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The Origins and Impact of Proportional Representation

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Mar 12th, 2016
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  1. Introduction
  2.  
  3. The label “proportional representation” (PR) refers to a broad family of electoral systems. Specifically, it refers to electoral systems that are designed to share representation out across different strands of opinion. This introduction briefly fleshes out this definition of PR and then outlines the sections to follow. An electoral system is a set of rules governing two things. The first is the nature of the votes that members of the electorate are able to cast: whether, for example, for candidates or parties or both; and whether for just one candidate or party or more than one. The second is the process by which these votes are tallied in order to determine who gets elected. Electoral systems can be used to elect a single person, such as a president or chair, or to elect a multimember body, such as a legislature or council. Proportional electoral systems can be used only to elect collective bodies: their purpose of sharing representation out across different strands of opinion cannot be achieved if only one person is being chosen. The systems used to elect multimember bodies can be distinguished from each other on two key dimensions: proportionality and personalization (sometimes also referred to as the “inter-party” and “intra-party” dimensions). Proportionality refers to the degree to which the seats within the multimember body are allocated in proportion to the votes won by the different groups contesting the election. PR systems can be defined as systems that generally produce close correspondence between the share of the votes won by each political party or other grouping and its share of the seats. They contrast with majoritarian systems, which tend to give significant over-representation to the largest party (or the largest two parties), while under-representing all other parties. The commonest majoritarian system is single-member plurality, also widely known as first past the post. The scale of proportionality is, however, continuous: it is possible for an electoral system to occupy any position, from highly proportional to highly disproportional. Among PR systems, the key determinant of just how proportional the system is is the number of seats allocated in each electoral district: this number is called the district magnitude. The higher the district magnitude, the closer the result can approach perfect proportionality, while the lower the district magnitude, the further the system moves from proportionality. Personalization, meanwhile, refers to the degree to which elections involve a choice not just between political parties (or other such groupings), but between individual candidates. PR systems can occupy any position on this dimension, from highly personalized to highly party-centric. Further information on the many different forms that PR can take is provided in the Varieties section below. This bibliography begins with introductory readings and an overview of key journals dealing with PR and other electoral systems. The remainder of the bibliography is then divided into three sections. The first, on Varieties, outlines literature on the many different forms that PR systems can take. The second, on Origins, examines the invention of the various forms of PR and the processes by which PR systems have been adopted—or not adopted—at different times and in different countries around the world. The third, on Effects, introduces a wide variety of literatures relating to PR’s effects. This final section is much the longest: an electoral system can have effects on many aspects of politics, and large bodies of work have emerged on each of these. The survey here addresses eight key aspects of PR’s impact.
  4.  
  5. Introductory and Reference Works
  6.  
  7. Several books provide very useful introductory overviews of this subject. In addition, a number of printed and online sources give extensive information on the electoral systems that exist and have existed around the world.
  8.  
  9. Introductory Works
  10.  
  11. The most widely used introduction to the study of electoral systems is Farrell 2011. Norris 2004 goes further in analyzing empirical evidence on these systems’ consequences. Reynolds, et al. 2005, written primarily for practitioners rather than political scientists or students, gives much useful practical information and summarizes the electoral systems in use around the world. Powell 2000 is more advanced than the other books but provides a very useful framework for the analysis of electoral systems and their effects.
  12.  
  13. Farrell, David M. 2011. Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction. 2d ed. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
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  15. Farrell’s is the most widely used introduction to electoral systems, used not just by students, but also by citizens’ assemblies and policymakers around the world.
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  17. Norris, Pippa. 2004. Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press.
  18. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511790980Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  19. Norris surveys the various types of electoral system and then examines their consequences for various aspects of voting behavior and for the representation of women, ethnic minorities, and individual constituents.
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  21. Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. 2000. Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.
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  23. Powell’s book is more advanced than the others listed in this section, but it provides an encompassing understanding of how we might best think about electoral institutions. It distinguishes two “visions of democracy”—proportional and majoritarian—and examines how these operate in practice.
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  25. Reynolds, Andrew, Ben Reilly, and Andrew Ellis. 2005. Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
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  27. This book, primarily intended as a primer for electoral system designers in emerging democracies, provides a broad classification of electoral systems, a wealth of empirical information on systems around the world, and much guidance as to the advantages and disadvantages of different systems.
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  29. Reference Works
  30.  
  31. The works cited in this section provide wide-ranging useful information on electoral systems. The series edited by Dieter Nohlen and colleagues (Nohlen, et al. 1999; Nohlen 2005; Nohlen, et al. 2001; Nohlen and Stöver 2010) gives basic information on electoral systems and election results in all countries of the world often extending back to the 19th century. Each volume in this series contains detailed information on the evolution of electoral rules in each country within the region covered, including some narrative information on reform processes, as well as results of all national elections. No other reference work can boast such extensive coverage. Bormann and Golder 2013 reports a newly updated dataset on electoral systems in use throughout the world since 1946: this is the most detailed and accurate dataset on electoral systems available. The two websites listed—the ACE project and the PARLINE Database—are not always so meticulous, but nevertheless contain a wealth of information on individual countries and (in the case of ACE) on general topics relating to elections and electoral institutions.
  32.  
  33. ACE: The Electoral Knowledge Network.
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  35. This website contains an encyclopedia of elections and electoral systems and a country-by-country guide covering the whole world. There are also many links to useful further sources.
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  37. Bormann, Nils-Christian, and Matt Golder. 2013. “Democratic Electoral Systems around the World, 1946–2011.” Electoral Studies 32.2 (June): 360–369.
  38. DOI: 10.1016/j.electstud.2013.01.005Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  39. Golder’s dataset of electoral systems, covering the period from 1946 to 2000 and published in 2005, has become a standard source for scholars studying electoral systems. This article links to updated data files covering the period to 2011 and also presents analysis of the evidence these files contain. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
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  41. Nohlen, Dieter, ed. 2005. Elections in the Americas: A Data Handbook. 2 vols. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
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  43. Contains detailed information on the evolution of electoral rules in the Americas.
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  45. Nohlen, Dieter, Florian Grotz, and Christof Hartmann, eds. 2001. Elections in Asia and the Pacific: A Data Handbook. 2 vols. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
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  47. Contains detailed information on the evolution of electoral rules in Asia and the Pacific.
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  49. Nohlen, Dieter, Michael Krennerich, and Bernhard Thibaut, eds. 1999. Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
  50. DOI: 10.1093/0198296452.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  51. Contains detailed information on the evolution of electoral rules in Africa.
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  53. Nohlen, Dieter, and Philip Stöver, eds. 2010. Elections in Europe: A Data Handbook. Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos.
  54. DOI: 10.5771/9783845223414Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  55. Contains detailed information on the evolution of electoral rules in Europe.
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  57. PARLINE Database on National Parliaments.
  58. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  59. This database contains country-by-country information on legislative institutions, including legislative electoral systems, as well as detailed accounts of elections stretching back in many countries to the early 1970s. There are sometimes inaccuracies, but as a general source of information it is very helpful.
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  61. Journals
  62.  
  63. While no journal is concerned solely with PR systems, several specialize in the broader area of electoral politics. A range of general and regional journals also carry many articles that are relevant to anyone seeking to understand the origins and effects of PR.
  64.  
  65. Specialist Journals
  66.  
  67. Several journals—notably, Electoral Studies, Representation, and the Election Law Journal—concentrate on elections and electoral systems. A number of others—including Party Politics and the Journal of Elections, Public Opinion, and Parties—have a slightly wider focus.
  68.  
  69. Election Law Journal. 2002–.
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  71. This journal specializes in election law issues, overwhelmingly in the United States. Most contributions are from political science, but some also come from law.
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  73. Electoral Studies. 1982–.
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  75. This is a significant scholarly journal and publishes across the full spectrum of issues relating to elections and electoral systems.
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  77. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion, and Parties. 1991–.
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  79. This journal, which is the journal of the Elections, Public Opinion, and Parties section of the UK Political Studies Association, focuses mainly on public opinion and voting behavior. But it includes a sprinkling of articles on electoral institutions and their effects.
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  81. Party Politics. 1995–.
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  83. While the main focus of this journal is on the nature of political parties, it also carries a wide range of articles on representative democracy, including electoral institutions.
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  85. Representation. 1960–.
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  87. This has long been the journal of the McDougall Trust, a charity devoted to electoral research and linked to the UK’s Electoral Reform Society. It has, however, developed as an increasingly serious scholarly journal and was in 2012 adopted as the journal of the Representation and Electoral Systems section of the American Political Science Association.
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  89. General and Regional Journals
  90.  
  91. Beyond the specialist journals in the previous subsection, the general journals that most often contain articles relating to PR are Comparative Political Studies and the American Journal of Political Science, but the American Political Science Review, the Annual Review of Political Science, the British Journal of Political Science, Comparative Politics, the Journal of Democracy, and World Politics also frequently carry relevant articles. Much useful material also appears in regional journals, such as Latin American Politics and Society and West European Politics.
  92.  
  93. American Journal of Political Science. 1957–.
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  95. AJPS contains articles on all aspects of political science and publishes much of the most significant research into electoral politics.
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  97. American Political Science Review. 1906–.
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  99. The premier journal in political science, APSR frequently carries articles on all aspects of electoral politics. Only articles with broad comparative or theoretical implications are likely to be found here.
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  101. Annual Review of Political Science. 1998–.
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  103. Like other titles in the Annual Review series, this journal publishes review articles on specified topics, often very helpfully summing up the state of knowledge and pointing towards areas where important research remains to be done. Articles are written in a style accessible to students and non-specialists.
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  105. British Journal of Political Science. 1971–.
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  107. BJPS is the leading political science journal published outside the United States. Its content is similar to that of the leading American journals, with a strong focus on comparative, theoretical, or methodological insight.
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  109. Comparative Political Studies. 1968–.
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  111. CPS focuses particularly in the area of comparative politics. Articles here often have a more empirical motivation than in AJPS or APSR, though differences should not be exaggerated.
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  113. Comparative Politics. 1968–.
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  115. A greater proportion of articles in Comparative Politics than in Comparative Political Studies focus on Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia and on issues relating to democratization and new democracies rather than established democracies. Many articles pertain to elections and electoral systems.
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  117. Journal of Democracy. 1990–.
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  119. The Journal of Democracy focuses mainly on democratization and democratic development in new or weak democracies. It is less scholarly than the other journals listed here: articles are written to be accessible to students and practitioners and some are written by practitioners rather than political scientists.
