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The /Pol/lack's Playbook (2nd Edition, pastebin edition)

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  1. THE /POL/LACK’S PLAYBOOK
  2. A GUIDE TO PROPAGANDA AND INFORMATION WARFARE
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  7. Second “/Pol/ is an internet Vietnam” Edition
  8. INTRODUCTION
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  10. This packet has been designed to educate the users of 4chan.org/pol/ on propaganda, how shills use propaganda techniques to subvert the board Politically Incorrect, and how to use certain propaganda methods. In order to know the enemy, you must become the enemy, no? Information has been compiled from multiple sources, many containing a scientific angle, all of which are sound. I strongly encourage you to visit the final page once you are finished reading for the author’s notes, sources, and other interesting information. Below you can find the Table of Contents. Happy reading!
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  15. TABLE OF CONTENTS
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  17. Techniques for the dilution, misdirection, and control of an internet forum (Pages 3-5)
  18. The Seventeen Techniques for Truth Suppression (Pages 6-7)
  19. The Twenty-Five Rules of Disinformation (Pages 8-11)
  20. The Eight Traits of the Disinformationalist (Pages 12-13)
  21. Types of Shills (Screenshot, Page 14)
  22. How to Spot a Shill (Pages 15-18)
  23. The Influence of Source Credibility on Communication Effectiveness (Pages 19-20)
  24. Some Principles of Mass Persuasion (Pages 21-23)
  25. German Short-Wave Broadcasts to America (Pages 24-26)
  26. Goebbels Principles of Propaganda (Pages 27-28)
  27. Some Reasons Why Information Campaigns Fail (Pages 29-30)
  28. Specific Shill Groups (31-38)
  29. How to Recognize Propaganda (How to Size up Propaganda) (39-40)
  30. End Pages (Page 41-42)
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  40. “Techniques for dilution, misdirection and control of an internet forum”
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  42. Technique #1 - 'FORUM SLIDING'
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  44. If a very sensitive posting of a critical nature has been posted on a forum, it can be quickly removed from public view by 'forum sliding.' In this technique a number of unrelated posts are quietly prepositioned on the forum and allowed to 'age.' Each of these misdirectional forum postings can then be called upon at will to trigger a 'forum slide.' The second requirement is that several fake accounts exist, which can be called upon, to ensure that this technique is not exposed to the public. To trigger a 'forum slide' and 'flush' the critical post out of public view it is simply a matter of logging into each account both real and fake and then 'replying' to prepositioned postings with a simple 1 or 2 line comment. This brings the unrelated postings to the top of the forum list, and the critical posting 'slides' down the front page, and quickly out of public view. Although it is difficult or impossible to censor the posting it is now lost in a sea of unrelated and unuseful postings. By this means it becomes effective to keep the readers of the forum reading unrelated and non-issue items.
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  46. Technique #2 - 'CONSENSUS CRACKING'
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  48. A second highly effective technique is 'consensus cracking.' To develop a consensus crack, the following technique is used. Under the guise of a fake account a posting is made which looks legitimate and is towards the truth is made - but the critical point is that it has a VERY WEAK PREMISE without substantive proof to back the posting. Once this is done then under alternative fake accounts a very strong position in your favour is slowly introduced over the life of the posting. It is IMPERATIVE that both sides are initially presented, so the uninformed reader cannot determine which side is the truth. As postings and replies are made the stronger 'evidence' or disinformation in your favour is slowly 'seeded in.' Thus the uninformed reader will most like develop the same position as you, and if their position is against you their opposition to your posting will be most likely dropped. However in some cases where the forum members are highly educated and can counter your disinformation with real facts and linked postings, you can then 'abort' the consensus cracking by initiating a 'forum slide.'
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  55. Technique #3 - 'TOPIC DILUTION'
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  57. Topic dilution is not only effective in forum sliding it is also very useful in keeping the forum readers on unrelated and non-productive issues. This is a critical and useful technique to cause a 'RESOURCE BURN.' By implementing continual and non-related postings that distract and disrupt (trolling ) the forum readers they are more effectively stopped from anything of any real productivity. If the intensity of gradual dilution is intense enough, the readers will effectively stop researching and simply slip into a 'gossip mode.' In this state they can be more easily misdirected away from facts towards uninformed conjecture and opinion. The less informed they are the more effective and easy it becomes to control the entire group in the direction that you would desire the group to go in. It must be stressed that a proper assessment of the psychological capabilities and levels of education is first determined of the group to determine at what level to 'drive in the wedge.' By being too far off topic too quickly it may trigger censorship by a forum moderator.
  58.  
  59. Technique #4 - 'INFORMATION COLLECTION'
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  61. Information collection is also a very effective method to determine the psychological level of the forum members, and to gather intelligence that can be used against them. In this technique in a light and positive environment a 'show you mine so me yours' posting is initiated. From the number of replies and the answers that are provided much statistical information can be gathered. An example is to post your 'favourite weapon' and then encourage other members of the forum to showcase what they have. In this matter it can be determined by reverse proration what percentage of the forum community owns a firearm, and or a illegal weapon. This same method can be used by posing as one of the form members and posting your favourite 'technique of operation.' From the replies various methods that the group utilizes can be studied and effective methods developed to stop them from their activities.
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  63. Technique #5 - 'ANGER TROLLING'
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  65. Statistically, there is always a percentage of the forum posters who are more inclined to violence. In order to determine who these individuals are, it is a requirement to present a image to the forum to deliberately incite a strong psychological reaction. From this the most violent in the group can be effectively singled out for reverse IP location and possibly local enforcement tracking. To accomplish this only requires posting a link to a video depicting a local police officer massively abusing his power against a very innocent individual. Statistically of the million or so police officers in America there is always one or two being caught abusing there powers and the taping of the activity can be then used for intelligence gathering purposes - without the requirement to 'stage' a fake abuse video. This method is extremely effective, and the more so the more abusive the video can be made to look. Sometimes it is useful to 'lead' the forum by replying to your own posting with your own statement of violent intent, and that you 'do not care what the authorities think!!' inflammation. By doing this and showing no fear it may be more effective in getting the more silent and self-disciplined violent intent members of the forum to slip and post their real intentions. This can be used later in a court of law during prosecution.
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  67. Technique #6 - 'GAINING FULL CONTROL'
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  69. It is important to also be harvesting and continually maneuvering for a forum moderator position. Once this position is obtained, the forum can then be effectively and quietly controlled by deleting unfavourable postings - and one can eventually steer the forum into complete failure and lack of interest by the general public. This is the 'ultimate victory' as the forum is no longer participated with by the general public and no longer useful in maintaining their freedoms. Depending on the level of control you can obtain, you can deliberately steer a forum into defeat by censoring postings, deleting memberships, flooding, and or accidentally taking the forum offline. By this method the forum can be quickly killed. However it is not always in the interest to kill a forum as it can be converted into a 'honey pot' gathering center to collect and misdirect newcomers and from this point be completely used for your control for your agenda purposes.
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  71. CONCLUSION
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  73. Remember these techniques are only effective if the forum participants DO NOT KNOW ABOUT THEM. Once they are aware of these techniques the operation can completely fail, and the forum can become uncontrolled. At this point other avenues must be considered such as initiating a false legal precedence to simply have the forum shut down and taken offline. This is not desirable as it then leaves the enforcement agencies unable to track the percentage of those in the population who always resist attempts for control against them. Many other techniques can be utilized and developed by the individual and as you develop further techniques of infiltration and control it is imperative to share then with HQ."
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  78. “The Seventeen Techniques for Truth Suppression”
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  80. Dummy up. If it's not reported, if it's not news, it didn't happen.
  81. Wax indignant. This is also known as the "How dare you?" gambit.
  82. Characterize the charges as "rumors" or, better yet, "wild rumors." If, in spite of the news blackout, the public is still able to learn about the suspicious facts, it can only be through "rumors." (If they tend to believe the "rumors" it must be because they are simply "paranoid" or "hysterical.")
