War of the Austrian Succession (Military History

Introduction

Broadly speaking, the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748) pitted Austria and Britain against a coalition of France, Spain, and (for the years 1740–1742 and 1744–1745) Prussia. Piedmont-Sardinia and the Dutch Republic played lesser roles on the Anglo-Austrian side. Russia entered the war on the same side just before it ended. The belligerence began in late 1740 when Prussia unexpectedly sent its army into the rich Austrian province of Silesia with the aim of seizing it. It ended in the fall of 1748 when exhaustion in all camps, as complemented by a set of mutual military standoffs, allowed diplomats to craft the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. Although it was a European-wide belligerence, the war is best understood as an interrelated set of three coinciding conflicts. The first conflict pitted Prussia against Austria. Prussia won this contention, and the Treaty of Dresden (1745), which allowed Prussia to leave the broader war, transferred control of Silesia from Vienna to Berlin. The treaty also opened up a century during which Prussia and Austria vied for dominance in Germany, a rivalry that did not end until the era of Bismarck. The second conflict pitted Habsburg Austria against the Bourbon powers of France and Spain. In this contention France had the broad goal of weakening Austria in Germany, while Spain had the focused goal of securing territory in Italy for a Spanish prince. The peace treaty gave little to France but allowed Spain a modest victory. The third conflict pitted Britain against France for imperial supremacy. More than the other two, this rivalry had world-historical significance, and it demonstrated the peculiar advantages that flowed to London by virtue of its powerful navy. The war, fought in four theaters, has proved difficult for historians to assess because it was marked by an irregular ebb and flow of military successes and failures in all of them. Only toward the end, when France won clear dominance on land by conquering the Austrian Netherlands while Britain won even greater dominance at sea by crushing the Bourbon navies, did two balanced and competing successes allow peace negotiations to reach fruition. Meanwhile, a series of national revolts in smaller states demonstrated that belligerence was shredding traditional patterns of political loyalty. Two military commanders stood out above all others: Frederick II “the Great” of Prussia and Maurice of Saxony commanding for France. Although Frederick now has the greater reputation, Maurice was the more successful of the two in this war.

General Overviews of 18th-Century International Relations

All these books assume that what happened in 18th-century Europe was important for the wider world. Since the late 20th century, traditional forms of the study of international relations have fallen out of fashion (as the publication dates of a surprising number of the works in this bibliography will attest), and the best surveys of the course of diplomatic relations in 18th-century Europe tend to come from earlier decades. Immich 1967 is the most detailed of the four that are mentioned, but the reader should be forewarned that this splendid book is a reprint of the 1905 edition. Zeller 1955 is the French analogue to Immich’s German-language survey; not as detailed, but thorough and accurate. There is no English-language overview equivalent to these. Dorn 1940 covers just the wars of the mid-century, linking the War of the Austrian Succession with the Seven Years War (1756–1763) and treating them as two manifestations of the search for worldwide stability in mid-18th-century international relations. McKay and Scott 1983 is a short survey, helpful as an introduction to the subject and featuring useful bibliographic essays and a set of maps.

Dorn, Walter L. Competition for Empire, 1740–1763. New York: Harper, 1940.
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Dorn is particularly good at explaining war aims and keeping the reader aware of the American dimension.
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Immich, Max. Geschichte des europäischen Staatensystems von 1660 bis 1789. Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1967.
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Old, but still the best single overview. Immich is judicious in his judgments, thorough in his treatment, and, though written over a century ago, still generally reliable.
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McKay, Derek, and H. M. Scott. The Rise of the Great Powers, 1648–1815. London: Longman, 1983.
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Based on a wide range of up-to-date (as of 1983) studies, this book situates early modern state building in the context of an environment of competitive warfare.
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Zeller, Gaston. Histoire des relations internationales. Vol. 3, Les temps modernes. Part 2, De Louis XV à 1789. Paris: Hachette, 1955.
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A good alternative to Immich 1967 for those who prefer reading in French.
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General Overviews of the War

The War of the Austrian Succession has surprisingly received few general treatments. In part, that is because for a full century after its conclusion, historians were still undecided whether it was best understood as one European-wide belligerence or as several conflicts that happened to coincide. Not surprisingly, then, there was for a long time no universally accepted name to attach to these eight years of warfare (though almost from the beginning the clear-sighted Frederick the Great recognized it as a struggle over the succession rights of the House of Austria—a view that Maria Theresa of course understood as well). Broglie 1883 gave the war its first recognizably modern treatment. Drawing on an array of manuscript materials and writing in the shadow of France’s disastrous defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, the author was trying to account for the 18th-century miscalculations that had allowed Germany to become a greater military power than France. Die Kriege Friedrichs des Grossen (1890–1895) drew heavily on German archival materials—many of them now lost in the devastation of World War II—to help a historically conscious German audience to understand the events that had brought the new German imperial state to its recent glory. Kriege unter der Regierung der Kaiserin Maria Theresia (1896–1914) was the Austrian contribution to this late-19th-century profusion of archivally grounded studies of the war. With its publication, the archives of the three major Continental combatants had been tapped. Britain’s role in the war was chiefly naval and financial. For this reason the first major English-language contribution to the historiography of the war, Richmond 1920, was an examination of the course of Britain’s maritime involvement. Lodge 1930 focused on Britain’s diplomatic activities, leaving the military and naval sides largely untreated. The long-needed works Anderson 1995 and Browning 1993, appearing almost simultaneously at the end of the 20th century, were syntheses of the discoveries and conclusions of a wide array of international historians over a full half century. They are good complements.

Anderson, M. S. The War of the Austrian Succession, 1740–1748. London: Longman, 1995.
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A shorter treatment than Browning 1993, it divides the war into its various theaters, treating the theaters independently. This approach has the advantage of allowing the reader to see developments in particular theaters unfold over the course of several years. But it also makes the interrelationship among events in the various theaters somewhat more difficult for the reader to follow.
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Broglie, Albert. Frédéric II et Marie Thérèse, 1740–1742. 2 vols. Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1883.
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Francocentric, detailed, and lively. See also Frédérick II et Louis XV, 1742–1744 (2 vols.); Marie Thérèse, Impératrice, 1744–1746 (2 vols.); Maurice de Saxe et le Marquis d’Argenson; and La paix d’Aix-la-Chapelle.
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Browning, Reed. The War of the Austrian Succession. New York: St. Martin’s, 1993.
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A longer treatment than Anderson 1995, it treats the war as a sprawling conflict that unfolds in unexpected ways as the war evolves. Its angle of vision is that of the policymakers of the era, but this approach makes the continuity of events in the separate theaters somewhat more difficult for the reader to follow.
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Die Kriege Friedrichs des Grossen. Vols. 1–5. Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler, 1890–1895.
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Invaluable for its extensive use of documents that are now lost.
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Kriege unter der Regierung der Kaiserin-Königin Maria Theresia: Österreichischer Erbfolge-Krieg 1740–1748. 9 vols. Vienna: L.W. Seidel, 1896–1914.
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Detailed studies of Austria’s war-making efforts, with rich attention to the Italian campaigns.
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Lodge, Richard. Studies in Eighteenth-Century Diplomacy, 1740–1748. London: J. Murray, 1930.
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A disjointed but invaluable history of diplomacy (chiefly British) during the war; really a set of discrete studies.
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Richmond, H. W. The Navy in the War of 1739–48. 3 vols. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1920.
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Written when Britain still hoped to rule the waves, these volumes describe how the kingdom recovered from a disappointing start to gain total control of the Atlantic waters.
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18th-Century Warfare