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  121. Latin American Politics and Society. 1959–.
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  123. This and other Latin American regional journals carry many insights relating to the electoral institutions of this region.
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  125. West European Politics. 1978–.
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  127. WEP is the leading regional European politics journal. Again, it covers a great range of issues, including electoral politics.
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  129. World Politics. 1948–.
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  131. Though its cover describes World Politics as a “Journal of International Relations,” in fact it publishes much leading research in the area of comparative politics, including electoral politics.
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  133. Varieties
  134.  
  135. PR systems are traditionally divided into a number of types according to the mechanics through which they operate. There are two basic types—party list systems and the single transferable vote (STV)—as well as a number of additional possible variants. Much of the important variation among PR systems is not, however, captured by this traditional categorization: if we are interested in how proportional a PR system is, then the difference between list-based and STV systems is not very important. Rather, a number of other factors—most importantly the district magnitude—are key. The two subsections below address in turn these two ways of thinking about variety among PR systems.
  136.  
  137. Types of PR
  138.  
  139. The two basic types of PR, as noted above, are party list PR and STV. Party list systems are designed specifically to achieve partisan proportionality. Votes are added up across parties and a formula is used to translate vote shares into seat shares. There is great variety among list PR systems. The degree of proportionality varies according to factors such as the precise electoral formula used, the district magnitude, and whether a threshold is used to set a minimum vote share that a party must attain to win any seats (see the next subsection). There is also variation according to whether party lists are open (such that voters determine the order in which candidates are elected from each party’s list), closed (such that parties themselves decide this), or flexible (such that parties and voters both have some influence). The personalization of the system declines as we move from open through flexible to closed lists. The STV system is designed not specifically with partisan proportionality in mind, but rather with the goal of ensuring that voters’ preferences are reflected in the outcome, whether these preferences are structured by party ties or by any other criteria, such as candidates’ sociological characteristics or their positions on specific issues. Voters cast their ballots for candidates rather than party lists. STV systems thus occupy a position high on the scale of personalization. In addition to the basic types, multiple electoral systems are often combined within a single election. Such mixed systems combine a proportional system (all real-world examples use list systems) with a non-proportional system (most real-world examples use single-member plurality). In mixed-member proportional (MMP) systems, the two parts are linked such that the overall outcome is proportional. In mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) systems, the two parts are separate, and the overall outcome is only partially proportional. Reynolds, et al. 2005 sets out the various types of electoral system very clearly and also presents a global survey of where each system is used. Farrell 2011 provides further detailed discussion of each type, particularly in chapters 4–6 (pp. 64–152). Lakeman 1974 presents a spirited case for STV over list PR systems. Massicotte and Blais 1999 gave the first detailed analysis of mixed systems, while Shugart and Wattenberg 2001 developed the framework for analyzing mixed systems that is most commonly used today. Carey and Shugart 1995 offers the best-known categorization of electoral systems in terms of personalization. Some authors have suggested that the scope of the term “PR” as used here and in most of the literature is too narrow. Notably, Cox 1991 argues that one form of plurality rule—namely, the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system—can operate just as proportionally as do systems using proportional formulas, so long as the district magnitude is the same. While this may be true under some conditions, most scholars agree that it does not hold in general: Farrell 2011, for example, argues that such systems “are at most semi-proportional” (p. 42).
  140.  
  141. Carey, John M., and Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1995. “Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas.” Electoral Studies 14.4 (December): 417–439.
  142. DOI: 10.1016/0261-3794(94)00035-2Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  143. This article sets out the standard ordering of electoral systems according to degree of personalization. It does so by analyzing the incentives that candidates face to build their own personal following rather than relying on the following of their political party. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
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  145. Cox, Gary W. 1991. “SNTV and d’Hondt are ‘Equivalent.’” Electoral Studies 10.2 (June): 118–132.
  146. DOI: 10.1016/0261-3794(91)90043-RSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  147. Cox here argues that, at least under some plausible conditions, the outcomes produced by the plurality-based SNTV electoral system can be just as proportional as those produced (in districts of the same size) by the d’Hondt form of list PR. He uses this to highlight the importance of district magnitude in determining whether a system should be considered proportional. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
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  149. Farrell, David M. 2011. Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction. 2d ed. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
  150. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  151. This book runs through the main families of electoral systems, including list PR systems (pp. 64–92), mixed-member systems (pp. 93–118), and STV (pp. 119–152). It has become the standard introductory text on these matters.
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  153. Lakeman, Enid. How Democracies Vote: A Study of Electoral Systems. 4th ed. London: Faber and Faber, 1974.
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  155. Lakeman was for several decades one of the leading voices for electoral reform in the United Kingdom. Her work unabashedly sets out the case for STV over all other systems, but it does so with an analytical precision that still merits reading.
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  157. Massicotte, Louis, and André Blais. 1999. “Mixed Electoral Systems: A Conceptual and Empirical Survey.” Electoral Studies 18.3 (September): 341–366.
  158. DOI: 10.1016/S0261-3794(98)00063-8Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  159. Massicotte and Blais were among the first authors systematically to examine the nature of mixed electoral systems. They identified five key types. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
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  161. Reynolds, Andrew, Ben Reilly, and Andrew Ellis. 2005. Electoral System Design: The New International IDEA Handbook. Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
  162. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  163. This book classifies all electoral systems and also provides exhaustive information on the electoral systems used for national lower-house elections around the world.
  164. Find this resource:
  165. Shugart, Matthew Soberg, and Martin P. Wattenberg. 2001. “Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: A Definition and Typology.” In Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds? Edited by Matthew Soberg Shugart and Martin Wattenberg, 9–24. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
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  167. Most analyses of mixed electoral systems today focus on two main types: MMP and MMM. These types were defined and analyzed by Shugart and Wattenberg.
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  169. The Degree of Proportionality in PR Systems
  170.  
  171. Given that PR electoral systems are defined in terms of their proportionality—the degree to which they award seats to parties in proportion to the votes won by those parties—a key aspect of the analysis of PR systems concerns just how proportional they are. One aspect of the system that affects the degree of proportionality is the precise formula used for translating votes into seats: Gallagher 1990 analyzes these formulas and the underlying notions of proportionality that they embody in some detail. So long as some kind of proportional formula is used, however, the main determinant of the degree of proportionality is the district magnitude: the number of seats allocated within each electoral district. Even if a proportional formula is in theory applied, an election is not proportional if only one seat is allocated per district, but the greater the district magnitude is, the more closely can perfect proportionality be approximated. Other aspects of the electoral system—such as assembly size and whether there are thresholds on the share of the vote a party must obtain before winning seats—can also have important effects on proportionality. Rae 1967 presented the first detailed study of the importance of district magnitude. Taagepera and Shugart 1989 took this much further. Lijphart 1994 looked more broadly across a range of factors influencing proportionality.
  172.  
  173. Gallagher, Michael. 1990. “Proportionality, Disproportionality, and Electoral Systems.” Electoral Studies 10.1 (March): 33–51.
  174. DOI: 10.1016/0261-3794(91)90004-CSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  175. Gallagher here analyzes the different conceptions of proportionality embodied by different forms of PR and considers the various indices of proportionality that can best capture these. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
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  177. Lijphart, Arend. 1994. Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945–1990. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
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  179. Lijphart builds particularly on the work of Rae, identifying the key dimensions of variation among electoral systems in terms of proportionality and presenting detailed evidence on the effects of electoral systems across twenty-seven democracies.
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  181. Rae, Douglas W. 1967. The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.
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  183. Rae proposed that the simple distinction between proportional and majoritarian systems was inadequate. Rather, he identified three key dimensions of variation among electoral systems: ballot structure, district magnitude, and electoral formula.
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  185. Taagepera, Rein, and Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1989. Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.
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  187. Taagepera and Shugart’s groundbreaking study demonstrated the importance of district magnitude relative to other determinants of proportionality. They labeled it “the decisive factor” (p. 112).
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  189. Origins
  190.  
  191. The first steps in the design of proportional electoral systems occurred in the United States in the last years of the 18th century. What we would today call PR systems were first devised in Europe, however, over the second half of the 19th century, and it was not until 1899 that a PR system was first adopted (in Belgium) as the system to elect a national lower house. Today, PR systems are commonly used for electing legislative institutions throughout the world. Almost all of the new democracies created since the 1970s have chosen proportional (or, at least, partly proportional) electoral institutions. This section of the bibliography outlines the literature on this remarkable transformation in the world’s electoral systems. It contains four subsections. The first focuses on the invention of the main forms of PR, beginning in the late 18th century and continuing until the early years of the 20th century. The second subsection concentrates on the early adoptions of PR, first in Belgium and then in many other countries around the world. The third subsection looks at the politics around electoral system choice in the contemporary world, since 1945. The final subsection features on the particular characteristics of electoral system choice processes in the context of democratization.
  192.  
  193. The Invention of Proportional Electoral Systems
  194.  
  195. Elections of one form or another have taken place for millennia: see Colomer 2004 (pp. 13–53) for a broad overview of the development of electoral systems since ancient times. Proportional electoral systems emerged rather late in this history. Indeed, while ideas about proportional representation had some earlier precursors (see Balinski and Young 2001, p. 6), their detailed development began only towards the end of the 18th century. Even then, that development took place not in relation to the proportional allocation of seats to parties on the basis of the votes they had won, but rather to the proportional allocation of seats to states of the United States on the basis of population—that is, to the problem of fair “apportionment.” These debates are outlined in detail in Balinski and Young 2001. Concern about proportional representation as we normally think of it today—the proportional representation of political parties or communities of thought—first bore fruit several decades later: as political parties began to develop in their modern form, so too did concern over whether they received their fair shares of representation or not. Among modern forms of PR, it was the STV variety that began to emerge first. STV had roughly simultaneous and apparently independent origins in the United Kingdom and Denmark. The first steps in the UK occurred in the 1820s through the work of Thomas Hill. Thomas Hare took this process further in the 1850s (see Hare 1857 for a key early contribution to this development and Hart 1992 for a historian’s overview). Similar progress was made meanwhile in Denmark through the writings and actions of Carl Andrae, as outlined in Andrae 1926. The first recorded advocacy of a list-based PR system appears to have been by the American Thomas Gilpin in 1844 (see Hoag and Hallett 1926, pp. 457–464). Later in the 19th century and the early 20th century, successive European authors reinvented the basic idea of list PR as well as many of the allocation mechanisms that had previously been identified in the United States as solutions to the apportionment problem. They included Victor D’Hondt, Eduard Hagenbach-Bischoff, and André Sainte-Laguë. The most comprehensive account of these origins remains Hoag and Hallett 1926, though Carstairs 1980 also gives useful perspective.
