Krauss Case

On 3/20/2018 2:32 PM, Gary Whittenberger wrote:
> Brandon,
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> Continuing our discussion.
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> BC6:  Don't worry about taking longer to reply, I'm plenty distracted these days myself lol. I just want to thank you for really coming through on helping me to better understand your thought processes. That kind of intellectual participation is hard to find these days. that said, I'll do my best to catch the discussion up
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> GW6: You are welcome.
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> BC6:  What makes this situation mob rule exactly? and is there any difference between what you call mob rule and what the dictionary refers to as direct democracy?
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> GW6: Here is my definition: “Mob rule is decision making based on rumors, hearsay, hysteria, speculations, unfounded conspiracy theories, exaggerations, or intense emotions such as fear, anger, or vengefulness, manifested in a large group of people, with little or no regard for evidence, truth, or justice.  Mob rule sometimes leads to aggression and/or high rates of error, both false positives and false negatives.”  If you provide a dictionary definition of “direct democracy,” then we could compare the two definitions, but in general, I don’t see the two as the same.  I have a negative view of mob rule and a positive view of direct democracy.
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> BC6:  To extrinsically value would be to value something only as a means to some other end. To me, money is extrinsically valuable. It doesn't contain value per se, but it is a means to other ends, you know? as for what you value, I think well being encapsulates both survival and advancement, so as far as i'm concerned we both intrinsically value well being.
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> GW6: Ok, I think I see your point about extrinsic value.  You equate it to what I call “instrumental value.”  However, I don’t agree with you that well being includes both survival and advancement.  I think they must be considered as separate because sometimes they come into conflict.  For example, a cancer patient may be ambivalent about continuing or discontinuing treatment.  Continuing treatment might support survival, but not well being.  But discontinuing treatment might support well being, but not survival.
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> BC6:  I disagree with both of those proposed rules for a couple reasons. one reason is because they do not account for context. I'm not a fan of blind heuristic modes of operation, and under certain contexts the rules you provided could readily justify acts i'd consider to be great injustices (obligatory nazi germany reference to mengele).
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> GW6: I don’t think this is a sound reason to oppose these rules.  All rules are generalizations designed to apply to categories of conditions or contexts.  If new conditions or contexts are found where the rules don’t seem to work or don’t seem to be rational, then the rules can be refined.  Having rules is better than having no rules.
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> BC6:  Another reason I disagree is that justice isn't a clearly defined concept and your rule refers to it without clearly defining it, which is unwieldy.
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> GW6: Again, I don’t think this is a sound reason to oppose these rules.  For this context, here is my definition: “Justice is the condition in which an offender is punished for a violation of a law or a correct moral rule 1) neither too leniently nor too harshly, but in a fair and  proportional manner, and/or 2) such that he/she is harmed approximately to the same degree (not in kind) that the offender harmed victims, including the community.”  Although wordy, I think that is more wieldy.
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> BC6:  Thirdly, for someone claiming to have a consequentialist paradigm, your proposed rules lack attention to consequence and seem to focus on rules or obligations, which is by my understanding of the term, deontological in nature.
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> GW6: Again, I don’t think this is a sound reason to oppose these rules.  Richard has already given the proper counter to your objection here.  I am using a system of ethics which is not deontological in nature, but is based in “rule utilitarianism.”  I believe that all deontological moral systems (including Kant’s) can be boiled down to some form of consequentialism.
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> BC6:  I believe that secular humanist ethics is best described as such: human wellbeing is intrinsically valuable. actions that lead to the consequence of an increase in human wellbeing are therefore good/just/morally defensible/ etc etc. actions that consequentially decrease human wellbeing are in turn bad/evil/unjust/etc etc. the moral imperative is to act in a way that has a net positive increase of human wellbeing. this directly includes awareness of context, be it situational, historical, or otherwise.
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> GW6: I think your view here is mostly consistent with my view.  The big differences that I see right now are 1) I cite survival, well being, and advancement, whereas you cite only well being. And 2) I cite rules as important, whereas you do not.  Also, we need to be concerned about the scope of “human.”  For me the scope should include not only the particular human persons directly involved in a particular decision, but also the human persons in the broader community, even in the entire world, who might be indirectly affected.  Also, we must consider not only the short run but the long run.
