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12/24-12/26/22 Ukrainian General Update LanguageLearner

Dec 26th, 2022 (edited)
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  1. 12/24-12/26/22 Update, day 304-306 of Russian invasion.
  2.  
  3.  
  4. Belarus:
  5.  
  6. RU and allied forces in Belarus, numbering <10k, are currently in the second week of a snap inspection which is rehearsing offensive operations towards N Ukraine as part of the exercise. UA forces continue to likewise perform defensive operations, with a number of UA units from the E front redeployed.
  7.  
  8. Currently, there are two competing theories:
  9.  
  10. RU TG channels and some UA military groupings believe that a second invasion is imminent, with the aim of targeting energy infrastructure W of Kyiv, such as the Rivne NPP, located some 65 km from the Belarusian border. Such actions would both likely depower much of the country, and also limit supplies coming in from Poland and the West.
  11.  
  12. In support of such belief, RU units have reportedly been on the move without social media communication since Christmas day, and the UA defensive units along the border are tasked with maximum readiness. A UA defensive training operation is ongoing around the Rivne NPP, with a special unit of the UA National Guards whose entire mission is defense of this specific power plant. They have additional data to draw on from the losses at the Chernobyl and Zaporizhia NPP's.
  13.  
  14. Rumors of RU battle plans include large salvos of artillery fire, which they posses in more abundance then UA forces here, coupled with attempts to move quickly towards the area W of Kyiv.
  15.  
  16. RU forces have been observed in the last several days moving towards SW Belarus, from where such an assault towards Rivne would be at its closest position. Units of the 1st Tanks army are visualized approaching the border.
  17.  
  18.  
  19. In opposition to this theory are groups such as the ISW, and publicly, the UA Intel agencies who have stated that no assault groupings of RU troops have been formed, which would be a neccesary condition if RU doesnt want to simply run units wholesale into a now well defended border.
  20.  
  21. Additionally, given the fact that many of the RU units in belarus are newly trained mobikis, they are unlikely to possess the capability to attack a numerically equal (or superior) force, in heavily defended positions, and be successful.
  22.  
  23. Were RU to attampt such an assault across the marshy areas N of Rivne, due to the lack of existing rail infrastructure present following the repulsion of the initial RU assault in Februrary, they would need to increasingly turn to long road-based logistics (such as that massive convoy that stalled out NW of Kyiv). This is unlikely to be any more succesful now. The UA intel agencies and ISW have stated that this whole provocation is likely designed to draw UA troops away from the fierce fighting in the East, so as to give RU forces more breathing room there.
  24.  
  25. Finally, despite bellicose statements from Lukashenko, the Belarusian people are military forces are very reluctant to participate, much less die, in this war. Casualities or damage to Belarusian territory could cause the area to become much less amenable to RU presence.
  26.  
  27.  
  28. On Christmas day, an RU Mig-31 caught fire at the airbase which is currently been used by a number of RU combat aircraft, including their A-50U Mainstay AWACS craft, which can be used either for more effective air combat control of fighters, or for other analysis and radar activities. Talk about a Christmas miracle!
  29.  
  30. A "Belarusian Volunteer Corps" has publicly formed in ukraine, with stated goals to de-occupy both Ukraine and the territory of Belarus proper.
  31.  
  32.  
  33. Kyiv/ West Ukraine:
  34.  
  35. Due to RU strikes in and around UA energy infrastructure, the aboveground trams have been suspended due to electrical infrastructure issues. The full fleet of available busses are being repurposed for this activity, and the metro is still running.
  36.  
  37. Per the Kyiv mayor, in the event of a long-term blackout in Kyiv, critical infrastructure, medical facilities, and basic heating institutions will be prioritized. Buses will also replace the Metro in such a case.
  38.  
  39. Kyiv residents are asking for redundant air raid warning systems to be built, in the case of a loss of electricity. Due to issues with numerous accidents at night, there are proposals to enforce a 20 mph/30 kph speed limit whenever the electricity fails, and to prioritize power for stoplights, as otherwise cars basically dont allow people to cross safely.
  40.  
  41. As of the 26th, some 9 million people in Ukraine are disconnected from electricity following numerous RU cruise missile strikes.
  42.  
  43. UA law enforcement is conducting anti-corruption raids in Ukraine, such as on a construction company that apparently secured a wildly lofty $40 million USD contract in Dnipro for reconstruction purposes.
  44.  
