SPEECH PRO

Resolved: The Benefits of the United State’s Offensive Cyber Operations Outweigh the Harms

Pro:

Contention 1: Cyber Attacks In Fact Reduce Violence and Loss of Life by Providing an Alternative Avenue of Warfare.
	Since the dawn of cyber technology, many have warned of a cyber “Pearl Harbor” and an inevitable cyberwar. In fact, the introduction of cyber attacks has actually allowed countries to gain strategic advantage without any death or violence whatsoever. THomas Rid in 2013 states that cyber operations “make it possible to carry out highly targeted attacks on an adversary’s technical systems without directly harming human operators and managers”. Stuxnet, a strategically catastrophic virus that destroyed 1,000 nuclear refinement centrifuges, did not kill a single person. A bombing run or missile strike with similar effect would have killed hundreds or even thousands of people. Offensive cyber operations provide an option that is more decisive than diplomacy, but less destructive than full scale war. In the further interest of preventing a full scale war, Smeets and Lin in 2018 state that cyber attacks give countries the chance to “back down with honor”. If a country attacks another nation, the defending government will feel pressure from their citizens to respond. Cyber attacks do not have the same affect. The citizens may even not know about an attack, giving a government a chance to de-escalate without facing political backlash. Historically, actions by rogue states have required military operations that are costly both in lives and money. Cyber warfare provides an alternative that allows the US to keep face without allowing bad actors to go unpunished. Which is the better way to accomplish an objective; risking human lives or destroying a database? And would implementing war rather than cyber attacks truly make the world a better place?

Contention 2: China, Russia, and other bad actors have already engaged in Cyber operations, and we need to join in to protect our own interests.
The effects of cyber operations inside of the the US have varied.According to the CSIS, In 2017, a particularly ambitious Russian hacker breached over 60 universities and US government organizations. The Russian government also compromised the personal cell phones of NATO soldiers deployed in Poland and the Baltic states. In short, Russia is behaving like a cyber criminal, and the United States has not even begun to approach Russia’s level of cyber activity. Increasing the operations is in the ultimate best interest of our country and for securing the best outcomes for future attacks. According to Andrew E Kramer in the New York Times, Russia has over one million hackers working for them outside of government. We cannot  bomb these people without risking a full scale conflict, nor can we sanction these people. SO how do you respond? Cyber operations are inevitably the only solution. Many states endorse those private groups to do cyber attacks. traditionally, we can’t bomb third party in another country or arrest them. according to the UN in 2017, war is generally prohibited unless unless a mandate is given. This makes most american wars, for example the intervention in syria, illegal and a violation of international law. The Geneva law also states that one cannot attack civilians or a country randomly, therefore meaning that the other country must know about what is happening and a declaration of war must be made. BUT we can attack them cyber operationally; and we don’t even have to physically attack anyone, we can just disable their computers, databases, etc. All these attacks on the US add up quickly, The White House says in 2016 it cost the US between $57 billion and $109 billion dollars on repairing the damage done from these operations. This also why we need response to these third parties the only way we can is to hack.

Contention 3: Cyber Operations can be very successful
	Stuxnet, of course, was an extremely successful cyber operation, but an even better example is that of the U.S. cyber operations in the Straight of Hormuz. A US government cyber operation in June of this year wiped out an Iranian database that contained information necessary to target oil tankers in the region. Norman Roule , a former senior intelligence officer, states that the attack “Changed Iran’s behavior without initiating a broader conflict or initiating retaliation” (NY Times, 2019). THis attack was extremely effective; the NY Times also states that since the June attack, no tankers have been targeted in covert operations due to the wiped-out database. This attack successfully deescalated the situation and had a decisive strategic effect. This is an excellent representation of the power cyber operations can bring to bear.

