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Counterinsurgency in the Modern World (Military History)

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  1. Introduction
  2.  
  3. Together, terrorism and guerrilla warfare for the most part constitute insurgencies. While terrorism is mainly urban, guerrilla warfare is primarily rural. Insurgency is the weapon of the weak and is mainly resorted to by nonstate actors. Attempts by the polity to crush insurgencies are known as counterinsurgency (COIN). If COIN fails, then the insurgents might develop conventional forces to capture state power. This constitutes the third and final stage of Maoist insurgency. COIN is known by a variety of names. In the late 19th century, it was categorized as “small war.” In the 1970s, a British officer called it low-intensity operations, and the Americans termed it low intensity conflict (LIC). Some call it irregular warfare. In the 1990s, Western military analysts termed this war as operations other than war (OOTW). The latter includes both military and nonmilitary means. This essay focuses on the theory and praxis of COIN. Temporally the essay covers the 19th and 20th centuries and the first decade of the 21st century. The rise of the modern industrial state gave rise to modern COIN. Imperialism, decolonization, and the Cold War generated changes in the character of COIN. The geographical net is cast wide, that is, around four regions: Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America. Special focus is given to regions that have generated a very high number of insurgencies. How the COIN campaigns differ in the various regions is also brought under our scanner. An attempt is made to compare and contrast the varying approaches of the great powers’ COIN policies. The debate regarding the philosophy of minimum force in British COIN is touched upon. Further, it is contrasted with the use of brute force by the Americans in dealing with the insurgents as well as with their evolving approach to COIN. In order to understand the evolution of COIN, some understanding of the insurgencies is also necessary. Hence at times this essay focuses on the rebels and their ideologies and activities.
  4.  
  5. General Overviews
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  7. For a beginner, Ellis 1995 is a work of synthesis that is a must. Ellis traces the origin of insurgency from Roman times and shows the changes in the dynamics of irregular warfare in differing political contexts. Unfortunately, he stops before the end of the Cold War. Taber 1965 claims that insurgency will never fail if genuine economic inequalities and social discrimination exist. In Taber’s metaphor, the fleas (guerrillas) will be infallible against the dog (counterinsurgency forces) if the former conduct a political and psychological war featuring the grievances of the exploited. Fairbairn 1974, a survey of the counterinsurgency (COIN) against the Marxist insurgencies in rural regions, concludes that social discrimination, economic exploitation, and revolutionary ideologies were not important in the origins of insurgencies. Rather, support from foreign countries was crucial. Military personnel superiority, good intelligence, and special training are necessary for a successful COIN. Probably, the best wide-ranging overview of modern insurgencies is Beckett 2001. Beckett asserts that, despite technological advancement, the principles of COIN remained constant during the 19th and 20th centuries. The same argument is put forward by another British scholar, Thomas Mockaitis, in Mockaitis 2003. Good intelligence is the key to effective COIN, and it can only come through implementing a “hearts and minds” policy. Duyvesteyn 2005 argues that features of conventional warfare are present in so-called irregular warfare. Fowler 2005 writes that the post–Cold War era is experiencing a different form of insurgency due to transnational connections, NGOs, modern communications, etc. The COIN forces must mesh traditional and innovative elements. Light mobile forces, emphasis on HUMINT (human intelligence), and a flatter command structure will make the security forces more adept in fighting the insurgents. The American military officer Robert Cassidy makes a comparative analysis of the American, British, and Russian COIN campaigns in Cassidy 2006. In his analysis, the British Army, based on regiments, is best suited for fighting the insurgents, and the American and Russian preference for brute force is self-defeating. Further, the British institutional culture is geared toward preserving historical lessons; and the American and the Russian militaries have forgotten the COIN campaigns they conducted during the 19th and early 20th century. Kilcullen’s experiences in East Timor and as advisor to General David H. Petraeus in Iraq and Afghanistan shape his best-selling book, The Accidental Guerrilla (Kilcullen 2009). As most Western forces are likely to be third parties engaged in COIN operations, they should be aware of how their role is perceived by the locals. Many will regard the intervening forces as invaders of their physical and cultural space. Global movements (e.g., al-Qaeda or, in the past, Communism) opposed to these Western forces more generally often are able to exploit this resentment. Successful COIN therefore must account for both the local and globalized dimensions of insurgency by developing positive relations with the local population (through the promotion of political and economic development and security) and reduce the influence of the global movement.
  8.  
  9. Beckett, Ian F. W. Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies: Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750. London: Routledge, 2001.
  10. DOI: 10.4324/9780203402450Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  11. The British historian shows the evolution of insurgencies from Napoleon’s time till the beginning of the new millennium in a lively engaging style.
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  13. Cassidy, Robert M. Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006.
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  15. Organizational cultures of the armies, says Cassidy, shape the COIN campaigns. The British regimental system is suited to decentralized small team infantry operations. In contrast, the American penchant for a firepower-based approach and the Russian culture of using overwhelming force alienate the people in the insurgent-infested zones.
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  17. Duyvesteyn, Isabelle. “The Concept of Conventional War and Armed Conflict in Collapsed States.” In Rethinking the Nature of War. Edited by Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom, 65–87. London: Frank Cass, 2005.
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  19. Decentralized operations at the tactical plane, centralized planning at the strategic level, etc., are required for conducting both regular and irregular wars.
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  21. Ellis, John. From the Barrel of a Gun: A History of Guerrilla, Revolutionary and Counterinsurgency Warfare, from the Romans to the Present. London: Greenhill, 1995.
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  23. Written in a simple but engaging narrative style, this volume introduces the subject beautifully for an undergraduate student. Revised edition of A Short History of Guerilla Warfare, originally published in 1975.
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  25. Fairbairn, Geoffrey. Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare: The Countryside Version. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1974.
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  27. Not popular and economic grievances but organizational strength of the revolutionaries and the government forces, asserts Fairbairn, determined whether insurgency in a particular region succeeded or not.
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  29. Fowler, Michael C. Amateur Soldiers, Global Wars: Insurgency and Modern Conflict. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005.
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  31. By focusing on politics and copying the unconventional forces, a state’s security agencies have a chance to take on the insurgents effectively.
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  33. Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
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  35. Insurgency and counterinsurgency are played out in a globalized environment. Kilcullen argues that Western forces engaged in COIN activities abroad need to recognize this if they are to succeed.
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  37. Mockaitis, Thomas R. “Winning Hearts and Minds in the ‘War on Terrorism.’” Small Wars and Insurgencies 14 (2003): 21–38.
  38. DOI: 10.1080/09592310412331300546Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  39. The principles for fighting Islamic terrorism, says Mockaitis, remain the same as those used half a century ago for effectively fighting the Communist guerrillas.
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  41. Taber, Robert. War of the Flea: A Study of Guerrilla Warfare Theory and Practise. New York: L. Stuart, 1965.
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  43. The author, an investigative journalist, portrays insurgency as the harbinger of social revolution.
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  45. Journals
  46.  
  47. The seven important journals for studying unconventional warfare are Armed Forces and Society, International Security, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Journal of Strategic Studies, Small Wars and Insurgencies, and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Peace Research, and International Organization publish on occasion an article relevant to COIN, but rarely feature articles devoted exclusively to COIN. A good online resource is Small Wars Journal.
  48.  
  49. Armed Forces and Society.
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  51. The official journal of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. At times it carries articles on the sociology of terrorists, guerrillas, and COIN.
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  53. International Security.
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  55. Published four times per year by MIT Press for the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. This journal occasionally carries articles on insurgencies and counterinsurgencies and their international ramifications.
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  57. Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History.
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  59. Published by Routledge five times per year. Occasionally, it carries articles on British COIN in its far-flung empire during the 19th and early 20th centuries.
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  61. Journal of Slavic Military Studies.
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  63. Four issues per year from Routledge; covers Russia and Eastern Europe. It frequently carries essays on the former USSR and post-Soviet Russia’s campaigns against insurgents in various parts of Eurasia.
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  65. Journal of Strategic Studies.
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  67. Published by Routledge six times per year. Some issues are devoted to essays on insurgency and counterinsurgency.
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  69. Small Wars and Insurgencies.
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  71. Published by Routledge; the best journal in the field for anybody interested in nonconventional warfare. Previously published four times per year; from 2011 it is published five times per year.
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  73. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism.
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  75. Published monthly by Taylor & Francis; focuses on terrorism and the organizational structure of the terrorist cells.
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  77. Autobiographies
  78.  