  83. Knock down straw men. Deal only with the weakest aspects of the weakest charges. Even better, create your own straw men. Make up wild rumors (or plant false stories) and give them lead play when you appear to debunk all the charges, real and fanciful alike.
  84. Call the skeptics names like "conspiracy theorist," "nutcase," "ranter," "kook," "crackpot," and, of course, "rumor monger." Be sure, too, to use heavily loaded verbs and adjectives when characterizing their charges and defending the "more reasonable" government and its defenders. You must then carefully avoid fair and open debate with any of the people you have thus maligned. For insurance, set up your own "skeptics" to shoot down.
  85. Impugn motives. Attempt to marginalize the critics by suggesting strongly that they are not really interested in the truth but are simply pursuing a partisan political agenda or are out to make money (compared to over-compensated adherents to the government line who, presumably, are not).
  86. Invoke authority. Here the controlled press and the sham opposition can be very useful.
  87. Dismiss the charges as "old news."
  88. Come half-clean. This is also known as "confession and avoidance" or "taking the limited hangout route." This way, you create the impression of candor and honesty while you admit only to relatively harmless, less-than-criminal "mistakes." This stratagem often requires the embrace of a fall-back position quite different from the one originally taken. With effective damage control, the fall-back position need only be peddled by stooge skeptics to carefully limited markets.
  89. Characterize the crimes as impossibly complex and the truth as ultimately unknowable.
  90. Reason backward, using the deductive method with a vengeance. With thoroughly rigorous deduction, troublesome evidence is irrelevant. E.g. We have a completely free press. If evidence exists that the Vince Foster "suicide" note was forged, they would have reported it. They haven't reported it so there is no such evidence. Another variation on this theme involves the likelihood of a conspiracy leaker and a press who would report the leak.
  91. Require the skeptics to solve the crime completely. E.g. If Foster was murdered, who did it and why?
  92. Change the subject. This technique includes creating and/or publicizing distractions.
  93. Lightly report incriminating facts, and then make nothing of them. This is sometimes referred to as "bump and run" reporting.
  94. Baldly and brazenly lie. A favorite way of doing this is to attribute the "facts" furnished the public to a plausible-sounding, but anonymous, source.
  95. Expanding further on numbers 4 and 5, have your own stooges "expose" scandals and champion popular causes. Their job is to pre-empt real opponents and to play 99-yard football. A variation is to pay rich people for the job who will pretend to spend their own money.
  96. Flood the Internet with agents. This is the answer to the question, "What could possibly motivate a person to spend hour upon hour on Internet news groups defending the government and/or the press and harassing genuine critics?" Don’t the authorities have defenders enough in all the newspapers, magazines, radio, and television? One would think refusing to print critical letters and screening out serious callers or dumping them from radio talk shows would be control enough, but, obviously, it is not.
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  101. “The Twenty-Five Rules of Disinformation”
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  104. Note: The first rule and last five (or six, depending on situation) rules are generally not directly within the ability of the traditional disinfo artist to apply. These rules are generally used more directly by those at the leadership, key players, or planning level of the criminal conspiracy or conspiracy to cover up.
  105. Hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil. Regardless of what you know, don’t discuss it — especially if you are a public figure, news anchor, etc. If it’s not reported, it didn’t happen, and you never have to deal with the issues.
  106. Become incredulous and indignant. Avoid discussing key issues and instead focus on side issues which can be used show the topic as being critical of some otherwise sacrosanct group or theme. This is also known as the ‘How dare you!’ gambit.
  107. Create rumor mongers. Avoid discussing issues by describing all charges, regardless of venue or evidence, as mere rumors and wild accusations. Other derogatory terms mutually exclusive of truth may work as well. This method which works especially well with a silent press, because the only way the public can learn of the facts are through such ‘arguable rumors’. If you can associate the material with the Internet, use this fact to certify it a ‘wild rumor’ from a ‘bunch of kids on the Internet’ which can have no basis in fact.
  108. Use a straw man. Find or create a seeming element of your opponent’s argument which you can easily knock down to make yourself look good and the opponent to look bad. Either make up an issue you may safely imply exists based on your interpretation of the opponent/opponent arguments/situation, or select the weakest aspect of the weakest charges. Amplify their significance and destroy them in a way which appears to debunk all the charges, real and fabricated alike, while actually avoiding discussion of the real issues.
  109. Sidetrack opponents with name calling and ridicule. This is also known as the primary ‘attack the messenger’ ploy, though other methods qualify as variants of that approach. Associate opponents with unpopular titles such as ‘kooks’, ‘right-wing’, ‘liberal’, ‘left-wing’, ‘terrorists’, ‘conspiracy buffs’, ‘radicals’, ‘militia’, ‘racists’, ‘religious fanatics’, ‘sexual deviates’, and so forth. This makes others shrink from support out of fear of gaining the same label, and you avoid dealing with issues.
  110. Hit and Run. In any public forum, make a brief attack of your opponent or the opponent position and then scamper off before an answer can be fielded, or simply ignore any answer. This works extremely well in Internet and letters-to-the-editor environments where a steady stream of new identities can be called upon without having to explain criticism, reasoning — simply make an accusation or other attack, never discussing issues, and never answering any subsequent response, for that would dignify the opponent’s viewpoint.
  111. Question motives. Twist or amplify any fact which could be taken to imply that the opponent operates out of a hidden personal agenda or other bias. This avoids discussing issues and forces the accuser on the defensive.
  112. Invoke authority. Claim for yourself or associate yourself with authority and present your argument with enough ‘jargon’ and ‘minutia’ to illustrate you are ‘one who knows’, and simply say it isn’t so without discussing issues or demonstrating concretely why or citing sources.
  113. Play Dumb. No matter what evidence or logical argument is offered, avoid discussing issues except with denials they have any credibility, make any sense, provide any proof, contain or make a point, have logic, or support a conclusion. Mix well for maximum effect.
  114. Associate opponent charges with old news. A derivative of the straw man — usually, in any large-scale matter of high visibility, someone will make charges early on which can be or were already easily dealt with – a kind of investment for the future should the matter not be so easily contained.) Where it can be foreseen, have your own side raise a straw man issue and have it dealt with early on as part of the initial contingency plans. Subsequent charges, regardless of validity or new ground uncovered, can usually then be associated with the original charge and dismissed as simply being a rehash without need to address current issues — so much the better where the opponent is or was involved with the original source.
  115. Establish and rely upon fall-back positions. Using a minor matter or element of the facts, take the ‘high road’ and ‘confess’ with candor that some innocent mistake, in hindsight, was made — but that opponents have seized on the opportunity to blow it all out of proportion and imply greater criminalities which, ‘just isn’t so.’ Others can reinforce this on your behalf, later, and even publicly ‘call for an end to the nonsense’ because you have already ‘done the right thing.’ Done properly, this can garner sympathy and respect for ‘coming clean’ and ‘owning up’ to your mistakes without addressing more serious issues.
  116. Enigmas have no solution. Drawing upon the overall umbrella of events surrounding the crime and the multitude of players and events, paint the entire affair as too complex to solve. This causes those otherwise following the matter to begin to lose interest more quickly without having to address the actual issues.
  117. Alice in Wonderland Logic. Avoid discussion of the issues by reasoning backwards or with an apparent deductive logic which forbears any actual material fact.
  118. Demand complete solutions. Avoid the issues by requiring opponents to solve the crime at hand completely, a ploy which works best with issues qualifying for rule 10.
  119. Fit the facts to alternate conclusions. This requires creative thinking unless the crime was planned with contingency conclusions in place.
  120. Vanish evidence and witnesses. If it does not exist, it is not fact, and you won’t have to address the issue.
  121. Change the subject. Usually in connection with one of the other ploys listed here, find a way to side-track the discussion with abrasive or controversial comments in hopes of turning attention to a new, more manageable topic. This works especially well with companions who can ‘argue’ with you over the new topic and polarize the discussion arena in order to avoid discussing more key issues.
