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- 1. These lectures are about objectivity and its limits. In the
- second and third lectures I shall be concerned with normative
- questions; I shall defend the objectivity of ethics, and try to
- explain what it means. But today I am going to say something
- about the problem of objectivity as it occurs in metaphysics, especially
- in the philosophy of mind. I do this because the problem
- has a similar form in the two areas, and because ideas arising from
- metaphysics influence our views of what must be done to discover
- objectivity in ethics. I hope therefore not only to say something
- about subjectivity and objectivity in the philosophy of mind, but
- also to set the stage for an account of what it would be for ethics
- to be objective.
- 2. As an aid to comprehension, let me begin by asserting without
- argument what I hope to show by examination of particular
- cases.
- Objectivity is a method of understanding. It is beliefs and
- knowledge that are objective in the primary sense. Only derivatively
- do we call objective the truths that can be understood in
- this way.
- To acquire a more objective understanding of some aspect of
- the world, we step back from our view of it and form a new conception
- which has that view and its relation to the world as its
- object. In other words, we place ourselves in the world that is to
- be understood. The old view then comes to be regarded as an
- appearance, more subjective than the new view, and correctable
- or confirmable by reference to it. The process can be repeated,
- yielding a still more objective conception.
- 78 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
- But it will not always yield a result, and sometimes it will
- be thought to yield a result when it really doesn’t: then, as
- Nietzsche warned, one will get a false objectification of an aspect
- of reality that cannot be better understood from a more objective
- standpoint. So although there is a connection between objectivity
- and reality - only the supposition that we and our appearances
- are parts of a larger reality makes it reasonable to seek understanding
- by stepping back from the appearances in this waystill
- not all reality is objective, for not everything is better understood
- the more objectively it is viewed. Appearance and perspective
- are essential parts of what there is, and in some respects they
- are best understood from a less detached standpoint. Both in
- ethics and in metaphysics, I believe, realism underlies the claims
- of objectivity and detachment, but it supports them only up to a
- point.
- 3. The question I want to discuss now is whether there is a
- sense in which the mind and the self are parts of objective reality.
- Eventually I shall take up the question of what it is for a particular
- person to be me (or you). But first I am going to talk
- about the objective status of mental phenomena in general.
- This question is in the background of the mind-body problem,
- for the mind-body problem arises because certain features
- of subjective experience resist accommodation by one very important
- conception of objectivity. I am not going to offer a solution
- to the mind-body problem here. But I believe that no
- progress can be made with it unless we understand this conception
- and examine its claims with care.
- For convenience I shall refer to it as the physical conception
- of objectivity. It is not the same thing as our idea of what physical
- reality is actually like, but it has developed as part of our method
- of arriving at a truer understanding of the physical world, a world
- that is presented to us initially but somewhat inaccurately through
- sensory perception.
- [NAGEL] The Limits of Objectivity 79
- The development goes in stages, each of which gives a more
- objective picture than the one before. The first step is to see that
- our perceptions are caused by the action of things on us, through
- their effects on our bodies, which are themselves parts of the
- physical world. The next step is to realize that since the same
- physical properties that cause perceptions in us through our bodies
- also produce different effects on other physical things and can
- exist without causing any perceptions at all, their true nature must
- be detachable from their perceptual appearance and need not
- resemble it. The third step is to try to form a conception of that
- true nature independent of its appearance either to us or to other
- types of perceivers. This means not only not thinking of the
- physical world from your own particular point of view, but not
- thinking of it from a more general human perceptual point of
- view either: not thinking of how it looks, feels, smells, tastes, or
- sounds. The secondary qualities then drop away, and the primary
- qualities are thought of structurally.
- This has turned out to be an extremely fruitful strategy. The
- understanding of the physical world has been expanded enormously
- with the aid of theories and explanations that use concepts
- not tied to a specifically human perceptual viewpoint. Our
- senses provide the evidence from which we start, but the detached
- character of this understanding is such that we could possess it
- even if we had none of our present senses, so long as we were
- rational and could understand the mathematical and formal
- properties of the objective conception of the physical world. We
- might even in a sense share an understanding of physics with other
- creatures to whom things appeared quite different, perceptually -
- so long as they too were rational and numerate.
- The world described by this objective conception is not just
- centerless, it is also in a sense featureless. While the things in
- it have properties, none of these properties are perceptual aspects.
- All of those have been relegated to the mind, a yet-to-be-examined
- domain. The physical world as it is supposed to be in itself con-
- 80 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
- tains no points of view and nothing that can appear only to a
- particular point of view. Whatever it contains can be apprehended
- by a general rational consciousness that gets its information
- through whichever perceptual point of view it happens to view
- the world from.l
- 4. Powerful as it has proven to be, this bleached-out physical
- conception of objectivity encounters difficulties if it is put forward
- as the method for seeking a complete understanding of reality.
- For the process began when we noticed that how things appear
- to us depends on the interaction of our bodies with the rest of the
- world. But this leaves us with no account of the perceptions and
- specific viewpoints which were left behind as irrelevant to physics
- but which seem to exist nonetheless, along with those of other
- creatures. Not to mention the mental activity of forming an objective
- conception of the physical world, which seems not itself
- capable of physical analysis.
- Faced with these facts one might think the only conceivable
- conclusion would be that there is more to reality than what can
- be accommodated by the physical conception of objectivity. But
- to remarkable numbers of people this has not been obvious. The
- physical has been so irresistibly attractive, and has so dominated
- ideas of what there is, that attempts have been made to beat everything
- into its shape and deny the reality of anything that cannot
- be so reduced. As a result the philosophy of mind is populated
- with extremely implausible positions.
- I think part of the explanation of this modern weakness for
- reduction is that a less impoverished and reductive idea of objectivity
- has not been available, to fill out the project of constructing
- an objective picture of the world. The objectivity of physics was
- viable: it continued to yield progressively more understanding
- 1Bernard Williams gives an excellent account of this idea in his recent book,
- Descartes: The Project of Pure Inquiry (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books,
- 1978). He calls it the absolute conception of reality.
- [NAGEL] The Limits of Objectivity 81
- through successive applications to those properties of the physical
- world that earlier applications had discovered.
- It is true that recent developments in physics have led some
- to believe that it may after all be incapable of providing a conception
- of what is really there, independently of observation. But
- I do not wish to argue that since the idea of objective reality has
- to be abandoned because of quantum theory anyway, we might as
- well go the whole hog and admit the subjectivity of the mental.
- Even if, as some physicists think, quantum theory cannot be
- interpreted in a way that permits the phenomena to be described
- without reference to an observer, the heliminable observer need
- not be a member of any particular species, like the human, to
- whom things look and feel in highly characteristic ways. This
- does not therefore require that we let in the full range of subjective
- experience.
- The central problem is not whether points of view must be
- admitted to the account of the physical world. Whatever may be
- the answer to that question, we shall still be faced with an independent
- problem about the mind. It is the phenomena of consciousness
- themselves that pose the clearest challenge to the idea
- that physical objectivity gives the general form of reality. In
- response I do not want to abandon the idea of objectivity entirely
- but rather to suggest that the physical is not its only possible
- interpretation.
- 5. Eventually I shall argue that the claims of even an expanded
- objectivity should not be exaggerated. But first I want to explore
- the possibility of arriving at an objective concept of mind. The
- reason for wanting such a thing is that we assume some connection,
- even if not a very tight one, between what is real and what
- can be objectively understood. We assume in particular that we
- ourselves, minds included, are parts of the world as it is in itself,
- and not just parts of the world as it appears to us: though we are
- of course also parts of that phenomenal world. And if we are
- 82 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
- parts of the world as it is in itself, then we would hope to be able
- to acquire some conception of ourselves that is not just the conception
- from within: a conception of ourselves from without, as
- contained in the world.
