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  1. X1 Time Time_1 Place Place_1 Place_2 Place_3 Place_4 Place_5 Environment Environment_1 Environment_2 Environment_3 Environment_4 Environment_5 Aircraft 1 Aircraft 1_1 Aircraft 1_2 Aircraft 1_3 Aircraft 1_4 Aircraft 1_5 Aircraft 1_6 Aircraft 1_7 Aircraft 1_8 Aircraft 1_9 Aircraft 1_10 Aircraft 1_11 Aircraft 1_12 Aircraft 1_13 Aircraft 1_14 Aircraft 1_15 Aircraft 1_16 Aircraft 1_17 Aircraft 1_18 Aircraft 1_19 Aircraft 1_20 Aircraft 1_21 Component Component_1 Component_2 Component_3 Aircraft 2 Aircraft 2_1 Aircraft 2_2 Aircraft 2_3 Aircraft 2_4 Aircraft 2_5 Aircraft 2_6 Aircraft 2_7 Aircraft 2_8 Aircraft 2_9 Aircraft 2_10 Aircraft 2_11 Aircraft 2_12 Aircraft 2_13 Aircraft 2_14 Aircraft 2_15 Aircraft 2_16 Aircraft 2_17 Aircraft 2_18 Aircraft 2_19 Aircraft 2_20 Aircraft 2_21 Person 1 Person 1_1 Person 1_2 Person 1_3 Person 1_4 Person 1_5 Person 1_6 Person 1_7 Person 1_8 Person 1_9 Person 2 Person 2_1 Person 2_2 Person 2_3 Person 2_4 Person 2_5 Person 2_6 Person 2_7 Person 2_8 Person 2_9 Events Events_1 Events_2 Events_3 Events_4 Events_5 Assessments Assessments_1 Report 1 Report 1_1 Report 2 Report 2_1 Report 1_2 X97
  2. 1517486 201802 1201-1800 ZZZ.Airport US NA NA 0 NA NA NA NA Daylight NA NA NA Air Carrier B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model NA 2 Part 121 IFR Passenger NA Taxi NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Aircraft X Flight Deck Air Carrier Captain; Pilot Flying Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) NA NA Communication Breakdown; Training / Qualification NA 1517486 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown NA NA Person Flight Crew Taxi; Aircraft In Service At Gate NA Procedure; Human Factors; Company Policy; Airport Procedure As we contacted the Pushback Driver for the required exchange of call outs, we finished running the Before Pushback Checklist. The First Officer and I, and Company Dispatcher doing his annual qualification on the jumpseat, were all listening on the Flight interphone to the exchange between the Pushback Driver and me. All call outs were normal up to the pushback call for 'Brakes Set'. Once the return reply 'Brakes Set' was said by me, at that second the communication plugs were pulled and the communications ended. All three of us in the cockpit heard the headset connection plugs pulled out along with the door shut. I also watched the Ramp Agent walk away with the box in hand.This was very disturbing because we were starting the new 737 MAX engines, and number 2 was not stable and running yet. I was hoping for them to stay until we cleared them off, as per procedure. They all started to walk off without even any hand signals. I opened my window, and with number 1 still shut down, I got the attention of the nearby Wing Walker, and asked him to tell the pushback to 'hook back up'. After enduring their looks as if I had asked them to do something insane, they hooked back up. At this point all three of us in the cockpit listened to what I could only call a cover up for their poor and improper adherence to our procedures. We didn't have any communication problems during this push; it was crystal clear, all up to this re-plug in. It was still very clear; however, every time I made a call or statement on the interphone, it was followed by the pushback saying 'can you hear me'. I changed the pace of my calls, different intervals, and was never interrupted, just the reply, 'can you hear me' after each of my responses. You could tell they were making a joke out of this. I stated on the intercom that this entire pushback is so wrong, and their attitudes showed they don't care. 'I will write this up, and this activity will stop'. After my comments, he responded in a manner that showed he heard me just fine. All three of us in the cockpit listened and observed this low moment in communications intended for Safety. The other two Crew Members are willing to verify this report. This type of unsafe, anti-procedure behavior cannot be tolerated. This is becoming a nation-wide trend, with this being one of the worst examples. I'm sure excuses will be made concerning poor communications involving equipment. I will not buy that excuse in this example. The attitudes on the Ramp came through loud and clear on this day that they do not buy into our Company procedures. NA NA NA A pilot reported a tug driver and ramp crew did not follow proper procedures during pushback. NA
  3. 1521358 201802 1801-2400 ZZZ.Airport US NA NA NA NA NA Icing NA NA NA NA NA Air Carrier B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model NA 2 Part 121 IFR Passenger NA Landing NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Aircraft X Flight Deck Air Carrier First Officer; Pilot Flying NA NA NA Communication Breakdown; Situational Awareness Party1 Flight Crew; Party2 ATC 1521358 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Ground Event / Encounter Loss Of Aircraft Control; Ground Excursion Runway; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence NA NA Person Flight Crew In-flight Flight Crew Diverted; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification Weather; Airport Weather We were operating Aircraft X on day 2 of a 4 day trip. The first leg was the Captain's leg in our rotation. We arrived and had a 2 hour sit. The next leg was supposed to be my leg per our rotation. After review of the weather there was low visibility and possible contamination reports in [Destination Airport] and I would not be able to land with my status on the 737. We decided it needed to be the Captain's leg. While conducting the walk around I found a maintenance issue that would not allow the airplane we had to fly up to [Destination Airport]. We were given another aircraft and it too had a small maintenance issue that was resolved. We ended up departing about 1.5 hours late. As we flew up to [Destination Airport] we were checking the weather conditions and it seemed as if we would be able to fly an ILS CAT 3 to runway 12R. We sent for landing data for both 12R and 12L. 12L runway data required us to have braking action 'Good' or better for us to use it. The data for runway 12R gave us a better safety margin due to its length. We were assigned the ILS 12R by [Destination Airport] approach. On downwind leg [Destination Airport] stated that runway 12R would be shut down for snow removal and to expect runway 12L. We re-sent for new landing data for 12L and it still showed we needed braking action 'Good' or better. We kept quarrying [Destination Airport] approach for a braking action report for 12L and could not get a response. [Destination Airport] then told us the braking action for 12L was 'Medium' and per our landing data we could not land on that runway. They told us that it would be around 30 minutes to plow runway 12R. At that point we were starting to approach our Bingo fuel to divert to our alternate. We were also weight restricted so we did not have a lot of extra fuel in general. We then decided to divert initially, but after loading in the FMC we would land there with 3,000lbs of fuel or less. We realized we needed a much closer divert airport and found ZZZ1 to be a good option. We landed at ZZZ1 with no issues except that there was not going to be fuel services available after [a certain time]. As we found a place on the ramp to talk to operations we were told that the fueler was called back out to the airport and would be there in 10 minutes. Dispatch wanted us to fly back. A flight plan was sent to our ACARS printer and my Captain was able to verbally discuss this flight back over to [Destination Airport]. From what I heard from the phone call, the weather was improving and aircraft were getting into [Destination Airport] with no problems. The Dispatcher also added ZZZ2 as an alternate and it was a good and legal alternate. Our CCO (Crew Critical Off) time was getting close to the max duty day but we accepted an extension and there was some back and forth about our max CCO time. My Captain received another phone call stating we were good. We got our clearance from ATC and had a void time [to comply with]. We decided we could make the void time and the CCO time if we hustled for this 1 hour flight back to [Destination Airport]. The Captain was once again the pilot flying for this leg due to our plan to fly a CAT 3 ILS to 12R in [Destination Airport]. Between ATIS and ATC, we were staying constantly up to date on [Destination Airport] weather and braking action and it seemed a landing on 12R was going to happen. We were getting vectors for the CAT III ILS 12R and were handed off to tower on final approach and they stated 'braking action poor, cleared to land runway 12R'. I believe we were both shocked by that statement and we had to execute a missed approach. Tower then stated [another aircraft] landed 45 minutes