  196.  
  197. Andrae, Poul. 1926. Andrae and His Invention, the Proportional Representation Method. Copenhagen: Andrae.
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  199. This book, by Carl Andrae’s son, sets out Andrae’s claim to be the inventor of the STV system. It contains much detail on the discussions and developments of the mid-19th century.
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  201. Balinski, Michel L., and H. Peyton Young. 2001. Fair Representation: Meeting the Ideal of One Man, One Vote. 2d ed. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
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  203. This book’s principal purpose is to judge the relative merits of the various systems of proportional apportionment that were devised in the United States in the late 18th century and the first half of the 19th century: most notably, the Hamilton, Jefferson, Adams, and Webster methods. In doing so, it provides a rich history of the debates of these times.
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  205. Carstairs, Andrew McLaren. 1980. A Short History of Electoral Systems in Western Europe. London: George Allen & Unwin.
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  207. While mainly concerned with the adoption of PR systems in European countries, this book also gives some brief insights regarding the invention of proportional systems during the 19th century.
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  209. Colomer, Josep M. 2004. “The Strategy and History of Electoral System Choice.” In Handbook of Electoral System Choice. By Josep M. Colomer, 3–78. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
  210. DOI: 10.1057/9780230522749Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  211. This chapter gives an overview of the history of electoral systems and electoral system choice, including the history of proportional systems.
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  213. Hare, Thomas. 1857. The Machinery of Representation. 2d ed. London: W. Maxwell.
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  215. In this pamphlet, Hare set out the basic form of what would later be known as the STV electoral system.
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  217. Hart, Jenifer. 1992. Proportional Representation: Critics of the British Electoral System, 1820–1945. Oxford: Clarendon.
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  219. This outlines the debates in the United Kingdom through which the STV form of PR emerged during the 19th century.
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  221. Hoag, Clarence Gilbert, and George Hervey Hallett Jr. 1926. Proportional Representation. New York: Macmillan.
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  223. Hoag and Hallett were leading advocates of PR in the United States. Chapter 9 of their classic work gives much information on the origins of the various forms of PR.
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  225. The Adoption of Proportional Systems, 1899–1945
  226.  
  227. Though a form of PR was used for a nationwide election in Denmark in 1856, the first enduring system of PR at the national level was adopted in Belgium in 1899. Over the ensuing decades (particularly in the immediate aftermath of World War I), most European democracies adopted proportional systems, as did several democracies in Latin America. The literature about this wave of PR adoptions was limited until around 2005, but a wealth of vigorous debate has developed since then. The first contribution to have a wide impact was Rokkan 1970: Rokkan identified two mechanisms underpinning the growth of PR in the early 20th century, relating to the need to accommodate multiple groups within diverse societies and the established parties’ need to respond to a rising threat from the left. Boix 1999 and Calvo 2009 test out Rokkan’s ideas through statistical analysis, while two more recent book-length studies—Ahmed 2012 and Pilon 2013—present deep historical narratives. Other authors take the debate in somewhat different directions. Blais, et al. 2005 finds evidence that democratic ideals were important. Cusack, et al. 2007 has set off lively debate about the importance of underlying socioeconomic structure; see Kreuzer 2010 for a critical response to this work. There is also a rich case literature on this subject. Among the volumes that usefully gather case studies of many individual countries are Carstairs 1980 and Colomer 2004.
  228.  
  229. Ahmed, Amel. 2012. Democracy and the Politics of Electoral System Choice: Engineering Electoral Dominance. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press.
  230. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139382137Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  231. Ahmed engages with the argument, made famous by Rokkan, that PR systems were adopted in response to a threat from the left. Using considerable historical analysis, she argues that what mattered was not just the size of the left, but also its durability and its ideology: a shift to PR was more likely where the left had deeper roots and more extremist views.
  232. Find this resource:
  233. Blais, André, Agnieszka Dobrzynska, and Indridi H. Indridason. 2005. “To Adopt or Not to Adopt Proportional Representation: The Politics of Institutional Choice.” British Journal of Political Science 35.1 (January): 182–190.
  234. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123405000098Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  235. The authors argue that the spread of democratic ideas was a crucial element in the story of the rise of proportional electoral systems in early-20th-century Europe. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  236. Find this resource:
  237. Boix, Carles. 1999. “Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies.” American Political Science Review 93.3 (September): 609–624.
  238. DOI: 10.2307/2585577Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  239. Building on the work of Rokkan, Boix identifies conditions under which the rise of new parties following mass enfranchisement did or did not lead to the adoption of proportional electoral systems. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  240. Find this resource:
  241. Calvo, Ernesto. 2009. “The Competitive Road to Proportional Representation: Partisan Biases and Electoral Regime Change under Increasing Party Competition.” World Politics 61.2 (April): 254–295.
  242. DOI: 10.1017/S0043887109000100Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  243. Calvo argues that many adoptions of PR in the early 20th century are explained not specifically by a socialist threat—which was weak in many cases—but by an increase in the number of parties following mass enfranchisement, which markedly increased partisan biases under existing majoritarian rules. Available online by subscription.
  244. Find this resource:
  245. Carstairs, Andrew McLaren. 1980. A Short History of Electoral Systems in Western Europe. London: George Allen & Unwin.
  246. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  247. This gives clear but entirely descriptive histories of electoral reforms in thirteen European democracies.
  248. Find this resource:
  249. Colomer, Josep M., ed. 2004. Handbook of Electoral System Choice. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
  250. DOI: 10.1057/9780230522749Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  251. Colomer’s introduction to this volume provides an overview and argues that politicians’ self-interested behavior towards the electoral system leads to a natural trend in the direction of more proportional systems. The book’s five subsequent parts cover the Americas, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia and the Pacific. Most parts contain an overview chapter followed by a set of country histories.
  252. Find this resource:
  253. Cusack, Thomas, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice. 2007. “Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Systems.” American Political Science Review 101.3 (August): 373–391.
  254. DOI: 10.1017/S0003055407070384Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  255. This widely discussed article argues that electoral systems have economic origins. Specifically, it argues that the adoption of proportional electoral rules was more likely in the early 20th century in countries with more organized, consensual economic structures. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  256. Find this resource:
  257. Kreuzer, Marcus. 2010. “Historical Knowledge and Quantitative Analysis: The Case of the Origins of Proportional Representation.” American Political Science Review 104.2 (May): 369–392.
  258. DOI: 10.1017/S0003055410000122Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  259. Kreuzer analyzes extensive historical materials in this article to argue that the analysis in Cusack, et al. 2007 does not withstand scrutiny. By contrast, his reanalysis of Boix 1999 is supportive. The article is followed in the same issue by responses by Cusack, et al. and by Boix. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  260. Find this resource:
  261. Pilon, Dennis. 2013. Wrestling with Democracy: Voting Systems as Politics in the Twentieth Century West. Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press.
  262. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  263. This book adopts a qualitative, historical approach to examine electoral reform processes throughout the 20th century. It argues that most literature on electoral reforms has viewed such episodes too ahistorically, detaching them from their political context. In particular, it contends that electoral reforms, including the early-20th-century shift to PR, have been strongly shaped by changes in the nature and position of the left.
  264. Find this resource:
  265. Rokkan, Stein. 1970. Electoral Systems. In Citizens, Elections, Parties: Approaches to the Comparative Study of the Processes of Development. By Stein Rokkan, with Angus Campbell, Per Torsvik, and Henry Valen, 147–168. Oslo, Norway: Universitetsforlaget.
  266. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  267. Building on earlier work by Karl Braunias, Rokkan posited that PR was adopted first as a means of accommodating minorities in heterogeneous societies, and second as a response to the rise of the left in the wake of mass enfranchisement. Revised from Stein Rokkan, “Electoral Systems,” in David Sills (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (n.p.: Crowell Collier and Macmillan, 1968), vol. 5, pp. 6–21.
  268. Find this resource:
  269. Contemporary Patterns of Electoral System Choice and Change
  270.  
  271. The literature on electoral reform has tended to divide between studies that concentrate on the widespread shift to PR in the early 20th century and studies taking their evidence from the postwar era, and in some cases only from the most recent years. Colomer 2004a provides a rare example of a study that bridges this divide. Some of the debates outlined in the Adoption of Proportional Systems, 1899–1945—particularly those stemming from the work of Cusack, et al. 2007 on the impact of socioeconomic structure—have not significantly penetrated the later period. A focus on self-interested politicians is, however, shared by both literatures: studies of electoral reform have commonly assumed that politicians are always in charge of the processes by which electoral systems are adopted and changed and that, when considering the electoral system, these politicians pursue their own party’s power interests. Two of the most important studies taking this approach are Benoit 2004 and Colomer 2004a. Remmer 2008 presents a similar analysis, drawing particularly on evidence from Latin America. Nevertheless, some more recent studies have contested the utility of this perspective, suggesting that other actors may often play important roles too. Katz’s article in Gallagher and Mitchell 2005 was an important stimulus to this debate. Studies such as Renwick 2010 and the articles by LeDuc, Norris, and Renwick in Hazan and Leyenaar 2011 have focused particularly on the roles that public opinion can play in pushing for electoral reforms. These studies explore the idea that popular dissatisfaction with established democratic practice increasingly gives politicians reason to pursue (or tolerate) reforms to electoral and other democratic institutions. Katz, meanwhile, again in Hazan and Leyenaar 2011 focuses on the role (or, at least, the potential role) of the courts. Rahat 2011 provides a helpful overview of all of these debates. Colomer 2004b contains numerous useful case histories.
  272.  
  273. Benoit, Kenneth. 2004. “Models of Electoral System Change.” Electoral Studies 23.3 (September): 363–389.
  274. DOI: 10.1016/S0261-3794(03)00020-9Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  275. Benoit offers the clearest statement of the hypothesis that electoral rules are determined by self-interested politicians. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  276. Find this resource:
  277. Colomer, Josep M. 2004a. “The Strategy and History of Electoral System Choice.” In Handbook of Electoral System Choice. By Josep M. Colomer, 3–78. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
  278. DOI: 10.1057/9780230522749Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  279. Colomer employs the assumption of self-interested politicians to posit a broad trend towards greater proportionality in electoral systems. He shows strong evidence that this trend does exist across the world taken as a whole.