- It is not obvious that this is possible, but it is natural enough
- to consider whether it might be. And to find out, we must ask
- ourselves whether it is possible to form a conception of our own
- minds from an objective standpoint. Here it is essential, as it is in
- regard to other matters, not to identify objectivity with the physical
- conception of objectivity. We have to think of objectivity as
- something general enough to admit of different interpretations for
- different subjects of inquiry.
- The general idea of objectivity that we must use to think
- about a single world containing both mental and physical phenomena,
- is the idea of the world as it is, rather than as it appears
- to any particular viewpoint within it. Even if such a conception
- works very differently with respect to minds from the way it works
- with respect to matter, it still has to provide a way of thinking
- about what the world contains in detachment from any particular
- point of view within that world. The results will be understandable
- to individuals who occupy various points of view only if they
- can think about the world in detachment from their particular perspectives
- on it.
- Our capacity for such detachment, indeed our appetite for it,
- is one of our most important and creative characteristics. It leads
- to false objective conceptions of mind and other things if the
- supply of interpretations of objectivity is too meagre. But we may
- be able to remedy this if we try to develop an interpretation to
- suit the subject matter instead of trying to understand the mind
- and its attributes by means of a conception of objectivity developed
- to account for a completely different set of things. The question
- then is whether, viewing the world in detachment from our particular
- perspective on it - i.e., viewing it as a place that contains
- us —we can form an objective conception that includes points of
- [NAGEL] The Limits of Objectivity 83
- view, our own and those of others, and that does not misrepresent
- them as aspects of objective physical reality.
- There are many points of view in the world, of many different
- kinds, and we are familiar with only a few. To understand them
- all from no particular point of view would seem to require a
- process of self-transcendence different from that which occurs
- when we investigate the external world. Perhaps no conception of
- objectivity adequate to the mind can exist, in which case we shall
- have to choose between abandoning the assumption that everything
- real has an objective character and abandoning the assumption
- that the mind is real. But we are not faced with this dilemma
- simply by the failure of the physical conception of objectivity to
- apply to the mental. It is clear that an objective conception of
- mental phenomena cannot, like that of physical phenomena, be
- based on abstraction from the specific form of our external perception
- of them. So we must ask instead whether there can be an
- understanding of them independent of the specific point of view
- to which they appear, which nevertheless keeps their perspectival
- character.
- What I want to do is to explain what a natural objective
- understanding of the mind along these lines would be. I believe
- it has its beginnings in the ordinary concept of mind, but that it
- can be developed beyond this. The question is, how far beyond?
- In my view, quite far. I believe we can include ourselves,
- experiences and all, in a world conceivable not from a specifically
- human point of view, and that we can do this without reducing
- the mental to the physical. But I also believe that any such conception
- will necessarily be incomplete. And this means that the
- pursuit of an objective conception of reality comes up against
- limits that are not merely practical, limits that could not be overcome
- by any objective intelligence, however powerful. But finally,
- I shall claim that this is no cause for philosophical alarm, because
- there is no reason to assume that the world as it is in itself must
- be objectively comprehensible. It is natural for us to want to bring
- 84 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
- our capacity for detached, objective understanding as much into
- alignment with reality as we can, but it should not surprise us if
- objectivity is essentially incomplete.
- 6. The fundamental problem of how the mind can be objectively
- understood appears in philosophy independently of the
- ambition to form a complete scientific conception of the world.
- It appears as the problem of other minds. Each of us is the subject
- of various experiences, and to understand that there are other
- people in the world as well, one must be able to conceive of
- experiences of which one is not the subject: experiences that are
- not present to oneself. To do this it is necessary to have a general
- conception of subjects of experience and to place oneself under it
- as an instance. It will not do simply to extend the idea of what is
- immediately felt into other people’s bodies, for as Wittgenstein
- observed, that will only give you an idea of feeling things in their
- bodies, not of their feeling things.
- Though we all grow up with the required general conception
- that allows us to believe in genuinely other minds, it has been
- philosophically very problematic, and there has been much difference
- of opinion over how it works. Some philosophers have been
- attracted to analyses in behavioral, causal, or functional terms
- which are objective in the sense in which physics is objective.
- That is because, though nontheoretical, the ordinary concept of
- mind is evidently a conception of how things are, and it is assumed
- that physical objectivity provides the general form of understanding
- how things are.
- Others, seeing that the physical idea of objectivity cannot be
- applied to the mental, have been left with an insoluble problem
- of solipsism: the inability to make sense of the idea of real minds
- other than one’s own. Solipsism seems to me to represent a higher
- level of insight than reductionism, for it does not throw away the
- problem which must be faced and solved if we are to understand
- what minds are and how the world can contain them.
- [NAGEL] TheLimits of Objectivity 85
- But both these responses rest on a fundamental mistake. The
- ordinary concept of mind contains the beginnings of an entirely
- different way of conceiving objective reality. We do not make
- sense of the idea of other minds by construing it in a way which
- becomes unintelligible when we try to apply it to ourselves. We
- do not abandon the essential factor of a point of view when we
- conceive of the minds of others: instead we generalize it, and
- think of ourselves as one point of view among others. The first
- stage of objectification of the mental is for each of us to be able
- to grasp the idea of all human perspectives, including his own,
- without depriving them of their character as perspectives. It is the
- analogue for minds of a centerless conception of space for physical
- objects, in which no point has a privileged position.
- The beginning of an objective concept of mind is the ability
- to view one’s own experiences from outside, as events in the
- world. If this is possible, then others can also conceive of those
- events and one can conceive of the experiences of others, also
- from outside. Any experience can be thought about and known
- to have occurred not only from the point of view of its subject but
- from other points of view, at least if they are sufficiently similar
- in type to that of the subject.
- To think in this way we use not a faculty of external representation,
- but a general idea of subjective points of view, of which
- we imagine a particular instance and a particular form. It is this
- general faculty of sympathetic subjective imagination that takes
- us on the first step outside of ourselves in the acquisition of an
- objective concept of mind, and that enables each person to place
- himself among the contents of the world.
- So far the process does not involve any abstraction from the
- general forms of our experience. We still think of experience in
- terms of the familiar point of view we share with other humans.
- All that is involved in the external conception of mind is the
- imaginative use of this point of view - a use that is partly present
- in the memory and expectation of one’s own experiences.
- 86 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
- To represent an experience from outside by imagining it subjectively
- is the analogue of representing an objective spatial configuration
- by imagining it visually. One uses ordinary appearance
- as a medium. What is represented does not resemble the representation
- in all respects. It is represented in terms of certain general
- features of subjective experience - subjective universals -
- some instances of which one is familiar with from one’s own
- experience. But the capacity to form universal concepts in any
- area enables one not only to represent the present situation from
- without but to think about other possibilities which one has not
- experienced and perhaps never will experience directly. So the
- pretheoretical concept of mind involves a kind of objectivity which
- permits us to go some way beyond our own experiences and those
- exactly like them. The difficult step is the next one, the step
- beyond representation by resemblance.
- 7. Of course one possibility is that this particular process can
- go no farther. We can have a concept of mind general enough
- to allow us to escape solipsism and perhaps even ethnocentrism,
- but perhaps we cannot transcend the general forms of human
- experience and the human viewpoint. That viewpoint permits us
- to conceive of experiences we have not had, because of the flexibility
- of the human imagination. But it may not allow us to
- detach the concept of mind from a human perspective. If this is
- so, then there are strict limits to the objectivity of that concept;
- and that seems to mean that we cannot conceive of ourselves as
- parts of a world whose reality can be acknowledged from every
- rational perspective.
- This is a drastic conclusion, but I think it follows if we restrict
- the pursuit of objectivity in this area to the use of subjective
- imagination about the experiences of others. Even allowing for
- a certain amount of flexibility, the subjective imagination can
- reach only so far. And it may seem that there is no other way of
- conceiving of minds - our own and others’ - from outside with-
- [NAGEL] The Limits of Objectivity 87
- out losing hold of the fact that they are perspectives or points of
- view. For if we don’t conceive of them from inside, we must be
- conceiving of them as part of the familiar external world, and
- that is the old mistake.