These works serve as an introduction to the rules, principles, and customs that tended to prevail in the conduct of war in pre-Napoleonic Europe. (For works that focus on maritime matters, see the War at Sea.) Chandler 1990 describes the weapons that soldiers had access to, the various ways in which commanders might choose to deploy their forces, and the tactical options available to these commanders. Duffy 1988 looks at 18th-century warfare—its rhythms, its terrors, its deprivations, and its rewards—from the perspective of the soldiers who found themselves enlisted in the various armies of the era. Pares 1936 points out the differences between the ways of war in the new world and the old. An important work that adds to our understanding of the era, Kunisch 1973 shows how military units made up of irregulars added the option of quasi-guerrilla warfare to the range of choices a commander might choose from. Parker 1996 treats the still-unresolved issue of the extent to which the very nature of warfare—basically, the interplay of weaponry, tactics, mobilization, and size—changed in the century before the War of the Austrian Succession. This study helps the reader understand the relationship of the thinking of Frederick II and Maurice of Saxony to the thinking of the great commanders of the previous century. Luh 2004 examines the tensions between the military theory and the military practice of the age, arguing that conceptions of princely honor guided and sometimes overrode the imperatives of efficiency. All the works mentioned thus far operate under the assumption that military history is preeminently about operational concerns—i.e., armies, battles, weaponry, strategy, tactics, supply, quartering, and similar topics. In recent decades the boundaries of the purview of military historians have become more elastic, with the intent of linking the military sphere with the broader social/political sphere of life—e.g., taxation, class, sexual practices, labor force dislocations, military pensioning, and similar topics. While not neglecting operational concerns, Childs 1982 introduces some of the issues that these new military historians address, as they relate to the 18th century.

Chandler, David. The Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough. 2d ed. Tunbridge Wells, UK: Spellmount, 1990.
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A good survey of the strategies, tactics, weapons, and organizational skills that nations used during the era of the War of the Austrian Succession. Its schematized charts are useful. Originally published 1976 (London: B. T. Batsford).
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Childs, John. Armies and Warfare in Europe, 1648–1789. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1982.
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Childs’s broad goal is to situate 18th-century warfare between the mercenary and irregularly controlled armies of the Thirty Years War and the sprawling armies of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. This is a splendid overview of the trends at play when war broke out in 1740.
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Duffy, Christopher. The Military Experience in the Age of Reason. New York: Atheneum, 1988.
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Using an extensive array of contemporary diaries, reports, and memoirs, Duffy lets the participants in the wars of the era speak for themselves.
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Kunisch, Johannes. Der kleine Krieg: Studien zum Heerwesen des Absolutismus. Frankfurter Historische Abhandlungen 4. Wiesbaden, West Germany: Steiner, 1973.
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A reminder that irregular units, foreshadowing the later development of asymmetric warfare, played an important role in the War of the Austrian Succession, especially in the eastern regions.
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Luh, Jürgen. Kriegskunst in Europa, 1650–1800. Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 2004.
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Inspired by Clifford Geertz, Luh finds grounds for resisting functional interpretations of the evolution of military practices. Above all, he argues for the importance of sheer spectacle in the military conventions of the 18th century.
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Pares, Richard. “American versus Continental Warfare, 1739–63.” English Historical Review 51 (1936): 429–465.
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Pares describes the differences between warfare in Europe and warfare in America during the middle years of the century.
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Parker, Geoffrey. The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800. 2d ed. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
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A good introduction to the contested question of whether the changes in the character of warfare in the century before the War of the Austrian Succession constituted something close to a revolutionary overturning of older ways. Originally published in 1988.
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Bilateral Wartime Diplomacy

The surveys mentioned in General Overviews of the War deal with all the combatants on a multinational playing field. Many studies, however, have focused on the wartime relations between just two of the combatant states. Schlenke 1963 examines the path by which Britain and Prussia, enemies in the War of the Austrian Succession, became allies in the subsequent Seven Years War. Braubach 1952 treats the reciprocal topic of how Austria and France, enemies in the War of the Austrian Succession, became allies in the Seven Years War. In each case the countries’ leaders reassessed their nations’ interests and adjusted policy and treaties accordingly. Baudrillart 1890–1900 focuses on the puzzling relationship between the two Bourbon states and analyzes how the less powerful Spain managed to extract more from the Family Compact than the more powerful France. Otruba 1964 seeks to place the significance of Britain’s financial assistance to Austria in proper proportion—as an important but not controlling element on many Austrian decisions. Geyl 1924 analyzes the efforts of William Bentinck to bend Britain closer to the war hopes of the Dutch. Mahrer 1972 assesses the character of Britain’s ties with and influence on Russia at a time when Austria was seeking to enlist the tsarist state in its struggle with Prussia. Karge 1887 explains how the Treaty of the Two Empresses (1746) was finally brought about.

Baudrillart, Alfred. Philippe V et la cour de France. 5 vols. Paris: Librairie de Paris, 1890–1900.
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Baudrillart’s sympathies lie with France, but his command of materials lends authority to these volumes.
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Braubach, Max. Versailles und Wien von Ludwig XIV. bis Kaunitz: Die Vorstadien der diplomatischen Revolution im 18. Jahrhundert. Bonn, West Germany: Ludwig Röhrscheid, 1952.
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Traces the steps that led Europe’s great dynastic rivals, the Habsburgs and the Bourbons, to become allies against the Hohenzollern upstart in Berlin.
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Geyl, Pieter. Willem IV en Engeland tot 1748 (Vrede van Aken). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1924.
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The War of the Austrian Succession was the death knell for the Maritime Alliance between Britain and the Netherlands. Geyl explains why this was so.
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Karge, Paul. Die russisch-österreichische Allianz von 1746 und ihre Vorgeschichte. Göttingen, Germany: Robert Peppmüller, 1887.
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Uneasy neighbors in the Balkans (though united in their hostility toward the Ottomans), Austria and Russia agreed in 1746 (the “Treaty of the Two Empresses”) to cooperate in order to keep Prussia in check.
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Mahrer, Eva. “Die englisch-russische Beziehungen während des österreichischen Erbfolgekrieges.” PhD diss., University of Vienna, 1972.
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An examination of the diplomatic relations between two mutually uncomprehending countries.
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Otruba, Gustav. “Die Bedeutung englischer Subsidien und Antizipationen für die Finanzen Österreichs 1701–1748.” Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte 51 (1964): 192–234.
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Britain’s preferred mode of belligerence on the Continent was to purchase allies. The funds it supplied Austria during the war were important for Vienna’s ability to keep arms in the field.
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Schlenke, Manfred. England und das friderizianische Preussen 1740–1763. Munich: Verlag Karl Albert, 1963.
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The less-examined side of the Diplomatic Revolution of 1756 is the shift in the London-Berlin relationship from de facto enmity in the War of the Austrian Succession to cautious amity in the Seven Years War. Schlenke analyzes how the two Protestant powers came to cooperate.
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Printed Documents

The following collections of documents provide windows on aspects of the war. By their very nature, such publications, because they are selective, lack the comprehensiveness of the true archival searches that the student of the war might wish for. But when particular compilations are relevant to the specific historical problem being researched, they can be invaluable. Politische Correspondanz (1879–1880) is the single most useful collection of printed documents for the War of the Austrian Succession. A king who was determined to lead, Frederick II used correspondence to give orders, request information, encourage his subordinates, and dissimulate. Frederick II 1866 is the proud king’s post facto apologia pro vita sua. It provides the view of himself that he wanted the world to accept. Hinrichs 1937 includes selections from the correspondence of the diplomat whom Fredrick most relied on. The multivolume Archives diplomatique (1884– ) provides many of the dispatches and letters that the French government sent to its accredited agents posted to stations around Europe. It allows the researcher to trace the shaping of France’s policies and the efforts by the French government to realize them. Rousset 1865 includes letters that the French king exchanged with the man whom, among his military leaders, he trusted the most. Argenson 1862–1863 is useful (though finally disappointing) for the researcher seeking to make sense of the marquis’s policies as foreign minister. Pribram 1907–1913 provides the texts of the various treaties and agreements that defined the relationship of Austria and Great Britain. Bussemaker 1908 allows the researcher to trace the efforts by Dutch policymakers to find a sound course for the republic in wartime. See also Ozanam 1975(cited under Spain), Yorke 1913 (cited under Great Britain), and Arneth 1863–1879 (cited under Austria).