  122. Emotionalize, Antagonize, and Goad Opponents. If you can’t do anything else, chide and taunt your opponents and draw them into emotional responses which will tend to make them look foolish and overly motivated, and generally render their material somewhat less coherent. Not only will you avoid discussing the issues in the first instance, but even if their emotional response addresses the issue, you can further avoid the issues by then focusing on how ‘sensitive they are to criticism.’
  123. Ignore proof presented, demand impossible proofs. This is perhaps a variant of the ‘play dumb’ rule. Regardless of what material may be presented by an opponent in public forums, claim the material irrelevant and demand proof that is impossible for the opponent to come by (it may exist, but not be at his disposal, or it may be something which is known to be safely destroyed or withheld, such as a murder weapon.) In order to completely avoid discussing issues, it may be required that you to categorically deny and be critical of media or books as valid sources, deny that witnesses are acceptable, or even deny that statements made by government or other authorities have any meaning or relevance.
  124. False evidence. Whenever possible, introduce new facts or clues designed and manufactured to conflict with opponent presentations — as useful tools to neutralize sensitive issues or impede resolution. This works best when the crime was designed with contingencies for the purpose, and the facts cannot be easily separated from the fabrications.
  125. Call a Grand Jury, Special Prosecutor, or other empowered investigative body. Subvert the (process) to your benefit and effectively neutralize all sensitive issues without open discussion. Once convened, the evidence and testimony are required to be secret when properly handled. For instance, if you own the prosecuting attorney, it can insure a Grand Jury hears no useful evidence and that the evidence is sealed and unavailable to subsequent investigators. Once a favorable verdict is achieved, the matter can be considered officially closed. Usually, this technique is applied to find the guilty innocent, but it can also be used to obtain charges when seeking to frame a victim.
  126. Manufacture a new truth. Create your own expert(s), group(s), author(s), leader(s) or influence existing ones willing to forge new ground via scientific, investigative, or social research or testimony which concludes favorably. In this way, if you must actually address issues, you can do so authoritatively.
  127. Create bigger distractions. If the above does not seem to be working to distract from sensitive issues, or to prevent unwanted media coverage of unstoppable events such as trials, create bigger news stories (or treat them as such) to distract the multitudes.
  128. Silence critics. If the above methods do not prevail, consider removing opponents from circulation by some definitive solution so that the need to address issues is removed entirely. This can be by their death, arrest and detention, blackmail or destruction of their character by release of blackmail information, or merely by destroying them financially, emotionally, or severely damaging their health.
  129. Vanish. If you are a key holder of secrets or otherwise overly illuminated and you think the heat is getting too hot, to avoid the issues, vacate the kitchen.
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  134.  
  135. “The Eight Traits of the Disinformationist”
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  137. 1) Avoidance. They never actually discuss issues head-on or provide constructive input, generally avoiding citation of references or credentials. Rather, they merely imply this, that, and the other. Virtually everything about their presentation implies their authority and expert knowledge in the matter without any further justification for credibility.
  138. 2) Selectivity. They tend to pick and choose opponents carefully, either applying the hit-and-run approach against mere commentators supportive of opponents, or focusing heavier attacks on key opponents who are known to directly address issues. Should a commentator become argumentative with any success, the focus will shift to include the commentator as well.
  139. 3) Coincidental. They tend to surface suddenly and somewhat coincidentally with a new controversial topic with no clear prior record of participation in general discussions in the particular public arena involved. They likewise tend to vanish once the topic is no longer of general concern. They were likely directed or elected to be there for a reason, and vanish with the reason.
  140. 4) Teamwork. They tend to operate in self-congratulatory and complementary packs or teams. Of course, this can happen naturally in any public forum, but there will likely be an ongoing pattern of frequent exchanges of this sort where professionals are involved. Sometimes one of the players will infiltrate the opponent camp to become a source for straw man or other tactics designed to dilute opponent presentation strength.
  141. 5) Anti-conspiratorial. They almost always have disdain for ‘conspiracy theorists’ and, usually, for those who in any way believe JFK was not killed by LHO. Ask yourself why, if they hold such disdain for conspiracy theorists, do they focus on defending a single topic discussed in a NG focusing on conspiracies? One might think they would either be trying to make fools of everyone on every topic, or simply ignore the group they hold in such disdain.Or, one might more rightly conclude they have an ulterior motive for their actions in going out of their way to focus as they do.
  142. 6) Artificial Emotions. An odd kind of ‘artificial’ emotionalism and an unusually thick skin — an ability to persevere and persist even in the face of overwhelming criticism and unacceptance. This likely stems from intelligence community training that, no matter how condemning the evidence, deny everything, and never become emotionally involved or reactive. The net result for a disinfo artist is that emotions can seem artificial.
  143. Most people, if responding in anger, for instance, will express their animosity throughout their rebuttal. But disinfo types usually have trouble maintaining the ‘image’ and are hot and cold with respect to pretended emotions and their usually more calm or unemotional communications style. It’s just a job, and they often seem unable to ‘act their role in character’ as well in a communications medium as they might be able in a real face-to-face conversation/confrontation. You might have outright rage and indignation one moment, ho-hum the next, and more anger later — an emotional yo-yo.
  144. With respect to being thick-skinned, no amount of criticism will deter them from doing their job, and they will generally continue their old disinfo patterns without any adjustments to criticisms of how obvious it is that they play that game — where a more rational individual who truly cares what others think might seek to improve their communications style, substance, and so forth, or simply give up.
  145. 7) Inconsistent. There is also a tendency to make mistakes which betray their true self/motives. This may stem from not really knowing their topic, or it may be somewhat ‘freudian’, so to speak, in that perhaps they really root for the side of truth deep within.
  146. I have noted that often, they will simply cite contradictory information which neutralizes itself and the author. For instance, one such player claimed to be a Navy pilot, but blamed his poor communicating skills (spelling, grammar, incoherent style) on having only a grade-school education. I’m not aware of too many Navy pilots who don’t have a college degree. Another claimed no knowledge of a particular topic/situation but later claimed first-hand knowledge of it.
  147. 8) Time Constant. Recently discovered, with respect to News Groups, is the response time factor. There are three ways this can be seen to work, especially when the government or other empowered player is involved in a cover up operation:
  148. a) ANY NG posting by a targeted proponent for truth can result in an IMMEDIATE response. The government and other empowered players can afford to pay people to sit there and watch for an opportunity to do some damage. SINCE DISINFO IN A NG ONLY WORKS IF THE READER SEES IT – FAST RESPONSE IS CALLED FOR, or the visitor may be swayed towards truth.
  149. b) When dealing in more direct ways with a disinformationalist, such as email, DELAY IS CALLED FOR – there will usually be a minimum of a 48-72 hour delay. This allows a sit-down team discussion on response strategy for best effect, and even enough time to ‘get permission’ or instruction from a formal chain of command.
  150. c) In the NG example 1) above, it will often ALSO be seen that bigger guns are drawn and fired after the same 48-72 hours delay – the team approach in play. This is especially true when the targeted truth seeker or their comments are considered more important with respect to potential to reveal truth. Thus, a serious truth sayer will be attacked twice for the same sin.
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  153.  
  154. “How to spot a Shill (COINTELPRO Agent)”
  155. The original source of this article refers to negative actors as “COINTELPRO Agents.” For this book's purposes, “COINTELPRO Agents” are shills.
  156.  
  157. One way to neutralize a potential activist is to get them to be in a group that does all the wrong things. Why?
  158. The message doesn’t get out.
  159. A lot of time is wasted.
  160. The activist is frustrated and discouraged
  161. Nothing good is accomplished.
  162. FBI and Police Informers and Infiltrators will infest any group and they have phoney activist organizations established.
  163. Their purpose is to prevent any real movement for justice or eco-peace from developing in this country.
  164. Agents come in small, medium or large. They can be of any ethnic background. They can be male or female.
  165. The actual size of the group or movement being infiltrated is irrelevant. It is the potential the movement has for becoming large which brings on the spies and saboteurs.
  166. This booklet lists tactics agents use to slow things down, foul things up, destroy the movement and keep tabs on activists.
