Lee Kuan Yew notes

Review: Lee Kuan Yew's From Third World to First

Outline:

GOING IT ALONE

> "The threat from racial fanatics was unpredictable, unlike that from the communists who were rational and calculating and would see no benefit in going for Choo or our children." (5)

> Unemployment was alarming at 14 percent and rising. (7)

> "When things got bad, even the skeptical Chinese-speaking left-leaning types saw us, a group of bourgeois English-educated leaders, stand up for them and defend their interests." (7-8)

> "Although divided into several races, I believed a fair and even-handed policy would get them to live peacefully together, especially if such hardships as unemployment were shared equally and not carried mainly by the minority groups." (8)

1965: "Do not worry about Singapore. My colleagus and I are sane, rational people even in our moments of anguish. We weigh all possible consequences before we make any move on the political chessboard.... Out people have the will to fight and the stuff that makes for survival." (8)

BUILDING AN ARMY FROM SCRATCH

> When [minister of defense Keng Swee] learned to his astonishment that 80 percent of recent recruits to all units were Malays, [he] had given instructions that all recruitment and training should cease and the position be frozen. The army commander misinterpreted this and, on his own initiative, had instructed the Chinese major to discharge all Malay recruits. The major assembled everyone in the parade square, asked the non-Malays to fall out, and told the Malays tha tthey were dismissed. For a few minutes, the Malays were dumbfounded at this discrimination. When they recovered from the shock, bedlam broke out as thy attacked the non-Malays with poles, sticks, and auerated water bottles; burnt two motorcycles; damaged a scooter; and overturned a van. ...The Singapore police and army were still nearly all Malays who would sympathize with the rioters.

> I told [Keng Swee] that I intended to go... sort the problem out myself. ...I said the major had misundrestood his orders, which were to take on only Singapore citizens... Malays who were Singapore citizens were eligible. Ten of them identified as ringleaders of the riots would be detained and charged by the police, but the rest could go home. ...I added that all those who were Singapore citizens had to report back to camp the following day for normal training. ...I hoped they would behave themselves because of the prospect of jobs.

> At a press briefing, I asked the reporters to report the matter tactfully, especially in the Malay paper. ...Fourteen men were charged with rioting but the attorney general later decided that it was best to withdraw the charges. This was a sharp reminder to the government that we had to deal with matters of race with the utmost sensitivity. [12-13]

Israel covertly helped build Singapore military.

> We had to reorientate people's minds to accept the need for a people's army and overcome their traditional dislike for soldiering. Every Chinese parent knew the saying 好汉不当兵，好爹不打钉 (a good lad does not become a soldier, good steel does not become nails). We set up national cadet corps and national police cadet corps in all secondary schools so that parents would identify the army and police with their sons and daughters. We wanted the people to regard our soldiers as their protectors--a reversal from the days when army and police uniforms aroused fear and resentment as symbols of colonial coercion. ...Only if we changed people's thinking and attitudes could we raise a large citizen army like Switzerland's or Israel's. We gave ourselves a decade to accomplish this. (18)

> I proposed a small standing army plus the capacity to mobilize the whole civilian population who should be trained and put into reserves. ...I did not want money spent on the recurrent costs of a large army: It was better spent on the infrastructure we needed to raise and train national service battalions. ...The best deterrent to any Malaysian plan to regain control over Singapore was their knowledge that even if they could subdue our armed forces, they would have to keep down a whole people well trained in the use of arms and explosives. (19)

> To counter the traditional prejudice against soldiery, we held send-off ceremonies for the recruits from community centers in every constituency. (20)

Crash program, huge time crunch.

In 1969, after race riots in Malaysia, anger and riots rose in Singapore:

> I was determined to make it clear to all, in particular the Chinese, now the majority, that the government would enforce the law impartially regardless of race or religion. (22)

Examining army make-up in wake of race riots:

> George Bogaars, then [defense secretary]... had learned to distrust the Chinese-educated because nearly all communists were Chinese-educated. He preferred Malays when recruiting noncommissioned officers and warrant officers for the SAF to train our national servicemen, believing the Chinese-educated were prone to Chinese chauvinism and communism. This bias had to be redressed, a sensitive task that we entrusted to a team headed by Bogaars (23).

> By 1971, we had 17 national service battalions (16,000 men), with 14 battalions (11,000 men) in the reserves. (24)

> The Israelis helped us plan our naval buildup and the New Zealanders trained our sailors for our fast patrol boats. ...The Israelis insisted from the very start that our officers learn from them and take over as instructors as soon as possible.

There was tension between Singapore muslims and Israeli help over issues such as an Israeli embassy in Singapore and a vote to condemn Israel. Eventually allowed Israel a trade representative office, then an embassy, after Muslims in Singapore were accustomed to Israeli presence (26)

Singapore sent "some of [their] ablest students" to respected overseas universities, fully paid, with an eight-year service obligation after graduation. "Without a yearly intake of about 10 of our best students, the SAF would have the military hardware but without the brainpower to use them to best advantage." (27-28)

BRITAIN PULLS OUT

> We badly needed the confidence British forces generated. If they were to leave suddenly before we had any capacity to defend ourselves, I did not think we could survive. Their presence gave people a sense of security (32)

From Brit Harold Wilson, Labour Party meeting in June 1966: "Lee Kuan Yew, as good a left-wing and democratic socialist as any in this room, certainly wants us to stay there." (34)

> British military regulations required them to destroy surplus military equipment, but [defense secretary Denis Healey] agreed to revise the regulations so that such equipment could be handed over to Singapore for training and other uses. He and his team bent over backward to help. (37)

> The days of the white man's control of Asia had passed. Instead, some Asians insisted upon Asian solutions to Asian problems so that the big Asian countries could settle their problems with the smaller ones. The smaller ones had the right to ask their friends from the West to help redress the balance (37)

On the Vietnam war, at a Labour Party annual conference:

> Since I could not ignore the subject, I said, "I do not want to sound like a hawk or a dove. If I have to choose a metaphor from the aviary, I would like to think of the owl. Anyone looking at what is happening in Vietnam must have baleful eyes. It need never have been thus. And perhaps it was not the wisest place, nor the safest ground in Asia to have made a stand. But enormous sacrifices have already been expended and in blood, both Vietnamese and American." For that anti-Vietnam audience this was the furthest I could go to hint that if the Americans pulled out, there would be severe repercussions for the rest of Southeast Asia. (39)

When Brits pulled out of Singapore earlier than expected, LKY had several conversations with British officials resulting in a nine-month withdrawal delay. "I was able to put across a reasoned, not an angry, case. I tugged at the heartstrings of the British people, that our long and fruitful association should not end in an unseemly way which would damage Singapore's future." ...I saw no point in venting my spleen. ...I needed goodwill and cooperation from the British to execute the withdrawal with the minimum of friction and the maximum of goodwill, and not have military workshops stripped bare as had happened in Guinea when the French left in the 1960s (43)