Archives diplomatique: Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France depuis les traités de Westphalie jusqu’à la révolution française. Paris: F. Alcan, 1884–.
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These volumes are very valuable. They are organized by country and, within that categorization, chronologically.
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Argenson, René-Louis de Voyer de Paulmy. Journal et mémoires. Vols. 4–5. Edited by E. J. B. Rathery. Paris: Jules Renouard, 1862–1863.
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Not really reliable, but still of interest to anyone examining the policy ambitions of the man who misguided France for three years.
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Bussemaker, Carel Hendrik Theodoor, ed. Archives ou correspondance inédite de la maison d’Orange-Nassau. Vol. 4.1. Leiden, The Netherlands: A. W. Sijthoff, 1908.
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The revolution of 1747 conferred on William, Prince of Orange, the leadership (stadholdership) of all seven of the United Provinces. These documents are useful for students of this event.
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Frederick II. Mémoires de Frédéric II. Vol. 1, Histoire de mon temps. Edited by B. Boutaric and E. Campardon. Paris: Henri Plon, 1866.
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The Prussian king was a famous liar. But these memoirs—and notice the “History of My Times” ascription—show the intelligence of this remarkable roi-connétable at work.
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Hinrichs, Carl, ed. Friedrich der Grosse und Maria Theresia: Diplomatische Berichte von Otto Christoph Graf v. Podewils. Berlin: R. v. Decker, 1937.
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Frederick gave Podewils his orders; Podewils served his master well.
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Politische Correspondenz Friedrich’s des Grossen. Vols. 1–4. Berlin: Alexander Duncker, 1879–1880.
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One of the major achievements of late-19th-century German historical scholarship was the launching of this publication project. The monarch’s letters cover a variety of topics and display a wide range of royal moods.
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Pribram, Alfred Francis, ed. Österreichische Staatsverträge: England. 2 vols. Innsbruck, Austria: Wagner, 1907–1913.
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The texts of treaties are often important. Pribram affords scholars easy access to those treaties involving London and Vienna.
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Rousset, Camille, ed. Correspondance de Louis XV et du Maréchal de Noailles. 2 vols. Paris: Paul Dupont, 1865.
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Noailles failed Louis XV at Dettingen but remained something of a confidant of the king. And it is important for the fate of French arms that Noailles wound up supporting Maurice of Saxony.
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The Combatant States

Students of the war have two reasons for looking at the national histories of the states that were combatants. First, it was the governments of these states that made the decisions to enter the war and to muster, direct, and deploy the forces they needed. These decisions need to be examined. Second, because the convention of segmenting the study of history into national units has been so strong, many of the important treatments of the war have been written within the context of the particular national histories of the participating states. See, for example, Richmond 1920 (cited under General Overviews of the War).

Austria

Of all the major combatant states, the one we conventionally call “Austria” was the least like a modern state. (See Dutch Republic for a lesser power that was even more decentralized.) It didn’t really have a capital (Vienna was merely where the ruler usually lived), and its constituent parts (provinces like Bohemia, Silesia, Upper Austria, Tyrol, Hungary, and even the far-off Austrian Netherlands) were united only insofar as they acknowledged Maria Theresa to be their sovereign. The Empress-Queen’s subjects spoke many languages and professed a variety of faiths, and the provinces they lived in retained a multifarious array of immunities and privileges, all zealously defended by regional aristocracies whose loyalty to the Habsburgs was contingent on the retention of the local ways of life. Dickson 1987 examines how the government tried to make this structure more orderly and to extract more revenue from its subjects. Hochedlinger 2003 examines how the perceived needs of the military transformed the way the ramshackle state experimented with reorganizations across the course of a century. Duffy 1977 examines the reorganization of the army prompted by Austria’s failures in the early years of the War of the Austrian Succession (and the earlier war against Russia). Klingenstein 1977 focuses on changes in the institutions that guided Austrian foreign policy. Arneth 1863–1879 provides a magisterial life of Maria Theresa, who presided over Austria during the war. It is rich in documentary material. Walter 1951 presents portraits of the men Maria Theresa turned to as advisers in her bold efforts to reconstruct Austria. Lentze 1964 draws attention to the importance of the Pragmatic Sanction in shaping the identity of Austria.

Arneth, Alfred von. Geschichte Maria Theresia’s. 10 vols. Vienna: Braumüller, 1863–1879.
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A triumph of the 19th-century biographical craft. Arneth steeped himself in the archival resources and quotes from them extensively.
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Dickson, P. G. M. Finance and Government under Maria Theresa, 1740–1780. 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon, 1987.
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Raising revenues from the loosely joined Habsburg state was never an easy task. Dickson explains how methods improved.
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Duffy, Christopher. The Army of Maria Theresa: The Armed Forces of Imperial Austria, 1740–1780. New York: Hippocrene, 1977.
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Although Maria Theresa’s officials never contrived to forge an army that could humble Prussia’s, she did oversee the creation of a skilled fighting force that in most other circumstances acquitted itself well.
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Hochedlinger, Michael. Austria’s Wars of Emergence: War, State, and Society in the Habsburg Monarchy, 1683–1797. London: Longman, 2003.
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The course of Austrian military achievement reached its nadir in the 1730s and 1740s. Hochedlinger sees the wars against Russia and Prussia as the shaping forces in Austria’s uneven progress toward becoming a more modern state.
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Klingenstein, Greta. “Institutionelle Aspekte der österreichischen Aussenpolitik im 18. Jahrhundert.” In Diplomatie und Aussenpolitik Österreichs. Edited by Erich Zöllner, 74–93. Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1977.
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The conduct of foreign policy requires institutional organs. Klingenstein examines how the reform impulse affected Austrian diplomatic activity.
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Lentze, Hans. “Die Pragmatische Sanktion und das Werden des österreichischen Staates.” Der Donauraum 9 (1964): 3–12.
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Though widely dismissed by historians as a feckless diplomatic initiative by Charles VI, the Pragmatic Sanction was, in Lentze’s view, a major step in the effort to create a more united Austria.
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Walter, Friedrich. Männer um Maria Theresia. Vienna: Adolf Holzhausen, 1951.
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A quick learner, Maria Theresa began early on appointing men of ability to important advisory positions and offices of command. Walter introduces them and explains their importance.
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Dutch Republic

Owing to its commercial weight and its consequent wealth, the Dutch Republic (the United Provinces) was the most important of the nonmonarchical states that fit into the interstices of a generally dynastic Europe. It was actually a very loose confederation of seven provinces, the most important of which was Holland (often a synecdoche for the entire assemblage). The republic had a limited legislature (the States General) and no executive, though each province had its own head (stadholder). Its international influence derived in part from having been in recent decades an ally of Britain, in the so-called Maritime Alliance. But fear of France was prompting many in the republic to question whether continued cooperation with France’s cross-channel enemy was the wisest policy. Carter 1975 analyzes how this tension played itself out in the scrappy politics of the republic across the 18th century. Beer 1871 traces the course of Dutch decisions in the time of the War of the Austrian Succession itself. Ailly 1898 is, for those who read Dutch, a study of the role played by the republic’s strongest anglophile politician in trying to sustain the alliance and retain the friendship of a puzzled British government in the war’s final years.

