. And it requires specific procedures that are to be followed to limit
  76. the examination of privileged documents.
  77. Limitations on Attorney-Client Privilege
  78. For the attorney-client privilege to exist, there must actually be an attorneyclient relationship regarding a specific matter.
  79. If someone has a lawyer to help resolve a tax dispute with the IRS,
  80. the representation is limited to that matter and so is the privilege.
  81. Other things he may have told his lawyer in passing are outside the
  82. scope of the representation and are not privileged.
  83. Other conversations with a lawyer are not automatically covered by
  84. the privilege. If a president asks a lawyer for political advice, that
  85. conversation is not protected by the attorney-client privilege.
  86. The law is clear that as a general matter, a person cannot claim to have
  87. an attorney for all matters that might arise. One obvious reason for this
  88. limitation is that it would frustrate legitimate investigations.
  89. Another important limitation on attorney-client privilege is the crime-fraud
  90. exception. This exception allows the government to read, review, compel
  91. production of, and compel testimony of an attorney and his or her records. It
  92. arises if, and only if, the client uses the attorney’s services to commit a crime.
  93. 69
  94. Presidential Use and Abuse of Privileges Lecture 7
  95. For example, when Monica Lewinsky was subpoenaed in Paula
  96. Jones’s sexual harassment lawsuit against Bill Clinton, Lewinsky
  97. submitted an affidavit saying she had never had any sexual contact
  98. with the president. We now know that was a lie, and because she
  99. used a lawyer to help draft the affidavit, that lawyer was required to
  100. testify about his interactions with Ms. Lewinsky.
  101. The crime-fraud exception demonstrates how testimonial privileges are
  102. limited to their theoretical justification, meaning that privileges are always
  103. in derogation of the truth, so they are generally construed quite narrowly.
  104. Executive Privilege
  105. The other testimonial privilege that comes into play with respect to
  106. presidents and those who work for them is executive privilege. Executive
  107. privilege is the right of the president and the executive branch to withhold
  108. information from public scrutiny.
  109. In many ways, the reasoning behind executive privilege is similar to that
  110. of attorney-client privilege. The purpose is to foster candid political and
  111. policy-based discussions between the president and his advisors, so the
  112. president is granted the right to keep his closest advisors from being forced
  113. to reveal their conversations with him.
  114. Dwight D. Eisenhower was the first
  115. president to use the phrase “executive
  116. privilege,” but the idea is almost as
  117. old as the nation itself.
  118. Although executive privilege is
  119. not mentioned anywhere in the
  120. Constitution, George Washington was
  121. the first to invoke the concept, albeit
  122. unsuccessfully. That was in 1792, when he
  123. tried to refuse congressional and judicial requests for information
  124. about a military expedition in Ohio. In the end, Washington gave
  125. in and sent all of the requested papers to Congress.
  126. 70
  127. Investigating American Presidents
  128. Executive privilege extends not just to the legal advice that the president
  129. receives but, at least in theory, to many communications that take place
  130. within the executive that are intended to develop policy within the executive.
  131. Despite the seemingly essential nature of executive conversations, they
  132. are not always privileged against disclosure. Indeed, quite to the contrary,
  133. history seems to tell us that they are less well protected than are attorneyclient conversations.
  134. Limitations on Executive Privilege
  135. The most famous case involving a presidential invocation of executive
  136. privilege is President Richard Nixon during the Watergate scandal. The
  137. special prosecutor had issued a subpoena demanding that President Nixon
  138. turn over the tapes of conversations in the White House. Nixon resisted,
  139. asserting that the confidential nature of the conversations made them
  140. privileged against disclosure.
  141. Nixon lost, but he did not completely lose. The Supreme Court recognized
  142. that there was a set of competing values.
  143. As it said, there is a “valid need for protection of communications
  144. between high government officials and those who advise and assist
  145. them in the performance of their manifold duties.”
  146. On the other hand, the Court rejected Nixon’s extreme reading
  147. that he had an absolute power to withhold the tapes. Referring to
  148. Article II of the Constitution, which defines executive power, the
  149. Court held as follows: “To read the Article II powers of the president
  150. as providing an absolute privilege as against a subpoena essential
  151. to enforcement of criminal statutes on no more than a generalized
  152. claim of the public interest in confidentiality of nonmilitary and
  153. nondiplomatic discussions would upset the constitutional balance
  154. of ‘a workable government’ and gravely impair the role of the courts
  155. under Article III.”
  156. 71
  157. Presidential Use and Abuse of Privileges Lecture 7
  158. President Nixon had asserted only that confidentiality was generally
  159. a good thing, not that the White House tapes were particularly in need
  160. of confidentiality. Indeed, how could he, given that they disclosed his
  161. own crimes? And so, the Court held that public interest in truth–in the
  162. factual determination of a criminal investigation—was more important
  163. than Nixon’s assertion of a privilege. Nevertheless, it left the door open for
  164. future claims by future presidents.
  165. In the end, Nixon knew that he’d made a mistake. Four days after he
  166. produced the tapes that the Court ordered released, he resigned from office.
  167. As he indicated in his memoirs, he understood that he had hurt not just
  168. his own presidency, but potentially the presidencies of all who came after
  169. him. He wrote, “I was the first president to test the principle of executive
  170. privilege in the Supreme Court, and by testing it on such a weak ground…
  171. I probably ensured the defeat of my cause.”
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