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- I converted this from the doc and formatted it using a text editor called nano. I formatted it for easy viewing when converted to an ebook. I may have made mistakes. Find the doc file and use that as a comparison when quoting authoritatively or you may look foolish.
- (U) = Unclassified
- (S\\NF) = Secret, No Foreign Dissemination
- No Foreign Dissem is an added restriction to any classification as is any added compartmentalized restriction.
- Document begins
- UNCLASSIFIED
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- I. (U) BACKGROUND -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1
- A. (U) Administrative Matters -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 1
- 1. (U) Appointing Authority -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 1
- 2. (U) Brief Description of the Incident -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1
- B. (U) Constraints and Limitations -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 2
- C. (U) Format of the Report -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 2
- II. (U) ATMOSPHERICS -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 4
- A. (U) Introduction -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 4
- B. (U) Local Security Situation -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 4
- 1. (U) Iraq -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 4
- 2. (U) Baghdad -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 4
- 3. (U) Route Irish -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 4
- C. (U) Known Insurgent Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5
- 1. (U) Methods of Attack -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 5
- 2. (U) Insurgent TTPs for IEDs -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5
- 3. (U) Insurgent TTPs for VBIEDs -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 6
- 4. (U) Effectiveness of Attacks -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 7
- D. (U) Recent Incidents in the Vicinity of Checkpoint 541 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 8
- E. (U) Unit Experience in the Baghdad Area of Responsibility -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 8
- 1. (U) Third Infantry Division -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 8
- 2. (U) Second Brigade, 10th Mountain Division -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 9
- 3. (U) 1-69 Infantry Battalion -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 9
- 4. (U) 1-76 Field Artillery Battalion -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 10
- F. (U) Findings -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 10
- III. (U) TRAFFIC CONTROL POINTS, BLOCKING POSITIONS,
- AND TRAINING -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 12
- i UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED
- A. (U) Introduction -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 12
- B. (U) Traffic Control Points and Blocking Positions -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 12
- C. (U) Standing Operating Procedures in use on 4 March 2005 -- -- -- -- -- -- . 12
- 1. (U) Doctrinal Discussion of TCPs and Roadblocks -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 13
- 2. (U) 3ID TCP SOP -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 14
- 3. (U) 2/10 MTN TCP SOP -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 15
- 4. (U) 1-69 IN TCP SOP -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 16
- 5. (U) Rhino Bus Run TTP Background Information -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 17
- D. (U) Training of BP 541 Soldiers -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 18
- E. (U) Rules of Engagement Training Received by BP 541 Soldiers -- -- -- -- -- 19
- F. (U) Findings -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 20
- G. (U) Recommendations -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 21
- IV. (U) THE INCIDENT AT BP 541 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 23
- A. (U) Introduction -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 23
- B. (U) Site Description -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 23
- C. (U) Personnel Involved -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 24
- D. (U) The Mission -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 25
- 1. (U) Receipt of the Mission -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 25
- 2. (U) Establishing the Blocking Position -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 26
- 3. (U) The Duties of the Soldiers -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 27
- 4. (U) Communications Regarding the Mission Duration -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 28
- E. (U) The Incident -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 29
- F. (U) Post-Incident Events -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 31
- G. (U) Forensic Evidence -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 33
- 1. (U) 5 March 2005 Report -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 33
- 2. (U) 11 March 2005 Report -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 33
- 3. (U) 14 March 2005 Report -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 34
- 4. (U) BP 541 Traffic Samples -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 34
- ii UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED
- 5. (U) Number of Rounds -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 34
- H. (U) Findings -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 35
- I. (U) Recommendations -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 37
- V. (U) COORDINATION -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 40
- A. (U) Introduction -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 40
- B. (U) MNF-I/MNC-I Involvement -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 40
- C. (U) Captain Green -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 41
- D. (U) Findings -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- . 42
- iii UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED
- I. BACKGROUND
- A. (U) Administrative Matters
- 1. (U) Appointing Authority
- (U) I was appointed by LTG John R. Vines, Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) on 8 March 2005 to
- investigate, per U.S. Army Regulation 15-6 (Annex 1B), all the facts and circumstances surrounding the
- incident at a Traffic Control Point (TCP) in Baghdad, Iraq on 4 March 2005 that resulted in the death of Mr.
- Nicola Calipari and the wounding of Ms. Giuliana Sgrena and Mr. Andrea Carpani. Lieutenant Colonel Richard
- Thelin, USMC was appointed as my legal advisor for this investigation. I was directed to thoroughly review (1)
- the actions of the Soldiers manning the TCP, (2) the training of the Soldiers manning the TCP, (3) TCP
- procedures, (4) the local security situation, (5) enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), (6) the
- Rules of Engagement (ROE) employed during the incident, and (7) any coordination effected with the Soldiers at
- the TCP or their higher levels of command on the transport of Ms. Sgrena from Baghdad to Baghdad International
- Airport (BIAP). (Annex 1A).
- (U) The appointing letter (Annex 1A) refers to the location of the incident as being a Traffic Control Point
- (TCP). As will be further explained in this report, the Soldiers involved were actually manning a former
- Traffic Control Point, but executing a blocking mission. This mission took place at a southbound on-ramp from
- Route Vernon (also known as Route Force on MNF-I graphics) onto westbound Route Irish, the road to BIAP. The
- intersection of these two routes has been designated as Checkpoint 541. For purposes of this report, the
- position will be referred to as Blocking Position 541 (BP 541).
- 2. (U) Brief Description of the Incident
- (U) On the evening of 4 March 2005, personnel of A Company of 1-69 Infantry (attached to 2d Brigade Combat
- Team, 10th Mountain Division), were patrolling Route Irish, the road linking downtown Baghdad with BIAP. Seven
- of those Soldiers were then assigned the mission of establishing and manning a Blocking Position (BP) on the
- southbound on-ramp off Route Vernon to westbound Route Irish. They were to man the BP until relieved, which
- was anticipated to be after a convoy transporting the U.S. Ambassador to Camp Victory had passed and arrived
- at its destination.
- (U) The Soldiers established the BP by approximately 1930 hours and began executing their mission. At
- approximately 2050 hours, the car carrying Mr. Calipari, Mr. Carpani, and Ms. Sgrena, traveling southbound on
- Route Vernon, approached the on-ramp to enter westbound Route Irish. For reasons that are examined later in
- this report, the car came under fire. The shooting resulted in the wounding of the driver (Mr. Andrea
- Carpani), and Ms. Sgrena, and the death of Mr. Nicola Calipari. The Commanding General, Third Infantry
- Division directed a commanders inquiry/preliminary investigation be conducted that night.
- B. (U) Constraints and Limitations
- (U) Ideally, the scene of the incident would have been preserved as it existed immediately after the shooting
- was over and the car had stopped. Doing so would have allowed the initial investigators to get precise
- measurements on the distances and locations of the significant objects involved in the event. An initial
- on-site investigation was conducted, but a number of circumstances that occurred on the site prevented the
- incident site from being treated as a sterile site. Both HMMWVs involved in the blocking position were moved
- to transport Ms. Sgrena to the Combat Support Hospital in the International Zone. Further, the scene was not
- deemed to be a crime scene, and efforts were made to clear the roadway. As a result, the car was moved from
- its position, per the unit s Standing Operating Procedure on Consequence Management, before a location using a
- global positioning system could be obtained. At the direction of the Commander, 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain
- Division the car was placed back in the position that was thought to be its actual stopping point based on
- eyewitness testimony and digital photographs taken of the car before its initial removal from the scene.
- (U) A further constraint was the inability to reconstruct the event so as to provide accurate data for
- forensic analysis of bullet trajectory, speed of the vehicle, and stopping distance due to the inherent danger
- in the vicinity of the incident location. This was made evident during a site visit by the Joint Investigation
- Team when a hand grenade was thrown (from the Route Vernon overpass) at the Team s vehicles as members were
- boarding, injuring one Soldier.
- (U) These factors limited the forensic team s ability to conduct an on-site, in-depth analysis, although
- extensive tests were performed on Camp Victory. As a result, the forensic studies of the car could not be as
- conclusive as they normally would be.
- (U) Other limitations include the removal and disposal of the shell casings to allow free operation of the
- turret in the blocking vehicle. Additionally, the cell phones involved in the incident were returned to Mr.
- Carpani before he left the scene. (Annex 4M). More importantly, while sworn statements were provided by all
- the key U.S. personnel involved in the incident, the Italian personnel provided only unsworn statements as
- they are not required under Italian law to swear to statements until appearing before a judge.
- C. (U) Format of the Report
- (U) This report is divided into five sections; (1) Background, (2) Atmospherics, including a historical
- overview of attacks along Route Irish and prevailing enemy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs), (3)
- Discussion of TCP and BP tactical missions and training received by BP 541 personnel, (4) Events and actions
- at BP 541 on the evening of 4 March 2005, and (5) Coordination effected pertaining to the hostage recovery.
- Each section will review the pertinent facts, set forth findings, and, as appropriate, provide recommendations
- for future action. Additionally, documentary evidence used in preparing this report is included in annexes.
- 3 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED
- II. ATMOSPHERICS
- A. (U) Introduction
- (U) This section examines the local security situation as of 4 March 2005, known insurgent Tactics,
- Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs), and recent events occurring in the vicinity of Checkpoint 541. The previous
- experience of the Soldiers manning the BP that night, their parent unit, and their higher headquarters units
- in the Baghdad Area of Responsibility (AOR), is also examined. The purpose of this section is to present a
- full picture of the conditions facing the Soldiers manning BP 541 that night.
- B. (U) Local Security Situation
- 1. (U) Iraq. From July 2004 to late March 2005, there were 15,257 attacks against Coalition Forces throughout
- Iraq. The U.S. considers all of Iraq a combat zone. (Annex 8E).
- 2. (U) Baghdad. Baghdad is a city of six million people and is home to a large number of suspected insurgents
- and terrorists operating both in the city and its environs. (S//NF) From 1 November 2004 to 12 March 2005
- there were a total of 3306 attacks in the Baghdad area. Of these, 2400 were directed against Coalition Forces.
- (Annex 8E)
- 3. (U) Route Irish. Route Irish is an East-West road along south Baghdad. It is approximately 12 kilometers
- long and runs from the International Zone in downtown Baghdad to BIAP. The highway is a four-lane road with a
- 50 meter wide median. (Annexes 8E, 144K).
- (U) Route Irish has six major intersections. Each of these has been assigned a corresponding checkpoint number
- by Coalition Forces to facilitate command and control. Entry Control Point 1 (ECP 1) is located at one end of
- the highway near BIAP. Checkpoints 539-543 follow the road east going into downtown. (Annex 141K).
- (U) Checkpoint 541 refers to the intersection of Route Irish with Route Vernon (also known as Route Force),
- which runs North-South. (Annex 142K).
- (U) Route Irish is commonly referred to as the deadliest road in Iraq by journalists, Soldiers, and
- commanders. There is no corresponding alternative route from downtown Baghdad (and the International Zone) to
- BIAP, which gives the route a heavy traffic flow and causes Coalition convoy movement to become more
- predictable. These conditions make Route Irish a lucrative target area for insurgents to employ improvised
- explosive devices (IEDs) of varying types and to achieve effects in terms of casualties. Soldiers in 1st
- Cavalry Division and 3d Infantry Division have come to refer to Route Irish as IED Alley. (Annex 8E).
- (S//NF) Between 1 November 2004 and 12 March 2005, there were 135 attacks or hostile incidents that occurred
- along Route Irish. These included 9 complex attacks (i.e., a combination of more than one type of attack,
- e.g., an IED followed by small arms fire or mortars), 19 explosive devices found, 3 hand grenades, 7 indirect
- fire attacks, 19 roadside explosions, 14 rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), 15 vehicle borne explosive devices,
- and 4 other types of attacks. (Annexes 1E, 8E).
- (S//NF) The attack density for the period 1 November 2004 to 12 March 2005 is 11.25 attacks per mile, or a
- minimum of one attack per day along Route Irish since November. (Annex 8E).
- (S//NF) The highest concentration of IED attacks occurs at 1000 hours, with the second highest concentration
- of attacks occurring at 1600 hours. These times correspond to convoys departing from or arriving at the
- Victory Base complex, the largest Coalition military facility in Baghdad. (Annex 5E).