earlier and reported the braking action poor. We then asked tower about the conditions of runway 12L. We never really got a solid report about 12L's conditions other than it was plowed more recent than 12R. We told them we must have braking action 'Good' on that runway and they said they were not optimistic about us having that. The Captain was showing some signs of fatigue enroute, but at this point I could tell the Captain needed a break from flying the airplane. I told him that I felt well rested and would take over aircraft control. So we transferred controls and I became pilot flying. Once again we did not have a lot of fuel to wait out the 30 minutes or more it would take to plow runway 12R. We were told not to expect better than 'Medium' braking action on 12L. So we made the decision to divert to our alternate of ZZZ2 and informed our Dispatcher. Our Dispatcher asked us if we could make [a different alternate], but once again after looking at the fuel on landing at [a different alternate] we would be 3,000lbs or less. The Dispatcher's response was either 'OK' or 'Roger' with not much more info such as fuel burn to ZZZ2, current weather, field conditions, or another suggestion of a closer or better alternate. We pressed on to ZZZ2. Looking at the weather we got from ATC as we approached ZZZ2 we had winds 140/09, 5 SM, with BR, and Overcast at 800ft, temp 00, dew point -02, Altimeter 30.15. As we got closer to ZZZ2 the automated weather service also confirmed the same conditions. We requested runway data for 06 and showed we were good to land with brakes 3 and 'Good' braking action. We decided on brakes MAX which would give us 1,695 feet of extra distance on the [7,600+] foot runway. We did look at runway 18 because of it being [a little longer]feet longer but the only approach option was an RNAV that took us down to 492 ft AGL. A full RNAV approach brief in my opinion requires a lot more information along with a reference to the QRH that with our current fuel status time was of the essence. Also the FOM states preference for instrument approach procedure backup should be from best to worst stating a precision approach as the best option. Runway 06 ILS would take us down to 200 FT AGL. Another factor I thought about was we really did not want to have to perform a go around at that point due to low ceilings and get into an even more critical fuel situation. The runway data for 06 gave us a 2 KT headwind and a 7 KT crosswind which were all legal for my status on the 737. Also the visibility was better than 4,000 RVR or 3/4SM and we had no knowledge of any contamination on the runway and there were no braking action reports. I conducted the ILS approach to 06 and was stable along with a touchdown in the touchdown zone markers with minimum float. I got the thrust reversers to max and the speed brakes were deployed. However, I started to realize we were not slowing down as we should have been for the expected conditions. I started to apply manual braking. I verbalized this to the Captain and he commanded, 'Max manual brakes, max manual brakes'. The Captain also came on the brakes to confirm Max manual braking. I did the best I could to maintain directional control and braking but we approached the end of the runway and slid off into the grass. The airplane did come to a stop at this point and we were only 115 FT from the end of the runway to our tail. (Ground personel showed us that exact number with a measuring device). We evaluated the situation, having passengers remain seated and Flight Attendant (FA) check their condition. No unusual lights or indications came on. The landing gear and aircraft seemed in good shape. We decided an evacuation was not required. We fired up the APU, secured the engines and began coordination with crash rescue, ATC, company, and airport operations. No reported injuries, and all passengers and crew were ok. No immediate signs of aircraft damage. We were able to de-plane everyone off the aircraft through door 1L with air stairs. One of the Ground Operations personel came into the flight deck and told us we experienced a 'flash freeze' on the runway surface due to the atmospheric conditions in ZZZ2. He said that a 'flash freeze' also occurred around the same time the night before. The Captain and I made sure everyone was off the airplane, did our final walk through the cabin, and secured the aircraft. NA NA NA B737 First Officer reported a runway excursion after landing at an airport that experienced a flash freeze just prior to landing. NA
  4. 1535616 201804 1201-1800 ZZZ.Airport US NA NA 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Air Carrier B737-800 NA 2 Part 121 IFR Passenger NA Parked NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Gate / Ramp / Line NA Air Carrier Pilot Flying; Captain Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) NA NA NA NA 1535616 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown NA NA Person Flight Crew Routine Inspection; Aircraft In Service At Gate Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem Human Factors; Procedure Procedure 737-800 almost settled on its tail while Passengers were deplaning and cargo being unloaded. I was performing the preflight walkaround inspection as required after a Crew change. Approaching the nose gear wheel well, I noticed the nose was much higher above the ground than usual. I looked at the winglets thinking this aircraft was a MAX 8. But the scimitar winglets confided it was not a MAX. I then noticed the nose gear strut was at full extension. The torque link/scissor link was fully extended. The nose of the aircraft was making a slight up and down bobbing motion. This motion was the weight of each Passenger stepping of the -800 onto the jetway.I ran to the forward cargo hold and told them to stop unloading. No one on the ramp noticed the issue as they were focused upon unloading the cargo bins. I ran to the aft cargo bin to ensure they kept unloading cargo from the rear bin. Many large cardboard boxes were being unloaded from the rear bin. The aft belt loader was even with the lip of the cargo bin. After the aircraft was back to 'normal' nose strut extension, the difference between the belt loader and bin lip was 6' to 7'. This appears to indicate the front bin was being held unloaded before the belt loader was positioned at the rear bin. While waiting for the rear bin to be unloaded and more Passengers left the -800, a Ramp worker at the front bin said, 'I've never seen the front of the aircraft move up and down like that before.' That's because there was very little weight on the nose gear. The Ground Crew seemed concerned. I'm convinced if this had been a through flight with no walkaround, or the walk around was started a few minutes later, the -800 would've been on its tail with 70 to 80 Passengers onboard. Once the aircraft settled on its nose gear, I had the Ramp finish unloading the foreword bin. I [noticed a] 6' to 7' difference between the rear loader and rear bin. We need tail stands or Ramp monitor. NA NA NA B737-800 Captain reported aft aircraft settling while simultaneously unloading passengers and cargo. NA
  5. 1538699 201804 NA ZZZ.TRACON US NA 15 NA 3000 VMC NA NA NA NA NA TRACON ZZZ Air Carrier B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model NA 2 Part 121 IFR Passenger NA Initial Approach NA Class B ZZZ NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Aircraft X Flight Deck Air Carrier First Officer; Pilot Not Flying Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Last 90 Days 496; Flight Crew Type 2200 NA Distraction; Human-Machine Interface; Situational Awareness; Training / Qualification NA 1538699 Aircraft X Flight Deck Air Carrier Captain; Pilot Flying Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Last 90 Days 327 NA Troubleshooting; Confusion; Human-Machine Interface NA 1538699 Deviation - Altitude Overshoot; Deviation - Procedural Clearance; Deviation - Track / Heading All Types NA NA Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew In-flight Air Traffic Control Provided Assistance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation Human Factors; Company Policy; Aircraft Aircraft While on a 300 degree intercept heading, at an assigned altitude of 3000 feet, autopilot engaged, we received clearance 'Maintain 3000 ft until established, cleared for the ILS Approach', and were handed over to the Tower. The pilot flying 'armed' VOR/LOC, which was verified on the FMA (Flight Mode Annunciator). Approaching the extended centerline of the runway, the pilot flying determined that VOR/LOC had failed to 'capture' and was overshooting the final. The pilot flying then made immediate correction back toward centerline via manual input with the control yoke, which disengaged the autopilot in all axes. The pilot flying noted there was no ILS 'raw data' presented on his