00:16 Hello, welcome to today's program of the
00:19

00:19 National Capital Area Skeptics on April
00:21

00:21 9, 2026 in Arlington, Virginia. I'm
00:25

00:25 Scott Snell, the current president.
00:27

00:27 Unlike many of our programs, we're not
00:29

00:29 live streaming to YouTube today, but
00:32

00:32 instead it's being recorded for our
00:33

00:33 YouTube site later.
00:36

00:36 Founded 39 years ago, the National
00:38

00:38 Capital Area Skeptics, also known as
00:40

00:40 NCAAS,
00:42

00:42 is a nonprofit educational and
00:44

00:44 scientific membership organization that
00:46

00:46 promotes critical thinking and
00:48

00:48 scientific understanding. You may wonder
00:51

00:51 how a skeptics's organization differs
00:53

00:53 from other pro-science organizations.
00:56

00:56 Many of our topics are generally very
00:58

00:58 intriguing to the public and often
01:00

01:00 sensationalized by news media and
01:03

01:03 publishers. Extra sensory perception,
01:06

01:06 ghost hunting, health claims, and so
01:09

01:09 forth. Or today's topic of unidentified
01:12

01:12 flying objects, also known as
01:14

01:14 unidentified anomalous phenomena, excuse
01:17

01:17 me. Of particular concern to us is that
01:21

01:21 news media and publishers will sometimes
01:23

01:23 unfortunately omit information that
01:26

01:26 would otherwise lead their readers or
01:28

01:28 viewers to a different undesired
01:31

01:31 conclusion. Our group focuses on
01:34

01:34 evidence-based claims. We also place an
01:36

01:36 emphasis on learning how we can be
01:39

01:39 fooled. We can be fooled by others and
01:42

01:42 or fool ourselves. What techniques can
01:45

01:45 each of us develop to minimize this?
01:48

01:48 And as skeptics, we're open-minded,
01:51

01:51 asking tough questions, and following
01:53

01:53 the evidence wherever it may lead us. We
01:56

01:56 provide a forum for ideas, information,
01:58

01:58 and perspectives that have been
01:60

01:60 marginalized by publishers and the news
02:02

02:02 media.
02:04

02:04 We appreciate your support. If you so
02:06

02:06 choose, please visit ncas.org
02:10

02:10 to learn more about us. Most of all, we
02:12

02:12 appreciate your participation in this
02:15

02:15 exchange of information and ideas.
02:18

02:18 It's my pleasure to introduce our
02:20

02:20 speaker today. Dr. Sean Kirkpatre is a
02:23

02:23 laser and materials physicist who served
02:26

02:26 as the first director of the department
02:28

02:28 of defense's all domain anomaly
02:31

02:31 resolution office. He's also an adjunct
02:34

02:34 assistant professor of physics at the
02:36

02:36 University of Georgia. Speaking to us
02:38

02:38 today on all domain anomaly resolution
02:41

02:41 office, a duality and mission regarding
02:44

02:44 unidentified anomalous phenomena. Sean
02:46

02:46 Kurpatre.
02:49

02:49 >> Well, thank you everybody. It's a
02:50

02:50 pleasure to be here and some familiar
02:53

02:53 faces. Uh you'll have to forgive me.
02:55

02:55 Spring is attacking me as much as I love
02:58

02:58 it. Uh so I am going to uh give you kind
03:04

03:04 of a rundown of what arrow is, what we
03:08

03:08 did, but more importantly we'll talk a
03:10

03:10 little bit about some of the key
03:11

03:11 findings and how we uh how we address
03:14

03:14 them and be happy to dig into any of
03:16

03:16 those as we go on. Um first just a
03:20

03:20 little side note like what what was
03:23

03:23 Arrow? Why did we have it? Well, why is
03:25

03:25 it here? Um, arrow was an effort that
03:28

03:28 was directed by Congress. Uh, it was set
03:31

03:31 in statute to investigate uh
03:35

03:35 unidentified anomalous phenomena. Now,
03:38

03:38 some of you are curious, I'm sure, as to
03:40

03:40 why we changed the name to that. Um, and
03:44

03:44 it's interesting a little story about
03:47

03:47 legislation. So, the original
03:49

03:49 legislation uh was unidentified aerial
03:53

03:53 phenomena, right? and they used that
03:55

03:55 because they wanted to get away from UFO
03:59

03:59 culture. And this really was supposed to
04:02

04:02 be a broad look at all
04:05

04:05 possible explanations, most notably uh
04:08

04:08 for an adversary uh capabilities and
04:10

04:10 technologies
04:12

04:12 and if they were being employed. Uh
04:15

04:15 unfortunately some of the rather
04:17

04:17 overzealous staffers on the hill uh
04:20

04:20 decided in the uh first year of the
04:23

04:23 establishment of Arrow that they wanted
04:25

04:25 to expand the domain um so that it was
04:29

04:29 more than aerial. It was supposed to be
04:31

04:31 under sea air air and space but they
04:35

04:35 didn't want to change the name.
04:38

04:38 And so in the first draft of that
04:40

04:40 legislation in 2023,
04:43

04:43 uh they actually put in the legislation
04:46

04:46 in the definition section of the
04:49

04:49 section for arrow uh a new definition.
04:52

04:52 It was unidentified aerial phenomena
04:55

04:55 means undersea air and space to
04:60

04:60 to which uh I went back to the hill and
05:03

05:03 said, "No, you you can't do that. you're
05:05

05:05 you're you're just making matters worse,
05:08

05:08 right? We're trying to clean this up,
05:09

05:09 not make this worse. So, um I actually
05:13

05:13 proposed anomalous to them to keep the
05:16

05:16 UAP acronym and to allow for the fact
05:20

05:20 that hey, we're we're we don't really
05:22

05:22 care about balloons. We care about
05:26

05:26 technologies and that's what we're
05:28

05:28 trying to go find and identify and
05:30

05:30 characterize. And that was really how we
05:33

05:33 came up with that name. Now there was a
05:38

05:38 um a desire
05:41

05:41 uh both by the department uh and uh
05:45

05:45 Congress to get at a couple of things.
05:48

05:48 one, uh, the safety and security of our
05:52

05:52 pilots and our, um, operators who were
05:55

05:55 legitimately making observations of
05:60

05:60 stuff that was in their airspace that if
06:02

06:02 they ran into would be really, really
06:05

06:05 bad. Um, for those of you that are
06:08

06:08 scientifically motivated, you might
06:11

06:11 consider how much uh energy is is in a
06:16

06:16 tethered balloon if it's hit by an F35
06:19

06:19 wing going at, you know, some
06:23

06:23 Mach one or so. It pretty much would rip
06:26

06:26 the wing off and we don't want that to
06:29

06:29 happen. So, that's bad. Um, but two, and
06:32

06:32 and really this is where Congress put me
06:35

06:35 in a very difficult position.
06:39

06:39 They wanted an investigation ultimately
06:41

06:41 aimed at whether or not anybody in the
06:43

06:43 executive branch was misappropriating
06:46

06:46 funds and executing programs without
06:49

06:49 congressional oversight.
06:52

06:52 Now, I, you know, give this a little
06:54

06:54 thought for a moment. You've got a
06:56

06:56 congressional mandate. So, in law, I am
06:59

06:59 stood up. I have authorities. I answer
07:01

07:01 to Congress on this, but I work in the
07:04

07:04 executive branch to which I am now
07:06

07:06 investigating. So that that makes makes
07:10

07:10 things really fun. Now, I had two bosses
07:13

07:13 uh both the deputy secretary of defense
07:15

07:15 and the um principal deputy DNI. Um, and
07:19

07:19 then in as we stood all this up, and
07:22

07:22 I'll I'll get to that in a minute, we
07:25

07:25 integrated uh law enforcement and civil
07:28

07:28 and FAA and all kinds of other
07:31

07:31 authorities in there so we could
07:33

07:33 execute.
07:34

07:34 Arrow really had two missions. The way I
07:37

07:37 would explain this to everyone,
07:38

07:38 including as I would go back to Congress
07:41

07:41 weekly, uh, was
07:44

07:44 operational and historical. Right? So if
07:46

07:46 you look at the 70 some odd pages of
07:49

07:49 initial legislation I was given which
07:51

07:51 was really fun and if you ever want to
07:54

07:54 go to sleep go read that u and it breaks
07:57

07:57 down into really two main streams right
07:59

07:59 so the operational piece which was uh
08:02

08:02 understanding really the present what is
08:04

08:04 happening in our airspace today uh what
08:08

08:08 is happening in space what is happening
08:10

08:10 in the seas understanding the reporting
08:14

08:14 structure standardizing the reporting
08:16

08:16 structure, getting all of that
08:18

08:18 information in, analyzing it and
08:21

08:21 applying both scientific rigor and
08:23

08:23 intelligence trade craft and then uh um
08:27

08:27 putting out uh analytic reports on on
08:30

08:30 those and feeding that back to the
08:32

08:32 operators because as we'll see a little
08:34

08:34 bit on the operators uh needed some
08:38

08:38 education,
08:39

08:39 right? So, believe it or not, and this
08:41

08:41 will be sacrilege to some of you, um
08:44

08:44 operators are are not above being
08:47

08:47 mistaken
08:49

08:49 and and they they really like to believe
08:51

08:51 that they aren't until they're proven
08:53

08:53 otherwise.
08:55

08:55 Uh now, I've got some good anecdotes
08:57

08:57 about that. We come back to that later.
08:60

08:60 The second mission was the historical
09:01

09:01 review. So, in law, I was required to go
09:04

09:04 back and review all of the studies the
09:06

09:06 US government had had undertaken for
09:08

09:08 this topic. going back to 1937
09:12

09:12 I believe it was if I remember
09:15

09:15 um review all of those catalog
09:18

09:18 understand all of those make sure all of
09:20

09:20 those are available to the public
09:22

09:22 um and then integrate in a secure manner
09:26

09:26 uh these alleged whistleblowers that
09:28

09:28 were whispering into the ears of
09:30

09:30 Congress of hey uh there's a conspiracy
09:33

09:33 the government is hiding the aliens is
09:36

09:36 there's a legacy program um and pull the
09:40

09:40 thread on every one of those sto every
09:43

09:43 one of those thread every one of those
09:44

09:44 stories every one of those people that
09:46

09:46 would come to give their statements and
09:49

09:49 then try to cross reference not only
09:51

09:51 what they're saying to the historical
09:54

09:54 review but also investigate what is it
09:56

09:56 that they're actually seeing or alleging
09:60

09:60 and where is the data and the evidence
10:02

10:02 that supports that.
10:04

10:04 All right, what would did we not do? We
10:07

10:07 did not investigate people. Um, that is
10:10

10:10 a common misper perception. I had no
10:13

10:13 authority to investigate a person unless
10:17

10:17 when you came into my office and you
10:19

10:19 gave your statement, there was always a
10:22

10:22 law enforcement official there. If you
10:24

10:24 came in and told me that he had
10:27

10:27 committed a crime,
10:29

10:29 that information is immediately handed
10:31

10:31 to the FBI or AFOSR and or sorry, AFOSI
10:35

10:35 and they go off to investigate that as a
10:38

10:38 as a criminal activity. Uh if you have
10:40

10:40 evidence of
10:43

10:43 misappropriation of funds, that is an
10:46

10:46 investigation that would go on with the
10:48

10:48 IG and with uh law enforcement, right?
10:53

10:53 Uh none of that actually happened.
10:56

10:56 Uh we did not engage in any
10:58

10:58 disinformation campaigns contrary to
10:60

10:60 popular belief. Um
11:03

11:03 but we did investigate disinformation
11:07

11:07 from both uh domestic and foreign
11:09

11:09 sources. So, I did have people on staff
11:12

11:12 that understand military deception, and
11:16

11:16 we would go and investigate
11:19

11:19 things that looked like deception being
11:22

11:22 done on us, whether that was from
11:24

11:24 domestic sources or foreign sources, and
11:27

11:27 we did find some of that.
11:30

11:30 Um, we weren't reverse engineering any
11:32

11:32 alien technology because unfortunately,
11:35

11:35 I'll just cut to the chase, there is no
11:37

11:37 alien technology.
11:39

11:39 um nor was there any evidence of aliens
11:41

11:41 or any illegal programs that did not
11:43

11:43 have proper oversight. Um so let me let
11:46

11:46 me pull on that thread just for a
11:48

11:48 moment.
11:50

11:50 Uh in law I had 12 committees on the
11:55

11:55 hill that I had to answer to.
11:58

11:58 That is more than the NRO,
12:01

12:01 right? I had a lot of committees to
12:03

12:03 answer to. Um
12:07

12:07 there are four committees and many of
12:10

12:10 you who work in the national security uh
12:13

12:13 arena understand this but the general
12:15

12:15 public does not. The way the congress
12:19

12:19 works they have committees right
12:21

12:21 committees that each committee has
12:22

12:22 different oversight authorities for
12:24

12:24 different parts of the US government.
12:25

12:25 There are two military and two
12:27

12:27 intelligence two on the senate two on
12:30

12:30 the house. Now, Congress, congressional
12:34

12:34 members, if they want access to anything