- (S//NF) Approximately 66 percent of all night time attacks along Route Irish occur between the hours of 1900
- and 2100. (Annex 8E). The incident at BP 541 occurred between 2030 and 2100 hours on 4 March 2005.
- (U) The majority of IED and VBIED attacks occur in and around three overpasses (CP 540, CP 541, and CP 543)
- and the turnoff to the International Zone. As mentioned earlier, CP 541 is the location where the incident
- occurred on 4 March 2005. (Annex 3E).
- C. (U) Known Insurgent Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
- 1. (U) Methods of Attack
- (U) Insurgent attacks throughout the Iraqi Theater of Operation fall into one of several categories, all of
- which have occurred along Route Irish in the past year. They include: Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs),
- Unexploded IEDs, Hand Grenades, Indirect Fire (mortars, rockets, and unidentified indirect fire),
- Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPGs), Small Arms Fire (SAF), Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs),
- and Complex Attacks. The most common attacks along Route Irish are IEDs, VBIEDs, and SAF. (Annex 8E).
- 2. (U) Insurgent TTPs for IEDs
- (U) A large number of evolving techniques have been adopted by the insurgents in placing IEDs along Route
- Irish. Examples of currently used techniques are listed below: (S//NF) Explosives positioned alongside guard
- rails. The large number of guard rails on the road make these devices difficult to detect and relatively easy
- to emplace by staging equipment in vehicles or near overpasses, and, in a matter of minutes, having the IED
- armed and in the desired location.
- (S//NF) Explosives wrapped in a brown paper bag or a plastic trash bag. This is a particularly easy method of
- concealment, easy to emplace, and has been used effectively against Coalition Forces and civilians along
- Route Irish.
- (S//NF) Explosives set on a timer. This technique is new to the Route Irish area, but is being seen more
- frequently.
- (S//NF) Use of the median. The 50 meter wide median of Route Irish provides a large area for emplacing IEDs.
- These can be dug in, hidden, and/or placed in an animal carcass or other deceptive container.
- (S//NF) Surface laid explosives. The enemy will drop a bag containing the explosive onto the highway and exit
- the area on an off-ramp with the detonation occurring seconds or minutes later depending on the desired time
- for the explosion.
- (S//NF) Explosives on opposite sides of the median. Devices have been found along both sides of the median
- that were apparently designed to work in tandem, to counter Coalition Force tactics to avoid the right side
- of the highway while traveling Route Irish.
- (S//NF) Explosives hidden under the asphalt. Insurgents pretend to do work on the pavement, plant the
- explosives, and repair the surface. These are usually remote-detonated devices.(Annex 11E).
- 3. (U) Insurgent TTPs for VBIEDs
- (U) There are two basic types of car bombs, i.e., suicide (where the car is moving) and stationary (where the
- car is parked). Both can be either command or remote-detonated. (Annex 8E). (S//NF) The enemy is very skillful
- at inconspicuously packing large amounts of explosives into a vehicle. The most commonly used detonation
- materials are plastic explosives and 155mm artillery shells. When moving, these VBIEDs are practically
- impossible to identify until it is too late. (Annex 8E).
- (U) The techniques for employing VBIEDs continue to evolve. Some of the more commonly used techniques include:
- (S//NF) Multiple suicide vehicles. The first vehicle either creates an opening for a second, more powerful
- vehicle, or acts as bait to draw other personnel, such as medics and other first responders, into the kill
- zone of the first vehicle. As people respond, the second VBIED engages the responders.
- (S//NF) Suicide VBIEDs are typically used against convoys, Coalition Force patrols, or Coalition checkpoints
- where they can achieve maximum damage. Such vehicles will rapidly approach the convoy from the rear and
- attempt to get in between convoy vehicles before detonating.
- (S//NF) Stationary VBIEDs are typically parked along main supply routes, like Route Irish, and often have
- been found near known checkpoints. These are usually remotely operated and may be employed in conjunction
- with a suicide VBIED.
- (S//NF) A particularly devious technique is for a driver to approach a checkpoint and claim that he has
- injured people in his vehicle. The VBIED is then detonated when Coalition Soldiers approach. (Annex 8E).
- 4. (U) Effectiveness of Attacks
- (U) The number of IED detonations from 15 June 2003 through 4 March 2005 (the date of the incident), has
- steadily increased. Although the effectiveness of those detonations has decreased over that timeframe, the
- overall average number of casualties during that period is nearly one per IED detonation. (Annex 4E).
- (S//NF) The week of the incident saw 166 IED incidents, with 131 detonations and 35 IEDs rendered safe. There
- were 82 casualties from those incidents. (Annex 4E).
- (U) The number of VBIED detonations from 15 June 2003 through 4 March 2005 has also seen a relatively steady
- increase. Similar to the decrease in the effectiveness of IEDs, the effectiveness of VBIEDs has also decreased
- over that period, but there have been spikes for particular VBIED events that have produced large numbers of
- casualties. (Annex 4E).
- (S//NF) There were 17 VBIEDs detonated during the week of the incident with five rendered safe. The average
- casualty per VBIED detonation that week was 23 due to the large number of casualties that resulted from a
- VBIED detonation in Al Hillah. The Al Hillah attack was widely publicized and caused all Coalition Forces
- concern as they patrolled Baghdad and its environs. Any intelligence gained on potential VBIEDs was passed in
- the form of a BOLO (Be On the Look Out) message to units on patrol via FM radio. (Annex 4E).
- D. (U) Recent Incidents in the Vicinity of Checkpoint 541
- (U) Overpasses like Checkpoint 541 are particularly susceptible to attacks. Such sites provide excellent early
- observation in all directions, easy escape routes, and high speed access to Route Irish. The latter factor is
- particularly evident at Checkpoint 541 where there is a long (380 meter) exit lane coming off of southbound
- Route Vernon leading to the on-ramp to Route Irish. (Annex 5E).
- (S//NF) Checkpoint 541 has been the site of 13 attacks between 1 November 2004 and early March 2005. Two of
- those attacks involved VBIEDs. Other attacks included mortars, small arms fire, and IEDs. (Annex 1E).
- (U) On the evening of the incident, there were at least two cases of small arms fire in the immediate
- vicinity, one before and one after the incident. Also, as mentioned earlier, while the Joint Investigation
- Team was examining the site, a hand grenade was tossed at the personnel from the Route Vernon overpass. This
- site is under the observation of insurgents in the adjoining housing complex and local neighborhoods anytime a
- position is established at Checkpoint 541. (Annex 1E).
- (S//NF) The two adjoining Route Irish checkpoints, numbers 540 and 542, were also the target of attacks during
- the 1 November 2004 to early March 2005 period. Checkpoint 540 had 15 attacks, with three of those attacks
- being VBIEDs. Similarly, Checkpoint 542 had 12 attacks during that period, with two of those attacks being
- VBIEDs. (Annex 1E).
- (U) Furthermore, two days before the incident, two Soldiers from the same unit (1-69 IN) were killed by an IED
- at Checkpoint 543. The Commander, A Company, 1-69 IN lost a very close friend in that attack. (Annexes 1E,
- 74C).
- E. (U) Unit Experience in the Baghdad Area of Responsibility
- 1. (U) Third Infantry Division (3ID)
- (U) The Division returned to Iraq in early February 2005. It conducted a formal Transfer of Authority with the
- 1st Cavalry Division and assumed responsibility for MND-Baghdad on 27 February 2005. (Annex 15E).
- (S//NF) The Division consists of seven U.S. Brigades and one Iraqi Brigade. Since their arrival, units of 3ID
- have conducted 14,463 patrols throughout the Baghdad area, to include 33 Rhino Bus escort missions (See
- Section III.C.5. of this report for background information on the Rhino Bus), through 25 March 2005. (Annex
- 15E).
- (S//NF) In its first month since TOA, 3ID has received 422 attacks from insurgents resulting in 13 killed and
- 60 wounded. (Annex 15E).
- 2. (U) Second Brigade, 10th Mountain Division (2/10 MTN)
- (U) The Second Brigade has been in Iraq for nearly eight months. (Annex 65C).
- (U) From 12 August 2004 to 11 March 2005, 2/10 MTN Soldiers conducted approximately 50,000 patrols. The
- Soldiers also conducted 5,237 Traffic Control Points (TCPs) during that period. (Annex 4E).
- (U) Between 15 December 2004 and 13 March 2005, 2/10 MTN Soldiers conducted 712 TCPs in support of Rhino Bus
- operations. There were usually eight such TCPs conducted per night in support of Rhino Bus movements. (Annex
- 4E).
- (U) The TCPs that were conducted for the Rhino Bus movements are more properly called hasty Blocking Positions
- (BPs). (See Section III.B. of this report for a discussion of the difference between TCPs and BPs).
- 3. (U) 1-69 Infantry Battalion (1-69 IN)
- (U) 1-69 IN arrived in the Iraqi Theater of Operations on 4 November 2004. The unit first served in Taji,
- north of Baghdad where they spent approximately three months. While in Taji, the primary mission of 1-69 IN
- was to conduct patrols in search of insurgents responsible for firing rockets and mortars at Coalition bases.
- (Annex 10E).
- (U) In February 2005, 1-69 IN relocated to Baghdad under the command and control of 2/10 MTN. The Commander,
- 1st Cavalry Division assigned the unit the mission of patrolling and securing Route Irish as of 15 February
- 2005. (Annex 65C).
- (U) Through early April 2005, 1-69 IN had conducted over 2000 patrols in Iraq. About two-thirds of those
- patrols were dismounted patrols requiring the Soldiers to leave their vehicles. About one-third of the patrols
- were conducted at night. (Annex 10E).
- (U) The unit has conducted over 1000 Traffic Control Points (TCPs) since arriving in Iraq. Most of those
- occurred along Route Irish. Other than the subject incident, there was only one incident involving civilians
- (one wounded civilian in Taji). (Annex 10E).
- (S//NF) Since arriving in Iraq, 1-69 IN has experienced 19 roadside explosive devices, 38 incidents of small
- arms fire, 4 RPGs, 3 VBIEDs, 3 hand grenades, 16 indirect fire attacks, and 2 complex attacks. (Annex 10E).
- (S//NF) Five attacks against 1-69 IN in November resulted in two fatalities and three wounded. Five
- detonations in December resulted in one fatality and three wounded. In January 2005, 1-69 IN received six
- detonations that resulted in seven fatalities and three wounded. The seven fatalities all came in one attack
- involving 10 buried 155mm artillery rounds. After relocating to Baghdad in February, the unit received one
- attack with no fatalities or wounded. Through early March, 1-69 IN has received four detonations resulting in
- three fatalities and three wounded. (Annex 10E).
- (S//NF) Overall, 1-69 IN suffered 10 fatalities and 9 wounded while in Taji, followed by 3 fatalities and 3
- wounded while conducting security operations on Route Irish. All 13 of the units combat related fatalities in
- theater have come as a result of IEDs. (Annex 10E).
- 4. (U) 1-76 Field Artillery Battalion (1-76 FA)
- (U) 1-76 FA was new to the Baghdad AOR, having arrived on 21 February 2005. Their Right Seat/Left Seat Ride
- program began on 22 February 2005. 1-76 FA personnel were in the last night of their Right Seat/Left Seat Ride
- program with 2-82 FA and in charge of VIP security operations on the evening of 4 March 2005. The Transfer of
- Authority occurred the next day, 5 March 2005. (Annexes 59C, 63C).
- (U) 1-76 FA is responsible for security inside the International Zone as well as U.S. Embassy VIP movement
- security along Route Irish. (Annex 58C).
- (U) 1-76 FA has Direct Liaison Authorized (DIRLAUTH) to coordinate directly with 1-69 IN for security along
- Route Irish. This is the same level of coordination previously authorized by 1st Cavalry Division to 2-82 FA.
- When executing DIRLAUTH, 1-76 FA directly coordinates an action with units internal or external to its command
- and keeps the 3ID commander informed. The 1-76 FA TOC passes all coordination efforts through the 4th Brigade
- TOC to 3ID JOC. (Annex 58C).
- F. (U) Findings
- (U) Route Irish and its checkpoints, particularly the ones at the three overpasses (CP 540, CP 541, and CP
- 543), are continually subject to attacks from IEDs, VBIEDs, SAF, and other methods of attack. It is a road
- filled with dangers that can kill, maim, and injure Soldiers and civilians. (Annexes 3E, 5E, 8E).