EADI (Electronic Attitude Direction Indicator). Pilot not flying noted he did have CDI (Coursed Deviation Indicator) and glideslope pointers, but did not have VOR/LOC capture yet. Both pilot flying and pilot not flying verified that proper frequencies and inbound courses were set correctly. The pilot flying had the runway in sight visually at that point and continued hand flying toward the runway. The pilot not flying's FMA then 'captured' VOR/LOC, while pilot flying's remained in 'arm'. At that time we were outside of the Final Approach Fix. We then received instruction from Final Monitor to climb back to 3000 feet. The pilot flying immediately returned to altitude, while maintaining centerline track to the runway visually. In the distraction, we had inadvertently descended to approximately 2450 feet. Inside of the Final Approach Fix, pilot flying set and descended to 2700 feet. Pilot not flying's FMA remained in VOR/LOC with glideslope pointer descending the scale toward the 'centered' position, while pilot flying's 'raw data' indications remained blank, with VOR/LOC 'armed' on his FMA. At, or just prior to, ZZZZZ at 2700 feet, LOC and glideslope indications suddenly appeared, and VOR/LOC captured on the pilot flying's FMA. Pilot flying selected APP mode on the MCP (Mode Control Panel). Glideslope immediately 'captured' on the pilot flying's FMA, and indications remained normal without further anomaly. Approach and landing were made on without incident.Contributing factors were this was the first flight of a morning trip. Also both pilots first flight in MAX aircraft so there was a lot of looking around for information that has become instinctual in the NG. The weather was ragged SCT-BKN layer between 3000-3200 feet. More time in the MAX aircraft would be helpful. Time spent looking for information on redesigned display layout was definitely a distraction. I have never seen such a disparity between Captain and First Officer instrumentation like we experienced, where one side has good data and the other has none (assuming both are tuned/setup identically, which ours were). I'm not sure if this issue is MAX specific. As the pilot monitoring, I should have done a better job monitoring our altitude, especially after the autopilot was disconnected. I became too distracted by the problem and trying to quickly correct it. I should have recognized and called out the altitude deviance. NA [Report narrative contained no additional information.] NA B737 MAX pilots reported flying through the final approach course and descending below published altitudes due to confusion with the new style instrument displays. NA
  6. 1548464 201806 1801-2400 ZZZ.Airport US NA NA 0 NA VMC Windshear NA Dusk NA NA Tower ZZZ Air Carrier B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model NA 2 Part 121 IFR Passenger FMS Or FMC Takeoff NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Wheels/Tires/Brakes NA X Improperly Operated NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Aircraft X Flight Deck Air Carrier Pilot Not Flying; First Officer Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Last 90 Days 240; Flight Crew Type 1884 NA NA NA 1548464 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Procedural FAR; Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation - Speed All Types NA NA Person Flight Crew In-flight General None Reported / Taken Manuals; Aircraft; Procedure Manuals Exceeded the MAX tire ground speed on takeoff using the recommended procedure for takeoff in possible windshear conditions. After takeoff, we sent a report for the overspeed and discussed ways to mitigate this threat in the future. NA NA NA B737 pilot reported exceeding the aircraft's maximum tire speed during takeoff. NA
  7. 1550073 201806 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Air Carrier B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated NA 2 Part 121 IFR Passenger FMS Or FMC Cruise NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Air/Ground Communication NA X Design NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Company NA Air Carrier Other / Unknown NA NA NA Communication Breakdown Party1 Maintenance; Party2 Flight Crew 1550073 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy NA NA Person Maintenance In-flight General None Reported / Taken Equipment / Tooling; Aircraft Ambiguous Ever since the 737MAX, it seems most 737 controllers are not getting ACARS messages or Electronic Logbook write-ups the crew sends. The messages are not coming through on Maintenance Control ACARS/ELB page or through the Maintenance Control's alert manager application.Yesterday on a flight, I received a call from dispatch asking if I could answer the crew. Since I had not received any messages and no other controllers had either we were in the dark. Dispatcher gave me the info I proceeded to reply to Captain's inquiry, also telling him to message both dispatch and Maintenance Control, as we were not receiving the messages from him. We never got a response, but dispatch called and said Captain received our message and problem was resolved.After this situation, I decided to try and test it out on another aircraft, which had just arrived in our base. I sent a test log page. Again, we did not receive any pop up on Maintenance Control [page] or Maintenance Control's alert manager informing us of the write-up. NA NA NA Maintenance personnel reported that on Boeing 737MAX, Maintenance Control is not receiving ACARS or Electronic Logbook write-ups the flight crew sends. NA
  8. 1555013 201806 NA ZZZ.Airport US NA NA 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Air Carrier B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model NA 2 Part 121 IFR Passenger FMS Or FMC Parked NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Aircraft X Flight Deck Air Carrier First Officer; Pilot Not Flying Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Total 10861; Flight Crew Type 1660 NA Human-Machine Interface; Training / Qualification NA 1555013 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence NA NA Person Flight Crew Pre-flight General None Reported / Taken Human Factors; Manuals; Procedure; Company Policy Company Policy I had my first flight on the Max [to] ZZZ1. We found out we were scheduled to fly the aircraft on the way to the airport in the limo. We had a little time [to] review the essentials in the car. Otherwise we would have walked onto the plane cold.My post flight evaluation is that we lacked the knowledge to operate the aircraft in all weather and aircraft states safely. The instrumentation is completely different - My scan was degraded, slow and labored having had no experience w/ the new ND (Navigation Display) and ADI (Attitude Director Indicator) presentations/format or functions (manipulation between the screens and systems pages were not provided in training materials. If they were, I had no recollection of that material).We were unable to navigate to systems pages and lacked the knowledge of what systems information was available to us in the different phases of flight. Our weather radar competency was inadequate to safely navigate significant weather on that dark and stormy night. These are just a few issues that were not addressed in our training.I recommend the following to help crews w/ their introductory flight on the Max:Email notification the day before the flight (the email should include: Links - Training Video, PSOB and QRG and all relevant updates/FAQ's)SME (Subject Matter Expert) Observer - the role of the SME is to introduce systems navigation, display management, answer general questions and provide standardized best practices to the next generation aircraft.Additionally, the SME will collect de-identified data to provide to the training department for analysis and dissemination to the line pilots regarding FAQs and know systems differences as well best practices in fly the new model aircraft. NA NA NA B737 MAX First Officer reported feeling unprepared for first flight in the MAX, citing inadequate training. NA