12:37

12:37 that is a military or intelligence
12:39

12:39 program, they have to go ask for
12:41

12:41 permission from those committees.
12:45

12:45 And those committees can either grant it
12:47

12:47 or not. And if they don't, they don't
12:49

12:49 get access.
12:51

12:51 So there were some committee members,
12:54

12:54 some members of Congress who did not
12:56

12:56 exist on any of those 12 committees that
12:59

12:59 had oversight of Arrow. Nor did they
13:02

13:02 have any um
13:04

13:04 well included in those four in those 12
13:07

13:07 committees were the four uh military and
13:10

13:10 intel. And since they didn't if they
13:13

13:13 wanted access, they had to go ask
13:15

13:15 permission. And often those committees
13:17

13:17 would say no. That is not up to us to to
13:21

13:21 do anything about. That's internal how
13:23

13:23 Congress handles their clearances and
13:25

13:25 accesses. Unfortunately,
13:28

13:28 as alluded to in the opening statement,
13:30

13:30 right, there are members who t or tend
13:34

13:34 to leave that part out, right? And so,
13:36

13:36 the general public thinks that we're u
13:40

13:40 intentionally withholding information
13:41

13:41 from members of Congress when we
13:43

13:43 actually are not because they aren't
13:45

13:45 cleared by their own people. But the
13:48

13:48 other 12 committees, they they got
13:50

13:50 everything all the time. I I was on the
13:53

13:53 hill.
13:55

13:55 All right. So, how did we set this up?
13:57

13:57 How did it work? Um, initially, so what
14:01

14:01 I'm going to show you here and in the
14:02

14:02 next slide is at startup. This is what I
14:05

14:05 walked into the department to do. This
14:09

14:09 is how I structured it and set it up. It
14:12

14:12 it has of course evolved since that
14:14

14:14 time. Uh there was a director who was an
14:17

14:17 SCES, that was me. There was initially a
14:20

14:20 deputy director that was an '06. We
14:23

14:23 later turned that into an SCES. Um and
14:26

14:26 then the heads of each one of those four
14:28

14:28 columns were also SCEs. Um
14:33

14:33 we had an analysis uh group. I set up an
14:36

14:36 operations group. I set up an S&T group.
14:38

14:38 And I set up a messaging group.
14:41

14:41 What are those four things for? Uh, so
14:44

14:44 analysis is exactly what you think it
14:48

14:48 is. And we're going to walk through
14:49

14:49 analysis in some detail because I think
14:51

14:51 that's where a lot of you have um some
14:53

14:53 interest. So I'm going to put that aside
14:55

14:55 for a moment. But it's basically
14:57

14:57 standardizing the data, the reporting,
14:60

14:60 integrating it, make sure we're
15:01

15:01 databasing and cataloging it, and then
15:04

15:04 setting up a rigorous analytic structure
15:06

15:06 to go after each and every one. And
15:07

15:07 we'll we'll talk through that in a
15:09

15:09 minute. the operations piece uh you know
15:13

15:13 in again everything that you see here is
15:15

15:15 in law so I didn't make any of this up
15:20

15:20 um you know we had to uh uh standardize
15:24

15:24 the reporting through uh uh orders so
15:29

15:29 one of the things that we'll talk about
15:30

15:30 a little bit later but to cut to the
15:32

15:32 chase none of the services had standard
15:35

15:35 reporting processes
15:37

15:37 all of them had different mechanisms
15:40

15:40 Uh Navy had range fowler reports, the
15:43

15:43 Air Force had uh
15:47

15:47 range safety reports. Uh the Army had
15:51

15:51 something else and none of those systems
15:53

15:53 were actually integrated together in any
15:55

15:55 way that made any sense. And they all
15:57

15:57 had different levels of detail
15:59

15:59 associated with it. Um so one of the
16:02

16:02 first things we did was actually I
16:04

16:04 issued orders to the entire department
16:06

16:06 through the joint staff J3
16:10

16:10 uh to standardize all of that. Say this
16:13

16:13 is what you're going to report. You have
16:15

16:15 72 hours to report it. You will collect
16:18

16:18 all the data. You will collect all the
16:19

16:19 ancillary data. You will pull all the
16:21

16:21 data off of your platforms. You will
16:23

16:23 save it all and you will move it over
16:25

16:25 both to the service
16:27

16:27 and to Arrow.
16:30

16:30 and then we would take it from there.
16:33

16:33 Um,
16:35

16:35 we had to um uh build at at Congress's
16:39

16:39 request. They wanted a essentially a
16:42

16:42 flyaway team that if somebody saw
16:44

16:44 something and shot it down, which
16:46

16:46 happened. Uh, we had to be able to to
16:49

16:49 send people out into the field. What
16:52

16:52 Congress failed to remember is that
16:55

16:55 there are these things called joint
16:56

16:56 combatant commands that already have
16:58

16:58 purview and authorities over every
17:01

17:01 square inch of the globe and they
17:03

17:03 already have all the personnel and
17:05

17:05 capabilities there. So really all I
17:07

17:07 needed to do was coordinate with them to
17:08

17:08 go and pick up stuff if things fell off.
17:12

17:12 So,
17:13

17:13 uh, we worked at that, right? Um,
17:17

17:17 synchronizing our, uh, operational and
17:20

17:20 counter intelligence responses. Again,
17:23

17:23 identifying was this somebody else like
17:25

17:25 an adversary. That was really our one of
17:27

17:27 our bigger concerns. And then how were
17:30

17:30 we going to uh get that uh information
17:35

17:35 back and go after it. So, we have uh
17:40

17:40 um teams working to uh to standard those
17:45

17:45 um standard operating procedures on how
17:47

17:47 we're going to go off and do that. All
17:49

17:49 right. Um
17:51

17:51 the S&T group was charged with really
17:55

17:55 two things, main things. One was they
17:58

17:58 were part of uh the analytics in that
18:01

18:01 they ran an S&T group that was academic,
18:06

18:06 national labs, DoD labs, some industry
18:09

18:09 partners that all came together from an
18:12

18:12 S&T perspective and would look at cases
18:15

18:15 from a science and technology,
18:18

18:18 try to identify the underlying sensor
18:21

18:21 phenomenologies, what was happening to
18:23

18:23 it, where it was um where it was headed.
18:26

18:26 uh what could have caused it, what where
18:28

18:28 it could have come from. Um
18:33

18:33 so that was that was one. The other
18:34

18:34 thing that they were meant to do
18:37

18:37 um was
18:40

18:40 set up our calibration campaign and our
18:44

18:44 measurement campaign for pattern of
18:46

18:46 life. So,
18:48

18:48 it will not surprise many of you that
18:52

18:52 our military sensors, whether they're
18:55

18:55 aircraft,
18:57

18:57 range radars, shipworn radars,
19:01

19:01 uh, space-based systems, they're
19:03

19:03 designed for pretty much one thing,
19:06

19:06 right? Identify big fastm moving threats
19:10

19:10 and put a weapon on it, right? That's
19:13

19:13 ultimately what we're trying to do with
19:14

19:14 many and most of those weapon systems.
19:17

19:17 They are not intelligence collectors.
19:20

19:20 They are not um systems to pull data off
19:24

19:24 easily and characterize slow, small,
19:28

19:28 semi-transparent
19:30

19:30 uh objects, right? That's not what they
19:33

19:33 do. And we all saw the result of what
19:36

19:36 happens when you turn those filters off.
19:38

19:38 When we turned those filters off after
19:40

19:40 the Chinese high altitude balloon and
19:43

19:43 what did we do? We scrambled jets and
19:46

19:46 shot down a bunch of things. Do you know
19:49

19:49 what we shot down?
19:52

19:52 Balloons.
19:54

19:54 And the worst one, absolute worst one,
19:59

19:59 was they shot down a balloon that had a
20:02

20:02 tethered package on the bottom that had
20:05

20:05 a transponder on it
20:08

20:08 that was built, flown, and operated by a
20:10

20:10 boy scout group
20:12

20:12 that had circumnavigated the globe eight
20:15

20:15 times before we shot it down
20:19

20:19 with a half million dollar missile. All
20:22

20:22 right. It's awesome. Fantastic. You can
20:27

20:27 imagine the response in on the hill when
20:29

20:29 I briefed that.
20:32

20:32 Now, on top of that, um, you know, other
20:36

20:36 balloons that would be seen, and this is
20:39

20:39 my to my point of these weapon systems
20:42

20:42 aren't me meant to characterize and
20:43

20:43 understand these things. There was
20:45

20:45 another balloon that was shot down and
20:47

20:47 the pilot
20:49

20:49 described it as having potential
20:52

20:52 stealthlike capabilities
20:54

20:54 and that they couldn't get a good lock
20:56

20:56 on it.
20:57

20:57 And the reason they couldn't do that is
20:59

20:59 because it was a star-shaped Myar
21:02

21:02 balloon
21:04

21:04 from Walmart
21:06

21:06 said happy birthday on the side. We got
21:09

21:09 a real nice closeup in the AIM missile
21:11

21:11 before it blew up. Right.
21:16

21:16 All right. Um,
21:18

21:18 so our S&T group, um, I had them put
21:22

21:22 together a calibration campaign
21:25

21:25 where we laid out all a cross-section of
21:28

21:28 all of our military systems
21:32

21:32 and they started running through and
21:34

21:34 coordinating with those program offices
21:35

21:35 and those owners and operators on
21:39

21:39 calibrating what does a a medium alitude
21:44

21:44 weather balloon look like in an F-35
21:47

21:47 sensor suite going at half a mock. What
21:51

21:51 does it look like in the infrared? What
21:53

21:53 does it look like in the UV or not UV,
21:55

21:55 the uh IR or the uh EO? What does it
21:59

21:59 look like on radar? And you'd be
22:01

22:01 surprised all the kinds of
22:03

22:03 phenomenologies you get back from that.
22:05

22:05 And we'll we'll touch on sensor
22:06

22:06 phenomenologies in a bit.
22:09

22:09 Um so that took up a large part of their
22:11

22:11 time. The other piece of that was
22:14

22:14 um I had my thumb sorry I had my boss's
22:18

22:18 thumb on my uh head to put uh sensors
22:25

22:25 out in the field uh full-time
22:29

22:29 and and why is that important?
22:33

22:33 So, we have all of these sensitive
22:35

22:35 ranges that we do testing on,
22:38

22:38 right? And that is where a lot of these
22:40

22:40 reports come from, which spikes concern
22:43

22:43 that somebody is flying stuff into our
22:46

22:46 protected airspace.
22:48

22:48 Well,
22:52

22:52 when we do a test in a range,
22:57

22:57 we turn the sensors on, all the range
22:59

22:59 sensors, all the ground sensors, right?
23:02

23:02 When we're done with the test, the
23:04

23:04 sensors get turned off because it costs
23:06

23:06 money
23:07

23:07 for putting the contractors out there to
23:10

23:10 run the sensors longer than that. So, we
23:14

23:14 we generally don't. Um, so one of the
23:18

23:18 things we needed to do was to build a
23:20

23:20 permanent sensor suite that could
23:23

23:23 operate remotely 24/7 to go and just
23:26

23:26 monitor and get our pattern of life
23:30

23:30 because a lot of these uh range
23:32

23:32 commanders did not know what was flying
23:34

23:34 through their airspace when they weren't
23:36

23:36 doing a test.
23:39

23:39 And a lot of these places are downwind
23:42

23:42 from major metropolitan areas. And you
23:45

23:45 would be surprised how much trash is in
23:47

23:47 our air. And a lot of that shows up on
23:50

23:50 radars.
23:54

23:54 Okay, so that's what the SMT group did.
23:57

23:57 The uh messaging group had a a much
24:00

24:00 harder job, right? So they were one
24:03

24:03 ensuring that we were integrating all of
24:06

24:06 our data and messaging to the Congress.
24:09

24:09 Um they were ensuring that we were
24:11

24:11 messaging across the inter agency.
24:15

24:15 They were ensuring that we were
24:17

24:17 messaging to the public and that we were
24:20

24:20 building out the interfaces for both the
24:24

24:24 uh web portal, uh the talking points,
24:28

24:28 the media engagements, all of that came
24:31

24:31 through that group. Um and so they they
24:34

24:34 had a much harder job. All right. Um I'm
24:38

24:38 not going to stick to this very long
24:40

24:40 other than I just wanted to show you
24:43

24:43 Again,
24:44

24:44 I took 70 some odd pages of legislation
24:48

24:48 and turned it into this report card.
24:52

24:52 And this became the living report card
24:54

24:54 that I brief the deputy secretary and
24:57

24:57 the PDD and I on every month. Here's the
24:60

25:00 progress we're making. Here's what we're
25:01

25:01 doing next month. Here's where we're
25:03

25:03 going the next month. Right? And then I
25:05

25:05 would brief this to Congress,
25:07

25:07 right? So everybody was informed at all
25:09

25:09 times. this is everything that we're
25:11

25:11 doing and where we're going. And if you
25:13

25:13 had any questions or direction or other
25:16

25:16 changes you would like to make, you