- So the issue is whether we can form a general concept of
- experience that extends far beyond our own or anything like it.
- Or more accurately, whether there can be such a concept - for
- we may be unable to grasp it as we are presumably unable to grasp
- now concepts of objective physical reality which will be developed
- five centuries hence. The possibility that there is such a concept
- is sufficient motive for trying to form it. It is only if we are convinced
- in advance that the thing makes no sense that we can be
- justified in setting the limits of objectivity with regard to the mind
- so close to our own ordinary viewpoint.
- 8. I believe that in fact we already possess a rudimentary general
- concept of experience, and that it does not lose all content
- when we use it to think about cases in which we cannot apply it
- more specifically.
- Consider first, cases where we have strong evidence that
- experience is present, without either knowing what its character
- is, or even being in a position to hope ever to reach an understanding
- of its character that will include the capacity for selfascription.
- This is true of at least some of the experiences of all
- animals that are not very close to us in structure and behavior.
- In each case there is extensive external evidence of conscious inner
- life, but only limited application of our own mental conceptsmostly
- general ones — to describe it.2
- It is the ordinary prephilosophical concept of experience that
- leads to this result. We have not simply left it behind and taken
- off with the word. And the extension is not part of a private
- 2 Skeptics should read Herbert Spencer Jennings’ great book, originally published
- in 1906, The Behavior of the Lower Organisms (Bloomington: Indiana University
- Press, 1976).
- 88 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
- language but a natural idea shared by most human beings about
- what sorts of things occupy the world around them. We are
- forced, I think, to conclude that all these creatures have specific
- experiences which cannot be represented by any mental concepts
- of which we could have first-person understanding. This doesn’t
- mean that we can’t think about them in that general way, or
- perhaps in more detail but without first-person understanding -
- provided that we continue to regard them as subjective experiences
- rather than mere behavioral dispositions or functional states.
- But it seems to me that we can in principle go farther. We can
- use the general concepts of experience and mind to speculate
- about forms of conscious life whose external signs we cannot
- confidently identify. There is probably a great deal of life in the
- universe, and we may be in a position to identify only some of its
- forms, because we would simply be unable to read as behavior the
- manifestations of creatures sufficiently unlike us. It certainly
- means something to speculate that there are such creatures, and
- that they have minds.
- These uses of the general concept of mind exemplify a theoretical
- step that is commonplace elsewhere. We can form the
- idea of phenomena that we do not know how to detect. Once the
- conception of a new physical particle is formed, defined in terms
- of a set of properties, those properties may then allow experiments
- to be devised which will permit its detection. In this way
- the progress of physical discovery has long since passed to the
- formation of physical concepts that can be applied only with
- sophisticated techniques of observation, and not by means of
- unaided perception or simple mechanical measurement.
- Only an unacceptable verificationist dogmatism would deny
- the possibility of forming objective concepts that reach beyond our
- current capacity to apply them. The aim of reaching a conception
- of the world which does not put us at the center in any way
- requires the formation of such concepts. We are supported in this
- aim by a kind of intellectual optimism: the belief that we possess
- [NAGEL] The Limits of Objectivity 89
- an open-ended capacity for understanding what we have not yet
- conceived, and that it can be called into operation by detaching
- from our present understanding and trying to reach a higherorder
- view which explains it as part of the world.
- It is the same with the mind. To accept the general idea of a
- perspective without limiting it to the forms with which one is
- familiar, subjectively or otherwise, is the precondition of seeking
- ways to conceive of particular types of experience that do not
- depend on the ability either to have those experiences or to
- imagine them subjectively. It should be possible to investigate
- in this way the quality-structure of some sense we do not have,
- for example, by observing creatures who do have it.
- But if we could do that, we should also be able to apply the
- same general idea to ourselves, and thus to analyze our experiences
- in ways that can be understood without having had such
- experiences. That would constitute a kind of objective standpoint
- toward our own minds. To the extent that it could be achieved,
- we would be able to see ourselves as not merely part of the human
- world: something we can already do with regard to our bodies.
- And this would serve a natural human goal: for it is natural to
- want to reach a general understanding of reality, including ourselves,
- which does not depend on the fact that we are ourselves.
- 9. In the pursuit of this goal, however, even at its most successful,
- something will inevitably be lost. If we try to understand
- experience from an objective viewpoint that is distinct from that
- of the subject of the experience, then even if we continue to credit
- its perspectival nature, we will not be able to grasp its most
- specific qualities unless we can imagine them subjectively. We
- will not know exactly how scrambled eggs taste to a cockroach
- even if we develop a very complete objective phenomenology of
- his sense of taste. When it comes to values, goals, and forms of
- life the gulf may be even more profound.
- Since this is so, no objective conception of the mental world
- 90 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
- can include it all. But in that case we must ask what the point is
- of looking for such a conception. The aim was to place perspectives
- and their contents in a world seen from no particular point
- of view. It turns out that some aspects of those perspectives cannot
- be understood in terms of an objective concept of mind. So
- with respect to those aspects we are in the same position we were
- in to begin with. We must say either that they are not real or that
- not everything real is part of objective reality. Since the first is
- patently absurd, that leaves the second. But if some aspects of
- reality can’t be captured in an objective conception, why not forget
- the ambition of capturing as much of it as possible? The world
- just isn’t the world as it appears to one highly abstracted point of
- view. And if one can’t have complete objectivity, the goal of
- capturing as much of reality as one can in an objective net is pointless
- and unmotivated.
- I believe there is an answer to this, and that it is the answer to
- a very general problem of which this is an instance. Reality is not
- just objective reality, and any objective conception, in order not to
- be false, must include an acknowledgment of its own incompleteness.
- This is an important qualification to the claims of objectivity
- in other areas as well, and later I shall argue that it has a direct
- application to ethics. We may try to develop as complete an
- understanding of values as we can from a neutral standpoint
- but we will have to acknowledge the existence and validity of
- some values that cannot be neutrally understood, and even of
- some values that cannot be either neutrally or sympathetical1y
- understood.
- But to return to the case under discussion: even if an objecttive
- conception of mind were developed, it would have to include
- the qualification that the exact character of each of the experientia1
- and intentional perspectives with which it deals can be
- understood only from within or by subjective imagination. A
- being with total imaginative power could understand it all, but
- an ordinary being using an objective concept of mind will not.
- [NAGEL] The Limits of Objectivity 91
- So we have not given up the idea of the way the world really
- is, independently of how it appears to us or to any particular occupant
- of it. We have only given up the idea that this coincides with
- what can be objectively understood. The way the world is includes
- appearances, and there is no single point of view from which they
- can all be fully grasped.
- This amounts to the rejection of idealism with regard to the
- mind. The world is not my world, or our world - not even the
- mental world is. This is a particularly unequivocal rejection of
- idealism because it affirms the reality of aspects of the world that
- cannot be grasped by any conception I can possess -not even an
- objective conception of the kind with which we transcend the
- domain of initial appearances. Here it can be seen that physicalism
- is based ultimately on a kind of idealism: the idealism of objectivity.
- Objectivity is not reality. It is just one way of understanding
- reality. Still, even if objective understanding can be only
- partial, it is worth trying to extend it, for a simple reason.
- The pursuit of an objective understanding of reality is still
- the only way to expand our knowledge of what there is beyond
- the way it appears to us. Even if we have to acknowledge the
- reality of some things that we can’t grasp objectively, as well as
- the ineliminable subjectivity of some aspects of our own experience
- which we can grasp only subjectively, the pursuit of an objective
- concept of mind is simply part of the general pursuit of
- understanding. To give it up because it cannot be complete would
- be like giving up axiomatization in mathematics because it cannot
- be complete.
