Chris,

I have a few final clarifications for you…

First of all, I’m not sure what premises you think I’m accepting, but let me assure you that I do NOT agree using induction without epistemic justification is irrational. You object to this assertion by complaining that it is not an argument, and indeed you are correct, it is not. What we decide to call “rational” or “irrational” depends on whatever standards of rationality we are using, and so it suffices for me to point out that my standard does not impose any such requirement for the epistemic justification of induction. But why use such a standard? What makes my standard “better” than yours? Well, in the debate I spent a good deal of time discussing my motivation, which includes among other observations the fact that we can’t shake induction as an assumption, and also the importance I see in always being willing to go question it and other assumptions—a willingness you seem not to share.

Allow me to expound even further by responding more directly to one of your criticisms from the debate: You claimed that if we reason “invalidly,” then we are guilty of irrationality. I could interpret this in one of at least two ways: First, by “reasoning invalidly” I can take you to mean attempting to use deductively valid reasoning, but making a mistake in so doing. If this is what you think is going on, then allow me to be clear that I am not claiming induction is a form of deduction. As you no doubt know, induction and deduction are two entirely different forms of inference, and I certainly recognize that. So, on this interpretation, I’m not reasoning invalidly because I’m not intending to use deduction when I use induction. But there is a second possible interpretation of your criticism, which is that any non-deductive inference should be taken as invalid and therefore irrational. But if that’s what you’re saying, then I would simply reject whatever standard of rationality leads you to make that judgment. Non-deductive reasoning, e.g. inductive reasoning, is not irrational simply because it’s not deductively valid—at least, not by my standard. (Notice also that if you think non-deductive reasoning is always irrational, then you had better be able to re-cast any inductive argument as a deductive argument. Are you?) But whatever you are using as a standard of rationality, I must insist that on my standard, there is at least one form of non-deductive reasoning which is perfectly rational: inductive reasoning.

I may remind you that you haven’t presented an argument, either, for regarding all epistemically unjustified assumptions as irrational. You just claim that it is so—and I suppose by your standard it is. However, there can never be an argument showing that your standard of rationality is “correct” or “incorrect,” because standards are not matters of fact. You can observe that by your standard, I am irrational, and maybe I am. But the reverse is also true: by my standard, you are guilty of an error in reasoning (and therefore in some respect irrational). The real question is, what standard do we want to use?

In addition to the serious problems I see with your standard (e.g. it means we are all irrational, even on Calvinism, due to points (2) and (3) from my previous post), it seems motivated almost exclusively by a desire to justify your religious beliefs. This I find extremely suspicious, and it makes your standard quite unattractive. In contrast, the standard I use is psychologically satisfying, at least to me, and integrates very smoothly with other satisfying standards (e.g. certain linguistic standards).

So, to summarize, you needed, among other things, to either show that I am irrational BY MY OWN STANDARD, or else win me over somehow to embrace your standard. I think it’s fairly evident that you can’t do the former, because one of your key premises quite clearly conflicts with my standard. As for the latter, that too seems unlikely, since your standard appears motivated by unattractive religious dogma. You also needed to show that you can get induction from the Calvin/Bolt conception of Yahweh (and from nowhere else), and that assuming the existence of such a God is itself epistemically justified. Unfortunately I remain unmoved by your arguments on those subjects.

I think this may be my last post on the subject, but I thank you again for the dialog. I hope it was as fun and interesting for you as it was for me! As anticipated, I found your case for theism to be very weak; it’s clever, to be sure!—but it has a fair number of serious flaws which I don’t think can be mended. However, our discussion has forced me to think carefully about my own position, even modifying it slightly, and for that I am grateful. I hope that my comments have similarly helped you, even if you don’t accept my case as a whole. It was nice to exchange ideas, even if we don’t agree with each other.

Take care,

–Ben