25:18

25:18 know, let me know now. And that's that's
25:20

25:20 how we did it. And that's all it was.
25:23

25:23 All right. So, I'm going to dive into
25:25

25:25 some of the analytics here for a minute
25:30

25:30 because I think um you all will want to
25:33

25:33 know this I think the best or the most.
25:36

25:36 Um we set up a very very rigorous
25:39

25:39 analytic process by which um we would
25:43

25:43 collate the data from a given event. We
25:46

25:46 would bring that uh in right as a
25:50

25:50 package. It would get packaged as a as a
25:53

25:53 case. We logged into a database. Um we
25:57

25:57 would do a preliminary analysis. That
25:59

25:59 preliminary analysis would would look at
26:02

26:02 the reporting, look at and maybe even
26:05

26:05 reach out to the operator at that stage
26:08

26:08 just to verify of hey is this um is this
26:13

26:13 automatically meet the threshold of say
26:16

26:16 a balloon like we had a number of
26:18

26:18 reports that came in where they would
26:21

26:21 say it's a UAP but then in the comments
26:25

26:25 they would say it's a balloon we got a
26:28

26:28 picture of
26:29

26:29 like, well then, well then why did you
26:31

26:31 send me this report? I don't care,
26:33

26:33 right? Um, so there was a there was a
26:36

26:36 little bit of a learning curve that went
26:37

26:37 on to that. Um, we then um did something
26:41

26:41 that a lot of people um had questions
26:44

26:44 about but but didn't know this was part
26:46

26:46 of the process. The first, one of the
26:48

26:48 first things we would do is coordinate
26:51

26:51 across the department, the IC, NASA,
26:54

26:54 anybody, DOE, anybody that had um
26:58

26:58 something going on in the area that the
27:00

27:00 report came from and go, "Hey, is this
27:04

27:04 one of your programs? Is this you? Are
27:07

27:07 you doing something?" And and remember,
27:09

27:09 as the director, um, I had access to all
27:13

27:13 that. Now, not all my team had access to
27:16

27:16 all that, but so I get on the phone with
27:18

27:18 them and go, "Hey, is this your flying
27:20

27:20 wombat?"
27:22

27:22 Right? Because if this is your flying
27:23

27:23 wombat, you've been seen. People are
27:26

27:26 taking pictures of you. Stop it. Um,
27:30

27:30 and and most of the time they would go,
27:32

27:32 "No, we weren't flying flying wombat
27:34

27:34 yesterday. That was that's not us.
27:36

27:36 That's something else." Um, and and
27:40

27:40 there were several cases like that. And
27:42

27:42 those usually well not usually they
27:44

27:44 always turned out to be somebody else
27:49

27:49 right all right so that was the first
27:52

27:52 thing right we had to um deconlict
27:55

27:55 make sure that was done assuming it
27:58

27:58 passes that gate it's packaged up and
27:60

27:60 it's sent over uh to number three over
28:02

28:02 there where we're doing a a I I almost
28:05

28:05 called a red team blue team uh I had set
28:09

28:09 up a intel driven
28:12

28:12 analytic team and an S&T team. I already
28:16

28:16 told you about the S&T team. My intel
28:18

28:18 team was an inter agency team of
28:21

28:21 analysts from across NSA, NGA, the S&TI
28:25

28:25 centers, NRO, you know, all of the
28:29

28:29 intelligence community, DIA, CIA, of
28:32

28:32 course,
28:34

28:34 and they would look at the data, look at
28:38

28:38 the reporting through the lens of
28:42

28:42 adversaries
28:43

28:43 and intelligence tradecraft.
28:46

28:46 So,
28:48

28:48 what do I mean by that? All right, we
28:52

28:52 watch what foreign adversaries do. We,
28:55

28:55 you know, that's what the intelligence
28:56

28:56 community does, right? We we spy on bad
28:59

28:59 guys. That's our job.
29:02

29:02 We know where their research is going,
29:06

29:06 right? We we pay attention to all of
29:08

29:08 that.
29:10

29:10 Um, we from an intelligence perspective
29:15

29:15 ask the question, hey, if they're
29:18

29:18 working on an advanced propulsion system
29:22

29:22 and we know that they are where they are
29:25

29:25 currently in their R&D program and we
29:27

29:27 project that they're not going to get
29:29

29:29 there for another 15 years, what would
29:33

29:33 happen if they suddenly had a
29:35

29:35 breakthrough and they got got to it now?
29:38

29:38 What does that look like? What are those
29:40

29:40 signatures? And are you seeing that in
29:43

29:43 this case? And if you are, it has to be
29:47

29:47 based in the intelligence record because
29:49

29:49 the intelligence community does not
29:51

29:51 guess. They only assess based off of
29:53

29:53 what's in the intelligence record. So
29:55

29:55 that's evidentiary based. They have to
29:57

29:57 have data behind it. And they put put
29:60

29:60 together a view. Hey, this video shows
30:03

30:03 this thing.
30:05

30:05 It could be, you know, this Japanese
30:08

30:08 thing, maybe, could be this Chinese
30:11

30:11 thing, maybe. Uh, but we don't think
30:14

30:14 they're there yet. We think it's maybe,
30:17

30:17 uh, you know, another decade away. But
30:20

30:20 if they did have a breakthrough, it
30:22

30:22 might match this video. It might. The
30:26

30:26 S&T team, on the other hand, does a
30:28

30:28 little bit different. They take a look
30:30

30:30 at the data and they take a look at the
30:32

30:32 sensor and they go, I know how this
30:34

30:34 sensor works. I know what a fleer does.
30:37

30:37 I know what this radar is going to do. I
30:39

30:39 know what the processing algorithms are
30:42

30:42 behind it. And I'm going to I'm going to
30:45

30:45 pull apart the data
30:48

30:48 to see what the sensor is telling me.
30:53

30:53 and and the sensor will tell me what it
30:56

30:56 thinks it saw and whether or not what it
30:58

30:58 saw is a real object or if it's an
31:02

31:02 anomaly in the algorithm, if it's a if
31:06

31:06 it's a video compression issue, if it's
31:08

31:08 a radar issue, you'd be surprised what
31:11

31:11 radars do this. Just as an aside, no,
31:15

31:15 I'm not going to do that yet because
31:16

31:16 we're going to get to the sensor thing.
31:17

31:17 I'll come back to that. Um, so they
31:19

31:19 would look at that, they pull it out,
31:20

31:20 they do their assessment, they do a a
31:23

31:23 report. So I got two teams that are
31:26

31:26 doing an assessment on this and then
31:28

31:28 they come together in step four and we
31:30

31:30 do a uh basically we do a cage match. I
31:33

31:33 put them both in a room. They got to
31:35

31:35 brief each other on their findings. they
31:38

31:38 have to come they either have the same
31:40

31:40 answer or if they have differences they
31:42

31:42 have to reconcile them um through both
31:46

31:46 S&T and through u the intelligence
31:50

31:50 record they come to a conclusion if
31:53

31:53 there's a discrepancy that they can't
31:55

31:55 resolve they they document that that
31:58

31:58 then goes to a higher level review
32:00

32:00 higher level review of both scientists
32:02

32:02 and intelligence seniors that then look
32:05

32:05 at that and make sure one that all the
32:07

32:07 trade tradecraftraft is is accurate to
32:09

32:09 all the S&T methodology is accurate and
32:12

32:12 their conclusions are sound. They write
32:14

32:14 all that up. They bring that back to me
32:16

32:16 as the director. I would review it.
32:18

32:18 Sometimes I'd send them back to do some
32:20

32:20 more homework. Sometimes they'd be fine.
32:22

32:22 And we'd sign it off and then it enters
32:25

32:25 into the declassification process.
32:29

32:29 I'm going to spend a moment on the
32:30

32:30 declass process because this seems to be
32:32

32:32 a a problem people can't get their head
32:35

32:35 around.
32:40

32:40 Why is an video of a balloon classified?
32:46

32:46 >> Sources and methods 100% has absolutely
32:49

32:49 nothing to do with the target. It has
32:51

32:51 everything to do with the sensor. If my
32:53

32:53 sensor, if my camera is classified,
32:58

32:58 anything I take a picture of with that
32:60

32:60 camera is classified. Period. N dot.
33:03

33:03 Because if an adversary got a hold of
33:05

33:05 that picture, the raw data, they could
33:09

33:09 reverse engineer it, figure out how that
33:11

33:11 sensor works, and then defeat it. If
33:15

33:15 it's a sensor that was in an operation
33:18

33:18 that we weren't supposed to be in or we
33:20

33:20 didn't acknowledge,
33:23

33:23 that's an operational classification. So
33:26

33:26 now I have technical sources and methods
33:28

33:28 and then I have operations both of which
33:31

33:31 have different classifications for
33:33

33:33 things. So now if I have an F-35 of
33:36

33:36 which every sensor is classified
33:39

33:39 and they're all classified differently
33:40

33:40 which makes it all even better and
33:43

33:43 they're classified differently depending
33:45

33:45 on which service owns the F-35. So the
33:48

33:48 Air Force has a different set of
33:50

33:50 classifications than the Navy.
33:52

33:52 And then if you take on top of that that
33:55

33:55 I'm flying this F-35,
33:57

33:57 say in the Middle East on an operation
34:00

34:00 and I happen to pick up something,
34:03

34:03 then now I've got operational
34:06

34:06 classification on top of the technical
34:08

34:08 classification. So in order to take any
34:11

34:11 one of those things and go get it
34:13

34:13 declassified, it has to go through all
34:16

34:16 of those people.
34:19

34:19 So, if it's an Air Force mission on an
34:22

34:22 Air Force F-35, it has to go through the
34:24

34:24 F-35 program office. It has to go
34:26

34:26 through the Air Force. It has to go
34:27

34:27 through the owning Joint Combatant
34:29

34:29 Command.
34:31

34:31 How fast do you think that happens?
34:34

34:34 >> And how much priority do you think
34:36

34:36 they're going to put on doing that if
34:39

34:39 they're in the middle of a conflict?
34:43

34:43 Right. So, I've got a backlog of things
34:47

34:47 that have been resolved that need to be
34:49

34:49 declassified. And I'm sorry, but no
34:52

34:52 presidential treat tweet is going to
34:54

34:54 make it go faster because they still
34:56

34:56 have to go through that process,
34:59

34:59 right? You still have to go and get all
35:01

35:01 of them. The only thing that's going to
35:02

35:02 happen is they might put a higher
35:04

35:04 priority on it, but it's not going to be
35:05

35:05 zero analysts. It'll be one, right? It's
35:09

35:09 still going to go through that process.
35:11

35:11 Um, and then once that's declassified,
35:15

35:15 it gets published. And you've seen uh at
35:19

35:19 least many of them when I was there. All
35:22

35:22 right. Any questions about the analytic
35:24

35:24 process?
35:33

35:33 So, by the time I retired, I had
35:38

35:38 I want to say we had about 1,800
35:41

35:41 cases.
35:42

35:42 >> Is that before or after your initial
35:44

35:44 screen?
35:47

35:47 >> That that was that was total.
35:48

35:48 >> That's total.
35:49

35:49 >> That's total. And then we and then we
35:51

35:51 would identify a bunch of their balloons
35:53

35:53 and we could get those out and you know
35:56

35:56 really kind of focus down on the things
35:58

35:58 one that we had data for because of
36:01

36:01 those 1800 that was 25 years worth of
36:06

36:06 reporting. Right? And some of those
36:08

36:08 early reports were just a scribbled
36:11

36:11 sticky note from some pilot that said,
36:13

36:13 "Hey, I saw something." Okay, great.
36:16

36:16 Right? and and so uh I think
36:20

36:20 uh you know I think we would review
36:26

36:26 I want to say it was of order 30ish
36:30

36:30 a month um in detail
36:34

36:34 um that that had some enough data that
36:38

36:38 you could either quickly put them to bed
36:40

36:40 or run them through a much now ones that
36:44

36:44 we had a lot of data for that you could
36:46

36:46 really dig begin to um you know that
36:49

36:49 could take anywhere from 30 days to six
36:51

36:51 months. I had one case we worked on for
36:53

36:53 nine months
36:54

36:54 >> started right away.
36:58

36:58 >> Yeah.
37:01

37:01 >> Yep. We tried to um and and then I guess
37:04

37:04 this is an important data point for for
37:06

37:06 some of you and I'll come back to you. U
37:10

37:10 remember my original mission safety and
37:12

37:12 security and then national security,
37:15

37:15 right?
37:17

37:17 If I found a bunch of data that
37:20

37:20 supported a large number of balloons
37:23

37:23 flying through a test range that
37:27

37:27 um the base commander was not previously
37:30

37:30 aware of, we would package all of those
37:32

37:32 and I would give it to the range safety
37:35

37:35 folks to say, "You have a problem. You
37:38

37:38 need to figure out how you're going to
37:39

37:39 clear your range before you start flying
37:41

37:41 around."
37:43

37:43 Um, if I found something that was