When Australia was preparing to leave with the British: "I stressed to [Australia's external affairs minister] that it was necessary to make clear to everyone that it was not the intention of the Western allies to leave a vacuum in the area after 1971, which could be filled by either Russia or China or anybody else. ...I assured him that we regarded any attack on Malaysia as a threat to Singapore, but I encouraged him to make it clear to the Malaysians that any bilateral agreement with Australia that excluded Singapore was simply not on." (45)

(On Malaysia) "Wherever we can agree, we work together. If we cannot agree, well, we wait a while." (45)

SURVIVING WITHOUT A HINTERLAND

> In 1965, a few months after independence, an economic plannet whom the Indian government had seconded to us presented me with a thick volume of his report. I scanned the summary to confirm that his plans were based on a common market with Malaysia. I thanked him, and never read it again. (49)

In 1961, [Dutch economic advisor Dr. Albert Winsemius]... laid two preconditions for Singapore's success: first, to eliminate the communists who made any economic progress impossible; second, not to remove the statue of Stamford Raffles. To tell me in 1961, when the communist united front was at the height of its power and pulverizing the [PAP](%LINK) government day after day, that I should eliminate the communists left me speechless. ...To keep Raffles' statue was easy. My colleagues and I had no desire to rewrite the past and perpetuate ourselves by renaming streets or buildings or putting our faces on postage stamps or currency notes. ...Letting [the statue] remain would be a symbol of public acceptance of the British heritage and could have a positive effect. I had not looked at it that way, but was quite happy to leave this monument because he was the founder of modern Singapore. If Raffles had not come here in 1819 to establish a trading post, my great grandfather would not have migrated to Singapore. (50)

Singapore's "merlion" was created for tourism.

They concentrated on getting factories started. "Despite our small domestic market of 2 million, we protected locally assembled cars, refrigerators, air conditioners, radios, television sets, and tape-recorders, in the hope that they would later be partly manufactured locally. (51)

>Healey [British defense secretary] in 1967 had promised "significant aid" to offset the loss from the rundown of British forces. I was convinced our people must never have an aid-dependent mentality. If we were to succeed we had to depend on ourselves. ...Assistance should provide Singapore with jobs through industries and not make us dependent on perpetual injections of aid. I warned our workers, "The world does not owe us a living. We cannot live by the begging bowl." (53)

> In January 1968: "If we were a soft society then we would already have perished. A soft people will vote for those who promised a soft way out, when in truth there is none. There is nothing Singapore gets for free, even our water we pay for." (53)

> I told the newly arrived British high commissioner... in February 1968 that Singapore would accept whatever his government gave, but would not press them. (54)

Military facilities were converted to civilian use. My favorite: "Blakang Mati (behind death), an island off Singapore's harbor housing a British Gurkha battalion, became 'Sentosa' (tranquillity), a tourist resort." (54)

He took a sabbatical in autumn 1968 to visit Harvard:

> [Harvard Business School professor Ray Vernon] dispelled my previous belief that industries changed gradually and seldom moved from an advanced country to a less-advanced one. [It was possible], provided their people were disciplined and trained to work the machines, and there was a stable and efficient government to facilitate the process for foreign entrepreneurs (56)

First official visit to America in October 1967, he talked to business people at a luncheon: "[Singapore's] philosophy was to provide good and services 'cheaper and better than anyone else, or perish.' They responded well because I was not putting my hand out for aid, which they had come to expect of leaders from newly independent countries. I noted their favorable reaction to my 'no begging bowl' approach." (56)

Each time he visited America, he would meet "20 to 50 executives", "painting a silver lining on somber clouds" and "answer[ing] their difficult questions frankly and directly."

> "Since our neighbors were out to reduce their ties with us, we had to link up with the developed world--America, Europe, and Japan--and attract their manufacturers to produce in Singapore." (57)

> The first part [of my development strategy] was to leapfrog the region. (57)

> The accepted wisdom of development economists at the time was that MNCs were exploiters of cheap land, labor, and raw materials. ...Third World leaders believed this theory of neocolonialist exploitation, but Keng Swee and I were not impressed. We had a real-life problem to solve and could not afford to be conscribed by any theory or dogma. (58)

> The second part of my strategy was to create a First World oasis in a Third World region. ...This meant we had to train our people and equip them to provide First World standards of service. I believed this was possible, that we could reeducate and reorientate our people with the help of schools, trade unions, community centers, and social organizations. If the communists in China could eradicate all flies and sparrows, surely we could get our people to change their Third World habits. (58)

They created a one-stop agency for economics, the Economic Development Board (EDB), per Winsemius's advice. "Hon Sui Sen was picked by Keng Swee as the first chairman of the EDB and given the choice of the brightest and best of our scholars who had returned from [overseas universities]... Sui Sen, a quiet, outstanding administrator with an amazing ability to get the best out of those who worked for him... shaped the culture of the EDB. He made the EDB so successful and large that he had to break off different componens of the organization." (59)

> It was hard legwork for our young EDB officers to interest foreign investors in the opportunities in Singapore, to persuade them to send missions here to see for themselves. ...EDB officers would sometimes call on 40 to 50 companies before getting one to visit Singapore. They worked with inexhaustible energy because they felt the survival of Singapore depended upon them. (59)

Winsemius was critical as economic advisor, serving until 1984.

> The top executives of the MNCs soon appreciated the value of his role and spoke freely to him of their problems: overregulation by the government, the rising value of the Singapore dollar, too much job-hopping, too restrictive a policy on employing foreign workers, and so on. Winsemius had a pragmatic, hands-on approach, a good head for figures, and a knack for getting to grips with the basic issues, ignoring the mass of details. ...It was Singapore's good fortune that he enjoyed working with us. (61)

Pioneer certificate program: tax-free status for up to five years (ten after 1975)

> As finance minister, Keng Swee used to attend the foundation-laying ceremony and later the official opening of the factory, to create two occasions for publicity over one factory. He did this even for the smallest factory employing a mere handful of workers, like the one making mothballs. (61)

> [After Texas Instruments set up a plant to assemble semiconductors], Hewlett-Packard sent out a scout. ...An EDB project officer was assigned to look after his delegation and everything was made convenient and swift. While HP negotiated to acquire a site for its own factory, it decided to lease the top two floors of a six-story building. The elevator to lift the heavy machinery needed a big transformer for electricity, but there was none in place for the time of the visit of Mr. Hewlett himself. Rather than have him walk up six flights of stairs, the EDB got a gigantic cable extended from a neighboring building, and on the day of the visit the elevator worked. Hewlett-Packard invested. (62)

> Visiting CEOs used to call on me before they made their investment decisions. I thougt the best way to convince them was to ensure that the roads from the airport to their hotel and to my office were neat and spruce, lined with shrubs and trees. ...They would see right in the heart of the city a green oasis, 90 acres of immaculate rolling lawns and woodland, and nestling between them a nine-hole golf course. Without a word being said, they would know that Singaporeans were competent, disciplined, and reliable, a people who would learn the skills they required soon enough. (62)

> After recovery [from Arab oil embargo in 1973] in 1975, we coudl afford to be more selective. When our EDB officer asked how much longer we had to maintain protective tariffs for the car assembly plant owned by a local company, the finance director of Mercedes-Benz said brusquely, "Forever," because our workers were not as efficient as Germans. We did not hesitate to remove the tariffs and allow the plant to close down. Soon afterward we also phased out [other protections]. (63)

One example of a failure--German camera manufacturer Rollei relocated to Singapore, but sold poorly and closed down. "Rollei's failure was a great blow for Singapore because European investors interpreted it as a failure in the transfer of technology from Europeans to Singaporeans. ...One consolation was that the 4,000 workers trained in precision engineering became a valuable base for the disk drive industry that arrived in Singapore in the 1980s." (65)

Yew discusses how the government started various industries, relying on top scholars who studied overseas as entrepreneurs.