- 10. I want now to change the subject slightly, from the general
- Even if we accept the liberal realist picture of the world that
- concept of mind to the individual concept of the self.3
- 3 I discuss this problem more fully in “The Objective Self,” forthcoming in
- Knowledge and Mind (essays in honor of Norman Malcolm), Carl Ginet and Sydney
- Shoemaker, eds.
- 92 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
- I have sketched, as a place that contains us, with all our perspectives,
- and other beings, with all theirs, something still remains
- puzzling. Each of us will have to admit that one of the most
- important things about this centerless world is that one of the
- persons in it is himself. What kind of a fact is that? What kind
- of fact is it, for example, that I am Thomas Nagel? It is a fact I
- appear to recognize whenever I take a step back from my current
- viewpoint to pursue a more objective overview, which includes
- that person. But the fact that I am TN does not fit very easily
- into the conception of the world from nowhere within it that this
- detachment is supposed to produce. How can there be room in
- such an impersonally described world for the further fact that TN
- is me, the locus of my consciousness?
- I am not a solipsist. I do not believe that the point of view
- from which I see the world is the perspective of reality. The
- world is seen from many points of view, including this one; there
- are many subjects of consciousness in it, and an adequate center
- less conception of the world must include them all. If the world
- really doesn’t have a particular point of view, there can be no
- irreducibly first-person facts. On the other hand nothing could be
- clearer than that I am TN, and this seems like a first-person fact if
- there ever was one. So I seem to have on my hands a fact about
- the world which both must exist (for how things are would be
- incomplete without it) and cannot exist (for how things are cannot
- include it).
- A full treatment of this question would have to deal with
- the charge that it is a pseudo-problem caused by misunderstanding
- of the logic of token-reflexives. I believe this charge can be shown
- to be false. But instead of trying to do that here, I am going to
- propose a solution to the problem. Any problem that has a solution
- must be real.
- The philosophical thought that I am TN has a content very
- different from what is conveyed when I use the words ‘I am TN’
- to introduce myself to you. But it is a content for which room can
- [NAGEL] The Limits of Objectivity 93
- be found in a centerless conception of the world. A similar fact
- can be discovered about each of you, which is the object of your
- thought that you are the particular human individual you in fact
- are. But I shall proceed in the Cartesian first person, which is
- intended to be understood by each of you as applying to himself.
- When I think that I am TN, I think that the real me regards
- the world from the point of view of TN: occupies TN, so to
- speak. Another way of putting it would be to say that the publicly
- identifiable person TN contains the real me. But what is this ‘real
- me’? Why isn’t the real me just TN?
- Strange as it may sound, I find it extremely puzzling that I
- should be TN, and I think if we can understand what is puzzling
- about it, we will get to the heart of the problem. Actually the
- question “How can I be TN?” has two aspects, corresponding to
- the two directions in which it can be asked. So far I have been
- discussing the question “What kind of fact is it that the particular
- person TN is me?” But there is also the question “How can I
- be the particular person TN, or any other particular person for
- that matter? How can I be somebody?” It is this question that
- is really basic.
- Think about the world as a whole, with the publicly identifiable
- person you are as one of its contents, and ask yourself,
- “How can I be anything so specific as that; how can I be merely
- a particular person?” This is different from the original question,
- which was, “What makes that person me?” The problem here is
- how I can be anything so specific as a particular person in the
- world at all - any person.
- The trouble is that my connection with TN seems arbitrary.
- When I consider the world as a whole, as existing from no particular
- point of view, TN is just one person among many others,
- and although on Earth his species is dominant, that fades to insignificance
- on an astronomical scale. How can I, who am thinking
- about the entire, centerless universe, be anything so specific
- as this: this creature in the universe, existing in a tiny morsel of
- 94 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
- space and time, with a definite and by no means universal mental
- and physical organization ?
- I believe the solution to both these problems is the same. The
- problems are: (1) What kind of fact is it that TN is me?
- (2) How can I be anything so specific as TN? And the solution
- comes from identifying the ‘I’ in these thoughts with an objective
- self that each of us contains, that has an unlimited capacity
- to step back from the standpoint of the person I am in order to
- form a new conception of the world in which that person and his
- states are located.
- The picture is this. Essentially I am a subject that apprehends
- a centerless world. Essentially I have no particular point of view.
- In fact I ordinarily view the world through the eyes, the person,
- the daily life of TN, as through a window. But the experiences
- and the perspective of TN with which I am directly presented are
- not essential to the point of view of the true self. The true self
- apprehends the world from no point of view and includes in its
- conception TN and his perspective among the contents of the
- world.
- How do I separate my true self from this person ? By treating
- the experiences of this person, which depend on his particularity,
- as data. I throw him into the world as a thing that interacts with
- the rest of it, and ask what the world must be like from no point
- of view in order to appear to him as it does from his point of
- view. I can reason in this way about anyone else as well as about
- him. Even though I receive the information of his point of view
- directly, I try to deal with it for the purpose of constructing a
- realist and partly objective picture in a way similar to that which
- would be appropriate if the information were coming to me
- indirectly.
- So when I have the philosophical thought that I am TN, I am
- recognizing that the particular objective self that is the subject
- of this centerless conception of a world in which TN is located,
- is also viewing the world from within through the perspective of
- [NAGEL] The Limits of Objectivity 95
- TN. And when I am philosophically puzzled over how I can be
- merely the person TN, it is because I am thinking of myself as the
- objective self which occupies TN. The paradox disappears because
- TN, like the rest of you, turns out to be not merely a particular
- creature with a very specific perspective on the world from his
- position inside it. Any human being also contains a very different
- kind of subject, largely undeveloped or unexplored, but with the
- potential for indefinite further impersonal and objective apprehension
- of the world. The ‘further fact’ that I am TN is the fact
- that this impersonal conception of the world can close over itself
- by locating the subject that forms it at a particular point in the
- world that it apprehends. It is attached to, and developed from,
- the perspective of TN. And since that is not an irreducibly firstperson
- fact, it can be part of the real world.
- 11. Let me close by saying something about the more general
- implications of these remarks, which have been concerned specifically
- with the philosophy of mind. In trying to explain how the
- mind and the self are to be included in the real world that simply
- exists, I have distinguished between reality and objective reality,
- and also between objectivity and particular conceptions of objectivity.
- The physical conception of objectivity is inappropriate for
- increasing our understanding of the mind; and even the kind of
- objectivity that is appropriate for this purpose will not permit us
- to form a complete idea of all the various incompatible mental
- perspectives. The general upshot, that applies to ethics as well, is
- that one should pursue the kind of objectivity appropriate to the
- subject one is trying to understand, and that even the right kind of
- objectivity may not exhaust the subject completely.
- The problem of bringing together subjective and objective
- views of the world can be approached from either direction. If
- one starts from the subjective side the problem is the traditional one
- of skepticism, idealism, or solipsism. How, given my personal experiential
- perspective, can I form a conception of the world as it is
- 96 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
- independent of my perception of it? And how can I know that
- this conception is correct? (The question may also be asked from
- the point of view of the collective human perspective rather than
- from that of an individual.) If on the other hand one starts from
- the objective side, the problem is how to accommodate, in a world
- that simply exists from no perspective, any of the following
- things: (a) oneself, (b) one’s point of view, (c) the point of
- view of other selves, similar and dissimilar, and (d) the objects
- of various types of judgment that seem to emanate from these
- perspectives.
- It is this second version of the problem that interests me. It is
- the obverse of skepticism because the given is objective reality -
- or the idea of an objective reality - and what is problematic by
- contrast is subjective reality. Without receiving full acknowledgment
- this approach has been very influential in recent analytic
- philosophy. It accords well with a bias toward physical science as
- a paradigm of understanding.