37:46

37:46 definitively for an adversary,
37:50

37:50 that goes to the intelligence community
37:52

37:52 because that's their job, right? Hey,
37:54

37:54 you got a problem. Somebody's flying a
37:57

37:57 drone in the backyard. Go get it, right?
38:02

38:02 Um, we weren't replicating anything that
38:05

38:05 already existed. It was more of a filter
38:08

38:08 and analyze and then hand off to who was
38:11

38:11 the uh cognizant authority.
38:15

38:15 >> I was just going to say um with respect
38:17

38:17 to the sources and methods. I would
38:19

38:19 suspect that one of the reasons why a
38:21

38:21 lot of the raw radar data is absence in
38:24

38:24 a lot of these reports is because of
38:26

38:26 that very y it exhibits more than
38:29

38:29 probably anything that you can do for
38:31

38:31 our our capability.
38:32

38:32 >> Yeah. But it it gives you a lot
38:35

38:35 >> gives you a lot of definitive
38:37

38:37 information that you don't want to just
38:39

38:39 share with the world.
38:40

38:40 >> Exactly. And uh more importantly, it
38:43

38:43 gives you a lot of vulnerabilities
38:44

38:44 because a lot of the anomalies that
38:46

38:46 those radars see are derived from
38:50

38:50 vulnerabilities in the fusion engine or
38:52

38:52 the analytics that are that are
38:54

38:54 automated. So, you know, we're all
38:56

38:56 trying to push AI and machine learning
38:58

38:58 and we're going to do all this machine
38:60

38:60 to machine sensor stuff. Well, that
39:02

39:02 comes with risk if it makes a mistake,
39:06

39:06 right? And so, you've got to get a human
39:08

39:08 to pull all that data apart, which is
39:10

39:10 why you have to have the raw data to do
39:12

39:12 the analysis. There's a lot of people
39:15

39:15 that would complain to me about, why
39:17

39:17 aren't you analyzing this video off of
39:19

39:19 the internet?
39:21

39:21 Like, well, one, it's not my job. Two,
39:24

39:24 there's no raw data with that. And video
39:27

39:27 compression is is just as bad as radar
39:30

39:30 artifacts when it comes to anomalies
39:33

39:33 that show up in those compressions that
39:36

39:36 people normal everyday people don't
39:39

39:39 understand and you have to really pull
39:41

39:41 on that.
39:42

39:42 >> I would suspect there's a certain amount
39:44

39:44 of meta metadata that come with that you
39:46

39:46 you could pull off.
39:48

39:48 >> Yep. Yep.
39:51

39:51 >> Um so you mentioned sensor suites. Can
39:53

39:53 you go a little bit further? I mean, is
39:55

39:55 that like a package that Arrow put
39:57

39:57 together? It was sent out to ranges for
39:59

39:59 them to use.
40:00

40:00 >> Yeah, I designed a portable sensor
40:03

40:03 suite. Had uh some folks building it. It
40:07

40:07 was a combination of radar, EO, and IR.
40:11

40:11 Now, we ran into a problem in deployment
40:14

40:14 um and had to get the deputy involved.
40:18

40:18 And
40:20

40:20 it's a security issue. uh people who
40:23

40:23 aren't tracking that this is a problem
40:25

40:25 tend to get sensitive when you want to
40:28

40:28 put a camera in their security areas
40:31

40:31 >> as you might imagine. So, uh you know
40:34

40:34 that takes some finesse to work through.
40:37

40:37 Um but yeah, there were there were
40:39

40:39 there's a suite of those built. Um
40:41

40:41 >> well, like can you say how many and
40:43

40:43 where they were deployed?
40:44

40:44 >> Nope.
40:47

40:47 >> Yep.
40:50

40:50 >> All right.
40:53

40:53 So, I'm going to quickly just kind of re
40:56

40:56 rego through a lot of these key
40:57

40:57 findings. I want to get to the really
40:59

40:59 end part where we talk about some of the
41:01

41:01 more meteor stuff we can discuss. Um,
41:05

41:05 really again, just to put it all to bed,
41:08

41:08 uh, for the millionth time, there was no
41:11

41:11 evidence of anything that had to do with
41:15

41:15 extraterrestrial technology. There were
41:17

41:17 a lot of allegations. My my personal
41:19

41:19 favorite was the piece of metal that
41:21

41:21 that was um given to the army that we
41:24

41:24 took control of and went and did isotope
41:27

41:27 measurements on. And and for those of
41:29

41:29 you who are scientifically minded,
41:31

41:31 isotope fingerprinting is pretty
41:33

41:33 definitive and it was definitely uh
41:36

41:36 terrestrial made. Um not not
41:40

41:40 >> no no no. Um
41:47

41:47 uh we didn't find any evidence for
41:49

41:49 private companies doing any sort of
41:51

41:51 reverse engineering of anything. And
41:53

41:53 just to put that one to bed, I did meet
41:56

41:56 with the CTOs of every major defense
41:60

41:60 contractor prime. Um they gave us their
42:03

42:03 full cooperation. In fact, um, one of
42:07

42:07 them helped me drag out of the closet
42:09

42:09 some, uh, no pun intended, some, uh,
42:14

42:14 one of their engineers who
42:18

42:18 believed in something without actually
42:21

42:21 going through, uh, any sort of
42:23

42:23 scientific analysis and he did some
42:25

42:25 interviews with us and we kind of got
42:27

42:27 that put to bed, too.
42:30

42:30 This this last point is is really one of
42:32

42:32 the bigger takeaways from the
42:34

42:34 investigation.
42:36

42:36 Every named program I had a bunch of
42:38

42:38 people come in and name classified
42:40

42:40 programs. This program is where the
42:43

42:43 aliens are. This program is where the
42:45

42:45 aliens are. No, that program is where
42:47

42:47 the aliens are.
42:49

42:49 Um, every one of them
42:53

42:53 uh was either a misidentified authentic,
42:56

42:56 highly sensitive
42:58

42:58 uh aerospace program that they shouldn't
43:00

43:00 or didn't have access to, but somehow
43:03

43:03 heard something, saw something
43:06

43:06 somewhere.
43:07

43:07 Um,
43:10

43:10 uh, and none of those were related to
43:13

43:13 extraterrestrial technologies. um
43:16

43:16 or they resolved to uh the
43:19

43:19 disestablished uh programs that we did
43:22

43:22 identify and put out in the public
43:24

43:24 domain. Uh one of those key ones is uh
43:29

43:29 Kona Blue and we'll touch on that in a
43:31

43:31 bit. Um, and so really, you know, my
43:36

43:36 takeaway to
43:38

43:38 Congress in one of my final outbreaks,
43:41

43:41 in fact, my final outbreak was, hey, you
43:44

43:44 you have a security problem,
43:47

43:47 you have an OBSC problem, you have a
43:49

43:49 data problem.
43:51

43:51 And when I briefed the heads of agencies
43:54

43:54 and services on this, half of them
43:59

43:59 looked at me and put their finger in my
44:01

44:01 chest and said, "Go open a counter
44:04

44:04 intelligence investigation and go after
44:06

44:06 these people." And I would have to say,
44:08

44:08 "I can't.
44:10

44:10 My hands are tied because Congress
44:14

44:14 extended the whistleblower protections
44:16

44:16 to these people." So they can walk in
44:20

44:20 and say whatever they want. I can't go
44:22

44:22 after them. You have a data problem. You
44:24

44:24 need to go plug your data problem. Find
44:26

44:26 out where your data leak is. I can't go
44:29

44:29 after these people.
44:32

44:32 Um
44:34

44:34 and so I gave that message to Congress
44:36

44:36 and to the department and to the IC and
44:38

44:38 to the DOE and to everybody else that
44:40

44:40 had programs named.
44:43

44:43 All right.
44:45

44:45 Um yeah, there's no government
44:48

44:48 conspiracy to hide this uh from
44:50

44:50 Congress.
44:53

44:53 the department in particular. Just at
44:57

44:57 the same time I was standing up and
44:59

44:59 executing this, the director of the
45:02

45:02 SAPCO office who owns all of the special
45:05

45:05 access programs for the Department of
45:07

45:07 Defense was going through a uh review of
45:11

45:11 every program,
45:14

45:14 every program. And they were
45:16

45:16 declassifying a bunch and they were
45:18

45:18 binning a bunch and it was it's called
45:20

45:20 SAP reform. You may have heard of it.
45:22

45:22 Um, and so the director of the SAPCO and
45:25

45:25 I became very close and went through
45:29

45:29 that portfolio.
45:31

45:31 Um, and here's the other thing that that
45:33

45:33 people don't really understand or at
45:35

45:35 least the cognitive dissonance in this
45:38

45:38 hurts my head sometimes.
45:41

45:41 If I am a program of record and I have a
45:45

45:45 SAP
45:46

45:46 wrapped around it, a security construct
45:49

45:49 wrapped around it. I exist in the
45:54

45:54 SAPCO's office. And if I exist in the
45:57

45:57 SAPCO's office, I am on the CBJB that is
46:01

46:01 reported to Congress for the oversight
46:04

46:04 of each of those programs. Remember I
46:06

46:06 told you there were two military two
46:08

46:08 intel committees,
46:11

46:11 right? There are some programs that are
46:14

46:14 so sensitive that the only people on
46:16

46:16 those four committees that get to see it
46:18

46:18 are the chair and the vice chair.
46:21

46:21 None of the other members.
46:23

46:23 And so that
46:26

46:26 who can do the math? Four committees
46:29

46:29 times two is eight,
46:32

46:32 right? That's usually the gang of eight.
46:35

46:35 the people talk to
46:37

46:37 that plus the uh uh congressional
46:40

46:40 leadership, so the Senate um and and
46:44

46:44 majority leaders. Um all right. So
46:49

46:49 great. Um
46:53

46:53 that means any program that we found
46:57

46:57 that was a real program had
46:59

46:59 congressional oversight.
47:03

47:03 If a program was named and it turned out
47:05

47:05 to not be a real program
47:09

47:09 and it didn't exist in the SAPCO's
47:11

47:11 office or in DNI's CAPCO office or in
47:14

47:14 DHS's CAPCO office or any of the other
47:17

47:17 SAPOs and CAPCOS around the inter agency
47:20

47:20 because we had every one of them working
47:22

47:22 on this. Somebody would walk in, she'd
47:25

47:25 walk in, tell me, "Hey, this program is
47:28

47:28 the program." Just like when we were
47:31

47:31 doing the operational piece where I'd
47:32

47:32 have to call up and deconlict all the
47:34

47:34 blue programs, I'd call up every SAPCO
47:37

47:37 or the directors of SAPCO and Kepco. We
47:40

47:40 call up all the SAPOs and Kepos and they
47:42

47:42 would go through their holdings and is
47:45

47:45 this a program? Is this a program of
47:47

47:47 history? Is this a historical program?
47:50

47:50 Right? That's how we found Kona Blue. by
47:52

47:52 the way, it was in the archives buried
47:53

47:53 at the bottom of DHS.
47:56

47:56 Um,
47:58

47:58 all right. So, uh, none of those. And
48:01

48:01 so, if it's not a real program, it's
48:03

48:03 then it doesn't have a real SAP security
48:06

48:06 wrapper around it, which means it's not
48:09

48:09 a real SAP program. Can't,
48:13

48:13 right?
48:15

48:15 Okay. Uh, but we didn't find any of
48:17

48:17 those. Um, all right. A lot of the
48:20

48:20 sightings and reports of those sightings
48:24

48:24 um you know about extraterrestrial stuff
48:28

48:28 have largely been influenced by a range
48:30

48:30 of cultural, political, technological
48:32

48:32 factors. So for those of you who are
48:35

48:35 history buffs, F-17,
48:39

48:39 remember the F-17,
48:41

48:41 first time that got rolled out,
48:43

48:43 everybody thought there were aliens and
48:45

48:45 UFOs flying around. Awesome. Um but the
48:48

48:48 S of 117 is not an alien ship.
48:54

48:54 Um there were some domestic and
48:56

48:56 international uh factors that influenced
48:59

48:59 this uh as well. So like I said that we
49:02

49:02 investigated this information. There
49:04

49:04 there definitely was some from foreign
49:07

49:07 adversaries. There was also some from
49:09

49:09 domestic sources.
49:12

49:12 Um
49:15

49:15 and that last one which is really
49:17

49:17 interesting. Um you know again um
49:22

49:22 new new technological advances sometimes
49:25

49:25 appear magic to people who are not
49:27

49:27 scientifically minded.
49:30

49:30 And that tends to cause a lot more um
49:38

49:38 uh sensationalism than than one would
49:41

49:41 hope. For example, drones over New
49:43

49:43 Jersey.
49:45

49:45 When that first came out, I got called.
49:49

49:49 I can't tell you. I I wasn't even I was
49:51

49:51 retired. I got called right about this.
49:54

49:54 I'm like, it I'm like, "Guys, it's it's
49:57

49:57 drones." Like, there's there's lights.
49:60

50:00 This is my favorite one, right? Lights.
50:06

50:06 Play along with me for a minute.
50:09

50:09 How many spacecraft
50:11

50:11 has the United States, just the United
50:14

50:14 States, launched to other planets?
50:22

50:22 >> Over 50 over 50 probes, satellites,
50:27

50:27 right? Everything. They're spacecraft,
50:30

50:30 right? We're not putting humans in them,
50:32

50:32 but they are spacecraft,
50:34

50:34 right? How many of them have blinking
50:37

50:37 lights on them?
50:42

50:42 >> None. Not a single one. Why?