Ailly, Antoine Jean d’. Willem Bentinck van Rhoon en de diplomatieke betrekkingen tusschen Engeland en de Nederlandsche Republiek gedurende de laatste jaren vóór den Vrede van Aken in 1748. Amsterdam: J. H. de Witt, 1898.
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When the anti-French revolution that wracked the republic in 1747 proved inadequate for rejuvenating the Dutch war effort, even a stalwart like Bentinck recognized that a new day was at hand.
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Beer, Adolf. “Holland und der österreichische Erbfolgekrieg.” Archiv für Österreichische Geschichte 46 (1871): 297–418.
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A study of how the Dutch Republic fought a war without ever declaring war.
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Carter, Alice Clare. Neutrality or Commitment: The Evolution of Dutch Foreign Policy, 1667–1795. London: Edward Arnold, 1975.
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A lifetime student of Anglo-Dutch relations, Carter provides a clear and informed analysis of the foreign policy dilemma facing all 18th-century Dutch politicians.
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France

With a population of about 25 million, France was Europe’s largest country. With a large army, a fine diplomatic service, and an empire in the New World, it was the only European state that enjoyed the option of trying to be both a land and a maritime power. Moreover, its leaders were often ambitious. In general, its 18th-century trajectory was one of hubris as a consequence of regular overextension of goals and fecklessness of leadership—until the French people, despairing of such leadership, overturned the existing order at the end of the century. Breen 2011 provides a broad summary of recent work about how France was managed during the reign of Louis XV (and before): in brief, Breen argues that competence from below helped to sustain the institutions of state stability. Corvisier 1964 discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the army in the first two-thirds of the century. Lacour-Gayet 1910, written in days likelier to encourage boldness of judgment, provides a similar service for the navy. Pritchard 1987 is a useful update on maritime activities, focusing on naval structure. Black 1988 argues that Cardinal Fleury had a keener grasp of France’s international situation in 1741 than critics have been inclined to realize, and that his resistance to entering the war was sensible. Pajol 1883–1884 examines the glory years of Maurice of Saxony, when the French army, finally reorganized, temporarily rehabilitated France’s military reputation. (See also the War in Flanders.) Zévort 1879 describes the ill-considered foreign policy of d’Argenson, whose odd ideological zeal led him to squander many of the advantages being secured by French arms. See also Argenson 1862–1863 (cited under Printed Documents).

Black, Jeremy. “French Foreign Policy in the Age of Fleury Reassessed.” English Historical Review 103 (1988): 359–384.
DOI: 10.1093/ehr/CIII.CCCCVII.359Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
Black is a master of the international politics of the era. His nuanced judgment of Fleury presents a director of foreign policy who was neither unduly timorous nor ideologically blinkered.
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Breen, Michael P. “Law, Society, and the State in Early Modern France.” Journal of Modern History 83 (2011): 346–386.
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A survey of a wide range of studies of the interplay and tensions between the institutions of law and the hopes for stability in France of the Old Regime.
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Corvisier, André. L’armée française de la fin du XVIIe siècle au ministère de Choiseul: Le soldat. 2 vols. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964.
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A sweeping study of the life of the French foot soldier in times of war and peace.
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Lacour-Gayet, G. La marine militaire de la France sous le règne de Louis XV. Paris: Honoré Champion, 1910.
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Louis XV was not a capable monarch. Lacour-Gayet examines the consequences of his feebleness for the fate of the navy.
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Pajol, Charles Pierre Victor. Les guerres sous Louis XV. Vols. 2–3. Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1883–1884.
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The swiftness of the turnaround of fortunes for the French army in the middle years of the war—in the brief period from Dettingen (1743) to Fontenoy (1745)—was astonishing. Pajol explains it.
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Pritchard, James. Louis XV’s Navy, 1748–1762: A Study of Organization and Administration. Kingston, Canada: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1987.
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The navy performed miserably in the War of the Austrian Succession. Pritchard analyzes the weaknesses and discusses the reforms undertaken to remedy the shortcomings.
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Zévort, Edgar. Le marquis d’Argenson et le ministère des affaires étrangères du 18 Novembre 1744 au 10 Janvier 1747. Paris: Germer Ballière, 1879.
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One need not be a French patriot to regard the Marquis d’Argenson’s oddly pro-Prussian tenure as foreign minister as disastrous for France. In the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War, Zévort explores its problems.
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Great Britain

The books included here are culled from the immense number of good studies of 18th-century Britain. Brewer 1989 explains how Britain, as the paradigm of the fiscal-military state, had the capacity to mobilize money and thereby to wage war, and how that capability in turn transformed Britain into a state built on war. Conway 2006, in a study of Britain during the two big mid-century wars, argues that Brewer overstates his thesis. Horn 1967 gives an overview of Britain’s relations with Europe in the 18th century. Black 1985 explains how the Walpole administration became entangled in a Continental war that the prime minister had doubts about. (Black has written extensively about the 18th century; his books are generally valuable to the student.) Rogers 1977 explores how Britain recruited, supplied, trained, and paid the men whom it sent abroad (in fairly small numbers) when Britain became involved in warfare on the Continent. But it was the navy, not the army, that was Britain’s most valuable fighting force. Rodger 2005 explains how Britain recruited its tars, requisitioned materials, sustained its shipyards, remunerated its sailors, and fought its wars at sea. Rodger argues that historians have underestimated the extent to which the navy allowed Britain to serve its purposes in Europe, and not just in the empire. Harding 1987 treats the diplomacy and politics of the naval war with Spain that was already underway when Prussia seized Silesia. Yorke 1913 gives a glimpse into the operations of the wartime government from the comments of a man who sat close to the centers of power.

Black, Jeremy. British Foreign Policy in the Age of Walpole. Edinburgh: John Donald, 1985.
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Authoritative and crisp, it shows how Britain got caught up in a war that began in faraway central Europe.
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Brewer, John. The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 1688–1783. New York: Knopf, 1989.
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The interpretation of the military, political, and commercial success of 18th-century Britain that has won the most adherents. Argues that the financing needs and the military ambitions of the kingdom were mutually reinforcing.
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Conway, Stephen. War, State, and Society in Mid-Eighteenth-Century Britain and Ireland. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199253753.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
The pressures of waging war promoted firmer unification in Britain, in part because the Jacobite rebellion stirred anti-Catholic sensibilities.
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Harding, R. H. “Sir Robert Walpole’s Ministry and the Conduct of the War with Spain, 1739–41.” Historical Research 60 (1987): 299–320.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2281.1987.tb00499.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
An examination of Britain’s reasons for launching “the War of Jenkins’ Ear.”
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Horn, D. B. Great Britain and Europe in the Eighteenth Century. Oxford: Clarendon, 1967.
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An examination of the administration of British foreign policy in the era.
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Rodger, N. A. M. The Command of the Ocean: A Naval History of Britain, 1649–1815. New York: W. W. Norton, 2005.
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A magisterial treatment of the organization, training, administration, leadership, and role of the Royal Navy.
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Rogers, H. C. B. The British Army of the Eighteenth Century. New York: Hippocrene, 1977.
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Though Britain’s wartime army was small, it was very good. Rogers explains why.
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Yorke, Philip C. The Life and Correspondence of Philip Yorke, Earl of Hardwicke, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain. 3 vols. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1913.
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The close friend and confidant of the Duke of Newcastle, who was Britain’s de facto foreign secretary, Hardwicke provides a window into the operations of the wartime government.
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Holy Roman Empire

In the 18th century, there was no encompassing German state. Instead, there was the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, a congeries of duchies, grand duchies, electorates, counties, abbacies, free cities, palatinates, and other political entities, all juridically independent (sovereign) of each other and yet still parts of the ancient constitutional relic that linked the (mostly) German-speaking part of Europe with its medieval past. The nominal ruler of this odd entity was styled the Holy Roman emperor. He held the position by virtue of election—there were nine electors at the time of the War of the Austrian Succession—and the office itself, rich in dignity but wanting in power, had for centuries been filled, until the death of Charles VI (1740), by a Habsburg. Noël 1968 dissects the tensions between various centrifugal and centripetal forces that dogged the empire’s self-understanding. Meisenburg 1931 examines the role of the imperial legislature during the War of the Austrian Succession. Wilson 2008 demonstrates why the empire, for all its weaknesses, could not be ignored, even by a monarch as independent as Frederick II. Hartmann 1985 explores the life of Charles VII, the unfortunate elector of Bavaria who unwisely secured the glory of the imperial title for himself early in the war and spent his few remaining years paying a steep price for succumbing to this ambition.