  79. Most soldiers hate conducting counterinsurgency (COIN); they find it demoralizing. This sentiment is reflected in memoirs of the military personnel engaged in fighting insurgents. Docherty, a British Captain, served in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2006, he was deployed in Afghanistan’s Helmand Province. His autobiography (Docherty 2007) reflects empathy for the common Afghans but distrust for those higher up. He claims that the top brass was out of touch with the populace in the insurgent-infested areas. Lack of cultural sensitivities by the occupying force harmed intelligence collection. Meehan 2009 shows the contradictory pulls of military professionalism and ethics. Meehan, an American captain in charge of a tank platoon, never forgave himself for unintentionally causing the death of an Iraqi family while patrolling Baqubah in June 2007. He asserts that military duty prevents him from questioning the unjust objectives of invading Iraq on the part of his oil-hungry government. On the other hand, he fully realizes that the COIN operation that causes a lot of casualties in order to construct a “free Iraq” is actually a sham. An exception is the American Brigadier Pete Mansoor (Mansoor 2008). His service in Iraq during 2003–2004, was characterized by a synthesis of professional eagerness and human sensibilities. He accepts that COIN is 80 percent political work including civic projects and 20 percent military operations. Collins 2005 portrays the tensions within the Western forces deployed in Kuwait in 2003. Collins was charged with war crimes. He says it was due to the “false” accusations of an American major who had botched the COIN campaign.
  80.  
  81. Collins, Tim. Rules of Engagement: A Life in Conflict. London: Headline, 2005.
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  83. The British colonel claims that it was the British officers who were teaching COIN techniques to the reluctant American officers deployed in Kuwait.
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  85. Docherty, Leo. Desert of Death: A Soldier’s Journey from Iraq to Afghanistan. London: Faber & Faber, 2007.
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  87. Docherty was so disillusioned that he left the army after three years of service. He claims that the West is making the same mistake in Afghanistan and Iraq. The local governments and the indigenous police forces in these two countries are corrupt and inefficient.
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  89. Mansoor, Peter R. Baghdad at Sunrise: A Brigade Commander’s War in Iraq. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008.
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  91. Mansoor writes that human intelligence and “boots on the ground” are key principles for conducting a successful COIN.
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  93. Meehan, Shannon P. Beyond Duty: Life on the Frontline in Iraq. Cambridge, MA: Polity, 2009.
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  95. The American captain is overwhelmed by guilt because of the collateral damage he inflicted during an operation in Iraq in 2007.
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  97. Classical Theorists
  98.  
  99. Several scholars claim that the works of both Eastern and Western classical theorists of warfare provide valuable insight on modern counterinsurgency (COIN). Bartley 2005 emphasizes that the terrorists as well as the COIN forces could learn a lot from the ancient Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu. In recent times, several Western analysts have gone on record saying that the Prussian military philosopher Carl von Clausewitz (b. 1780–d. 1831) has said a lot about COIN. Kinross 2004 notes that the Prussian’s concept of kleine Krieg (small war) influenced subsequent strategic thinking on low intensity conflict (LIC). Smith 2005 says that Clausewitz deserves praise for showing the dialectics between COIN and conventional operations. In fact, the two types of conflicts are interrelated, especially at the level of politics. Duyvesteyn 2004, by making a case study of the civil wars in Liberia (1989–1997) and Somalia (1988–1995), claims that Clausewitz’s trinity—war, government, and people—could explain these conflicts. These wars are political in nature: The nonstate actors use their militias for gaining political power and legitimize it by inheriting the mantle of the “failed” state apparatus.
  100.  
  101. Bartley, Caleb M. “The Art of Terrorism: What Sun Tzu Can Teach Us about International Terrorism.” Comparative Strategy 24 (2005): 237–251.
  102. DOI: 10.1080/01495930500197874Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  103. Bartley emphasizes that Sun Tzu’s focus on the use of spies, human intelligence, and psychological operations is of great use today for fighting terrorists.
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  105. Duyvesteyn, Isabelle. Clausewitz and African War: Politics and Strategy in Liberia and Somalia. London: Routledge. 2004.
  106. DOI: 10.4324/9780203311745Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  107. By making a case study of the civil wars in Liberia and Somalia, Duyvesteyn asserts that Clausewitz’s trinity still holds water.
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  109. Kinross, Stuart. “Clausewitz and Low-Intensity Conflict.” Journal of Strategic Studies 27 (2004): 35–58.
  110. DOI: 10.1080/0140239042000232765Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  111. Kinross asserts that Clausewitz’s focus on morale, political objectives of war, human intelligence, etc. has shaped later Western theorists’ thinking on COIN.
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  113. Smith, M. L. R. “Strategy in an Age of ‘Low-Intensity’ Warfare: Why Clausewitz is still more relevant than his critics.” In Rethinking the Nature of War. Edited by Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom, 28–64. London: Frank Cass, 2005.
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  115. Unconventional and conventional warfare are dialectically interlinked, and the complex interlinkage between the two types of war can only be understood through Clausewitz’s parameters, Smith asserts.
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  117. Asymmetric Warfare
  118.  
  119. Asymmetric warfare describes situations in which one side possesses a preponderance of military capability. Academic work on asymmetric war tends to focus on how the inferior belligerent is able to continue the fight or even win such wars. Indeed, Mack 1975, Arreguín-Toft 2001, and Lyall and Wilson 2009, using statistical analyses, find that states tended to win wars against rebels during the 19th century, but over the course of the 20th century the reverse was the case. Different authors have different explanations. Lyall and Wilson 2009 and Lyall 2010 argue that increasing mechanization has led to greater isolation of modern militaries from the local population, depriving the state of access to valuable local information that could be used for more effective counterinsurgency (COIN). Mack 1975 focuses on the relative time horizons and abilities to sustain conflict, contrasting nationalism-based insurgent movements and foreign democratic intervening armies. As long as the insurgents can prolong the fight, their chances of winning increase. Arreguín-Toft 2001 examines the nature of the strategic interaction between the state and insurgents. When direct and indirect strategies interact, such that the rebels employ guerrilla tactics and the government employs more conventional tactics, weaker actors are much more likely to win. COIN forces therefore should employ more initiative than discipline, more endurance than punching power. Butler and Gates 2009 argues that the choice of tactics involves a trade-off between the rebels’ ability to hurt the government and the government’s ability to hurt the rebels. This notion of “the ability to hurt” is further refined to mean the expected battle deaths from combat between forces. The government’s ability to hurt the rebels depends heavily on its ability to identify and target rebel members. The rebels’ ability to hurt the government is also related to its distribution and density. Kalyvas and Balcells 2010 examines different “technologies of rebellion,” defined by the relative capabilities of the state and the rebels. When the fighting capacities of the belligerents are near parity, conventional warfare ensues. In situations where the rebels are weaker than the state, technologies of guerrilla warfare and insurgency prevail. When both parties are weak, wars are characterized as symmetric nonconventional (SNC) warfare. Kalyvas and Balcells 2010 shows that in the post–Cold War era the dominant form of civil war was no longer insurgency and that SNC warfare is more widespread than during the Cold War. Valentino, et al. 2004 finds that mass killing during war often constitutes an aspect of a calculated military strategy designed to defeat broad-based insurgency. The authors conclude, however, that such a strategy is rarely successful.
  120.  
  121. Arreguín-Toft, Ivan. “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict.” International Security 26 (2001): 93–128.
  122. DOI: 10.1162/016228801753212868Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  123. A conventional army is useless in fighting an unconventional war. Instead, to win against the insurgents, the army should transform its conventional forces into some sort of unconventional force.
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  125. Butler, Christopher, and Scott Gates. “Asymmetry, Parity, and (Civil) War: Can International Theories of Power Help Us Understand Civil War.” International Interactions 35 (2009): 330–340.
  126. DOI: 10.1080/03050620903084877Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  127. Relative capabilities of rebels and the state and respective abilities to inflict combat deaths affect recruitment and the ability to sustain conflict, thereby determining whether terrorism, guerrilla tactics, or conventional warfare are employed.
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  129. Kalyvas, Stathis N., and Laia Balcells. “International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict.” American Political Science Review 104 (2010): 415–429.
  130. DOI: 10.1017/S0003055410000286Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  131. The end of the Cold War significantly altered the absolute and relative capabilities of states and rebels.
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  133. Lyall, Jason. “Do Democracies Make Inferior Counterinsurgents? Reassessing Democracy’s Impact on War Outcomes and Duration.” International Organization 64 (2010): 167–192.
  134. DOI: 10.1017/S0020818309990208Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  135. Using a statistical matching analysis, Lyall finds that, contrary to much previous research, democracies are no more likely to succeed or fail in COIN wars than other regime types. Moreover, the duration of COIN wars is no different whether fought by a democracy or not.