- But if under the pressure of realism we admit that there are
- things which cannot be understood in this way, then other ways of
- understanding them must be sought. One way is to enrich the
- notion of objectivity. But to insist in every case that the most
- objective and detached account of a phenomenon is the correct
- one is likely to lead to reductive conclusions. Sometimes, in the
- philosophy of mind, and as I hope to show, in ethics, the truth
- is not to be found by traveling as far away from one’s personal
- perspective as possible.
- II. VALUE
- 1. Whether values can be objective depends on whether an
- interpretation of objectivity can be found that allows us to advance
- our knowledge of what to do, what to want, and what things provide
- reasons for and against action. Last week I argued that the
- physical conception of objectivity was not able to provide an
- understanding of the mind, but that another conception was available
- which allowed external understanding of at least some
- aspects of mental phenomena. A still different conception is
- required to make sense of the objectivity of values, for values are
- neither physical nor mental. And even if we find a conception, it
- must be applied with care. Not all values are likely to prove to be
- objective in any sense.
- Let me say in advance that my discussion of values and reasons
- in this lecture and the next will be quite general. I shall be talking
- largely about what determines whether something has value,
- or whether someone has a reason to do or want something. I shall
- say nothing about how we pass from the identification of values
- and reasons to a conclusion as to what should be done. That is of
- course what makes reasons important; but I shall just assume that
- values do often provide the basis for such conclusions, without
- trying to describe even in outline how the full process of practical
- reasoning works. I am concerned here only with the general question,
- whether values have an objective foundation at all.
- In general, as I said last time, objectivity is advanced when
- we step back, detach from our earlier point of view toward something,
- and arrive at a new view of the whole that is formed by
- including ourselves and our earlier viewpoint in what is to be
- understood.
- 98 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
- In theoretical reasoning this is done by forming a new conception
- of reality that includes ourselves as components. This
- involves an alteration, or at least an extension, of our beliefs.
- Whether the effort to detach will actually result in an increase of
- understanding depends on the creative capacity to form objective
- ideas which is called into action when we add ourselves to the
- world and start over.
- In the sphere of values or practical reasoning, the problem is
- somewhat different. As in the theoretical case, in order to pursue
- objectivity we must take up a new, comprehensive viewpoint after
- stepping back and including our former perspective in what is to
- be understood. But in this case the new viewpoint will be not
- a new set of beliefs, but a new, or extended, set of values. If
- objectivity means anything here, it will mean that when we detach
- from our individual perspective and the values and reasons that
- seem acceptable from within it, we can sometimes arrive at a new
- conception which may endorse some of the original reasons but
- will reject some as subjective appearances and add others. This is
- what is usually meant by an objective, disinterested view of a
- practical question.
- The basic step of placing ourselves and our attitudes within
- the world to be considered is familiar, but the form of the resulta
- new set of values, reasons, and motives - is different. In order
- to discover whether there are any objective values or reasons we
- must try to arrive at normative judgments, with motivational content,
- from an impersonal standpoint: a standpoint outside of our
- lives. We cannot use a non-normative criterion of objectivity: for
- if any values are objective, they are objective values, not objective
- anything else.
- 2. There are many opinions about whether what we have reason
- to do or want can be determined from a detached standpoint
- toward ourselves and the world. They range all the way from the
- view that objectivity has no place in this domain except what is
- [NAGEL] The Limits of Objectivity 99
- inherited from the objectivity of those theoretical and factual elements
- that play a role in practical reasoning, to the view that
- objectivity applies here, but with a nihilistic result: i.e., that
- nothing is objectively right or wrong because objectively nothing
- matters. In between are many positive objectifying views which
- claim to get some definite results from a detached standpoint.
- Each of them is criticized by adherents of opposing views either
- for trying to force too much into a single objective framework or
- for according too much or too little respect to divergent subjective
- points of view.
- Here as elsewhere there is a direct connection between the
- goal of objectivity and the belief in realism. The most basic idea
- of practical objectivity is arrived at by a practical analogue of
- the rejection of solipsism or idealism in the theoretical domain.
- Just as realism about the facts leads us to seek a detached point of
- view from which reality can be discerned and appearance corrected,
- so realism about values leads us to seek a detached point
- of view from which it will be possible to correct inclination and
- to discern what we really should do, or want. Practical objectivity
- means that practical reason can be understood and even engaged
- in by the objective self.
- This assumption, though powerful, is not yet an ethical position.
- It merely marks the place which an ethical position will
- occupy if we can make any sense of the subject. It says that the
- world of reasons, including my reasons, does not exist only from
- my point of view. I am in a world whose properties are to a certain
- extent independent of what I think, and if I have reasons to
- act it is because the person who I am has those reasons, in virtue
- of his condition and circumstances. One would expect those reasons
- to be understandable from outside. Here as elsewhere objectivity
- is a form of understanding not necessarily available for all
- of reality. But it is reasonable at least to look for such understanding
- over as wide an area as possible.
- 100 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
- 3. It is important not to lose sight of the dangers of false
- objectification, which too easily elevate personal tastes and prejudices
- into cosmic values. But initially, at least, it is natural to
- look for some objective account of those reasons that appear from
- one’s own point of view.
- In fact those reasons usually present themselves with some
- pretensions of objectivity to begin with, just as perceptual appearances
- do. When two things look the same size to me, they look at
- least initially as if they are the same size. And when I want to
- take aspirin because it will cure my headache, I believe at least
- initially that this is a reason for me to take aspirin, that it can
- be recognized as a reason from outside, and that if I failed to take
- it into account, that would be a mistake, and others could recognize
- this.
- The ordinary process of deliberation, aimed at finding out
- what I have reason to do, assumes that the question has an answer.
- And in difficult cases especially, deliberation is often accompanied
- by the belief that I may not arrive at that answer. I do not assume
- that the correct answer is just whatever will result or has resulted
- from consistent application of deliberative methods-even assuming
- perfect information about the facts. In deliberation we are
- trying to arrive at conclusions that are correct in virtue of something
- independent of our arriving at them. If we arrive at a conclusion,
- we believe that it would have been correct even if we
- hadn’t arrived at it. And we can also acknowledge that we might
- be wrong, since the process of reasoning doesn’t guarantee the
- correctness of the result. So the pursuit of an objective account
- of practical reasons has its basis in the realist claims of ordinary
- practical reasoning. In accordance with pretheoretical judgment
- we adopt the working hypothesis that there are reasons which
- may diverge from actual motivation even under conditions of perfect
- information - as reality can diverge from appearance -
- and then consider what form these reasons take. I shall say more
- about the general issue of realism later on. But first I want to
- [NAGEL] The Limits of Objectivity 101
- concentrate on the process of thought by which, against a realist
- background, one might try to arrive at objective conclusions about
- reasons for action. In other words, if there really are values, how
- is objective knowledge of them possible?
- In this inquiry no particular hypothesis occupies a privileged
- position, and it is certain that some of our starting points will be
- abandoned as we proceed. However, one condition on reasons
- obviously presents itself for consideration: a condition of generality.
- This is the condition that if something provides a reason
- for a particular individual to do something, then there is a general
- form of that reason which applies to anyone else in comparable
- circumstances. What count as comparable circumstances depends
- on the general form of the reason. This condition is not tautological.
- It is a rather strong condition which may be false, or true only
- for some kinds of reasons. But the search for generality is a
- natural beginning.
- 4. There is more than one type of generality, and no reason to
- assume that a single form will apply to every kind of reason or
- value. In fact I think that the choice among types of generality
- defines some of the central issues of contemporary moral theory.
- One respect in which reasons may vary is in their breadth. A
- general principle may apply to everyone but be quite specific in
- content, and it is an open question to what extent narrower principles
- of practical reasons (don’t lie; develop your talents) can
- be subsumed under broader ones (don’t hurt others; consider your
- long-term interests), or even at the limit under a single widest
- principle from which all the rest derive. Reasons may be general,
- in other words, without forming a unified system that always
- provides a method for arriving at determinate conclusions about
- what one should do.