  45. Per the UA government, in the absence of further RU missile attacks, UA will be able to transition back to scheduled power outages for the new year. Per the UA government, there's a state of emergency in the energy sector since the last major RU attack on the 16th.
  46.  
  47. There are currently 3 scenarios should there be a massive power failure:
  48.  
  49. 1: Blackout on the E bank of the Dnipro in Kyiv, and then prioritizing the W bank as well as industry, as the E bank is worked to be returned to power. Power plants would be rolled back online gradually.
  50.  
  51. 2. Blackout of the entire country for a day, and then emphasizing power delivery from the EU power grid as well as resumption of NPP.
  52.  
  53. 3. Blackout of the entire country for up to a week, with priority place on returning dams and coal power plants to service along with EU energy grids, as it may take up to 7 days for the NPP to come online and broadly restore power.
  54.  
  55. Due to the war, emigration, and other effects, the population of Ukraine is shrinking rapidly, and currently there is a catastrophic drop in the birth rate. This is expected to reduce the population to 35 million by 2035.
  56.  
  57. The UA government reminds citizens about restrictions on fireworks and curfews will be in effect over the winter holidays.
  58.  
  59. The Minister of the Armed Forces of France will visit Kyiv on Wednesday.
  60.  
  61.  
  62. Sumy/Chernihiv/Kharkiv city:
  63.  
  64. Strikes continue along the border, with RU forces specifically firing rocket salvos towards the E Kharkiv border villages.
  65.  
  66. RU forces also attempted some recon by fire into E Kharkiv, near Velykyi Burluk, but were repelled.
  67.  
  68. A UA SOF team was located and killed in the Bryansk region of Russia, per RU video footage. This would be the first video evidence of UA ground combat troops operating in RU proper.
  69.  
  70. In Kharkiv, there is a movement to discard old Soviet carpets and turn them into dog shelters for the animals in the city.
  71.  
  72. There was allegedly some explosions over the Kursk airfield in Russia, potentially the work of UA drones.
  73.  
  74.  
  75. Kupyansk/Kreminna/Svatove
  76.  
  77. Along the Svatove/Kreminna axis, it appears there is an ongoing UA offensive operation taking place.
  78.  
  79. N of Kupyansk, which continues to be shelled, RU forces have continued attempts to press the UA grouping at Dvorichne.
  80.  
  81. UA troops do not appear to be making major moves along the entire length of the frontline highway to Svatove, while they are instead making heavy attacks around Kuzemivka, to the immediate NW of Svatove proper. Should UA be able to definitively gain control of this highway (and given RU shelling of the area, UA forces have at least reached the road), they will possess an elevation advantage against RU troops in the area and on the way to Svatove proper.
  82.  
  83. Due W of Svatove in this area, RU forces continue to defend against UA troops pushing on Kolomyichyka and Dzherelne, who have been battering them with artillery and HIMARS strikes. This has resulted in less RU artillery volume in this area, another potential springboard towards an assault on Svatove.
  84.  
  85. The biggest activity is seen in the S approach to Svatove from Kreminna, where UA troops continue to fight around Ploschanka, and have been heavily engaged in Chervonopopivka. Unfortunately, following UA seizure of territory here, a RU counterattack appears to have caused major casualties and forced UA troops to withdraw somewhat. The situation remains unclear. Reportedly, a number of RU conscript units and mobikis are being deployed in this area, as RU officers and command structures are being withdrawn from this area and Kreminna itself, back towards Rubizhne.
  86.  
  87. RU and UA forces continue to skirmish over Dibrova to the SW of Kreminna, and there is a heavy UA troop presence S of Kreminna in the woods, which has been menacing RU forces in the city for several weeks now. Should Kreminna be liberated, it would very much inhibit any RU defenses between Kreminna and Svatove, possibly leading to RU abandonment, and subsequent UA assaults towards Svatove from the southern direction in force. It would also allow for UA to press towards Rubizhne and Severodonetsk, while menacing the RU grouping closer to Lysychansk.
  88.  
  89. Keep an eye on this area. There has been idle speculation that this assault is designed, in concert with RU troop movements agitating from belarus, to force the RU military to move at the UA tempo of battle, rather then setting it themselves with another front.
  90.  
  91.  
  92. Siversk/Lysychansk.
  93.  
  94. There is no major change around Siversk/Lysychansk, with RU attempts towards the NE,E, and SE fronts. It appears that more RU forces have been redeployed here from Kherson.
  95.  
  96. UA forces have retaken some territory near Spirne in recent days.
  97.  
  98.  