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  137. Lyall, Jason, and Isaiah Wilson III. “Rage against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars.” International Organization 63 (2009): 67–106.
  138. DOI: 10.1017/S0020818309090031Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  139. Modern militaries’ reliance on mechanization makes it harder for them to gather vital information for successful COIN.
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  141. Mack, Andrew. “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict.” World Politics 27 (1975): 175–200.
  142. DOI: 10.2307/2009880Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  143. The spread of nationalist-inspired insurgencies explains the historical decline in COIN success. Since nationalist groups are fighting for their homeland, they have a longer time horizon in contrast to democracies prone to impatience with persistent wars. Moreover, a common national identity helps these groups overcome collective action problems, which also allows them to sustain their fighting capacity over long periods.
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  145. Valentino, Benjamin,Paul Huth, and Dylan Balch-Lindsay. “‘Draining the Sea’: Mass Killing and Guerrilla Warfare.” International Organization 58 (2004): 375–407.
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  147. Using statistical analysis, Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay find that mass indiscriminate killing is much more commonly in COIN operations than in conventional war. Governments facing extensive guerrilla activity often will target the local civilian population in an attempt to undercut the logistical support they provide for the rebels.
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  149. American Perspectives
  150.  
  151. The RAND Corporation study Long 2006 shows the evolution of American thinking on counterinsurgency (COIN) after 1945. The principles for conducting a successful COIN, asserts the author, remain constant after 1945. Kronvall 2007 notes that after World War II, the US Army initially wanted to confront the irregulars with large conventional sweeps. After the Vietnam fiasco, the US Army realized the effectiveness of small unit patrolling. The Marines focused more on nation-building tasks and realized that in unconventional warfare, the political and economic sides of the equation are more important than the military one. Johnson 2001 notes that the Marine Corps developed a viable COIN doctrine before World War II, but it was marginalized. Linn 1999 shows that the US Army developed a COIN approach in the Philippines that focused on cooperation with the civilian authority and the local indigenous security force. But in Vietnam, the US armed forces entered the fray with the idea of fighting a conventional war against an unconventional enemy. Further, the US Army did not care about the customs and beliefs of the locals in Vietnam. Dunn 1985 writes that this prevented any real bonhomie between the Vietnamese civilians and the American forces. The “search and destroy” operations by large units not only failed to win the allegiance of the peasants but alienated them. Harmon 2007 in its comparative analysis concludes that the American military displayed a disdain for COIN till the 1970s. Not only was the US Army unwilling to relearn the old lessons but it was unable to adapt itself against the unorthodox techniques of the enemy. Nagl 2005 likewise is blistering in its criticism of the US in Vietnam. In Paschall 2007, American Colonel Rod Paschall emphasizes that poverty and ideology are unimportant in fuelling the Marxist insurgencies. Economic development of the disturbed regions is not what is important, he argues, but a large military force along with allied indigenous auxiliaries will root out the insurgents.
  152.  
  153. Dunn, Peter M. “The American Army: The Vietnam War, 1965–1973.” In Armed Forces and Modern Counter-Insurgency. Edited by Ian F. W. Beckett, and John Pimlott, 77–111. London: Croom Helm, 1985.
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  155. Inadequate attention to local culture and absence of clear lines of command and control, says Dunn, hampered the American COIN in Vietnam.
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  157. Harmon, Christopher C. “Illustrations of ‘Learning’ in Counterinsurgency.” In Modern Counter-Insurgency. Edited by Ian Beckett, 351–370. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007.
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  159. By making a comparative study of American and British COIN experiences, Harmon concludes that, unlike the British, the Americans forgot all past lessons and displayed a rigid attitude in learning anything new.
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  161. Johnson, Wray R. Vietnam and the American Doctrine for Small War. Bangkok: White Lotus, 2001.
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  163. Primacy of political factors, small unit actions, and winning the “hearts and minds” of the people in the disturbed region are the cardinal principles of COIN. The Marines possessed such a doctrine, but the US Army neglected it.
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  165. Kronvall, Olof. Finally Eating Soup with a Knife? A Historical Perspective on the US Army’s 2006 Counterinsurgency Doctrine. Oslo: Institutt for Forsvarsstudier, 2007.
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  167. Kronvall’s slim volume reflects the slow learning process in the US Army as regards conducting COIN.
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  169. Linn, Brian McAllister. “Cerberus’ Dilemma: The US Army and Internal Security in the Pacific, 1902–1940.” In Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of the Colonial Powers c. 1700–1964. Edited by David Killingray and David Omissi, 114–136. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1999.
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  171. Linn says that from the first decade of the 20th century, the US Army, in collaboration with the colonial authority and local units, conducted a commendable COIN campaign against the Filipino insurgents.
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  173. Long, Austin. On “Other War”: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2006.
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  175. Despite the changing characters of insurgencies, the two main principles of COIN are winning the “hearts and minds” and small unit operations, according to Long.
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  177. Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
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  179. A revision of Lt. Col. Nash’s University of Chicago doctoral dissertation, which describes how the British COIN operations succeeded in ending the Malayan insurgency (1948–1960) and why American counterinsurgency efforts failed in Vietnam.
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  181. Paschall, Rod. “Marxist Counterinsurgencies.” In Modern Counter-Insurgency. Edited by Ian Beckett, 453–466. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007.
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  183. Colonel Paschall emphasizes the coercive aspects of COIN to root out the Marxist insurgencies.
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  185. British Perspectives
  186.  
  187. Callwell (nicknamed “the Colonial Clausewitz”) published an influential treatise on imperial policing (see Callwell 1990). His manual, based on British “butcher and bolt” expeditions launched in Afro-Asia, influenced generations of British officers and the British counterinsurgency (COIN) manuals published during the 20th century. One of the most powerful works on COIN to come out in the post–World War II period is Kitson 1971. For Kitson, COIN includes political, economic, psychological, and military measures. Mockaitis 1990 asserts that the use of minimum force is the cardinal feature of British COIN. Experiences of imperial policing and the regimental structure of the British Army enabled the British to develop the policy of using force in a selective manner. Thornton 2004 notes that Protestant ethics, Victorian chivalrous values, the public school system, and the imperial legacy of the white man’s burden that involved the onerous duty of “civilizing the savages” generated the minimum-force philosophy for conducting COIN among the British. The Royal Air Force (RAF) after the end of World War I claimed that it could police Iraq while causing minimum casualties. Cox 1985 shows that the RAF desired to secure its service interest in the era of retrenchment, and it sold politicians the idea that air policing would be faster and cost less than the deployment of ground forces. Omissi 1990 argues that in the sparsely populated wide plains of the Transjordan area, air control was quite effective. However, in the densely populated urban centers of Palestine, aircrafts proved useless. Another technique of the British, notes Omissi 1989, is to give special privileges to the marginal ethnic groups and to use them in policing the majority ethnic community in Mesopotamia. Unlike Mockaitis and Thornton, who emphasize continuity between the pre– and post–World War II eras, Jones 2001 argues that the nonmilitary aspects of COIN, such as psychological operations, co-opting ex-insurgents, and the hearts and minds campaign, came into existence after 1945.
  188.  
  189. Callwell, C. E. Small Wars: A Tactical Textbook for Imperial Soldiers. London: Greenhill, 1990.
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  191. Callwell warns military officers that in cases of irregular war, decisive battles and sieges did not occur. And capturing the enemy’s capital, if there was one, was also useless. Rather, raids and ambushes by light infantry were effective. Originally published in 1896.
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  193. Cox, Jafna L. “A Splendid Training Ground: The Importance to the Royal Air Force of its Role in Iraq, 1919–32.” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 13 (1985): 157–184.
  194. DOI: 10.1080/03086538508582685Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  195. Service interest, says Cox, resulted in the deployment of the RAF instead of a large ground force for COIN duty in Iraq after World War I.
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  197. Jones, Tim. Postwar Counterinsurgency and the SAS, 1945–1952: A Special Type of Warfare. London: Frank Cass, 2001.
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  199. The noncoercive aspects of COIN, asserts Jones, came into existence in the post–World War II period in Malaya.
  200. Find this resource:
  201. Kitson, Frank. Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-Keeping. London: Faber & Faber, 1971.
  202. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  203. Intelligence gathering and psychological operations for winning over the people in the disturbed region are the cardinal principles for conducting a successful COIN, asserts this retired British officer.
  204. Find this resource:
  205. Mockaitis, Thomas R. British Counterinsurgency, 1919–60. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1990.
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  207. The British looked upon the insurgents as “naughty boys.” Selective use of minimum force along with political and economic packages, writes the British historian, have been characteristic of British COIN.