> I was fearful that these enterprises would result in subsidized and loss-making nationalized corporations as had happened in many new countries. Sui Sen, who knew his young officers, assured me that it was possible to succeed.... And he had given clear instructions that the enterprises had to be profitable or be shut down. ...The projects succeeded. As a result, many new companies sprang up under the auspices of other ministers and their ministries. When these also were successful, we turned state monopolies such as the Public Utilities Board, the Port of Singapore Authority, and Singapore Telecom into separate entities, free from ministerial control, to be run as companies, efficient, profitable, and competitive. (67)

> If I have to choose one word to explain why Singapore succeeded, it is confidence. ...Within days of the oil crisis in October 1973, I decided to give a clear signal to the oil companies that we did not claim any special privilege over the stocks of oil they held in their Singapore refineries. If we blocked export from those stocks, we would have enough oil for our own consumption for two years, but we would have shown ourrselves to be completely undependable. I met the CEOs or managing directors of all the oil refineries--Shell, Mobil, Esso, Singapore Petroleum, and BP... I assured them publicly that Singapore would share in any cuts they imposed on the rest of their customers, on the principle of equal misery. (68)

He asked "Japanese, Germans, French, and Dutch" to set up training centers in Singapore--some government-funded, others private. He used these institutes as points of reference to compare Singapore's worker standards to other countries and validate them.

CREATING A FINANCIAL CENTER

Point against Scott Alexander: "Unlike Hong Kong, Singapore could neither ride on the reputation of the City of London, an established financial center with its long history of international banking, nor depend on the backing of the Bank of England, a symbol of financial expertise, reliability, and trustworthiness."

> Both Keng Swee and I had decided in 1965, soon after independence, that Singapore should not have a central bank that could issue currency and create money. We were determined not to allow our currency to lose its value against the strong currencies of the big nations.... So we retained our currency board which issues Singapore dollars only when backed by its equivalent value in foreign exchange. The MAS (Money Authority of Singapore) has all the powers of a central bank except the authority to issue currency notes.(72)

He talks a lot about prioritizing integrity in the bank and financial institutions. A story:

> The MAS's reputation for being thorough and uncompromiseing in admitting only financial institutions of repute was put to the test in the 1970s and 1980s when it denied a license to the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI). The BCCI swindle affected nearly all the big financial centers by the time it finally ended.... It had about 400 branches or offices in 7u3 countries in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and America. it applied for an offshore banking license in Singapore in 1973. We rejected the application because the bank was too new (it started only in 1972) and low in capitalization. It resubmitted its application in 1980. Again the MAS would not approve; its international standing was poor.

In 1982, it tried again and was rebuffed again. One final time: "Not deterred, the BCCI tried again, this time through Harold Wilson. There was something strange about his letter. His practice had been to sign off in his own hand, "Yours sincerely Harold." This time the "Yours sincerely" was typewritten and he signed himself "(Harold) Wilson of Rievaulx." I decided he was writing pro forma, to oblige a friend. (75) Singapore "emerged unscathed" when the BCCI shut down in 1991.

> To meet the competition from international banks, the MAS encouraged the four largest local banks to acquire and merge with the smaller local banks to become bigger and stronger. (76)

The Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC) was founded in 1981 to manage Singapore's pension scheme and yearly public sector surpluses. Keng Swee, LKY, and Sui Sen were all involved. "My cardinal objective was not to maximize returns but to protect the value of our savings and get a fair return on capital." (78)

Singapore initially had intense financial regulations because Yew "believed we needed more time to establish our standing and reputation." After 1990, foreign institution managers convinced him that they were being too conservative. Part of his view change came when he was added to J. P. Morgan's international advisory board. "I was struck by the quality of the members of this board which included the bank's directors. ...I was impressed by the way they welcomed and prepared for innovation and change in banking.... I concluded that Singapore was light-years behind them." (79-80)

Singapore's primary banks were inward-looking in the 90s. "From their responses I concluded they were not awake to the dangers of being in-bred and of failing to be outward- and forward-looking ain an age of rapid globalizatoin. They were doing well, protected from competition. They wanted the government to continue to restrict foreign banks. ...I decided in 1997 to break this old mold. Singapore banks needed an infusion of foreign talent and a different mindset. If these three big banks would not move, then the DBS Bank, in which the government had a stake, should set the pace. After talent scouting in 1998, DBS Bank engaged John Olds, an experienced senior executive who was about to leave J. P. Morgan." (80) He loosened up restrictions on access from foreign banks and adopted the foreign strategy of "concentrat[ing] on protecting not the different market players or the individual investors, but the system itself."

> Only after the MAS had demonstrated the strength of its system to weather the financial crisis of 1987 and 1997-1998 did I feel confident enough to move closer to a position where what is not expressly forbidden is permitted. Our cautious approach helped us weather the 1997-1998 East Asian financial crisis. Our banks were sound and not overextended. No bubble puffed up our stock market. It has taken us 30 years from the time we firs tlaunched the Asian dollar market in 1968 to establish our credentials as a soundly managed international financial center. (82)

He decided on maximum disclosure of information, persuading banks to abandon practice of maintaining hidden reserves and not disclosing nonperforming loans.