  99. Bakhmut:
  100.  
  101. NE of Soledar, RU forces have managed to make some gains in recent days along the Bakhmut/Lysychansk highway near Vesele, after leveling small villages following months of shelling.
  102.  
  103. In Soledar, RU forces continue to skirmish with UA troops and shelling continues along the major line of contact. RU is apparently trying to maneuver further SW from here, along the highway near Bakhmutske towards Bakhmut city proper, at least judging on UA artillery strikes. RU forces appear to be shelling somewhat further into Soledar proper, although RU positions have not changed significantly since advancing around the mine here 2 weeks ago.
  104.  
  105. RU forces continue to skirmish in the fields to the NE of Bakhmut city, near the intersection right outside of town and its gas station there. RU is still shelling toward Pidhorodne and the NE Bakhmut suburbs, with some territory taken along the fields here, and UA shelling immediately outside the NE section of the city. This wooded territory immediately to the NE of Bakhmut has some 200-300 ft of elevation over the city proper, and so RU forces and UA troops continue to skirmish around it, with RU recently retaking the hilltop.
  106.  
  107. To the E, along the heavily defended Patris Lumumby st, RU forces continue to work to dislodge UA forces from the fortified ceramic factory, one of 3 remaining heavily reinforced UA strongpoints. UA forces in this area repelled the RU incursion into the residential outskirts of Bakhmut, following Zelensky's morale-raising tour in Bakhmut last week. RU forces do continue to press here, and this area has a 50 ft elevation dip valley between the two sides, which has become a no mans land. RU shelling remains heavy here.
  108.  
  109. SE of Bakhmut, RU forces have continued attempts to fight downhill from their positions in the garbage dump towards the UA residential region, although thus far they appear blunted.
  110.  
  111. S of Bakhut, RU forces appear to have seized more territory in Optyne and Ivanhrad today, which increasingly allows for an RU incursion into the S residential area of Bakhmut city.
  112.  
  113. SW of Bakhmut, RU forces attempting to push counter-clockwise to cut off supplies have been impeded by the UA defense of Kliischiivka, although RU is consolidating its forces along the riverside towns of Kurdyumivka and Ozarianivka for further assaults in this area.
  114.  
  115. Overall, the situation remains tense in Bakhmut, with RU forces continuing to shovel men into the grinder, and photographs showing a small area of a blasted field covered in enough RU bodies to be reminiscent of WW1.
  116.  
  117. About 10k people remain in Bakhmut. People wryly are grateful the frozen weather allows for bodies to sit out multiple days before rotting, so that in some of the most dangerous areas corpses can still be retrieved somewhat intact. Bodies are frequently buried in gardens.
  118.  
  119.  
  120. Donetsk/Luhansk occupied regions:
  121.  
  122. Fighting continues without significant change around Donetsk, although the former ROSCOSMOS RU space program head (and over-the-top Putin sycophant) Rogozin continues to be in surgery after his dinner party was shelled in donetsk. He reportedly took severe injuries to his lower extremities and genitals. Rogozin had announced himself the head of the "Tsars Wolves" PMC, and had been agitating in the Donbas for some months, making genocidal statements.
  123.  
  124. There were a series of blasts at the RU Engels airbase, where RU strategic aviation is based, and had been targeted by presumably a long-range UA drone attack before. RU reporting seems to coalesce around 3 individuals from a ground crew killed, and possibly some planes damaged. RU claims to have shot down a drone which then crashed into a building, while the UA government states that a strike occurred, and potentially RU pilots were eliminated along with damaged aircraft. They advise to wait to see satellite imagery before making claims of dozens killed or whole wings of aircraft destroyed.
  125.  
  126. Footage emerged of an RU officer beating (under threat of execution should they resist) a group of 10 RU conscripts who were carrying off 2 casualties, blaming them for getting other combat troops killed. Morale remains low.
  127.  
  128.  
  129. Mariupol:
  130.  
  131. RU leveled the remains of the Mariupol Opera House, where several hundred people died as RU bombers struck the clearly marked shelter during the battle of Mariupol. This is an apparent attempt to cover up war crimes.
  132.  
  133. There are other attempts to level historic infrastructure in the city. The cold continues to set in among the ruined buildings.
  134.  
  135. RU forces continue to transit the city towards Berdyansk, towards Melitopol.
  136.  
  137.  
  138. Zaporizhia/Southern Axis :
  139.  