  208. Find this resource:
  209. Omissi, David. “Britain, the Assyrians and the Iraq Levies, 1919–1932.” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 17 (1989): 301–322.
  210. DOI: 10.1080/03086538908582795Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  211. The British armed and utilized marginal ethnic groups successfully, notes Omissi, in policing Iraq before World War II.
  212. Find this resource:
  213. Omissi, David. “Technology and Repression: Air Control in Palestine 1922–36.” Journal of Strategic Studies 13 (1990): 41–63.
  214. DOI: 10.1080/01402399008437430Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  215. The strengths and limitations of air policing in the Middle East during the interwar era are clearly portrayed by the British historian Omissi.
  216. Find this resource:
  217. Thornton, Rod. “The British Army and the Origins of its Minimum Force Philosophy.” Small Wars and Insurgencies 15 (2004): 83–106.
  218. DOI: 10.1080/09592310410001677005Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  219. British society and history, writes Thornton, generated the idea of the application of minimum necessary force in COIN campaigns.
  220. Find this resource:
  221. French Perspectives
  222.  
  223. Based on the author’s experience in Indochina and Algeria, Trinquier 2006 is a treatise on counterinsurgency (COIN). His focus on torturing the captured terrorists and pursuing a scorched-earth policy to terrorize the insurgents might seem spine chilling. However, his plan to build up maquis teams from the local inhabitants and captured insurgents in order to fight the guerrillas like the guerrillas is more fruitful and is somewhat similar to the counter gangs trained by the British in Kenya to hunt the Mau Maus. Another French officer, Galula (Galula 1964), emphasizes politics in defeating the insurgents. For him, COIN operations should be comprised of 80 percent politics and 20 percent military operations. Pimlott 1985 notes that during the period from 1946 to 1984, from Indochina to Chad, the French Army stuck to the paradigm of “search and destroy” while pursuing the guerrillas through road-bound mobile convoys that were vulnerable to ambush and interdiction by the insurgents. Thomas 1999 says that in Algeria between 1954 and 1958, the French generals’ insistence that dialogue should start only after defeat of the insurgents muddied French COIN policy. In contrast, Pottier 2005 shows that in Vietnam in the 1950s, the French had quite successfully established local defense forces in the mountains that fought the Red regime. But this scheme (Trinquier’s brainchild) remained marginalized within the overall French pacification strategy.
  224.  
  225. Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1964.
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  227. Lieutenant Colonel Galula, after graduating from St. Cyr Military Academy, participated in World War II and in the post–World War II COIN operations against the Communists. He emphasizes political work and collection of intelligence from the locals.
  228. Find this resource:
  229. Pimlott, John. “The French Army: From Indochina to Chad, 1946–1984.” In Armed Forces and Modern Counter-Insurgency. Edited by Ian F. W. Beckett and John Pimlott, 46–76. London: Croom Helm, 1985.
  230. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  231. Pimlott writes that the problem with French COIN is that they had a rigid theory of response, known as guerre revolutionnaire. Furthermore, the French Army was unwilling to display adaptation and flexibility.
  232. Find this resource:
  233. Pottier, Philippe. “GCMA/GMI: A French Experience in Counterinsurgency during the French Indochina War.” Small Wars and Insurgencies 16 (2005): 125–146.
  234. DOI: 10.1080/09592310500079874Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  235. The failure of the French high command to coordinate their excellent COIN plan with conventional military forces resulted in the failure of the French pacification campaign.
  236. Find this resource:
  237. Thomas, Martin. “Order before Reform: The Spread of French Military Operations in Algeria, 1954–1958.” In Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of the Colonial Powers c. 1700–1964. Edited by David Killingray and David Omissi, 198–220. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1999.
  238. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  239. Too much autonomy of the French generals in Algeria and their insistence that dialogue with the insurgents should not accompany military operations resulted in failure of French COIN policy.
  240. Find this resource:
  241. Trinquier, Roger. Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency. Translated by Daniel Lee. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006.
  242. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  243. This French officer turned scholar emphasizes scorched-earth policy and torture to weed out the insurgents. Originally published in 1964.
  244. Find this resource:
  245. Soviet/Russian Perspectives
  246.  
  247. In the first half of the 19th century, the Imperial Russian Army had to conduct pacification campaigns in the Transcausasian region. Oleinikov 2004 shows the tactical and technical difficulties faced by Ivan against the Chechen mountaineers. Interestingly, the same difficulties were faced by the British soldiers in 19th century Afghanistan. After the withdrawal from Afghanistan in the late 1980s, Russia revised its counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine. Operation by heavy mechanized force was replaced by lightly equipped air-mobile forces for COIN duties. However, as van Dyke 2007 shows, the conservative elements within the military establishment resisted such a transition. Further, in 1995, the lightly equipped forces in Chechnya failed against the urban centers held by the Chechen guerrillas. The Russians then reverted to heavy-handed operations by armored forces supported by artillery and gunships. Focusing on COIN in Chechnya, Lyall 2010 finds evidence that this indiscriminate, brutal approach did lead to a reduction in insurgent activity. Blank 2003 shows the contradictions in Russia’s war against terror in the new millennium. Rather than fighting the insurgents, the Russians, under the guise of “humanitarian interventions” used force to cow those republics which had broken away from the USSR. Between 8 and 12 August 2008, Russia attacked Georgia in response to the latter attacking South Ossetia. Thomas 2009 shows that Moscow acted as peacekeeper and highlighted the role of the minority (i.e., Ossetians) against the domination by the majority.
  248.  
  249. Blank, Stephen. “An Ambivalent War: Russia’s War on Terrorism.” Small Wars and Insurgencies 14 (2003): 127–150.
  250. DOI: 10.1080/09592310412331300606Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  251. By making a case study of Central Asia and Chechnya, the author argues that the threat to Russia’s geopolitical interests due to great-power rivalry, rather than hunting the terrorists, is the principal driver shaping Russia’s global war on terror.
  252. Find this resource:
  253. Lyall, Jason. “Are Coethnics More Effective Counterinsurgents? Evidence from the Second Chechen War.” American Political Science Review 104 (2010): 1–20.
  254. DOI: 10.1017/S0003055409990323Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  255. Counterintuitively, using a quasi-experimental design and statistical matching analysis, Lyall finds that indiscriminate shelling of Chechen villages led to a reduction in insurgent attacks relative to those villages that did not experience indiscriminate violence.
  256. Find this resource:
  257. Oleinikov, Dmitri I. “The Caucasus Factor in Russian Military Reform.” In Reforming the Tsar’s Army: Military Innovation in Imperial Russia from Peter the Great to the Revolution. Edited by David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye and Bruce W. Menning, 205–214. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
  258. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  259. The smoothbore hand arms of the Russians, says Oleinikov, were outranged by the Chechen guerrillas’ longer-range rifles that enabled the guerrillas to shoot from the mountaintops at the lumbering regular infantry columns.
  260. Find this resource:
  261. Thomas, Timothy L. “The Bear Went through the Mountain: Russia Appraises its Five-Day War in South Ossetia.” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 22 (2009): 31–67.
  262. DOI: 10.1080/13518040802695241Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  263. Though apparently successful, the peace-enforcement action showed the Russian Army to be lacking in adequate night-fighting, communication, and electronic equipment.
  264. Find this resource:
  265. van Dyke, Carl. “Kabul to Grozny: A Critique of Soviet (Russian) Counter-Insurgency Doctrine.” In Modern Counter-Insurgency. Edited by Ian Beckett, 467–483. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007.
  266. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  267. The Russians tried to revise their COIN doctrine after the Afghan experience, but, van Dyke claims, the reorganized COIN force failed in Chechnya.
  268. Find this resource:
  269. Imperial Counterinsurgency
  270.  
  271. Before World War II, both the Asian and European powers had to launch counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns against the rebels. The French Revolution probably gave birth to the modern state and opened the Pandora’s box of nationalism. One of its manifestations was the rise of guerrilla war in Napoleonic Spain. Tone 2007 by making a case study of the Navarre province asserts that the guerrillas fought neither for nationalism nor royalty nor British gold; the middle peasants fought to save their property and local institutions from the occupying French. Esdaile 2007 asserts that it would be erroneous to claim that only the Spanish guerrillas ruined Napoleon’s position. Lack of central leadership and dispersed bands of guerrillas were a problem for the French Army; however, a combination of conventional operations and Spain’s peculiar terrain also hampered the French antiguerrilla operations. Porch 2000 notes that till the late 19th century, greater cohesion among the imperial armies due to superior discipline and training gave them an advantage over the non-European indigenous forces. On a comparative analysis, notes Porch, French and Russian pacification campaigns were more brutal than British COIN. Zirkel 1999 notes that German policy toward the African rebels during the last decade of the 19th century was extremely repressive. Brutalization of COIN policy was the product of the militarization of the German colonial establishment. If anything, says Young 2002, Japanese antiguerrilla operations in Manchuria were more militarized than the German operation in Africa. And Japanese COIN occasionally escalated into conventional operation. Erickson 2005 shows that the Ottomans used both paramilitary forces and regular units in their COIN campaigns. While the paramilitary units engaged in dispersed and mobile counterguerrilla operations, the infantry and artillery assaulted Armenian villages.