  9. 1557046 201807 1201-1800 ZAB.ARTCC NM NA NA NA 34000 NA NA NA NA NA NA Center ZAB Air Carrier B737-800 NA 2 Part 121 IFR Passenger FMS Or FMC Descent; Cruise STAR PINNG1 Class A ZAB NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Center ZAB Air Carrier A319 NA 2 Part 121 IFR Passenger FMS Or FMC Descent; Cruise STAR PINNG1 Class A ZAB NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Facility ZAB.ARTCC NA Government Enroute Air Traffic Control Fully Certified NA NA NA NA 1557046 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter NA NA Person Flight Crew In-flight Air Traffic Control Issued New Clearance; Air Traffic Control Separated Traffic; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification; Flight Crew Took Evasive Action Environment - Non Weather Related; Procedure Procedure I was working sector 90/47combined. A B737-800 had checked on at FL340 after being descended by sector 80 and I gave them descend via into PHX on the PINNG1. About 10-12 miles in trail, an A319, checked on also at FL340, just leveled, also going to PHX, having been descended by sector 80. The pilot keyed up and asked for lower. I gave them FL300. I had no ride reports, most everything was reporting smooth. The closest weather was well to the north, about 60 miles away. When the pilot had keyed up, I heard a warning tone in the background so I thought maybe something was going on. The pilot then told me they had received moderate turbulence about 60 seconds previous. I told them I had no ride reports and asked the preceding aircraft, the B737-800 at FL340, who said it was smooth. I told the A319 that they were following a B738 and that they might have gotten the wake off them. The pilot confirmed that a minute or so later, and then informed me that the aircraft had rolled. I told the supervisor. The A319 asked if they could start down and stay 2000 or so feet underneath the B737-800, I told him they were both going to PHX on the arrival, so I offered to vector the aircraft out to get more space. At this point, they were about 13 miles in trail and the pilot took me up on the offer. At the point where I had 15 miles or so, I told the pilot, but he wanted to stay on the vector for another 1.5 minutes. I turned them back at about 17-18 miles and ended up with just over 18. The pilot was obviously rattled. I asked the B737-800 pilot if they were heavier than normal, but he told me no.I had three other wake events recently. I had an ERJ175 the other day being vectored behind a B777 into PHX who asked for an additional vector to stay at least 12 miles behind the aircraft. Granted they were following a heavy, but I'm not sure if controllers in enroute understand the impact of using less than 8-9 miles of separation behind a heavy, especially the 'larger' heavies like the B777 and B748s (and, of course, A380). About a month or so ago (maybe more) I had an ERJ175 behind an A321 at FL350 behind vectored to stay behind. About 8 miles back they got into the wake and complained about it. I had a B737 on the HYDRR arrival into PHX about 12 miles behind company B738 and got moderate turbulence. Usually in the absence of adverse and/or forecasted adverse ride reports, that is almost always a wake encounter. I also had a conversation with a pilot friend of mine who expressed concern to me about the number of wake events they are having in enroute. The increased accuracy of both RNAV and RNP has increased the risk of these events considerably.Recommendation: I've reported the wake problems we've been having in enroute before. In conversations with the enroute representative, it is known about the wake problems with the A321 and B738/9 (as well as MAX I'm sure), but that information has not really trickled down to the controller ranks. This is somewhat disconcerting to me. I don't know that the status quo of 1000 feet /5-mile in enroute is sufficient anymore. Terminal has considerable wake turbulence training, and the separation standard accounts for much of this (though I don't know much about RECAT). The wake problems we are having in enroute should necessitate training as well as consideration of our enroute separation standard. At a minimum, maybe we should start telling the aircraft when the preceding aircraft is a heavy, B738/9 or A321? Maybe we need an increased standard beyond 5 miles when following a preceding aircraft at the same altitude. NA NA NA ZAB Enroute Controller reported seeing a number of wake turbulence events recently, and questioned current in-trail techniques. NA
  10. 1560763 201807 0601-1200 BWI.Airport MD NA NA NA 17000 NA NA NA Daylight NA NA TRACON PCT Air Carrier B737-800 NA 2 Part 121 IFR Passenger FMS Or FMC; GPS Climb SID TERPZ 6 Class E PCT NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Aircraft X Flight Deck Air Carrier Pilot Not Flying; First Officer Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Last 90 Days 230; Flight Crew Type 1600 NA NA NA 1560763 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Deviation - Altitude Crossing Restriction Not Met; Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy NA NA Person Flight Crew In-flight General None Reported / Taken Aircraft; Airspace Structure Airspace Structure I have flown out of BWI on the TERPZ 6 to either OTTTO or RAMAY the last three weeks. Each time I have flown a 737-800 or MAX8. The first two times in the 737-800 we had to adjust our climb out speed below the ECON Schedule (which was around 300) to make the 17,000ft., or above restriction at FOXHL (FMC warnings were received 'unable next altitude'). In the 737 MAX8, it was less. So by starting early to adjust our profile we were able to meet the restriction. It appears like a trend that heavy 737-800 aircraft in summertime will have a hard time meeting the climb restriction, and if you do not catch it soon enough you may not make the FOXHL restriction.[Suggestion].In the Departure Section of the SID add a note. If departing the TERPZ 6 to OTTTO or RAMAY be aware that high gross weights and hot temperatures may not allow you to climb via the FMC ECON Speed and meet the 17,000ft., or above restriction at FOXHL. NA NA NA B737-800 First Officer reported that departing out of BWI, the aircraft is unable to make the 17000ft. restriction at FOXHL on TERPZ 6 departure. NA
  11. 1568887 201808 1801-2400 ZZZ.Airport US NA NA 0 NA VMC NA NA Night NA NA Ramp ZZZ Air Carrier B737-800 NA 2 Part 121 IFR Passenger NA Taxi NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Aircraft X Flight Deck Air Carrier Captain; Pilot Flying Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Total 11000 NA Situational Awareness NA 1568887 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Conflict Ground Conflict, Critical NA NA Person Flight Crew Taxi Flight Crew Took Evasive Action Human Factors Human Factors Upon taxi into gate, [guidance system] was active, both pilots cleared ramp area. Approximately 20 ft remaining FO yells for me to stop. I immediately stopped aircraft and FO [advised] fueler was backing up into our safety zone. We were in a B737 MAX with the split winglets and thus the clearance provided below the wingtip was considerably less. After speaking with ramp [personnel] who reviewed the ramp video, I believe the monitoring and quick response of the FO averted possible damage or impact to aircraft. Ramp fueler personnel inattentive to position on ramp. [Not] all ramp personnel may be accustomed to the 737 MAX winglet design and the increased clearance required. Training for this may be beneficial. NA NA NA B737-800 Captain reported making a sudden stop to avoid a collision with a fuel truck on the ramp. NA
  12. 1572630 201808 1201-1800 ZZZ.Airport US NA NA 0 NA NA NA NA Daylight NA NA NA Air Carrier B737-800 NA 2 Part 121 IFR Passenger NA Taxi NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Engine Starting System NA X Improperly Operated NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Aircraft X Flight Deck Air Carrier Captain; Pilot Flying Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Last 90 Days 354 NA Other / Unknown NA 1572630 Aircraft X Flight Deck Air Carrier First Officer; Pilot Not Flying Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) NA NA Other / Unknown NA 1573224 Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy NA NA Automation Aircraft Other Automation Taxi Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem Human Factors; Manuals; Aircraft Human Factors We were pushing back from the gate in a MAX 8 and were starting the number 2 engine. The FO (First Officer) configured the air conditioning panel before the tick on the EGT was gone, causing the EEC (Electronic Engine Controller) to abort the engine start. Once we saw the white box flashing, we aborted the engine start, reviewed the QRC, and followed the QRH guidance. After confirming with Maintenance (and a review of the [operation manual]) a second successful start was made.We conducted a briefing about the MAX engine start and the items that we were going to see, and time limits associated during our normal preflight briefings. I was very surprised when the aborted start happened due to the fact that we had reviewed the start process. I will continue to brief the engine start procedures with a bigger emphasis on the EGT roll back. NA [Report narrative contained no additional information.] NA B737 MAX-8 crew reported failing to follow the engine start procedure resulting in an aborted engine start. NA
