Clashes between Azerbaijani drones and the air defense system of Armenia: What are the lessons for Serbia? by Zoran Vukosavljević is a former member of the Yugoslav Army Air Defense

Clashes between Azerbaijani drones and the air defense system of Armenia: What are the lessons for Serbia? by Zoran Vukosavljević is a former member of the Yugoslav Army Air Defense

Almost 20 days duration of the war in the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between the army of Azerbaijan  which aims to "liberate" the area and put it back in its constitutional and legal system and the army of Nagorno-Karabakh or the self-proclaimed "Republic of Artsakh" and their allies from Armenia, who are looking for ways to defend and keep that area or at least a significant part of it under Armenian influence.

It should be briefly mentioned here that the territory of the " Republic of Arcah " consists of the former Autonomous Region of Nagorno-Karabakh, which functioned as such as part of Azerbaijan during the existence of the USSR , but also areas outside the former Autonomous Region, which Armenians occupied during conflicts and wars in the period between 1988 - 1994 . year, seeking the right to self-determination for the Armenian majority in the then Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region.

The war began on September 27, 2020. year, by attacking Azerbaijani forces with artillery weapons in all directions of contact, with an emphasis on the far north and far south of the disputed area.

Bajraktar TB-2 reconnaissance and combat drone.
It was quickly established that this war would be very specific in some ways, and that is the mass use of unmanned aerial vehicles, kamikaze drones, hovering kamikaze missiles and even unmanned piston planes. These means are used by both sides in the conflict, but Azerbaijan certainly possesses a much larger amount of these lethal means, so their effects are much greater than with the opposite side.
In addition, we had the opportunity to see the use of modern quasi-ballistic missiles of great destructive power with TV guidance at the end.

Although it is difficult and ungrateful to quote quantities and numbers, according to available sources, it can be concluded that Azerbaijan uses more than 50 different Israeli-made reconnaissance unmanned platforms, such as "Hermes", "IAI Heron", "IAI Searcher", "Aerostar" and "Orbiter". ” (Which he also produces). In addition, Azerbaijan uses, according to some sources, up to 2 squadrons of Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 attack drones , which means at least 20-25 aircraft.


The so-called drone-kamikaze (loitering-ammunition) IAI Harop.
In addition to them, it uses a number of Israeli-made kamikaze drones of the "Harop" type and a number of locally modified unmanned aerial vehicles "Orbiter 1" and "Orbiter 3",  which can also serve as kamikaze drones.
In addition to this, Azerbaijan also owned about 60 An-2  planes ,  which were apparently converted into unmanned drones, with the task of being baits for the reaction of the Armenian air defense system, so that other drones would then act on them. Also, the function of kamikaze-drones is not excluded, because these aircraft can carry larger bombs than "ordinary" BPLs.

Looking at these figures, one can really get the impression that Azerbaijan is ready to wage this war in a different way and to give an advantage in airstrikes and reconnaissance to unmanned platforms and guided missiles, rather than manned aircraft, either fighter planes or helicopters.

One of the reasons is the fact that Azerbaijan does not have enough fighter planes and helicopters to be able to wage air war for a long time (if necessary). According to some available data, there are two squadrons of attack attackers "SU-25" and two squadrons of attack helicopters "Mil Mi-24" .  For hunting protection, they could use one squadron "MiG-29" .

On the other hand, the rather strong (at least on paper) air defense of Armenia and their allies from the "Republic of Arcah" (hereinafter "Armenians" or "Armenian side") was certainly a deterrent. Having that in mind, we can conclude that the decision was correct, and certainly aviation and helicopters can be used in later phases of the conflict, when and if drones, kamikaze drones and guided ballistic missiles sufficiently damage the air defense systems of the Armenian side.

For now, and the war has been going on for a little over twenty days, we have seen that there are certain successes that are worth mentioning and that everyone (not just the warring parties) in the world is currently paying attention to and thinking about how to turn these experiences into a new military defense. / or offensive practice or doctrine.

In order to be able to analyze as objectively as possible what is currently happening in the war-torn area, it is necessary to look at the situation on the ground from a military-technical, but also other aspects such as traffic-logistics, but also from the aspect of geography, afforestation and similar.


S-300PT-1A air defense rocket launcher of Armenia
The Armenian side has air defense systems that are not among the "most modern", but far from being completely outdated for "scrap iron" .