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> BC6:  it definitely overlaps with a pursuit of the truth too, but discourages a learning process that would consequentially reduce human wellbeing. sure this leads to questions about defining, categorizing and evaluating what constitutes human wellbeing itself, and i'd love to have that conversation at some point. But for now, I was just sharing what my understanding of the phrase secular humanist ethics so that you may better understand what I meant when I said i felt we had some differences in ethical theory. I go into more depth on those differences in my last paragraph to richard.
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> GW6: My secular humanist ethics does not discourage learning, but encourages it.
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> BC6:  With that understanding of my usage of secular humanist ethics in mind, I want to clearly state that what I actually oppose is the delaying of the removal of krauss from the honorary board. I am claiming that the consequences of such a delay would be a net negative of human wellbeing. Everything else so far is of secondary importance to me.
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> GW6: Yes, we are definitely in disagreement on this.  I see your approach here as a “rush to judgement” based on inadequate evidence, due process, and deliberation.  I am claiming that the consequences of such a rush to judgement would be a net negative to human well being.  I estimate that the work of a proper ethics panel could be wrapped up in 45-60 days.  Yes, ethics panels are more expensive of resources in the short run than is mob rule, but probably not in the long run, and their benefits are far worth the expense.
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> BC6:  In my opinion, your proposal of an ethics panel is actually your answer to an unspoken question, that question being: Who bears the responsibility of gathering information? I actually think that's a great question, but I believe that whatever the answer to that question would be, it would be more context dependent and consequentially aware than your current proposed form of an ethics panel.
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> GW6: I think the correct answer to your question here is “the organizations who aim to impose penalties on Krauss were he to be found guilty.”
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> BC6:  Lastly, thank you richard for introducing the term rule consequentialism to me. I'm now aware that I am more of an act consequentialist~ Having read up on it, I'm very surprised that such a theory exists. I struggle to understand the apparent paradox of a rule oriented system where the rules are somehow supposed to be justified by their consequences. Even just the idea of a rule justified by it's consequences confuses me.
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> GW6: Suppose the problem is this: A very prominent male scientist, science education, secular humanist, and atheist is accused of sexual misconduct by several women and he denies guilt.  Rule X is “Investigate and adjudicate with an ethics panel” and Rule Y is “Adjudicate based on rumors, hearsay, hysteria, speculations, unfounded conspiracy theories, exaggerations, or intense emotions such as fear, anger, or vengefulness, manifested in a large group of people.”  Rule X will have a greater benefit-to-harm ratio than rule Y, and therefore Rule X should be implemented.  The benefit-to-harm ratio is calculated with respect to not only the parties in the dispute but to the community, the nation, and humanity as a whole, over the long run.  Seek to know the truth and to implement justice to the greatest extent of your ability and skill!  If each of us does this, we will move humanity one small step forward.
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> BC6:  Despite that struggle, I do actually think i hit the nail close to the head when i referenced heuristics, and although I made it clear that i'm not a fan of heuristics, I understand that they are somewhat of a necessity. the categorization of consequentialism actually incorporates this by delineating further between full rule consequentialism (what I believe Gary to be) and partial rule consequentialsim (of which act consequentialism actually falls under, aka what I believe).
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> GW6: With rule consequentialism you compare rules, but with action consequentialism you compare actions.  The first approach is better because it has broader application.  You deal with categories of situations rather than just specific situations.
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> BC6:  With that in mind, there's still a bone i have to pick: I would say that heuristic models are openly understood to not guarantee optimal results, and are just good enough under the circumstances of some kind of contextual limitation (for example, immediacy.) partial rule consequentialism is self aware of this understanding. However, everything i've seen about the full rule consequentialist paradigm so far lacks the innate compatibility for contextual nuance, instead applying their proposed rules blanketly (usually at the societal level) with no regard to any other contexts. It is in this difference that I believe i've found the root of my disagreeance with Gary.
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> GW6: As I said, rules can be and should be refined with experience and learning, still keeping in mind that the goal is maximizing the benefit-to-harm ratio, said another way, minimizing the harm-to-benefit ratio.
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> BC6:  While merely tangential, I never was a fan of kant's catagorical imperative anyway lol
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> GW6: On that, we agree.
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> Gary W


MY UNPROOFED RESPONSE
I'm really enjoying my time spent with you, and I'm actually long overdue for this kind of stimulating discussion so I'm really gonna open up this time. If this comes across as excessively wordy, you (both Gary and Richard) have my apologies in advance.