  13. 1583028 201809 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Daylight NA NA NA Air Carrier B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated NA 2 Part 121 IFR Passenger FMS Or FMC; GPS Cruise NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Powerplant Fuel System NA X Malfunctioning NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Aircraft X Flight Deck Air Carrier Captain; Pilot Flying Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Last 90 Days 420; Flight Crew Type 9000 NA Troubleshooting NA 1583028 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation - Procedural Weight And Balance; Inflight Event / Encounter Fuel Issue NA NA Person Flight Crew In-flight General None Reported / Taken Aircraft Aircraft My concern is that some MAX 8 aircraft are burning significantly more fuel than what is calculated on the Dispatch release. Perhaps the fuel bias on these aircraft needs to be re-evaluated. On this particular flight, the burn rate was so high that the Pilots referred to the MAX AOM (Aircraft Operator Manual) to look up what constitutes a fuel leak. Our flight plan fuel was for a burn of 21,600 pounds from push to touchdown. Our actual burn was 22,900 pounds (actual fuel load of 28,100 at push minus our 5,200 pounds at touchdown. We pulled into the gate with 5,000 pounds). This was 1,300 pounds more fuel burned than planned.Other than a direct to ZZZ shortly after departing ZZZ1, we flew the flight planned altitude and routing. I also slowed to .76 Mach a couple of times for pockets of turbulence. Winds were close to flight plan and there was minimal off-course maneuvering to avoid a couple of buildups. Based on another long MAX 8 flights where we burned more than flight plan, I kept a detailed fuel log this flight. We pushed with 700 pounds fuel more than flight plan. Fifty minutes into the flight we were plus 500 pounds of fuel over flight plan. At 1+20 into the flight, we were plus 300 pounds. At 1+49 we were at the calculated flight plan fuel. Eleven minutes later we were at -300 pounds from flight planned fuel. Around that point we contacted Dispatch through ACARS to let them know our fuel was not trending well. We got into the books and ran the Fuel Leak QRH just in case. The flight attendants scanned the engines and the wings. Everything checked out ok with respect to the QRH, except we had an unusual fuel burn. Dispatch, the FO (First Officer), and I came up with a plan to update our status over ZZZ and also over ZZZ2. At 2+11, we were -500 pounds for fuel. The fuel trend stayed constant at -500 pounds from flight plan for the duration of the flight from that point onward. The weather was VFR at ZZZ3 so we elected to continue over ZZZ and also ZZZ2. I was concerned as my calculations had us landing with less than 5,000 pounds. Dispatch said his calculations had us landing with 6,300 pounds. Dispatch was very helpful throughout the majority of the flight providing updates on weather and asking our fuel status. Dispatch also asked that I call him after landing. We landed uneventfully other than fuel being 900 pounds lower than the Dispatch Release after flying the flight plan. After landing, I walked around the aircraft and went into the main gear well. My concern was a potential fuel leak. I noted none nor any abnormal fuel smells. After that, I called Dispatch and we had a conference call with Maintenance. The Maintenance Controller said they were noting that several MAX 8 aircraft are not fuel efficient. He said they think the Boeing-recommended engine cleaning cycle is not frequent enough. I was told during this call that when the LEAP engines are dirty they lose all of their efficiency. If this is the case, shouldn't the fuel bias on these aircraft be adjusted accordingly? From now on, I am going to plan on an extra 400 pounds per hour of fuel on each MAX 8 I fly on a leg longer than two and a half hours. NA NA NA B737 MAX-8 Captain reported the engine fuel burn was higher than expected. NA
  14. 1583127 201810 1801-2400 DEN.Airport CO NA NA NA 7000 VMC NA NA NA NA NA Tower DEN Air Carrier B737-800 NA 2 Part 121 IFR NA NA Initial Approach NA Class B DEN NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Aircraft X Flight Deck Air Carrier Pilot Flying; Captain Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Total 18000 NA Situational Awareness NA 1583127 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Unstabilized Approach NA NA Person Flight Crew In-flight General None Reported / Taken Aircraft; Human Factors Human Factors The purpose of this [report] is to explain a situation where I unintentionally used a high rate of descent to recapture a glide path landing in DEN in a 737 MAX. I have flown the MAX a few times [before] but this was the first time I've flown it in a high density altitude airport. The landing was uneventful and I felt like I was in control the entire final approach but the rate of descent was higher than I anticipated or normally use due to my hesitancy to quickly revert from reliance on technology to visual approach procedures. I understand the emphasis on visual approaches in training and safety. After an uneventful flight to DEN we were given a left downwind turn to base for DEN runway 16L outside of LEETS at 7000 feet. It was a clear night so I accepted the visual when offered and slowed appropriately for the final decent. To increase my familiarity of the MAX, prior to top of descent, I briefed and intended to engage ARM III below 5000 feet AGL and set up the HUD to do so. As we neared LEETS I pushed the Approach ARM button (with 7000 feet in the MCP) but my attention was outside and on the flight display system when I made a rookie mistake. I didn't notice that the Approach mode did not arm. I have flown the 737 MAX a few times and was familiar with, what I believe to be, slightly different descent characteristics. Also, I armed the speed brakes but apparently when I did so the handle was slightly past the detent. I don't know if the ARM switch wouldn't engage as a result of this or not? Also I don't know if the Landing Attitude Modifier behaves differently due to the speed brake handle not precisely set in detent? Of course since I had 7000 feet in the MCP as we flew past LEETS I lost vertical path display and in the moment(s) it took to evaluate what was happening, I got high on path. The vertical guidance displays were now unusable so I abandoned the idea of the CAT III practice and adjusted to a high rate of descent to visually get on the PAPI. Since DEN is 5434 feet I rationalized that a higher descent rate was appropriate due to the high density altitude and called 'stable' at 1000 feet with a 1200 feet rate of descent but correcting. When I adjusted the throttles, the speed brake green light went to amber and the FO (First Officer) quickly and correctly armed the speed brake. I didn't get enough power in soon enough and ended up getting three reds on the PAPI and a 'Glide Slope' announcement to which I adjusted up to regain path. I continued to an uneventful landing. As a result of this situation which happened very quickly, I will 1) recommit to confirming buttons arm when pushed, 2) recommit to confirming the speed brake handle is fully in the arm detent (in addition to the green arm light) 3) react more swiftly to visual methods (or go around) when appropriate when displays don't appear as expected and 4) continue to ensure stabilized approaches or go around as necessary. NA NA NA B737 MAX Captain reported an unstabilized approach into DEN due to human factors and aircraft familiarization. NA
  15. 1590012 201810 0001-0600 ZZZ.Airport US NA NA 1000 NA NA NA NA Daylight NA NA Tower ZZZ Air Carrier B737-800 NA 2 Part 121 IFR Passenger NA Takeoff NA Class C ZZZ NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Autothrottle/Speed Control NA X Improperly Operated NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Aircraft X Flight Deck Air Carrier Pilot Flying; Captain Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Last 90 Days 419 NA Confusion NA 1590012 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Deviation - Speed All Types NA NA Person Flight Crew In-flight Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem Aircraft Aircraft After 1000 feet I noticed a decrease in aircraft performance. I picked up that the autothrottles were not moving to commanded position even though they were engaged. I'm sure they were set properly for takeoff but not sure when the discrepancy took place. My scan wasn't as well developed since I've only flown the MAX once before. I manually positioned the thrust levers ASAP. This resolved the threat, we were able to increase speed to clean up and continue the climb to 3000 feet. Shortly afterwards I heard about the (other carrier) accident and am wondering if any other crews have experienced similar incidents with the autothrottle system on the MAX? Or I may have made a possible flying mistake which is more likely. The FO (First Officer) was still on his first month and was not able to identify whether it was the aircraft or me that was in error. NA NA NA B737-MAX8 Captain reported the autothrottles failed to move to the commanded position during takeoff and climb. NA