  167. It is the agent’s job to keep the activist from quitting such a group, thus keeping him/her under control.
  168. In some situations, to get control, the agent will tell the activist:
  169. “You’re dividing the movement.”
  170. [Here, I have added the psychological reasons as to WHY this maneuver works to control people]
  171. This invites guilty feelings. Many people can be controlled by guilt. The agents begin relationships with activists behind a well-developed mask of “dedication to the cause.” Because of their often declared dedication, (and actions designed to prove this), when they criticize the activist, he or she – being truly dedicated to the movement – becomes convinced that somehow, any issues are THEIR fault. This is because a truly dedicated person tends to believe that everyone has a conscience and that nobody would dissimulate and lie like that “on purpose.” It’s amazing how far agents can go in manipulating an activist because the activist will constantly make excuses for the agent who regularly declares their dedication to the cause. Even if they do, occasionally, suspect the agent, they will pull the wool over their own eyes by rationalizing: “they did that unconsciously… they didn’t really mean it… I can help them by being forgiving and accepting ” and so on and so forth.
  172. The agent will tell the activist:
  173. “You’re a leader!”
  174. This is designed to enhance the activist’s self-esteem. His or her narcissistic admiration of his/her own activist/altruistic intentions increase as he or she identifies with and consciously admires the altruistic declarations of the agent which are deliberately set up to mirror those of the activist.
  175. This is “malignant pseudoidentification.” It is the process by which the agent consciously imitates or simulates a certain behavior to foster the activist’s identification with him/her, thus increasing the activist’s vulnerability to exploitation. The agent will simulate the more subtle self-concepts of the activist.
  176. Activists and those who have altruistic self-concepts are most vulnerable to malignant pseudoidentification especially during work with the agent when the interaction includes matter relating to their competency, autonomy, or knowledge.
  177. The goal of the agent is to increase the activist’s general empathy for the agent through pseudo-identification with the activist’s self-concepts.
  178. The most common example of this is the agent who will compliment the activist for his competency or knowledge or value to the movement. On a more subtle level, the agent will simulate affects and mannerisms of the activist which promotes identification via mirroring and feelings of “twinship”. It is not unheard of for activists, enamored by the perceived helpfulness and competence of a good agent, to find themselves considering ethical violations and perhaps, even illegal behavior, in the service of their agent/handler.
  179. The activist’s “felt quality of perfection” [self-concept] is enhanced, and a strong empathic bond is developed with the agent through his/her imitation and simulation of the victim’s own narcissistic investments. [self-concepts] That is, if the activist knows, deep inside, their own dedication to the cause, they will project that onto the agent who is “mirroring” them.
  180. The activist will be deluded into thinking that the agent shares this feeling of identification and bonding. In an activist/social movement setting, the adversarial roles that activists naturally play vis a vis the establishment/government, fosters ongoing processes of intrapsychic splitting so that “twinship alliances” between activist and agent may render whole sectors or reality testing unavailable to the activist. They literally “lose touch with reality.”
  181. Activists who deny their own narcissistic investments [do not have a good idea of their own self-concepts and that they ARE concepts] and consciously perceive themselves (accurately, as it were) to be “helpers” endowed with a special amount of altruism are exceedingly vulnerable to the affective (emotional) simulation of the accomplished agent.
  182. Empathy is fostered in the activist through the expression of quite visible affects. The presentation of tearfulness, sadness, longing, fear, remorse, and guilt, may induce in the helper-oriented activist a strong sense of compassion, while unconsciously enhancing the activist’s narcissistic investment in self as the embodiment of goodness.
  183. The agent’s expresssion of such simulated affects may be quite compelling to the observer and difficult to distinguish from deep emotion.
  184. It can usually be identified by two events, however:
  185. First, the activist who has analyzed his/her own narcissistic roots and is aware of his/her own potential for being “emotionally hooked,” will be able to remain cool and unaffected by such emotional outpourings by the agent.
  186. As a result of this unaffected, cool, attitude, the Second event will occur: The agent will recompensate much too quickly following such an affective expression leaving the activist with the impression that “the play has ended, the curtain has fallen,” and the imposture, for the moment, has finished. The agent will then move quickly to another activist/victim.
  187. The fact is, the movement doesn’t need leaders, it needs MOVERS. “Follow the leader” is a waste of time.
  188. A good agent will want to meet as often as possible. He or she will talk a lot and say little. One can expect an onslaught of long, unresolved discussions.
  189. Some agents take on a pushy, arrogant, or defensive manner:
  190. To disrupt the agenda
  191. To side-track the discussion
  192. To interrupt repeatedly
  193. To feign ignorance
  194. To make an unfounded accusation against a person.
  195. Calling someone a racist, for example. This tactic is used to discredit a person in the eyes of all other group members.
  196. Saboteurs
  197. Some saboteurs pretend to be activists. She or he will ….
  198. Write encyclopedic flyers (in the present day, websites)
  199. Print flyers in English only.
  200. Have demonstrations in places where no one cares.
  201. Solicit funding from rich people instead of grass roots support
  202. Display banners with too many words that are confusing.
  203. Confuse issues.
  204. Make the wrong demands.
  205. Cool Compromise the goal.
  206. Have endless discussions that waste everyone’s time. The agent may accompany the endless discussions with drinking, pot smoking or other amusement to slow down the activist’s work.
  207. Provocateurs
  208. Want to establish “leaders” to set them up for a fall in order to stop the movement.
  209. Suggest doing foolish, illegal things to get the activists in trouble.
  210. Encourage militancy.
  211. Want to taunt the authorities.
  212. Attempt to make the activist compromise their values.
  213. Attempt to instigate violence. Activisim ought to always be non-violent.
  214. Attempt to provoke revolt among people who are ill-prepared to deal with the reaction of the authorities to such violence.
  215. Informants
  216. Want everyone to sign up and sing in and sign everything.
  217. Ask a lot of questions (gathering data).
  218. Want to know what events the activist is planning to attend.
  219. Attempt to make the activist defend him or herself to identify his or her beliefs, goals, and level of committment.
  220. Recruiting
  221. Legitimate activists do not subject people to hours of persuasive dialog. Their actions, beliefs, and goals speak for themselves.
  222. Groups that DO recruit are missionaries, military, and fake political parties or movements set up by agents.
  223. Surveillance
  224. ALWAYS assume that you are under surveillance.
  225. At this point, if you are NOT under surveillance, you are not a very good activist!
  226. Scare Tactics
  227. They use them.
  228. Such tactics include slander, defamation, threats, getting close to disaffected or minimally committed fellow activists to persuade them (via psychological tactics described above) to turn against the movement and give false testimony against their former compatriots. They will plant illegal substances on the activist and set up an arrest; they will plant false information and set up “exposure,” they will send incriminating letters [emails] in the name of the activist; and more; they will do whatever society will allow.
  229. This booklet in no way covers all the ways agents use to sabotage the lives of sincere an dedicated activists.
  230. If an agent is “exposed,” he or she will be transferred or replaced.
  231. COINTELPRO is still in operation today under a different code name. It is no longer placed on paper where it can be discovered through the freedom of information act.
  232. The FBI counterintelligence program’s stated purpose: To expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, and otherwise neutralize individuals who the FBI categorize as opposed to the National Interests. “National Security” means the FBI’s security from the people ever finding out the vicious things it does in violation of people’s civil liberties.
  233.  
  234.  
  235.  
  236.  
  237. -------------
  238.  
  239.  
  240.  
  241.  
  242.  
  243.  
  244. “The Influence of Source Credibility on Communication Effectiveness”
  245.  
  246. “An important but little-studied factor in the effectiveness of communication is the attitude of the audience toward the communicator. Indirect data on this problem come from studies of ‘prestige’ in which subjects are asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement with statements which are attributed to different individuals. The extent of agreement is usually higher when the statement are attributed to ‘high prestige’ sources. There are few studies in which an identical communication is presented by different communicators and the relative effects on opinion subsequently measured without the explicit reference to the position taken by the communicator. Yet the latter research setting may be a closer approximation of the real-life situation to which the results of research are to be applied. In one of the studies reported by Hovland, Lumsdaine and Sheffield, the effects of a communication were studied without reference to the source of the items comprising the opinion of the questionnaire. They found that opinion changes following the showing of an Army orientation film were smaller among the members of the audience who believed the purpose of the film was ‘propagandistic’ than those among who believed its purpose ‘informational.’