- (U) The insurgents are continually adjusting their methods of attack along the Route Irish corridor. (Annex
- 11E).
- (U) The long straightaway off southbound Route Vernon leading to the on-ramp to westbound Route Irish provides
- an excellent opportunity for a suicide VBIED to build up speed and threaten Soldiers in their positions.
- (Annex 5E).
- (U) The Soldiers of 1-69 IN had suffered a significant number of deaths in the four months that they had been
- in Iraq as of 4 March 2005, including two Soldiers that were killed by an IED at Checkpoint 543 two days
- before the incident. (Annexes 1E, 10E).
- (U) 1-69 IN Soldiers were experienced in patrolling, providing route security, and conducting TCPs. (Annex
- 10E).
- (U) Due to it being their first full day on shift, 1-76 FA Soldiers lacked experience in issuing operational
- orders and in battle tracking security forces during execution of blocking missions. (Annexes 59C, 63C).
- III. TRAFFIC CONTROL POINTS, BLOCKING POSITIONS, AND TRAINING
- A. (U) Introduction
- (U) This section examines TCPs, BPs, and training matters. It first discusses the difference between a TCP and
- a BP. Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) for the various units involved regarding TCPs and BPs are assessed,
- and the Rhino Bus TTP is outlined. This is followed by a review of the training on TCPs, BPs, weapons, and
- Rules of Engagement (ROE) that the Soldiers manning BP 541 had received before 4 March 2005. The ROE that were
- in effect that night are explained. The section concludes with findings and recommendations.
- B. (U) Traffic Control Points and Blocking Positions
- (U) Task Force 1-69 IN had received missions to establish TCPs and blocking positions numerous times in the
- past. Although the terms are used interchangeably (Annex 65C), there are subtle, but distinct, differences in
- approach to establishing the two positions. (Annex 96C).
- (S//NF) A traffic control point involves (1) the stopping of a vehicle, (2) a search of that vehicle, and (3)
- the authorized passage of the vehicle through the control point. (Annexes 66C, 68C, 70C, 72C). TCPs can be of
- limited or extended duration. (Annex 97C).
- (S//NF) A blocking position, in contrast, does not involve the search of a vehicle. Ideally, the underlying
- intent of a blocking position involves no contact with a vehicle. In Iraq, the purpose of a BP is twofold: (1)
- to prevent vehicles from gaining access to the protected location, and (2) to prevent VBIEDs from getting
- close enough to kill or injure Soldiers or civilians. Blocking positions are neither intended nor designed to
- allow traffic to pass. The intent is to achieve maximum standoff from approaching vehicles and force them to
- turn around. (Annexes 66C, 68C, 70C). Blocking positions can be temporary or for longer durations. (Annex
- 97C). As indicated to 1-69 IN during Relief in Place operations, patrols must be prepared to execute hasty BPs
- when required.
- C. (U) Standing Operating Procedures in use on 4 March 2005
- (U) SOPs are designed to serve as guidelines for specific operations and are not prescriptive in nature. They
- provide a baseline for acceptable operations from which commanders can derive principles and techniques and
- adapt them to their current mission. (Annexes 44C, 65C, 72C, 96C, 98C).
- 1. (U) Doctrinal Discussion of TCPs and Roadblocks (Army Field Manual 3-21.9,
- Chapter 7)
- (U) Construction and manning of checkpoints and roadblocks are high frequency tasks for an infantry company
- and subordinate elements when they must establish area security during stabilization operations. (Annex 5F).
- (U) A checkpoint is a predetermined point used as a means of controlling movement, such as a place where
- military police check vehicular and pedestrian traffic, to enforce circulation measures and other law, order,
- and regulations. (Annex 5F).
- (U) A roadblock is used to limit the movement of vehicles along a route or to close access to certain areas or
- roads. Checkpoints and roadblocks can be either deliberate or hasty. The primary difference is the extent of
- planning and preparation conducted by the establishing force. (Annex 5F).
- (U) Checkpoints and roadblocks may be established to:
- (U) Check and/or inspect and register all personnel and vehicles in and out of the controlled area.
- (U) Deter illegal movement.
- (U) Create an instant roadblock.
- (U) Control movement into the area of operations or on a specific route.
- (U) Prevent smuggling and contraband.
- (Annex 5F).
- (U) The layout, construction, and manning of checkpoints and roadblocks should reflect the considerations of
- Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops Available Time, Civilians (METT-TC), especially the time available for
- emplacing them. (Annex 5F). The following factors should be considered in establishing a checkpoint or
- roadblock:
- (U) Position the checkpoint or roadblock where it is visible and where traffic cannot turn back, get off the
- road, or bypass without being observed.
- (U) Place obstacles in the road to slow or canalize traffic into the search area.
- (U) Position a combat vehicle off the road, but within sight, to deter resistance to Soldiers manning the
- checkpoint. It must be able to engage vehicles attempting to break through or bypass a checkpoint.
- (Annex 5F).
- (U) Many items are used to reinforce a roadblock or a checkpoint. These include: barrels filled with sand,
- water, or heavy concrete blocks (emplaced to slow and canalize vehicles), concertina wire (emplaced to control
- movement around the checkpoint), and signs stating the speed limit into and out of the checkpoint (in both
- English and the local language.) (Annex 5F). 2. (U) 3ID TCP SOP
- (S//NF) In 3ID s published Field Standard Operating Procedures (FSOP), there is a section directly addressing
- traffic control points. A TCP is defined as a Structured Engagement Area. The 3ID FSOP does not include
- guidelines for positions with a blocking mission (i.e., blocking positions). (Annex 1F).
- (S//NF) The TCP SOP calls for an Alert Line, a Warning Line, a Stop line, a Search Area, and an Overwatch
- Area. (Annex 1F).
- (S//NF) The Search Area should be a well-lit checkpoint, provide standoff from neighborhood structures, allow
- a sufficient area to accommodate more than one search team, the establishment of warning signs with sufficient
- distance for drivers to react, the use of physical barriers to force vehicles to slow down, and other barriers
- like tire poppers, to block movement of vehicles attempting to continue through the search area. (Annex 1F).
- (S//NF) The Warning Line and Alert Line should provide maximum standoff for oncoming traffic. (Annex 1F).
- (S//NF) Soldiers should fire into engine blocks before engaging the driver. (Annex 1F).
- (S//NF) The equipment for a TCP includes warning signs, triangles, sawhorses, traffic cones, and/or tire
- poppers. (Annex 1F).
- (S//NF) Minimum leader requirements for executing a TCP are listed as (1) map reconnaissance, (2) mission
- briefing, (3) safety briefing, and (4) back brief to the commander or designated representative. Position
- selection considerations are not specifically addressed. (Annex 1F).
- 3. (U) 2/10 MTN TCP SOP
- (S//NF) The 2/10 MTNs published Tactical Standing Operating Procedures (TACSOP) addresses checkpoint
- operations. The TACSOP does not provide guidance on blocking positions. (Annex 2F).
- (S//NF) A unit establishes checkpoints to control its area of responsibility, deny the enemy freedom of
- movement, and contribute to security of military units as well as the populace. They must be established to
- ensure that the position cannot be bypassed. (Annex 2F).
- (S//NF) The 2/10 MTN TACSOP distinguishes between vehicle checkpoints (VCPs) and personnel checkpoints (PCPs).
- These are further divided into three types: deliberate, hasty, and flying. (Annex 2F).
- (S//NF) Deliberate checkpoints are permanent or semi-permanent. They are used near operating bases or along
- Main Supply Routes (MSRs). (Annex 2F).
- (S//NF) Hasty checkpoints are planned in advance and will be maintained for a set period of time of short
- duration. Hasty checkpoints are frequently employed during the conduct of vehicle or foot patrols. (Annex 2F).
- (S//NF) Flying, or immediate, checkpoints are conducted when specific intelligence indicates that a checkpoint
- will hinder the enemys freedom of movement at a specific time and place. They are conducted immediately and
- often with little or no planning. (Annex 2F). Although not a TCP mission, the mission given to 1-69 IN to
- block Route Irish on 4 March 2005 fell into this category.
- (S//NF) Vehicle checkpoints should consist of four zones: canalization zone, turning or deceleration zone,
- search zone, and safe zone. (Annex 2F).
- (S//NF) The canalization zone uses natural obstacles and/or artificial obstacles to canalize the vehicles into
- the checkpoint. It usually consists of disrupting or turning obstacles, such as serpentines and other barrier
- systems. Warning signs should be placed at least 100 meters in front of the checkpoint. (Annex 2F).
- (S//NF) The turning or deceleration zone forces vehicles to make a rapid decision, i.e., decelerate, make slow
- hard turns, or maintain speed and crash into obstacles. (Annex 2F).
- (S//NF) The search zone is a relatively secure area where personnel and vehicles are positively identified.
- (Annex 2F).
- (S//NF) The safe zone is the assembly area for the checkpoint that allows personnel to eat, sleep, and recover
- in relative security. (Annex 2F).
- (S//NF) The use of radios or cell phones should be limited to essential communications and/or entirely
- prohibited as their transmissions may detonate any IEDs present. (Annex 2F).
- (S//NF) The SOPs used by 2/10 MTN originated with the 1st Armored Division, and then were adopted by the 1st
- Cavalry Division, and in turn by 3ID. (Annexes 66C, 67C). It is noted that the SOP is not prescriptive, i.e.,
- there is no requirement for signs, only a suggestion. (Annex 2F). Soldiers and leaders alike acknowledged
- using this SOP as a reference for establishing blocking positions, adopting certain procedures and equipment
- as required. (Annexes 65C, 66C, 98C).
- 4. (U) 1-69 IN TCP SOP
- (S//NF) The 1-69 IN has its own Tactical Standard Operating Procedures (TACSOP). It is a modified version of
- the 256th Brigade TACSOP. (Annexes 72C, 98C, 3F). It addresses checkpoint operations, but not blocking
- positions. (Annexes 72C, 96C, 3F). In addition, there are checklists for equipment to be used at TCPs. (Annex
- 3F).
- (S//NF) The TCPs described in the 1-69 TACSOP are of a more enduring nature than those described in 2/10 MTNs
- TACSOP. Even hasty checkpoints are more like 2/10 MTN s deliberate checkpoints. There is no similar position
- as the flying or immediate TCP described by the 2/10 MTN SOP. (Annex 3F).
- (S//NF) The Battle Drill for TCP occupation described in the 1-69 IN TACSOP is the same as that found in 3ID s
- FSOP. (Annexes 1F, 3F).
- (S//NF) The Battalion considers barriers as mandatory equipment for blocking positions (Annexes 96C, 97C,
- 98C). These can be existing barriers on site or other obstacles such as concertina wire. (Annexes 96C, 98C).
- The team at BP 541 considered the on-site Jersey barriers as meeting this requirement. (Annexes 74C, 77C).
- (S//NF) Signs are required for TCPs. (Annex 96C). Signs were not used at BPs by 4-5 Air Defense Artillery
- (ADA), 1-69 IN s predecessor. Based on their experience, the opinion of the BP 541 Soldiers was that signs had
- been marginally effective for TCPs conducted in the daytime in Taji. They were less effective at night. During
- both day and night operations, the signs were easily bypassed. (Annexes 79C, 87C).
- (S//NF) The Soldiers have found concertina wire to be effective at TCPs in the daytime. Wire becomes quite
- ineffective at night as motorists cannot see it, even when chemlights are attached to it. Furthermore, the BP
- 541 Soldiers believed that the emplacement of concertina wire exposes them to additional risk. (Annexes 79C,
- 87C).
- (S//NF) The signs that A Company, 1-69 IN Soldiers had used in Taji had not been available since their move to
- Baghdad on 5 February 2005. (Annexes 81C, 112C). On or about 12 February 2005, the signs were unloaded and
- stored next to a conex. There were approximately 25 signs in this shipment. These were TCP signs that said
- Stop and Wait to be called forward. Other signs that had been for the rear of vehicles said Stay back 100
- meters or you will be shot. The last part of that phrase or you will be shot was to be covered with tape.
- (Annex 112C). The signs had not been modified, and, therefore, not reissued as of 4 March 2005. (Annex 95C).
