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INSIGHT - GERMANY/AFGHANISTAN - German security company in A

Feb 27th, 2012
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  1. Re: [alpha] INSIGHT - GERMANY/AFGHANISTAN - German security company in Afghanistan
  2. Email-ID 5008523
  3. Date 2011-08-04 22:20:06
  4. Good work, Hoor.
  5.  
  6. On 8/4/11 4:10 PM, Hoor Jangda wrote:
  7.  
  8. Kunduz isn't part of phase 1 of the handover so there are foreign forces
  9. still in the province.
  10.  
  11. On Thursday, 8/4/11 3:10 PM, Kristen Cooper wrote:
  12.  
  13. Is Kunduz among the initial areas where they are trying to hand over
  14. security to the Afghan forces?
  15.  
  16. On 8/4/11 3:50 PM, Michael Wilson wrote:
  17.  
  18. PUBLICATION: Check with Hoor first
  19. SOURCE: New source, DE1000
  20. ATTRIBUTION: Stratfor source
  21. SOURCE DESCRIPTION: Former intelligence analyst in Afghanistan.
  22. SOURCE Reliability : (new source not sure yet)
  23. ITEM CREDIBILITY: (not sure yet)
  24. DISTRIBUTION: Alpha
  25. SPECIAL HANDLING:
  26. SOURCE HANDLER: Hoor
  27.  
  28. This is someone that I spoke to post the Kunduz attack (August 2) at
  29. the German security office. These are the main questions I asked
  30. after the attack: There is quite a bit here. If you have any
  31. questions you want asked let me know.
  32.  
  33. Questions I asked:
  34. What do you think will happen with Kunduz? does it appear that the
  35. security situation will get worse? Any idea what the Taliban
  36. structure in Kunduz is currently looking like?
  37.  
  38. His response :
  39. Dear Hoor,
  40.  
  41. Many thanks for your reply. It's great to discuss analytical
  42. intricacies with someone at Stratfor, which I've been reading and
  43. greatly appreciating as a subscriber for some 9 years now.
  44.  
  45. The company, LANTdefence, actually belongs to EXOP GmbH, a small
  46. German security and intelligence firm. The main client base
  47. consisted of humanitarian organisations active in Afghanistan and
  48. Pakistan, particularly German ones. I traveled a lot to and within
  49. Pakistan for a corporate client, building up an intelligence and
  50. early warning infrastructure for their project sites. I still have a
  51. number of good contacts in the humanitarian and security environment
  52. in Afghanistan. Later this year I might actually go back to
  53. Afghanistan for a few weeks on a consulting assignment.
  54.  
  55. Re. the situation in Kunduz: I visited Kunduz several times in 2009
  56. and 2010, and even back then, the security situation was decidedly
  57. worse than in Mazar and even Kabul. International aid workers could
  58. only move around the city with local escort. Whether the escorts
  59. were armed or not pretty much depended on the approach of the
  60. respective humanitarian organisation/company: The Germans (GIZ) were
  61. generally travelling without armed escort, while the UN and actors
  62. like DAI (contractor of USAID) had different approaches. The main
  63. character of Kunduz City has long been the fact that it is basically
  64. surrounded by Taliban or Taliban-friendly insurgents, who have also
  65. been known to have a permanent if somewhat subtle presence in the
  66. city. Insurgent influence on the city was always palpable - e.g.
  67. when I spent a few days there in May 2010 it was a fact of life that
  68. cell phones didn't work between 6pm and 5am because the Taliban
  69. forced the providers to switch off networks during the night.
  70. Western nationals working with aid agencies could generally not be
  71. present beyond city limits. Even locals working for Western
  72. organisations were increasingly threatened.
  73.  
  74. The current situation in Kunduz has further deteriorated, compared
  75. to 2010, according to my contacts in Kunduz and Kabul. The German
  76. Bundeswehr which is based near Kunduz airport has dramatically
  77. failed in their stabilisation efforts, largely due to not
  78. understanding the concept of COIN. (I have talked to many German
  79. officers every time I was in Kunduz, and have researched the German
  80. COIN approach in my 2008 dissertation at King's College London.)
  81. This does not bode well for the future security situation in Kunduz.
  82. US forces are largely dictating the pace and degree of pressure on
  83. the insurgents, but NATO forces in the area are on the backfoot as
  84. everyone is well aware that NATO will leave within the next 2-3
  85. years. Local power brokers (Taliban, arbaki, corrupt police, ANA,
  86. etc.) are preparing to fight for the power gap that NATO forces will
  87. leave behind when they will eventually draw back.
  88.  