  280. Find this resource:
  281. Colomer, Josep M., ed. 2004b. Handbook of Electoral System Choice. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
  282. DOI: 10.1057/9780230522749Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  283. This book contains numerous case study chapters from all parts of the globe outlining electoral reform debates and processes in recent times as well as in earlier periods.
  284. Find this resource:
  285. Gallagher, Michael, and Paul Mitchell, eds. 2005. The Politics of Electoral Systems. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
  286. DOI: 10.1093/0199257566.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  287. Most of the chapters in this volume are country studies that provide brief snapshots of the electoral system and the politics of electoral reform in each case. In addition, the chapter by Richard Katz (pp. 57–76) offers detailed discussion of the many mechanisms that may operate during processes of electoral reform, contesting the value of more parsimonious models.
  288. Find this resource:
  289. Hazan, Reuven, and Monique Leyenaar, eds. 2011. Special Issue: Understanding Electoral Reform. West European Politics 34.3 (May).
  290. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  291. This volume includes studies examining a range of aspects of electoral reform. Several articles (those of Lawrence LeDuc, Pippa Norris, and Alan Renwick) focus on the role of public opinion in electoral reforms, while Richard Katz examines the role of judges. Pilet and Bol examine the preferences of political parties.
  292. Find this resource:
  293. Rahat, Gideon. 2011. “The Politics of Electoral Reform: The State of Research.” Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties 21.4 (November): 523–543.
  294. DOI: 10.1080/17457289.2011.609618Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  295. This review article discusses three contemporary approaches to the study of electoral reform, which Rahat labels rational choice, historical-comparative, and institutional. It suggests that all bring insights, which it is useful to combine.
  296. Find this resource:
  297. Remmer, Karen L. 2008. “The Politics of Institutional Change: Electoral Reform in Latin America, 1978–2002.” Party Politics 14.1 (January): 5–30.
  298. DOI: 10.1177/1354068807083821Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  299. Remmer finds that electoral reforms in Latin America reflect the interests of the political parties in power. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  300. Find this resource:
  301. Renwick, Alan. 2010. The Politics of Electoral Reform: Changing the Rules of Democracy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press.
  302. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  303. This book examines electoral reforms across advanced democracies since 1945. While agreeing that new democracies overwhelmingly adopt proportional systems, it contests the view that there is a trend towards greater proportionality in existing democracies. It argues that powerful mechanisms work against those adduced by Colomer.
  304. Find this resource:
  305. Electoral System Choice during Democratic Transition
  306.  
  307. The literature cited in the subsections above relates mostly to electoral reforms in ongoing democratic contexts. The initial choice of electoral institutions in new democracies can have similar features—such as the prominent role of politicians who seek to promote their own power interests. But they also have some specific features of their own. One such feature is a frequently heightened level of uncertainty: politicians choosing electoral rules in new democracies often have little idea how well they can expect to do in the coming elections. Przeworski 1991 and Andrews and Jackman 2005 present theories of the effects that such uncertainty can be expected to have. A second feature is the nature of the democratic transition process and the incentives that this creates for the actors involved in electoral system design. Shugart 1998 focuses attention here. A third feature is the international context: international pressures are often more important in electoral reforms in new democracies than in established democracies. Hartmann 2007 charts the importance of colonial heritage for electoral system choice in Africa. These features can sometimes combine with a very unstable background situation to produce a process of electoral system choice that is little short of chaotic—as is illustrated by Reynolds 2006, a study of electoral reform in Afghanistan. Reilly 2006, meanwhile, surveys examples across Asia and the Pacific.
  308.  
  309. Andrews, Josephine T., and Robert W. Jackman. 2005. “Strategic Fools: Electoral Rule Choice under Extreme Uncertainty.” Electoral Studies 24.1 (March): 65–84.
  310. DOI: 10.1016/j.electstud.2004.03.002Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  311. The authors argue here that uncertainty has characterized electoral reforms during both post-communist transition in Eastern Europe and the democratization wave in early-20th-century Europe, and that this encourages the adoption of proportional systems. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  312. Find this resource:
  313. Hartmann, Christof. 2007. “Paths of Electoral Reform in Africa.” In Votes, Money and Violence: Political Parties and Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa. Edited by Matthias Basedau, Gero Erdmann, and Andreas Mehler, 144–167. Stockholm: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.
  314. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  315. This chapter presents a broad survey of electoral system choice during and since democratization in African countries. It particularly highlights the importance of colonial heritage in shaping the choices that were made during the initial democratization phase.
  316. Find this resource:
  317. Przeworski, Adam. 1991. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press.
  318. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139172493Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  319. This book is a classic in the literature on democratization, drawing together the insights of game theory and empirical evidence. Chapter 2, particularly pp. 79–88, presents an influential account of how different possible democratization scenarios yield different institutional choices.
  320. Find this resource:
  321. Reilly, Benjamin. 2006. Democracy and Diversity: Political Engineering in the Asia-Pacific. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
  322. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199286874.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  323. This book examines political reform processes across East and Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Chapter 5 (pp. 97–120) focuses on the electoral system.
  324. Find this resource:
  325. Reynolds, Andrew. 2006. “The Curious Case of Afghanistan.” Journal of Democracy 17.2 (April): 104–117.
  326. DOI: 10.1353/jod.2006.0036Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  327. Reynolds outlines the accidents and missteps that lead to the adoption of the SNTV electoral system for Afghanistan’s first democratic elections, in 2005. Available online by subscription.
  328. Find this resource:
  329. Shugart, Matthew Soberg. 1998. “The Inverse Relationship between Party Strength and Executive Strength: A Theory of Politicians’ Constitutional Choices.” British Journal of Political Science 28.1 (January): 1–29.
  330. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123498000088Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  331. Shugart focuses not on the translation of votes into seats, but on how politicians seek through their electoral system choices to maximize their share of the vote. Different electoral systems place differing levels of importance on politicians’ personal reputations or those of their parties. Politicians prefer systems that fit their reputational strengths. The article draws on evidence from Latin America and Eastern Europe. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  332. Find this resource:
  333. Effects
  334.  
  335. Political scientists have examined the effects of PR electoral arrangements upon a very wide range of aspects of politics and society. I do not attempt here to cover all of these literatures. Rather, I concentrate on eight areas in which research activity has been particularly intense. First, the largest literature by some margin has focused upon effects on the party system, particularly the number of parties with a significant role to play in the political system. This number has enormous repercussions for all aspects of politics, including whether governments are formed by coalitions or single parties, the durability of governments, and the accountability of governments to voters. Second, a related literature concerns the diversity of the party system: the degree to which competition focuses on the center ground or allows space for more extremist views. Third, one of the liveliest current debates concerns the nature of the congruence between voters’ wishes and political outcomes that different electoral systems provide. While proportional electoral institutions clearly provide a greater correspondence than do majoritarian systems between parties’ vote shares and their seat shares, that does not necessarily mean that actual power is spread proportionally or that proportional systems yield governments closer to voters’ preferences. Several literatures examine these connections in depth. Fourth, one of the key arguments in favor of proportional systems has long been that they foster better descriptive representation, particularly better representation of women. Much research has analyzed the strength of this relationship and the mechanisms underpinning it. Fifth, descriptive representation relates also to the representation of ethnic, linguistic, or religious minorities. Particularly in post-conflict settings, proportional systems have often been advocated as means of accommodating inter-group tensions. These claims have, however, been contested, giving rise to vigorous debate. Sixth, much concern has been expressed in recent years in many countries over declining electoral participation. Electoral institutions have been prominent among the factors posited as affecting turnout, and numerous cross-national studies have now been conducted. Seventh, the effects of PR have been analyzed in terms not only of the function of the political system, but also of the outputs of that system. In particular, are different electoral institutions associated with different economic outcomes? Studies have examined the effects of PR and other systems upon the size of the state, budget deficits, economic growth, trade openness, and other key economic indicators. Finally, several studies examine the links been electoral institutions and various forms of malpractice. Some studies have suggested that PR systems increase corruption, others that they reduce it, and still others that any net effects are marginal. The following subsections address each of these eight areas in turn.
  336.  
  337. The Number of Parties
  338.  
  339. The most direct effect of the proportionality of an electoral system is upon the party system: the proposition that the electoral system influences the number of parties that have an effective role to play in politics is one of the most widely discussed in political science. As noted above, the character of the party system, in turn, has multiple effects on the formation and character of governments and the nature of politics more widely. Discussions of the relationship between the electoral system and the party system almost always begin with the work of the French political scientist Maurice Duverger. This section therefore also begins with Duverger and other key contributions following in his footsteps. It then identifies studies that have sought to test Duverger’s propositions and have found them to be either deficient or supported. Finally, the section outlines what approaches a scholarly consensus that has emerged in recent years as to exactly what the relationship between the electoral system and the party system is.
  340.  
  341. Duverger and Other Key Contributions
  342.  
  343. The starting point for most studies of the impact of the electoral system upon the number of parties in a country’s party system is Duverger 1978, a classic study. Earlier authors had addressed that impact, but had not examined it in the same detail, and Duverger quickly became the standard point of reference. Duverger argued that plurality electoral systems promote the development and maintenance of two-party systems, while proportional electoral systems permit the existence of multiparty systems. These two propositions are commonly known, following Riker 1982, which analyzed the state of knowledge on them, as “Duverger’s Law” and “Duverger’s Hypothesis.” Duverger’s Law and Hypothesis have been subject to more analysis than almost any other proposition in comparative politics. Within a few years of the publication of Duverger’s work, another classic text, Downs 1957, examined the underlying logic of the mechanisms whereby plurality systems foster two-partism. The most important studies of the relationship between the electoral system and the party system that followed—Rae 1967, Riker 1982, Taagepera and Shugart 1989, and Lijphart 1994—all built upon the foundations that Duverger and Downs had laid. Finally, Cox 1997 deepened significantly our understanding of the mechanisms underpinning this relationship, developing a new theory of their microfoundations in voters’ and politicians’ behavior.
  344.  
  345. Cox, Gary W. 1997. Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World’s Electoral Systems. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press.