  140. RU and UA forces continue to skirmish around Vuhledar and Pavlivka, with a continued decrease in volume of RU fire. Given the lack of ground progress by RU forces, they may be either winding down this failed offensive attempt, or consolidating for a new push.
  141.  
  142.  
  143. Kherson:
  144.  
  145. On the morning of 12/24, RU shelled the central market of Kherson, killing at least 10 and wounding some 70 more.
  146.  
  147. RU also shelled the Kherson regional hospital, destroying part of the psychiatric care facility. There were no injuries.
  148.  
  149. RU has implemented a 10-day, 24/7 curfew in Hornostaivka, just across the river from UA positions in NE Kherson. This will last until Jan 3rd. It could be a cover for the movement of RU military equipment, either in or out.
  150.  
  151. UA forces continue to heavily shell around Hola Prystan and the river islands near it (where a grouping of RU forces is believed to be based in lookout for a potential UA naval assault), as well as near Nova Kahkovka.
  152.  
  153. On the Kinburn Peninsula, RU forces continue to exchange fire with UA troops in Ochakiv across the bay, reportedly damaging a UA naval SOF grouping. UA remains steadfast that it will de-occupy the "remaining areas of Mykolaiv oblast" which would include the peninsula.
  154.  
  155. A RU HQ was hit in the Kherson region where an officers meeting was being held, causing up to 70 casualties.
  156.  
  157. Odessa/Black Sea/Crimea:
  158.  
  159. RU is reportedly leery about having their ships venture further into the black sea recently, due to both storms and the threat of UA kamikaze naval drones.
  160.  
  161. The GUR stated that Ukraine will regain control over Crimea via both military means and diplomacy.
  162.  
  163. Thanks to the grain corridors, it was possible to export 15 million tons of agricultural products from Ukraine in the period from August 1 to December 25
  164.  
  165. General:
  166.  
  167. Yesterday Ukrainian forces eliminated:
  168.  
  169. 550 x soldiers (Total 102,600)
  170. 7x APC
  171. 5x tanks
  172. 5x Artillery (0x MLRS)
  173. 12x vehicles
  174. 1x UAV
  175.  
  176. The US Congress passed its budget bill including support for Ukraine .The budget package includes nearly $45 billion for emergency aid to Ukraine and about $38 billion for regions recovering from natural disasters.
  177.  
  178. As part of this package comes the issuance of a Patriot missile battery to Ukraine, who hopes to have it up and running in the next 6 months. The training is expected to take 2-3 months, and UA troops have already been selected.
  179.  
  180. There are increased political developments in Moscow with Yevgeny Nikiforov, a member of the Suroviikin-Prigozhin power bloc becoming the commander of the RU Western Military District, rather then Sergei Kurzovlev, who is more of a Shoigu-Gerasimov affiliate. He is the 4th commander of this whole military district in 10 months, and this shows that Prigozhin's power bloc is growing. Similarly, a video emerged of RU troops around bakhmut publicly blaming Gerasimov for lack of supplies. While this created a stir online, Prigozhin went and visited this unit personally on camera, while speaking about their plight.
  181.  
  182. It remains to be seen if Prigozhin can continue his rapid moves in the halls of power, or if eventually the tables turn on him.
  183.  
  184. The head of the State Duma of the Russian Federation advocates increased taxes for Russians who have left the country.
  185.  
  186. On December 26, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine called on the UN to deprive Russia of the status of a permanent member of the UN Security Council and to exclude it from the UN in general.
  187.  
  188. Next year, Ukrainian diplomats will focus on intensifying interaction with African countries and other parts of the Global South - Latin America, Asian countries, and the Pacific region. This comes after a number of UA diplomatic trips were cut short following attacks on UA energy infrastructure.
  189.  
  190. Presently, the EU has offered more then 1000 generators and 78k tons of aid to Ukraine.
  191.  
  192. More than 70% of Russian residents expressed their support for the actions of the Russian Armed Forces, while 21% were against it. The support fo peace talks has decreased among those polled.
  193.  
  194. Per the UA Intel agencies, Iran is currently in no rush to transfer ballistic missiles to Ukraine. Thus far, RU has launched about 540 IRGC provided drones out of a total complement of 1700 ordered..
  195.  
  196. The UK has stated it has trained some 10k UA troops in 2022, and hopes to double that number in 2023.
  197.  
  198. Putin stated he is ready for negotiations, but that "Kyiv and its Western patrons refuse diplomacy" and are trying to "split russia apart". UA has stated it will be ready for peace summits come February, where it will lay out its requirements to end the war, involving the UN and EU.
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