  247. But such a study does not rule out the possibility that the results could be explained by general predisposition factors; that is, individuals who are ‘suspicious’ of mass-media sources may be generally less responsive to such communications. The present study was designed to minimize the aforementioned methodological difficulties by experimentally checking the effects of the source in a situation in which the subject’s own opinion was obtained without reference to the source. A second objective of the present study was to investigate the extent to which opinions derived from high and low credibility sources are maintained over a period of time. Hovland, Lumsdaine and Sheffield showed that some opinion changes in the direction of the communicator’s position are larger after a lapse of time than immediately after the communication. This they refer to as the ‘sleeper effect.’
  248. One hypothesis which they advanced for their results is that individuals may be suspicious of the motives of the communicator and initially discount his position, and thus may evidence little or no immediate change in opinion. With the passage of time, however, they may remember and accept what was communicated but not remember who communicated it. As a result, they may then be more inclined to agree with the position which had been presented by the communicator… Opinion questionnaires were administered before the communication, immediately after the communication, and a month after the communication... the second questionnaire, handed out immediately after the booklets were collected differed completely in format from the earlier one. It contained a series of general questions on the subject’s reactions to the articles, gradually moving toward opinion questions bearing on the content discussed in the content of the articles. At the end of the questionnaire there was a series of fact-quiz items. Sixteen multiple choice questions, four on each content area, were used together with a question calling for the recall of the author of each articles. An identical questionnaire was administered four weeks after the communication. At no prior time had the subjects been forewarned that they would be given this second post-test questionnaire… Following the communication, subjects were asked their opinion about the fairness of the presentation of each topic and the extent to which each communicator was justified in his conclusion.
  249. Although the communications being judged were identical, there was a marked difference in the way the subjects responded to the ‘high credibility’ and ‘low credibility’ sources. Their evaluations were also affected by their personal opinions on the topic before the communication was ever presented.”
  250.  
  251. TLDR; You’re more likely to convince people if you use more prestigious and reliable sources (For example, CBS News over Breitbart) and appeal to their bias in some way (If you’re trying to appeal to communists, present yourself as a communist or a former communist). However, in many cases, people may forget who told them certain information but remember the information they were told. This leaves them vulnerable to a change of opinion.
  252.  
  253.  
  254.  
  255.  
  256.  
  257. --------------
  258.  
  259.  
  260.  
  261.  
  262. “Some Principles of Mass Persuasion”
  263.  
  264. What happens psychologically when someone attempts to influence the behavior for another person? The answer, in broad outline, may be described as follows: to influence behavior, a chain of processes must be initiated within the person. These processes are complex and interrelated, but in broad terms they may be characterized as (i) creating a particular cognitive structure, (ii) creating a particular motivational structure, and (iii) creating a particular behavioral (action) structure. In other words, behavior is determined by the beliefs, opinions, and “facts” a person possesses; by the needs, goals, and values he has; and by the momentary control held over his behavior ‘from the outside’ requires the ability to influence these determinants in a particular way.
  265.  
  266.  
  267. CREATING A PARTICULAR COGNITIVE STRUCTURE
  268. The ‘message’ (i.e. information, facts, etc.) must reach the sense organs of the persons who are to be influenced. Research upon readership and listenership has made it clear that putting a message on national radio network or in a national periodical by no means ensures that it will actually reach the sense organs of a significant proportion of the population.
  269.  
  270. 1a. Total stimulus situations are selected or rejected on the basis of an impression of their general characteristics. Although the factors determining the way people select stimulus situations are only partially known, there appear to be a broad categories which people employ in characterizing stimulus situations such as entertainment, news, politics, advertising, and the like.
  271.  
  272. 1b. The categories employed by a person in characterizing stimulus situations tend to protect him from unwanted changes in his cognitive structure. Illustrative of this principle are the tendencies of people to read newspapers whose editorial policy tends to agree with their own and to listen predominantly to political candidates who belong to their own party.
  273.  
  274. 2. Having reached the sense organs, the ‘message’ must be accepted as a part of the person’s cognitive structure. Even after a ‘message’ reaches the sense organs of an individual there are many reasons that it may not be incorporated into his cognitive structure.
  275.  
  276. 2a. Once a ‘message’ is received it will tend to be accepted or rejected on the basis of more general categories to which it appears to belong.
  277. 2b. The categories employed by a person in characterizing ‘messages’ tend to protect him from unwanted changes in his cognitive structure. Anyone desiring to influence the behavior of others must keep constantly in mind a very simple and obvious fact, namely, that everyone, after the earliest stages of infancy, possesses a remarkably stable cognitive structure upon which he depends for a satisfactory adjustment to his environment. Any effort to change behavior through a modification of this cognitive structure must overcome the forces tending to maintain the structure.
  278.  
  279. 2c. When a ‘message’ is inconsistent with a person’s prevailing cognitive structure it will either (a) be rejected, (b) be distorted so as to fit, or (c) produce changes in the cognitive structure. Which of these outcomes will actually occur depends upon the relative strength of the forces maintaining the cognitive structure and of those carried by the new message.
  280.  
  281.  
  282. CREATING A PARTICULAR MOTIVATIONAL STRUCTURE
  283. 3. To induce a given action by mass persuasion, this action must be seen by the person as a path to some goal that he or she has. When people were asked during the war why they were buying [war] bonds, they gave answers that could readily be interpreted in terms of the motivational principles outlined here. The most common reasons were related to desire to win the war.
  284.  
  285. 3a. A given action will be accepted as a path to a goal only if the connections ‘fit’ the person’s larger cognitive structure. As documentation of this principle it is necessary only to refer again to the fact that, despite efforts to explain the relation between buying [war] bonds and inflation control, over half of the population still denied that there was such a relationship, because it did not fit into their general understanding of the economy.
  286.  
  287. 3b. The more goals which are seen as attainable by a single path, the more likely it is that a person will take that path. It is, of course possible for a given action to be seen as leading simultaneously to more than one goal. When such a situation exists, the forces directed toward these various goals will all assume the direction of the one action which is the path common to them all.
  288.  
  289. 3c. If an action is seen as not leading to a desired goal or as leading to an undesired end, it will not be chosen.
  290. 3d. If an action is seen as leading to a desired goal, it will tend not to be chosen to the extent that easier, cheaper, or otherwise more desirable actions are also seen as leading to the same goal. These two principles are simply elaborations of the general motivational scheme already outlined. They point, however, to exceedingly important practical implications for anyone desiring to influence behavior by mass persuasion. Much of the psychological warfare of competing propagandists or of competing advertising programs is concerned with these two principles.
  291.  
  292.  
  293.  
  294.  
  295. CREATING A PARTICULAR BEHAVIORAL STRUCTURE
  296. 4. To induce a given action, an appropriate cognitive and motivational system must gain control of the person’s behavior at a particular point in time. Needless to say, a person’s behavior is at all times under the control of some motivational system, and the problem of inducing a given action is that of getting a particular cognitive and motivational structures for the control of behavior is often very great.
  297.  
  298. 4a. The more specifically defined the path of action to a goal (in an accepted motivational structure), the more likely it is that the structure will gain control of behavior.
  299. 4b. The more specifically a path of action is located in time the more likely it is that the structure will gain control of behavior. Examination of a number of campaigns of mass persuasion will reveal that quite commonly the course of action being encouraged is described in relatively general terms… circumstances vary greatly among people in the general population, so that a specific statement may not apply realistically to all and, if a statement is made too specific, it can be more easily rejected.
  300.  