The backbone of the Armenian Air Defense consists of the "S-300PT-1A" systems , which are mostly located around the capital Yerevan. These are the first traction (semi-mobile) versions of the system from the "S-300P" family and they were probably intentionally located around the capital of Armenia, and moved away from the border with the disputed area of ​​Nagorno-Karabakh, precisely because of their semi-mobility. These systems have 5V55K missiles with a range of up to 47 km with radio command guidance and 5V55KD missiles with a range of up to 75 km with missile guidance (thus they have been modified from the "PT" version to the "PT-1A" version). The capital of Armenia is defended by 3 missile divisions "S-300PT-1A"and each division has its own surveillance-acquisition radar "36D6 Niva" or "Tin Shield" as indicated in the west and low-altitude detector "5N66". Additional radar support is provided by medium and long range radars such as "P-14 Obrona", "P-37" and "55Ž6M Desna" as well as radars "P-18 Terek" (western designation: Spoon Rest D). Target radar "5N63" is able to aim 8-12 missiles at 4-6 targets simultaneously.


Self-propelled launcher of the S-300PS air defense system of Armenia.
In addition to the "S-300PT" system, there is certainly the "S-300PS" system, which is the most potent system of the Armenian air defenseand the first mobile system from the S-300P family. Armenia has 2 divisions of this missile system, which uses 5V55R missiles with a range of up to 75 km and, according to some sources, 5V55RUD missiles with a range of up to 90 km, which would bring it closer to the "S-300PM" system. These divisions also have their own surveillance-acquisition radar "36D6 Niva" and low-altitude detector "76N6" (western designation: Clam Shell). Due to their mobility, but also the greater range of action at a distance, these systems are located along the border with the "Republic of Arcach", so that they can cover the airspace of that self-proclaimed state. Also, the divisions have additional support and medium-range radar type "P-18 Terek" and "36D6 Niva". Target radar "30N6" is able to aim up to 12 missiles at up to 6 targets simultaneously.


Transport and loading vehicles of the S-125M1 Neva air defense missile system of Armenia.
The Armenian side also has "S-125M1 Neva / Pechora" systems . According to some data, these are 5 missile divisions of this system, of which 2 are located in the region of Yerevan, 2 in the north near Lake Sevan, and 1 division is allegedly located on the territory of the so-called Republic of Arcah. The system is able to act on air targets at distances up to 24 km and altitudes up to 18 km. Each division has its own surveillance and acquisition radars P-12 / P-18 / P-15. For support and data on the situation in the airspace, it uses the same surveillance and acquisition radars as the "S-300PT-1A", in the Yerevan region as part of the unique air defense system of the capital of Yerevan. Around Lake Sevan, additional support is provided by the P-18 Terek radar. System "S-125M1 Neva / Pechora"it can track and shoot at low-flying targets, and there is a possibility of effects on drones and drones. According to some data, at least part of the "S-125" system is located on mobile point platforms.


Position of the Buk M1-2 air defense missile system, in the foreground the observation and acquisition radar Kupol, Armenia.
In the northern part of the country, around Lake Sevan, there are mobile air defense missile systems "9K37 Buk-M1-2", which are the most potent air defense system of Armenia after "S-300PS", and considering the dangers of drones, probably the most suitable for use. It is not known for sure how many systems Armenia has, but it is certainly not less than 1 division with 3 batteries of the "Buk-M1-2" system. "Buk-M1-2" systems are capable of using 9M317 missiles at targets at distances of up to 45 km and altitudes of up to 25 km, and are also able to successfully act at targets on the ground, namely tactical air-to-ground missiles and cruise missiles. air-to-ground and ground-to-ground missiles, as well as on water targets. The division also includes the observation and acquisition radar "9S18M1-1 Kupol". It is a 3D radar with a phase grid, intended for the detection and acquisition of targets at distances up to 130 km. It transmits data on targets to the "9S470 M1-2" command station, which assigns data to rocket batteries, ie their self-propelled launch vehicles with "9A310 M1-2" radar, which carry 4 semi-active 9M317 radar self-guided missiles. One division "Buk-M1-2" with 3 rocket batteries, is able to act on up to 6 targets simultaneously.