  346. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  347. Cox’s book offers what many regard as the best analysis of how electoral institutions shape party systems. His core concept—that of “strategic coordination”—focuses attention on how different electoral systems pose differing coordination problems to voters and politicians, with differing outcomes. The core finding, that the impact of electoral systems on the number of parties depends on social structure, is also reported in Amorim Neto and Cox 1997 (cited under the Interaction of the Electoral System and Social Structure).
  348. Find this resource:
  349. Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper & Row.
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  351. Downs developed the median voter theorem to posit that plurality electoral systems generate two-party systems, where competition focuses on the center ground of politics. This became a seminal contribution in understanding the microfoundations of the effects of electoral institutions.
  352. Find this resource:
  353. Duverger, Maurice. 1978. Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. London: Methuen.
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  355. Duverger argued that plurality electoral systems lead to two-partism, whereas proportional systems tend towards multipartism. He identified two mechanisms underpinning this: the mechanical effect (the automatic effect any given electoral system has on the translation of votes into seats) and the psychological effect (the effect that anticipation of the mechanical effect has upon voters and politicians who want to maximize the impact of their efforts). Originally published in 1954.
  356. Find this resource:
  357. Rae, Douglas W. 1967. The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.
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  359. Rae offered one of the first cross-national statistical studies of the effects of electoral system proportionality—particularly district magnitude—upon the proportionality of outcomes and the number of parties.
  360. Find this resource:
  361. Lijphart, Arend. 1994. Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945–1990. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
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  363. Lijphart presented detailed evidence on the effects of electoral systems upon party systems from twenty-seven democracies. In doing so, like Rae and Taagepera and Shugart before him, he emphasized the central importance of district magnitude in determining the degree of proportionality of the electoral system and therefore the degree to which the system permits the development of multipartism.
  364. Find this resource:
  365. Riker, William H. 1982. “The Two-Party System and Duverger’s Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science.” American Political Science Review 76.4 (December): 753–766.
  366. DOI: 10.2307/1962968Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  367. Riker restated and refined Duverger’s postulates (famously distinguishing between “Duverger’s Law” and “Duverger’s Hypothesis”—p. 754) and reviewed the literature that tested them. He concluded that this, at least, was an area in which political science had made true progress. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  368. Find this resource:
  369. Taagepera, Rein, and Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1989. Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press.
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  371. This celebrated study analyzes the mathematical regularities exhibited by electoral systems and the effects of electoral systems. The authors propose a “Generalized Duverger’s Rule” (p. 142), under which the number of parties varies with district magnitude.
  372. Find this resource:
  373. Criticisms of Duverger
  374.  
  375. There have always been some scholars who have criticized Duverger’s arguments. Some have argued that Duverger exaggerates the correlation between the electoral system and the party system: Leys 1959 argued that the nature of society mattered alongside the electoral system, while Shively 1970 found that evidence for Duverger’s psychological effect did not exist. Others question whether the correlation between the electoral system and the party system reflects a causal effect of the former upon the latter: rather, they suggest that the number of parties is shaped largely by external factors and that it is the party system that then shapes the electoral system. Grumm 1958 proposed this argument shortly after Duverger wrote, while Colomer 2005 has done so much more recently.
  376.  
  377. Colomer, Josep M. 2005. “It’s Parties that Choose Electoral Systems (or, Duverger’s Laws Upside Down).” Political Studies 53.1 (March): 1–21.
  378. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2005.00514.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  379. Colomer does not reject Duverger’s proposition that the electoral system affects the number of parties. But he argues that what matters more is the effect of the number of parties on the choice of electoral system. The primary determinants of the number of parties lie outside the electoral system; an electoral system that reinforces that will then typically be chosen. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  380. Find this resource:
  381. Grumm, John G. 1958. “Theories of Electoral Systems.” Midwest Journal of Political Science 2.4 (November): 357–376.
  382. DOI: 10.2307/2108721Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  383. Grumm argued that the evidence did not support the proposition that the electoral system influences the number of parties. Rather, he suggested, it is the number of parties that determines the choice of electoral system. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  384. Find this resource:
  385. Leys, Colin. 1959. “Models, Theories, and the Theory of Political Parties.” Political Studies 7.2: 127–146.
  386. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.1959.tb01896.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  387. This article contests both the logic underlying Duverger’s arguments and the empirical claim that there is indeed a clear link between the electoral system and the number of parties. It then develops an alternative model relating the number of parties to both the electoral system and the number of “bodies of political opinion” (p. 135) in society. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  388. Find this resource:
  389. Shively, W. Phillips. 1970. “The Elusive ‘Psychological Factor’: A Test for the Impact of Electoral Systems on Voters’ Behavior.” Comparative Politics 3.1 (October): 115–125.
  390. DOI: 10.2307/421504Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  391. Shively examined the responses of British and German voters to the closeness of the electoral contest in their district and concluded there was no evidence for Duverger’s psychological effect. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  392. Find this resource:
  393. Support for Duverger
  394.  
  395. Beyond the core innovations cited above under Duverger and Other Key Contributions, a number of studies have sought directly to test Duverger’s propositions and found support for them. Fisher 1973 provided an early such study offering data from just one country, whereas Blais and Carty 1991 engaged in more sophisticated analysis across twenty countries. Taagepera and Shugart 1993 gave further statistical evidence supporting the arguments in the authors’ earlier book, and also highlighted the importance of looking at the number of parties within each district as well as across a country as a whole.
  396.  
  397. Blais, André, and R. K. Carty. 1991. “The Psychological Impact of Electoral Laws: Measuring Duverger’s Elusive Factor.” British Journal of Political Science 21.1 (January): 79–93.
  398. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123400006037Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  399. Blais and Carty estimated the size of the mechanical and psychological effects through analysis of electoral data from twenty countries. They concluded that both are important factors shaping the number of parties. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  400. Find this resource:
  401. Fisher, Stephen L. 1973. “The Wasted Vote Thesis: West German Evidence.” Comparative Politics 5.2 (January): 293–299.
  402. DOI: 10.2307/421245Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  403. Fisher examined voting patterns in West Germany’s mixed electoral system and argued that there was evidence for the psychological effect posited by Duverger. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  404. Find this resource:
  405. Taagepera, Rein, and Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1993. “Predicting the Number of Parties: A Quantitative Model of Duverger’s Mechanical Effect.” American Political Science Review 87.2 (June): 455–464.
  406. DOI: 10.2307/2939053Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  407. This article tests hypotheses regarding the effects of district magnitude and assembly size on the number of parties at the district and national levels. It offers further support for the conclusion in Taagepera and Shugart 1989 (cited under Duverger and Other Key Contributions) that district magnitude has a powerful effect on the number of parties. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  408. Find this resource:
  409. The Interaction of the Electoral System and Social Structure
  410.  
  411. The general view emerging from much research has been that the electoral system has an important effect upon the number of parties, but that social structure matters too: a multiplicity of parties is more likely where there is a multiplicity of groups in society. Three important studies—Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1994, Amorim Neto and Cox 1997, and Clark and Golder 2006—have taken this insight further and argued that the electoral system and the social structure interact with each other in determining the number of parties. All three reach very similar conclusions based on different evidence and statistical techniques. Yet the consensus around these results is not complete. Stoll 2008 finds that the existence of the posited interaction effect depends on the measure of social diversity that is used. Moser and Scheiner 2012, building on Stoll’s work, finds that the effects of the electoral system and social diversity are additive rather than interactive and do not take entirely the expected form.
  412.  
  413. Amorim Neto, Octavio, and Gary W. Cox. 1997. “Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures, and the Number of Parties.” American Journal of Political Science 41.1 (January): 149–174.
  414. DOI: 10.2307/2111712Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  415. This article repeats the study by Ordeshook and Shvetsova using a larger dataset and some different variable specifications. It draws very similar conclusions regarding the interaction of the electoral system and the heterogeneity of society. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  416. Find this resource:
  417. Clark, William Roberts, and Matt Golder. 2006. “Rehabilitating Duverger’s Theory: Testing the Mechanical and Strategic Modifying Effects of Electoral Laws.” Comparative Political Studies 39.6 (August): 679–708.
  418. DOI: 10.1177/0010414005278420Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  419. Clark and Golder criticize the methods used by the previous studies and present a new statistical analysis. This draws conclusions very similar to those reached by Ordeshook and Shvetsova and by Amorim Neto and Cox. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  420. Find this resource:
  421. Moser, Robert G., and Ethan Scheiner. 2012. Electoral Systems and Political Context: How the Effects of Rules Vary Across New and Established Democracies. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press.
  422. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139178945Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  423. Moser and Scheiner find that the number of parties is higher under proportional rules irrespective of the level of heterogeneity of society. They also find that the number of parties rises at first with rising heterogeneity, but subsequently falls, as cross-group coalitions begin to build.
  424. Find this resource:
  425. Ordeshook, Peter C., and Olga V. Shvetsova. 1994. “Ethnic Heterogeneity, District Magnitude, and the Number of Parties.” American Journal of Political Science 38.1 (February): 100–123.
  426. DOI: 10.2307/2111337Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  427. Ordeshook and Shvetsova found that the electoral system and the heterogeneity of society interact in determining the number of parties. Where heterogeneity is low, the number of parties is likely to be low whatever the electoral system. But where heterogeneity is high, the electoral system has a crucial effect: more permissive systems (with higher district magnitudes) allow parties to multiply; less permissive systems do not. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  428. Find this resource:
  429. Stoll, Heather. 2008. “Social Cleavages and the Number of Parties: How the Measures You Choose Affect the Answers You Get.” Comparative Political Studies 41.11 (November): 1439–1465.
  430. DOI: 10.1177/0010414007305813Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  431. Stoll points out that social cleavages can be conceptualized and measured in many ways. She shows that different measures yield very different statistical results: some but far from all support the interactive model identified by the authors above. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  432. Find this resource:
  433. The Diversity of the Party System
  434.  
  435. One of the claims often made in popular discourse regarding electoral systems is that majoritarian systems lead to competition focused on the center ground of politics, while proportional systems permit representation for a greater diversity of views. This can be thought an advantage for majoritarianism—if extremism is feared—or for proportionality—if the complaint that politicians are “all the same” is more of a concern. A famous early statement of the dangers of extremism said to be posed by PR came from Hermens 1941, drawing on the experiences of interwar Europe. The standard scholarly reference point for analysis of the impact of electoral institutions on the location of parties in ideological space is, however, Downs 1957. Downs argued that plurality rules favor two-party systems with competition around the center ground of politics, whereas proportional rules could allow greater diversity. These conclusions are extended considerably by Cox 1990. Empirical studies of party system polarization under different electoral systems have tended to support the proposition that greater proportionality is associated with greater such polarization: Jackman and Volpert 1996 and Carter 2002 provide prominent examples. Ezrow 2010 somewhat qualifies this conclusion, finding strong centripetal pressures under PR too. Nevertheless, he agrees that “niche parties” away from the political center do better under proportional than majoritarian rules.
