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NSA Backdoors Exposed (Updated)

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Jan 1st, 2014
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  1.  
  2. ¤ IT Firms Lose Billions After NSA Scandal ::
  3.  
  4. http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/it-firms-lose-billions-after-nsa-scandal-exposed-by-whistleblower-edward-snowden-9028599.html
  5. ---------------------------------------
  6. ¤ Apple Claims They Know Nothing About Backdoors ::
  7.  
  8. http://www.infowars.com/apple-says-it-knows-nothing-about-your-iphone-spying-on-you/
  9.  
  10. ¤ Apple Inc. Lying Exposed ::
  11.  
  12. Logs from a properly air-gapped Mac OSX show
  13. the system attempting to access the Airport -
  14. yet the Airport card was physically disconnected.
  15.  
  16. http://pastebin.jity.de/view/f3610334
  17. ---------------------------------------
  18. ¤ Dell Inc. Apologizes for the ‘Inconvenience’
  19. of Helping NSA Install Backdoors ::
  20.  
  21. http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131230/17174425718/dells-twitter-account-apologizes-inconvenience-helping-nsa-place-hidden-bios-bug.shtml
  22.  
  23. http://www.infowars.com/dells-twitter-account-apologizes-for-the-inconvenience-of-helping-nsa-install-spyware/
  24. ---------------------------------------
  25. ¤ Jacob Appelbaum Explains New NSA Leaks ::
  26.  
  27. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b0w36GAyZIA
  28.  
  29. Mirror » http://fileb.ag/xwcp0jrewk2o
  30.  
  31. ¤ Jacob’s NSA Slides @ioerror (ZIP) ::
  32.  
  33. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-catalog.zip
  34.  
  35. ¤ Documents Reveal Top NSA Hacking Unit ::
  36.  
  37. The NSA’s TAO hacking unit is considered
  38. to be the intelligence agency’s top secret
  39. weapon. It maintains its own covert network,
  40. infiltrates computers around the world and
  41. even intercepts shipping deliveries to plant
  42. back doors in electronics ordered by those
  43. it is targeting. ... ...
  44.  
  45. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-nsa-uses-powerful-toolbox-in-effort-to-spy-on-global-networks-a-940969.html
  46.  
  47. The insert method and other variants of
  48. QUANTUM are closely linked to a shadow
  49. network operated by the NSA alongside the
  50. Internet, with its own, well-hidden
  51. infrastructure comprised of “covert”
  52. routers and servers. It appears the NSA
  53. also incorporates routers and servers
  54. from non-NSA networks into its covert
  55. network by infecting these networks with
  56. “implants” that then allow the government
  57. hackers to control the computers remotely.
  58.  
  59. In this way, the intelligence service seeks
  60. to identify and track its targets based on
  61. their digital footprints. These identifiers
  62. could include certain email addresses or
  63. website cookies set on a person’s computer.
  64. Of course, a cookie doesn’t automatically
  65. identify a person, but it can if it includes
  66. additional information like an email address.
  67. In that case, a cookie becomes something
  68. like the web equivalent of a fingerprint.
  69. ---------------------------------------
  70. ¤ NSA QUANTUM Theory (FOXACID) ::
  71.  
  72. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-quantumtheory.pdf
  73.  
  74. ¤ NSA/GCHQ QUANTUM Tasking Techniques ::
  75.  
  76. “YahooBcookie’s are unique to a specific
  77. computer and can hold other <yahoo> addresses
  78. that are being logged into on that computer
  79. as long as the user does not clear browser
  80. cookies.”
  81.  
  82. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-quantum-tasking.pdf
  83.  
  84. ¤ NSA QFIRE Packet Injection Attacks ::
  85.  
  86. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-qfire.pdf
  87. ---------------------------------------
  88. ¤ NSA Catalog for Hardware Backdoors ::
  89.  