2K11 Circle in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Of the mobile hull systems, it is worth mentioning the " 2K11 Krug" and "2K12 Kub" systems .  According to the available data, the systems are active in the so-called Republic of Artsakh, while in Armenia they are probably in reserve or have been spent.

The air defense system "2K11 Krug" has 3M8M2 and M3 missiles with a range of up to 50 km in distance and up to 24.5 km in height. Its main purpose is to defend command posts at the army level (army air defense corps), but given the very small territory of Nagorno-Karabakh and the absence of such large strategic formations and given the range of the system, it is used practically for air defense territories. Missile Division "2K11 Circle" consists of 3 rocket batteries with 3 launchers, each with 2 PA missiles. At the battery level, there is a radar for guiding missiles "1S32M2", and at the level of the division observation-acquisition radar "1S12" popularly called "Bear".
The system can also operate centrally through KIS "K-1 Krab" or "Poljana". He showed himself very well in his actions on high-flying targets and the so-called stratospheric drones, but it has problems with low-flying and slower targets, and that is not its purpose.


2K12 Cube in Nagorno-Karabakh.
As for the self-propelled missile system "2K12 Kub", the basic fire unit is a missile battery, which consists of 1 radar observation and guidance station "1S91 RStON" and 4 self-propelled launchers "2P25M1" with 3 missiles "3M9M / M3" on each of them. Batteries can be imported into the centralized system "K-1 Krab" or "Poljana", and for this import each rocket battery has its own Device for data transmission on the target "UPPC 9S417", and at the level of divisions or regiments is UKUV - Device for command and control of fire "9S416", observation-acquisition radar "1RL128D Bear" and radar for measuring altitude "PRV-9 or 16".

The system has a range of up to 24 km in distance and up to 7 km in height, with the possibility of raising the ceiling of action up to 14 km in centralized operation. Unlike the "2K11 Krug " system, the "2K12 Kub" system has significantly better possibilities of action on low-flying targets, primarily due to the way of guidance (semi-active radar homing), greater maneuverability and mobility of the 3M9 missile compared to 3M8, but also multichannel per missile. is an important aspect of action on low-flying and very low-flying targets.


OSA-AKM Armenia.
Of the other systems, the " 9K33 Osa-AK / AKM" system is worth mentioning , and the Armenian side has a number of these systems both in Armenia itself and in the "Republic of Arcah".

"9K33 Osa-AK / AKM" air defense missile systems are the latest modifications of the "Osa" air defense system. They consist of a launch vehicle with 6 9M33M2 and M3 rockets. The missiles have a maximum range of 10.3 - 12 km in distance and up to 5 km in height. The missiles are guided by radio command, "three-point" guidance methods. The "9A33BM" radar complex is one of the most complex radar systems the Soviets have ever produced. It consists of an observation radar with a range of 45 km, but also excellent ability to detect targets at low and very low altitudes, small reflecting surfaces and even hovering helicopters.

On the other hand, the complexity of the radar system causes a somewhat slower reaction when switching from detection and acquisition to capture and tracking of the target with target radar, which itself has a very good range of 28 km. It is a complex system with separate surveillance radar and target radar, which again consists of the basic radar for tracking targets and missiles in a narrow beam, antenna tracking system for "wide-beam" interrogator missiles and receiving antennas for tracking medium-range missiles and so on. times 2 "or one" set of antennas "for each rocket. A total of 7 antennas within the target radar. In addition, there is an optical TV target tracking system.


Tor-M2KM Armenia.
However, the most modern air defense system is the system that has only recently arrived in Armenia, the "Tor-M2KM" short-range hull air defense system . The system started arriving only during 2019, and for now it is unlikely that the delivered quantity is greater than 1 rocket battery with up to 4 launch weapons with a radar system. The system is very atypical. Namely, it is a "container system" that is delivered without an accompanying vehicle or semi-trailer, and thus can be placed on the supporting structure of a wheeled or tracked vehicle of any suitable type (load capacity above all), as well as on a semi-trailer. The "container" can also be placed on warships. The Armenian army decided that the carrier would be a KAMAZ-63501 8 × 8 truck, a priest.

The Tor-M2KM system can use 9M331 and 9M332 projectiles. The launch vehicle with radar system consists of an observation-acquisition radar with a range of up to 25 km, a target tracking and guidance radar with a range of up to 20 km, an electro-optical tracking system and 8 ZV "9M331" or 9M332 "missiles housed in 2 containers of 4 rockets. The maximum range in distance is up to 16 km, and in height up to 10 km.