  436.  
  437. Carter, Elisabeth L. 2002. “Proportional Representation and the Fortunes of Right-Wing Extremist Parties.” West European Politics 25.3 (July): 125–146.
  438. DOI: 10.1080/713601617Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  439. Carter finds that extremist parties are more likely to win seats under proportional than majoritarian rules, but that they do not win more votes. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  440. Find this resource:
  441. Cox, Gary W. 1990. “Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems.” American Journal of Political Science 34.4 (November): 903–935.
  442. DOI: 10.2307/2111465Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  443. While downplaying the importance of the electoral formula, Cox analyzes the effects of a variety of electoral rules—including district magnitude—upon the tendency for centripetal or centrifugal patterns of competition. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  444. Find this resource:
  445. Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper & Row.
  446. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  447. Downs sets out the classic “median voter theorem” of the location of political parties in ideological space (chapter 8, pp. 114–141). He deals with the effects of plurality versus proportional electoral systems relatively briefly (pp. 122–125).
  448. Find this resource:
  449. Ezrow, Lawrence. 2010. Linking Citizens and Parties: How Electoral Systems Matter for Political Representation. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
  450. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199572526.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  451. Ezrow finds that centrist parties do better than non-centrist parties irrespective of the electoral system and that the rewards to centrism are no lower under proportional than non-proportional systems. He does, however, find that “niche parties” are encouraged to a greater degree under PR.
  452. Find this resource:
  453. Hermens, Ferdinand A. 1941. Democracy or Anarchy? A Study of Proportional Representation. Notre Dame, IN: Univ. of Notre Dame Press.
  454. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  455. Hermens argued vociferously that PR was a major contributor during the interwar years to the rise of Fascism in Italy and Nazism in Germany. The mechanisms through which he contended this occurred were several, including a multiplication and radicalization of political parties.
  456. Find this resource:
  457. Jackman, Robert W., and Karin Volpert. 1996. “Conditions Favouring Parties of the Extreme Right in Western Europe.” British Journal of Political Science 26.4 (October): 501–521.
  458. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123400007584Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  459. The authors find that a variety of factors shape support for extreme-right parties. Among these is the proportionality of the electoral system: greater proportionality enhances support for the extreme right. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  460. Find this resource:
  461. Congruence between Voters’ Views and Political Outcomes
  462.  
  463. While it is true almost by definition that proportional electoral systems ensure greater correspondence between parties’ vote shares and their shares of the seats in the legislature, that does not mean they guarantee a greater connection between what voters want and what governments actually do. Several literatures examine this issue further. One considers whether vote shares are reflected in parties’ shares of actual power. Another analyzes the degree of ideological congruence between voters and their representatives.
  464.  
  465. The Distribution of Power
  466.  
  467. Critics of proportional electoral systems often argue that, while they may lead to a fair translation of votes into seats, they can produce an unfair translation of votes into actual power. They can, it is said, allow the “tail to wag the dog”: that is, the small parties to act as king-makers, holding the larger parties to ransom. Scholarly research directly into this claim has been slight. The first significant contribution was that of Taylor and Lijphart 1985. Despite Lijphart’s general strong advocacy of PR, Taylor and Lijphart found that the record of proportional systems on this score was no better than that of the majoritarian alternatives. More recently, further evidence has been explored by Vowles 2004 and Blau 2008. Both look, like Taylor and Lijphart 1985, at parties’ possession of executive office, and both offer valuable conceptual as well as empirical advances.
  468.  
  469. Blau, Adrian. 2008. “The Effective Number of Parties at Four Scales: Votes, Seats, Legislative Power and Cabinet Power.” Party Politics 14.2 (March): 167–187.
  470. DOI: 10.1177/1354068807085888Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  471. Blau measures the effective number of parties in terms of votes and seats (as conventionally), but also in terms of power over legislation and power within the executive. He illustrates these through application to the United Kingdom and Germany. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  472. Find this resource:
  473. Taylor, Peter J., and Arend Lijphart. 1985. “Proportional Tenure vs Proportional Representation: Introducing a New Debate.” European Journal of Political Research 13.4 (December): 387–399.
  474. DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.1985.tb00134.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  475. This article posits that what matters most is the proportionality of representation in the executive, not in the legislature. It finds that neither proportional nor majoritarian electoral systems perform well on this score. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  476. Find this resource:
  477. Vowles, Jack. 2004. “Electoral Systems and Proportional Tenure of Government: Renewing the Debate.” British Journal of Political Science 34.1 (January): 166–179.
  478. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123403230398Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  479. Vowles reconsiders the conceptualizations of Taylor and Lijphart (1985) and analyzes fresh evidence. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  480. Find this resource:
  481. Ideological Congruence between Voters and Politicians
  482.  
  483. Building on the research on party system diversity outlined in the previous subsection, an important debate is ongoing about whether proportional systems lead to greater congruence between the ideological positions of voters and those of legislators and executives than non-proportional systems. The issue at stake in this debate is the degree to which the politicians in power pursue the policies that average voters want them to pursue. A consensus had begun to emerge, summed up in Powell 2006, that proportional systems do in fact produce greater congruence: the coalition governments typically produced by PR are generally located closer to the median voter than the single-party governments produced by majoritarian systems. McDonald and Budge 2005 broadly agrees with Powell’s findings. But Blais and Bodet 2006 and Golder and Stramski 2010 have challenged this conclusion, finding that proportional systems in fact perform no better than majoritarian systems. Powell 2009, Powell 2013, and Rohrschneider and Whitefield 2012 attempt to understand the apparent shift. They find that it reflects not an earlier misunderstanding in the literature, but rather a real-world change in how party systems operate.
  484.  
  485. Blais, André, and Marc André Bodet. 2006. “Does Proportional Representation Foster Greater Congruence between Citizens and Policy Makers?” Comparative Political Studies 39.10 (December): 1243–1262.
  486. DOI: 10.1177/0010414005284374Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  487. Using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project, Blais and Bodet find that PR has mutually canceling effects on ideological congruence, meaning that their net effect is “nil.”
  488. Find this resource:
  489. Golder, Matt, and Jacek Stramski. 2010. “Ideological Congruence and Electoral Institutions.” American Journal of Political Science 54.1 (January): 90–106.
  490. DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00420.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  491. Golder and Stramski argue that the effects of electoral institutions on the degree of ideological congruence between voters and their representatives depend on how we conceptualize the key variables. Using their own proposed measures, they find that proportional institutions lead to more representative legislatures, but not to more representative executives. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  492. Find this resource:
  493. McDonald, Michael D., and Ian Budge. 2005. Elections, Parties, Democracy: Conferring the Median Mandate. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
  494. DOI: 10.1093/0199286728.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  495. This book proposes that the crucial function of elections lies in ensuring congruence between the median voter and the median member of the legislature. It finds that, at any given point in time, proportional electoral systems are much better at this than non-proportional systems, but that, over time, the distortions under non-proportional systems tend to cancel each other out.
  496. Find this resource:
  497. Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. 2006. “Election Laws and Representative Governments: Beyond Votes and Seats.” British Journal of Political Science 36.2 (April): 291–315.
  498. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123406000160Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  499. This article helpfully sums up much of the literature as it existed at the time on how electoral systems affect the degree of ideological congruence or divergence between voters and their representatives. It finds that such representativeness is greater under proportional systems, both for legislatures and for executives. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  500. Find this resource:
  501. Powell, G. Bingham. 2009. “The Ideological Congruence Controversy: The Impact of Alternative Measures, Data, and Time Periods on the Effects of Electoral Rules.” Comparative Political Studies 42.12 (December): 1475–1497.
  502. DOI: 10.1177/0010414009332147Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  503. Powell here seeks to explain why several recent studies have drawn conclusions on ideological congruence different from his own previous results. He finds that the differences are due not to alternative measures or data, but to a substantive change over time: while ideological congruence was previously higher under PR than non-PR systems, that pattern has not been maintained in recent years. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  504. Find this resource:
  505. Powell, G. Bingham. 2013. “Representation in Context: Election Laws and Ideological Congruence between Citizens and Governments.” Perspectives on Politics 11.1 (March): 9–21.
  506. DOI: 10.1017/S1537592712003635Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  507. Powell pursues further here the changing patterns of ideological congruence, drawing to do so on data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project and the Comparative Manifestos project. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  508. Find this resource:
  509. Rohrschneider, Robert, and Stephen Whitefield. 2012. “Institutional Context and Representational Strain in Party–Voter Agreement in Western and Eastern Europe.” West European Politics 35.6 (November): 1320–1340.
  510. DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2012.713748Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  511. The authors posit that the declining effect of electoral institutions upon ideological congruence highlighted in Powell 2009 can be explained by dealignment and the rise in the number of independent voters clustered around the political center. They find that European evidence supports this interpretation. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  512. Find this resource:
  513. The Representation of Women
  514.  
  515. It has long been observed that women appear to achieve higher levels of representation under proportional than under non-proportional systems. Detailed literature examining this link began to emerge in the 1980s. More recently, the focus of research has tended to shift away from the proportional/majoritarian distinction towards gender quotas and aspects of the electoral system such as the degree of personal voting, which are not covered here. Nevertheless, the original proposition that proportionality has a strong effect remains important. Before the 1980s, research on this issue was rather primitive: an example of the state of our understanding is provided by Currell 1974. The first systematic comparative studies, demonstrating the impact of proportional rules upon women’s descriptive representation, were Rule 1981, Rule 1987, and Norris 1985. By the mid-1990s, scholars were able to take this basic association for granted. Matland and Studlar 1996 focused on improving our understanding of the mechanisms underpinning this association. Thames and Williams 2010 provides one of the most comprehensive recent statistical studies, drawing on data from fifty-seven countries. They find that greater proportionality (as measured by district magnitude) is associated with higher representation of women. But they take this for granted, treating it as a control variable: they focus mainly on the degree of electoral system personalization. A rich case literature also exists on these issues. One volume gathering together case studies from around the world and focusing specifically on the link between electoral systems and women’s representation is Tremblay 2008.