- A second respect in which reasons vary is in their relativity
- to the agent, the person for whom they are reasons. The distinction
- between reasons that are relative to the agent and reasons that
- 102 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
- are not is an extremely important one. I shall follow Derek Parfit
- in using the terms ‘agent-relative’and ‘agent-neutral’ to mark this
- distinction. (Formerly I used the terms ‘subjective’and ‘objective,’
- but those terms are here reserved for other purposes.)
- If a reason can be given a general form which does not include
- an essential reference to the person to whom it applies, it is an
- agent-neutral reason. For example, if it is a reason for anyone
- to do or want something that it would reduce the amount of
- wretchedness in the world, then that is an agent-neutral reason.
- If on the other hand the general form of a reason does include
- an essential reference to the person to whom it applies, it is an
- agent-relative reason. For example, if it is a reason for anyone to
- do or want something that it would be in his interest, then that is
- an agent-relative reason. In such a case, if something were in Jones’s
- interest but contrary to Smith’s, Jones would have reason to want
- it to happen and Smith would have the same reason to want it not
- to happen. (Both agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons are objective,
- since both can be understood from outside the viewpoint of
- the individual who has them.)
- A third way in which reasons may vary is in their degree of
- externality, or independence of the interests of sentient beings.
- Most of the apparent reasons that initially present themselves to
- us are intimately connected with interests and desires, our own or
- those of others, and often with experiential satisfaction. But it is
- conceivable that some of these interests give evidence that their
- objects have intrinsic value independent of the satisfaction that
- anyone may derive from them or of the fact that anyone wants
- them - independent even of the existence of beings who can take
- an interest in them. I shall call a reason internal if it depends on
- the existence of an interest or desire in someone, and external if
- it does not. External reasons were believed to exist by Plato, and
- more recently by G. E. Moore, who believed that aesthetic value
- provided candidates for this kind of externality.
- These three types of variation cut across one another. For-
- [NAGEL] The Limits of Objectivity 103
- mally, a reason may be narrow, external, and agent-relative (don’t
- eat pork, keep your promises), or broad, internal, and agent-neutral
- (promote happiness), or internal and agent-relative (promote your
- own happiness). There may be other significant dimensions of
- variation. I want to concentrate on these because they locate the
- main controversies about what ethics is. Reasons and values that
- can be described in these terms provide the material for objective
- judgments. If one looks at human action and its conditions from
- outside and considers whether some normative principles are
- plausible, these are the forms they will take.
- The actual acceptance of a genera1 normative judgment will
- have motivational implications, for it will commit you under some
- circumstances to the acceptance of reasons to want and do things
- yourself.
- This is most clear when the objective judgment is that something
- has agent-neutral value. That means anyone has reason to
- want it to happen-and that includes someone considering the
- world in detachment from the perspective of any particular person
- within it. Such a judgment has motivational content even before
- it is brought back down to the particular perspective of the individual
- who has accepted it objectively.
- Agent-relative reasons are different. An objective judgment that
- some kind of thing has agent-relative value commits us only to
- believing that someone has reason to want and pursue it if it is related
- to him in the right way (being in his interest, for example).
- Someone who accepts this judgment is not committed to wanting
- it to be the case that people in general are influenced by such
- reasons. The judgment commits him to wanting something only
- when its implications are drawn for the individual person he
- happens to be. With regard to others, the content of the objective
- judgment concerns only what they should do or want.
- I believe that judgments of both these kinds, as well as others,
- are evoked from us when we take up an objective standpoint.
- And I believe such judgments can be just as true and compelling
- 104 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
- as objective factual judgments about the real world that contains
- us.
- 5. When we take the step to objectivity in practical reasoning
- by detaching from our own point of view, the question we must
- ask ourselves is this: What reasons for action can be said to apply
- to people when we regard them from a standpoint detached from
- the values of any particular person ?
- The simplest answer, and one that some people would give, is
- “None.” But that is not the only option. The suggested classification
- of types of generality provides a range of alternative
- hypotheses. It also provides some flexibility of response, for with
- regard to any reason that may appear to a particular individual
- to exist subjectively, the corresponding objective judgment may be
- that it does not exist at all, or that it corresponds to an agentneutral,
- external value, or anything in between.
- The choice among these hypotheses, plus others not yet imagined,
- is difficult, and there is no general method of making it any
- more than there is a general method of selecting the most plausible
- objective account of the facts on the basis of the appearances.
- The only ‘method,’ here or elsewhere, is to try to generate hypotheses
- and then to consider which of them seems most reasonable, in
- light of everything else one is fairly confident of.
- This is not quite empty, for it means at least that logic alone
- can settle nothing. We do not have to be shown that the denial
- of some kind of objective values is self-contradictory in order to
- be reasonably led to accept their existence. There is no constraint
- to pick the weakest or narrowest or most economical principle
- consistent with the initial data that arise from individual perspectives.
- Our admission of reasons beyond these is determined not
- by logical entailment, but by what we cannot help believing, or at
- least finding most plausible among the alternatives.
- In this respect it is no different from anything else: theoretical
- knowledge does not arise by deductive inference from the appear-
- [NAGEL] The Limits of Objectivity 105
- ances either. The main difference is that our objective thinking
- about practical reasons is very primitive, and has difficulty taking
- even the first step. Philosophical skepticism and idealism about
- values are much more popular than their metaphysical counterparts.
- Nevertheless I believe they are no more correct. I shall
- argue that although no single objective principle of practical reason
- like egoism or utilitarianism covers everything, the acceptance
- of some objective values is unavoidable - not because the alternative
- is inconsistent but because it is not credible. Someone who, as
- in Hume’s example, prefers the destruction of the whole world
- to the scratching of his finger, may not be involved in a contradiction
- or in any false expectations, but he is unreasonable nonetheless
- (to put it mildly), and anyone else not in the grip of an
- overly narrow conception of what reasoning is would regard his
- preference as objectively wrong.
- 6. But even if it is unreasonable to deny that anyone ever
- objectively has a reason to do anything, it is not easy to find positive
- objective principles that are reasonable. I am going to attempt
- to defend a few in the rest of this lecture and the next. But I
- want to acknowledge in advance that it is not easy to follow the
- objectifying impulse without distorting individual life and personal
- relations. We want to be able to understand and accept
- the way we live from outside, but it may not always follow that
- we should control our lives from inside by the terms of that
- external understanding. Often the objective viewpoint will not be
- suitable as a replacement for the subjective, but will coexist with
- it, setting a standard with which the subjective is constrained not
- to clash. In deciding what to do, for example, we should not
- reach a result different from what we could decide objectively that
- that person should do - but we need not arrive at the result in
- the same way from the two standpoints.
- Sometimes, also, the objective standpoint will allow us to
- judge how people should be or should live, without permitting us
- 106 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
- to translate this into a judgment about what they have reasons to
- do. For in some respects it is better to live and act not for reasons,
- but because we cannot help it. This is especially true of close personal
- relations. Here the objective standpoint cannot be brought
- into the perspective of action without destroying precisely what
- it affirms the value of. Nevertheless the possibility of this objective
- affirmation is important. We should be able to view our lives
- from outside without extreme dissociation or distaste, and the
- extent to which we should live without considering the objective
- point of view or even any reasons at all is itself determined
- largely from that point of view.
- It is also possible that some idiosyncratic individual grounds of
- action, or the values of strange communities, will prove objectively
- inaccessible. To take an example in our midst: I don’t think
- that people who want to be able to run twenty-six miles without
- stopping are irrational, but their reasons can be understood only
- from the perspective of a value system that is completely alien to
- me, and will I hope remain so. A correct objective view will have
- to allow for such pockets of unassimilable subjectivity, which need
- not clash with objective principles but won’t be affirmed by them
- either. Many aspects of personal taste will come in this category,
- if, as I think, they cannot all be brought under a general hedonistic
- principle.