Among other air defense systems, we should mention the IC guided missiles "Strela-10M" and light portable missile systems "Strela-2M" and "Igla". As for anti-aircraft guns, Armenia has ZSU 23/4 "Spike" . It is a radar-guided cannon. This cannon has significant range and range limitations in both range and height.

What did we see in the first twenty days?

The technical aspect is very interesting.

Unmanned aerial vehicles, kamikaze drones and reconnaissance aircraft, fly at speeds ranging from just over 100 km / h to 250-300 km / h. These speeds are very problematic for tracking in air defense radar systems. Namely, there is no big difference in the air defense systems in terms of whether they are "newer" or "older", the problem is present in almost everyone.

Thus, the air defense systems "S-300PT" and "S-300PS" cannot, with their radars for tracking targets and guiding missiles, track targets that fly slower than 50 m / s and about 180 km / h, respectively. The same applies to the air defense system "S-125M1 Neva". In the case of the air defense system "9K37 BukM1-2", "2K12 Kub and 2K11 Krug", that limit varies between 50-60 m / s, which means from 180-216 km / h. This practically means that these air defense systems will practically not be able to react effectively against an unmanned reconnaissance or attack aircraft, if it flies at speeds below 50 or 60 m / s .

There is also the question of flight altitude.

Unmanned aerial vehicles, such as the Bayraktar TB2,  can fly at altitudes of over 7,000 meters, which is enough to "exceed" the battery surveillance radar of the " 2K12 Cube" system , even when and if the aircraft flies slightly faster than 60 m / s, so in addition to low flight speed, altitude may be a problem here. The exception is the air defense system "9K33 Osa-AK / AKM",  which should be the "right" solution to these problems. The system has a very solid observation radar that can detect very low-flying targets, but also floating targets. In that sense, there is no problem with low flight speed. The problem here is the limited observation height of only 5 km, but also the fact that slow targets flying at speeds below 100 m / s (360 km / h)) , can be detected at distances less than6.4 km. In this sense, this is a problem, when attackers are aircraft that fly slower than 100 m / s at altitudes over 5 km, or at altitudes up to 5 km, but at distances over 6.4 km and which can operate laser-guided missiles from distances up to 8000 m (Bayraktar TB2) .  Also, a certain "internality" of the radar system, which is quite complex, but also single-channel in purpose, showed in this conflict that the air defense system"9K33 Axis AK / AKM" is not able to cope with these challenges of drones and was a frequent victim of unmanned aerial vehicles and kamikaze drones, although he had some success in shooting them down.

Certainly, the best solution for the problem of drones would be the "Tor M2KM" system, but the problem here is that Armenia simply does not have enough of these systems, and considering that they only reached the beginning of the year, the level of crew training is also a question.

The system is very atypical. Namely, it is a "container system" that is delivered without an accompanying vehicle or semi-trailer, and thus can be placed on the supporting structure of a wheeled or tracked vehicle of any suitable type (load capacity above all), as well as on a semi-trailer. The "container" can also be placed on warships. The Armenian army decided that the carrier would be a KAMAZ-63501 8 × 8 truck, a priest.

The Tor-M2KM system can use 9M331 and 9M332 projectiles. The launch vehicle with radar system consists of an observation-acquisition radar with a range of up to 25 km, a target tracking radar and guidance missiles with a range of up to 20 km, an electro-optical tracking system and 8 ZV "9M331" or 9M332 "missiles housed in 2 containers of 4 rockets. The maximum range in distance is up to 16 km, and in height up to 10 km.
The system has very few restrictions on its use for action against drones, low-flying helicopters and piston planes, and it can be said that this system is in fact the right solution to this problem that the Armenians had in the first days of the war. The only question is how many of these systems are available and what is the current status in terms of technical equipment and staff training.

The next question concerns the angles of attack at which unmanned aerial vehicles, primarily kamikaze drones of the "IAI Harop" type,  but also quasi-ballistic missiles "Lora"  can attack targets, including air defense systems (especially stationary or semi-mobile).