  516.  
  517. Currell, Melville E. 1974. Political Woman. London: Croom Helm.
  518. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  519. This book explores the role of women in (mostly) British politics in the first three quarters of the 20th century. In considering why there were so few women in Parliament, it briefly examines comparative evidence on the role of the electoral system, positing that list PR systems are best for women and “other minority groups” (p. 179).
  520. Find this resource:
  521. Matland, Richard E., and Donley E. Studlar. 1996. “The Contagion of Women Candidates in Single-Member District and Proportional Representation Electoral Systems: Canada and Norway.” Journal of Politics 58.3 (August): 707–733.
  522. DOI: 10.2307/2960439Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  523. These authors take the positive association between PR and women’s representation as given and seek to understand the mechanisms underlying it. Having reviewed the existing literature, they posit a “contagion” theory: if some, likely small, parties run women candidates, other parties tend to follow; this effect is stronger under proportional than majoritarian systems. The article tests this against evidence from Canada and Norway. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  524. Find this resource:
  525. Norris, Pippa. 1985. “Women’s Legislative Participation in Western Europe.” West European Politics 8.4 (October): 90–101.
  526. DOI: 10.1080/01402388508424556Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  527. Norris dichotomized electoral systems into list PR and others and found that women’s representation was higher in the former category. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  528. Find this resource:
  529. Rule, Wilma. 1981. “Why Women Don’t Run: The Critical Contextual Factors in Women’s Legislative Recruitment.” Western Political Quarterly 34.1 (March): 60–77.
  530. DOI: 10.2307/447890Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  531. Rule analyzed a large number of factors shaping levels of women’s presence in legislatures by comparing both across US state legislatures and across national legislatures. The latter analysis included the electoral system, and Rule found that non-proportional electoral systems were associated with fewer women legislators. Available online by subscription.
  532. Find this resource:
  533. Rule, Wilma. 1987. “Electoral Systems, Contextual Factors and Women’s Opportunity for Election to Parliament in Twenty-Three Democracies.” Western Political Quarterly 40.3 (September): 477–498.
  534. DOI: 10.2307/448386Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  535. Rule here presented further statistical analysis of the determinants of women’s presence in legislatures. She found women’s representation was higher where district magnitude was higher, particular under systems of list PR. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  536. Find this resource:
  537. Thames, Frank C., and Margaret S. Williams. 2010. “Incentives for Personal Votes and Women’s Representation in Legislatures.” Comparative Political Studies 43.12 (December): 1575–1600.
  538. DOI: 10.1177/0010414010374017Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  539. As many recent authors, Thames and Williams argue that proportionality is not the only feature of an electoral system that affects women’s representation: the degree to which the system encourages competition for personal votes matters too. They base their conclusions on statistical analysis of data from fifty-seven countries. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  540. Find this resource:
  541. Tremblay, Manon, ed. 2008. Women and Legislative Representation: Electoral Systems, Political Parties, and Sex Quotas. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
  542. DOI: 10.1057/9780230610378Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  543. This volume contains a series of case studies examining the impact of electoral systems on women’s representation. The country studies include cases from North America, Latin America, Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Pacific.
  544. Find this resource:
  545. Minority Representation and the Stability of Democracy
  546.  
  547. Concerns about minority representation have been strongest in deeply divided societies, where failure to accommodate diversity may threaten democracy. A major debate emerged in the 1980s and 1990s as to which electoral system was best suited to such societies. Many authors, led by Arend Lijphart (e.g., Lijphart 1977), advocated proportional institutions that would ensure fair representation for minority groups. Others, led by Donald Horowitz (e.g., Horowitz 1985), advocated the alternative vote system (also known as instant runoff voting), arguing that this would encourage candidates to build cross-community coalitions of support. The various chapters in Reynolds 2002 illustrate these conflicting viewpoints. Support for Horowitz comes, for example, from Reilly 2002. Most empirical studies, however, such as Norris 2008 and Huber 2012, have corroborated the arguments of Lijphart. While the problems with PR that Horowitz highlights are real, it has become apparent that his proposed solution is likely to work only in limited circumstances. Two countries have sought to implement his prescriptions: Fiji and Papua New Guinea. The former illustrates the weaknesses of the proposal—as shown by Fraenkel and Grofman 2006—while the latter, as suggested by Reilly 2002, exemplifies its strengths. Yet the strength of Lijphart’s case has been questioned too: the evidence presented by Selway and Templeman 2011 shows that the debate is still far from over.
  548.  
  549. Fraenkel, Jon, and Bernard Grofman. 2006. “Does the Alternative Vote Foster Moderation in Ethnically Divided Societies? The Case of Fiji.” Comparative Political Studies 39.5 (June): 623–651.
  550. DOI: 10.1177/0010414005285032Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  551. Fraenkel and Grofman use evidence from Fiji to explore the conditions under which the alternative vote does and does not foster inter-group accommodation. See also the response by Horowitz and the rejoinder by Fraenkel and Grofman in the same issue. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  552. Find this resource:
  553. Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press.
  554. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  555. Horowitz’s magisterial book on divided societies includes detailed discussion of electoral systems at pp. 628–651. The author sets out the various goals that might be pursued through electoral design in divided societies and argues that no single system is best for all contexts. He acknowledges that proportional as well as preferential institutions can be valuable.
  556. Find this resource:
  557. Huber, John D. 2012. “Measuring Ethnic Voting: Do Proportional Electoral Laws Politicize Ethnicity?” American Journal of Political Science 56.4 (October): 986–1001.
  558. DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2012.00601.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  559. Using data from forty-three countries, Huber finds that the “ethnicization” of electoral behavior is lower under PR systems, contrary to the concern that motivates Horowitz. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  560. Find this resource:
  561. Lijphart, Arend. 1977. “Majority Rule versus Democracy in Deeply Divided Societies.” Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies 4.2 (December): 113–126.
  562. DOI: 10.1080/02589347708704717Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  563. Lijphart has advocated PR as part of the wider set of institutions labeled “consociationalism” in many writings. This is an early, detailed, and clear exposition. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  564. Find this resource:
  565. Norris, Pippa. 2008. Driving Democracy: Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work? Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press.
  566. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511790614Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  567. This book examines consociationalism in the round. Chapter 5 (pp. 103–131) focuses on electoral systems, finding that PR is associated with higher levels of democracy than are non-PR systems, and that the difference is particularly marked in more heterogeneous societies.
  568. Find this resource:
  569. Reilly, Benjamin. 2002. “Electoral Systems for Divided Societies.” Journal of Democracy 13.2 (April): 156–170.
  570. DOI: 10.1353/jod.2002.0029Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  571. Reilly reiterates the case for preferential systems such as the alternative vote and draws on evidence from five cases around the world: Northern Ireland, Estonia, Australia, Fiji, and Papua New Guinea. Available online by subscription.
  572. Find this resource:
  573. Reynolds, Andrew, ed. 2002. The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
  574. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  575. This volume includes important essays by both Horowitz (pp. 15–36) and Lijphart (pp. 37–54), as well as by Pippa Norris (pp. 206–247) and Rein Taagepera (pp. 248–264), examining the principles, practice, and effects of electoral and broader constitutional design in divided societies. It also includes case study chapters on polities including Fiji and Northern Ireland.
  576. Find this resource:
  577. Selway, Joel, and Kharis Templeman. 2011. “The Myth of Consociationalism? Conflict Reduction in Divided Societies.” Comparative Political Studies 45.12 (December): 1542–1571.
  578. DOI: 10.1177/0010414011425341Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  579. Selway and Templeman analyze data from 101 countries and conclude that PR and other consociational institutions have no clear effect in reducing ethnic conflict. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  580. Find this resource:
  581. Electoral Turnout
  582.  
  583. The proportion of eligible voters who turn out at elections varies widely: between countries, between groups within countries, and within countries across time. A wide literature, usefully summed up by Blais 2006, has investigated many possible causes of this variation. Blais and Carty 1990 provided one of the first studies to focus specifically on the effects of electoral institutions and found that greater proportionality is associated with higher turnout. The large literature that has developed since then is reviewed by Blais and Aarts 2006 and by Geys 2006. Blais and Aarts 2006 finds that this literature remains inconclusive: while studies based on long-established democracies tend to find that greater proportionality increases turnout, those using evidence from Latin American and other newer democracies find no clear link, and there is no clear theory as to why turnout should be higher where proportionality is greater. Geys 2006, by contrast, concludes that the bulk of research points to a positive effect on turnout. Several more recent studies build on these findings to explore underlying causal mechanisms. Endersby and Krieckhaus 2008 finds that proportionality strongly affects turnout in full democracies but not in partial democracies and theorizes as to why that might be. Selb 2009, meanwhile, posits that lower turnout in majoritarian systems can be explained by the existence of safe seats where there is little incentive for voters to turn out. He finds that cross-national evidence supports this hypothesis. A final issue concerns whether changes in electoral systems lead to changes in turnout: if PR is associated with higher turnout, do shifts towards greater proportionality increase turnout? Bowler and Donovan 2013 surveys the available evidence.
  584.  
  585. Blais, André. 2006. “What Affects Voter Turnout?” Annual Review of Political Science 9: 111–125.
  586. DOI: 10.1146/annurev.polisci.9.070204.105121Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  587. Blais here gives a general overview of the literature on the determinants of turnout. There is a short section on the effects of the electoral system, but that is not the primary focus: institutional, socioeconomic, and party-political variables are all investigated. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  588. Find this resource:
  589. Blais, André, and R. K. Carty. 1990. “Does Proportional Representation Foster Voter Turnout?” European Journal of Political Research 18.2 (March): 167–181.
  590. DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.1990.tb00227.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  591. This article, reporting one of the earliest large-scale studies of the issue, found that turnout was significantly higher under proportional than under majoritarian systems. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  592. Find this resource:
  593. Blais, André, and Kees Aarts. 2006. “Electoral Systems and Turnout.” Acta Politica 41.2 (July): 180–196.
  594. DOI: 10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500148Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  595. The authors here survey theories as to why greater proportionality might or might not lead to higher turnout and evidence on what relationship in fact exists. They contend that both theory and evidence remain inconclusive.
  596. Find this resource:
  597. Bowler, Shaun, and Todd Donovan. 2013. The Limits of Electoral Reform. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
  598. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695409.001.0001Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  599. Bowler and Donovan analyze reforms to a range of electoral institutions, assessing whether these reforms generate the positive effects that their supporters predict. Chapter 4 (pp. 64–79) focuses on the electoral system as understood here and pays particular attention to effects upon turnout. The authors find little evidence of any effect.