Hartmann, Peter Claus. Karl Albrecht—Karl VII.: Glücklicher Kurfürst, unglücklicher Kaiser. Regensburg, West Germany: Friedrich Pustet, 1985.
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Charles Albert of Bavaria hoped to raise the standing of the house of Wittelsbach by winning election to the imperial dignity after the last male Habsburg died. He became a French puppet and was left stranded to face Maria Theresa’s wrath unassisted when the French withdrew from Germany.
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Meisenburg, Friedrich. Der deutsche Reichstag während des österreichischen Erbfolgekrieges (1740–1748). Dillingen, Germany: Schwäbische Verlagsdruckerei, 1931.
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The legislature of the Holy Roman Empire usually possessed little power, but in turbulent times its activities were potentially consequential—hence contemporaneous concern about its activities.
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Noël, Jean-François. “Traditions universalistes et aspects nationaux dans la notion de Saint-Empire romain germanique au XVIIIe siècle.” Revue d’Histoire Diplomatique 82 (1968): 193–212.
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The empire was universalistic (or at least pan-European) in its aspirations. But the addition of “German Nation” to its title in the 16th century had acknowledged its emerging function as a Germanic institution. Both impulses existed in the 18th century.
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Wilson, Peter H. “Prussia’s Relations with the Holy Roman Empire, 1740–1786.” Historical Journal 51 (2008): 337–371.
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Approached with imaginative diplomacy, the empire might be used as an arena for addressing the quarrels among states, thereby stifling or at least muting them.
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Piedmont-Sardinia

Led by a crafty monarch (Charles Emmanuel III) and his able foreign minister (Count d’Ormea), the small but strategically located kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia was, after Prussia, the biggest Continental winner in the war, securing small but valuable pieces of land on its eastern frontier. And this was achieved despite the occupation of the king’s homeland of Savoy by the French. (Works listed in the War of the Alps will also be relevant.) Quazza 1957 examines the strengths and weaknesses of governance in the kingdom at the time of the war. Baudi di Vesme 1941 analyzes Piedmont-Sardinia’s role and opportunities in the war. Baudi di Vesme 1950 examines the strategizing of Charles Emmanuel at the crucial moment when the peace treaty signed at Dresden finally allowed Austria to join France and Spain in placing large armies close to the frontiers of Piedmont-Sardinia. Manno 1967 examines the small but able army that the king had at his disposal for defending his lands.

Baudi di Vesme, Carlo. “La guerra di successione d’Austria e la politica di Casa Savoia: Rassegna critica degli studi vecchi e nuovi.” Rivista Storica Italiana 58 (1941): 215–234.
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Piedmont-Sardinia benefited by being ruled by the ablest monarch (Frederick II alone excepted) in Europe.
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Baudi di Vesme, Carlo. “La crisi europea del 1745–46 e l’Italia.” Bolletino Storico-Biblografico Subalpino 48 (1950): 84–117.
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With the end of fighting in Germany, Italy became one of the two major Continental theaters and subsequently the site of the sanguinary battle of Piacenza (1746). It was the moment of maximal danger for Piedmont-Sardinia.
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Manno, A. “L’esercito piemontese: Lo stato attuale degli studi.” Bolletino Storico-Bibliografico Subalpino 65 (1967): 404–433.
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Piedmont-Sardinia was served by an army that was familiar with the ways of mountain warfare and skilled at using various well-placed fortresses to ward off attacks.
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Quazza, Guido. Le riforme in Piemonte nella prima metà del Settecento. 2 vols. Modena, Italy: Società Tipografica Editrice Modenese, 1957.
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Charles Emmanuel III was among the European rulers who saw value in introducing reforms of the sort that are often associated with the Enlightenment. Quazza provides that context for his reign.
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Prussia

Clark 2006 situates mid-18th-century Prussia within the broader framework of Prussian history, emphasizing how Prussia was largely a constructed (rather than organic) political entity. While it would be inaccurate to say that Prussia was an army that directed a state (see Graf 1997 for a corrective to that common oversimplification), it remains true that the connection between civilian affairs and military matters was tighter in Prussia than in any other combatant state. When Prussia went to war, it enjoyed the strategic benefit of having the state and the army under the control of the same person—a fusion that created an office that in German historiography is often styled roi-connétable. As roi-connétable, Frederick II could be confident that the army would follow his command; that the government would, insofar as events could be controlled, follow his instructions; and that both would bend their efforts to the service of the state as defined by Frederick himself. The conventional view of the king as a rather single-minded and powerful leader is elegantly presented in Ritter 1974. A famously contrarian book, Schieder 1983, sees Frederick as a man beset by contradictory impulses and understandings. Duffy 1974 examines the character of the successful fighting force bequeathed to, and subsequently enhanced by, Frederick. Showalter 1996 demonstrates how the very capable roi-connétable who ruled Prussia deployed this valuable institution.

Clark, Christopher. Iron Kingdom: The Rise and Downfall of Prussia, 1600–1947. Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2006.
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Clark argues that Frederick II and the Junkers were not as almighty as their historical reputation might suggest, but still the Prussia of the age was a state held together by an army and a bureaucracy.
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Duffy, Christopher. The Army of Frederick the Great. Newton Abbot, UK: David & Charles, 1974.
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The Prussian army anatomized, by a scholar with a rich understanding of several national armies of the 18th century.
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Graf, Holger Th. “Militärisierung der Stadt oder Urbanisierung des Militärs? Ein Beitrag zur Militärgeschichte der frühen Neuzeitaus stadtsgeschlichtlicher Perspective.” In Klio in Uniform? Probleme und Perspektiven einer modernen Militärgeschichte der frühen Neuzeit. Edited by Ralf Pröve, 89–108. Cologne: Böhlau, 1997.
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A summary of recent scholarship, suggesting that traditional historiography has exaggerated the extent to which the Prussian state was based on militarization.
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Ritter, Gerhard. Frederick the Great: A Historical Profile. Translated by Peter Paret. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974.
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Written during the 1930s, this biography by a distinguished and conservative military historian stands as a rebuke to the Führer by emphasizing Frederick’s orderliness, flexibility, and commitment to sane goals. Originally published in 1968.
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Schieder, Theodor. Friedrich der Grosse: Ein Königtum der Widersprüche. Frankfurt: Propylaen, 1983.
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A revisionist and controversial view—Frederick as a man of uncertainties?—of the monarch who led Prussia.
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Showalter, Dennis E. The Wars of Frederick the Great. London: Longman, 1996.
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Demonstrates how a man who was fortunate enough to be able to serve as roi-connétable enjoyed important advantages when waging war.
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Russia

Russia didn’t join the war until 1746, when a formal alliance with Austria (the Two Empress’s Treaty) finally aligned the two states. Russian troops began marching westward in 1747, and although the war ended before they saw action, their slow approach was another pressure that prodded France into seeking peace. Mediger 1952 is a splendid study of the interactions that led to later Russian cooperation with both Prussia and Austria. LeDonne 2004 examines Russia’s development of a “grand strategy” for dealing with the West. Duffy 1981 explains why the other European states were fearful of Russia’s military potential. Brennan 1987 examines the reign of Elizabeth I, the wartime tsarina.