- But the most difficult and interesting problems of accommodation
- appear where objectivity can be employed as a standard, but
- we have to decide how. Some of the problems are these: To what
- extent should an objective view admit external values? To what
- extent should it admit internal but agent-neutral values? To what
- extent should the reasons to respect the interests of others take an
- agent-relative form ? To what extent is it legitimate for each person
- to give priority to his own interests? These are all questions about
- the proper form of generality for different kinds of practical reasoning,
- and the proper relation between objective principles and
- the deliberations of individual agents. I shall return to some of
- [NAGEL] The Limits of Objectivity 107
- them later, but there is a great deal that I shall not get to.
- I shall not, for example, discuss the question of external
- values, i.e., values which may be revealed to us by the attractiveness
- of certain things, but whose existence is independent of the
- existence of any interests or desires. I am not sure whether there
- are any such values, though the objectifying tendency produces a
- strong impulse to believe that there are, especially in aesthetics
- where the object of interest is external and the interest seems
- perpetually capable of criticism in light of further attention to the
- object.
- What I shall discuss is the proper form of internal values or
- reasons - those which depend on interests or desires. They can
- be objectified in more than one way, and I believe different forms
- of objectification are appropriate for different cases.
- 7. I plan to take up some of these complications in the next
- lecture. Let me begin, however, with a case for which I think the
- solution is simple: that of pleasure and pain. I am not an ethical
- hedonist, but I think pleasure and pain are very important, and
- they have a kind of neutrality that makes them fit easily into
- ethical thinking - unlike preferences or desires, for example,
- which I shall discuss later on.
- I mean the kinds of pleasure and pain that do not depend on
- activities or desires which themselves raise questions of justification
- and value. Many pleasures and pains are just sensory experiences
- in relation to which we are fairly passive, but toward which
- we feel involuntary desire or aversion. Almost everyone takes the
- avoidance of his own pain and the promotion of his own pleasure
- as subjective reasons for action in a fairly simple way; they are
- not backed up by any further reasons. On the other hand if someone
- pursues pain or avoids pleasure, these idiosyncracies usually
- are backed up by further reasons, like guilt or sexual masochism.
- The question is, what sort of general value, if any, ought to be
- assigned to pleasure and pain when we consider these facts from
- 108 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
- an objective standpoint ?
- It seems to me that the least plausible hypothesis is the zero
- position, that pleasure and pain have no value of any kind that
- can be objectively recognized. That would mean that looking at it
- from outside, you couldn’t even say that someone had a reason not
- to put his hand on a hot stove. Try looking at it from the outside
- and see whether you can manage to withhold that judgment.
- But I want to leave this position aside, because what really
- interests me is the choice between two other hypotheses, both of
- which admit that people have reason to avoid their own pain and
- pursue their own pleasure. They are the fairly obvious general
- hypotheses formed by assigning (a) agent-relative or (b) agentneutral
- value to those experiences. If the avoidance of pain has only
- agent-relative value, then people have reason to avoid their own
- pain, but not to avoid the pain of others (unless other kinds of reasons
- come into play). If the avoidance of pain has agent-neutral
- value as well, then anyone has a reason to want any pain to stop,
- whether or not it is his. From an objective standpoint, which of
- these hypotheses is more plausible? Is the value of sensory pleasure
- and pain agent-relative or agent-neutral ?
- I believe it is agent-neutral, at least in part. That is, I believe
- pleasure is a good thing and pain is a bad thing, and that the
- most reasonable objective principle which admits that each of us
- has reason to pursue his own pleasure and avoid his own pain will
- acknowledge that these are not the only reasons present. This is a
- normative claim. Unreasonable, as I have said, does not mean
- inconsis ten t.
- In arguing for this claim, I am somewhat handicapped by the
- fact that I find it self-evident. It is therefore difficult for me to
- find something still more certain with which to back it up. But I
- shall try to say what is wrong with rejecting it, and with the reasons
- that may lie behind its rejection. What would it be to really
- accept the alternative hypothesis that pleasure and pain are not
- impersonally good or bad? If I accept this hypothesis, assuming
- [NAGEL] The Limits of Objectivity 109
- at the same time that each person has reason to seek pleasure and
- avoid pain for himself, then when I regard the matter objectively
- the result is very peculiar. I will have to believe that I have a
- reason to take aspirin for a headache, but that there is no reason
- for me to have an aspirin. And I will have to believe the same
- about anyone else. From an objective standpoint I must judge
- that everyone has reason to pursue a type of result that is impersonally
- valueless, that has value only to him.
- This needs to be explained. If agent-neutral reasons are not
- ruled out of consideration from the start (and one would need
- reasons for that), why do we not have evidence of them here?
- The avoidance of pain is not an individual project, expressing the
- agent’s personal values. The desire to make pain stop is simply
- evoked in the person who feels it. He may decide for various
- reasons not to stop it, but in the first instance he doesn’t have to
- decide to want it to stop: he just does. He wants it to go away
- because it’s bad: it is not made bad by his deciding that he wants
- it to go away. And I believe that when we think about it objectively,
- concentrating on what pain is like, and ask ourselves
- whether it is (a) not bad at all, (b) bad only for its possessor, or
- (c) bad period, the third answer is the one that needs to be
- argued against, not the one that needs to be argued for. The
- philosophical problem here is to get rid of the obstacles to the
- admission of the obvious. But first they have to be identified.
- Consider how strange is the question posed by someone who
- wants a justification for altruism about such a basic matter as this.
- Suppose he and some other people have been admitted to a hospital
- with severe burns after being rescued from a fire. “I understand
- how my pain provides me with a reason to take an analgesic,”
- he says, “and I understand how my groaning neighbor’s
- pain gives him a reason to take an analgesic; but how does his
- pain give me any reason to want him to be given an analgesic?
- How can his pain give me or anyone else looking at it from outside
- a reason?”
- 110 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
- This question is crazy. As an expression of puzzlement, it
- has that characteristic philosophical craziness which indicates that
- something very fundamental has gone wrong. This shows up in
- the fact that the answer to the question is obvious, so obvious that
- to ask the question is obviously a philosophical act. The answer
- is that pain is awful. The pain of the man groaning in the next
- bed is just as awful as yours. That’s your reason to want him to
- have an analgesic.
- Yet to many philosophers, when they think about the matter
- theoretically, this answer seems not to be available. The pain of
- the person in the next bed is thought to need major external help
- before it can provide me with a reason for wanting or doing anything:
- otherwise it can’t get its hooks into me. Since most of these
- people are perfectly aware of the force such considerations actually
- have for them, justifications of some kind are usually found.
- But they take the form of working outward from the desires and
- interests of the individual for whom reasons are being sought.
- The burden of proof is thought always to be on the claim that he
- has reason to care about anything that is not already an object of
- his interest.
- These justifications are unnecessary. They plainly falsify the
- real nature of the case. My reason for wanting my neighbor’s pain
- to cease is just that it’s awful, and I know it.
- 8. What is responsible for this demand for justification with
- its special flavor of philosophical madness? I believe it is something
- rather deep, which doesn’t surface in the ordinary course of
- life: an inappropriate sense of the burden of proof. Basically, we
- are being asked for a demonstration of the possibility of real
- impersonal values, on the assumption that they are not possible
- unless such a general proof can be given.
- But I think this is wrong. We can already conceive of such a
- possibility, and once we take the step of thinking about what
- reality, if any, there is in the domain of practical reason, it be-
- [NAGEL] The Limits of Objectivity 111
- comes a possibility we are bound to consider, that we cannot help
- considering. If there really are reasons not just motivational
- pushes and pulls, and if agent-neutral reasons are among the kinds
- we can conceive of, then it becomes an obvious possibility that
- physical pain is simply bad: that even from an impersonal standpoint
- there is reason to want it to stop. When we view the matter
- objectively, this is one of the general positions that naturally suggests
- itself.