  89. I am not too sure about the insurgent structure in Kunduz at the
  90. moment - at least I don't have a complete picture. However, I know
  91. from conversations with local police and foreign intel people there
  92. that apart from the local Taliban structure, foreign fighters have
  93. always posed a particular problem in Kunduz. There has always been
  94. talk about 'the Uzbeks', referring to Islamist militants from
  95. Uzbekistan who have been known to live in local safehouses in the
  96. city. Also, Kunduz police chief Aqtash told me in a 90-min meeting
  97. last year that there is a hotspot village about 20km northwest of
  98. Kunduz City where according to his estimates around 100 Haqqani
  99. militants or sympathisers are based. Furthermore, recent information
  100. from German authorities (and Youtube videos) show that there is a
  101. small but seemingly constant stream of jihadi fighters with German
  102. passports who join the insurgents in the Kunduz area. From what I
  103. know these are German militants who first take the usual route
  104. Turkey-Zahedan (Iran)-Pakistani tribal areas and are then moved on
  105. to Northern Afghanistan via Kunar/Nuristan and Badakhshan.
  106.  
  107. Lastly, a few words on the 02 Aug attack in Kunduz. I agree with you
  108. in considering this a particularly interesting event. While it is
  109. not unheard of that local guards employed by international orgs get
  110. injured or killed in attacks, direct attacks on Western security
  111. companies are quite rare in Afghanistan according to my reading. The
  112. January 2011 attack on the 'Finest' supermarket in Kabul was such an
  113. attack, but in that case an individual XE employee had been tracked
  114. and assaulted while shopping at the supermarket. The attack now on
  115. LANTdefence (and their local partner Kabora) is therefore a
  116. significant thing in my view. Such a suicide attack after just one
  117. year of presence in Kunduz is certainly a setback - other Western
  118. security companies have operated in Kunduz for years without getting
  119. hit. The fact that the Taliban have hightlighted the attack in their
  120. claim of responsibility as being against a 'German intelligence
  121. centre' leaves no doubt that it was LANTdefence/EXOP that was the
  122. intended target. The problem for LANTdefence/EXOP were always the,
  123. let's say, close ties to German intelligence that did certainly not
  124. go unnoticed among local house staff, local guards and drivers etc.
  125. Plenty of opportunities for the Taliban to gather target intel, if
  126. the right sort of pressure is put on the families of local staff,
  127. for example. On the other side, almost all foreign security
  128. companies are rumoured to have intelligence ties, so the Taliban
  129. could very well have only done some guess-work.
  130.  
  131. The attack was apparently meant to be a strong warning against the
  132. company, but was not actually designed to annihilate it completely.
  133. (The main LANTdefence office is in Kabul anyway.) I know the
  134. compound in Kunduz pretty well, and any attacker could have expected
  135. to run into resistance from anything between 6 and 10 armed guards
  136. and their German ex-army supervisors. Still, only two insurgent
  137. gunmen stormed the house after the initial blast that opened the
  138. main gate. They were not killed by responding police, but detonated
  139. their explosives belts themselves after 1-2 hours of firefight.
  140.  
  141. The attack will certainly have implications for the security of
  142. foreign aid workers, especially Germans in the area and probably
  143. country-wide. As I said before, LANTdefence, partnering with Kabora,
  144. is responsible for all GIZ physical security all over Afghanistan.
  145. Now that LANTdefence themselves have become the target of an attack
  146. and have been singled out by Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid as
  147. 'German intelligence', the company will be forced to drastically
  148. step up their own security measures, which leaves less bandwidth for
  149. protecting their clients. Also, if for example the Kabul HQ of the
  150. company would be attacked, the neighbouring GIZ building on one
  151. side, and the other neighbours, the French NGO ACF, would be
  152. severely affected as well. It is surely a problem when a security
  153. provider becomes a security risk themselves.
  154.  
  155. Anyway - I could go on forever but have to cut short now. I hope my
  156. info is useful for you to even better understand the local context.
  157. As I said in my initial message, if you plan to incorporate some of
  158. the more sensitive info into your analyses, such as the background
  159. on LANTdefence/EXOP, that's fine, but please do not hint at whom you
  160. have it from. If you have questions on the above or on anything
  161. else, don't hesitate to get back in touch.
  162.  
  163. Thanks and all best,
  164.  
  165. --
  166. Hoor Jangda
  167. Tactical Analyst
  168. Mobile: 281 639 1225
  169. STRATFOR, Austin
  170.  
  171. --
  172. Michael Wilson
  173. Director of Watch Officer Group, STRATFOR
  174. Office: (512) 744 4300 ex. 4112
  175.  
  176.  
  177. --
  178. Hoor Jangda
  179. Tactical Analyst
  180. Mobile: 281 639 1225
  181. STRATFOR, Austin
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