Brennan, James F. Enlightened Despotism in Russia: The Reign of Elisabeth, 1741–1762. New York: Peter Lang, 1987.
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Just how enlightened Elizabeth was remains dubious, but Brennan’s is a modern study of the monarch who ruled Russia during the war.
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Duffy, Christopher. Russia’s Military Way to the West: Origins and Nature of Russian Military Power, 1700–1800. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981.
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The 18th century saw Russia’s entry as a major player on the European scene. Duffy shows how the army was the institution that gave meaning to this penetration of the West.
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LeDonne, John P. The Grand Strategy of the Russian Empire, 1650–1831. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.
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LeDonne has a sweeping thesis—that Russia’s strategic goals in the 18th century were offensive rather than defensive—and he argues for it vigorously.
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Mediger, Walther. Moskaus Weg nach Europa: Der Aufstieg Russlands zum europäischen Machtstaat im Zeitalter Friedrichs des Grossen. Braunschweig, West Germany: Georg Westermann Verlag, 1952.
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A complement to Duffy 1981, focusing on diplomatic strategies.
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Spain

Ruled since 1700 (with one small break) by Philip V, Spain was the junior partner in the de facto Bourbon alliance (the so-called Family Compact) that generally assured that Versailles and Madrid would cooperate in the middle years of the 18th century. Spain brought an experienced navy and a serviceable army to the table. These tools, when combined with the almost obsessive determination of the Spanish queen, Elizabeth Farnese, to have her son Don Philip installed as an Italian prince, gave Spain greater weight in the shaping of Bourbon decisions than might have been expected from the apparently subordinate partner. Lynch 1989 places the era of the war in the larger context of Spanish suffering under a succession of generally inadequate monarchs, privileged landowners, and a failed modernization. Serrano 2004 provides an introduction to the many aspects of the king’s long reign that are now engaging historians of Spain. Kamen 2001 examines the life of the king and the Italianization of Spanish foreign policy after his marriage to Elizabeth Farnese. Delsante 1974 examines the rather ineffectual role of Don Philip in the armed effort to secure him some Italian real estate. Ibañez de Ibero 1965 examines the foreign policy of Philip V’s able foreign minister. Ozanam 1975 deals with the final years of the war, when, with Philip V’s death, Elizabeth Farnese suddenly lost much of her influence.

Delsante, Ubaldo. “Don Filippo di Borbone e la guerra di successione austriaca.” Archivio Storico per le Province Parmensi, 4th ser., 26 (1974): 371–412.
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Few people (aside from his mother) thought much of Don Philip. This examination of his role as the effort to install him proceeded helps explain the reason for the widespread dubiety.
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Ibañez de Ibero, Carlos. “El Marqués de la Ensenada y su politica exterior.” Rivista de Historia Militar 9 (1965): 143–156.
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Ensenada supported the Spanish goal of installing Don Philip in Italy. This piece describes his efforts.
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Kamen, Henry. Philip V of Spain: The King Who Reigned Twice. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001.
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Never a strong-willed man, Philip V was further disabled by neurological illness in the final years of his reign.
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Lynch, John. Bourbon Spain, 1700–1808. Oxford: Blackwell, 1989.
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A well-organized political history with a splendid bibliography.
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Ozanam, Didier, ed. La diplomacia de Fernando VI: Correspondencia reservada entre D. Jose de Carvajal y el Duque de Huescar, 1746–1749. Madrid: CSIC, Escuela de Historia Moderna, 1975.
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Ferdinand VI wanted to extricate Spain from the war. Carvajal was the minister chosen to accomplish this task.
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Serrano, Eliseo, ed. Felipe V y su tiempo: Congreso international celebrado en Zaragoza, 15 al 19 Enero de 2001. 2 vols. Zaragoza, Spain: Institución Fernando el Católico, 2004.
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These pieces, treating all sorts of aspects of Philip’s long reign, are products of the stimulus provided to Spanish historians in 2000 by the three hundredth anniversary of the accession of the Bourbons.
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Smaller Countries in the War

When large countries go to war, smaller ones are confronted with difficult decisions—decisions on which the very survival of the state might depend. All the states mentioned in these works found themselves caught up in the War of the Austrian Succession. Dann 1991 examines the dilemma of Hanover, a medium-sized and exposed German state that found itself ruled by the man who was also monarch of mighty Great Britain. Hanke 2006 shows how Prussia’s seizure of Silesia compelled Saxony, which needed a land link to Poland if it was to be a major power, to be anti-Prussian in its policy. Genoa hoped to stay out of the war, but when Austria and Piedmont-Sardinia began contriving plans to despoil it, the republic decided to cast its lot with the Bourbons. Broche 1935 tells of the high price that the republic paid for its unfortunate geographical location. (See also Venturi 1967, cited under Revolts.) Finally, Black 1989 examines yet another instance of the ways in which small countries can become undone in times of major wars. In this case, the miseries that Bavaria endured were self-inflicted, since the ambitious ruler chose to use Charles VI’s death to snatch the imperial dignity for himself. (See also Hartmann 1985, cited under Holy Roman Empire.)

Black, Jeremy. “The Problems of the Small State: Bavaria and Britain in the Second Quarter of the Eighteenth Century.” European History Quarterly 19 (1989): 5–36.
DOI: 10.1177/026569148901900101Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
Black’s broader interest here is to explore, through a case study, the constraints and possibilities facing the leaders of smaller states in the international relations of the 18th century.
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Broche, Gaston E. La république de Gênes et la France pendant la guerre de la succession d’Autriche (1740–1748). 3 vols. Paris: Société Française d’Imprimerie et de Librairie, 1935.
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Neutrality, triumph, occupation, revolution—Genoa tasted all the vagaries of war as it sought to defend itself from avaricious states on its frontiers.
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Dann, Uriel. Hanover and Great Britain, 1740–1760: Diplomacy and Survival. Leicester, UK: Leicester University Press, 1991.
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The era of personal union (1714–1837), during which the elector of Hanover was also king of Great Britain, presented Hanoverian ministers with all sorts of challenges, as they tried to prevent the electorate from slipping into total dependence on British policies.
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Hanke, René. Brühl und das Renversement des Alliances: Die antipreussische Aussenpolitik des Dresdener Hofes, 1744–56. Münster, Germany: Lit Verlag, 2006.
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Brühl was effectively in charge of Saxon policy from 1738 on. This study examines the lessons he learned from the War of the Austrian Succession.
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The Major Theaters

With a few outlying exceptions, most of the engagements of the war occurred in one of the four major theaters: (1) central Germany, in the struggle for Silesia; (2) the area now called Belgium but then called the Austrian Netherlands or (as here) Flanders; (3) the mountains of northern Italy; and (4) the high seas (in particular, the Atlantic and the Mediterranean).

The Silesian Wars

The military struggles in Silesia, Bohemia, and Bavaria are often styled, in German historiography, the first two Silesian Wars. (The third and last Silesian War is coterminous with the Seven Years War.) The title is apt, for their result was Prussia’s seizure and subsequent defending of Silesia, an economically valuable province with a largely Protestant population. The first Silesian War ended in 1742 with the Treaty of Breslau (Berlin). Prussia resumed war in 1744, and the Treaty of Dresden ended the second conflict. Grünhagen 1881 is a detailed history of the first war, written from a Prussian perspective. Baumgart 1984 examines how Prussia replaced Habsburg with Hohenzollern administrative authority in the conquered province. Kunisch 1990 explains the geopolitical importance of the province. Browning 2005 is an examination of recent studies of the wars and of the sources that give us information about them. (On Maurice of Saxony at Prague, see White 1962, cited under the War in Flanders.)