WINNING OVER THE UNIONS

> I started my political life fighting for the unions as their legal adviser and negotiator. By the mid-1950s, the communists had gained control of most of them, and both communist and noncommunist unions had turned combative. ...Given the communist hold on our unions, it was inevitable that we suffered endless strikes, slowdowns, and riots... Between July 1961 and September 1962, we had 153 strikes, a record for Singapore. In 1969, for the first time since before the war, we had no strikes or work stoppages. (83)

> Singapore's British-style trade union practices had been the bane of our labor movement. [British] advisers taught [union leaders] all the bad habits and practices of how to squeeze employers for more pay and benefits regardless of the consequences to the company. At a meeting in July 1966... I urged them to abandon these British union practices which had ruined Britain's economy. I admitted that I had been responsible for many of them when I was negotiating for the unions. At the time there was too much exploitation of our workers. But the consequences were so bad, adding to our unemployment, that I regretted having done this. For example, triple pay on public holidays had led to leansing workers deliberately allowing garbage to accumulate before public holidays to ensure that they would have to work on these holidays. (84)

> I told our union leaders that they must not kill the goose whose golden eggs we needed. ... Our union practices, I explained, were forcing employers to become capital-intensive, investing in expensive machines to get the work done with the minimum of workers, as in Britain. This had created a small group of privileged unionized workers getting high pay and a growing band of unemployed and underemployed workers. ...We needed new attitudes, the most important of which was that pay must accord with performance. ...The unions and workers were so shaken by separation and fearful at the prospect of British withdrawal that they accepted my hard-headed approach. (84)

With this approach, he butted heads with former colleague and National Trades Union Congress (NTUC) secretary-general Ho See Beng. "I had to override his protests but took care to meet the union leaders privately to explain my worries. These off-the-record meetings made them understand why I had to get a new framework in place, one that would make for a trim and lean workforce. (85)

The story of his 1966 fight with K. Suppiah, who issued an ultimatum to the government for a wage increase and refused to settle. LKY offered a wage increase in 1968, but no sooner, and warned that striking workers there on work permits from India could lose their permits and jobs if they striked. Suppiah, in turn, shrugged the warnings off and accused LKY of forgetting how much he owed his position as prime minister to the trade union movement. 2,000 workers went on strike on 1 February 1967, with Suppiah warning that 14,000 more would join in if the grievances were not settled within a week.

> "The police arrested andcharged Suppiah and 14 other leaders of the cleansing workers' union with calling an illegal strike. The registrar of trade unions issued notices to the union and the federation to show cause why they should not be deregistered. At the same time, the ministry of health declared that the strikes had sacked themselves; those who wished to be reemployed could apply the next day. ...Ninety percent of them applied for reemployment. Two months later... Suppiah's [unions] were deregistered. ...The way the government met the strike head-on won the support of the public. It triggered a change in union culture, from a defiant flouting of the law to reasonable give-and take." (86) He banned strikes in essential services and made other changes to labor laws.

Asked to reform restrictive practices and abuse of fringe benefits, warned that he would consider port strikes akin to Britain's to be high treason, pointed out that port had a 10% increase in cargo handling but it was all taken up by overtime and so no new workers were added, which was "immoral at a time of high employment."

He balanced this out by urging employers to provide fair rewards, both direct and indirect.

When Britain announced its withdrawal, he "seized that moment to make radical reforms", then spelled out minimum employment conditions providing uniform leave provisions and "restoring to management the right to hire and fire, to promote and transfer". He required a secret ballot within a union for strikes and industrial action to avoid intimidation tactics.

> In 1972, we set up the National Wages Council (NWC), with representatives from unions, management, and government. Every year, using facts and figures available to the government, the NWC reached a wide consensus recommendation on wage increases and other terms and conditions of service for the coming year that would be affordable and would promote further economic growth. (88)

> I got management to undertake their new role of winning worker cooperation, without which productivity could not increase. Strict laws and tough talk alone could not have achieved this. It was our overall policy that convinced our workers and union leaders to support our key objective... Ultimately it was the trust and confidence they had in me, gained over long years of association, that helped transform industrial relations from one of militancy and confrontation to cooperation and partnership. (88)

He hand-picked Devan Nair for leader of the NTUC, included him in meetings with Winsemius, and had him teach union leaders basic principles of economics. Union membership started lagging due to reduced militancy, so he convinced them to shift focus towards cooperative enterprises--taxis, supermarkets, insurance. "Union leaders sat on the boards of directors to oversee the professional managers of these enterprises and soon understood that good management was critical for success." (89)

The union co-ops kept expanding, including into clubs, resorts, and quality condos. "I believed these facilities would reduce the feeling that workers belonged to a lower order, excluded from lifestyles which only the successful enjoyed. To make them affordable, the government provided state land at nominal prices." (91) In 1990, he convinced the NTUC to set up a labor college.

He also encouraged and selected high-quality officers to join unions, including promising overseas students, and encouraged NTUC to some MPs to work with unions and act as advisers so they could raise union issues in parliament.

> "We have put in place a fair framework to govern industrial relations. Restrictions on unions' excesses are balanced by consultative and arbitration procedures through which the unions can protect the interests of the workers. The key to peace and harmony in society is a sense of fair play, that everyone has a share in the fruits of our progress." (93)

A FAIR, NOT WELFARE SOCIETY

The best quote:

> We believed in socialism, in fair shares for all. Later, we learned that personal motivation and personal rewards were essential for a productive economy. However, because people are unequal in their abilities, if performance and rewards are determined by the marketplace, there will be a few big winners, many medium winners, and a considerable number of losers. That would make for social tensions because a society's sense of fairness is offended. (95)

No interest in winner-take all. "To even out the extreme results of free-market competition, we had to redistribute the national income through subsidies on things that improved the earning power of citizens, such as education. Housing and public health were also obviously desirable. But finding the correct solutions... was not easy. We decided each matter in a pragmatic way, always mindful of possible abuse and waste. If we over-re-distributed by higher taxation, the high performers would cease to strive. Our difficulty was to strike the right balance." (95)

Wanted to give every citizen a stake, prioritized home ownership after seeing the difference in maintenance between rental and owned properties and out of desire to allow a sense of ownership.

Colonial government started 5% CPF pension fund with matching 5%, which he worked with Keng Swee to expand into a fund to enable home ownership. He promised unions that every worked would have opportunity to own a home. "Once workers got used to a higher take-home pay, I knew they would resist any increase in their CPF contribution that would reduce their spendable money. So, almost yearly I increased the rate of CPF contributions, but such that there was still a net increase in take-home pay. It was painless for the workers and kept inflation down." (97)

He increased CPF up to a maximum of 25% (with employer matching for a total of 50%), later reduced to 40 percent. "I was determined to avoid placing the burden of the present generation's welfare costs onto the next generation." (97)

After a fire destroyed a squatter settlement in 1961, he immediately amended the law to allow the government to acquire fire site at price it would be if the land still had squatters on it (about one-third vacant market value). "It is heinous in the extreme to allow any profit to be made out of this fire." He later amended the law to allow government to acquire land for public purposes at a fixed rate, since "I saw no reason why private landowners should profit from an increase in land value brought about by economic development and the infrastructure paid for with public funds." As prosperity increased, he moved it closer to market rates (97)

In 1974, he asked Housing & Development Board (HDB) CEO to vary apartment designs and landscaping to avoid uniform look. "I asked the HDB to set aside land in these estates for clean industries which could then tap the large pool of young women and housewives whose children were already schoooling." (98)