50:47

50:47 What's a blinking light for? Collision
50:49

50:49 avoidance. So, who's going to see them?
50:51

50:51 Right. Exactly. So, and they take up
50:54

50:54 energy. They take up swap. Take up
50:57

50:57 processing. Why would you do that? So if
50:60

50:60 I'm uh you know an alien civilization
51:02

51:02 and I'm sending a probe to the United
51:04

51:04 States, which by the way was another
51:06

51:06 thing that all of them came to the
51:08

51:08 United States. Um
51:11

51:11 why would there be blinking lights on
51:12

51:12 them?
51:15

51:15 If they have blinking lights on them,
51:17

51:17 chances are it's an airplane, a
51:19

51:19 Starlink, or a drone.
51:23

51:23 Starlink chains were off the charts in
51:26

51:26 reporting particularly by operators
51:29

51:29 wearing night vision goggles.
51:32

51:32 Absolutely.
51:34

51:34 Um so we did actually find a conspiracy
51:37

51:37 but it was not the US government. Um
51:40

51:40 there was a group of people who have
51:41

51:41 been trying to milk this for many many
51:43

51:43 years including getting earmarks out of
51:46

51:46 Congress for
51:48

51:48 lots of money.
51:50

51:50 All right, let me talk about operational
51:53

51:53 findings because this is this is sort of
51:55

51:55 important. I'm sure you'd find this
51:57

51:57 interesting. It's more relevant right
51:58

51:58 now. Um the like I said at the
52:01

52:01 beginning, services, all the services
52:03

52:03 had very uneven reporting requirements.
52:05

52:05 They had different mechanisms,
52:06

52:06 processes, different procedures for
52:08

52:08 doing so, different levels of
52:09

52:09 enforcement. Um so, as I said, we we
52:13

52:13 issued DoDwide orders through joint
52:15

52:15 staff. We standardized that, identified
52:17

52:17 what had to be collected, retained, and
52:19

52:19 a timeline for reporting. Um, and then I
52:23

52:23 worked with the services to level set
52:25

52:25 those reporting mechanisms. And here's
52:27

52:27 where it gets a little frustrating. Uh,
52:29

52:29 from a bureaucratic perspective, it's a
52:32

52:32 very simple solution to standardize
52:34

52:34 that, but the services don't like to be
52:38

52:38 told
52:40

52:40 what to go by.
52:42

52:42 They want to figure it out on their own.
52:46

52:46 and then they'll buy, right? So
52:50

52:50 I while I had authority to do so, going
52:53

52:53 in and telling the, you know, Secretary
52:55

52:55 of the Air Force, hey, you need to buy,
52:58

52:58 you know, the range fowler system that
52:60

52:60 the Navy uses is anathema to them. They
53:03

53:03 will not do that, right? Same thing for
53:05

53:05 the Navy. Go buy the Air Force's thing.
53:07

53:07 No. Um, so really what we did was work
53:11

53:11 with them to level set the the here are
53:13

53:13 the requirements on what you've got to
53:15

53:15 be able to provide. It needs to be easy
53:16

53:16 to do um or they're not going to do it.
53:20

53:20 Uh
53:22

53:22 most of those sightings and associated
53:25

53:25 narratives, especially the ones that
53:26

53:26 made it into the public domain,
53:29

53:29 always failed to account for some of the
53:31

53:31 more obvious explanations.
53:34

53:34 radar reflection cubes and calibration
53:37

53:37 spheres.
53:39

53:39 Another one of my favorites, the sensor
53:42

53:42 phenomenologies,
53:43

53:43 testing configurations.
53:46

53:46 Um, you know,
53:49

53:49 now I'll talk about some sensor
53:50

53:50 phenomenologies real quick. So, a radar,
53:53

53:53 most of you know how radars work, right?
53:55

53:55 Sends pulse out, gets reflection, pulse
53:57

53:57 comes back, collects it. But you know
53:60

53:60 today
54:02

54:02 um there's a there's an um algorithmic
54:06

54:06 engine behind it. There's a fusion
54:09

54:09 engine. There's a AIdriven things that
54:12

54:12 that are accelerating how we take that
54:15

54:15 data and turn it into information.
54:20

54:20 What happens when a brand new radar
54:22

54:22 waveform is tested
54:25

54:25 and it goes against an object that's
54:28

54:28 semi-transparent to the radar,
54:32

54:32 I get maybe I get a missing pulse. Maybe
54:37

54:37 I get only one out of every five pulses
54:40

54:40 depending on what it is that it's
54:42

54:42 reflecting off of.
54:44

54:44 And when I see that, if you look at how
54:46

54:46 the fusion engines then interpret that
54:49

54:49 missing information, it tries to
54:51

54:51 extrapolate to the next data point.
54:54

54:54 And when it does that,
54:57

54:57 you get really exciting things like,
54:60

54:60 hey, that object accelerated from 0.5 MK
55:03

55:03 to 2 and a half Mach
55:06

55:06 in, you know, half a second.
55:10

55:10 But it's not until you pull the raw data
55:14

55:14 out and you look at the the each
55:16

55:16 individual pulse train in that pulse
55:18

55:18 train you understand oh well it missed
55:21

55:21 these datas and now if I go and I
55:23

55:23 simulate that in the fusion engine I can
55:26

55:26 recreate that
55:29

55:29 effect
55:30

55:30 that happened a lot and it really
55:33

55:33 happens when you're testing new
55:35

55:35 waveforms like when DARPA tests new
55:37

55:37 waveforms
55:39

55:39 which happened on the limits. It's very
55:42

55:42 exciting.
55:44

55:44 Radar reflection cubes and calibration
55:46

55:46 spheres. We use those to calibrate our
55:50

55:50 radars. That's what they're for. They're
55:52

55:52 basically balloons with corner cubes in
55:54

55:54 them and we launch them and we shoot
55:57

55:57 radars at them. We get the returns off
55:59

55:59 them. We use them to calibrate, set
56:00

56:00 those up. It's awesome.
56:03

56:03 So, um, there's a little known, uh,
56:07

56:07 declassified,
56:09

56:09 uh, CIA program from the late
56:13

56:13 80s, I think,
56:16

56:16 maybe in mid 90s.
56:21

56:21 Um, and this declassified program
56:25

56:25 uh
56:27

56:27 was essentially taking radar reflection
56:29

56:29 cubes, calibration spheres, sneaking
56:33

56:33 them up underwater off the shore of uh
56:36

56:36 Adversary and popping them out of the
56:39

56:39 water and sitting back and watching what
56:41

56:41 happens.
56:43

56:43 How many what are their radars? What
56:45

56:45 whether they turn on? What's their
56:47

56:47 response time? Right. Really cool. Why
56:51

56:51 Why wouldn't somebody do that to us?
56:57

56:57 >> Yep.
56:59

56:59 >> Sean, may I ask a question here? Nice to
57:01

57:01 connect with you in person for the first
57:02

57:02 time. Uh, but about the Nimmits. So, uh,
57:06

57:06 I I've met all four pilots who had
57:09

57:09 visual observations of the contact.
57:12

57:12 >> And, um, what how do you explain that? I
57:16

57:16 explain it by a couple of different
57:18

57:18 things. One, uh, because I've spoken
57:21

57:21 with them as well, and we've decid we
57:24

57:24 we've actually determined that the water
57:26

57:26 underneath the main object that was
57:28

57:28 being observed
57:30

57:30 uh, was welling up, not down, which
57:34

57:34 means the object came out of the water,
57:36

57:36 not into it. I wasn't pushing down.
57:38

57:38 There was no propulsion associated with
57:40

57:40 it. So, there's a couple of things here.
57:43

57:43 one, you've got um a really cool optical
57:48

57:48 illusion called parallax that pilots are
57:50

57:50 prone to. I am certain that played into
57:53

57:53 this since we're talking about 2004.
57:56

57:56 It's a long time ago for people to
57:58

57:58 remember.
57:59

57:59 Um we've got actual data that data
58:05

58:05 observations that suggest whatever this
58:08

58:08 thing was came out of the water and not
58:10

58:10 propulsing over it.
58:12

58:12 And then we have uh the radar. Lots of
58:15

58:15 people like to point to the radar. Uh
58:17

58:17 the radar was actually being tested by
58:19

58:19 DARPA on a new calibration. It was going
58:22

58:22 through its shake and bake and all those
58:24

58:24 phen those anomalies were from that
58:27

58:27 radar. So um can I say that 100%. No.
58:33

58:33 But it sure hell is a lot more
58:35

58:35 convincing and realistic than a bunch of
58:37

58:37 aliens. Uh, I'm not claiming aliens, but
58:41

58:41 it wasn't it wasn't it came out of the
58:44

58:44 water and then it also uh trajected to
58:48

58:48 the cat point. And this is these are
58:50

58:50 these are trained aviators. I understand
58:53

58:53 that they're trained aviators, but
58:54

58:54 they're also trained aviators that are
58:56

58:56 prone to um optical illusions like
58:60

58:60 everybody else. And there's no data that
59:02

59:02 suggests that that thing went from point
59:04

59:04 A to point B. It's only a visual report.
59:08

59:08 Right.
59:10

59:10 >> They can look at things like hydro state
59:13

59:13 >> hydraulic stuff from the water.
59:16

59:16 >> That's that's what we're So that's what
59:17

59:17 I had them recreate for me. What they
59:20

59:20 saw on the water was an upwelling,
59:24

59:24 not a downwelling.
59:27

59:27 >> From where the object came out.
59:29

59:29 >> What object?
59:30

59:30 >> Uh the tic tac.
59:32

59:32 >> But this would be
59:34

59:34 >> could have been anything. Yeah. Well, so
59:37

59:37 Sean, respect to you immensely. My name
59:39

59:39 Tim Galedet, retired admiral, former
59:41

59:41 Noah administrator. Having a PhD in
59:44

59:44 oceanography, I I don't have any any
59:47

59:47 other explanation geophysically for what
59:51

59:51 they observed in terms of that. But
59:54

59:54 yeah, fine if that's what I
59:56

59:56 >> I wasn't suggesting it's geohysical. I'm
59:58

59:58 suggesting that there is a probably
60:02

60:02 one of these calibration spheres pops
60:05

60:05 out of the water. And could it have been
60:08

60:08 from somebody else? Absolutely. Because
60:11

60:11 as I said,
60:13

60:13 late 80s we declassified the CIA
60:16

60:16 program. There is absolutely no reason
60:19

60:19 to believe that somebody else wouldn't
60:21

60:21 do that in our test ranges and we would
60:24

60:24 not know it because our SOS network is
60:26

60:26 not all that great.
60:28

60:28 So,
60:28

60:28 >> wow. Okay, that this is a great thing to
60:30

60:30 bring up here in public because if our
60:34

60:34 SOS range and our West Coast training
60:36

60:36 range
60:36

60:36 >> in the early 2000s
60:38

60:38 >> are being infiltrated by adversaries
60:40

60:40 like the Chinese, that is a really
60:43

60:43 important talking point,
60:44

60:44 >> wouldn't it?
60:45

60:45 >> Yeah, exactly right. Why Why is Congress
60:48

60:48 not investigating that?
60:50

60:50 >> Oh, that is a fantastic question. Why
60:53

60:53 don't you ask them that?
60:54

60:54 >> I like that. Yes, exactly right. Why
60:56

60:56 aren't they and doing you know I don't
60:58

60:58 know that as opposed to other things.
61:03

61:03 So look going through all these things
61:05

61:05 is difficult especially the farther back
61:07

61:07 in time you go which is brings me to
61:10

61:10 that next major data point. You know
61:12

61:12 look there's an inver inverse
61:15

61:15 correlation between how far back in the
61:17

61:17 past uh an event occurred and the amount
61:20

61:20 of data available to actually analyze
61:22

61:22 it. Right? So the farther back in time
61:25

61:25 you go
61:27

61:27 um the less data there is to analyze
61:31

61:31 which means everybody can speculate all
61:34

61:34 they want. you're never going to
61:36

61:36 actually know.
61:39

61:39 And and that is a problem, right? And I
61:42

61:42 told Congress this like you can you can
61:45

61:45 keep asking me about the Nimmits all you
61:48

61:48 want, but until somebody has actual raw
61:51

61:51 data to analyze,
61:55

61:55 um,
61:56

61:56 you know, visual
61:59

61:59 reporting is not evidence. It is a
62:03

62:03 starting point for an investigation that
62:05

62:05 requires data and more evidence.
62:08

62:08 Right?
62:10

62:10 >> I've looked at I've looked at
62:16

62:16 >> So what Ryan described to us was a
62:20

62:20 sphere with a cube in it.
62:25

62:25 >> So a sphere with a cube in it is a
62:27

62:27 calibration sphere.
62:33

62:33 That's what he described.
62:34

62:34 >> But but that's something that General
62:36

62:36 wouldn't have.
62:37

62:37 >> That's exactly right. And yet he should
62:40

62:40 know that as an as an aviator,
62:43

62:43 right? So we we've got that part. All
62:45

62:45 right. You go back in time, it's harder
62:47

62:47 to do. Um operators, they really need a
62:51

62:51 feedback loop to learn. I think you know
62:54

62:54 some of these operators,
62:57

62:57 and here's a great example, right? I had
62:59

62:59 some F-35 pilots. They collected
63:01

63:01 something. They were absolutely certain
63:04

63:04 it was, you know, something to worry
63:06

63:06 about. We thought it was something to
63:07

63:07 worry about. It was in one of those, you
63:10

63:10 know, classified sensors. We were
63:12