  16. 1590405 201810 1801-2400 MKJS.Airport FO NA NA NA 3000 VMC NA NA NA NA NA Tower MKJS Air Carrier B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated NA 2 Part 121 IFR Passenger NA Initial Approach NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Aircraft X Flight Deck Air Carrier Captain; Pilot Flying Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument NA NA Situational Awareness NA 1590405 Aircraft X Flight Deck Air Carrier First Officer; Pilot Not Flying Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument NA NA Situational Awareness NA 1590398 Deviation - Track / Heading All Types; Inflight Event / Encounter CFTT / CFIT NA NA Automation Aircraft Terrain Warning In-flight Flight Crew Took Evasive Action; Flight Crew Became Reoriented Human Factors Human Factors LENAR 4 Arrival for ILS DME RWY 07. Cleared to OMAXI descending to 3,000 FT. Cleared for the approach. Intercepted OMAXI on LNAV and selected 1,800 FT for ANAPA crossing. Selected LOC as we crossed OMAXI (waited until between SIA 278 and 218 radials per note on 10-7B-1). Received a warning CAUTION TERRAIN. Disconnected autopilot and verified aircraft position. We were slightly north (left) of localizer and above 1,800 feet for ANAPA crossing. Continued to hand fly a visual approach, intercepted glide slope at ANAPA and landed RWY 07. We are unsure why we received a warning when we were at proper altitudes and north of localizer which should have kept clear of all terrain. NA During arrival in MKJS aircraft was on VNAV path and direct to OMAXI. Prior to OMAXI 1,800 feet was selected on MCP to use VNAV guidance until the FAF. During the smart turn to final approach course after OMAXI the Captain selected VOR/LOC to use the LOC lateral guidance. A few seconds later the caution terrain alert sounded for a few seconds. I looked at my EFIS annunciator and realized the aircraft was not in path anymore and was on SPD mode. The altitude was between 3,000 feet (OMAXI altitude) and 1,800 feet (for ANAPA), maybe slightly below the plan path but [I] do not remember exactly at what altitude. Aircraft was on correct course on LOC track. The Captain immediately climbed a little bit and steered the aircraft a few degrees toward the left of course towards the water as a precaution and the alert went away [immediately]. I believe that when VOR/LOC mode was selected the aircraft reverted from path mode to SPD mode and got a little bit lower than the planned descent path prior to the FAF and that triggered the caution terrain a for a few seconds. I realize the importance of the pilot monitoring being on the constant look out for sudden EFIS mode changes and making sure the aircraft is complying with the correct altitudes and courses since the Pilot Monitoring has a broader picture of what is going on with the aircraft as a whole. NA B737 flight crew reported receiving a GPWS terrain alert on approach to MKJS. NA
  17. 1593017 201811 NA NA NA NA NA 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Air Carrier B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated NA NA NA NA NA NA Other N/A NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Aircraft X Flight Deck Air Carrier Captain Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) NA NA Training / Qualification; Confusion NA 1593017 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy NA NA Person Flight Crew Pre-flight General None Reported / Taken Aircraft; Manuals Manuals The recently released 737 MAX8 Emergency Airworthiness Directive directs pilots how to deal with a known issue, but it does nothing to address the systems issues with the AOA system.MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System) is implemented on the 737 MAX to enhance pitch characteristics with flaps UP and at elevated angles of attack. The MCAS function commands nose down stabilizer to enhance pitch characteristics during steep turns with elevated load factors and during flaps up flight at airspeeds approaching stall. MCAS is activated without pilot input and only operates in manual, flaps up flight. The system is designed to allow the flight crew to use column trim switch or stabilizer aisle stand cutout switches to override MCAS input. The function is commanded by the Flight Control computer using input data from sensors and other airplane systems.The MCAS function becomes active when the airplane Angle of Attack exceeds a threshold based on airspeed and altitude. Stabilizer incremental commands are limited to 2.5 degrees and are provided at a rate of 0.27 degrees per second. The magnitude of the stabilizer input is lower at high Mach number and greater at low Mach numbers. The function is reset once angle of attack falls below the Angle of Attack threshold or if manual stabilizer commands are provided by the flight crew. If the original elevated AOA condition persists, the MCAS function commands another incremental stabilizer nose down command according to current aircraft Mach number at actuation.This description is not currently in the 737 Flight Manual Part 2, nor the Boeing FCOM, though it will be added to them soon. This communication highlights that an entire system is not described in our Flight Manual. This system is now the subject of an AD.I think it is unconscionable that a manufacturer, the FAA, and the airlines would have pilots flying an airplane without adequately training, or even providing available resources and sufficient documentation to understand the highly complex systems that differentiate this aircraft from prior models. The fact that this airplane requires such jury rigging to fly is a red flag. Now we know the systems employed are error prone--even if the pilots aren't sure what those systems are, what redundancies are in place, and failure modes. I am left to wonder: what else don't I know? The Flight Manual is inadequate and almost criminally insufficient. All airlines that operate the MAX must insist that Boeing incorporate ALL systems in their manuals. NA NA NA B737MAX Captain expressed concern that some systems such as the MCAS are not fully described in the aircraft Flight Manual. NA
  18. 1593021 201811 NA NA NA NA NA 0 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Air Carrier B737 Next Generation Undifferentiated NA 2 Part 121 IFR NA NA Parked NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Aircraft X Flight Deck Air Carrier Captain Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Last 90 Days 178; Flight Crew Total 21200; Flight Crew Type 3342 NA Training / Qualification; Confusion NA 1593021 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy NA NA Person Flight Crew Pre-flight General None Reported / Taken Procedure; Manuals; Company Policy; Human Factors Manuals This was the first flight on a Max for both pilots. Unfamiliarity with flight deck displays led to confusion about display annunciations and switch function. The Flight Manual does not address at least one annunciation, or the controls for the display--or if it does, neither pilot could find the explanation. I have spent literally days looking for an explanation, could not find one, and that is why I wrote this report. It shouldn't be this hard to figure out what I'm looking at.On the First Officer side ND, on the ground only, there is a MAINT annunciation. We both saw it, couldn't find any immediate explanation for it on the ground, and didn't address it until airborne. I researched the FM (Flight Manual) for an explanation, accomplishing a word search of the term MAINT. There are only two references I could find: the overhead MAINT light (a no go item) and the CDS MAINT light (a QRH item). There is no explanation of the ND MAINT annunciation. We spent the entire hour flight trying to find the meaning of this annunciation and came up empty handed. We determined to check it out once we landed (if the light came on again). Sure enough, after parking, the MAINT annunciation came back on the ND display. We called Maintenance to check out the light. We waited to make an ELB entry, unsure if one was required. Turned out, an ELB entry was not required.The mechanic explained the light was part of a menu for maintenance use only on the ground. In addition, there are two selector knobs that are under-explained (i.e., not explained) in the manual, and we were uncertain what their purpose was. One is under the Fuel Flow switch and the other under the MFD/ENG TFR display switch. These knobs don't seem to work in flight. The First Officer offered to hit the SEL function in flight, to test it out, but I thought something irreversible or undesirable might happen (not knowing what we were actually selecting), so we did not try it out in flight. The mechanic later explained SEL on the First Officer side was used on the ground by maintenance to toggle between the maintenance functions. I forgot to ask what my side did, and still don't know.Finally, in the Captain's preflight procedure in the bulletin, it says, 'Selector... C'. What selector is this referring to? Is this the same selector under the Fuel Flow switch, (which is shown in the MAX panels on the L position, as if that is the normal position?) This is very poorly explained. I have no idea what switch the preflight is talking about, nor do I understand even now what this switch does.I think this entire setup needs to be thoroughly explained to pilots. How can a Captain not know what switch is meant during a preflight setup? Poor training and even poorer documentation, that is how. It is not reassuring when a light cannot be explained or understood by the pilots, even after referencing their flight manuals. It is especially concerning when every other MAINT annunciation means something bad. I envision some delayed departures as conscientious pilots try to resolve the meaning of the MAINT annunciation and which switches are referred to in the setup. NA NA NA B737MAX Captain reported confusion regarding switch function and display annunciations related to 'poor training and even poorer documentation'. NA