> Compressing 30 years into a few pages makes it all appear simple and straightforward. There were enormous problems, especially in the early stages when we resettled farmers and others from almost rent-free wooden squatter huts with no water, power, or modern sanitation, and therefore no utility bills, into high-rise dwellings with all these amenities but also a monthly bll to pay. It was a wrenching experience for them in personal, social, and economic terms.
> Difficult adjustments were inevitable and there were comic, even absurd, results. Several pig farmers could not bear to part with their pigs and reared them in their high-rise apratments. Some were seen coaxing their pigs up the stairs! One family, a couple with 12 children moving from a hut to a new HDB apartment at Old Airport Road, brought a dozen chickens and ducks to rear in the kitchen. The mother built a wooden gate at the kitchen entrance to stop them from entering the living room. In the evenings, the children would look for earthworms and insects at the grass patches outdoors for feed. They did this for 10 years until they moved into another apartment.
> The Malays preferred to be closer to the ground. They planted vegetables around the high-rise as they used to do in their kampongs. For a long while, many Chinese, Malays, and Indians walked up the stairs instead of taking the elevators, not because they wanted the exercise but because they were afraid of elevators. There were people who continued to use kerosene lamps instead of electric bulbs. Others carried on their business as before, selling cigarettes, sweets, and sundry goods from their front rooms on the ground floor. They all suffered from culture shock. (99)

They went too quickly as demand rose and had some issues with defects and poor workmanship. Later, to avoid slumification, he used public funds to upgrade old housing to approximately new quality while inhabitants remained--S$58,000 (~$31,000 USD) per home, but charging owners only S$4,500 (~$2500 USD)

Health care! "[British] belief that all people were equal and no one should be denied the best of medical services was idealistic but impractical and led to ballooning costs. The British National Health Service was a failure. American-style medical insurance schemes are expensive, with high premiums because of wasteful and extravagant diagnostic tests paid for out of insurance. We had to find our own solution." (100)

> The ideal of free medical services collided against the reality of human behavior, certainly in Singapore. My first lesson came from government clinics and hospitals. When doctors prescribed free antibiotics, patients took their tablets or capsules for two days, did not feel better, and threw away the balance. They then consulted private doctors, paid for their antibiotics, completed the course, and recovered. I decided to impose a charge of 50 cents for each attendance at outpatient dispensaries. (100)

He arranged to set aside part of each person's CPF contribution for co-payment of medical bills. From 1977, they started at 1 percent of CPF into a medical account, gradually increasing it to 6 percent. The upper limit in 1986 was S$15,000 (~$7000 USD). "To reinforce family solidarity and responsibility, Medisave accounts could be used to pay medical costs for a member's immediate family: grandparents, parents, spouse, and children. (101)

Patients in government hospitals pay prorated fees subsidizes at rates up to 80 percent depending on type of ward chosen. No means test--higher wards came with increased costs and increased comfort, and rising incomes led to high Medisave savings and allowed people to feel wealthy enough to choose better-fitted wards.

> We allowed the use of Medisave for private hospital fees, subject to price limits for various procedures. This competition put pressure on government hospitals to improve their service quality. But we disallowed the use of Medisave for visits to outpatient clinics or private GPs. We believed more people would see a doctor unnecessarily for minor ailments if they could pay from Medisave than if they had to pay from their monthly budget (102).

In 1990, added optional MediShield insurance against catastrophic illness, then in 1993 set up Medifund from government revenue to allow those with no Medisave/MediShield to apply for total fee waivers. "While no one is deprived of essential medical care, we do not have a massive drain on resources, nor long queues waiting for operations." (102)

In 1978, they began to allow people to invest CPF funds, first in the Singapore Bus Services (to allow profits to go back to workers, the regular users of public transport and to decrease incentives towards demanding lower fares), later in anything. If investments outperformed CPF interest rate, they could take surplus out. Safeguards included.

> "When we floated Singapore Telecom in 1993, we sold a large portion of its shares at half their market value to all adult citizens. We did this to redistribute part of the surpluses the government had accumulated over the years of our steady growth. We wanted our people to hold shares in a major Singapore company and have a tangible stake in the country's success. (103)" To discourage immediate sale for cash gains, they offered bonus shares after first, second, fourth, and sixth years, resulting in 90% of workforce owning shares.

Riots in 1950s before widespread ownership and 1960s afterwards looked dramatically different, with people protecting their assets much better in second. "I was not wrong." -Lee Kuan Yew, 2000 (103)

Few have consumed their assets. Almost every worker carries their own pension fund, paid out at death according to worker's written wishes.

Deliberately reinforced Confucian tradition that a man is responsible for his family, deliberately pushed against European-style welfare states and Western criticisms of their "hard-hearted" policies, was "certain that [people] would prefer to make additional effort to pay for the extras they sought", waited decades for vindication (which came in 1980s). Mentions that people reject "buffet syndrome" for health care.

Protections for CPF: balance, assets bought with it, and HDB apartments bought with it are unavailable to creditors.

> Contra Scott again: "Singaporeans are unlike their counterparts in Hong Kong, Taipei, Seoul, or Tokyo, who have high wages but pay vast rents for tiny rooms which they will never own." (105)

> "There will always be the irresponsible or the incapable, some 5 percent of our population. They will run through any asset, whether a house or shares. We try hard to make them as independent as possible and not end up in welfare homes. More important, we try to rescue their children from repeating the feckless ways of their parents. We have arranged help but in such a way that only those who have no other choice will seek it. This is the opposite of attitudes in the West, where liberals actively encourage people to demand their entitlements with no sense of shame, causing an explosion of welfare costs. (106)

Annual budget surpluses were recorded every year but the 1985-1987 recession (after 2000: 2002-2004, 2009, 2015 also had deficits) https://graphics.straitstimes.com/STI/STIMEDIA/Interactives/2015/02/budget_singapore_2015/index.html

Singapore's tax structure details:
- income taxes have been progressively reduced, going from 66% of tax revenue in 1984 to about half of tax revenue in 1996. They have shifted to taxing consumption.
- No capital gains tax, 3% VAT equivalent (now 7% https://www.iras.gov.sg/irashome/GST/GST-registered-businesses/Learning-the-basics/Goods-and-Services-Tax--GST---What-It-Is-and-How-It-Works/), import tariff 0.4% (now duty-free https://www.export.gov/article?id=Singapore-Import-Tariffs).
- Top marginal income tax rate decreased from 55 percent in 1965 to 28 percent in 1996 (now 22 percent https://www.iras.gov.sg/irashome/Individuals/Locals/Working-Out-Your-Taxes/Income-Tax-Rates/).
- Coprorate tax rate of 40 percent dropped to 26 percent (now 17% https://singaporelegaladvice.com/law-articles/singapore-corporate-tax-guide-tax-rate-filing-procedure/).
- Inheritance tax was cut from 60 percent to between 5 and 10 percent in 1984, resulting in an increase of revenue collection "as the wealthy no longer found it worthwhile to avoid estate duty." (107)
- "Our aim is to have partial or total cost recovery for goods and services provided by the state. This checks over-consumption of subsidized public services and reduces distortions in the allocation of resources." (also 107)

"All this fine-tuning to rev up the economy would never have been possible had the communists retained their baleful influence." (108)

THE COMMUNISTS SELF-DESTRUCT

In the early 1960s, Singapore's communist party basically self-destructed, leaving the PAP unopposed.