Rid 2013:
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2013-10-15/cyberwar-and-peace
Card 1: Weaponized computer code and computer-based sabotage operations make it possible to carry out highly targeted attacks on an adversary’s technical systems without directly and physically harming human operators and managers.
Smeets and Lin 2018:
https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2018/10/Art-03-Offensive-Cyber-Capabilities.-To-What-Ends.pdf
Card 1: Considering the growing interest in the use of offensive cyber capabilities as a tool for the state, this study assessed to what degree these capabilities have the potential to change the role of military power. We have shown that OCCs have the potential to significantly affect how states use their military power in several ways. First, OCCs have downgraded the role of deterrence, except for those states with a credible reputation for being able and willing to conduct offensive cyber operations. However, we indicated that compellence is no longer ruled out as a function of military power considering several features of cyber capabilities. Unlike conventional capabilities, the effects of offensive cyber capabilities do not necessarily have to be exposed publicly, which means the compelled party can back down post-action without losing face. The potential to control the reversibility of effect of a cyber capability by the attacker may also encourage compliance. As OCCs can be used as both a preemptive and a preventive strike option, it reemphasizes the potential to use of force for defensive purposes. Finally, due to its largely non-material ontology and transitory nature, its symbolic value as a prestige weapon to enhance swaggering remains unclear.
CSIS 2017:
https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/190904_Significant_Cyber_Events_List.pdf
Card 1:February 2017. A suspected Russian hacker breaches at least 60 universities and US government organizations using SQL injections, including HUD, NOAA, Cornell University, and NYU, among many others. This follows up a hack by the same actor against the U.S. Electoral Assistance Commission in December 2016.
Card 2:
September 2017. Russia compromised the personal smartphones of NATO soldiers deployed to Poland and the Baltic states.
White House 2016:
https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/cea-report-cost-malicious-cyber-activity-u-s-economy/
Card 1: We estimate that malicious cyber activity cost the U.S. economy between $57 billion and $109 billion in 2016.
 NY Times 2019:
Card 1: Norman Roule , a former senior intelligence officer, states that the attack “Changed Iran’s behavior without initiating a broader conflict or initiating retaliation”






CONTENTION 4
Offensive operations are not a sign of aggression, but a move towards greater flexibility in defensive responses. Earlier this year, Congress and the White House granted the U.S. Cyber Command a range of new authorities, and, in the months since national security experts have said the Department of Defense will be more aggressive in cyberspace, leading attacks against bad actors who have stolen intellectual property or against those who are attempting to influence American elections. But a new narrative with additional nuance now surrounds that discussion. Rather than thinking of the United States as being more aggressive, national security experts and government officials say that Cyber Command has more flexibility and that the authorities allow for offensive action in the name of defensive purposes. “During peacetime, we’re not seeking to escalate, we’re not trying to be aggressive in behavior, we are trying to defend those that breach norms to be able" to enact consequences, Burke “Ed” Wilson, deputy assistant secretary of defense for cyber policy, said during an April 23 event hosted by the Atlantic Council. Adversaries have been increasingly active in the so-called “gray zone” of conflict. Top military officials argue that those activities, while individually not rising to the level of armed conflict, have a cumulative strategic effect on the United States. “In this space, there is going to be constant contact, there is going to be continuous engagement. The question we have to ask ourselves is ‘what are the acceptable things below that threshold of armed conflict,’” said Emily

FOR THESE REASONS JUDGE, WE STRONGLY AFFIRM THE RESOLUTION.

. Card Pomerluea ’19 Pomerluea, Mark (Reporter for C4ISRNET and Fifth Domain). “Is Cyber Command really being more ‘aggressive’ in cyberspace?.” Fifth Domain, 25 April 2019, https://www.fifthdomain.com/dod/2019/04/25/is-cyber-command-really-being-more-aggressive-in-cyberspace/. [Premier]

NY Times 2019 Card: Gary Brown of the National Defense University, states that is is imprudent to “Stockpile [access to networks] access and never act on it.


Summary
Judge