  19. 1593699 201811 0601-1200 ZZZ.Airport US NA NA 0 NA NA NA NA Daylight NA NA NA Air Carrier B737-800 NA 2 Part 121 IFR Passenger NA Parked NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Cockpit Furnishing Boeing X Design NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Aircraft X Flight Deck Air Carrier Captain; Pilot Not Flying Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Last 90 Days 428 NA NA NA 1593699 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Flight Deck / Cabin / Aircraft Event Other / Unknown NA N NA Pre-flight NA Equipment / Tooling Equipment / Tooling ATIS sheet fell through the slot forward of the center pedestal and the blank off plate. We had Maintenance come out to remove it. We discovered 20 other ATIS sheets mixed into the wiring. The aircraft is only six months old. Severe potential fire hazard! NA NA NA 737MAX8 Captain reported a slot in the cockpit center pedestal allowed flight documents to slip through and collect on aircraft wire bundles. NA
  20. 1593701 201811 1201-1800 ZZZ.Airport US NA NA NA 33000 NA NA NA Daylight NA NA Center ZZZ Air Carrier B737-800 NA 2 Part 121 IFR Passenger FMS Or FMC Climb NA Class A ZZZ NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA FMS/FMC NA X Improperly Operated NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Aircraft X Flight Deck Air Carrier First Officer; Pilot Not Flying Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Last 90 Days 454; Flight Crew Type 454 NA Distraction; Training / Qualification NA 1593701 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation - Procedural Clearance NA NA NA NA Flight Crew Returned To Clearance Aircraft; Human Factors Human Factors We were climbing from FL 330 given a clearance to FL 360. Aircraft briefly leveled at initial cruise altitude FL 340 before Aircrew intervention. [Center] queried if we received the clearance to FL 360. As a result of the brief delay [Center] issued brief off course vectors to both us and converging traffic. Causal factors were equipment: not much experience in MAX-800, as a result, still have to search for everything. Automation: Upon receipt of FL 360 clearance and after the Captain dialed the MCP Altitude 36,000 FT, I should have, but failed to, ensured the cruise altitude reflected FL 360. Engaging the ALT INTV button would have facilitated the process. The solution is to Verify/Verbalize/Monitor. Verifying the CDU cruise altitude (NAV 2/3) would have prevented the temporary level off. Monitoring would have mitigated the delay at FL 340 but could have been timelier. As a relatively new First Officer, I had not seen this issue. However, I could have done a better job with VVM (Verbalize, Verify, Monitor) to back up the Captain with his duties while flying. Had I seen the momentary level off, I might have been able to alert ATC of it, avoiding any confusion or deviation of what the expectations were. NA NA NA B737 MAX8 First Officer reported an altitude deviation due to an intermediate level off by the aircraft automation. NA
  21. 1597286 201811 NA ZZZ.Airport US NA NA NA 2000 NA NA NA NA NA NA Tower ZZZ Air Carrier B737-800 NA 2 Part 121 IFR Passenger FMS Or FMC Takeoff NA Class C ZZZ NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Autopilot NA X Malfunctioning NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Aircraft X Flight Deck Air Carrier First Officer; Pilot Not Flying Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Last 90 Days 511 NA NA NA 1597286 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical NA NA Person Flight Crew In-flight Flight Crew Regained Aircraft Control Aircraft Aircraft Day 3 of 3 departing in a MAX 8 after a long overnight. I was well rested and had discussed the recent MAX 8 MCAS guidance with the Captain. On departure, we had strong crosswinds (gusts > 30 knots) directly off the right wing, however, no LLWS or Micro-burst activity was reported at the field. After verifying LNAV, selecting gear and flaps up, I set 'UP' speed. The aircraft accelerated normally and the Captain engaged the 'A' autopilot after reaching set speed. Within two to three seconds the aircraft pitched nose down bringing the VSI to approximately 1,200 to 1,500 FPM. I called 'descending' just prior to the GPWS sounding 'don't sink, don't sink.' The Captain immediately disconnected the autopilot and pitched into a climb. The remainder of the flight was uneventful. We discussed the departure at length and I reviewed in my mind our automation setup and flight profile but can't think of any reason the aircraft would pitch nose down so aggressively. NA NA NA B737 MAX First Officer reported that the aircraft pitched nose down after engaging autopilot on departure. Autopilot was disconnected and flight continued to destination. NA
  22. 1597380 201811 NA ZZZ.TRACON US NA NA NA 2000 NA Rain; Snow NA NA NA NA TRACON ZZZ Air Carrier B737-800 NA 2 Part 121 IFR Passenger FMS Or FMC Climb NA Class B ZZZ NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Autoflight System NA X Malfunctioning NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Aircraft X Flight Deck Air Carrier Captain; Pilot Flying Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Multiengine Flight Crew Last 90 Days 626 NA Human-Machine Interface; Confusion NA 1597380 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe NA NA Automation Aircraft Other Automation; Person Flight Crew In-flight Aircraft Equipment Problem Dissipated; Flight Crew FLC Overrode Automation; Flight Crew Overcame Equipment Problem Aircraft; Human Factors Aircraft It was day three of six for me and day three with very good FO (First Officer). Well rested, great rapport and above average Crew coordination. Knew we had a MAX. It was my leg, normal Ops Brief, plus I briefed our concerns with the MAX issues, bulletin, MCAS, stab trim cutout response etc. I mentioned I would engage autopilot sooner than usual (I generally hand fly to at least above 10,000 ft.) to remove the possible MCAS threat. Weather was about 1000 OVC drizzle, temperature dropping and an occasional snow flake. I double checked with an additional personal walkaround just prior to push; a few drops of water on the aircraft but clean aircraft, no deice required. Strong crosswind and I asked Tug Driver to push a little more tail east so as not to have slow/hung start gusts 30+. Wind and mechanical turbulence was noted. Careful engine warm times, normal flaps 5 takeoff in strong (appeared almost direct) crosswind. Departure was normal. Takeoff and climb in light to moderate turbulence. After flaps 1 to 'up' and above clean 'MASI up speed' with LNAV engaged I looked at and engaged A Autopilot. As I was returning to my PFD (Primary Flight Display) PM (Pilot Monitoring) called 'DESCENDING' followed by almost an immediate: 'DONT SINK DONT SINK!' I immediately disconnected AP (Autopilot) (it WAS engaged as we got full horn etc.) and resumed climb. Now, I would generally assume it was my automation error, i.e., aircraft was trying to acquire a miss-commanded speed/no autothrottles, crossing restriction etc., but frankly neither of us could find an inappropriate setup error (not to say there wasn't one). With the concerns with the MAX 8 nose down stuff, we both thought it appropriate to bring it to your attention. We discussed issue at length over the course of the return to ZZZ. Best guess from me is airspeed fluctuation due to mechanical shear/frontal passage that overwhelmed automation temporarily or something incorrectly setup in MCP (Mode Control Panel). PM's callout on 'descending' was particularly quick and welcome as I was just coming back to my display after looking away. System and procedures coupled with CRM (Resource Management) trapped and mitigated issue. NA NA NA B737MAX Captain reported an autopilot anomaly in which led to an undesired brief nose down situation. NA