  301. 4c. A given motivational structure may be set in control of behavior by placing the person in a situation requiring a decision to take, or not to take, a step of action that is a part of the structure. If an action, like buying [war] bonds, has become a part of a person’s motivational structure, one way to bring that structure into control over the person's behavior is to place him in a situation where he must decide whether or not he will buy a bond at that moment.
  302.  
  303.  
  304. CONCLUSION: The principles presented here derive from a more extensive theory of human motivation. They are concerned with the particular motivational problem of inducing behavior ‘from the outside.’ To the extent that they are valid, they should apply to all inductions, whether through the mass media or in a face-to-face situation. They should also apply to induction attempted for all types of purposes, whether to sell, to train, to supervise, to produce therapy, and so on. In all attempts the process of induction must be concerned with the establishment of cognitive, motivational, and behavioral structures. Only when conditions are proper in respect to all three of these, will the actual induction of behavior occur. Applied to the field of mass persuasion, these principles may serve as a yardstick for evaluating the probable success of any proposed campaign, The principles are by no means exhaustive, nor do they give detailed guides for creative aspects of the development of campaigns. They do, however, provide a list of essential requirements for the success of any campaign of mass persuasion.
  305.  
  306.  
  307. --------------
  308.  
  309.  
  310.  
  311.  
  312. “German Short-Wave Broadcasts To America”
  313.  
  314. Propaganda may have as its characteristic the potentiality for creating faction or cohesion in a population. German radio propaganda to the United States cleaves to the former course, and provides a good case study.
  315.  
  316.  
  317. Dissolvent Propaganda
  318. Hitler himself has described the aim and methods of this type of propaganda. “Our strategy is to destroy the enemy from within, to conquer him through himself,” he confided to Hermann Rauschning. “Mental confusion, contradictions of feeling, indecisiveness, panic - these are our weapons.” Or again, “Artillery preparation before an attack as during the World War will be replaced in the future war by the psychological dislocation of the adversary through revolutionary propaganda.” And German broadcasts to America… were ammunition for the new type of artillery barrage. The following devices were employed:
  319.  
  320. Breaking Faith in the Customary Sources of Information
  321. Propaganda which seeks to disunify a nation must first destroy or weaken the standards in terms of which people judge events. Such standards we adopt in large part from our social milieu. “Each of us,” comments Walter Lippmann, “lives and works on a small part of the earth’s surface, moves in a small circle, and of these acquaintances knows only a few intimately. Of any public event that has wide effects, we see at best only an aspect…” On the whole, it is the newspaper and the radio in modern society which supply whatever security-giving stereotypes or standards we construct to “cover the spaces we cannot directly observe.” Upon the former, Germany centered its attack… In an attempt to discredit it [the Pro-British American Press] as inaccurate, biased, and venal, the attack was launched on four fronts. (1) The press was linked with already established negative stereotypes: “British plutocrats,” “aliens,” “Jews,” and “Wall Street.” (2) To disparage the accuracy of the American press wishful news reports and editorial interpretation of prominent American Papers were subjected to derisive scrutiny. A regular program called “Listen and Judge for Yourself” was devoted entirely to that end. (3) International intrigue, always good for a thrill, was made the “nigger in the woodpile”; a “plot” for persuading the government to occupy South America, for example, was attributed to Arthur Hays Sulzberger of the New York Times. (4) Slyly they questioned, did the American Press represent American opinion?
  322.  
  323. Setting Group Against Group
  324. To divide and conquer is the dictum of the new propaganda. Not only did the German radio attempt to drive a wedge between the United States and the allies; it labored also to split group from group within the United States. The anti-Semitic appeal, as always, was the opening wedge… Other groups too the German radio sought to pit against each other - political parties, economic classes, isolationists and interventionists, geographical regions.
  325.  
  326. Setting the People Against Their Leaders
  327. A nation without leadership is anarchy. To break the faith of the American people in their leaders was the constant design of the German radio. “Who,” asked one speaker as early as 1940, “is making the decisions in America - the people or the politicians?”
  328.  
  329. Exaggerating Crisis Situations
  330. Because constant crisis leaves a people emotionally exhausted, it is a powerful ally of the solvent propagandist. Even before the outbreak of active warfare in Europe, this device was put into service. Before they actually existed, crises were invented… When active warfare did commence in Europe, opportunity was taken to make every diplomatic and military event appear as a symptom of impending crisis - an episode in the drama of inexorable German advance.
  331.  
  332. Stimulating Feelings of Guilt
  333. Compulsive indecision is one price man pays for conflict over what he deems to be “right.” When such a conflict is aggravated by a sense of guilt for related actions in the past, indecisiveness is heightened. All during the spring and summer of 1940 America was reminded of its behavior during the last war. Painful examples of the way in which America had been misled by British propaganda during World War I were dug up, along with detailed accounts of war hysteria.
  334.  
  335. Aggravating the Fifth Column
  336. The fifth-column [“any group of people who undermine a larger group from within, usually in favor of an enemy group or nation”1] is a double-edged sword. As a weapon of military strategy, its effectiveness has already been realized. As a means of fostering divisive suspicion, moreover its potentialities have not been overlooked by German strategists… It is important to note that the Germans did not merely try to defend themselves against these charges [of their own Fifth Column use]; rather, by countercharges they tried to complicate the issue as much as possible. “There’s much talk of fifth-column activity in the United States. Well, it would seem that such activities are actually being carried on; and if the investigators look carefully, they’ll probably find that the hatbands of the columnists have London labels.” But rarely if ever did the Germans attempt to deny the charge that they used fifth-column tactics in Europe.
  337.  
  338. Stimulating Fatalism
  339. The nation convinced of the futility of resistance is ripe for the ravages of dissolvent propaganda. Ever since the outbreak of the war in September, 1939, Berlin broadcasts have tried to create an impression of the inevitability of German victory… Constantly listeners were told of the calm assurance of the German people, of the invincibility of German arms, of the weakness and confusion of the enemies of the Reich in resisting the might of the Reichswehr. By July 1, German announcers were taking for granted a complete and imminent victory.
  340.  
  341.  
  342.  
  343. The Strategy of Terror
  344. That a cowed population is open to the depressing effects of fatalism has been demonstrated by Edmond Taylor in his study of the French collapse. After the invasion of Scandinavia, the horror of war was a constant theme of Berlin speakers. The main stress of this material was the fruitlessness of resistance. In contrast to war and its horrors stood cooperation with Germany; samples were the peaceful affiliates of the Axis. Never in the period of the present survey was the United States directly threatened with an onslaught of German force. But in discussions of German activities against her enemies, it was made abundantly clear that resistance by any nation was hopeless.
  345.  
  346.  
  347. -------------------
  348.  
  349.  
  350. “Goebbels Principles of Propaganda”
  351.  
  352. Dr. Joseph Goebbels, beside being an intriguing character, was the Propaganda Minister for Hitler's Third Reich. He was recognized as a master of propaganda as his work was studied after WWII. Goebbels did not survive to enjoy the recognition; he and his wife committed suicide on 1 May 1945, a week before the final collapse of the Third Reich.
  353. After the war, US personnel discovered a very large diary dictated by Goebbels. In it are his principles of propaganda. Leonard Doob's 1950 article details them from a translation of the diary by Louis Lochner (1948).
  354. Hitler's Basic Principles:
  355. These principles are abstracted from Jowett & O'Donnell.
  356. Avoid abstract ideas - appeal to the emotions.
  357. Constantly repeat just a few ideas. Use stereotyped phrases.
  358. Give only one side of the argument.
  359. Continuously criticize your opponents.
  360. Pick out one special "enemy" for special vilification.
  361. Goebbels' Principles of Propaganda:
  362. When reading these propaganda principles, keep in mind that they were applied in wartime (WWII) and involve issues that don't arise otherwise. It's a long list, but Goebbels was dealing with the complexity of an all-out war. While reading them you may realize that some of the principles are generally applicable and not limited to wartime. Some might be quite familiar today. It is interesting to note that Goebbels' principles derive from Hitler's own ideas of propaganda.