- 5. (U) Rhino Bus Run TTP Background Information
- (U) Since October 2004, there had been significant insurgent contact on Route Irish. Most of the contacts were
- RPGs, SAF, IEDs, and VBIEDs. These attacks prompted a re-assessment of the Coalitions responses for operations
- along Route Irish.
- (S//NF) Route Irish is the primary route to BIAP for U.S. Embassy personnel, and there was routinely at least
- one convoy each day. Rhino buses (armored buses) were procured to provide better protection for passengers.
- Additionally, a series of briefings and plans were developed to address the insurgent situation along Route
- Irish. The result was the Rhino Bus Run Program. (Annex 65C).
- (S//NF) Under the Rhino Bus Run Program, 1-76 FA escorts two or three Rhino armored buses and one or two
- baggage trucks to and from the Embassy staging area in the International Zone and the BIAP passenger terminal
- twice nightly, seven days a week. Each run consists of up to 65 escorted passengers. This is the standard TTP
- 1-76 FA learned during the Right Seat/Left Seat Ride program conducted by 2-82 FA as part of Relief in Place
- operations. 1-76 FAs higher headquarters, Fourth Brigade, coordinates attack helicopter support to conduct
- route reconnaissance ahead of the convoy and Close Air Support in the event of an attack. (Annex 59C).
- (S//NF) Under the Rhino Bus Run TTP, 1-76 FA identifies the escort platoon. Once the escort platoon leader
- receives the number of passengers for transport at the staging area, and has established communications with
- the attack helicopters, the 1-76 FA TOC requests clearance from the 3ID TOC (the battlespace owner) through
- 4th Brigade TOC to move the convoy. Once 4th Brigade receives clearance from 3ID TOC, the 1-76 FA Battle
- Captain contacts 1-69 IN Battle Captain and requests that they establish blocking positions along Route Irish.
- Once the 1-69 IN Battle Captain notifies the 1-76 FA Battle Captain that the units are set in position, the
- convoys depart from the staging area. Once the convoy has passed ECP 1, the 1-76 FA Battle Captain contacts
- the 1-69 IN Battle Captain and clears the units to open their blocking positions. The same process is followed
- for the reverse trip. (Annex 59C).
- (U) There is no written SOP that covers Rhino Bus operations. The TTPs that 1-76 FA used on 4 March 2005 are
- the same TTPs employed by 2-82 FA. (Annex 59C).
- D. (U) Training of BP 541 Soldiers
- (U) The Soldiers manning BP 541 on 4 March 2005 received SOP training on TCPs at Fort Hood and the National
- Training Center (NTC). (Annexes 72C, 96C, 97C, 98C). The training at Fort Hood was part of mobilization
- training, and was conducted by the Battalion leadership and the Mobilization Assistance Team, while the
- training at NTC occurred as part of the Mission Rehearsal Exercise. (Annex 96C).
- (S//NF) The Soldiers were trained to the following standards for TCPs: (1) 360 degree security, (2) one
- element controls traffic entry to the TCP, and (3) one element conducts searches and operates the detainee
- holding area. Soldiers are to control traffic effectively and efficiently, keep Soldiers safe, and accomplish
- the mission. (Annex 96C).
- (S//NF) The Battalion Commander gave verbal guidance at Fort Hood on using M4s as the primary weapon for
- firing warning shots. This was intended for mounted mobile operations as a TTP for clearing overhead passes
- instead of static blocking positions due to difficulty in traversing the gunners turret. (Annex 73C).
- (S//NF) There is no evidence to indicate that the Soldiers were trained to execute blocking positions before
- arriving in theater. TTPs for blocking positions and other operations were learned and practiced during the
- Right Seat/Left Seat Ride exercises as part of the Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority process with the
- Soldiers of 4-5 ADA from 5 to 15 February 2005. Gunners and leaders were able to watch tasks being performed
- before they had to perform these tasks themselves under the supervision of 4-5 ADA. (Annexes 72C, 96C, 97C,
- 98C, 9G). These TTPs were accepted by the 1-69 IN Battalion Commander as approved higher headquarters
- sanctioned guidance. (Annex 72C).
- (S//NF) The 4-5 ADA blocking position TTP called for one vehicle, either a HMMWV or a Bradley Fighting
- Vehicle, to pull up next to the last Jersey barrier (closest to Route Irish). The Soldiers at the BP would
- then use a hand-held spotlight and laser pointer to get drivers attention, and make them stop and turn
- around. Normally, these blocking positions, which were hasty in nature, would be held for 10-15 minutes
- before the TOC would order the road opened. Signs were not used by 4-5 ADA. (Annexes 74C, 83C).
- (S//NF) As demonstrated by 4-5 ADA previously, the standard practice by Alpha Company, 1-69 IN personnel at
- blocking positions is for the gunner to use the spotlight, while the HMMWV commander or Truck Commander
- operates the laser pointer. If the gunner must fire his weapon, M4 or M240B, he drops the hand-held light to
- engage the threat with well-aimed fire using both hands. (Annexes 74C, 79C). There is no specific training for
- operating the spotlight and the M240B simultaneously. (Annex 66C).
- (U) Based upon the fact that two 1-69 IN Soldiers were killed by an IED two nights before at Checkpoint 543,
- his experience, training, and risk assessment, the Alpha Company Commander chose to augment the 4-5 ADA TTP on
- 4 March 2005 by placing two HMMWVs at BP 541 for additional force protection. Force protection was paramount
- in his mind because of the threat of IEDs and VBIEDs. (Annex 74C). As a result, Second Lieutenant Acosta
- tasked the overwatch vehicle gunner to operate the green laser pointer rather than have Staff Sergeant Brown,
- the Truck Commander do so. (Annexes 77C, 87C).
- E. (U) Rules Of Engagement (ROE) Training Received by BP 541 Soldiers
- (U) The Soldiers were trained on ROE as part of their deployment preparation at Fort Hood and the National
- Training Center (NTC), as well as in Kuwait and Iraq. (Annexes 111C, 128C, 134C). The training at Fort Hood
- and NTC centered on basic ROE concepts of the escalation of force, hostile intent, hostile act, and positive
- identification. Specifically, Soldiers were briefed on the right of self defense, which allows them to defend
- themselves and Coalition Forces with all necessary force to negate the potential threat. Soldiers also
- received training in graduated force, which is designed to allow them to employ escalating measures of
- non-lethal force to properly discern hostile intent and prevent accidental civilian injury. Soldiers were
- briefed on positive identification (PID), which requires Soldiers to have a reasonable certainty that the
- object of attack is a proper military target. Soldiers were also briefed on the protections afforded detainees
- and civilians, their duty to care for the wounded and sick, military necessity, proportionality,
- discrimination, and collateral damage1 . (Annexes 111C, 1G, 3G).
- (U) While at NTC, judge advocates from the Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO) conducted impromptu
- interviews with the Soldiers, including Soldiers from 1-69 IN, where they were questioned about basic ROE
- principles. ROE is a key aspect of training at NTC and Soldiers are challenged with difficult, real world
- scenarios that emphasize ROE issues, such as, the use of force and properly identifying hostile intent.
- (Annexes 111C, 1G).
- (U) The Soldiers of the BP 541 team had received formal refresher ROE training approximately one month before
- the incident. (Annexes 129C, 132C, 133C, 137C). This training included vignettes on TCP operations, fixed site
- security, and patrols, and emphasized the use of graduated force and how and when to use non-lethal measures
- of force. Specifically, the vignettes highlighted how to discern hostile act and hostile intent from innocuous
- civilian activity. (Annexes 111C, 1G). 19
- (S//NF) 1 Military necessity requires that all targets are proper military targets, i.e., they possess a
- military attribute, the destruction of which provides a military advantage. Proportionality refers to whether
- any expected collateral damage is excessive in comparison to the overall military value of the target.
- Discrimination requires Soldiers to employ force in a manner that properly distinguishes between lawful
- targets and unlawful targets. Collateral damage encompasses any death or injury to civilians and damage or
- destruction of civilian property.
- (U) The entire battalion, including every member of the BP 541 team, received an in-depth review of a recent
- AR 15-6 investigation involving a shooting incident that further reinforced proper execution of ROE. (Annex
- 133C). The investigation involved the wounding of a civilian at a TCP, in which the vehicle was driving at a
- high rate of speed and the Soldiers at the TCP engaged the vehicle. The brief discussed the use of signs,
- chemical lights, spotlights, and graduated force as it applies to fixed position operations. Failure to follow
- the SOP was discussed and how proper use of the SOP can help a Soldier to discern hostile intent. Escalation
- of force to discern hostile intent was emphasized. (Annexes 111C, 1G, 2G, 3G).
- (U) Furthermore, the Soldiers were briefed on ROE before going out on patrol each day. They were so briefed on
- 4 March 2005. (Annexes 83C, 129C, 130C, 132C, 134C, 135C).
- (S//NF) The 1-69 IN TACSOP ROE defines a Hostile Act as a use of force against 1-69 IN or friendly forces, or
- persons or property under the protection of 1-69 IN forces that is likely to cause serious permanent injury or
- death or significant property damage. (Annex 3F).
- (S//NF) The 1-69 IN TACSOP ROE defines Hostile Intent as a threat of imminent use of force against 1-69 IN or
- friendly forces, or persons or property under the protection of MNC-I forces that is likely to cause serious
- permanent injury or death or significant property damage. Hostile intent may be judged by the threatening
- force or individual s capability and preparedness to inflict damage, or by evidence, particularly
- intelligence, that clearly indicates that a surprise strike is imminent. (Annex 3F).
- (S//NF) The 1-69 IN TACSOP ROE allows the use of deadly force if a Soldier, his unit, other U.S. forces, or
- designated friendly forces are attacked or threatened with imminent attack. (Annex 3F).
- (S//NF) The ROE taught to the Soldiers was shout, show, shove, shoot. (Annexes 129C, 130C, 131C, 132C, 133C).
- The 1-69 IN TACSOP ROE also provides for shout, show, shove, shoot. (Annex 3F). For the night of 4 March 2005
- at BP 541, the Soldiers were told the ROE was: Shout, i.e., use the spotlight on an approaching vehicle as far
- in advance of the Alert Line as possible; Show, i.e., use the green laser light, aimed at the driver, at the
- Alert Line; Shove, i.e., fire warning shots; and Shoot, i.e., disabling shots first, then, if necessary, shoot
- to kill. (Annexes 77C, 81C). F. (U) Findings
- (U) The leaders and Soldiers understood their mission to block vehicle access to Route Irish on the evening of
- 4 March 2005. They were knowledgeable of the Rules of Engagement to be employed in that mission. (Annexes 74C,
- 77C, 83C).
- (U) The Soldiers at BP 541 had been trained, and routinely refreshed on, the Rules of Engagement since their
- arrival in theater. (Annexes 77C, 81C, 111C).
- (U) There is no written SOP or TTP in 3ID, 2/10 MTN, or 1-69 IN for the execution of the blocking mission and
- establishing a blocking position. (Annexes 1F, 2F, 3F). The procedure was passed on from the departing unit
- (4-5 ADA) to the incoming unit (1-69 IN) during the Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority, where leaders
- observed the execution of the mission one week, and executed the mission the following week under the
- supervision of the outgoing unit (Right Seat/Left Side Ride). The only training received by 1-69 IN Soldiers
- on blocking positions was that employed along Route Irish during after-curfew Rhino Bus Runs, and occurred
- during the Left Seat Right Seat Ride process with 4-5 ADA. (Annexes 72C, 96C, 97C, 98C, 9G). It is clear that
- these BPs were not established as TCPs.
- (U) There is no clear guidance in these units on what equipment is required for establishing a blocking
- position (e.g., different road signs). (Annexes 1F, 2F, 3F).
- (U) Requiring the gunner in a blocking position to operate the hand-held spotlight as well as his crew-served
- weapon is an accepted practice in 1-69 IN. (Annexes 72C, 74C).
- G. (U) Recommendations
- (U) Recommend that all Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs) review the inherent differences between the blocking
- mission and any other mission involving TCPs. Given the nature of the environment in Iraq, recommend that
- blocking positions be addressed separately in unit SOPs.
- (S//NF) Soldiers and leaders must understand that in a BP, the goal is to achieve standoff as far away and as
- quickly as possible, with no vehicle passage.