My usage of direct democracy is just people deciding on actions directly and I was just checking to see if literally that directness was what you objected to, but I see that that isn't the case.

    With regard to you bringing up mob rule, I don't think this situation necessarily qualifies. Actually you know what? Let me be direct with my rationale. false accusations are a small percentage of accusations. the prevalence of false accusations is exaggerated. this causes a negative bias towards accuser credibility that is counterfactual. The bias creates a culture where a victim of sexual harassment making an accusation revictimizes themselves, at the very least psychologically. This impending revictimization discourages the vast majority of victimized persons from even attempting justice for the crimes committed against them. Such flaws of the justice system itself is a detraction to well being. people living in a society where aspects of the culture impede justice for a non trivial percentage of the population have a lower state of wellbeing than people who would live in a society that encouraged seeking justice. My recommended method of transitioning between these two societies is to replace the counterfactual negative bias towards accusers with the attitude of trust first, then verify.

    First, on trust: this is meant to directly oppose the notion that an individual should suspend judgement or withhold all action first. that notion does not take into account the context of relevant facts regarding the unique circumstance surrounding sexual harassment allegations. That notion causes harm to the majority of accusers who are already fighting a documented, historically verified uphill battle of being unheard, distrusted, and psychologically attacked. That notion often claims to be fact oriented yet spites statistical evidence of low rates of falsified accusations and instead contributes to high rates of sexual harassment going unpunished.

    Second, on verify: I do not believe that all claims by victims are "automagically" true just by some virtue. I do not believe that any and all actions are to be taken before verification. I believe the best actions taken before verification are context dependent. I believe that verification after trust is a sound compromise that balances encouraging the majority of accusers or would be accusers that have been socially disenfranchised while also serving as a net to catch the minority of false accusers. I believe that there is a difference between mere hearsay and the prior attempts at seeking justice that have been historically quashed or at the very least not taken seriously due to the aforementioned negative bias present in society. I believe that the aforementioned difference is a narrow line that is difficult to discover yet the ideal verification process strives to find that very line.
    Instrumental and extrinsic are definitely interchangeable, so we're on the same page there. I think your concepts are distinct delineations of wellbeing. in your example, what you refer to as survival is merely physical wellbeing, and when you refer to the patient's ambivalence is psychological wellbeing. As i've already stated, i believe the moral imperative is to act in a way that results in a net positive of wellbeing overall, and this includes its various delineations.

    I disagree that all rules are generalizations. Why gary, that's a generalization itself! lol. I have plenty of examples of common every day rules that disprove your claim. Why, rules sets from sports to grammar are precise and accurate. even in the case of exceptions to rules, there is a predetermined, precise and accurate rule regarding exceptions themselves. I believe you're conflating "rules of thumb" with the concept of rules overall. However, what I do actually agree with you on is the concept that we should operate under the awareness that our so called "rules" are subject to revision due to a variety of factors and contexts. In this way, I think your usage of rule is closer to heuristics than I previously thought. Would it be fair to characterize your usage of the word rule as "a potentially variable approach one takes towards a goal, i.e. solving a problem," as opposed to "a strict set of guidelines that accurately and precisely dictate behavior"? I thought your usage was the latter, but i'm checking now to see if it is the former.

    As for the unwieldiness comment, if your usage of the term rule isn't the strict set of guidelines then i understand better what you meant with your proposed rules. I more or less agree with your usage of justice. To me, justice is how fairness is "enforced," and I think your 2 definitions are a good enough starting point. But as fun as a deeper dive on what constitutes justice and it's applications (if I may add a third: punishment should be deliberated and administered in a timely manner) I think we overwhelmingly agree on justice and we should continue the other main points of our discussion.