Kamikaze drones type "IAI Harop",  but also locally produced"Orbiters 1/3" , are able to hover-cruise at altitudes up to 3000-4000 meters and to optically or passively radar search for their target. When they find a target, they head towards it, fly low following the configuration and relief of the terrain, and then crash at high angles of attack, which can be problematic for tracking the radars of air defense missile systems. Given that they fly low, before the attack, following the configuration and relief of the terrain, bearing in mind that most of the Nagorno-Karabakh region is hilly and mountainous, all radar-guided air defense missile systems may have problems tracking a target that can be temporarily "blocked". “Behind a hill, which causes the loss of radar coverage for illuminating the target and the loss of coverage on the radar-guided missile of the air defense system.


Quasi-ballistic missile Lora.
The quasi-ballistic missile "Lora"  has a range of about 400 km, a circular error (CEP) of only 10 meters and INS / GPS guidance with TV self-guidance. The warhead weighs up to 570 kg, is highly explosive, cassette or percussion. Missiles from the "Lora" system sink at angles of 88-90 degrees, which is beyond the capabilities of radar to track the targets of all radar-guided air defense missile systems that Armenia has. "S-300PT" and "S-300PS" systems can cover angles up to 64 degrees, and other air defense systems such as "S-125M1 Neva / Pechora", "2K11 Krug", "2K12 Kub" and even " 9K37 Beech M1-2 "," 9K33 Axis AK / AKM "and" Tor M2KM ".

This problem can be solved by having at least 2 fire units in the deployment area that will cover each other. The condition is that the distance of the first fire unit from the second is 5-7 km (depending on the type of air defense system) so that then, say, the second air defense unit can act on a projectile that is at a high angle of attack within the so-called. dead radar piles, crashes on the first unit. Of course, this implies excellent coordination of the work of several fire brigades through a joint command center and / or command-information system.

However, the "Lora" system could primarily be dangerous for stationary and semi-mobile systems, such as the "S-300PT" and for stationary versions of the "S-125M1 Neva" system. Other, mobile systems, by their very mobility, should prevent any impact of this system, and the systems "9K33 Axis AK / AKM" and "Tor-M2KM" seem to me to be too point targets for precise guidance, even if they were located .


Relief of the Republic of Arcah.
Tactical problems and challenges

The area of ​​"extended Nagorno-Karabakh" or the so-called Republic of Arcah, should be viewed similarly to the area of ​​Montenegro. They are superficially similar, and geographically. The so-called The Republic of Arcah is a distinctly hilly and mountainous country located on the slopes of the South Caucasus. Hilly-mountainous relief, afforestation and traffic infrastructure play a big role in the tactics of both the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides.

As soon as you look at the relief map of the so-called Republic of Arcach, you can immediately see that the space for deployment and maneuver of air defense units is quite limited, especially of "larger" systems.

It is important to point out that this is not just an air war, as it was in our country in 1999 (with the exception of Kosovo and Metohija where there were land conflicts, mostly in the border zone with Albania), but an air-land war and that a large number of units of the army, artillery, armored mechanized units, infantry units are deployed on the ground, and that it is necessary to coordinate movements, maneuvers and occupying positions very smartly and to avoid direct grouping of a large number of soldiers, military equipment, vehicles and the like. , in a certain small area, not only because of reconnaissance and action from the airspace, but also because of the action of Azerbaijani artillery and multi-barrel rocket launchers.

That is why it should come as no surprise that the "first strike" was received by air defense units armed with the "9K33 Axis AK / AKM" system, but also mobile missile systems with IR "Strela-10M" missiles, because they are the easiest to deploy and choose a position for action. the simplest. Despite the fact that they were successful in shooting down a number of unmanned aerial vehicles, drones and "AN-2" unmanned aerial vehicles, they also suffered a lot. The hitting of several tools of these systems is shown, and the numbers vary from 6-12 systems "9K33 Axis AK / AKM" and three systems "Arrow-10M".

In all these shooting recordings, it is noticeable that the masking of these air defense systems is not even close to the required level. There are also objective circumstances, and that is that the surrounding terrain, the land, is quite bare, so it is not so easy to disguise the funds. However, it must be stated that the masking was at a really unsatisfactory level .

As for larger systems, the objective circumstance must be underlined that there are not many "choices" where they can be deployed, and the deployment of a number of air defense systems at the same time, in such conditions of constant VaP surveillance with drones and aircraft, and in conditions of unfavorable terrain. , you almost don't even have to think.