  90. The specialists at ANT, which presumably
  91. stands for Advanced or Access Network Technology,
  92. could be described as master carpenters for
  93. the NSA’s department for Tailored Access
  94. Operations (TAO). In cases where TAO’s usual
  95. hacking and data-skimming methods don’t suffice,
  96. ANT workers step in with their special tools,
  97. penetrating networking equipment, monitoring
  98. mobile phones and computers and diverting or
  99. even modifying data. Such implants, as they are
  100. referred to in NSA parlance, have played a
  101. considerable role in the intelligence agency’s
  102. ability to establish a global covert network
  103. that operates alongside the Internet.
  104.  
  105. Some of the equipment available is quite
  106. inexpensive. A rigged monitor cable that
  107. allows “TAO personnel to see what is displayed
  108. on the targeted monitor,” for example, is
  109. available for just $30. But an “active GSM
  110. base station” -- a tool that makes it possible
  111. to mimic a mobile phone tower and thus monitor
  112. cell phones -- costs a full $40,000. Computer
  113. bugging devices disguised as normal USB plugs,
  114. capable of sending and receiving data via radio
  115. undetected, are available in packs of 50 for
  116. over $1 million.
  117.  
  118. The ANT division doesn’t just manufacture
  119. surveillance hardware. It also develops software
  120. for special tasks. The ANT developers have a
  121. clear preference for planting their malicious
  122. code in so-called BIOS, software located on a
  123. computer’s motherboard that is the first thing
  124. to load when a computer is turned on.
  125.  
  126. This has a number of valuable advantages: an
  127. infected PC or server appears to be functioning
  128. normally, so the infection remains invisible
  129. to virus protection and other security programs.
  130. And even if the hard drive of an infected
  131. computer has been completely erased and a new
  132. operating system is installed, the ANT malware
  133. can continue to function and ensures that new
  134. spyware can once again be loaded onto what is
  135. presumed to be a clean computer. The ANT
  136. developers call this “Persistence” and believe
  137. this approach has provided them with the
  138. possibility of permanent access.
  139.  
  140. Another program attacks the firmware in
  141. hard drives manufactured by Western Digital,
  142. Seagate, Maxtor and Samsung, all of which,
  143. with the exception of latter, are American
  144. companies. Here, too, it appears the US
  145. intelligence agency is compromising the
  146. technology and products of American companies.
  147.  
  148. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-tao-ant-pdf.pdf
  149. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/catalog-reveals-nsa-has-back-doors-for-numerous-devices-a-940994.html
  150. http://gizmodo.com/the-nsa-actually-intercepted-packages-to-put-backdoors-1491169592
  151. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/29/der-spiegel-nsa-hacking-unit-tao
  152. https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/12/31/snow-d31.html
  153.  
  154. ¤ NSA Cisco / Juniper Router Backdoors ::
  155.  
  156. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-firewalls.pdf
  157.  
  158. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-router.pdf
  159.  
  160. ¤ NSA Computer Monitor Backdoor ::
  161.  
  162. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-bildschirm.pdf
  163.  
  164. ¤ NSA PCI Bus Backdoor ::
  165.  
  166. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-rechner.pdf
  167.  
  168. ¤ NSA Motherboard Backdoor (#BadBIOS) ::
  169.  
  170. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-server.pdf
  171.  
  172. ¤ NSA Keyboard Backdoor ::
  173.  
  174. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-tastatu.pdf
  175.  
  176. ¤ NSA Apple iPhone Backdoor ::
  177.  
  178. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-handys.pdf
  179.  
  180. ¤ NSA WiFi Card / Apple Airport Backdoors ::
  181.  
  182. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-mobilfunk.pdf
  183.  
  184. ¤ NSA Active 802.11 Netcard Backdoor ::
  185.  
  186. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-w-lan.pdf
  187.  
  188. ¤ NSA USB Backdoor to Bridge Air-gaps ::
  189.  
  190. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-usb.pdf
  191.  
  192. ¤ NSA Alternative SIGINT Hunter ::
  193.  
  194. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/nsa-ant-raumuber.pdf
  195.  
  196. ¤ NSA Keystroke, Screenshot & SIGINT Hunting ::
  197.  
  198. http://cryptome.org/2013/12/greenwald-13-1231.pdf
  199.  
  200. http://truth-out.org/news/item/20948-glenn-greenwald-the-nsa-can-literally-watch-every-keystroke-you-make
  201. _______________________________________
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