  600. Find this resource:
  601. Endersby, James W., and Jonathan T. Krieckhaus. 2008. “Turnout around the Globe: The Influence of Electoral Institutions on National Voter Participation, 1972–2000.” Electoral Studies 27.4 (December): 601–610.
  602. DOI: 10.1016/j.electstud.2008.05.004Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  603. Endersby and Krieckhaus find a strong positive effect of electoral system proportionality upon turnout in full democracies, but not in partial democracies. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  604. Find this resource:
  605. Geys, Benny. 2006. “Explaining Voter Turnout: A Review of Aggregate-Level Research.” Electoral Studies 25.4 (December): 637–663.
  606. DOI: 10.1016/j.electstud.2005.09.002Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  607. This meta-analysis of eighty-three studies of the determinants of voter turnout finds that most identify a positive relationship between turnout and the proportionality of the electoral system. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  608. Find this resource:
  609. Selb, Peter. 2009. “A Deeper Look at the Proportionality–Turnout Nexus.” Comparative Political Studies 42.4 (April): 527–548.
  610. DOI: 10.1177/0010414008327427Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  611. This article assesses alternative accounts of the causal mechanisms underpinning the relationship between electoral institutions and proportionality. It posits specifically that the presence of safe seats in majoritarian systems depresses turnout. It finds that analysis of district-level data from thirty-one elections in twenty countries supports this hypothesis. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  612. Find this resource:
  613. Economic Effects
  614.  
  615. Electoral institutions clearly have effects within the political system on such aspects as who is represented and who participates in elections. Whether electoral institutions also have effects beyond the political system, notably upon economic outcomes, has been rather harder to establish. A series of studies have over recent years explored a range of possible outcomes. Persson and Tabellini 2006 surveys much of this literature. The greatest debate has focused on the relationship between electoral institutions and government spending. Other literatures have examined other possible economic effects.
  616.  
  617. Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 2006. “Electoral Systems and Economic Policy.” In The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. Edited by Barry R. Weingast and Donald A. Wittman, 723–738. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press.
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  619. This chapter provides a useful overview of recent writings on the economic effects of electoral institutions.
  620. Find this resource:
  621. Government Spending
  622.  
  623. The most influential contribution to the debate about the relationship between the electoral system and government spending has been Persson and Tabellini 2005. The central finding of this book is that PR systems are associated with higher government spending and higher budget deficits, which the authors interpret as a mark against the use of proportional systems. Milesi-Ferretti, et al. 2002 and Blume, et al. 2009 reach similar conclusions. Iversen and Soskice 2006 explores the mechanisms that might underpin this relationship by developing and testing a model focusing on who is more likely to win executive office under different electoral rules. Several other authors, however, have obtained different results: Béjar and Mukherjee 2011 finds that the volatility of government spending is lower under PR, while Blais, et al. 2010 finds that PR tends to preserve the status quo, whatever that status quo may be.
  624.  
  625. Béjar, Sergio, and Bumba Mukherjee. 2011. “Electoral Institutions and Growth Volatility: Theory and Evidence.” International Political Science Review 32.4 (September): 458–479.
  626. DOI: 10.1177/0192512110385299Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  627. The authors posit that PR systems lead to lower volatility in government spending and therefore also in economic growth rates than do majoritarian systems. The evidence supports this hypothesis. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  628. Find this resource:
  629. Blais, André, Jiyoon Kim, and Martial Foucault. 2010. “Public Spending, Public Deficits, and Government Coalitions.” Political Studies 58.5 (December): 829–846.
  630. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2010.00842.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  631. Studies that posit higher government spending under PR assume that the benefits of spending are more concentrated than the costs, and that multiple parties in coalition governments tend to push for increased spending. This article finds, however, that an alternative logic holds: that coalition governments, with more veto players, find it harder to change the status quo. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  632. Find this resource:
  633. Blume, Lorenz, Jens Müller, Stefan Voigt, and Carsten Wolf. 2009. “The Economic Effects of Constitutions: Replicating—and Extending—Persson and Tabellini.” Public Choice 139.1–2 (April): 197–225.
  634. DOI: 10.1007/s11127-008-9389-4Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  635. The authors summarize and then replicate Persson and Tabellini’s study, largely confirming the conclusions with respect to electoral systems. They again find that PR systems are associated with higher government spending. They find that PR is also associated with higher output per worker, though here what they call the details of the electoral system also matter. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  636. Find this resource:
  637. Iversen, Torben, and David Soskice. 2006. “Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More than Others.” American Political Science Review 100.2 (May): 165–181.
  638. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  639. Iversen and Soskice develop a model under which they expect center-left parties to dominate government under PR, while center-right parties should dominate under majoritarian systems. Government redistributive spending should therefore be higher in the former than in the latter. They test the latter proposition using data from fourteen countries and find that it is supported. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  640. Find this resource:
  641. Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria, Roberto Perotti, and Massimo Rostagno. 2002. “Electoral Systems and Public Spending.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117.2 (May): 609–657.
  642. DOI: 10.1162/003355302753650346Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  643. Using economic modeling, the authors posit that government transfer spending (i.e., redistributive payments to households) should be higher under proportional than under majoritarian systems. They find that evidence from OECD countries supports this, while evidence from Latin America is much weaker. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  644. Find this resource:
  645. Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 2005. The Economic Effects of Constitutions. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  646. Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  647. This seminal study examines the economic effects of electoral systems (whether proportional or majoritarian) and forms of government (whether parliamentary or presidential). It finds that PR systems are associated with somewhat higher overall government spending, higher welfare spending, and higher budget deficits, but that there is no clear relationship with levels of productivity, rent extraction, or adjustment to shocks.
  648. Find this resource:
  649. Other Economic Effects
  650.  
  651. One of the earliest studies of the economic effects of electoral (and other political) institutions—Rogowski 1987—took trade policy as its dependent variable. This connection has been pursued further in more recent years by Nielson 2003. Finally, surprisingly few prominent studies have looked directly at the relationship between proportionality and economic growth. Knutsen 2011 does, however, provide a noteworthy exception.
  652.  
  653. Knutsen, Carl Henrik. 2011. “Which Democracies Prosper? Electoral Rules, Form of Government and Economic Growth.” Electoral Studies 30.1 (March): 83–90.
  654. DOI: 10.1016/j.electstud.2010.09.006Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  655. This study finds a strong and robust positive effect of proportional electoral institutions upon economic growth. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  656. Find this resource:
  657. Nielson, Daniel L. 2003. “Supplying Trade Reform: Political Institutions and Liberalization in Middle-Income Presidential Democracies.” American Journal of Political Science 47.3 (July): 470–491.
  658. DOI: 10.1111/1540-5907.00034Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  659. Nielson concentrates mostly on the personalization of the electoral system, hypothesizing that greater personalization increases susceptibility to protectionism. He also explores the impact of proportionality measured in terms of district magnitude. The hypotheses are tested through data from eighteen developing countries. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  660. Find this resource:
  661. Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. “Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions.” International Organization 41.2 (Spring): 203–223.
  662. DOI: 10.1017/S0020818300027442Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  663. Rogowski argues that an open trade regime can be sustained only through insulation of decision-makers from demands for protectionism and pork and through policy stability. He argues that all of these requisites are promoted by PR with closed lists and large districts. He draws evidence from the then-twenty-four OECD states. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  664. Find this resource:
  665. Corruption and Electoral Malpractice
  666.  
  667. Several of the largest electoral reforms of the late 20th century—notably in Italy and Japan—were motivated in significant part by the perception that existing electoral institutions were contributing to corruption and that new electoral rules would therefore help stamp that corruption out. Political scientists have found it difficult to agree, however, about which rules are best at constraining corrupt behavior. Birch 2007 finds cross-national support for the straightforward proposition that electoral malpractice is higher the smaller is the electoral district. Chang and Golden 2007, however, concludes that district magnitude interacts with the openness of party lists in generating its effects: Birch’s pattern, the authors find, holds in closed-list systems, but the opposite is true in open-list systems. Persson and Tabellini 2003, meanwhile, finds that electoral institutions generate multiple, counteracting effects, and that any net effect of the electoral system upon corruption levels is therefore very limited. Nyblade and Reed 2008 helps to clear some of the fog by pointing out that corruption comes in different forms, which they label “cheating” and “looting.” The same electoral institutions may create incentives in favor of one of these but against the other.
  668.  
  669. Birch, Sarah. 2007. “Electoral Systems and Electoral Misconduct.” Comparative Political Studies 40.12 (December): 1533–1556.
  670. DOI: 10.1177/0010414006292886Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  671. Birch focuses on electoral malpractice. She posits that politicians’ incentive structures mean such malpractice is likely to be higher under single-member district systems than under list systems. She tests this against data from twenty-four post-communist countries. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  672. Find this resource:
  673. Chang, Eric C. C., and Miriam A. Golden. 2007. “Electoral Systems, District Magnitude, and Corruption.” British Journal of Political Science 37.1 (January): 115–137.
  674. DOI: 10.1017/S0007123407000063Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  675. Chang and Golden posit, based on the literature on personal reputation-building, that election candidates have greater incentives to engage in corrupt activities as district magnitude rises in open-list systems, but as district magnitude falls in closed-list systems. They find that the evidence supports this hypothesis. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  676. Find this resource:
  677. Nyblade, Benjamin, and Steven R. Reed. 2008. “Who Cheats? Who Loots? Political Competition and Corruption in Japan, 1947–1993.” American Journal of Political Science 52.4 (October): 926–941.
  678. DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00351.xSave Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  679. Nyblade and Reed distinguish two forms of corruption: cheating (manipulating elections in order to win office) and looting (extracting private benefits from the office one holds). They argue that the electoral circumstances generating these are quite different. They support their argument with evidence from Japan. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  680. Find this resource:
  681. Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 2003. “Electoral Rules and Corruption.” Journal of the European Economic Association 1.4 (June): 958–989.
  682. DOI: 10.1162/154247603322493203Save Citation »Export Citation »E-mail Citation »
  683. Persson and Tabellini find that different aspects of electoral institutions have countervailing effects, such that, overall, the proportionality of electoral systems has little effect upon levels of corruption. Available online for purchase or by subscription.
  684. Find this resource:
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