- (U) Recommend a comprehensive review of TCP and blocking position procedures, to include risk assessment,
- required equipment, considerations for site selection, and the establishment of clearly visible warnings or
- indicators, both day and night, for Soldier and civilian recognition. The Soldiers and leaders must look at
- the position holistically, i.e., from the perspective of Iraqi drivers and what they might see. Units must
- enforce a quality control program to maintain established standards.
- (U) As of this writing, MNC-I has already embarked on a comprehensive analysis of Entry Control Points (ECPs),
- TCPs, and BPs.
- (S//NF) This analysis will produce standard practices and guidelines for the selection and establishment of
- ECPs, TCPs, and BPs.
- (U) Recommend that permanent Coalition participation be included in the Force Protection Working Group to
- solicit lessons learned from other nations experiences in operating ECPs, TCPs, and BPs in an insurgency
- environment.
- (U) Recommend the development and publication of a written SOP for Rhino Bus Runs.
- IV. THE INCIDENT AT BP 541
- A. (U) Introduction
- (U) This section examines the shooting incident at BP 541 on the night of 4 March 2005. The section begins
- with a description of the site and then a brief look at the individuals involved. The mission assigned to the
- 1-69 IN Soldiers is detailed. The incident itself is then described. The events immediately following the
- shooting are addressed next. Following this is a look at the forensic evidence. The section concludes with
- findings and recommendations.
- B. (U) Site Description
- (U) BP 541 was located on the on-ramp from southbound Route Vernon onto westbound Route Irish approximately
- six miles west of the International Zone in Baghdad. Specifically, BP 541 (Grid 38S MB3571 8371) was located
- at the intersection of Route Vernon and Route Irish, which is the second intersection on Route Irish east of
- Baghdad International Airport (BIAP). The road leading to the on-ramp begins where the westernmost lane of
- Route Vernon separates from the highway. The on-ramp itself begins near a side street that borders the edge of
- a housing area on the west side of the road. This point is approximately 640 meters south of the nearby
- underpass on Route Vernon, and approximately 380 meters from where the road to the on-ramp splits from Route
- Vernon. (Annexes 141K, 144K).
- (U) At the interchange of the on-ramp and Route Vernon, the highway becomes an overpass extending over Route
- Irish. Three separate concrete Jersey barriers are located in the on-ramp to Route Irish. The barriers are
- arranged with the first two barriers on the right hand side of the on-ramp and the third one on the left hand
- side of the on-ramp, but not in a serpentine configuration, as one approaches from the north. The first
- barrier is approximately 75 meters from the concrete abutment of the Route Vernon overpass near the beginning
- of the on-ramp. The second barrier is approximately 37 meters beyond the first barrier (112 meters from the
- concrete abutment). The third barrier is approximately 31 meters beyond the second barrier (143 meters from
- the abutment). This third, or southernmost, barrier is approximately 80 meters from where the on-ramp merges
- with westbound Route Irish. The total length of the on-ramp is approximately 223 meters. (Annexes 142K, 144K).
- (U) From the vantage point of the southernmost barrier, Route Irish is directly south of the position with a
- 50-meter median separating the eastbound and westbound lanes. To the north and northwest of the position,
- there is a large open area that is littered with garbage and debris. The field extends from the bottom of the
- on-ramp to the side street and west. Immediately beyond the side street, approximately 150 meters from the
- southernmost barrier, is a large housing community with windows and porches that overlook the on-ramp. There
- is a clear line of sight from the houses to the on-ramp. The
- Route Vernon overpass stands several stories higher than the on-ramp and runs parallel to the on-ramp until
- the on-ramp curves to the southwest, approximately 50 meters from the beginning of the on-ramp. The overpass
- is supported by large cylinder concrete supports. The ground under the overpass is also littered with garbage
- and debris. (Annexes 16K, 143K).
- (U) The road itself is concrete. There is a slight elevation gain between the beginning of the on-ramp and its
- merger with Route Irish. The curve is banked slightly. The on-ramp, but for the Jersey barriers, is wide
- enough to accommodate two vehicles abreast of each other, i.e., it is two-lanes wide. (Annexes 16K, 19K).
- C. (U) Personnel Involved
- 1. (U) Captain Michael Drew, New York Army National Guard, a New York City Police Department Sergeant was the
- Commander, A Company, 1-69 IN, in charge of patrolling Route Irish and establishing blocking positions at four
- checkpoints on the night of 4 March 2005. (Annex 1J).
- 2. (U) First Lieutenant Robert Daniels, New York Army National Guard, was the Executive Officer for A Company,
- 1-69 IN on 4 March 2005 and was initially present at BP 541. (Annex 2J).
- 3. (U) Second Lieutenant Nicolas Acosta, Louisiana National Guard, was the platoon leader in charge of BP 541
- on 4 March 2005. (Annex 6J).
- 4. (U) Sergeant Sean OHara, Louisiana National Guard, was in the overwatch vehicle at BP 541 on 4 March 2005.
- (Annex 8J).
- 5. (U) Sergeant Luis Domangue, Louisiana National Guard, was the secondary gunner in the overwatch vehicle at
- BP 541 on 4 March 2005. (Annex 5J).
- 6. (U) Specialist Kenneth Mejia, Louisiana National Guard, was the driver of the overwatch vehicle at BP 541
- on 4 March 2005, and a trained combat life saver. (Annex 4J).
- 7. (U) Staff Sergeant Michael Brown, New York Army National Guard, a New York City Police Department officer
- was the acting Platoon Sergeant at BP 541 and the Truck Commander of the blocking vehicle on 4 March 2005.
- (Annex 7J).
- 8. (U) Specialist Mario Lozano, New York Army National Guard, was the gunner on the blocking vehicle at BP 541
- on 4 March 2005. He had been an M240B and M249 gunner in previous assignments. (Annex 10J).
- 9. (U) Specialist Brian Peck, New York Army National Guard, was the driver of the blocking vehicle at BP 541
- on 4 March 2005. (Annex 9J).
- 10. (U) Sergeant First Class Edwin Feliciano, New York Army National Guard, was with the Company Commanders
- vehicle on 4 March 2005. (Annex 3J).
- 11. (U) Mr. Nicola Calipari was an Italian military intelligence officer with the rank of Major General who
- was in charge of the recovery of Ms. Sgrena on 4 March 2005. (Annex 104C).
- 12. (U) Mr. Andrea Carpani is an Italian military intelligence officer with the rank of Major in the
- Carabinieri with years of experience working and driving in Baghdad. He was driving the car involved in the
- incident on 4 March 2005. (Annex 104C).
- 13. (U) Ms. Giuliana Sgrena is an Italian journalist for Il Manifesto. She had been kidnapped and held hostage
- in Baghdad for one month at the time of her release on the night of 4 March 2005. (Annex 103C).
- D. (U) The Mission
- 1. (U) Receipt of the Mission
- (U) The mission of A Company, 1-69 IN on 4 March 2005 was their standard mission, i.e., to provide security
- along Route Irish. The mission entailed looking for IEDs and VBIEDs and ensuring Coalition convoys could
- safely transit between the International Zone and BIAP. A Company, 1-69 IN had been performing this mission
- since 15 February 2005. Their normal patrol shift was 1500 to 2300 daily. (Annex 137C).
- (U) While on patrol, Captain Drew received two VBIED BOLO reports via radio, one for a black car, another for
- a white car. (Annexes 74C, 13E, 14E). He passed that information via radio to his subordinate leaders,
- including Second Lieutenant Acosta, who passed it on to his troops. (Annexes 74C, 77C).
- (U) At 1843 hours, the 1-69 IN Battle Captain received a call from the 1-76 FA Battle Captain asking how
- quickly they could establish blocking positions along Route Irish. (Annexes 60C, 61C, 3L).
- (S//NF) Adverse weather had mandated that the VIP travel by ground rather than by helicopter, and the Embassy
- requested that access to Route Irish be blocked for the movement. (Annexes 60C, 61C, 3L).
- (S//NF) At approximately 1900 hours, A Company, 1-69 IN received a mission from its Battalion TOC. A Company
- was directed to establish blocking positions on the four westbound on-ramps along Route Irish to support the
- movement of a VIP from the International Zone as they would for a Rhino Bus Run mission. (Annexes 58C, 133C,
- 137C). (U) At 1916 hours the 1-76 FA Battle Captain called the 1-69 IN Battle Captain to order all elements to
- report to their blocking positions for the VIP transit. (Annex 3L).
- (S//NF) Captain Drew considered the current enemy situation, and decided to place an M2 Bradley Fighting
- Vehicle at both Checkpoint 542 and Checkpoint 543, and two HMMWVs each at Checkpoint 540 and Checkpoint 541.
- He assigned Checkpoint 541 to a team led by Second Lieutenant Acosta. (Annex 137C).
- (U) At approximately 1930 hours, Second Lieutenant Acosta arrived at Checkpoint 541 with three HMMWVs. He
- found First Lieutenant Daniels in position at the on-ramp. Second Lieutenant Acosta relieved First Lieutenant
- Daniels. A short time later, Captain Drew pulled up in his HMMWV, took one of Second Lieutenant Acostas HMMWVs
- for placement at Checkpoint 540, and then left with First Lieutenant Daniels accompanying him. (Annex 133C).
- (U) At 1938 hours, the 1-69 IN Battle Captain reported to the 2/10 MTN Battle Captain that all blocking
- positions had been established. The 1-76 FA Battle Captain reported to the 2/10 MTN Battle Captain that the
- VIP would depart in approximately five to ten minutes. (Annex 2L).
- (U) At 1945 hours, the VIP security convoy NCOIC reported to the 1-76 FA Battle Captain that the convoy with
- the VIP departed the International Zone with a destination of Camp Victory. The 2/10 MTN Battle Captain
- requested the VIPs convoy departure time and composition from the 3ID JOC Battle Captain, as they were not in
- direct contact with 1-76 FA. Meanwhile, the 1-76 FA Battle Captain directed 1-69 IN Battle Captain to initiate
- the Route Irish closure plan. (Annexes 59C, 64C, 2L).
- 2. (U) Establishing the Blocking Position
- (U) The instructions given to Second Lieutenant Acosta by Captain Drew were to set up a blocking position to
- facilitate the movement of a VIP down Route Irish. (Annex 77C). Captain Drew also issued guidance on the
- importance of force protection. (Annex 74C). He expected to maintain the blocking position no more than 15
- minutes. (Annexes 74C, 77C).
- (U) Second Lieutenant Acosta emplaced his two vehicles to establish the blocking position. He positioned the
- blocking vehicle commanded by Staff Sergeant Brown on the road, near the outer curb, positioned in conjunction
- with the second barrier of three Jersey barriers already on-site on the on-ramp. Second Lieutenant Acosta
- placed the overwatch vehicle by the third Jersey barrier, closest to Route Irish. (Annexes 142K, 143K). In
- their final positions, both vehicles were facing toward Route Irish. (Annex 77C).
- (U) Second Lieutenant Acosta, using the factors of METT-TC, positioned the vehicles to provide standoff from
- the overpass (a common hand grenade throwing location), a clear line of sight to on-coming traffic, overwatch
- field of view (to watch for threats from nearby buildings), and to allow adequate room for on-coming vehicles
- to stop and turn around. (Annexes 77C, 83C).
- (U) Staff Sergeant Browns vehicle was positioned to block traffic from using the on-ramp to enter Route Irish.
- The other vehicle was positioned to provide overwatch of the area as well as to block traffic entering the
- on-ramp the wrong way from Route Irish. (Annexes 77C, 83C).
- (U) After consulting with Staff Sergeant Brown, Second Lieutenant Acosta established the Alert Line at the
- concrete abutment of the Route Vernon overpass. The Warning Line was established as the second light pole on
- the overpass up the on-ramp from the Alert Line. (Annexes 77C, 83C, 16K).
- (U) Second Lieutenant Acosta and Staff Sergeant Brown informed the gunners of the Alert Line and Warning Line
- locations, and reviewed when to shine the spotlight, and when to fire warning shots. (Annexes 77C, 83C).
- 3. (U) The duties of the Soldiers
- (U) Specialist Peck was the driver of the blocking vehicle and was to remain in the drivers seat, facing west
- down Route Irish. (Annexes 85C, 130C).