Baumgart, Peter. “Die Annexion und Eingliederung Schlesiens in den friderizianischen Staat.” In Expansion und Integration: Zur Eingliederung neugewonnener Gebiete in den preussischen Staat. Edited by Peter Baumgart, 81–118. Cologne: Böhlau Verlag, 1984.
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A reminder that seizing territory was only the first step in conquering or winning over its inhabitants.
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Browning, Reed. “New Views on the Silesian Wars.” Journal of Military History 69 (2005): 521–534.
DOI: 10.1353/jmh.2005.0077Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
Concludes that historians have too often presented Prussocentric interpretations of the wars.
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Grünhagen, Colmar. Geschichte des ersten schlesischen Krieges. 2 vols. Gotha, Germany: Perthes, 1881.
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Masterful. A splendid source of information in the absence of much subsequently destroyed archival material.
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Kunisch, Johannes. “Der Aufstieg neuer Grossmächte im 18. Jahrhundert und die Aufteilung der Machtsphären in Ostmitteleuropa.” In Staatskanzler Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz-Rietberg, 1711–1794: Neue Perspektiven zu Politik und Kultur der europäischen Aufklärung. Edited by Grete Klingenstein and Franz A. J. Szabo, 70–90. Graz, Austria: Andreas Schnider, 1990.
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Kunisch argues that Silesia wasn’t prized solely (or even chiefly) for its economic value. Rather, it was important for geostrategic reasons.
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The War of the Alps

The Italian theater featured the only examples of mountain warfare in the war, and it also included the sprawling battle of Piacenza and forays that took Austrians south of Rome. But even so, this theater has received much less attention from English-language historians than the combat in central Europe or the sieges in the Low Countries. Still, its results established a political equilibrium in Italy that lasted almost half a century—no mean feat in the 18th century. Wilkinson 1927 provides a valuable overview of the goals and tactics of armies from Austria, Spain, France, and Piedmont-Sardinia as they labored to deal with the unforgiving topography of the Apennines and Alps. Meduna 1923 draws heavily on Austrian documents for his examination of the aims of an Austrian force that hoped in 1746 to find compensation in Italy for a lost Silesia. Moris 1886 focuses on the campaigning of French troops. Poggi 1933 analyzes the defensive efforts of Piedmont-Sardinia in 1745, as Genoa sided with the Bourbons, and armies from both France and Spain sought advantages along Piedmont-Sardinia’s frontiers. Works listed under Piedmont-Sardinia are also relevant.

Meduna, Victor. Der Krieg in Italien gegen Spanien, Neapel und Frankreich, 1746. Vienna: Institut für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung, 1923.
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Drawing chiefly on Austrian sources, Meduna charts how the Austrian army sought to add more territory to Maria Theresa’s (and Francis I’s) holdings in Lombardy and Tuscany.
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Moris, Henri. Opérations militaires dans les Alpes et les Apennins pendant la guerre de la succession d’Autriche (1742–1748). Paris: I. Baudoin, 1886.
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The French had the benefit of the advice of the foremost authority of his day on mountain warfare, Pierre-Joseph Bourcet, and they often made good use of it.
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Poggi, Guido. “Guerre sulle Alpi Marittime (anno 1745).” Rivista Militare Italiana 7 (1933): 1428–1464, 1623–1649.
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This is the story of Piedmont-Sardinia besieged.
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Wilkinson, Spenser. The Defence of Piedmont, 1742–1748: A Prelude to the Study of Napoleon. Oxford: Clarendon, 1927.
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A fine English-language treatment of seven years of difficult warfare.
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The War in Flanders

The campaign in this theater, comprised chiefly of sieges, has attracted less attention from historians than the more dramatic fireworks in Germany. But Maurice of Saxony, having converted the ill-trained army that lost (under other commanders) at Dettingen (1743) into the skilled and massive fighting force that first displayed its quality at Fontenoy (1745), managed to achieve every goal that the French government set for him. Bois 1992, Colin 1901–1906, and White 1962 provide details of his triumphs at Rocoux, Brussels, Laffeld, and Maastricht. See also Skrine 1906 (cited under Major Battles).

Bois, Jean-Pierre. Maurice de Saxe. Paris: Librairie Artème Fayard, 1992.
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A magisterial examination of the marshal’s life, showing how his series of successes in all sorts of situations earned him appointment as commander of the largest army in Europe. Includes an account of the capture of Prague.
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Colin, Jean Lambert Alphonse. Les campagnes de Maréchal de Saxe. 3 vols. Paris: Librairie Militaire R. Chapelot, 1901–1906.
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Detailed analyses of Maurice of Saxony’s series of triumphant campaigns in the final years of the war, including his victory at Laffeld, the largest engagement of the entire conflict.
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White, Jon Manchip. Marshal of France: The Life and Times of Maurice, Comte de Saxe (1696–1750). Chicago: Rand McNally, 1962.
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Shorter than Bois 1992, this biography serves as an English-language introduction to the subject.
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The War at Sea

So successful was the Royal Navy in the War of the Austrian Succession that by the end of 1747 the British government was told—probably hyperbolically—that more French ships sat captive in British ports than stood ready for service in French harbors. By virtue of this dominance, Britain, by the end of the war, could trade with impunity across the world, deny the Bourbons access to their overseas colonial holdings, use the navy to assist the army in joint activities along the Ligurian coast and at Naples, and protect Louisbourg from recapture by the French. But the early years of the war had been less pleasant for the Admiralty, which oversaw such British embarrassments as the confusion and failure at Toulon (1744). In the context of naval tactics across the century, Creswell 1972 analyzes the tactics employed by Hawke, the greatest of the wartime naval commanders. The organizer of the navy’s success was Lord Anson; Saxby 1973 explains his strategic vision. As the siege of Cartagena (1741) showed, Spain’s Caribbean holdings posed a peculiar problem for the British. Temperley 1909 still stands as a clear analysis of why the War of Jenkins’ Ear began in 1739. Wright 1971 provides the broader context for Anglo-Spanish tensions in America; Oglesby 1969 looks specifically at such engagements as Cartagena. Further north in the New World, it was France that was Britain’s Bourbon foe. Steele 1969 provides context; Stanley 1968 sees the fall of Louisbourg (1745) as the beginning of the end for New France. See also Richmond 1920 (cited under General Overviews of the War) and Rodger 2005 (cited under Great Britain).

Creswell, John. British Admirals in the Eighteenth Century: Tactics in Battle. London: Allen & Unwin, 1972.
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Britain may not have had the best ships, but it had the best commanders.
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Oglesby, J. C. M. “Spain’s Havana Squadron and the Preservation of the Balance of Power in the Caribbean, 1740–1748.” Hispanic American Historical Review 49 (1969): 473–488.
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The strategic/economic importance of the Caribbean was a cardinal precept of the 18th century. Spain was Britain’s chief rival in this arena.
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Saxby, Richard C. “The Western Squadron and the Blockade of Brest, 1745–1815.” History Today 23 (1973): 20–29.
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The Western Squadron was Britain’s central strategic innovation. By keeping a large fleet at sea, hovering off western Europe, Britain contrived to keep Bourbon fleets in harbor—or destroy them.
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Stanley, George F. G. New France: The Last Phase, 1744–1760. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1968.
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French officials in the New World could read the writing on the wall, and even though France regained Louisbourg in the peace settlement, in the end there was no way France could hope to hold New France if Britain became determined to seize it.
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Steele, I. K. Guerillas and Grenadiers: The Struggle for Canada, 1689–1760. Toronto: Ryerson, 1969.
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A good depiction of the striking differences between two imperial orders in the New World.
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Temperley, Harold W. V. “The Causes of the War of Jenkins’ Ear.” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 3d ser., 3 (1909): 197–236.
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A master of old-fashioned diplomatic history, Temperley explains how Britain and Spain stumbled into one of the oddest-named of all European Wars—made odder still by the fact that the unfortunate Captain Jenkins had lost his ear years before war commenced.
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Wright, J. Leitsch, Jr. Anglo-Spanish Rivalry in North America. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1971.
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An overview of the sources and points of tension in the Americas between London and Madrid in the 18th century.
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Major Battles