  272.  
  273. Erickson, Edward J. “Bayonets on Musa Dagh: Ottoman Counterinsurgency Operations–1915.” Journal of Strategic Studies 28 (2005): 529–548.
  274. DOI: 10.1080/01402390500137465Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  275. The Ottomans used artillery and frontal attacks by the infantry in their COIN campaigns against the Armenians. Erickson notes that Ottoman brutality could be categorized as ethnic-cleansing operations.
  276. Find this resource:
  277. Esdaile, Charles. “War and Politics in Spain: 1808–1814.” In Warfare in Europe: 1792–1815. Edited by Frederick C. Schneid, 455–477. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007.
  278. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  279. A combination of guerrilla warfare and conventional operations destroyed the French position in Spain.
  280. Find this resource:
  281. Porch, Douglas. Wars of Empire. Edited by John Keegan. London: Cassell, 2000.
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  283. This beautifully illustrated volume with several color maps and photographs will be a starter for undergraduate students. Porch gives an account of the small wars conducted by the Western powers in the non-European world from the late 18th century till 1939.
  284. Find this resource:
  285. Tone, John Lawrence. “Napoleon’s Uncongenial Sea: Guerrilla Warfare in Navarre during the Peninsular War, 1808–1814.” In Warfare in Europe: 1792–1815. Edited by Frederick C. Schneid, 493–520. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007.
  286. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  287. The extremely brutal French pacification strategy, says Tone, pushed more peasants toward the guerrilla bands.
  288. Find this resource:
  289. Young, Louise. “Japan’s Wartime Empire in China.” In The Shadows of Total War: Europe, East Asia, and the United States, 1919–1939. Edited by Roger Chickering and Stig Förster, 327–345. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
  290. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  291. The Japanese colonial administration in Manchuria was trigger-happy and heavily militarized.
  292. Find this resource:
  293. Zirkel, Kirsten. “Military Power in German Colonial Policy: The Schutztruppen and their Leaders in East and South-West Africa, 1888–1918.” In Guardians of Empire: The Armed Forces of the Colonial Powers c. 1700–1964. Edited by David Killingray and David Omissi, 91–113. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1999.
  294. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  295. In East and Southwest Africa, German COIN policy aimed at the starvation and genocide of the colonized, notes Zirkel.
  296. Find this resource:
  297. Nato and United Nations’ Peacekeeping Operations
  298.  
  299. The United Nations’ (UN) forces are always multinational, which creates special problems regarding command, control, and deployments. Gordon 2003 notes that the principal problem is the Western governments’ unwillingness to accept casualties. Gordon argues for a holistic approach (which includes civilians, police and the military) in order to enforce peace. Jackson 2003 emphasizes a proper balance between military feasibility and political desirability in conducting a successful counterinsurgency (COIN). The UN has to depend to a great extent on NATO for conducting peacekeeping operations. Lansford 2002 shows that while Germany and France put greater emphasis on economic blockade and diplomacy, the United Kingdom, in alliance with the United Sates, focuses more on military campaigns to enforce peace in disturbed regions. Niebuhr 2007 asserts that NATO’s intervention in Yugoslavia in 1999 was due more to geopolitical interests than any humanitarian motives. The ham-handed approach of the Serbian Army’s COIN campaign, which increased the flow of refugees and threatened the West’s security, prompted the Western intervention under the guise of the UN. Byman and Waxman 2000 warns that it would be erroneous to argue that NATO achieved victory over the Serbian regime of Slobodan Milosevic in 1999 merely by the use of air power; a host of factors facilitated the Serbian retreat from Kosovo. A somewhat similar view of the NATO seventy-eight-day bombing campaign in the former Yugoslavia is evident in Forage 2001. On 26 May 1999, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) with NATO support launched an attack across Mount Pastrik. However, close air support and air interdiction failed to destroy the Yugoslav Army. But Milosevic feared a ground attack and on 3 June 1999, and ordered his troops’ withdrawal from Kosovo. The shortcomings of a UN-mandated peacekeeping operation comes out in the article Hardy 2007. During the period 1992–1993 in Somalia, the Australian contingent was given a free hand and worked out an effective COIN policy of reconstructing the civil society. But in Rwanda during the period 1994–1995, the order not to engage the Rwandan Patriotic Army made a travesty of the UN peace mission.
  300.  
  301. Byman, Daniel L., and Matthew C. Waxman. “Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate.” International Security 24 (2000): 5–38.
  302. DOI: 10.1162/016228800560291Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  303. The casualty-averse Western governments are attracted to the use of airpower in COIN campaigns. Along with bombings by NATO, attacks by the KLA and Moscow’s refusal to support Serbia resulted in the toppling of Milosevic’s regime.
  304. Find this resource:
  305. Forage, Paul C. “The Battle for Mount Pastrik: A Preliminary Study.” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 14.4 (2001): 57–80.
  306. DOI: 10.1080/13518040108430498Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  307. The 1999 NATO air campaign in Yugoslavia failed at the operational level; no cataclysmic air-land battle resulting in the destruction of Serbian Army occurred. But, says Forage, it succeeded at the strategic level, as Milosevic’s troops retreated from Kosovo.
  308. Find this resource:
  309. Gordon, Stuart. “Reinventing Command in United Nations Peace Support Operations: Beyond Brahimi.” In The Challenges of High Command: The British Experience. Edited by Gary Sheffield and Geoffrey Till, 146–176. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2003.
  310. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  311. The UN’s forces are always multinational, with differing, contradictory objectives. Another difficulty, notes Gordon, is in establishing a coherent policy for the different security agencies operating in a particular region.
  312. Find this resource:
  313. Hardy, Mat. “UN-Consistent: A Comparison of Australia’s Military Interventions in Somalia and Rwanda.” Small Wars and Insurgencies 18 (2007): 467–491.
  314. DOI: 10.1080/09592310701674457Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  315. The Australian contingent of the UN troops in Somalia worked out an effective COIN policy. But, writes Hardy, conflicting political aims of the UN, United States, and Australia complicated the task of the Australian peacekeepers in Rwanda.
  316. Find this resource:
  317. Jackson, Mike. “The Realities of Multinational Command: An Informal Commentary.” In The Challenges of High Command: The British Experience. Edited by Gary Sheffield and Geoffrey Till, 139–145. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2003.
  318. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  319. Maintaining a balance between various elements is Jackson’s watchword. A proper balance between human and signals intelligence and between political means and military capability is necessary for COIN to be successful.
  320. Find this resource:
  321. Lansford, Tom. All for One: Terrorism, NATO and the United States. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2002.
  322. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  323. The transition in NATO’s role from fighting a conventional-cum-nuclear war against USSR to fighting a global war against terror in the new millennium is the subject of Lansford’s monograph. He also shows the differing approaches among NATO members in fighting terrorism.
  324. Find this resource:
  325. Niebuhr, Robert. “Yugoslavia: The Final Showdown.” Small Wars and Insurgencies 18 (2007): 380–396.
  326. DOI: 10.1080/09592310701674291Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  327. The NATO intervention in favor of the Kosovar Albanians, writes Niebuhr, is the new type of war marketed by the West in the post–Cold War era. The name given to this conflict is “limited and humanitarian war.”
  328. Find this resource:
  329. Afghanistan
  330.  