63:12 working through that.
63:14

63:14 It's uh really difficult
63:18

63:18 uh um you know to analyze that data
63:22

63:22 because it's uh in a SAP folder and
63:25

63:25 you've got a
63:27

63:27 we had to build a separate SAP analytic
63:29

63:29 network just to put the data on it which
63:31

63:31 you would understand is a pain in the
63:34

63:34 back end and and but we did and we
63:36

63:36 pulled it apart and we understand it and
63:37

63:37 we looked at it and we're like hey yeah
63:39

63:39 turns out
63:42

63:42 there was this um
63:45

63:45 glitch in the fusion engine that made it
63:47

63:47 think it was something else. And we
63:50

63:50 brought the pilot in. We sat them down
63:52

63:52 and walked through all that. And they
63:54

63:54 go, "You ready for this?" They go, "Oh,
63:56

63:56 yeah. That's a known thing. We we we
63:59

63:59 knew that." Well, then why are you
64:01

64:01 telling me that this is I just spent six
64:03

64:03 months analyzing this
64:06

64:06 >> and building a SAP network to do it on?
64:08

64:08 and he's like, "Oh, um, well, we didn't
64:11

64:11 know that's what that was. We thought
64:13

64:13 that was something else." Like, "Okay,
64:15

64:15 well, it's not. It's this thing." And
64:17

64:17 so, you know, the F-35 program office
64:20

64:20 had to go fix it, right?
64:23

64:23 Um, and and finally, you know, this last
64:25

64:25 one, and I think I think we've just
64:27

64:27 touched on this, right? Operators don't
64:29

64:29 make they don't have the best analytic
64:31

64:31 hygiene.
64:33

64:33 Um and they they certainly tend to
64:35

64:35 believe that that their view as
64:38

64:38 experienced aviators or other um
64:42

64:42 operators are never wrong.
64:47

64:47 And and when you prove them wrong and
64:50

64:50 you bring them in like that F-35 pilot
64:52

64:52 and you sit them down and you go through
64:54

64:54 the data with them, they understand it,
64:57

64:57 they get it and then they accept it and
64:59

64:59 they move on
65:01

65:01 and they learn from it. And that's why
65:04

65:04 we need to do that. Now, unfortunately,
65:06

65:06 I've, you know, I've had a number of
65:09

65:09 uh people in Congress who also have that
65:12

65:12 same belief, but they don't learn.
65:16

65:16 Um, and most of our military and
65:18

65:18 intelligence leaders don't have that
65:20

65:20 hangup, at least to my knowledge.
65:23

65:23 Um,
65:25

65:25 so let's talk about the conspiracy for a
65:27

65:27 minute because there's a whole bunch of
65:29

65:29 things that we discovered that
65:30

65:30 contribute to this conspiracy that I'm
65:33

65:33 pretty sure all of you would be
65:35

65:35 interested in that have absolutely
65:36

65:36 nothing to do with science and
65:37

65:37 technology, unfortunately.
65:40

65:40 Um,
65:42

65:42 so I'll just start from the beginning.
65:46

65:46 Going back to the 60s, Air Force
65:49

65:49 officers, young lieutenants,
65:52

65:52 right, initiated their own deception
65:56

65:56 efforts without approval or oversight
65:58

65:58 during the development of stealth
65:60

65:60 technologies and in particular the F-17.
66:04

66:04 There was some base commander out at the
66:06

66:06 area that told his lieutenant to take a
66:10

66:10 doctor picture down to the local bar,
66:12

66:12 hang it up, and start spreading stories
66:14

66:14 about the UFOs.
66:18

66:18 Kid you not
66:21

66:21 in the Pentagon, and you can look this
66:23

66:23 one up on the internet. There's some
66:24

66:24 pictures out there. Um, there's a sign
66:27

66:27 or used to be a sign on one of the doors
66:30

66:30 very near the touring routes that said
66:33

66:33 alien autopsy room. It was
66:38

66:38 it was on the fifth floor. I want to say
66:41

66:41 it was the fourth corridor. Um, it was
66:45

66:45 it had been there for maybe a decade.
66:49

66:49 It was actually the Air Force 10 cap
66:52

66:52 office, I believe, if I remember
66:53

66:53 correctly. And when I stood up arrow and
66:56

66:56 I saw this and I told the deputy and the
67:00

67:00 deputy said, "You will go down there and
67:02

67:02 take it down right now. Right. Right
67:05

67:05 now."
67:06

67:06 Like, "Okay." So, it's not there
67:09

67:09 anymore. Uh, Kona Blue, right? We were
67:12

67:12 under uh statute under you know
67:16

67:16 legislation to
67:20

67:20 um find any program that had anything to
67:24

67:24 do with UAPs
67:26

67:26 and declassify it and get it out. So
67:30

67:30 this is the historical mission piece,
67:32

67:32 right? Not the operational piece. We
67:34

67:34 already talked about how difficult that
67:35

67:35 is. Um, and we did we found a an entire
67:40

67:40 uh proposed so it's actually a PAP
67:44

67:44 proposed special access program called
67:46

67:46 Kona Blue. It was hidden at DHS and it
67:50

67:50 was actually the follow-on program to
67:52

67:52 ATIP OAP by the same group of people
67:56

67:56 wanting to get another $20 million out
67:58

67:58 of the Congress to go stand up seven
68:01

68:01 institutes. You can read about all this
68:03

68:03 because we declassified it and put it
68:04

68:04 all out there. uh and uh
68:08

68:08 one of them was to study
68:11

68:11 non-human biologics and one was to study
68:18

68:18 psycho
68:20

68:20 telekinesis and
68:23

68:23 UFO technology and I don't know there
68:25

68:25 all kinds of stuff.
68:27

68:27 >> Um Yep. Yep. Um Eric Eric Davis
68:33

68:33 >> well he's involved in like all of this.
68:36

68:36 >> Um but this was you go look up this
68:39

68:39 program. It's it's on the website. You
68:41

68:41 can download all the documents that were
68:42

68:42 declassified. You can read them up. Uh
68:45

68:45 it'll tell you who was involved, what
68:47

68:47 they were trying to do. Uh this came uh
68:50

68:50 the story behind this is essentially
68:54

68:54 um
68:56

68:56 um for those of you who have followed
68:58

68:58 the ATIP OAP bit, right? So, Senator
69:01

69:01 Reid at the time uh had called up um the
69:06

69:06 Secretary of Defense told him to create
69:11

69:11 a special access program to hide all
69:14

69:14 this information that he was being told
69:16

69:16 existed through the Bigalow contracts
69:19

69:19 and all the effort that went through
69:21

69:21 that. Um
69:24

69:24 the department took a look at this very
69:27

69:27 closely and determined u not just no but
69:31

69:31 hell no this was not a real program.
69:33

69:33 This was not an authorized program. This
69:36

69:36 was you know money being used for
69:38

69:38 different purposes than it should be. Um
69:41

69:41 not only are we not going to set up a
69:43

69:43 SAP but we're shutting this ATIP allap
69:46

69:46 stuff down. Get rid of it. Uh
69:49

69:49 >> the Harry Reed stuff.
69:50

69:50 >> Yeah. that but those were just
69:52

69:52 theoretical studies.
69:54

69:54 >> No
69:54

69:54 >> propulsion studies. So
69:56

69:56 >> So
69:59

69:59 yeah yeah yeah. So so look
70:04

70:04 um Reed sent a letter over
70:07

70:07 asking for the SAP
70:10

70:10 secretary said no sent back shut down
70:13

70:13 the program.
70:16

70:16 Reed then uh en enlisted the help of
70:19

70:19 Lieberman
70:22

70:22 to find another home to stand up a sat.
70:26

70:26 Lieberman called his friend over at DHS
70:30

70:30 who was running S&T at the time,
70:33

70:33 asked her to stand it up. They went
70:36

70:36 through the motion of putting together
70:37

70:37 the entire package to propose standing
70:40

70:40 this up. details are in the package.
70:44

70:44 And it got as far as the DHS Sepco
70:48

70:48 who then sain our heads prevailed and
70:51

70:51 said not just no but hell no there's
70:54

70:54 nothing here and we're not doing this
70:56

70:56 and they shut that down and they filed
70:60

70:60 that away in their records and it sat in
71:03

71:03 their archives until we found it and we
71:06

71:06 declassified it and we put it out as per
71:08

71:08 the statute that I was asked to go do.
71:12

71:12 So it's on their website. You can go
71:14

71:14 look at it. The other thing we did was
71:16

71:16 we worked with the nationalmy's
71:18

71:18 sorry the national archives
71:21

71:21 u to stand up. They stood up a website
71:24

71:24 and a reading room where we could push
71:26

71:26 all the material that was being found.
71:29

71:29 They uh went through their archives. We
71:31

71:31 had all the agency archives, all the
71:33

71:33 service archives,
71:35

71:35 IC agencies were at large, uh, all
71:38

71:38 reviewing all of their holdings, and
71:40

71:40 anything we found had anything to do
71:42

71:42 with this, whether it was already in the
71:44

71:44 public domain or not, went over there.
71:46

71:46 Um, I think we did find some extra uh,
71:49

71:49 documents that hadn't been seen by the
71:51

71:51 public before, but there was nothing
71:53

71:53 exciting in them.
71:56

71:56 Um, we talked a moment about the
71:59

71:59 material that was given into the US Army
72:02

72:02 uh by TTSA proposed uh that's a that's
72:06

72:06 an autocorrect uh issue there proposed
72:09

72:09 to have anti-gravity uh properties uh
72:12

72:12 based upon theories that were put forth
72:15

72:15 in the ATB OAP papers uh and that
72:19

72:19 actually turned out to be not
72:21

72:21 extraterrestrial it was terrestrial we
72:23

72:23 took it through isotopic analysis and
72:27

72:27 did everything. We actually put that
72:29

72:29 report out. I told the lab we needed to
72:31

72:31 put it into a journal. Uh we also put
72:34

72:34 the report out into the public. Um
72:38

72:38 and that uh material went back to its
72:42

72:42 owner TTSA.
72:44

72:44 There was a think tank study. I think we
72:47

72:47 talked about this before. Um
72:50

72:50 the study looked at the impacts of if
72:55

72:55 the US if if all of this was true and
72:57

72:57 the US had these things and they came
72:59

72:59 out and told everybody that they had
73:01

73:01 these things what would be the impacts
73:04

73:04 that study was run by an institute here
73:06

73:06 in town. participants involved were the
73:10

73:10 some of the same players that were
73:12

73:12 involved in Kona Blue that were involved
73:14

73:14 in at Bosap that were involved in this
73:16

73:16 material. Um,
73:20

73:20 interestingly enough, they never wrote a
73:23

73:23 report. They never produced a briefing.
73:26

73:26 And the CEO and president of that think
73:30

73:30 tank um stated that he believed it was a
73:34

73:34 political ploy to try to embarrass the
73:36

73:36 other party at the time. Um
73:41

73:41 interesting,
73:42

73:42 but it adds to the it adds to the story,
73:46

73:46 right?
73:47

73:47 This the Air Force uh back I want to say
73:50

73:50 in the 80s it was 90s. I want to say it
73:52

73:52 was 90s. uh I don't have it exactly off
73:55

73:55 top of my head but uh the science
73:56

73:56 studies board they did a futures
73:58

73:58 analysis
74:00

74:00 right so what they do they looked at the
74:03

74:03 future 10 20 30 50 years from now and
74:07

74:07 said hey if we want to have flying cars
74:10

74:10 what do I need
74:13

74:13 and then they would sort of decompose
74:16

74:16 flying cars need a propulsion system
74:18

74:18 they need a fuel they need a landing
74:21

74:21 system guidance system and they They
74:23

74:23 broke it all out, right? And they
74:25

74:25 actually said, "Well, if we're going to
74:26

74:26 have a flying car, I can either do it by
74:28

74:28 conventional, you know, jets and
74:30

74:30 whatnot, or we can come up with
74:31

74:31 anti-gravity."
74:34

74:34 So, they would they would when
74:36

74:36 seriously, so they went through this,
74:37

74:37 this was supposed to be a a really long
74:40

74:40 range uh future study to go, hey, if if
74:44

74:44 f if anti-gravity theoretically could be
74:47

74:47 achieved, what would we need to research
74:49

74:49 to find it?
74:52

74:52 Now, they didn't fund any of this, thank
74:55

74:55 God, but they they did
74:58

74:58 identify sort of those big key areas and
75:01

75:01 they did identify some of the key
75:03

75:03 scientific findings that the they gave
75:05

75:05 basically back to the academic community
75:07

75:07 that said, "Go research these things.
75:09

75:09 These are interesting."
75:13

75:13 Uh, but that got out. People do that.
75:16

75:16 All right. Security officer Hazing.
75:19

75:19 One of my favorite blast things I found
75:23

75:23 uh Yankee Blue
75:28

75:28 um
75:31

75:31 I'm sure many of you are familiar with
75:33

75:33 the SAPCO organizational structure, but
75:36

75:36 in case you're not, quick rundown. OSD
75:39

75:39 has a SAPCO office that oversees all
75:43

75:43 Department of Defense special access
75:45

75:45 programs. Each service has a SAPCO
75:48

75:48 office that owns theirs, right? Um the
75:53

75:53 IC has a CAPCO office because we have to
75:56

75:56 be different. Uh but basically the Air
75:60

75:60 Force um had an officer um actually