  363. Propagandists must have access to intelligence concerning events and public opinion.
  364. Propaganda must be planned and executed by only one authority.
  365. It must issue all the propaganda directives.
  366. It must explain propaganda directives to important officials and maintain their morale.
  367. It must oversee other agencies' activities which have propaganda consequences.
  368. The Propaganda consequences of an action must be considered in planning that action.
  369. Propaganda must affect the enemy's policy and actions.
  370. By suppressing propagandistically desirable material which can provide the enemy with useful intelligence.
  371. By openly disseminating propaganda whose contents or tone causes the enemy to draw the desired conclusions.
  372. By goading the enemy into revealing vital information about himself.
  373. By making no reference to a desired enemy activity when any reference would discredit that activity.
  374. Declassified, operational information must be available to implement a propaganda campaign.
  375. To be perceived, propaganda must evoke the interest of an audience and must be transmitted through an attention-getting medium.
  376. Credibility alone must determine whether propaganda output should be true or false.
  377. The purpose, content, and effectiveness of enemy propaganda; the strength and effects of an expose'; and the nature of current propaganda campaigns determine whether enemy propaganda should be ignored or refuted.
  378. Credibility, intelligence, and the possible effects of communicating determine whether propaganda materials should be censored.
  379. Material from enemy propaganda may be utilized in operations when it helps diminish that enemy's prestige or lends support to the propagandist's own objective.
  380. Black rather than white propaganda must be employed when the latter is less credible or produces undesirable effects.
  381. Propaganda may be facilitated by leaders with prestige.
  382. Propaganda must be carefully timed.
  383. The communication must reach the audience ahead of competing propaganda.
  384. A propaganda campaign must begin at the optimum moment.
  385. A propaganda theme must be repeated, but not beyond some point of diminishing effectiveness.
  386. Propaganda must label events and people with distinctive phrases or slogans.
  387. They must evoke responses which the audience previously possesses.
  388. They must be capable of being easily learned.
  389. They must be utilized again and again, but only in appropriate situations.
  390. They must be boomerang-proof.
  391. Propaganda to the home front must prevent the raising of false hopes which can be blasted by future events.
  392. Propaganda to the home front must create an optimum anxiety level.
  393. Propaganda must reinforce anxiety concerning the consequences of defeat.
  394. Propaganda must diminish anxiety (other than that concerning the consequences of defeat) which is too high and cannot be reduced by people themselves.
  395. Propaganda to the home front must diminish the impact of frustration.
  396. Inevitable frustrations must be anticipated.
  397. Inevitable frustrations must be placed in perspective.
  398. Propaganda must facilitate the displacement of aggression by specifying the targets for hatred.
  399. Propaganda cannot immediately affect strong counter-tendencies; instead it must offer some form of action or diversion, or both.
  400. These would be principles guiding the conduct of propaganda operations.
  401.  
  402.  
  403.  
  404.  
  405. “Some Reasons Why Information Campaigns Fail”
  406.  
  407. The physical barriers to communication merely impede the supply of information. In order to publically increase public knowledge, not only is it necessary to present more information but is essential that the mass audience be exposed to and that it absorb the information. And in order to insure such exposure and absorption, the psychological characteristics of human beings must be taken into account. A number of these psychological characteristics are discussed below under the following topics:
  408.  
  409.  
  410. There Exists a Hard Core of Chronic “Know-Nothings”
  411. All persons do not offer equal targets for information campaigns. Surveys consistently find that a certain proportion of the population is not familiar with any particular event. Offhand, it might be thought that information concerning that event was not distributed broadly enough to reach them, but that this group would still have an equal chance of exposure to other information. Yet, when the knowledge of this same group is measured with respect to a second event, they tend also to little information in that area. And similarly, they will have little or no information concerning a third event. If all persons provided equal targets for exposure, and sole determinant of public knowledge were the magnitude of the given information, there would be no reason for the same individuals to show the same lack of knowledge. Instead, there is something about the uninformed which makes them harder to reach, no matter what the level or nature of information.
  412.  
  413. Interested People Acquire the Most Information
  414. The importance of motivation in achievement or learning, or in assimilating knowledge, has been consistently shown in academic studies. Yet this important factor is often ignored in information campaigns, amid all the talk of “increasing the flow of information.” The widest possible dissemination of material may be ineffective if it is not geared to the public’s interests.. It can be argued, of course, that the exposed people became interested after they had been exposed to the information, and that the disinterested persons are apathetic only because they were not exposed. It is probable that the two factors are interdependent; as people learn more, their interest increases, and as their interest increases, they impelled to learn more… This fact cannot be ignored by those in charge of information campaigns. Such groups constitute a special problem which flow of information.
  415.  
  416. People Interpret the Same Information Differently
  417. In a series of experimental studies beginning with the work of Bartlett, and carried on by a host of other investigators such as Margolies, Clark, Nadel, and Murphy, it has been consistently demonstrated that a person’s perception and memory of materials shown to him are often distorted by his wishes, motives, and attitudes.
  418.  
  419.  
  420.  
  421. Information Does Not Necessarily Change Attitudes
  422. The principle behind all information campaigns is that the disseminated information will alter attitudes or conduct. There is abundant evidence in all fields, of course, that all informed people actually do react differently to a problem than uninformed people do. But it is naive to suppose that information always affects attitudes, or that it affects all attitudes equally. The general principle needs serious qualification. There is evidence, based on investigations made with academic samples, that individuals, once they are exposed to that information, change their views differentially, each in the light of his own prior attitude. Data gathered by NORC [National Opinion Research Center] in recent national surveys show that these academic finding are equally applicable to the entire adult population.
  423.  
  424.  
  425. --------------
  426.  
  427.  
  428.  
  429. KNOWN SHILL ORGANIZATIONS ON 4CHAN AND THEIR TACTICS
  430.  
  431.  
  432. Several organizations have been proven to shill on 4chan.org and attempt manipulate popular opinion on the site.
  433.  
  434. The JIDF - Though the JIDF, or the Jewish Internet Defense League, are still one of the longest-lasting and consistent organizations conducting shilling operations on /pol/. The JIDF, according to their website, is “a private, independent, non-violent protest organization representing a collective of activists, operating under the name ‘Jewish Internet Defense Force’ since the 2008 massacre at the Mercaz HaRav Yeshiva in Jerusalem. We're on the cutting edge of pro-Israel digital online advocacy, presenting news, viewpoints, and information throughout a large network reaching hundreds of thousands via email, Facebook, YouTube, RSS feeds, Twitter, and other digital hubs to those who share our concerns for Israel and about about antisemitic and jihadist online content.” Unsurprisingly, the JIDF targets /pol/ because of its widespread anti-jewish activity. The JIDF is an experienced and knowledgeable organization when it comes to information warfare, though they haven’t yet been able to break /pol/.
  435.  
  436.  
  437. /leftypol/ - /leftypol/ is a board “dedicated to discussions of political events from the left-wing viewpoint on the imageboard site 8chan. Similar to 4chan’s counterpart /pol/ (politically incorrect), the board is known for its radical viewpoints on a wide range of current events and issues.” Sometimes, the term is used as a broader name for leftists on /pol/. Although members of the /leftypol/ community have always shilled on /pol/ in small numbers, /leftypol/ shilling skyrocketed and peaked during 2016 and early 2017.
  438. Screenshot from a leftist reddit thread describing raiding 4chan.
  439. Screenshot from a thread on /leftypol/ describing “How to deal with the rise of pol.”
  440.  
  441.  
  442. CTR/ShareBlue - ShareBlue (Commonly referred to as “ShariaBlue” on 4chan) is, according to Wikipedia: “An American progressive news website owned by the journalist and political activist David Brock. Shareblue is within a consortium of political groups in Democratic strategist David Brock’s network that will raise a roughly $40 million budget to oppose President Donald Trump's policies. Shareblue's monthly reach is reported to be 140 million across platforms.” ShareBlue is arguably the most aggressive, powerful, and persistent shilling organization to ever take on /pol/. The organization rose to notoriety during the 2016 US Presidential election, though they continued to zealously shill on Politically Incorrect until mid-2017. It’s not clear whether ShareBlue continues to dedicate resources to shilling on 4chan at this time, but it’s certainly a possibility.