After British announced withdrawal in 1968, the Barisan boycotted the election and 51 out of 58 consistuencies returned unopposed. "After winning all the seats, I set out to widen our support in order to straddle as broad a middle ground as possible. I intended to leave the opposition only the extreme left and right. We had to be careful not to abuse the absolute power we had been given. I was sure that if we remained honest and kept faith with the people, we would be able to carry them with us, however tough and unpalatable our policies" (111)

The communists had a hardcore following of 20-30% that stuck around for a long while, but were near-ubiquitous in the 50s and 60s as people were caught up in the events sweeping China.

The PAP was the opposition party from 1954 to 1959, taking their lessons in bitter conflict with the communists. From 1963 to 1988, some 690 people were detained, often held for years without trial. Lee Kuan Yew mentions several bombings from the "Malayan National Liberation Front" in the 1970s. "Could we have defeated them if we had allowed them habeas corpus and abjured the powers of detention without trial? I doubt it. Nobody dared speak out against them, let alone in open court." (112)

That's part of his trend towards being *extremely open* about his loathing of communism and his willingness to take whatever measures he deems necessary to stop it. He speaks of them in tones conveying equal measures of respect and fear. His chapter on their self-destruction is mostly full of anecdotes of specific high-profile communists growing disillusioned, dying in prison, or entering exile. He speaks of the threat of "communist infiltration and subversion" and their "fearsome" ability to "penetrate an organization with a cadre of influential activists,"  and requires all who enter politics to form parties to "force them out into the open and make them easy to monitor". Pro-communist article writers, radio operators, and other activists were all candidates for detention or exile through the 1980s, able to return only on condition of cutting links and disclusing all past communist party activities.

Part of the story from the Barisan perspective can be found at [BBC](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33621862).

"We were reminded from time to time that the communists never give up. The switch to English in our schools had dried up their supply of Chinese-educated recruits so they tried hard to enlist the English-educated. Knowing how skillful, resourceful, and tenacious the communists were in their methods of infiltration and manipulation, we were determined that they should not be given any chance to make a comeback by rebuilding their front organizations, especially in the trade unions. Their ability to penetrate an organization with a care of influential activists and take control of it was fearsome (114)

To return to Singapore, members of the CPM (Communist Party Malaya) had to cut links with party and make a full disclosure of past activities (117).

Great story from 1958 illustrating the Situation: he met a covert Communist leader in the 50s when they were considering working together with the PAP. "I suggested he prove his credentials by getting a city councillor of the Workers' Party I believed to be a communist activist to resign. He agreed and asked for time. A few weeks later the councillor resigned." (117)

STRADDLING THE MIDDLE GROUND

"Our critics believed we stayed in power because we have been hard on our opponents. This is simplistic. If we had betrayed the people's trust, we would have been rejected. ... WE had learned from our toughest adversaries, the communists. ...From many unhappy encounters with my communist opponents, I learned that while overall sentiment and mood do matter, the crucial factors are institutional and organizatoinal networks to muster support. (When we went into communist-dominated areas, we found ourselves frozen out.)" (121)

Formed the "People's Association" to provide advice and services such as literacy classes, sewing, cooking, auto and electrical intsrument repair. This was directly to compete with pro-communist social services. (122)

Co-opted "more active and promising members" of "goodwill" committees into management committees of community centers and citizens' consultative committees, which performed public works projects with government funds and self-raised funds. "By creating semi-government institutions such as the MCs and CCCs we mobilized a wide spectrum of elders who were respected in their own communities." (123)

"In our HDB new towns, there is a network that leads from the RCs to the MCs and CCCs on to the prime minister's office, the nerve center. Opposition leaders on walkabouts go through well-tended PAP ground. Naturally there are floating voters. But there is a hard core of local leaders who know that their PAP MP, backed by the government, will attend to their needs whether during or between elections." (123)

When people wanted opposition representatives in government, He talks about finding an unprincipled and furious opponent who was "useful as a sparring partner," "filled up space on the opposition side", and "probably kept better opponents out." In 1984, that opponent (Jeyaretnam) and another (Chiam See Tong) took parliament seats. Chiam See Tong's approach" PAP is good, but could do better and should listen more to criticism." "We treated him differently, extending him respect and latitude. We hoped that if he expanded, those who opposed us could gravitate towards a nonsubversive opposition. (125)

He gave an unscripted annual speech in Malay, Hokkien/Mandarin, and English, and talks about his oratory skills making much more of a difference than newspapers (126).

"One imperative is to confront directly those who accuse me or corruption or misusing the power of my office. I have always met head-on all such allegations. ...I have never been sued for defamation because I have not made any false defamatory statements. When I said something disparaging about my opponents, I had ample evidence to back my statements and my opponents knew that." (128)

"In 1988... Jeyaretnam insinuated that I had adviced [a minister of national development] to commit suicide; that I wanted to avoid a full investigation into allegations of corruption because they would have discredited me. He could have raised [the] suicide two years earlier but waited until election time. I won damages and costs." (129)

"My opponents waited for elections to get under way before they uttered their slanders, hoping to inflict maximum damage. Had I not sued, these allegations would have gained credence. Western liberal critics argue that my reputation is so unassailable that nobody will believe the outrageous things that are sasid about me, so I should ignore them manganimously instead of suing vindictively. But outrageous statements are disbelieved only because they are vigorously refuted. If I failed to sue, that would be cited as proof that there was something in it." (130)

"To straddle the middle ground and win elections, we have to be in charge of the political agenda. This can only be done by not being beaten in the argument with our critics. They complain that I come down too hard on their arguments. But wrong ideas have to be challenged before they influence public opinion and make for problems." (131)

"Far from oppressing the opposition or the press that unjustly attacked my reputation, I have put my private and public life under close scrutiny whenever I appeared as a plaintiff in court. Without a clear record, it would have been an unnecessary hazard. Because I did this and also gave the damages awarded to deserving charities, I kept my standing with our people." (131)

"The PAP Has sought to reach out to those outside the party... We changed the constitution in 1990 to provide for a small number of nonelected MPs, called Nominated MPs, to reflect independent and nonpartisan views. ...The NMPs have played a constructive role airing carefully considered criticisms of government policies, and the government has taken them seriously." (132)

"The PAP had countered the opposition's "by-election" strategy with the electoral carrot that priority for upgrading of public housing in a constituency would be in accord with the strength of voter support for the PAP in that constituency. This was criticized by American liberals as unfair, as if pork barrel politics did not exist elsewhere." (133)

"Will the political system that my colleagues and I developed work more or less unchanged for another generation? I doubt it. ...As an international hub of a knowledge-based economy in the information technology age, we will be ever more exposed to external influences. ...[The PAP's role] will depend on how PAP leadres respond to changes in the needs and aspirations of a better-educated people, and to their desire for greater participation in decisions that shape their lives. Singapore's options are not that numerous that there will be unbridgeable dfiferences between differing political views in working out solutions to our problems." (134)

NURTURING AND ATTRACTING TALENT: The famous HBD section

"On the night of 14 August 1983, I dropped a bombshell in my annual National Day Rally address. Live on both our television channels, with maximum viewership, I said it was stupid for our graduate men to choose less-educated and less-intelligent wives if they wanted their children to do as well as they had done. ...It caused a drop of 12 percentage points in votes for the PAP in the election the following year, more than I had anticipated." (135) Why? Because "the 1980 census figures... showed that our brightest women were not marrying and would not be represented in the next generation."

