Plantinga has offered a sophisticated restatement of the ontological argument. @h@ In a simplified version his revision goes like this. Let us begin by defining the property of maximal excellence, a property that includes omniscience, omnipotence, and moral perfection. Obviously God, if he exists, has maximal excellence in the actual world. But maximal excellence is not sufficient for Godhead: we need to consider worlds other than this one.

Plantiga :
"Those who worship God do not think of him as a being that happens to be of
surpassing excellence in this world but who in some other worlds is powerless or
uninformed or of dubious moral character. We might make a distinction here
between greatness and excellence; we might say that the excellence of a being in a given
world W depends only upon its . . . properties in W, while its greatness in W depends
not merely upon its excellence in W, but also upon its excellence in other worlds. The
limiting degree of greatness, therefore, would be enjoyed in a given world W only by a
being who had maximal excellence in W and in every other possible world as well." (The Nature of Necessity, 214)

Maximal greatness therefore is maximal excellence in every possible world,
and it is maximal greatness, not just maximal excellence, that is equivalent
to divinity or Godhead. Anything that possesses maximal greatness must
exist in every possible world, because in a world in which it does not exist it
does not possess any properties. If it is possible for maximal greatness to be
instantiated, then it is instantiated in every world. If so, then it is instantiated
in our world, the actual world; that is to say, Godhead is instantiated and God exists.

Plantinga’s argument obviously depends on the coherence of the apparatus
of possible worlds, and on a solution having been found to the
problem of transworld identity. He believes that he has found such a
solution, and he presents it at considerable length in his book. But it
should also be remarked that in the case of a possible God, rather than
of a possible human, the problem does not seem so pressing; it seems
foolish to put to Plantinga the question, ‘Which God are you proving the
existence of ?’ It remains the case, however, as Plantinga himself points out,
that the whole argument depends on the truth of the premiss that it is
possible for maximal greatness to be exemplified—that is to say, in his
terms, that it is exemplified in some possible world.

...Plantinga’s reinstatement of the argument, using logical techniques more modern
than any available to Russell, serves as a salutary warning of the danger
that awaits any historian of logic who declares a philosophical issue
definitively closed.
From : Kenny, A., & Kenny, W. A. (2007). Philosophy in the modern world: A new history of Western philosophy (Vol. 4). Oxford University Press.