Looking at the relief map, you can see that the entire central part of the so-called Republic of Arcah, hilly and mountainous, and the southern and western areas along the line of contact with Azerbaijan, lowland. I think that any deployment of "larger" air defense systems of the Armenian side in the peripheral, border areas with Azerbaijan in the west should be rejected immediately, because the risk of destruction even by artillery fire is too great due to the proximity of artillery units of the Azerbaijani army. Of course, it is possible to perform short, one-time, ambush actions, according to the principle of "act and maneuver" (shoot and scoot), but only in small ambush formations.


Spatial arrangement of the PVO Kub battery in full formation with 4 SLO.

Spatial arrangement of the Fire Control Battery of the PUB Kub system, full formation.
Air defense systems have their limitations and their requirements as to what positions must be in order to be occupied. Thus, for example, with the hull air defense system "2K12 Kub" ,  for the deployment of only 1 rocket battery, full formation composition, an average of 400 x 400 meters of relatively flat surface is needed. The maximum height difference between the observation and guidance radar (RStON) and the self-propelled launching gear (SLO) must not exceed 5% in relation to the distance. So at a distance of 200 meters, the height difference must not exceed 10 meters. This is a very good feature of this system, and it is similar with the "2K11 Krug" and "9K37 BukM1-2" systems, but it shows that it is not possible or very difficult to place the battery in a hilly area.

For the deployment of one "2K12 Kub" missile regiment of 4 self-propelled missile batteries, an optimal space of at least 10 x 10 km is required, meaning about 100 km2, not counting the space for the Fire Control Battery, missile control command and radar control center and automatic control system "K-1M". With the "2K11 Circle" system, an optimal space of 10 x 5 km is required for the deployment of one missile division with 3 missile batteries (basic fire formation). So about 50 km2 of space, not counting the command post with higher level surveillance and acquisition radars and the command and information system "K-1M" or "Poljana D1", if any. With the "9K37 Buk-M1-2" system for the deployment of one missile division with 3 missile batteries (basic fire formation), an optimal 5 x 15 km is required, meaning about 75 km2 of space,not counting the command post here with higher-level observation and acquisition radars. It is possible to deploy missile unit technology at somewhat closer distances, so the deployment space would be slightly lower than what we wrote, but that would narrow the space capabilities of the system and potentially facilitate the detection of more units in a small, narrow space. These systems can be deployed in a wider area than the one we have listed, which allows greater spatial possibilities of the system and makes it difficult to detect. On the other hand, there may be problems with logistics and communication, especially if it (radio connection) is interrupted. The wire connection is problematic over long distances due to the possibility of wire breakage. Thus, the stated values ​​are some "average" or "optimal" values.It is possible to deploy missile unit technology at somewhat closer distances, so the deployment space would be slightly lower than what we wrote, but that would narrow the space capabilities of the system and potentially facilitate the detection of more units in a small, narrow space. These systems can be deployed in a wider area than the one we have listed, which allows greater spatial possibilities of the system and makes it difficult to detect. On the other hand, there may be problems with logistics and communication, especially if it (radio connection) is interrupted. The wire connection is problematic over long distances due to the possibility of wire breakage. Thus, the stated values ​​are some "average" or "optimal" values.It is possible to deploy missile unit technology at somewhat closer distances, so the deployment space would be slightly lower than what we wrote, but that would narrow the space capabilities of the system and potentially facilitate the detection of more units in a small, narrow space. These systems can be deployed in a wider space than the one we mentioned, which allows greater spatial possibilities of the system and makes it difficult to detect. On the other hand, there may be problems with logistics and communication, especially if it (radio connection) is interrupted. The wire connection is problematic over long distances due to the possibility of wire breakage. Thus, the stated values ​​are some "average" or "optimal" values.but this would narrow the spatial capabilities of the system and potentially facilitate the detection of multiple units in a small, narrowed space. These systems can be deployed in a wider space than the one we mentioned, which allows greater spatial possibilities of the system and makes it difficult to detect. On the other hand, there may be problems with logistics and communication, especially if it (radio connection) is interrupted. The wire connection is problematic over long distances due to the possibility of wire breakage. Thus, the stated values ​​are some "average" or "optimal" values.but this would narrow the spatial capabilities of the system and potentially facilitate the detection of multiple units in a small, narrowed space. These systems can be deployed in a wider space than the one we mentioned, which allows greater spatial possibilities of the system and makes it difficult to detect. On the other hand, there may be problems with logistics and communication, especially if it (radio connection) is interrupted. The wire connection is problematic over long distances due to the possibility of wire breakage. Thus, the stated values ​​are some "average" or "optimal" values.especially if it (radio connection) is interrupted. The wire connection is problematic over long distances due to the possibility of wire breakage. Thus, the stated values ​​are some "average" or "optimal" values.especially if it (radio connection) is interrupted. The wire connection is problematic over long distances due to the possibility of wire breakage. Thus, the stated values ​​are some "average" or "optimal" values.