- (U) Specialist Lozano was the gunner in the blocking vehicle. He was to remain in the turret, facing north up
- the on-ramp toward on-coming traffic. From there, he was to operate a three million candlepower hand-held
- spotlight that he was to shine on approaching vehicles as soon as possible, even before the Alert Line (he was
- able to see at least 20 meters beyond the Alert Line). (Annexes 77C, 79C, 83C, 134C).
- (U) Staff Sergeant Brown, the Truck Commander of the blocking vehicle and acting Platoon Sergeant, was to be
- dismounted so he could execute local security around his vehicle. (Annexes 83C, 131C).
- (U) Specialist Mejia was the driver of the overwatch vehicle and was to remain in the drivers seat, facing
- west down Route Irish. (Annexes 89C, 128C).
- (U) Sergeant Domangue was to be in the turret of the overwatch vehicle where he would operate a green laser
- pointer. He was to shine the laser pointer on a vehicle as soon as he saw it, but no later than at the Alert
- Line, focusing it on the drivers side of the windshield. He was also to keep watch on the area between Route
- Irish and the on-ramp. (Annexes 87C, 129C).
- (U) Sergeant OHara was to be dismounted from the overwatch vehicle so as to provide local security for his
- vehicle. (Annexes 81C, 132C).
- (U) Second Lieutenant Acosta was to be dismounted so he could supervise the operation of the BP. (Annexes 77C,
- 133C).
- 4. (U) Communications Regarding the Mission Duration
- (U) Captain Drew, Second Lieutenant Acosta, and Staff Sergeant Brown were all concerned about the length of
- time that the Soldiers had been manning their blocking positions. (Annexes 74C, 77C, 83C). Captain Drew was
- concerned that leaving his Soldiers in a static position for more than 15 minutes left them open to attack. He
- was also concerned that he was not adequately performing his patrolling mission because his Soldiers were tied
- down to the blocking positions. (Annex 74C).
- (U) Captain Drew checked with the 1-69 IN TOC at least two times seeking to collapse the blocking positions
- and return his Soldiers to their patrolling mission. The 1-69 IN TOC, after checking with 2/10 MTN TOC,
- informed him that the convoy had not passed and to stay in position. (Annexes 74C, 2L).
- (U) At 2010 hours, the 2/10 MTN Battle Captain requested permission from the 3ID TOC to remove blocking
- positions until 15 minutes before VIP movement. (Annex 2L).
- (U) At 2014 hours, the 3ID TOC Battle Captain informed the 2/10 MTN Battle Captain that A Company, 1-69 IN
- could reduce their blocking positions until 2018 hours. (Annex 2L).
- (U) At 2015 hours, the 2/10 MTN Battle Captain reported to the 3ID TOC Battle Captain that A Company, 1-69 IN
- blocking positions would remain in place. (Annex 2L).
- (U) At 2020 hours, the 2/10 MTN Battle Captain notified 1-69 IN to keep blocking positions in place. (Annex
- 2L).
- (U) At 2030 hours, Captain Drew asked again about collapsing the blocking positions. He was told that the word
- from 3ID was not to move off the blocking positions, that the convoy would be coming down Route Irish in
- approximately 20 minutes, and that the convoy would consist of four HMMWVs and an up-armored Suburban.
- (Annexes 97C, 3L).
- (S//NF) 1-76 FA was able to communicate the requirement for blocking positions along Route Irish for a VIP
- movement from the International Zone to BIAP. (Annexes 58C, 59C, 62C, 63C). The security escort platoon with
- the VIP was able to, and did, relay departure and arrival times to the 1-76 FA Battle Captain. (Annexes 59C,
- 64C). The VIP convoy departed the International Zone in four HMMWVs (and no Suburban) at approximately 1945
- hours. It arrived at the Camp Victory gate at 2010 hours (Annex 59C). The convoy reached its destination on
- Camp Victory at 2020 hours (Annex 59C). The VIP returned to the International Zone by helicopter at
- approximately 2205 hours. The determination to fly by helicopter back to the International Zone was not made
- until shortly before the VIP departed as a result of clearing weather conditions. (Annexes 59C, 64C).
- (S//NF) The 1-76 TOC had two means of communicating with 4th Brigade, its higher headquarters: Voice Over
- Internet Protocol (VOIP)2 and FM. The 1-76 FA Battle Captain was using only VOIP to communicate with 1-69 IN,
- but experienced problems with VOIP, therefore losing its only communication link with 1-69 IN, other than
- going through 4th Brigade. (Annex 97C). As a result, the Battle Captain was unable to pass updated information
- about the blocking mission either directly to 1-69 IN, or to 4th Brigade. He did not attempt to contact 4th
- Brigade via FM communications. (Annex 63C). Fourth Brigade, in turn, could not pass updated information to its
- major command, 3ID. (Annex 57C). Likewise, 3ID had no new information to pass to its subordinate command, 2/10
- MTN. Finally, 2/10 MTN was thus unable to pass updated information to its subordinate command, 1-69 IN.
- (Annexes 51C, 52C).
- (U) There is no evidence to indicate that 1-76 FA passed on the information about the VIP departure and
- arrival times to any unit. (Annexes 59C, 63C). As a result, A Company, 1-69 INs Soldiers were directed to
- remain in their blocking positions.
- (U) Other than the duty logs, there are no other written records of communications or tape recordings among
- involved units relating to the coordination to block Route Irish on the evening of 4 March 2005. (Annex 6M).
- E. (U) The Incident
- (U) After arriving at BIAP from Italy in the late afternoon of 4 March 2005, and taking care of some
- administrative matters, Mr. Carpani and Mr. Calipari went to some undisclosed location in the Mansour District
- of Baghdad. (Annexes 104C, 105C). At approximately 2030 hours they recovered Ms. Sgrena and headed back toward
- BIAP. (Annexes 103C, 104C, 109C). Both agents made a number of phone calls to various officials during the
- drive. (Annex 104C). Mr. Carpani was mostly talking to his colleague, Mr. Castilletti, who was waiting for
- them outside of BIAP near Checkpoint 539. He updated Mr. Castilletti on his location and discussed
- arrangements at the airport. (Annex 105C). Mr. Carpani, who was driving, had to slow down at one point due to
- a flooded underpass on Route Vernon. (Annexes 103C, 104C). Mr. Carpani, who had experience driving in Baghdad,
- did not have an alternate route to the airport planned.
- 2 (S//NF) 2 VOIP is a technology that allows telephone calls to be made using a broadband internet connection
- instead of a regular (analog) phone line. (Annexes 104C, 105C). He was taking what he considered to be the
- most logical route to BIAP, but was not checking his speedometer. (Annex 105C). Neither he, nor Mr. Calipari,
- knew the on-ramp to Route Irish was blocked. (Annex 104C). Indeed, Mr. Carpani believed the road to the
- airport was open. (Annex 105C).
- (U) At approximately 2045 hours the Soldiers at BP 541 were in the positions that they had been occupying
- since 1930 hours. They had successfully turned around 15-30 vehicles, with none getting more than a few meters
- beyond the Alert Line. (Annexes 77C, 79C, 81C, 83C, 87C, 132C). Specialist Lozano was in his turret, his M240B
- (on which he had last qualified just five days before (Annex 6G)) pointed down and to his left at a grassy
- area with Specialist Peck in the drivers seat in the blocking vehicle. Specialist Mejia was in the drivers
- seat of the overwatch vehicle with Sergeant Domangue in the turret. Sergeant OHara was sitting in the rear
- passengers seat of the overwatch vehicle, cleaning his protective glasses. Staff Sergeant Brown, the acting
- Platoon Sergeant, was seeking to determine how much longer they were to remain in position. As such, he was
- standing with Second Lieutenant Acosta near the overwatch vehicle, their backs to the on-ramp. (Annexes 79C,
- 83C, 128C, 129C, 130C, 131C, 132C, 133C, 134C). None of the Soldiers knew that the Italians were coming.
- (Annexes 116C, 117C, 118C, 119C, 120C, 121C, 122C).
- (U) As the car approached the on-ramp to Route Irish, Mr. Carpani was on the cell phone updating Mr.
- Castilletti on their position and reporting that everything was going fine. (Annexes 104C, 105C). Though not
- in the habit of checking his speedometer, Mr. Carpani estimated his speed at 70-80 kph as he exited off of
- Route Vernon, heading toward the on-ramp to Route Irish. (Annex 105C). The courtesy light in the car was on
- and had been since picking up Ms. Sgrena in the Mansour District of Baghdad. (Annex 104C). Additionally, Mr.
- Carpani had his side window halfway open to listen for possible threats. (Annex 105C). Ms. Sgrena and Mr.
- Calipari were in the rear of the car talking to each other. (Annexes 103C, 105C). The atmosphere in the car
- was a mix of excitement over the recovery of Ms. Sgrena, and tension from the tasks yet to be completed.
- (Annex 140C).
- (U) At approximately 2050 hours, Specialist Lozano saw a car approaching the on-ramp, approximately 140 meters
- from his position. (Annexes 79C, 134C, 144K). Specialist Lozano, holding the spotlight in his left hand,
- shined his spotlight onto the car before it arrived at the Alert Line. (Annexes 79C, 85C). At this time,
- Sergeant Domangue acquired the vehicle s headlights and saw the spotlight shining on it. He then focused his
- green laser pointer onto the windshield of the car as it reached the Alert Line. (Annexes 87C, 129C). Both
- Specialist Lozano and Sergeant Domangue perceived the car to be traveling in excess of 50 mph (and faster than
- any other vehicles that evening). (Annexes 79C, 87C, 129C, 134C).
- (U) The car crossed the Alert Line still heading towards the Soldiers position without slowing down.
- Specialist Lozano continued to shine the spotlight, and shouted at the vehicle to stop, a fruitless effort,
- but an instantaneous reaction based on his training. (Annexes 85C, 130C). Without slowing down, the car
- continued toward the Warning Line with the spotlight and laser still on it. (Annexes 79C, 87C, 129C).
- (U) The car continued to approach at a high rate of speed, coming closer to the Soldiers than any other
- vehicle that evening. (Annexes 79C, 87C, 129C). When the car got to the Warning Line, Specialist Lozano, while
- still holding the spotlight in his left hand, used his right hand to quickly fire a two to four round burst
- into a grassy area to the on-coming vehicles right (the pre-set aiming point) as a warning shot. (Annexes 79C,
- 87C, 125C, 129C, 134C).
- (U) The vehicle maintained its speed as it went beyond the Warning Line. (Annexes 77C, 79C, 81C, 83C, 129C,
- 131C, 132C, 133C). Staff Sergeant Brown, a New York City Police Officer trained in vehicle speed estimation,
- estimated the car was traveling at 50 mph and believed that it would not be able to stay on the road around
- the curve at that speed. (Annex 83C). Specialist Lozano dropped the spotlight and immediately traversed his
- weapon from his left to his right, without having to move the turret, to orient on the front of the car. With
- both hands on the weapon, he fired another burst, walking the rounds from the ground on the passenger s side
- of the vehicle and towards the car s engine block in an attempt to disable it. (Annexes 77C, 79C, 81C, 83C,
- 87C, 129C, 131C, 132C, 133C). The rounds hit the right and front sides of the vehicle, deflated the left front
- tire, and blew out the side windows. (Annexes 104C, 105C, 132C, 1I).
- (U) Mr. Carpani reacted by saying into the phone, they are attacking us, not knowing who was shooting at him.
- (Annexes 103C, 104C, 105C). He stepped on the brakes, curled up on the left side of the car, and dropped the
- phone. (Annexes 104C, 105C). Specialist Lozano stopped firing as he saw the car slow down and roll to a stop.
- Approximately four seconds had elapsed between the firing of the first round and the last round, and no more
- than seven seconds from the time the car crossed the Alert Line until it came to a stop. (Annexes 77C, 79C,
- 81C, 83C, 87C, 129C, 131C, 132C, 133C, 134C). The car came to a stop near the middle of the on-ramp, such that
- the first Jersey barrier was aligned with the vehicle between the front and back doors. (Annexes 79C, 83C,
- 105C).