76:04

76:04 several officers come forward and say,
76:09

76:09 "Hey, um I was a SAPCO officer and as a
76:14

76:14 young SAPCO officer,
76:16

76:16 um the Air Force had this u tradition.
76:23

76:23 So you're a brand new SAPCO officer.
76:26

76:26 I'm the head I'm the director of the
76:28

76:28 SAPCO. You come into the Air Force and
76:30

76:30 you go, I'm ready for my portfolio and
76:33

76:33 I'm going to sit down with you or one of
76:35

76:35 my staff is and we're going to flip
76:36

76:36 through the the deadly quad chart book
76:41

76:41 of quad charts, right? Heavy quad
76:43

76:43 charts, another program. Here's your
76:45

76:45 program. Here's your portfolio. This is
76:46

76:46 what you need to know. I'm going to pull
76:48

76:48 out an NDA. I'm going to give it to you.
76:50

76:50 You're going to sign it. You're going to
76:51

76:51 say,
76:53

76:53 uh, this is what you're responsible for.
76:56

76:56 Okay. And then you go off on your way.
76:58

76:58 And then the next day, um or maybe later
77:02

77:02 that afternoon,
77:04

77:04 uh one of the staff will call you back.
77:06

77:06 Hey, we forgot to tell you something.
77:09

77:09 Bring you in and they slip the last quad
77:13

77:13 chart across the table to you and they
77:16

77:16 go
77:17

77:17 they flip it over and they go, "Hey,
77:19

77:19 this is uh this is uh the alien program.
77:25

77:25 Um, now we're not allowed to tell you
77:28

77:28 anything more than what's on this quad
77:29

77:29 chart. All you need to know is it
77:31

77:31 exists. You don't have ownership of it.
77:33

77:33 You don't have oversight of it. This is
77:35

77:35 just it, right? And then they take it
77:38

77:38 back. They give you another NDA that
77:41

77:41 signs Yankee Blue. Take it back. Send
77:44

77:44 you on your way. And then they sit
77:46

77:46 around in the office and they make bets
77:48

77:48 on how long it's going to take you to
77:49

77:49 figure out that's not real.
77:53

77:53 or if you do
77:56

77:56 and several of them don't and they go
77:59

77:59 away thinking they've signed for an
78:01

78:01 actual program.
78:05

78:05 So, uh
78:07

78:07 >> like to bear it out.
78:10

78:10 >> Uh no, it's it's a it's a it's a
78:13

78:13 tradition that is based in
78:17

78:17 I want to mess with my new cadetses.
78:21

78:21 So, um I I can only express
78:27

78:27 um the
78:31

78:31 excitement
78:34

78:34 that the Secretary of the Air Force
78:36

78:36 shared with me when I briefed him on
78:38

78:38 this.
78:42

78:42 I went in to brief him on all the
78:44

78:44 research that we'd done. Here's all the
78:46

78:46 things that we'd found. This is what
78:47

78:47 we've been doing, right?
78:50

78:50 There were maybe eight eight people or
78:52

78:52 so in the room. At the end of it, I
78:54

78:54 said, "Hey, sir. I need I need to talk
78:56

78:56 to you just for a minute alone." He's
78:59

78:59 like, "Okay." Sends everybody out. I
79:02

79:02 pull out this quad chart. I slide it
79:04

79:04 over to him.
79:07

79:07 I go, "Hey, sir.
79:09

79:09 Um,
79:11

79:11 this is the alien program."
79:14

79:14 And he looks at me
79:17

79:17 and he goes, "What? What? What do you
79:19

79:19 mean, Sean?" I'm like, and I told him
79:22

79:22 the story. I said, 'We've had some
79:24

79:24 officers come forward, share this. This
79:26

79:26 is what they're doing. This is not the
79:28

79:28 only one. There are several floating
79:30

79:30 around. They've been doing this for
79:32

79:32 maybe upwards of 30 years.
79:37

79:37 Um, what do you want to do about this?
79:42

79:42 Now, since since this is for public
79:44

79:44 consumption, I will not repeat what he
79:46

79:46 said. Um, but it was something to the
79:49

79:49 effect. Are are you effing kidding me?
79:54

79:54 Like, no, sir.
79:56

79:56 He goes, "Well,
79:58

79:58 when are you supposed to tell Congress?"
80:01

80:01 And I said, "I'm required by law to tell
80:02

80:02 them within 72 hours of finding it, and
80:04

80:04 I've already notified.
80:07

80:07 Your staff knows."
80:09

80:09 He goes, "Okay, well, we we we will have
80:12

80:12 to uh come clean about this and we're
80:14

80:14 going to have to investigate this and
80:16

80:16 we're going to have to take this very
80:17

80:17 seriously and go off and and do
80:18

80:18 something about it." I'm like, "Yes,
80:20

80:20 sir." So, I'm going to send my IG down
80:21

80:21 to you and you give them all the
80:23

80:23 information and they're going to go work
80:25

80:25 it. I'm like, "Great. Okay." I briefed
80:29

80:29 Congress and uh the senators uh on the
80:33

80:33 Sask in particular
80:36

80:36 said, "Are you effing kidding me?
80:40

80:40 Uh
80:42

80:42 yeah. Yeah. This is it. This is what
80:44

80:44 what we found. He's like,
80:47

80:47 I'm going to call the sec. Like he's
80:48

80:48 expecting your call. Go right ahead.
80:52

80:52 >> What's debt?
80:54

80:54 >> What's sec?
80:56

80:56 >> SE.
80:59

80:59 >> Um.
81:04

81:04 >> All right. So, uh, that one, uh, went on
81:07

81:07 and they went to investigate. Uh, and
81:09

81:09 just to give you, uh, kind of the scope
81:11

81:11 of what we're talking about here. Uh,
81:14

81:14 that was not only in the Pentagon.
81:19

81:19 Yankee Blue came from Central Command.
81:24

81:24 The There were many of these all around.
81:26

81:26 They they've been propagated
81:29

81:29 all around.
81:31

81:31 All right. The last one I'll just touch
81:33

81:33 on real quick is an SNIE that was
81:36

81:36 determined to be fake. Uh for those of
81:38

81:38 you not familiar with a special national
81:40

81:40 intelligence estimate, uh we have
81:43

81:43 national intelligence estimates and we
81:44

81:44 have special national intelligence
81:46

81:46 estimates just because we can. Um
81:51

81:51 they are all archived in one of the
81:53

81:53 agencies
81:56

81:56 and then they have very specific
81:59

81:59 tradecraft associated with it. They have
82:01

82:01 very specific uh ID numbers uh and they
82:05

82:05 are presented for presidential
82:08

82:08 consumption on very specific topics.
82:11

82:11 There's an SNIE that's out in the world,
82:14

82:14 right, that claims to be about UFOs and
82:17

82:17 nuclear weapons, I believe. Um we took a
82:21

82:21 look at that. We uh examined it. We had
82:24

82:24 the NIE office examine it. We had the
82:28

82:28 archives go through it at the agencies u
82:31

82:31 and it it does not exist as a real
82:34

82:34 thing. It is it is 100% ma manufactured.
82:38

82:38 None of the tradecraft matches. None of
82:40

82:40 the ID numbers match. It's all
82:44

82:44 fabricated
82:46

82:46 >> with the classification
82:47

82:47 >> with a classification marking.
82:50

82:50 >> And you're saying that a lot of this was
82:53

82:53 orchestrated by the lower ranking?
82:55

82:55 >> No, no, no. I'm saying this is a this is
82:58

82:58 like a grouping of a whole bunch of
82:60

82:60 different things that we found. Some of
83:02

83:02 these go back years, some of them are
83:04

83:04 very recent, some of them are unrelated
83:07

83:07 to each other. Uh but as a whole, it
83:11

83:11 contributes to this narrative and it is
83:14

83:14 a it is a self-enabling story that just
83:18

83:18 goes on
83:20

83:20 and there's so much more. So, so how far
83:23

83:23 back did you go? Did you guys go back to
83:25

83:25 Roswell, you know?
83:26

83:26 >> Oh, yeah.
83:27

83:27 >> They claimed there was hardware and all
83:29

83:29 these sensor things are collected.
83:31

83:31 >> Do you do you know how many times that
83:33

83:33 they reviewed
83:35

83:35 >> do do you know how many times they
83:36

83:36 reviewed uh Blue Book?
83:40

83:40 >> Do you know how many reports there are
83:43

83:43 on Blue Book?
83:44

83:44 >> Majestic.
83:45

83:45 >> Majestic
83:46

83:46 >> and Majestic. All artifacts,
83:49

83:49 >> all man-made
83:51

83:51 >> as far as we know.
83:53

83:53 >> So there's no there was no hardware from
83:56

83:56 Roswell because having worked for
83:58

83:58 material
83:59

83:59 >> there's only the balloon
84:00

84:00 >> digital stuff can have anomalies but I
84:04

84:04 always said show me if you want me to
84:06

84:06 work on a program. So
84:07

84:07 >> you're talking physical
84:09

84:09 >> mogul
84:10

84:10 >> physical
84:11

84:11 >> there was nothing beyond that
84:13

84:13 >> and in fact the remnants of mogul exist
84:15

84:15 at the national archives
84:18

84:18 >> so does the grassy null by the way
84:20

84:20 >> report track chronologically with the
84:23

84:23 high altitude dummy experiments that a
84:25

84:25 lot of times they describe
84:27

84:27 >> oh yeah that was always a good one when
84:29

84:29 they had the dummy up there
84:30

84:30 >> but did it track because it seemed that
84:32

84:32 when the air force came out a lot of the
84:34

84:34 the timing time frame just didn't Iraq
84:37

84:37 with with what would have been reported.
84:41

84:41 >> Uh
84:42

84:42 >> and and that was made pretty public
84:44

84:44 about either the Air Force sort of
84:46

84:46 screwed up on that or you know then
84:49

84:49 other people was thinking well it just
84:51

84:51 wasn't a good deception program if it
84:53

84:53 was that kind of thing.
84:54

84:54 >> I I don't know that we went to that much
84:56

84:56 detail
84:57

84:57 >> because there's a lot of inconsistencies
84:58

84:58 like that that keep the you know the
85:01

85:01 theories alive so to speak. any
85:04

85:04 inconsistency will keep the theory
85:05

85:05 alive. And in fact, any consistency will
85:07

85:07 keep the theory alive because no matter
85:09

85:09 what evidence we lay out in front of
85:11

85:11 people,
85:12

85:12 >> they're going to keep believing it and
85:14

85:14 they're going to
85:15

85:15 >> and and this story has morphed just in
85:18

85:18 the last few years as we've put more
85:20

85:20 information out. So I had um
85:24

85:24 eyewitnesses w whistleblowers who came
85:27

85:27 in and swore up and down that Kona Blue
85:30

85:30 was the program that was hiding all of
85:31

85:31 this before we found it and declassified
85:36

85:36 it.
85:37

85:37 >> All right.
85:38

85:38 >> I think there's a lot of
85:39

85:39 >> and then but but but once we
85:41

85:41 declassified it
85:44

85:44 uh Kona Blue no longer became that
85:47

85:47 program that the people were pointing
85:48

85:48 to, right? They came up with a different
85:50

85:50 name, a different
85:52

85:52 >> This is it. I'm done. I'm out.
85:55

85:55 >> We're We're up.
85:57

85:57 >> Go ahead.
85:57

85:57 >> That there's um there's mobile debris at
85:59

85:59 the National Archives that is part of
86:02

86:02 the Rodwell investigation or
86:05

86:05 >> No, I'm saying there's mobile debris.
86:06

86:06 >> There just mobile debris there. Just
86:09

86:09 >> whoever
86:10

86:10 >> that has nothing to do with Roell.
86:17

86:17 I I want to ask you and actually I want
86:19

86:19 to ask Admiral Galedet also how you
86:22

86:22 would feel maybe about talking back and
86:25

86:25 forth um for maybe 10 minutes or
86:28

86:28 something. Does that sound okay? Or
86:31

86:31 there may be others here that I don't
86:34

86:34 want to keep away from the microphone,
86:36

86:36 but it's sort of a interesting
86:39

86:39 possibility here and I I did want to
86:41

86:41 maybe raise that. I
86:43

86:43 >> I got about five minutes and then I got
86:45

86:45 to run. I'm already late.
86:48

86:48 Sean, I respect you. We both have
86:50

86:50 decades of government service together
86:52

86:52 and uh in intelligence and whatnot, DoD.
86:55

86:55 I'm going to ask you a point blank and
86:56

86:56 put you on the spot on something. After
86:58

86:58 my 2024
86:60

86:60 UAP hearing testimony in front of
87:02

87:02 Congress, you had tweeted a response
87:04

87:04 about my statement regarding Arrow where
87:07

87:07 you said, "I came and visited Arrow and
87:10

87:10 I was bitter because I didn't get a job
87:12

87:12 and that you believe that was because
87:16

87:16 you didn't hire me because I was prone
87:18

87:18 to conspiracy theories and that you
87:20

87:20 checked with some of my bosses on that
87:21

87:21 statement. It's well out there. You
87:24

87:24 tweeted it." Uh, and ultimately, you
87:27

87:27 know, I didn't go visit Arrow when you
87:29

87:29 were there. It was after you left. I was
87:31

87:31 invited by Mike Wel, the Navy Intel rep
87:36

87:36 who asked me to come there and that's
87:38

87:38 what I spoke about during my hearing.
87:40

87:40 And um, of course, I didn't look for a
87:44

87:44 job. I he invited me and for me to
87:46

87:46 actually go for a GS14 job after having
87:48

87:48 been an under secretary of commerce,
87:50

87:50 that's kind of preposterous, I would
87:52

87:52 say. And at the same time when you said
87:54

87:54 you check with my bosses, I had my
87:57

87:57 bosses formerly were two two stars, four
87:60

87:60 four stars and a secretary of commerce