These studies, many of them startlingly old for inclusion in a 21st-century bibliography, are important not only for their demonstration of the care (and chauvinism) of late-19th-century Prussian historiography but also because, in many instances, the archival sources on which they are based were lost in the destruction of World War II. Koser 1890 examines the many surprises at Mollwitz (1741), Prussia’s first engagement with Austrian troops. Müller 1905 examines Chotusitz (1742), the battle that ended the first Silesian War. When Fredrick reopened hostilities in 1744, he sought an opportunity to inflict a punishing defeat on Austria. Keibel 1899 shows why military historians have pronounced the battle of Hohenfriedberg (1745) the first clear evidence of the king’s mastery of battle tactics. Stabenow 1901 explains how Frederick overcame both numerical and topographical disadvantages to humble the enemy at Soor (1745). Brabant 1912 examines Kesselsdorf (1745), Prussia’s last battle of the war, where the Prussians prevailed under wintry conditions and without the king as their field commander. There were of course battles fought in other theaters. Orr 1972 dissects Dettingen (1743), perhaps the most error-ridden engagement of the war, in which the French surely merited defeat but the British hardly deserved victory. Skrine 1906 examines Fontenoy (1745), where both sides fought well but the revitalized French, finally led by Maurice of Saxony, prevailed. For Maurice’s triumphs at Rocoux, Laffeld, and Maastricht, see the War in Flanders. For the battle of Piacenza, see Meduna 1923 (cited under the War of the Alps). For Campo Santo, Bassignana, and Cuneo, see Wilkinson 1927 (cited under the War of the Alps). For the shift in the historical community’s sensibility with respect to battle history, see Childs 1982 (cited under 18th-Century Warfare).

Brabant, Artur. Kesselsdorf und Maxen: Zwei Winterschlachten bei Dresden. Dresden, Germany: Verlag von Alexander Köhler, 1912.
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The Prussian victory at Kesselsdorf (1745) allowed the victors to impose the Treaty of Dresden on Austria. This book, designed in part as a tourist guide, has the additional benefit of containing numerous pre-World War I photos of the battlefield.
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Keibel, Rudolf. Die Schlacht von Hohenfriedberg. Berlin: A. Bath, 1899.
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The first battle to suggest that Frederick II was a commander of genius, Hohenfriedberg (1745) demonstrated that Prussian cavalry had improved to the levels of Prussian infantry.
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Koser, Reinhold. “Zur Schlacht bei Mollwitz.” Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preussischen Geschichte 3 (1890): 479–491.
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The first battle of the war, Mollwitz (1741) was also its most important: Fredrick II ingloriously fled the battlefield, and if his troops had subsequently lost, it is difficult to see how Prussia could have prevailed—or even stayed in the war.
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Müller, Paul. Zur Schlacht bei Chotusitz. Berlin: E. Ebering, 1905.
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With Chotusitz (1742), Prussia sealed its claim to Silesia. It would never hand the province back.
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Orr, Michael. Dettingen, 1743. London: Charles Knight, 1972.
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This was the last occasion on which a British monarch (George II) led troops into battle, and thanks to French errors he unwittingly and undeservedly won!
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Skrine, Francis Henry. Fontenoy and Great Britain’s Share in the War of the Austrian Succession, 1741–1748. Edinburgh: W. Blackwood, 1906.
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Probably the most internationally celebrated battle of the war, Fontenoy (1745) is the engagement that first showed Europe how successfully Maurice of Saxony had transformed the French army.
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Stabenow, Hans. Die Schlacht bei Soor. Frankfurt: Voigt & Gleiber, 1901.
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Soor (1745) showed the Prussian commanders and troops at their best, as they prevailed against an enemy that significantly outnumbered them.
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The Revolts

As the war ground on, imposing misery on millions of civilians, it frayed the bonds of political discipline in some countries. Broadly speaking, the four revolts that arose during the conflict were of two sorts. In the case of the two commercial republics, the United Provinces and Genoa, the revolts tended to pit a resentful trading element against the rule of an entrenched patriciate. In the case of the two semifeudal provinces, Scotland and Corsica, the revolts tended to pit the distressed elements of a clan-based rural society against those people, usually merchants, who wanted to modernize the country. Ambrosi 1950 examines Corsica in the light of France’s ambition to conquer the island. Black 1990 studies the misfortune that befell Scotland as a consequence of becoming a threat to the far more powerful kingdom to the south. Venturi 1967 shows how the wealthy Genoese republic was inescapably involved in the ambitions of the larger states. On Genoa, see also Broche 1935 (cited under Smaller Countries in the War). Leeb 1973 studies the Dutch Republic. The author’s chief interest is the ideological character of the uprising, a focus that gives his analysis relevance for the broader historiographical discussion of the Atlantic revolutions of the 18th century. On the Dutch revolt, see also Geyl 1924 (cited under Bilateral Wartime Diplomacy).

Ambrosi, Christian. La Corse insurgée et la seconde intervention française au XVIIIe siècle (1743–1753). Grenoble, France: Imprimerie Allier, 1950.
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Emphasizes French actions and Corsican reactions.
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Black, Jeremy. Culloden and the ’45. New York: St. Martin’s, 1990.
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Rich with provocative insights and suggestions. See also Conway 2006 (cited under Great Britain).
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Leeb, I. Leonard. The Ideological Origins of the Batavian Revolution: History and Politics in the Dutch Republic, 1747–1800. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973.
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Leeb situates the events of 1747–1748 in the broader context of Dutch constitutional experimenting in the 18th century.
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Venturi, Franco. “Genova a metà del settecento.” Rivista Storica Italiana 63 (1967): 732–795.
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The master historian of the Enlightenment in Italy, Venturi presents a Genoa that sits amidst all sorts of forces, both external and internal.
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The Treaty of Aix-La-Chapelle

The treaty that ended the war was completed and ratified in October 1748. Baudi di Vesme 1967 is comprehensive, but focuses on the Italian issues that bedeviled negotiators. Beer 1871 studies Austria’s efforts to defend the Habsburg realm against further territorial concessions. Lodge 1930 (cited under General Overviews of the War) examines the negotiations from a British perspective. All three are careful and important works. Other studies look at particular issues. McGill 1969 explains the role of Count Kaunitz, Austria’s negotiator. Sosin 1957 explains why Louisbourg loomed so large in British calculations. Tamborra 1959 reviews the papacy’s interest in the negotiations.

Baudi di Vesme, Carlo. “La pace di Aquisgrana (1748): Una pagina di storia delle relazioni internazionali.” Bolletino Storico-Bibliografico Subalpino 65 (1967): 249–314.
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Detailed, thoughtful, and masterly. Continued in Bolletino Storico-Bibliografico Subalpino 66 (1968): 103–174, 365–428; 67 (1969): 483–593.
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Beer, Adolf. “Zur Geschichte des Friedens von Aachen im Jahre 1748.” Archiv für Österreichische Geschichte 47 (1871): 3–195.
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Thorough and grounded in documentary evidence, this was the first relatively comprehensive treatment of the complex treaty negotiations.
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McGill, William J. “Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz and the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1748.” Duquesne Review 14 (1969): 154–167.
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Count Kaunitz spent the whole decade of the 1740s learning to distrust Britain. This study examines an important way station on his path along the road toward effecting the Diplomatic Revolution of 1756.
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Sosin, Jack M. “Louisbourg and the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1748.” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd ser., 14 (1957): 516–535.
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Maurice of Saxony was astonished that France would hand over the Austrian Netherlands to regain Louisbourg. Many latter-day observers have shared his puzzlement. Sosin explains the importance of the citadel.
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Tamborra, Angelo. “La pace di Aquisgrana del 1748 e la politica della Santa Sede.” Archivio Storico Italiano 117 (1959): 522–540.
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With the disposition of so many Italian territories up for settlement at Aix-la-Chapelle, it is no surprise that Pope Benedict XIV should have taken an interest in what the negotiators were doing.