- F.(U) Post-Incident Events
- (U) Once the car came to a stop, Mr. Carpani got out of the car with his hands raised, cell phone in one hand,
- and told the Soldiers that he was from the Italian Embassy. (Annexes 77C, 79C, 81C, 83C, 85C, 104C, 130C,
- 131C, 132C, 133C, 134C). Second Lieutenant Acosta, Staff Sergeant Brown, Sergeant O Hara, and Specialist Peck
- approached the car with weapons raised and secured the driver. (Annexes 130C, 131C, 132C, 133C). Staff
- Sergeant Brown patted him down and asked him if there were others in the car. Mr. Carpani said there were two
- others and that there was one weapon on the front seat and another on the male passenger in the back seat. He
- warned Staff Sergeant Brown that both weapons had a round in the chamber. Staff Sergeant Brown then moved Mr.
- Carpani about 10 meters away from the car and off to the side of the road to question him and examine him.
- After initially taking control of the cell phones as well as Mr. Carpani s and Mr. Caliparis identification
- and badges, Staff Sergeant Brown returned those items to Mr. Carpani. At some point, Staff Sergeant Brown
- directed the car be placed in park since the car continued to roll. (Annexes 83C, 105C).
- (U) Sergeant OHara and Second Lieutenant Acosta searched the vehicle. (Annexes 77C, 81C). Second Lieutenant
- Acosta ordered Sergeant Domangue to inform Captain Drew and to send Specialist Mejia over with his medical
- kit. Specialist Mejia arrived at the car and found Mr. Calipari gravely injured. Specialist Mejia was able to
- bandage Mr. Caliparis wound, but Mr. Calipari died a few minutes later. Specialist Peck also tried to assist
- with Mr. Calipari. He then returned to the blocking vehicle and relieved Specialist Lozano in the turret to
- allow him to collect himself. (Annex 85C, 130C). Specialist Mejia then turned his attention to Ms. Sgrenas
- wounds. (Annex 89C, 128C). He tried to administer an IV, but his needles were too large. Meanwhile, Sergeant O
- Hara bandaged Ms. Sgrenas shoulder wound. (Annexes 128C, 132C).
- (U) Captain Drew then arrived on the scene along with Specialist Silberstein, who was a qualified medic.
- (Annexes 127C, 128C, 133C, 134C). Specialist Silberstein assessed Ms. Sgrena and treated her for shock. He
- then confirmed that Mr. Calipari was dead. (Annex 127C). Captain Drew assessed the situation, passed all
- available information to his command, and ordered the casualties to be evacuated to the Combat Support
- Hospital (CSH) in the International Zone for treatment of their wounds. He also requested an ambulance for Mr.
- Caliparis body. (Annexes 74C, 133C, 137C). Ms. Sgrena was loaded into the blocking vehicle and proceeded to
- the CSH with the overwatch vehicle following as U.S. military vehicles do not travel alone. (Annexes 127C,
- 128C, 129C, 130C, 132C, 133C). Mr. Carpani was transported later by a separate vehicle from another element of
- Captain Drews patrol. (Annex 136C). All equipment in the vehicle before the shooting was later returned to Mr.
- Carpani. (Annex 4M).
- (U) Before Mr. Carpani was transported to the CSH, he made at least seven phone calls on his cell phone. He
- tried asking how his companions were but was unable to get an answer. (Annexes 104C, 105C). Sergeant First
- Class Feliciano arrived with Captain Drew and found that Mr. Carpani spoke Spanish, as did Sergeant First
- Class Feliciano. He was able to tell Mr. Carpani about the condition of his companions. (Annex 91C)
- (U) Mr. Carpani told Sergeant First Class Feliciano who Ms. Sgrena was and that he was trying to get to the
- airport. He told Sergeant First Class Feliciano that he heard shots from somewhere, and that he panicked and
- started speeding, trying to get to the airport as quickly as possible. Mr. Carpani further told Sergeant First
- Class Feliciano that he continued to speed down the ramp, and that he was in a hurry to get to the airport.
- (Annexes 91C, 136C). 32 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED
- (U) Mr. Carpani became a little dizzy, so Sergeant First Class Feliciano got some water for him. Mr. Carpani
- kept making phone calls. He contacted Mr. Castilletti who put Captain Green on the phone. Mr. Carpani then had
- Captain Drew talk to Captain Green. Mr. Carpani kept on insisting that he wanted to go to the airport. After
- one of the phone calls, though, he said he needed to go to the hospital where Ms. Sgrena had been taken.
- (Annex 91C).
- (U) The incident was reported through command channels, and the Commanding General, 3ID ordered an immediate
- commanders inquiry/preliminary investigation into the incident. Before the investigator had arrived on the
- scene, the HMMWVs involved in the incident had departed to the CSH and the car had been moved in an effort to
- clean up the site so that the on-ramp could be re-opened. The Commander, 2/10 MTN arrived about two hours
- after the incident and ordered the car be put back in its stopped position to support the commanders inquiry
- as much as possible. (Annex 65C).
- G. (U) Forensic Evidence
- 1. (U) 5 March 2005 Report
- (U) Photographs of the incident scene were taken in the hours after the incident by Combat Camera personnel,
- as advised by CID personnel. (Annexes 32K 69K). The exact locations of the three incident vehicles could not
- be determined since the two HMMWVs had been moved upon transporting Ms. Sgrena to the Combat Support
- Hospital, and the car had been moved during cleanup efforts at the site. (Annex 5I).
- 2. (U) 11 March 2005 Report
- (U) The forensic investigation of the incident scene conducted on the morning of 11 March 2005 provided the
- following distances between relevant points based on GPS measurements3 :
- (U) Blocking vehicle to Alert Line 389 feet, 7 inches (118.8 meters)
- (U) Blocking vehicle to Warning Line 272 feet (82.9 meters)
- (U) Blocking vehicle to disabled vehicle stop point 125 feet (38.1 meters)
- (U) Disabled vehicle stop point to Warning Line 147 feet (44.8 meters)
- (U) 3 The position of the Toyota was determined from photographs taken before it was moved during cleanup
- efforts. The blocking vehicle location comes from GPS readings provided by the Preliminary Investigating
- Officer based on witness statements regarding its position at the time of the incident.
- (U) Disabled vehicle stop point to Alert Line 264 feet, 7 inches (80.7 meters)
- (U) Alert Line to Warning Line 117 feet, 7 inches (35.9 meters) (Annexes 5I, 143K).
- 3. (U) 14 March 2005 Report
- (U) A forensic examination of the car was performed after its removal from the scene. This analysis disclosed
- 11 entrance bullet holes. They are consistent with 7.62 mm bullets. Three bullets perforated the front section
- of the car at the bumper, right head light, and right fender. Two bullets perforated the windshield. Six
- bullets perforated the right side, right door, right front and rear passenger windows. No bullet holes or
- ricochet damage was noted on the cars undercarriage. (Annex 1I).
- (U) The trajectory analysis demonstrated that all 11 bullets came from one point of origin. The actual
- distance from the car to the machine gun could not be conclusively determined because of several variables:
- the grade of the curve and curvature of the roadway; depressions or elevations of the terrain; the lateral
- movement of the car; human reaction time, modulation of speed and braking by the driver; a flat tire; and
- lateral and vertical movement of the machine gun. The security situation at the incident site prevented
- examiners from visiting the scene. (Annex 1I).
- 4. (U) BP 541 Traffic Samples
- (U) On Friday, 25 March 2005, a certified radar operator conducted two traffic samples at BP 541. From 1809
- hours to 1824 hours, 27 vehicles were clocked. The average speed at the Alert Line was 44 mph. The average
- speed at the beginning of the on-ramps curve was 24 mph. From 1956 hours to 2015 hours, 30 vehicles were
- clocked. The average speed at the Alert Line was 46 mph. The average speed at the beginning of the curve was
- 26 mph. Unlike the night of the incident, which was also a Friday, the road was dry during these samples.
- (Annex 1M).
- 5. (U) Number of Rounds
- (U) The ammunition box in the blocking vehicle originally contained 200 rounds. There were 142 rounds
- remaining in the M240B ammunition box. No casings were collected. Eleven rounds hit the vehicle. The weapon
- had been fired on seven previous occasions using the same ammunition box. As such, there were no more than 40
- additional rounds that could have been fired. (Annexes 85C, 99C). 34 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED H.
- (U) Findings
- (U) Second Lieutenant Acosta was under a time constraint to establish the BP quickly and expected to be in
- position for a very limited time, i.e., no more than 15-20 minutes. Further, the position was on a tight curve
- that caused Second Lieutenant Acosta to make less than optimal choices in positioning his vehicles. Still,
- Second Lieutenant Acosta properly considered and employed the factors of METT-TC in deciding where to emplace
- his two vehicles so as to provide vehicle stand-off, force protection, overwatch field of view, and clear line
- of sight for the spotlight operator. From 15-30 vehicles were turned around without incident based upon how
- the position was established. (Annexes 77C, 79C, 81C, 83C, 87C, 1F, 2F, 3F).
- (U) At the time of the incident,
- there were only two HMMWVs, and seven U.S. military personnel, at BP 541. Both the blocking vehicle and the
- overwatch vehicle were positioned on the on-ramp, facing Route Irish. There were no other vehicles, or
- Soldiers in the immediate vicinity of BP 541, and the BP could not be seen by any other BPs on Route Irish.
- (Annexes 77C, 79C, 81C, 83C, 85C, 87C, 89C, 117C, 118C, 119C, 120C, 121C, 122C, 123C, 124C).
- (U) The Soldiers
- had a heightened sense of awareness because of the two VBIED BOLOs, one for a black car, another for a white
- car. (Annexes 74C, 77C, 13E, 14E). Given the number of vehicles that had been stopped and turned around, and
- this awareness of VBIEDs, it is highly unlikely that Specialist Lozano was not paying attention. Further,
- Specialist Lozano had recently rotated into the position, replacing Specialist Peck, to ensure that there was
- a fresh set of eyes in the turret. (Annexes 79C, 85C). Rotating qualified personnel in and out of the turret
- to maintain alertness was a wise decision by the BP 541 leadership.
- (U) Ineffective battle tracking procedures
- (communications, log posting, and information sharing) at the 1-76 FA TOC caused A Company, 1-69 IN to be left
- in their blocking positions longer than expected. The night of 4 March 2005 was the last night of the Left
- Seat Ride for 1-76 FA, and 4-5 March 2005 was the first full duty day for the unit. (Annexes 59C, 63C, 97C).
- (U) The spotlight and green laser pointer had proven effective in stopping and turning around vehicles before
- the car with the Italians arrived at the on-ramp. Many of the vehicles, though, screeched their tires when
- stopping. While effective for accomplishing the mission, the spotlight and laser pointer may not be the best
- system from a civilian point of view. (Annexes 77C, 79C, 81C, 83C, 87C, 132C)
- (U) Specialist Lozano did not
- drop the spotlight until after he fired the warning shots, then immediately transitioned to two hands on his
- weapon as he fired the disabling shots. (Annexes 79C, 83C, 85C, 87C).
- (U)
- Specialist Lozano spotlighted the car before it reached the Alert Line, fired warning shots as it reached the
- Warning Line, and fired on the vehicle in an attempt to disable it immediately after it crossed the Warning
- Line. (Annexes 79C, 87C, 129C, 134C).
- (U) Specialist Lozano was the only one to fire his weapon. (Annexes 77C,
- 79C, 81C, 83C, 85C, 87C, 89C).
- (U) The car was traveling at approximately 50 mph as it crossed the Warning
- Line. (Annex 83C).
- (U) Mr. Carpani did not apply his brakes until after the rounds began striking the car.
- (Annexes 104C, 105C).
- (U) Given the cyclic rate of fire of the M240B, Specialist Lozanos expertise with the weapon, and that only 11
- rounds struck the vehicle with only five of those impacting the front of the car, it is highly unlikely that
- any shots were fired after the car came to a stop. (Annexes 79C, 6G, 1I, 3M).
- (U) Both the blocking and overwatch vehicles were moved after the incident as directed by Captain Drew to
- transport Ms. Sgrena to the Combat Support Hospital. Both vehicles were needed to provide security for the
- move to the hospital. (Annexes 74C, 77C).
- (U) The gunner complied with the Rules of Engagement. After operating the spotlight, and perceiving the
- on-coming vehicle as a threat, he fired to disable it and did not intend to harm anyone in the vehicle.
- (Annexes 79C, 83C).