88:02

88:02 who I've all spoken with and you never
88:05

88:05 really check with them. So ultimately
88:07

88:07 your statement there was an outright lie
88:09

88:09 and I want to ask you what you have to
88:11

88:11 say about that.
88:12

88:12 >> I'd say it was not an outright lie
88:14

88:14 because Mike brought you in, you sat in
88:16

88:16 my office and we had this conversation
88:18

88:18 about you had left. It was Phillips
88:22

88:22 >> and the position you were looking for
88:24

88:24 was an SCES position.
88:25

88:25 >> I was not asking for a position.
88:27

88:27 Remember Mike brought me in. He asked me
88:29

88:29 to come.
88:31

88:31 >> Let me just ask you because time is
88:32

88:32 going to be short. We want to shed any
88:34

88:34 light on the issue itself.
88:37

88:37 >> Well, good point. No, no, ultimately, so
88:40

88:40 it's really clear that you have been
88:43

88:43 executing a misinformation,
88:44

88:44 disinformation campaign about this. This
88:47

88:47 whole slide captures it. and uh I know
88:49

88:49 you can't acknowledge it because you're
88:51

88:51 whoever's whoever you're on the payroll
88:53

88:53 with won't allow you to.
88:56

88:56 That's my statement.
88:57

88:57 >> Okay. Well, that's a that's a great
88:59

88:59 statement that has absolutely no bearing
89:01

89:01 from reality. So,
89:02

89:02 >> yes, sir.
89:04

89:04 >> Okay.
89:05

89:05 >> I have a question.
89:06

89:06 >> Um I was wondering what the 2017
89:12

89:12 Thanks. uh the 2017 uh New York Times
89:16

89:16 article um Senator for uh the late
89:20

89:20 Senator Harry Reid, Robert Bigalow. What
89:25

89:25 effect do you think all those things had
89:27

89:27 to bring us to where we are today where
89:29

89:29 the where we're having congressional
89:31

89:31 hearings about UFOs on Capitol Hill?
89:34

89:34 >> Well, it certainly revitalized. I mean,
89:36

89:36 look at one of the things we learned as
89:38

89:38 we looked at this historical record was
89:40

89:40 this story has a life cycle about every
89:44

89:44 decade, right? It crops up, morphs a
89:47

89:47 little bit, gains some popularity, and
89:50

89:50 then it goes away as as as
89:53

89:53 we spend taxpayer dollars and effort
89:55

89:55 going off to investigate these things,
89:57

89:57 put out the reports about, hey, this is
89:60

89:60 not what you're thinking it is, and then
90:03

90:03 move on, right? And then it crops back
90:05

90:05 up in 2017. I think they they basically
90:08

90:08 kicked it up uh again and it started
90:10

90:10 over again. Bigalow was really the
90:12

90:12 originator of a lot of this him and
90:14

90:14 Harry Reid. Uh
90:17

90:17 >> Bigalow was actually in 200 as far back
90:20

90:20 as 2006, he had he in the FAA manual for
90:24

90:24 pilots, he was having
90:27

90:27 reports sent to him or to his group. I
90:30

90:30 can't remember what the name of this
90:31

90:31 group is, but um yeah, I mean it just
90:35

90:35 seems that this is
90:37

90:37 the folly of a billionaire who uh you
90:40

90:40 know who basically you know like the
90:42

90:42 senator with his con with his
90:44

90:44 billionaire constituent who did you guys
90:46

90:46 look into you know
90:48

90:48 >> no like I said I don't we were not
90:51

90:51 authorized to go look at people
90:54

90:54 my job was to get at the truth and put
90:57

90:57 it out there.
90:59

90:59 We have a question from Mick West, a
91:01

91:01 fellow of the Committee for Skeptical
91:02

91:02 Inquiry, uh, publishers of Skeptical
91:06

91:06 Inquir magazine. He's well known for
91:09

91:09 analysis of UFO videos. He wants to ask
91:12

91:12 you, what do you think Arrow can do to
91:14

91:14 reduce the operational impact of false
91:17

91:17 sightings and to enhance readiness for
91:19

91:19 real UAP threats such as novel drones?
91:24

91:24 >> Education,
91:26

91:26 right? It's not just educating
91:29

91:29 the operators,
91:31

91:31 but it's educating the public so that
91:34

91:34 they know what they're looking for,
91:36

91:36 >> right? Because it would be really
91:38

91:38 helpful if I had a whole bunch of public
91:40

91:40 that was so enamored with this problem
91:43

91:43 that they were looking for those drones
91:46

91:46 and not UAPs.
91:50

91:50 >> That would be very helpful. But what
91:52

91:52 Arrow can do, they need to finish the
91:55

91:55 mandate we were given. They need to
91:57

91:57 educate. They need to put be transparent
92:00

92:00 as best they can in the time frame that
92:02

92:02 they can. And they need to put the keep
92:05

92:05 to the keep to the science, keep to the
92:08

92:08 technology.
92:10

92:10 >> To your comment just now, it's been two
92:12

92:12 years since volume one of their report
92:15

92:15 came out and it said volume two is
92:18

92:18 coming soon or some
92:21

92:21 Um but it hasn't. Nope.
92:23

92:23 >> And uh so anyway, I guess that's a
92:25

92:25 question if we ever get the current head
92:27

92:27 of a
92:28

92:28 >> Yeah, I would I would direct that one. I
92:30

92:30 mean, I can speculate. Um I have a good
92:32

92:32 idea what's holding up. U but you you'll
92:37

92:37 be sorely disappointed in the reason you
92:39

92:39 should just ask them. I see.
92:42

92:42 >> You have any thoughts on Lu Alzando?
92:45

92:45 >> Many, but no.
92:46

92:46 >> Yeah. Can I share them?
92:47

92:47 >> Yeah. Is there
92:49

92:49 >> are you are you generally considered to
92:50

92:50 be a villain amongst like the UFO
92:53

92:53 community? Is that
92:56

92:56 >> I I so look you know I was asked to come
92:59

92:59 in and stand up an organization and be
93:02

93:02 as objective in both the science and the
93:06

93:06 pursuit of the data and I was and I set
93:10

93:10 up really good structures to go after
93:13

93:13 that. Um, that's why I spent some time
93:16

93:16 going through the analytic process with
93:18

93:18 you. Um, I could go with just as much
93:21

93:21 detail in the S&T side and and you know
93:25

93:25 the operational side uh to eye watering
93:29

93:29 detail uh checks, balances,
93:32

93:32 tradecraftraft, methodology, everything
93:35

93:35 that you could possibly do uh to follow
93:40

93:40 the leads. And I I've testified to this
93:42

93:42 before. I've said it in the media
93:44

93:44 before. The best thing that could have
93:46

93:46 happened in that job is I found the
93:48

93:48 aliens and rolled them out, but that
93:51

93:51 didn't happen, right? The data doesn't
93:53

93:53 support it. The evidence doesn't support
93:55

93:55 it. I think you'll you I mean, as you've
93:58

93:58 seen, I think, you know, no matter what
93:60

93:60 you put in front of people, the the
94:02

94:02 belief is strong
94:05

94:05 and it's not going to change.
94:07

94:07 >> Maybe it's more of a desire.
94:10

94:10 It's it's akin to almost a a religion in
94:15

94:15 some senses and and it's and and you
94:17

94:17 know somebody I read this and I can't I
94:19

94:19 wish I could remember
94:20

94:20 >> isn't based on critical
94:21

94:21 >> that's correct and I wish I wish I could
94:23

94:23 remember where I want to give proper
94:26

94:26 credit to this it is not my my quote but
94:30

94:30 someone looked at this as
94:34

94:34 uh UFOs UAPs are
94:38

94:38 almost the um the god analog to the
94:45

94:45 unreligious
94:47

94:47 community, right? So the a lot of people
94:50

94:50 who are maybe not as religious need
94:54

94:54 something to fulfill the same need and
94:57

94:57 they replace it with aliens because they
94:60

94:60 want something bigger. They want
95:02

95:02 something
95:04

95:04 >> something that's that's better,
95:05

95:05 stronger, is gonna save us from all the
95:08

95:08 madness that's going on and that
95:13

95:13 uh needs to be and and they fill it with
95:15

95:15 something and that something
95:16

95:16 >> nature is weird enough on her own.
95:20

95:20 >> Indeed,
95:21

95:21 >> it's just some things we haven't been
95:23

95:23 able to figure out.
95:24

95:24 >> But it's not just that. It's it's
95:28

95:28 people have a desire for something and a
95:30

95:30 fulfillment of with something and
95:33

95:33 they're not getting it
95:34

95:34 >> and this is one way of of doing that.
95:37

95:37 Yes, sir.
95:37

95:37 >> Do you think the checks and balances are
95:39

95:39 holding it in arrow down?
95:43

95:43 >> You know, everything I've
95:44

95:44 >> good system there.
95:45

95:45 >> Yeah. You know, everything everything
95:47

95:47 that's in the way I set this up that
95:50

95:50 structure fundamentally still is there.
95:54

95:54 Um, in fact, I was just uh
95:60

95:60 where was I? Um, I was with the I was at
96:05

96:05 a function and the current uh SEF and
96:09

96:09 under secretaries and a bunch of other
96:11

96:11 people were there and it was a space
96:13

96:13 event and anyway one of one of the under
96:15

96:15 secretaries came up and and I hadn't
96:17

96:17 seen them since I left and they go you
96:20

96:20 know Sean I just wanted to say
96:25

96:25 Congress and a and a lot of the people
96:28

96:28 did not thank you enough, right? What
96:32

96:32 you did was um a really hard thing and
96:35

96:35 you set it up and Congress is now happy
96:37

96:37 with where we're going based on all that
96:40

96:40 work that you did and they're trying to
96:42

96:42 keep it that going as best they can.
96:44

96:44 Now, you know, the new director, like
96:46

96:46 every new director, is going to want to
96:48

96:48 put their own stamp on it and they're
96:50

96:50 going to move, you know, they're going
96:51

96:51 to make changes and whatnot, but I think
96:52

96:52 fundamentally the structure is still
96:54

96:54 doing pretty good.
96:57

96:57 certain
96:59

96:59 >> Oh, yeah. I've built six organizations
97:01

97:01 for the intelligence community and not
97:03

97:03 one of them survives
97:05

97:05 after you leave, right? It it that
97:08

97:08 changes into its own thing. It's like a
97:09

97:09 child.
97:11

97:11 So, no, literally this this this was a
97:14

97:14 this was a um this was an important
97:17

97:17 aspect of
97:19

97:19 uh OPSAC. So, we intentionally decided
97:23

97:23 that u I was going to be the only one
97:26

97:26 that was acknowledged to be part of
97:27

97:27 Arrow and we tried to keep everybody
97:30

97:30 else uh private and and secret because
97:36

97:36 and including location of the offices
97:38

97:38 because we didn't want people showing
97:39

97:39 up. We didn't want my staff getting
97:41

97:41 harassed,
97:43

97:43 right? Do you know how many people have
97:44

97:44 showed up to my house? They still show
97:46

97:46 up today. I just had one not a month
97:48

97:48 ago,
97:49

97:49 >> right? Um, and I don't live in an easy
97:53

97:53 place to get to and every time they try
97:54

97:54 to get to my house, they wreck and then
97:56

97:56 I've got to, you know, go get a tow
97:58

97:58 truck and get them out. And so now I
98:01

98:01 have, you know, crazy people coming to
98:03

98:03 my house, wrecking in my yard. How out,
98:06

98:06 you know, that gets old. It does. And I
98:09

98:09 did not want that for any of my people.
98:11

98:11 I needed them to focus on executing
98:13

98:13 that.
98:16

98:16 Can you tell us if I could just ask one
98:18

98:18 quick way?
98:18

98:18 >> This will be our last question. Thank
98:20

98:20 you.
98:20

98:20 >> How many truly an anonymous
98:25

98:25 >> that you found and with how you look at
98:28

98:28 those? So early on uh I briefed
98:32

98:32 uh
98:34

98:34 the Senate testimony and in Senate
98:37

98:37 testimony I said
98:40

98:40 um
98:42

98:42 at that time I think we had about 800
98:45

98:45 cases and I want to say I said around
98:48

98:48 two to 3%
98:51

98:51 had enough data and were interesting
98:53

98:53 enough that presented some sort of
98:55

98:55 anomaly to go investigate. And as we
98:58

98:58 pulled through that, that number, that
99:00

99:00 percentage stays about the same. Um, but
99:04

99:04 they get resolved, right? You go through
99:06

99:06 that process.
99:09

99:09 You go through that process and you can
99:13

99:13 pretty much resolve anything that you've
99:15

99:15 got data on. Now, if you don't have
99:17

99:17 data, it's going to stay anomalous and
99:19

99:19 there's nothing you can do about it,
99:21

99:21 right? Uh but most of the time you can
99:23

99:23 come up with likely explanations.
99:30

99:30 >> All right. Thank you very much.
99:31

99:31 >> Thank you guys.
99:34

99:34 I also want to thank you for your
99:36

99:36 service to the nation, sir. And um JDM,
99:40

99:40 thanks for producing. And also thanks to
99:43

99:43 the Center for Naval Analysis for
99:45

99:45 letting us use this facility after Dr.
99:47

99:47 Kirkpatrick's visit earlier today. On
99:51

99:51 behalf of the National Capital Area
99:52

99:52 Skeptics, I'm Scott Snell saying so long
99:55

99:55 from Arlington, Virginia. See you next
99:57

99:57 time.