    I'm still having a hard time recognizing the difference from deontology. I mean, i suppose deontology would say a rule is right regardless of consequences, whereas I think you would say a rule is right only because of it's predicted consequences? does that sound right to you?

    for 1): I already addressed you separation of well being/survival/advancement with my claim that they are all categorically wellbeing in one way or another, but lemme ask you this: what is your hierarchy of the 3? you already provided an example of conflict between the 3, so how do you resolve that conflict? for reference, my model resolves this conflict by recognizing them as being categorical variations on wellbeing and seeks to reach a conclusion with a net positive overall.
    for 2): As for your comment of my lack of mentioning rules, I think that's more relevant to a discussion of applied ethics whereas my talking points so far have been solely in the realm of normative ethics. i'm actually having a hard time even thinking of rules as even extrinsically valuable because I place great attention to encouraging acting in a manner that one can rationally justify as having a high probability of consequentially increasing human wellbeing. then again, my understanding of rule is the strict ruleset, and i think you're just talking about a generalized approach. Does what i just said fit what you would consider a rule, under your usage of the term? It's hard to suss this out when i technically need a response to a prior question. Its one of the reasons i prefer discussions in person lol.
    lastly, I specify human as a classifier from other forms of life, not to limit my ethical application to singular persons. My usage of human spans from the individual to the global population into posterity itself, so we're definitely on the same page there.

    when you replied "My secular humanist ethics does not discourage learning, but encourages it" you completely misunderstood what I wrote. I was not referring to your definition of secular humanist ethics when I used the word "it." the "it" in my previously written phrase "it definitely overlaps with a pursuit of the truth too" was referring to my definition of secular humanist ethics. I was specifying that my definition isn't as generalized as yours, and so could not be used to justify mengele-esque learning at all costs. Gary I know your secular humanist ethics encourages it, that would be the overlap with mine that i was referring to. I just wanted to point out that by being less generalized, it is less malleable. Malleability in a so called rule is a concern I have, because in my experience rules tend to be perceived as absolute. Now, i'm already pretty sure you didn't mean it that way, but i'm just sharing with you the understanding i had that informed my previous words so you can know the way i meant it.

    I touched upon my approach a couple paragraphs earlier, but i'll rephrase it here paralleling your words because I really want to stress the nuanced chord i'm striking: it is an immediate provisional action that is open to revision where conclusory judgment is withheld. I think i've said it before, but i'm not even necessarily against ethics panels per se, and I don't have a problem with fact checking whatsoever.  if you've read this far you have (hopefully) already read my beliefs that justify this position. Sorry if this being out of order is confusing, i'm mostly stream of conciousness replying to the order present in the previous email instead of editorializing for flow. Anyway, I hope that if we can get through this major discussion point, we can really take a bite out of how the two of us "calculate" net positives/negatives to human wellbeing.

    You think the correct answer to the unspoken question of "Who bears the responsibility of gathering information" is “the organizations who aim to impose penalties on Krauss were he to be found guilty.” Now THIS is interesting, so much so that  I'm brimming with excitement over how different our rationales are. If it's alright with you, I'm gonna shift back into inquiry mode here and really try to understand how you arrived at this answer. Lemme offer you a light paraphrasing of your answer restructured as a general principle to double check my understanding: You believe that a group that penalizes an individual bears the sole obligation of investigation...?

    I really disagree with your hypothetical problem involving rule X and rule Y, because I don't believe the dilemma you propose reflects the nature of these types of situations. I don't have the energy right not to propose a literal counter dilemma, but replying to my earlier wall of claims is definitely related to this.

    When you said "With rule consequentialism you compare rules, but with action consequentialism you compare actions.  The first approach is better because it has broader application.  You deal with categories of situations rather than just specific situations" I really didn't understand what you meant. It might be fatigue! lol. in all seriousness though, there's a lot here that's confusing to me. I don't view either of these ethical theories as comparisons, they're a set of beliefs that inform actions. They're both ethical theories of a similarly broad vein, so they get applied to literally anything and everything one could be morally unsure of. As for categories vs specific, didn't you yourself say that your usage of rule is generalized instead of strict? I swore you said they were meant to be changed dependent to specific situations instead of followed as absolutes. If not, I firstly apologize for remembering wrongly, and secondly, wouldn't that mean your usage of rule is actually of the strict variety? maybe that second part is neither here nor there, but regardless of my confusion I'm ultimately just disagreeing that one approach is better or worse.