- (U) There were a number of unrelated events that had a role in the incident. These were: (1) bad weather
- forcing a VIP to convoy on Route Irish that evening vice the preferred method of traveling by helicopter; (2)
- communications problems involving a unit new to the AOR that caused the Soldiers to be left in position longer
- than expected; (3) the recovery of Ms. Sgrena being pushed back daily, for several days, to 4 March 2005; (4)
- the Italians did not know the Soldiers were at the on-ramp, and were not expecting any such roadblocks; and
- (5) the Soldiers did not know the Italians were traveling to BIAP. (Annexes 51C, 52C, 57C, 59C, 60C, 61C, 63C,
- 97C, 104C, 105C, 107C, 109C, 116C, 117C, 118C, 119C, 120C, 121C, 122C).
- (U) Mr. Carpani was driving faster than any other vehicle observed by the Soldiers that evening. He failed to
- stop for the spotlight since he was not expecting a roadblock. Additionally, he was dealing with multiple
- distractions including talking on the phone while driving, the conversation in the back seat, trying to listen
- for threats, driving on a wet road, focusing on tasks to be accomplished, the need to get to the airport, and
- the excited and tense atmosphere in the car. (Annexes 104C, 105C, 125C, 140C). Any one of these would have
- affected his reaction time. 36 UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED I.
- (U) Recommendations (S//NF) Recommend the Force Protection Working Group consider the use of additional
- non-lethal measures (e.g., spike strips, temporary speed bumps, and wire) be emplaced to slow down or stop
- vehicles before the use of disabling shots. The intent is to provide as many non-lethal options as possible
- before asking a Soldier to focus on firing the weapon.
- (U) Recommend that the Force Protection Working Group, in conjunction with MNC-I Information Operations,
- propagate a Public Awareness/Public Service Campaign to inform all drivers of their responsibilities for
- behavior when approaching and while at Coalition Checkpoints. This information could be posted on panels or
- boards at airports and other major transportation centers, as well as in pamphlets to be distributed from
- various locations, to include rental car agencies and border control points. This public awareness campaign
- should enhance safe operations by promoting mutual trust, cooperation, and confidence for Coalition Forces and
- Iraqi citizens as well as formally outlining expected driver behavior throughout the AOR.
- (U) Recommend the Force Protection Working Group consider the following points as they develop the MNC-I SOP
- for TCP operations:
- (S//NF) Different signs for ECPs, TCPs, and BPs. For example:
- o (S//NF) Road Closed Do Not Enter (for BPs).
- o (S//NF) Coalition Checkpoint Ahead Proceed Slowly and Follow Directions (for TCPs).
- (U) Signs written in Arabic and English should, where possible, also incorporate international symbols to
- accommodate foreign nationals as they begin operating in Iraq.
- (S//NF) Highly visible and quickly deployable checkpoint and roadblock warning signs for Soldiers on patrol.
- (S//NF) Standards for when and how to use spotlights and lasers.
- (S//NF) The use of hand-held signs as an alternative to hand-and-arm signals.
- (U) Recommend a review of frequently established TCP locations to consider the use of existing permanent
- highway overpass signs that warn drivers that checkpoints may be upcoming (e.g., Possible Checkpoint Ahead
- Next Exit
- (S//NF) Recommend an assessment of the current technique of requiring the gunner to operate both the spotlight
- and the weapon in the turret of the vehicle. This will allow more reaction time and simplify duties and
- responsibilities of the gunner.
- (U) Further recommend a transition to a more driver friendly alert signal by substituting devices such as
- rotating warning lights and sirens to replace spotlights as early warning tools.
- (U) Recommend periodic reviews of Right Seat/Left Seat Ride Relief in Place procedures based on:
- (S//NF) Transfer of Authority between units (before and after).
- (S//NF) Changes in MTOE equipment.
- (S//NF) Significant changes in the operational environment.
- (S//NF) These reviews will ensure there is rigor in enforcing standards and essential tasks in accordance with
- existing SOPs. Further recommend MSC enforcement of Right Seat/Left Seat Ride certification programs where
- outgoing commanders certify incoming units ability to perform required tasks before TOA. This will ensure
- Soldiers and leaders can properly execute tasks to standard and understand the reasons for tasks that deviate
- from established procedures as a result of any recent changes.
- (S//NF) Recommend the MSC Commanders review MNF FRAGO 1269/5 2005 Dec 04 with subordinate commands to ensure
- thorough fratricide reporting and investigation of fratricide incidents. The use of Rapid Response Teams (SJA,
- PAO, PMO, CID, Safety, etc.) to provide support to the on-site commander is highly recommended.
- (U) Recommend development of a casualty post-incident procedure reference guide to assist junior leaders in
- accurately preserving incident scenes as much as time and the tactical situation allow.
- (S//NF) Some key pieces of information could include:
- (S//NF) Diagram of the scene to include exact grid of locations of personnel/equipment included.
- (S//NF) Amount of ammunition expended.
- (S//NF) Digital photos.
- (S//NF) Chronology of events.
- (S//NF) Personnel involved with the incident.
- (S//NF) Personnel on-site at the time of the incident.
- (S//NF) Permission to stand down or remove any equipment.
- (U) Recommend that no disciplinary action be taken against any Soldier involved in the incident.
- (U) Recommend that this report be circulated to all MNC-I Major Subordinate Commanders for use as an After
- Action Review tool.
- V. COORDINATION A.
- (U) Introduction
- (U) This section addresses the status of coordination with MNF-I, MNC-I, and their subordinate units regarding
- the recovery and transport of Ms. Sgrena on 4 March 2005. Further, it examines the role that Captain Green
- played in this incident. B.
- (U) MNF-I/MNC-I Involvement
- (U) When moving through another unit s battlespace in a combat zone, coordination with forces in the area is
- required for situational awareness, and, more importantly, for deconfliction of unit movements, positioning,
- and operations. For example, 2/10 MTN has successfully coordinated and executed previous movements and
- operations of units and forces not assigned to their AOR. The unit had coordinated, sometimes on relatively
- short notice, with numerous Joint Special Operations Units, Special Missions Units, and Special Tactics Units
- before 4 March 2005, with no incidents. (Annex 65C).
- (U) To determine who or what organizations were aware of the Sgrena recovery and transport operation, sworn
- statements were taken from key military officials within MNF-I, MNC-I, and their subordinate units that, by
- their function, would have had access to information about such an operation. A statement was also provided by
- the Political Military Counselor, U.S. Embassy Baghdad. The results are listed below:
- (U) No one at the U.S. Embassy, including the Political Military Counselor, knew about the Sgrena operation
- until after the shooting incident had occurred. (Annex 114C).
- (U) No one within the MNF-I leadership knew about the Sgrena operation until after the shooting incident had
- occurred. (Annexes 1C to 27C).
- (U) No one, with one exception to be addressed below, within the MNC-I leadership knew about the Sgrena
- operation until after the shooting incident had occurred. (Annexes 28C to 43C).
- (U) No one within the 3ID leadership knew about the Sgrena operation until after the shooting incident had
- occurred. (Annexes 44C to 56C).
- (U) No one within 4 BCT knew about the Sgrena operation until after the shooting incident had occurred.
- (Annex 5M).
- (U) No one within the 1-76 FA leadership knew about the Sgrena operation until after the shooting incident
- had occurred. (Annexes 58C to 63C).
- (U) No one within the 2/10 MTN leadership knew about the Sgrena operation until after the shooting incident
- had occurred. (Annexes 65C to 71C).
- (U) No one within the 1-69 IN leadership knew about the Sgrena operation until after the shooting incident
- had occurred. (Annexes 72C, 96C to 99C).
- (U) No one at the BIAP Command Post knew about the Sgrena operation until after the shooting incident had
- occurred. (Annex 110C).
- (U) No one at the Hostage Working Group knew about the Sgrena operation until after the shooting incident had
- occurred. (Annex 126C).
- (U) No one with A Company, 1-69 IN knew about the Sgrena operation until after the shooting incident had
- occurred. (Annexes 76C, 78C, 80C, 82C, 84C, 86C, 88C, 90C, 92C).
- (U) Thus, it can be positively stated that the U.S. military was totally unaware of the recovery and transport
- of Ms. Sgrena on 4 March 2005 until after the shooting incident had occurred. C.
- (U) Captain Green
- (U) Captain Green (USA) is the Aide-de-Camp to Major General Mario Marioli (ITAR), DCG, MNC-I. (Annex 107C).
- As early as 28 February 2005, Captain Green was aware that a number of Italian VIPs would be coming into BIAP.
- The date for their arrival kept getting pushed back. He was aware that the VIPs would be involved in working
- the Sgrena hostage situation. Captain Green knew no specifics beyond that. (Annexes 107C, 109C).
- (U) At approximately 1330 hours on 4 March 2005, Captain Green, Lieutenant Colonel Zarcone (ITAR), and one PSD
- departed for BIAP, arriving at about 1350 hours. Major General Marioli and another PSD arrived shortly
- thereafter. (Annex 107C). The plane finally arrived at 1626. (Annex 1H). Eleven passengers deplaned and were
- immediately taken to the Al Faw Palace at Camp Victory. There, security badges were obtained for five of the
- VIPs. (Annexes 106C, 107C).
- (U) Captain Green accompanied three Italian VIPs, Major General Marioli, and two PSDs in three cars to a
- location about one kilometer beyond Checkpoint 539 on Route Irish. Two Italians left, heading into Baghdad.
- The rest of the group waited at the site for a short while, returned to Camp Victory, then went back to the
- spot past Checkpoint 539. Major General Marioli did not want Captain Green to go back out to Checkpoint 539,
- but Captain Green, as his aide, insisted since his presence would be necessary to interface with the U.S.
- security forces in the area. (Annexes 100C, 106C, 107C).
- (U) At approximately 2030 hours, Major General Marioli approached Captain Green and asked him how he was doing
- and if Lieutenant Colonel Zarcone had told him what was going on. Captain Green said no, but that he suspected
- it had something to do with the Italian journalist. Major General Marioli said Yes, but it is best if no one
- knows. Captain Green took this as an order from a General Officer not to pass that information on to anyone.
- (Annex 109C). Moreover, Major General Marioli did not intend for Captain Green to take any action whatsoever
- on that information. He only told Captain Green so that he would not be surprised when Ms. Sgrena arrived.
- (Annex 100C).
- (U) Approximately 20 minutes later, a phone call came in to the third Italian VIP at the site near Checkpoint
- 539. The call brought news of the shooting. Captain Green made contact with U.S. personnel in a nearby Bradley
- Fighting Vehicle and confirmed the shooting. Captain Green subsequently was able to speak with Captain Drew at
- BP 541. Captain Green discussed the matter with Captain Drew and relayed to Major General Marioli that it was
- best for them to return to Camp Victory as the wounded were being transported to the Combat Support Hospital
- in the International Zone. (Annex 107C). Major General Marioli was very appreciative of Captain Greens
- coordination efforts following the shooting. (Annex 100C).
- (U) Captain Green was not informed of the recovery and transport of Ms. Sgrena until a short time before the
- incident at BP 541 occurred. (Annex 109C). He was not expected to take any action in the matter as it was an
- Italian national issue, nor was he in a position of any authority to do so. (Annex 100C). He was obeying an
- order from Major General Marioli. (Annex 109C). D.
- (U) Findings
- (U) No U.S. military personnel within MNF-I, MNC-I (to include Captain Green), or subordinate units were
- informed by the Government of Italy of the hostage rescue mission that occurred on 4 March 2005. (Annexes 1C
- to 56C, 58C to 63C, 65C to 72C, 76C, 78C, 80C, 82C, 84C, 86C, 88C, 90C, 92C, 96C to 99C, 110C, 114C, 126C,
- 7M).
- (U) Not coordinating with U.S. personnel was a conscious decision on the part of the Italians as they
- considered the hostage recovery an Intelligence mission and a national issue. (Annex 100C).
- (U) Based upon previous successful coordination efforts by 3ID and 2/10 MTN working with organizations from
- various agencies outside their chain of command, it is clear that, while the hostage recovery operation may
- have otherwise been a success, prior coordination might have prevented this tragedy. Iraq is still a hostile
- environment, i.e, a combat zone, and the more coordination that can be done to increase situational awareness
- of those operating within the battlespace, the better it is for all involved. (Annex 65C).
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