  23. 1598969 201812 0001-0600 PHX.Airport AZ NA NA NA 24000 NA NA NA NA NA NA Center ZAB Air Carrier B737-800 NA 2 Part 121 IFR NA NA Descent NA Class A ZAB NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Center ZAB NA HS 125 Series NA NA NA IFR NA NA Descent NA Class A ZAB NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Facility ZAB.ARTCC NA Government Enroute Air Traffic Control Fully Certified Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 15 NA Troubleshooting; Situational Awareness NA 1598969 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA ATC Issue All Types; Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy; Inflight Event / Encounter Wake Vortex Encounter NA NA Person Flight Crew In-flight Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Requested ATC Assistance / Clarification Airspace Structure; Procedure; Aircraft Ambiguous Aircraft X was descending via the GEELA arrival. There were at FL240 descending. 14 miles behind was Aircraft Y going to SDL. They are filed on the same route. Procedurally we take them north and get them down to 110 or 090. I started them down to FL240 for airspace with the intent of going lower and left once they cleared an over flight. The pilot leveled at FL240 and asked if they were following someone. I told them about the B738 (Aircraft X) 14 miles in front, they said they got some pretty significant wake turbulence. I asked them to describe it in terms of turbulence, they said moderate turbulence (although they hesitated when they responded) and said they had a significant rolling of the aircraft. I vectored them a little left and staggered them above the B738 until I had enough diverging course to get them lower. I asked the Aircraft X pilot if they were heavier than normal, he said no they were actually very light. The FLM (Front Line Manager) told me to ask Aircraft Y if they had any injuries or damage, they said no.I've had this happen a few times, mostly with B738s and 9s, but also with an A321. It seems to be an aircraft relative size thing, where the following aircraft is smaller or much smaller. It doesn't seem to matter whether the B738 is heavy or not, it appears to be a design issue, much like the B757 wake problem was discovered to be.This is unfortunately a known problem, but the issue does not seem to be adequately communicated to the workforce, specifically the enroute workforce. It seems to be significant enough that it causes consternation among crews. I even had a CRJ7 pilot who piped on frequency and mentioned they had experienced the same thing quite often. I think we need to visit the issue of wake turbulence separation, much like RECAT has done in terminal, to address some of the wake issues we are seeing. Compounding this is the increased traffic in the system and the accuracy of RNAV putting aircraft much more directly behind each other.I think the ERC (Event Review Committee) needs to issue a report to look into this wake turbulence issue with the B738/9/MAX and A321, in addition to the obvious problems of heavies (especially A380, B772/3, B748, A124). At a minimum we need information in the system, if only to let controllers know about the issue (I know wake turbulence was touched on recently in recurrent training, but more from the A380 problem). I think someone will get hurt by a wake encounter. NA NA NA ZAB Center Controller reported that a Hawker pilot encountered wake turbulence while 14 miles behind a B737-800 aircraft. NA
  24. 1603503 201812 NA ZZZ.Airport US NA NA 0 NA NA Rain NA Night NA NA NA Air Carrier B737-800 NA 2 Part 121 NA Passenger NA Parked NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Aerofoil Ice System NA X Malfunctioning NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Company Flight Deck Air Carrier Pilot Flying; Captain Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP); Flight Crew Instrument Flight Crew Last 90 Days 357 NA Time Pressure; Confusion; Distraction NA 1603503 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe; Deviation - Procedural MEL; Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy NA NA Person Flight Crew In-flight Flight Crew Became Reoriented Equipment / Tooling; Chart Or Publication; MEL; Procedure; Weather; Human Factors Human Factors ZZZ had terrible weather. We were already hours late when our aircraft arrived. The previous crew wrote up wing anti- ice not working. Outstation Maintenance arrived, and Dispatch and I determined that we could depart with a MEL (Minimum Equipment List) that allows us to fly in icing conditions. MEL was VERY complex and confusing. It required us to start a [B737] Max 8 with an air cart and start the number 2 engine first. I was concerned about the Safety of doing that in the dark and in heavy rain, so I made sure the ground crew and I were completely confident in our procedures. A new release with MEL arrived, logbook was completed by Outstation Maintenance, and we began the process of starting the number 2 engine. During that time, we also were dealing with three different runway changes at ZZZ (XXL then XYL then XZL) which also meant three different SIDS (Standard instrument Departure) and complete re-briefing of takeoff, departure and engine out procedures. Also had to coordinate a crossbleed start. Then, our release expired and we had to get with Dispatch to reload the flight. Amid all these distractions, we didn't realize that Maintenance never placed a sticker in the flight deck or logbook. I reviewed the logbook after Maintenance was done, but totally forgot about the stickers. I guess the major distraction was how the MEL and the MAX 8 AOM (Aircraft Operations Manual) differed with each other on this procedure, and lack of clear directions on working with this MEL. Flight was completed in ZZZ1 and we went to the hotel. I think a clearer AOM or MEL is needed on this problem. NA NA NA B737 MAX Captain reported departing with deferred maintenance and complex MEL, but noticed MEL sticker was not properly applied. NA
  25. 1604159 201812 0601-1200 DEN.Airport CO NA NA NA 10500 NA NA NA Daylight NA NA TRACON D01 Air Carrier B737-800 NA 2 Part 121 IFR Passenger FMS Or FMC Initial Approach NA Class B DEN NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Aircraft X Flight Deck Air Carrier Captain; Pilot Flying Flight Crew Multiengine; Flight Crew Instrument; Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) Flight Crew Last 90 Days 501; Flight Crew Type 11195 NA Situational Awareness; Human-Machine Interface NA 1604159 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA Deviation - Altitude Excursion From Assigned Altitude; Deviation - Altitude Undershoot; Deviation - Procedural Clearance NA NA Person Flight Crew; Person Air Traffic Control In-flight Air Traffic Control Issued Advisory / Alert; Flight Crew Returned To Clearance; Flight Crew Became Reoriented Human Factors Human Factors We planned for the Visual to Runway 16L and talked about the possible assignment to 17R. When checking in with Approach we were advised to expect 17R. We briefed and programmed the RNP Z 17R. AS we approached the IAF I was preparing for what to do (i.e. what fix to use based on location of active waypoint) and/or the state of the IAF (i.e. active waypoint or not). To the best of my recollection, the IAF was on LSK L2, then I placed it IAF under IAF, although a review after the fact stated we 'could' place in on top of it. We both complied with VVMI prior to execution. The aircraft continued on downwind with no descent. Almost simultaneously, as we noticed the wrong picture on the MAP display, the Controller asked us if we were descending. By this time I had disconnected automation and was following the purple line while both of us were monitoring altitude restrictions based on our clearance. The Pilot Monitoring reprogrammed the approach and the rest of the flight was uneventful. No further calls from ATC, altitude, or course deviations occurred. Consider calling the field in sight and requesting visual approach. We do believe that the IAF (since we were close to it) might have auto-sequenced from L2 to L1 (active), and as we know the programming in this case would have been different. Therefore, maybe a closer look at the distance remaining to the active waypoint might have helped prevent this situation. NA NA NA B737 MAX8 Captain reported failure to descend as charted while flying the RNAV (RNP) Z approach to Runway 17R at DEN due to an FMC programming error. NA
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