  331. The dominant interpretation is that Afghanistan’s clan-based society, Pushtun culture, and geography prevent the emergence of a stable polity. Schofield 2010 is a popular historical account that stresses that since ancient times the Afghans have always been busy fighting. Schofield’s account romanticizes British encounters with the “unruly” Pushtuns during the 19th and early 20th centuries. Grau 1998, a collection of translated primary data, makes clear why the Soviets lost the war against the mujahideen. With motor rifle battalions, tanks, and gunships, the Soviets tried to come to grips with the nimble mujahideen, who were armed with AK-47s and Stinger missiles. Every time the Soviets made a large sweep with their clumsy-firepower heavy-military units, the mujahideen vanished into thin air. Sinno 2008 is a groundbreaking monograph that asserts that the strength and fragility of the state and of the rebel outfits depend on organizational capacities. The organizational apparatus of a regime to mobilize economic resources and military manpower determines its fate. Matinuddin 1999 is a monograph by a Pakistani general that emphasizes the Pakistani intervention that led to the rise of the Taliban in the 1990s. Pakistani intervention was related to Islamabad’s geopolitical rivalry with India. Soviet-occupied Afghanistan in the 1980s was pro-Indian. Pakistan attempted to clear its western flank and gain strategic depth by aiding the Taliban forces. General Zia-ul-Haq, the military dictator of Pakistan, used the madrassas in Quetta and Punjab to train the talibs, and CIA directed weapons were used to equip them. The internal politics of Afghanistan that led to Soviet takeover, and the internal contradictions among the Afghan warlords that led to the rise of Taliban in 1994 are the subjects of Maley 2009. McInnes 2005 says that the US war in Afghanistan in the post-9/11 era reflects both traditions and innovations in the fields of technology and tactics. Orr 2009 notes that rebuilding the Afghan police and military and strengthening the governing apparatus at the grassroots level would pay greater dividends. The war in Afghanistan against the insurgents could be won, says O’Hanlon 2009, but it will take a lot of time and money along with the permanent presence of larger number of NATO-American soldiers.
  332.  
  333. Grau, Lester W., ed. The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan. London: Frank Cass, 1998.
  334. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  335. A valuable translation of several after-action reports generated by the Soviet officers deployed in Afghanistan. The collection shows that the Soviets fought in the hills of Afghanistan using tactics suited for the northern European plains. Originally published in 1996.
  336. Find this resource:
  337. Maley, William. The Afghanistan Wars. 2d ed. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2009.
  338. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  339. This volume provides a political and social account of the upheavals in Afghanistan from the time of Soviet intervention till the collapse of the Taliban. Originally published in 2002.
  340. Find this resource:
  341. Matinuddin, Kamal. The Taliban Phenomenon: Afghanistan, 1994–1997. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999.
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  343. This volume provides a Pakistani perspective about the rise of the Taliban movement in the 1990s. The author highlights Pakistan’s role in indoctrinating, equipping, and training the talibs for fighting in Afghanistan.
  344. Find this resource:
  345. McInnes, Colin. “A Different Kind of War? September 11 and the United States’ Afghan War.” In Rethinking the Nature of War. Edited by Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom, 109–134. London: Frank Cass, 2005.
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  347. After being defeated in a conventional conflict, the Taliban resorted to guerrilla warfare, which the United States is ill suited to combat. The US antiguerrilla warfare differs from that of Vietnam in the utilization of more local “native” troops and the greater use of satellite precision weapons.
  348. Find this resource:
  349. O’Hanlon, Michael. “Toward Reconciliation in Afghanistan.” Washington Quarterly 32 (2009): 139–147.
  350. DOI: 10.1080/01636600902775730Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  351. Massive economic inputs, larger numbers of NATO/US troops, and a reorganized Afghan police and army could save the country from a resurrected Taliban, claims O’Hanlon.
  352. Find this resource:
  353. Orr, Allan. “Recasting Afghan Strategy.” Small Wars and Insurgencies 20 (2009): 87–117.
  354. DOI: 10.1080/09592310802573491Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  355. Legitimate good governance for winning over the locals, says Orr, is the only way to end the unending war in Afghanistan.
  356. Find this resource:
  357. Schofield, Victoria. Afghan Frontier: At the Crossroads of Conflict. Rev. ed. London: I. B. Tauris, 2010.
  358. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  359. Written in a popular style, Schofield traces the history of “turbulent” Afghanistan from Alexander’s invasion to the Clinton administration. Originally published in 2003.
  360. Find this resource:
  361. Sinno, Abdulkader H. Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008.
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  363. A welcome break from counterinsurgency studies that focus on social, cultural, and ethnic factors. Sinno asserts that whether the state or the rebels win depends on their organizational capacity.
  364. Find this resource:
  365. Africa
  366.  
  367. Africa experienced two types of insurgencies in the 20th century. In the immediate post–World War II era, most of the insurgencies were related to the decolonization struggle. The Mau Mau insurgency erupted in Kenya in 1952. Initially, the British used aircraft for bombing and resorted to large-scale military operations. Heather 2007 finds that the British were more successful when they used the “natives” and organized small units that went deep inside the jungles. Percox 2007 notes that only after the Mau Mau guerrillas were suppressed did the British offer the package of decolonization. Successful suppression of the Mau Maus was mostly due to the villagization program, which enabled the British to cut the links between the Mau Maus and their rural support base through the food-control policy. Making a case study of the Portuguese Army in Mozambique between 1964 and 1974, Beckett 1985a concludes that the tactics of relying on mines and helicopters to deter the guerrillas proved self-defeating: by 1974, the Portuguese units were thoroughly demoralized. The Rhodesian Army devoted half of its training time to small unit operations. And this, Beckett 1985b asserts, proved effective against the guerrillas in the 1970s. Toase 1985 shows how the South African Army conducted a COIN campaign in Namibia that was characterized by police domination with the army functioning as a backup. The security forces depended on mobile teams to hunt down the guerrillas but at the same time also implemented a civic program. The post–Cold War era is witnessing civil war that is due to the breakdown of states in large parts of the continent. Jackson 2007 provides an overview of the “dirty wars” in present-day Africa. Greed for material goods and hunger for power are the two principal drivers of war in the “dark continent.” Vinci 2005, by making a case study of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) which operates in Uganda and Sudan, claims that a guerrilla movement could operate successfully without popular support. In 1994, the internecine struggle between the Hutus and the Tutsis in Rwanda erupted. There was no real economic grievance on the part of the Hutus, claims Jackson 2004; instead, indoctrination, propaganda, and elimination of the moderate Hutus resulted in civil war.
  368.  
  369. Beckett, Ian F. W. “The Portuguese Army: The Campaign in Mozambique, 1964–74.” Armed Forces and Modern Counter-Insurgency. Edited by Ian F. W. Beckett and John Pimlott, 136–162. London: Croom Helm, 1985a.
  370. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  371. In Mozambique, writes Beckett, the Portuguese relied on conventional war techniques and ultimately failed.
  372. Find this resource:
  373. Beckett, Ian. F. W. “The Rhodesian Army: Counter-Insurgency, 1972–1979.” In Armed Forces and Modern Counter-Insurgency. Edited by Ian F. W. Beckett and John Pimlott, 163–189. London: Croom Helm, 1985b.
  374. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  375. By the late 1970s, the Rhodesian Army devised techniques such as the use of counter gangs of captured guerrillas, offers of amnesty, and resettlement of suspected population. These methods, writes Beckett, proved effective.
  376. Find this resource:
  377. Heather, Randall W. “Intelligence and Counter-Insurgency in Kenya, 1952–56.” In Modern Counter-Insurgency. Edited by Ian Beckett, 79–105. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007.
  378. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  379. The initial British large-unit sweeps in Kenya were useless, but afterward, writes Heather, the British successfully launched small-unit tracker patrols that hunted the Mau Mau gangs.
  380. Find this resource:
  381. Jackson, Paul. “Legacy of Bitterness: Insurgency in North West Rwanda.” Small Wars and Insurgencies 15 (2004): 19–37.
  382. DOI: 10.1080/09592310410001676989Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  383. The Hutu-Tutsi struggle in Rwanda was not the product of economic grievance on the part of the Hutus.
  384. Find this resource:
  385. Jackson, Paul. “Is Africa Seeing Fourth Generation Warfare, or Is the Model Flawed?” Small Wars and Insurgencies 18 (2007): 145–160.
  386. DOI: 10.1080/09592310701400788Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  387. Jackson writes that, besides pillage and plunder, the dirty wars in Africa are also characterized by traditional modalities like spiritualism and secret societies.
  388. Find this resource:
  389. Percox, David A. “British Counter-Insurgency in Kenya, 1952–56: Extension of Internal Security Policy or Prelude to Decolonization?” In Modern Counter-Insurgencies. Edited by Ian Beckett, 263–318. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007.
  390. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  391. Not political reforms but control, coercion, and protection of the loyal Kikuyus, asserts Percox, resulted in British victory over the Mau Maus.
  392. Find this resource:
  393. Toase, Francis. “The South African Army: The Campaign in South West Africa/Namibia since 1966.” In Armed Forces and Modern Counter-Insurgency. Edited by Ian F. W. Beckett and John Pimlott, 190–221. London: Croom Helm, 1985.
