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Whats in the torrent:
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The qateam/ folder is a copy of what appeared to be a QA server with copies of
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all their Finspy Mobile malware.
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The www/FinFisher folder is a dump of https://www.gamma-international.de/FinFisher/
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That's where their customers went to download whatever they had purchased.
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Unfortunately, the downloads are all either encrypted zip or gpg files. But, on
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the chance that the encryption can be cracked (throw enough GPU at the zip
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files), it'll have everything. The only unencrypted thing in that part is
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FinFisher/Sales, which does have some semi-interesting stuff like a price list.
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The www/GGI folder is a copy of http://finsupport.finfisher.com/
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A dump of it's database is in Database.sql
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That's where all their customers went for support questions. Often the
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finfisher staff would reply over e-mail, and unfortunately I wasn't able to
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get the mail servers. The most interesting things there are the support_request
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and feedback tables in the database combined with the Support/Attachments
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folder. There's also some decent stuff in Product/Documents and Product/Updates.
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The www/conf folder has the webalizer stats on their visitors
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The www/ffw folder has their FinFly-Web demo site.
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Customers I've identified:
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29 - the Bahraini group, in support requests they ask for help setting up a
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website targetting activists in 14 Feb, and in another support request they
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attach their C&C server logs. The names of people with admin access to the
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FinSpy server are in the server logs, grep for "user name:"
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Abdulla Husain, Ahmad, Abdulla Al Eid, Yousif Al Sadiq, Rizwan Saleem, Sayed
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Ansar Husain, Humayun, and Mohammed Al Majed
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From metadata in attached word documents.
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69 - PCS Security Pte Ltd
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49 - Cliff Harris
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From text in support_request or feedback table:
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21 -  Nasser Alnuaimi Qatar state security bureau
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82 - Sanjin Custovic, Intelligence-Security Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina
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73 - Peter Balogh, SSNS - NBSZ hungary secret service
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61 - Wim Bordeyne, gives work e-mail of h.isrd@skynet.be although skynet.be is
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     an ISP?
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48 - Vietnam
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65 - Nigeria
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18 - Mongolia, and their email odmagnai@gmail.com appears in this whois record:
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http://wq.apnic.net/apnic-bin/whois.pl?searchtext=MAINT-MN-NITSYSTEM&form_type=advanced
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From their username in customer table:
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34 - Dyplex
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9 - Trovicor
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10 - Elaman
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23 - Cobham
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From gpg key used for their product download:
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68 - Jochen van der Wal, technical engineer for KLPD (dutch police)
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other customer gpg keys that are on keyservers but it doesn't identify them:
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43 - USB on Fire <usbonfire@gmail.com>
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14 - campo@campinator.com
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Employees identified from gpg keys:
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(1)     Alfons Rauscher <alfons.rauscher@vervis.de>
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          1024 bit DSA key 66878388, created: 2013-04-17
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(1)     Hari Purnama (pgp) <hp@gammagroup.com>
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          2048 bit RSA key A7A4AC21, created: 2013-03-05
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(1)     Melvin Teoh (Gamma Group) <mt@gammmagroup.com>
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          2048 bit RSA key D81082F4, created: 2012-03-08
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(1)     Alexander Hagenah <ah@primepage.de>
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          2048 bit RSA key 3F895273, created: 2013-03-05
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          2048 bit RSA key 3F895273, created: 2013-03-05
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# From support.hackingteam.com.tar.gz's /root/.bash_history
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./generate_client.sh FBI
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./generate_client.sh CSDN
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./generate_client.sh ALFAHAD
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./generate_client.sh CNI
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./generate_client.sh GIP
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./generate_client.sh GNSE
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./generate_client.sh IDA
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./generate_client.sh INTECH
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./generate_client.sh MACC
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./generate_client.sh MKIH
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./generate_client.sh MOI
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./generate_client.sh NSS
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./generate_client.sh ORF
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./generate_client.sh PANP
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./generate_client.sh PGJ
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./generate_client.sh PP
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./generate_client.sh SKA
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./generate_client.sh SSNS
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./generate_client.sh TNP
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./generate_client.sh UAEAF
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./generate_client.sh UZC