He argues that talent is his country's most precious asset and its defining factor.

"Malays as a rule were better in the arts than the sciences." (135)

He argues that the more talented people he had as leaders, the more effective his policies were.

His views were mocked by "liberal Western writers" for his "ignorance and prejudice", but Herrnstein of Bell Curve fame stood up for him (138)

Part of his argument: Status quo is prejudiced. Women want to marry up, men want to marry down. (139)

Tried to fix things by giving preferential school treatment to graduate mothers with 3+ children, but the graduates objected.

On "stop at two": "We should have foreseen that the better-educated would have two or fewer children, and the less-educated for or more. Western writers on family planning had not drawn attention to this already familiar though less stark outcome in their own mature countries because it was not politically correct to do so." (141)

Talks about opening borders to high-skilled immigrants and scouring world for talent. On interracial marriage: "We cannot allow old prejudices to hamper our development as an international center for trade, industry, and services." (143)

"In my first cabinet of 10, I was the only one born and educated in Singapore." (144)

MANY TONGUES, ONE LANGUAGE

Struggled to make English common-ish language, ensuring it was taught in all schools. Many Chinese-educated did not welcome change. Sometimes deported protest leaders because Singapore, another time arrested newspaper leaders for "glamorizing communism and stirring up chauvinistic sentiments over Chinese language and culture" (148)

"The opposition to English as the one common language was unremitting. The irony was that I was as keen and anxious as anyone to retain the best features of Chinese education. When I acted as legal adviser for the Chinese middle school student leaders in the 1950s, I was impressed by their vitality, dynamism, discipline, and social and political commitment. By contrast, I was dismayed at the apathy, self-centeredness, and lack of self-confidence of the English-educated students. The crux of the problem was that in our multiracial and multilingual society, English was the only acceptable neutral language, besides being the language that would make us relevant to the world. But it did seem to deculturalize our students and make them apathetic." (149)

Learned Mandarin and Hokkien to better communicate with his people.

Major Chinese university, Nantah, ultimately needed to be folded into University of Singapore, a source of much controversy. "I had the political strength to make those changes in Nantah because, unlike many champions of the Chinese language who sent their children to English schools, my three children were completely educated in Chinese schools. ...Had my hildren not done well in Chinese schools, I could not have spoken with that same authority. Years later I asked the three of them whether they regretted having gone to a Chinese, not an English, school. They were unanimous that they were better off for hvaing been in Chinese schools. (152)

"The values of America's consumer society were permeating Singapore faster than the rest of the region because of our education in the English language." (153)

Preserved traditional Chinese schools, targeted towards top 10% of primary school students, in part to help preserve and fortify traditional culture. "The ethos in these schools was, and still is, superior to that of the English-language schools, which tended to be more slack in these matters." (154)

Pushed Chinese people to speak Mandarin instead of Hokkien. "I used my standing with the people to persuade them to make the switch. They knew that my three children had mastered Mandarin, English, and Malay and respected my views on how to educate children." (155)

"Bilingualism in English and Malay, Chinese, or Tamil is a heavy load for our children. The three mother tongues are completely unrelated to English. But if we were monolingual in our mother tongues, we would not make a living. Becoming monolingual in English would have been a setback. We would have lost our cultural identity, that quiet confidence about ourselves and our polace in the world. In any case, we could not have persuaded our people to give up their mother tongues. Hence, in spite of the criticism from many quarters that our peoploe have mastered neither language, it is our best way forward." (155)

CORRUPTION

One reason communism was popular in Singapore: contrast between Chinese Communist Party and Nationalist leaders. "The students saw the communists as exemplars of dedication, sacrifice, and selflessness, the revolutionary virtues displayed in the spartan lives of the Chinese communist leaders." (157)

Fought corruption with full power of courts, at all levels. No bribes of cash or gifts. A bank reported a high-level official Tan Kia Gan for accepting a bribe, and LKY shut it down.

One official committed suicide after being caught receiving a bribe and his family disappeared from Singapore because they had lost face (163).

On money in elections:
"Our most formidable opponents, the communists, did not use money to win voters. Our own election expenses were small, well below the ammount allowed by law. ...We got [voters] to vote for us again and again by providing jobs, building schools, hospitals, community centers, and ...homes which they owned. ...Opposition parties also did not need money. They defeated our candidates because the electorate wanted an opposition MP to pressure the government for more concessions." (166)

He made the decision to raise salaries of ministers to avoid under-the-table "bonus compensation". "Underpaid ministers and public officials have ruined many governments in Asia. Adequate remuneration is vital for high standards of probity in political leaders and high officials." "Ostentatious egalitarianism is good politics." At one point, increased ministers' salaries from S$2500 to S$4500 per month, but kept his at S$3500 to remind public service that restraint was necessary. (167-168)

Ultimately, pegged ministerial salart at two-thirds of private-sector equivalents.

Tells the story of being taken to court suspected of improper conduct in property purchase when he got discounts and his brother was on the board. Went public with purchases and unsolicited discounts in response, paid the value to the finance minister, and when it was returned to him because there was no impropriety, donated it to charity. "As I told the House, the fact that the system I had set in place could investigate and report upon my conduct proved that it was impersonal and effective, and that no one was above the law." (171)

GREENING SINGAPORE

"Pirate taxi drivers were banished from the roads only after we had reorganized bus services and could provide them with alternative employment." Hawkers resettled into hawker centers instead of on the streets. (175)

Talks about knowing whether countries were downtrodden if their buildings were poorly maintained--ostentation didn't matter. Spent millions on greenery throughout the city. Got kids to plant trees in schools, grow gardens, etc. In 1970s, encouraged a competitive spirit with neighboring countries in out-greening each other. "Greening was positive competition that benefitted everyone--it was good for morale, for tourism, and for investors. It was immensely better that we competed to be the greenest and cleanestin Asia. I can think of many areas where competition could be harmful, even deadly." (177)

Subsidized rentals of street vendors when moving them (179)

Talks rather heartbreakingly about resettling farmers and disrupting their ways of life--tried to pay generously, but they missed their animals and plants and open spaces and were never really satisfied with the new setup.

