FreeBSD 16.0-CURRENT: mac(4)

MAC(4)                 FreeBSD Kernel Interfaces Manual                 MAC(4)

NAME
     mac – Mandatory Access Control

SYNOPSIS
     options MAC

DESCRIPTION
   Introduction
     The Mandatory Access Control, or MAC, framework allows administrators to
     finely control system security by providing for a loadable security
     policy architecture.  It is important to note that due to its nature, MAC
     security policies may only restrict access relative to one another and
     the base system policy; they cannot override traditional Unix security
     provisions such as file permissions and superuser checks.

     Currently, the following MAC policy modules are shipped with FreeBSD:

     Name                      Description                      Labeling        Load time
     mac_biba(4)               Biba integrity policy            yes             boot only
     mac_bsdextended(4)        File system firewall             no              any time
     mac_ddb(4)                ddb(4) interface restrictions    no              any time
     mac_do(4)                 Change command's uid/gid         no              any time
     mac_ifoff(4)              Interface silencing              no              any time
     mac_ipacl(4)              IP Address access control        no              any time
     mac_lomac(4)              Low-Watermark MAC policy         yes             boot only
     mac_mls(4)                Confidentiality policy           yes             boot only
     mac_ntpd(4)               Non-root NTP Daemon policy       no              any time
     mac_partition(4)          Process partition policy         yes             any time
     mac_portacl(4)            Port bind(2) access control      no              any time
     mac_priority(4)           Scheduling priority policy       no              any time
     mac_seeotheruids(4)       See-other-UIDs policy            no              any time
     mac_test(4)               MAC testing policy               no              any time

   MAC Labels
     Each system subject (processes, sockets, etc.) and each system object
     (file system objects, sockets, etc.) can carry with it a MAC label.  MAC
     labels contain data in an arbitrary format taken into consideration in
     making access control decisions for a given operation.  Most MAC labels
     on system subjects and objects can be modified directly or indirectly by
     the system administrator.  The format for a given policy's label may vary
     depending on the type of object or subject being labeled.  More
     information on the format for MAC labels can be found in the maclabel(7)
     man page.

   MAC Support for UFS2 File Systems
     By default, file system enforcement of labeled MAC policies relies on a
     single file system label (see MAC Labels) in order to make access control
     decisions for all the files in a particular file system.  With some
     policies, this configuration may not allow administrators to take full
     advantage of features.  In order to enable support for labeling files on
     an individual basis for a particular file system, the “multilabel” flag
     must be enabled on the file system.  To set the “multilabel” flag, drop
     to single-user mode and unmount the file system, then execute the
     following command:

           tunefs -l enable filesystem

     where filesystem is either the mount point (in fstab(5)) or the special
     file (in /dev) corresponding to the file system on which to enable
     multilabel support.

   Policy Enforcement
     Policy enforcement is divided into the following areas of the system:

     File System
     File system mounts, modifying directories, modifying files, etc.

     KLD
     Loading, unloading, and retrieving statistics on loaded kernel modules

     Network
     Network interfaces, bpf(4), packet delivery and transmission, interface
     configuration (ioctl(2), ifconfig(8))

     Pipes
     Creation of and operation on pipe(2) objects

     Processes
     Debugging (e.g. ktrace(2)), process visibility (ps(1)), process execution
     (execve(2)), signalling (kill(2))

     Sockets
     Creation of and operation on socket(2) objects

     System
     Kernel environment (kenv(1)), system accounting (acct(2)), reboot(2),
     settimeofday(2), swapon(2), sysctl(3), nfsd(8)-related operations

     VM
     mmap(2)-ed files

   Setting MAC Labels
     From the command line, each type of system object has its own means for
     setting and modifying its MAC policy label.

           Subject/Object           Utility
           File system object       setfmac(8), setfsmac(8)
           Network interface        ifconfig(8)
           TTY (by login class)     login.conf(5)
           User (by login class)    login.conf(5)

     Additionally, the su(1) and setpmac(8) utilities can be used to run a
     command with a different process label than the shell's current label.

   Programming With MAC
     MAC security enforcement itself is transparent to application programs,
     with the exception that some programs may need to be aware of additional
     errno(2) returns from various system calls.

     The interface for retrieving, handling, and setting policy labels is
     documented in the mac(3) man page.

SEE ALSO
     mac(3), mac_biba(4), mac_bsdextended(4), mac_ddb(4), mac_do(4),
     mac_ifoff(4), mac_ipacl(4), mac_lomac(4), mac_mls(4), mac_none(4),
     mac_ntpd(4), mac_partition(4), mac_portacl(4), mac_priority(4),
     mac_seeotheruids(4), mac_stub(4), mac_test(4), login.conf(5),
     maclabel(7), getfmac(8), getpmac(8), setfmac(8), setpmac(8), mac(9)

     Mandatory Access Control, The FreeBSD Handbook,
     https://docs.FreeBSD.org/en/books/handbook/mac/.

HISTORY
     The mac implementation first appeared in FreeBSD 5.0 and was developed by
     the TrustedBSD Project.

AUTHORS
     This software was contributed to the FreeBSD Project by Network
     Associates Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates
     Inc.  under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 (“CBOSS”), as part of
     the DARPA CHATS research program.

BUGS
     While the MAC Framework design is intended to support the containment of
     the root user, not all attack channels are currently protected by entry
     point checks.  As such, MAC Framework policies should not be relied on,
     in isolation, to protect against a malicious privileged user.

FreeBSD 16.0-CURRENT           December 30, 2024                        MAC(4)