The minimum distance between the air defense batteries should be at least 5 km, and there should be added command batteries or batteries for fire control and you come to the situation that in the area of ​​the so-called. The Republic of Arcach, taking into account the terrain, probably cannot deploy more than 4-6 missile fire units of the "2K12 Kub" or "2K11 Krug" or "9K37 Buk M1-2" system at one time, and ensure their operation. , supplying radar information from medium and long range radars and ensuring their maneuverability in that "narrow space" without being detected.


Radar P-18 Terek.
A good example is the deployment of early detection radar systems (and VOJiN systems) type "P-18 Terek" or "P-19 Flat Face B",  which form a beam by reflection from the ground and which require a flat plateau with a radius of 1500 meters, with the "possibility of tolerance" up to 500 meters, so that these radars can not be deployed "on top of the hill".

It should not be forgotten that the deployment of air defense missile systems in an area does not only mean the deployment of fire units, but also command and radar units, missile-technical maintenance and missile filling units, engineering security, short-range artillery-missile units, and up to quartermaster and background units in charge of providing conditions for living, rest and human nutrition. Also, there should be a single command center for the area that will ensure the functioning and coordination of the air defense system in the area through the fast and quality flow of information and orders, organization of timely and orderly maneuvers and other numerous activities.

In addition to all that, in the same area, there is a larger number of units of the land army, so the coordination of the work of the air defense system must be harmonized with their commands. So, it is possible that there are simply "too many" soldiers, units and means of war equipment in a certain small area, which can create big problems in positioning, camouflage, maneuver, logistical security, which probably happens occasionally, as we see in numerous recordings of the hitting of certain means of war equipment of the Armenian Army, which are broadcast almost daily by the Azerbaijani army.

Thus, the southern areas of the so-called. The Arcach Republics are relatively favorable for deploying "larger" air defense systems, but there is probably no room for more than 2-3 larger air defense fire units with all the accompanying logistics and support as we wrote. The aggravating factor is that the reconnaissance air platforms of Azerbaijan have an easy job to search a small area of ​​that southern plain area, with a mostly bare landscape, without dense forests, full of soldiers of all kinds and services. It is also a question of the strategic importance of the southern part of the country, which before the war was predominantly inhabited by Azeris and was not part of the former Autonomous Region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Today, that part is quite sparsely populated, because the Azeris who left this area were mostly not replaced by Armenians.

There is a certain area around the capital Stepanekert where the airport is located, but that area is under constant reconnaissance from the air. We have seen an example of the destruction of one aiming radar of the "2K11 Krug" air defense system and 2 self-propelled launch weapons of the "2K12 Kub" system, but without missiles , which leads to the conclusion that the funds were left to be targeted. Also, in this area, we saw footage of the observation radars "P-18" and "36D6".

Given the characteristics of the terrain, which makes it difficult to deploy larger air defense formations, constant reconnaissance from the airspace by drones and airplanes, perhaps the best solution would be to deploy air defense systems with regard to range, mobility, passability and possibly the possibility of joint war. distances and heights. Thus, the "S-300PS" systems could be deployed in the far east, along the very border of the so-called Republic of Arcach with Armenia, because their range provides action over most of the territory, and mobile units could be deployed in smaller formations, mixed, systems "Buk-M-1-2", "2K12 Kub" and "9K33 Osa AK / AKM "in the hilly and mountainous area of ​​the central part of Nagorno-Karabakh around the largest and most important cities of Stepanekert and Susa, in accordance with the possibilities that the terrain allows.We have already stated the organization and everything that is necessary for the functioning of the air defense system.