"Other cities had clean and green suburbs that gave their residents respite from city centers. Singapore's size forced us to work, play, and reside in the same small place, and this made it necessary to preserve a clean and gracious environment for rich and poor alike." (181)

Talks about pushes to ban advertising for cigarettes and the ban on chewing gum (done after vandals stuck it onto door sensors of trains and other nasty places). "Foreign correspondents in Singapore have no big scandals of corruption or grave wrongdoings to report. Instead they reported on the fervor and frequency of these "do good" campaigns, ridiculing Singapore as a "nanny state." They laughed at us. But I was confident we would have the last laugh. We would have been a grosser, ruder, cruder society had we not... [changed] our ways. ...If this is  "nanny state," I am proud to have fostered one." (183-184)

MANAGING THE MEDIA

Deliberately fostered a newpaper culture unlike US's. Chinese and Malay press: "cultural practice is for constructive support of policies they agree with, and criticism in measured terms when they do not." (185)

"My early experiences in Singapore and Malaya shaped my views about the claim of the press to be the defender of truth and freedom of speech. The freedom of the press was the freedom of its owners to advance their personal and class interests." (186)

"We had to tolerate locally owned newspapers that criticized us; we accepted their bona fides, because they had to stay and suffer the consequences of their policies. Not so "the birds of passage who run [the British-owned newspaper] the Straits Times" (187)

Encouraged newspapers to start for competition's sake, but shut down newspapers subsersively funded by PRC and others.

"I needed the media to reinforce, not to undermine, the cultural values and social attitudes being inculcated in our schools and universities." (190)

"I did not accept that newspaper owners had the right to print whatever they liked. Unlike Singapore's ministers, they and their journalists were not elected." Passed laws to prohibit anyone from holding more than 3% of ordinary newspaper shares, and gave minister authority to give shareholders management shares. Gave to local banks, reasoning they had a vested interest in remaining politically neutral. "I do not subscribe to the Western practice that allows a wealthy press baron to decide what voters should read day after day." (191)

Talks about relations with Western media: they don't complain about us banning communist publications, and we haven't banned them, only requested right of reply. Solution when they didn't publish replies: don't ban, restrist number of sold copies. "Those who could not buy copies could get them photocopied or faxed. This would reduce their advertising revenue but did not stop their reports from circulating." (191)

Hit Time magazine up with this when they wouldn't publish a reply. Later, Asian Wall Street Journal got same treatment and correspondent was invited to sue if he had been defamed. US state department wasn't thrilled, so he asked whether they had anything to say about newspaper's refusal to publish responses. "The State Department repeated that it did nnot take sides; it was merely expressing concern because of its 'fundamental and long-standing commitment to the principles of a free and unrestricted press'--which meant that 'the press is free to publish or not publish what it chooses however irresponsible or biased its actions may seem to be.'" (192)

AWSJ offered to distribute itself for free to paying subscribers; Singapore agreed if they would take out advertisements, then offered to defray half the cost of removal when AWSJ paused. AWSJ rejected, Singapore said "You are not interested in the business community getting information. You want the freedom to make money selling advertisements." (193)

US-owned Asiaweek pulled same, deleting and adding parts to a letter from press secretary, and got restricted from 11k copies to 500.

Invited one British critic to a live debate on TV. Critic replied no station would be interested, but LKY had already gotten BBC to agree. Critic said they should stay in newspaper medium. He wrote saying basically "debate me, you coward." Critic's paper (Times) didn't publish article. He bought a half-page ad in the Independent and went on BBC to say "Where I come from, if an accuser is not perpared to face the person he has attacked, there is nothing more to be said." (196)

"Countries that try to block the use of IT will lose. We have to learn to manage this relentless flood of information so that the Singapore government's point of view is not smothered by the foreign media. ...It is important for Singaporeans to know the official position of their government on major issues." (197)

CONDUCTOR OF AN ORCHESTRA

Get best men in charge of best ministries, tell them what he wanted them to achieve, and leave them to get on with the task.

Was impressed with Boston's Logan Airport because airplanes' noise footprint was over water. Ended up creating an absolutely remarkable airport at Changi, seriously beyond belief.

to reduce congestion, implemented peak-hour congestion fees and introduced limited number of certificates for new car owners. Discuss ideas at all levels. "Since the amount people pay the government now depends upon how much they use the roads, the optimum number of cars can be owned with the minimum of congestion." (206)

On concentrations of Malays in poorer areas: "Some sensitive matters... could not be publicly debated." Promised residents to demolish slums and decided to "scatter and mix [races] and thus prevent them from congregating as they had been encouraged to do by the British."

"Our Malay MPs played a critical role in mediating between government officials and residents." (207)

Mixed races deliberately, found they were self-segregating, implemented quotas in HDB housing. Means that apartments sold to minority groups need to be lower-cost since Malay and Indian buyers can't pay the higher price of Chinese majorities. LKY got sign-on from Indian and Malay ministers to avoid resegregation. "This made it easier to implement this policy." (209)

To prevent Chinese majority from winning in all constituencies, he had teams of four candidates with one required minority each contest groups of constituencies. (209)

Found that Malay students performed comparatively poorly versus Chinese and Indian students. "To have people believe all children were equal, whatever their race, and that equal opportunities would allow all to qualify for a place in a university, must lead to discontent. ...In 1980, I brought the Malay community leaders into my confidence in order to tackle the problem of Malay underachievement openly and sensitively." (210)

Consulted Malay colleagues before deciding on anything affecting Malays, consulted Islamic leader when Islamic issues were involved. One ministor, Raja, strongly imposed to this race-conscious approach: "He was a total multiracialist and saw my plan not as a pragmatic acceptance of realities, but as backsliding."

"While I shared Raja's ideal of a completely color-blidn policy, I had to face reality and produce results. From experience, we knew that Chinese or Indian officials coudl not reach out to Malay parents and students in the way their own community leaders did. ...Paid bereaucrats could never have the same commitment, zest, and rapport to move parents and their children. ...Only leaders of the wider ethnic family can." (211)

http://web.archive.org/web/20150815061558/http://www.mccy.gov.sg/~/media/MCCY-corp/Publications/ProgressofMalayCommunity1980.ashx Malay progress in Singapore

In 1959, abolished jury system for all cases except murder (213): "During a parliamentary select committee meeting, David Marshall, then our most successful criminal lawyer, claimed he had 99 acquittals out of the 100 cases he defended for murder. When I asked if he believed the 99 acquitted had been wrongly charged, Marshall replied his duty was to defend them, not judge them." ..."After the bill was passed and jury trials were abolished, there were fewer miscarriages of justice arising from the vagaries of jury sentiments." (213)

"After what I had seen of human conduct in the years of deprivation and harshness of Japanese occupation, I did not accept the theory that a criminal is a victim of society. Punishment then was so severe that even in 1944-1945, when many did not have enough to eat, there were no burglaries and people could leave their front doors unlocked, day or night. The deterrent was effective. ...We found caning more effective than long prison terms and imposed it for crimes related to drugs, arms trafficking, rape, illegal entry into Singapore, and vandalizing of public property." (213)

Early enthusiast in computer use, but didn't personally use a PC until mid-1990s.

Personally went to high-level people in private world at times and asked them to take massive paycuts to work in government. Example: Banker paid $2m chosen as chief justice at salary of $300,000; accepted out of sense of duty. Chief justice suggesting additional judges: Ask each judge and commissioner to name two most suitable, excluding self, then select unanimous choices from peers. (219)