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  395. One of the characteristics of counterinsurgency by the South African Army, writes Toase, was that it was used to supplement the special police.
  396. Find this resource:
  397. Vinci, Anthony. “The Strategic Use of Fear by the Lord’s Resistance Army.” Small Wars and Insurgencies 16 (2005): 360–381.
  398. DOI: 10.1080/09592310500221336Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  399. The LRA made deliberate use of fear among the populace (through abduction, mutilation, etc.) to paralyze the common people and the government’s security forces.
  400. Find this resource:
  401. Iraq
  402.  
  403. Chin 2003 rightly claims that Operation Enduring Freedom represented a hollow victory by the US conventional forces over the insurgents. Later events proved Chin right. The insurgency in Iraq erupted in May 2003 and continued through the decade and beyond. On an optimistic note, Chin 2007 suggests that the Americans can win in Iraq provided that the army exhibits good leadership at the junior level and the Shias can be co-opted into the US-supported regime. Hashim 2003 asserts that the United States faces the daunting task of rebuilding Iraq’s civil society in order to crush the insurgency. Hashim 2006 elaborates that the US policy of demobilizing Saddam’s army and police and replacing the Sunnis with Shias in the new government is fuelling the insurgency. Hills 2003 claims that the counterinsurgency (COIN) forces should provide security to the ordinary Iraqi citizens to gain their confidence and to elicit “live” information about the insurgents. Michael and Scolnick 2006 notes that the level of suicide attacks reached its zenith in 2005. However, this tactic by the insurgents is a self-defeating one in the long run.
  404.  
  405. Chin, Warren. “Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’: A Victory for a Conventional Force Fighting an Unconventional War.” Small Wars and Insurgencies 14.1 (2003): 57–76.
  406. DOI: 10.1080/09592310412331300566Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  407. Chin warns in this essay that the US force in Afghanistan will face the same problems that bedeviled the Soviets in the 1980s.
  408. Find this resource:
  409. Chin, Warren. “Examining the Application of British Counterinsurgency Doctrine by the American Army in Iraq.” Small Wars and Insurgencies 18.1 (2007): 1–26.
  410. DOI: 10.1080/09592310601173204Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  411. Not the vaunted British COIN doctrine of “winning hearts and minds” and minimum force but selective application of brute force and alliance with the majority ethnic community might win the COIN campaign for the Americans.
  412. Find this resource:
  413. Hashim, A. S. “The Insurgency in Iraq.” Small Wars and Insurgencies 14.3 (2003): 1–22.
  414. DOI: 10.1080/09592310410001676880Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  415. The collapse of the state and disintegration of the secular middle class are fuelling Islamic insurgency. The US callousness, notes the author, regarding collateral casualties is making the COIN campaign ineffective.
  416. Find this resource:
  417. Hashim, Ahmed S. Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq. London: C. Hurst, 2006.
  418. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  419. COIN would not be successful, warns Hashim, unless the Americans alter their faulty policy in reconstructing Iraq.
  420. Find this resource:
  421. Hills, Alice. “Basra and the Referent Points of Twofold War.” Small Wars and Insurgencies 14.3 (2003): 23–44.
  422. DOI: 10.1080/09592310410001676899Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  423. The human factor is more important than technology, the author notes, in the COIN campaign in Basra.
  424. Find this resource:
  425. Michael, George, and Joseph Scolnick. “The Strategic Limits of Suicide Terrorism in Iraq.” Small Wars and Insurgencies 17 (2006): 113–125.
  426. DOI: 10.1080/09592310600562886Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  427. As suicide attacks become more frequent, their novelty wears off, diminishing the awe among the populace. Further, the two authors note, indiscriminate suicide attacks are causing casualties among civilians and alienating them from the terrorists.
  428. Find this resource:
  429. Latin America
  430.  
  431. Landau 1993, from a liberal Marxist point of view, gives an account of the insurgencies and counterinsurgency (COIN) in three countries in Central America. Poverty, American imperialism, and lack of democratic institutions are fuelling insurgencies. Like E. J. Hobsbawm, Landau somewhat romanticizes the guerrillas, who have popular support but are cowed by brutal repressive measures of the governments concerned. In contrast, Godfrey 1985 paints a more positive picture of the military establishment by making a case study of the army in Uruguay during the Tupamaros campaign in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The army assisted civil development. However, the heavy-handed searches and large-scale arrests alienated the civilians. Robben 2006 links combat performance in unconventional warfare with conventional war by making a case study of the Argentinean Army. During the period 1975–1980, the Argentinean Army fought against the insurgents quite successfully, enjoying technological and firepower superiority. In 1982, faced with British technical superiority, the Argentinean soldiers in the Falkland Islands folded. From a historical perspective, the development of repressive organs in the South American polities could be traced back to the late 19th century. Kalmanowiecki 2003 shows that in response to the dangers posed by riots, strikes, and socialist ideology, a strong police force came into existence in Argentina during the last decades of the 19th century. Effective cooperation between the police and the military checked all pressures from below.
  432.  
  433. Godfrey, F. A. “The Latin American Experience: The Tupamaros Campaign in Uruguay, 1963–76.” In Armed Forces and Modern Counter-Insurgency. Edited by Ian F. W. Beckett and John Pimlott, 112–135. London: Croom Helm, 1985.
  434. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  435. The army in Uruguay followed a contradictory COIN policy. Commendable civic action was punctuated by the brutal behavior of the army personnel toward ordinary civilians.
  436. Find this resource:
  437. Kalmanowiecki, Laura. “Policing the People, Building the State: The Police-Military Nexus in Argentina, 1880–1945.” In Irregular Armed Forces and their Role in Politics and State Formation. Edited by Diane E. Davis and Anthony W. Pereira, 209–231. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
  438. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511510038Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  439. The development of an efficient police force from the 1880s, notes Kalmanowiecki, protected the Argentinean state from subversion.
  440. Find this resource:
  441. Landau, Saul. The Guerrilla Wars of Central America: Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993.
  442. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  443. Though the guerrillas have popular support, state repression, which Landau labels genocide, keeps them from capturing power.
  444. Find this resource:
  445. Robben, Antonius C. G. M. “Combat Motivation, Fear and Terror in Twentieth-century Argentinian Warfare.” Journal of Contemporary History 41 (2006): 357–377.
  446. DOI: 10.1177/0022009406062073Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  447. The COIN campaigns of the Argentinean Army, writes Robben, influenced its combat effectiveness during the Falklands War.
  448. Find this resource:
  449. Middle East
  450.  
  451. From 1970 to 1975, the British Army was deployed in Dhofar to protect the Sultan of Oman from guerrillas. The traditional British techniques of a “hearts and minds” approach and use of local auxiliaries characterized British counterinsurgency (COIN) in this region, according to Pimlott 1985. The guerrillas were encouraged to surrender, and many of them were later co-opted and used against their erstwhile comrades. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Hamas are the most dangerous terrorist outfits in this region. The PLO emerged after 1967 and Israel’s occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza resulted in increased terrorist activities against the Israelis. From 2000 onward, jihadi bombers became the most dangerous weapon in the hands of the Palestinian terrorists. Moghadam 2003 focuses on the motivations of the suicide bombers of the PLO. Barzilai and Inbar 1996 traces the differing political factions’ role in structuring Israel’s military response to the PLO. Cohen 1995 points out the structural limitations of the Israel Defense Force (IDF) in combating the terrorists. A stable peace requires some concessions to the Palestinian Arabs. However, David 2000 warns that the right-wing religious fanatics and the hardliners are against making any concessions. Worse, they are issuing propaganda calls to the Israeli soldiers to take a hard line against the Palestinians.
  452.  
  453. Barzilai, Gad, and Efraim Inbar. “The Use of Force: Israeli Public Opinion on Military Options.” Armed Forces and Society 23 (1996): 49–80.
  454. DOI: 10.1177/0095327X9602300103Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  455. The IDF and the National Religious Party, say the two authors, are hawkish and demand large-scale military action against the PLO.
  456. Find this resource:
  457. Cohen, Stuart A. “The Israel Defense Forces (IDF): From a ‘People’s Army’ to a ‘Professional Military’—Causes and Implications.” Armed Forces and Society 21 (1995): 237–254.
  458. DOI: 10.1177/0095327X9502100205Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  459. COIN duties are not performed efficiently by the reservists and short-service conscripts. Rather, as Cohen notes, specially trained and superbly equipped undercover forces are required.
  460. Find this resource:
  461. David, Steven R. “Democracy, Internal War and Israeli Security.” In Democratic Societies and their Armed Forces: Israel in Comparative Context. Edited by Stuart A. Cohen, 274–287. London: Frank Cass, 2000.