  443. https://img.4plebs.org/boards/pol/image/1485/83/1485837283280.jpg, https://img.4plebs.org/boards/pol/image/1501/42/1501429328628.jpg, https://img.4plebs.org/boards/pol/image/1485/90/1485905309443.jpg, , https://img.4plebs.org/boards/pol/image/1491/28/1491282737134.png
  444.  
  445.  
  446. Government Spooks: While no definite proof exists that the United States government specifically monitors or is active on /pol/ (there’s been limited evidence presented that the FBI monitors /b/), there has been a good amount of speculation on the government’s activities on the board, and agencies such as the CIA, NSA, and even the ATF have been rumored to monitor the site/board to a degree.
  447. https://imgur.com/a/zhD1B#6
  448. https://i.imgur.com/IwaFmFJ.jpg, http://i.imgur.com/CO9m3Wu.png
  449. http://www.thesmokinggun.com/documents/internet/another-4chan-user-gets-busted-fbi
  450.  
  451.  
  452.  
  453.  
  454.  
  455. BLACKED posters - Though it’s not exactly clear at this moment in time what wider organization, if any, is responsible for the enormous influx of sexually explicit posts claiming black men to be superior to white men that /pol/ has experienced in late 2017 and early 2018, they are certainly probably the most relevant shills to discuss at this moment in time. It’s possible that the same organization mounted a similar campaign on /pol/ back in 2015. Anyone on /pol/ recently knows this shill well.
  456. https://img.4plebs.org/boards/pol/image/1504/56/1504563955415.jpg,
  457. https://img.4plebs.org/boards/pol/image/1439/36/1439364969160.jpg
  458. This is a common “Superior black man” thread copypasta that shills like to use. At one point, it seems there were 16 entire threads alive at the same time on /pol/. Despite bans, the BLACKED style of posting continues to thrive on /pol/.
  459.  
  460.  
  461.  
  462. ---------------
  463.  
  464.  
  465.  
  466. “How to Size Up Propaganda”
  467.  
  468. The American Historical Association produced the G.I. Roundtable Series to help win World War II. Or so they were led to believe. In fact the U.S. Army sought the pamphlets as part of a larger effort to prepare for the transition to the postwar world, and represent a novel effort at social control. "What Is Propaganda?" by Ralph D. Casey, was published in July 1944.
  469.  
  470. No matter how we define it, the principal point on propaganda is this: Don’t be afraid of it.
  471. A few years ago this caution was more necessary than it is now. Propaganda was National Bogeyman No. 1. Speakers and writers saw magic in it. Some of them told us that we did everything but go to bed at night for no better reason than that the propagandist told us to. And so a great many people assumed that a propagandist was lurking behind every billboard, ready to spring out on us, and that whatever he told us was against our best interests.
  472. Both of these ideas were incorrect. One fact that has been emphasized in this pamphlet is that much propaganda is “good.” It urges us to do things that are for our own benefit. And another fact of importance is that much has been called propaganda when it has actually no promotional effort of any kind behind it.
  473. In a democratic country, where free expression is basic, no one who thinks the matter through could possibly want to stamp out all propaganda. The essence of democracy is that rival points of view have the right to compete in the open. Decisions on political and other questions must be made by a free people. That means a people who don’t shut their eyes and ears to opposing arguments, but instead look at them all, evaluate them, and throw out the ones that don’t hold water.
  474. Those who spread an unreasoned fear of propaganda base their preachments on the unscientific notion that propaganda by itself governs public opinion. But the truth is that propaganda is only one of the factors that influence public opinion. Specific information and sound knowledge of facts, presented without any propagandistic motive whatsoever, constitute an extremely important factor in the formation of public opinion. Events, as we have seen, constitute another very important factor. And there are others. The wave of unreasoned fear of propaganda has somewhat leveled off. We clearly realize that, although some promotional campaigns have been conspicuously successful, others have been just as conspicuously failures—evidence that many factors, working together, influence and shape public opinion.
  475. The propaganda against propaganda confused many citizens and led them to ask, “What can I believe?” One writer, answering this question, says that “you can believe in yourself, your own common sense, your own decent instincts, your own values and traditions.” The democratic principle requires that we come to our own judgments on the issues we face. Nobody can dodge the necessity of making up his own mind on any given question that calls for decision, whether it is international policy, local politics, or even the selection of one toothpaste over another. In making up his own mind he can look at all the propagandas and also bring into play all the information that is to be found outside propaganda and use every standard and criterion available to him in weighing values.
  476. He should not forget that there are safeguards and checks for sizing up the merits of propaganda and the self-interest that may lie back of it. One authority on propaganda suggests two, tests:
  477. l. Is it really propaganda? Is some individual or group consciously trying to influence opinion and action? Who? For what purpose?
  478. 2. Is it true? Does a comparison of independent reports show that the facts are accurate? Does such a comparison show that the suggestions made are soundly based?
  479. There are other tests that can be applied by the thinking citizen:
  480. Which fact or set of facts in a piece of promotion are really important and relevant? Which are irrelevant?
  481. If some individual or group is trying to influence opinion and action, is the effort selfish or is it unselfish? Will action resulting from the propaganda benefit the individual or group responsible for it? Or will it benefit those who act upon the suggestion given in the propaganda? Or will it benefit both?
  482. What is likely to be the effect of the action or of the opinion that the propaganda is trying to set in motion?
  483. All these points boil down to some very simple questions: What is the source of the propaganda? What is its authority? What purposes prompted it? Whom will it benefit? What does it really say?
  484.  
  485.  
  486.  
  487.  
  488. ----------------
  489.  
  490.  
  491. Author’s notes:
  492. Thank you to all the anons who gave constructive input on improving this work, your criticism and support has been extremely valuable to me (no homo).
  493. Many of the passages in this packet/book have been directly ripped and/or paraphrased from outside sources (not my own work). I don’t claim to have created these works or ownership over them (See “Sources”).
  494. Feel free to contribute to and edit this book as you please, as your own edition (It may be useful to collaborate).
  495. Feel free to spread this book and its information far and wide, just be careful who you share it with.
  496. I am not responsible for anything that you do with this information.
  497.  
  498.  
  499. Sources:
  500. Pages 3 through 13, 15 to 18 (may have taken from other sources): https://stopsprayingus.com/shill-handbook/#5
  501.  
  502. Page 14: https://4chan.org/v/
  503.  
  504. Page 19 through 26, 29 through 30 : The book Public Opinion and Propaganda (Numerous authors/contributors):
  505. https://www.amazon.com/Public-Opinion-Propaganda-Daniel-Katz/dp/0030059658/ref=sr_1_3/142-3273233-1118525?ie=UTF8&qid=1503600319&sr=8-3&keywords=Public+Opinion+and+Propaganda
  506.  
  507. 1(Page 25): https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fifth_column
  508.  
  509. Page 27 & 28: https://www.physics.smu.edu/pseudo/Propaganda/goebbels.html
  510.  
  511. Pages 39 & 40:
  512. https://www.historians.org/about-aha-and-membership/aha-history-and-archives/gi-roundtable-series/pamphlets/what-is-propaganda/how-to-size-up-propaganda
  513.  
  514. Other educational links to look into:
  515. https://theintercept.com/2014/02/24/jtrig-manipulation/
  516.  
  517. https://rebelsiren.wordpress.com/2014/01/22/dispelling-internet-disinformation-tactics-debunking-the-debunkers/
  518.  
  519. http://utminers.utep.edu/omwilliamson/ENGL1311/fallacies.htm
  520.  
  521. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/COINTELPRO
  522.  
  523. http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Bernays_Propaganda_in_english_.pdf
  524.  
  525. https://archive.fo/Cpzhw
  526.  
  527. https://www.historians.org/about-aha-and-membership/aha-history-and-archives/gi-roundtable-series/pamphlets/what-is-propaganda
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