Stationary or semi-mobile air defense systems such as "S-300PT-1A" and "S-125M1 Neva", in this phase of the war, perhaps should not be deployed in the area of ​​the so-called. Republic of Arcach, because the risk of destruction from the air is simply too high. These systems should be kept in case of emergency and if the war lasts a long time. I would also include units armed with the "Tor-M2KM" missile system due to its small number.

As for the units armed with air defense artillery systems and infrared self-propelled air defense missile systems, not much has been written about them. The main problem with these systems is the range in both height and distance, as well as the limited ability to detect targets and correct fire at night. However, these systems, together with the light portable missile systems "Strela 2M" and "Igla " must be in the function of protecting both ground units of the Armenian side and larger air defense missile systems and given their "invisibility" in radar and in most cases in IC spectrum, must be masked by visual observation from the airspace.

Through this analysis, we also provided some guidelines that could improve the position of air defense units and reduce suffering among soldiers on the ground. However, Armenians can not complain as "late" with procurement systems PSC "Tor M2KM" in large quantities, possibly air defense system, " Bulletproof S1 ", and that in their arsenal have insufficient funds for jamming unmanned aircraft, the so-called "anti- drone assets ”or C-UAV  assets.


C-UAV system Repellent-1.
Armenia has a small number of Russian-made "Repellent-1" systems  that are able to suppress or destroy swarms of reconnaissance, spy drones and drones, with very small areas and sizes. The system is able to automatically detect and neutralize enemy reconnaissance drones at distances of up to 30 km, performing strong electronic interference with their control sensors or satellite navigation links. The system is able to detect drones via their transceiver signals of control commands, at any time and air temperature from -45 to +50 degrees Celsius. The system is located on the chassis of the MAZ-6317 vehicle and is very mobile.


C-UAV system Sapsan-Bekas.
From other C-UAV systems that could, but were not procured, we single out the Anti-drone system "Sapsan Bekas ", which is also a mobile system, intended for suppression and neutralization of drones. The system is able to detect unmanned aerial vehicles at distances of 10 km (and more) and to neutralize them at distances of about 6km, performing strong electronic interference with their navigation and communication channels. The system can operate in manual or automatic mode and in a very wide frequency range from 400 MHz to 6 GHz. The system is also equipped with a "self-alien" recognition subsystem so that it will not interfere with frequencies entered in advance in the program as "own", and during that time it can "block" 11 different frequency wavelengths. It consists of the following basic sub-systems: active radar, signal detector and direction of drone range, video and opto-electronic surveillance and monitoring system and subsystem of radio frequency interference (suppression). The subsystem in charge of radio frequency interference is called "Luch"  .
C-UAV system Dome
Finally, we should not forget the easily portable portable systems such as the system "Dome" and "Rubež-Avtomatika ", which provide the formation of a kind of anti-drone "dome" with a diameter of not less than 3 km and thus provide protection from individual and swarms of drones coming from all several different directions at the same time. There are also "Pischal " systems , which weigh only 3.5 kg (lighter than the Kalashnikov) and are able to interfere with and neutralize the control channels of drones at distances up to 2 km and the "Luch" system , which is able to detect and interferes with enemy drones at distances of at least 6 km.

In any case, this war is a great "school", not only for Armenians, but also for Serbia . In addition to the procurement of quality air defense systems that can fight against drones, kamikaze drones and the like, and the procurement of its own attack drones with the development of their own, we should also work on the procurement of anti-drone protection, ie the procurement of C-UAV systems. at times it may be the best protection against these new "air strikes."

Zoran Vukosavljević is a former member of the Yugoslav Army Air Defense, co-author of the book "Sky Shield from the Earth - Self-Propelled Missile System"
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> Buy his book https://www.vojnaknjizara.com/shop/samohodni-raketni-sistem-pvo-2k12-kub-m-kvadrat/
> terms by Mike Mihajlovic
@MihajlovicMike "mrtve kupe radara" is the "cone of silence" which  basically means the sector that is not covered with radar because the physical characteristics. Radar is not designed to detect aircraft directly above the radar antenna. https://twitter.com/MihajlovicMike/status/1318589535710777348
> original article contains illustrations and placement graphics not captured by text translation kindly refer to https://tangosix.rs/2020/20/10/analiza-okrsaji-azerbejdzanskih-dronova-i-sistema-pvo-jermenije-koje-su-lekcije-za-srbiju/

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