  462. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  463. The rise of radical Judaism, warns David, might prove counterproductive to an effective COIN on Israel’s part in the long run.
  464. Find this resource:
  465. Moghadam, Assaf. “Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26 (2003): 65–92.
  466. DOI: 10.1080/10576100390145215Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  467. The material and nonmaterial motivational aspects of the PLO suicide terrorists are analyzed in this article.
  468. Find this resource:
  469. Pimlott, John. “The British Army: The Dhofar Campaign: 1970–1975.” In Armed Forces and Modern Counter-Insurgency. Edited by Ian Beckett and John Pimlott, 16–45. London: Croom Helm: 1985.
  470. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  471. Political primacy and coordinated civil-military responses at every stage, asserts Pimlott, characterized this campaign.
  472. Find this resource:
  473. South Asia
  474.  
  475. The subcontinent has experienced large-scale insurgencies from the British era onward. Chadha 2005, written by an Indian Army officer and influenced by Kitson, uses the term LIC (low intensity conflict) to cover both guerrilla war/insurgencies and terrorism in post-1947 India. Neither ideology nor poverty but ethnicity, claims Chadha, is one of the prime causes behind the internal rebellions. Political decentralization and training the police to cooperate effectively with the army are the hallmarks of an effective counterinsurgency (COIN). After making a case study of Indian Army in Nagaland during the 1960s and in Sri Lanka in the 1980s, Rajagopalan 2008 asserts that India has no effective COIN doctrine. Singh 2001 passes the responsibility for the failure of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka in 1988 to India’s political leadership who failed to hammer out a coherent policy. In contrast, Gates and Roy 2011 is a collection emphasizing that while India’s COIN is sensitive and humane, Pakistan’s represents brute force. As this collection highlights, India’s COIN doctrine is shaped by Hinduism and British colonial inheritance. Franke 2009 is a longue durée study of state building in north-east India that shows that the British relied less on punitive measures and more on political concessions. In contrast, India’s attempt to impose a centralized bureaucratic structure over the segmented clan society has resulted in more virulent opposition from the Naga tribes. For a hundred years, the British conducted a small war in the northwestern part of the subcontinent where Osama Bin Laden was ultimately hunted by the American and Pakistani troops. Roe 2010 tells us that the British policy of political persuasion, economic uplift, and implementation of a measured amount of force has relevance for modern-day management of the border.
  476.  
  477. Chadha, Vivek. Low Intensity Conflicts in India: An Analysis. New Delhi: SAGE, 2005.
  478. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  479. The author, an Indian lieutenant colonel, proposes a judicious mix of political reforms, good administration, and a large army presence to weed out the insurgents.
  480. Find this resource:
  481. Franke, Marcus. War and Nationalism in South Asia: The Indian State and the Nagas. London: Routledge, 2009.
  482. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  483. Franke, a German anthropologist, traces the attempts by the British and the independent Indian state to maintain “order” in the turbulent northeastern parts of the subcontinent.
  484. Find this resource:
  485. Gates, Scott, and Kaushik Roy. Unconventional Warfare in South Asia, 1947 to the Present. Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2011.
  486. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  487. This collection of nineteen reprint articles covers the COIN campaigns in India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The roles of religion and political factors in shaping counterinsurgencies are highlighted in this anthology.
  488. Find this resource:
  489. Rajagopalan, Rajesh. Fighting Like a Guerrilla: The Indian Army and Counterinsurgency. New Delhi: Routledge, 2008.
  490. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  491. Historical legacy and the organizational structure of the Indian Army prevent it from developing an effective COIN policy. Rajagopalan claims that, due to British training and experience during World War II, the Indian Army is still wedded to large-scale attritional warfare.
  492. Find this resource:
  493. Roe, Andrew M. Waging War in Waziristan: The British Struggle in the Land of Bin Laden, 1849–1947. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010.
  494. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  495. The American infantry officer turned author claims that the Americans and the Pakistanis could learn a lot from the COIN campaigns conducted by the British in Waziristan.
  496. Find this resource:
  497. Singh, Depinder. Indian Peacekeeping Force in Sri Lanka. New Delhi: Natraj, 2001.
  498. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  499. The Indian intervention in Sri Lanka against the Tamil insurgency failed, writes Singh, due to a lack of synergy between the political leadership and the military’s top brass.
  500. Find this resource:
  501. New Wars
  502.  
  503. Several civilian scholars and retired military officers assert that the new millennium is witnessing a new type of war. On the basis of studying the breakup of Yugoslavia, Kaldor 1999 asserts that the age of New Wars has dawned. The objectives of such wars are not state building but state un-building in the age of globalization. Mueller 2000 and Collier 2000 characterize New Wars as criminal activity. In Smith 2005, a retired British general claims that industrial war has been replaced by a new paradigm of war that he terms “war amongst the people.” The objective of such war, writes Smith, like Peter Mansoor, is not to capture territory or enemy combatants but to shape public opinion. Coker 2007 claims that the Anglo-Americans view war as instrumental/utilitarian. However, non-Westerners, who are at the forefront of waging the New Wars, conceptualize war not as an end but merely a means. In order to win the New Wars, says Berdal 2007, the counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns have to be dressed as “humanitarian missions.” Legitimacy and providing security to the people of the disturbed zone are basic for successful resolution of any crisis. In Hammes 2006, the author, an American colonel, asserts that the end of the Cold War has given rise to a new sort of insurgency which he terms fourth-generation warfare (4GW). Decentralized operations geared toward mental and moral objectives are characteristic of this insurgency. In the near future, a small group or even an individual with high-technology weapons could threaten large numbers of people, or even a city, with devastation. That sort of war Hammes terms fifth-generation warfare. Kalyvas 2001 compares the nature of violence between “new” and “old” civil wars and finds that the two eras are not that distinct. Violence in today’s civil wars often has its strategic dimensions, just as the violence of “old” civil wars was often extremely savage and brutal.
  504.  
  505. Berdal, Mats. “Consolidating Peace in the Aftermath of War—Reflections on ‘Post-Conflict Peace-Building’ from Bosnia to Iraq.” In On New Wars. Edited by John Andreas Olsen, 104–130. Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2007.
  506. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  507. Careful consideration of local cultural sensibilities and building up institutions for good governance at the local level are necessary for COIN to be effective.
  508. Find this resource:
  509. Coker, Christopher. “The Future of War: What Are the New Complexities?” In On New Wars. Edited by John Andreas Olsen, 83–103. Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2007.
  510. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  511. A culturalist interpretation is offered in this essay. COIN could never be successful, says Coker, unless the West’s security managers understand that the principal drivers of New Wars are the primordial concepts of honor and religiosity.
  512. Find this resource:
  513. Collier, Paul. “Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 44 (2000): 839–853.
  514. DOI: 10.1177/0022002700044006008Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  515. Collier develops an economic model that treats rebellion as a form of organized crime for which predation of the rents on natural resource exports is the primary objective. The model is employed to determine when a rebel group constitutes a viable military threat to the government.
  516. Find this resource:
  517. Hammes, Thomas X. The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century. St Paul, MN: Zenith, 2006.
  518. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  519. Fourth-generation warfare is the name given for the new type of insurgencies that the world is witnessing in the post–Cold War era. The focus is on psychological operations, claims Hammes, in a network-based society.
  520. Find this resource:
  521. Kaldor, Mary. New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999.
  522. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  523. Drawing on a case study of Yugoslavia, Kaldor contends that the age of Clausewitz’s trinitarian war is over. The New Wars, sustained by an “informal economy,” are fought by criminal gangs for apolitical “non-Clausewitzian” objectives.
  524. Find this resource:
  525. Kalyvas, Stathis N. “‘New’ and ‘Old’ Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?” World Politics 54 (2001): 99–118.
  526. DOI: 10.1353/wp.2001.0022Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  527. Many “old” civil wars had more than their share of “senseless” violence used to characterize “new” wars. Moreover, the violence employed in “new” wars is often not as gratuitous as claimed.
  528. Find this resource:
  529. Mueller, John. “The Banality of ‘Ethnic War.’” International Security 25 (2000): 42–70.
  530. DOI: 10.1162/016228800560381Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  531. Ethnic war is characterized by groups of marauding hooligans and criminals who receive support from political leaders.
  532. Find this resource:
  533. Smith, Rupert. The Utility of Force: The Art of Warfare in the Modern World. London: Allen Lane, 2005.
  534. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  535. For fighting this sort of new war, Smith writes, the militaries require less firepower and a decentralized command set up.
  536. Find this resource:
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