Arguments from Necessitation

1. The Classical Laws of Logic are necessary truths that hold in all possible worlds.
2. The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) states that everything must have a sufficient reason for its existence.
3. The Causal Principle states that every emergent event or existent must have a cause.

4. Therefore, the necessary truths of logic and the PSR must have a sufficient reason for their cause of existence, as they are not dependent on any particular material or temporal conditions and are necessary in all possible worlds.
5. It is rationally possible that there exists a being that is the ultimate source of all necessary truths and all emergent truths and the cause of the emergence of temporal events and existents.
6. This being, if it exists, would be the Necessary Being.
7. Therefore, if the Necessary Being exists, all necessary truths would be grounded in it, in at least one possible world.
8. Therefore, the proposition "All necessary truths are grounded in the Necessary Being" is possibly necessary, as it is necessarily true in at least one possible world (i.e. a possible world in which the Necessary Being exists).
C. Therefore, the proposition "All necessary truths are grounded in the Necessary Being" must be necessary in all possible worlds according to the Principle of Necessitation, which states that if a proposition is possibly necessary in some possible world, then it is necessary in all possible worlds.



1. The Classical Laws of Logic are necessary truths that hold in all possible worlds.
2. The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) states that everything must have a sufficient reason for its existence.
3. The Causal Principle states that every emergent event or existent must have a cause.

4. Therefore, necessary truths and emergent truths must have an extrinsically sufficient reason for their existence and a cause.
5. Some sufficient reason must make truths true, by extrinsically specifying them as true, as their cause.
6. Therefore, the sufficient reason and cause for necessary truths must be an existent that exists outside of the realm of material or emergent causes, extrinsically specifying the truths as true (or, grounded).
7. This existent is rationally necessary in some possible world.
8. This existent, if it exists, would be the Necessary Being; i.e. existing by virtue of what it is.
9. Therefore, truths must necessarily be rationally grounded in the Necessary Being, in at least one possible world.
10. By the Principle of Necessitation, if a proposition is possibly necessary in some possible world, then it is necessary in every possible world.
C. Therefore, truths must be grounded in the Necessary Being in all possible worlds.


1. In the past, the truth "no being exists on the Earth" was true.
2. Now, the truth "no being exists on the Earth" is not true.
3. Therefore, truths can change.
4. Something must make truths true, by extrinsically specifying them as true.
5. Therefore, the sufficient reason and cause for necessary truths must be an existent that exists outside of the realm of material or emergent causes, extrinsically specifying the truths as true (or, grounded).
6. This existent exists by virtue of what it is.
7. This existent is rationally necessary in some possible world.
8. This existent, if it exists, would be the Necessary Being.
9. Therefore, truths must be rationally grounded in the Necessary Being, in at least one possible world.
10. By the Principle of Necessitation, if a proposition is possibly necessary in some possible world, then it is necessary in every possible world.
C. Therefore, truths must be grounded in the Necessary Being in all possible worlds.


1. Necessary truths are truths that hold in all possible worlds.
2. Something must make truths true, by extrinsically specifying them as true.
3. Therefore, there must exist an existent that exists outside of the realm of material or emergent causes, extrinsically specifying necessary truths as true (or, grounding them).
4. This existent, if it exists, is rationally necessary in some possible world.
The Law of Non-Contradiction states that a proposition cannot be both true and false at the same time.
The Law of the Excluded Middle states that a proposition must be either true or false.
5. A proposition, if necessarily true in some possible world, entails the proposition that it is necessarily true in every possible world. That entailed proposition is either true, or false. If it is false, then the original proposition is not necessarily true in any possible world, which would be against the Law of Non-Contradiction; A proposition would in such case, be necessarily true in some possible world, and not necessarily true in every possible world.
C. Propositions which are necessary in some possible world (or possibly necessary), must therefore be necessary in every possible world, and this is known as the Principle of Necessitation.

1. The Law of Non-Contradiction states that a proposition cannot be both true and false at the same time.
2. The Law of the Excluded Middle states that a proposition must be either true or false.
3. A proposition that is possibly necessary in some possible world is a proposition that is necessarily true in at least one possible world.
4. If a proposition that is possibly necessary in some possible world is not necessarily true in every possible world, it would be logically possible for that proposition to be false in at least one possible world, which would make the proposition incoherent and not necessarily true in any possible world.
5. Therefore, if a proposition is possibly necessary in some possible world, it must be necessary in every possible world.
C. This is known as the Principle of Necessitation.


A "possibly necessary" proposition is a proposition that is necessary in some possible world, and therefore is either necessary in every possible world (if the entailed proposition is true, not being against the Law of Non-Contradiction and Law of the Excluded Middle) or not necessary in any possible world (if the entailed proposition is false, being against the Law of Non-Contradiction and Law of the Excluded Middle).