- And once this is seen as a possibility, it becomes difficult not
- to accept it. It becomes a hypothesis that has to be dislodged by
- anyone who wishes to claim, for example, that all reasons are
- agent-relative. The question is, what are the alternatives, once we
- take up the objective standpoint? We must think something. If
- there is room in the realistic conception of reasons for agent-neutral
- values, then it is unnatural not to ascribe agent-neutral badness to
- burn pains. That is the natural conclusion from the fact that anyone
- who has a burn pain and is therefore closest to it wants
- acutely to be rid of it, and requires no indoctrination or training to
- want this. This evidence does not entail that burn pains are impersonally
- bad. It is logically conceivable that there is nothing
- bad about them at all, or that they provide only agent-relative reasons
- to their possessors to want them to go away. But to take such
- hypotheses seriously we would need justifications of a kind that
- seem totally unavailable in this case.
- What could possibly show us that acute physical pain, which
- everyone finds horrible, is in reality not impersonally bad at all,
- so that except from the point of view of the sufferer it doesn’t in
- itself matter? Only a very remarkable and farfetched picture of
- the value of a cosmic order beyond our immediate grasp, in which
- pain played an essential part which made it good or at least
- neutral - or else a demonstration that there can be no agent-neutral
- values. But I take it that neither of these is available: the first
- because the Problem of Evil has not been solved, the second
- because the absence of a logical demonstration that there are
- 112 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
- agent-neutral values is not a demonstration that there are not agentneutral
- values.
- My position is this. No demonstration is necessary in order to
- allow us to consider the possibility of agent-neutral reasons: the
- possibility simply occurs to us once we take up an objective stance.
- And there is no mystery about how an individual could have a
- reason to want something independently of its relation to his particular
- interests or point of view, because beings like ourselves are
- not limited to the particular point of view that goes with their
- personal position inside the world. They are also, as I have put it
- earlier, objective selves: they cannot help forming an objective
- conception of the world with themselves in it; they cannot help
- trying to arrive at judgments of value from that standpoint; they
- cannot help asking whether, from that standpoint, in abstraction
- from who in the world they are, they have any reason to want anything
- to be the case or not-any reason to want anything to
- happen or not.
- Agent-neutral reasons do not have to find a miraculous source
- in our personal lives, because we are not merely personal beings:
- we are also importantly and essentially viewers of the world from
- nowhere within it - and in this capacity we remain open to judgments
- of value, both general and particular. The possibility of
- agent-neutral values is evident as soon as we begin to think from
- this standpoint about the reality of any reasons whatever. If we
- acknowledge the possibility of realism, then we cannot rule out
- agent-neutral values in advance.
- Realism is therefore the fundamental issue. If there really are
- values and reasons, then it should be possible to expand our
- understanding of them by objective investigation, and there is no
- reason to rule out the natural and compelling objective judgment
- that pain is impersonally bad and pleasure impersonally good. So
- let me turn now to the abstract issue of realism about values.
- 9. Like the presumption that things exist in an external world,
- [NAGEL] The Limits of Objectivity 113
- the presumption that there are real values and reasons can be
- defeated in individual cases, if a purely subjective account of the
- appearances is more plausible. And like the presumption of an
- external world, its complete falsity is not self-contradictory. The
- reality of values, agent-neutral or otherwise, is not entailed by the
- totality of appearances any more than the reality of a physical
- universe is. But if either of them is recognized as a possibility,
- then its reality in detail can be confirmed by appearances, at least
- to the extent of being rendered more plausible than the alternatives.
- So a lot depends on whether the possibility of realism is
- admitted in the first place.
- It is very difficult to argue for such a possibility. Sometimes
- there will be arguments against it, which one can try to refute.
- Berkeley’s argument against the conceivability of a world independent
- of experience is an example. But what is the result when
- such an argument is refuted? Is the possibility in a stronger position?
- I believe so: in general, there is no way to prove the possibility
- of realism; one can only refute impossibility arguments, and
- the more often one does this the more confidence one may have
- in the realist alternative. So to consider the merits of an admission
- of realism about value, we have to consider the reasons
- against it. I shall discuss three. They have been picked for their
- apparent capacity to convince people.
- The first argument depends on the question-begging assumption
- that if values are real, they must be real objects of some other
- kind. John Mackie, for example, in his recent book Ethics, denies
- the objectivity of values by saying that they are not part of the
- fabric of the world, and that if they were, they would have to be
- “entities or qualities or relations of a very strange sort, utterly
- different from anything else in the universe.” Apparently he has
- a very definite picture of what the universe is like, and assumes
- 4 J. L. Mackie, Ethics (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1977),
- p. 38.
- 114 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
- that realism about value would require crowding it with extra
- entities, qualities, or relations - things like Platonic Forms or
- Moore’s non-natural qualities. But this assumption is not correct.
- The impersonal badness of pain is not some mysterious further
- property that all pains have, but just the fact that there is reason
- for anyone capable of viewing the world objectively to want it to
- stop, whether it is his or someone else’s. The view that values are
- real is not the view that they are real occult entities or properties,
- but that they are real values: that our claims about value and
- about what people have reason to do may be true or false independently
- of our beliefs and inclinations. No other kinds of truths
- are involved. Indeed, no other kinds of truths could imply the
- reality of values.5
- The second argument I want to consider is not, like the first,
- based on a misinterpretation of moral objectivity. Instead, it tries
- to represent the unreality of values as an objective discovery. The
- argument is that if claims of value have to be objectively correct
- or incorrect, and if they are not reducible to any other kind of
- objective claim, then we can just see that all positive value claims
- must be false. Nothing has any objective value, because objectively
- nothing matters at all. If we push the claims of objective
- detachment to their logical conclusion, and survey the world from
- a standpoint completely detached from all interests, we discover
- that there is nothing - no values left of any kind: things can be
- 5 In discussion, Mackie claimed that I had misrepresented him, and that his
- disbelief in the reality of values and reasons does not depend on the assumption
- that to be real they must be strange entities or properties. As he says in his book,
- it applies directly to reasons themselves. For whatever they are they are not needed
- to explain anything that happens, and there is consequently no reason to believe in
- their existence. But I would reply that this raises the same issue. It begs the question
- to assume that explanatory necessity is the test of reality in this area. The
- claim that certain reasons exist is a normative claim, not a claim about the best
- explanation of anything. To assume that only what has to be included in the best
- explanatory picture of the world is real, is to assume that there are no irreducibly
- normative truths.
- There is much more to be said on both sides of this issue, and I hope I have
- not misrepresented Mackie in this short footnote.
- [NAGEL] The Limits of Objectivity 115
- said to matter at all only to individuals within the world. The
- result is objective nihilism.
- I don’t deny that the objective standpoint tempts one in this
- direction. But I believe this can seem like the required conclusion
- only if one makes the mistake of assuming that objective judgments
- of value must emerge from the detached standpoint alone.
- It is true that with nothing to go on but a conception of the world
- from nowhere, one would have no way of telling whether anything
- had value. But an objective view has more to go on, for its
- data include the appearance of value to individuals with particular
- perspectives, including oneself. In this respect practical reason is
- no different from anything else. Starting from a pure idea of a
- possible reality and a very impure set of appearances, we try to
- fill in the idea of reality so as to make some partial sense of the
- appearances, using objectivity as a method. To find out what the
- world is like from outside we have to approach it from within:
- it is no wonder that the same is true for ethics. And indeed, when
- we take up the objective standpoint, the problem is not that values
- seem to disappear but that there seem to be too many of them,
- coming from every life and drowning out those that arise from
- our own. It is just as easy to form desires from an objective standpoint
- as it is to form beliefs. Probably easier. Like beliefs, these
- desires and evaluations must be criticized and justified partly in
- terms of the appearances. But they are not just further appearances,
- any more than the beliefs about the world which arise from
- an impersonal standpoint are just further appearances.
- The third type of argument against the objective reality of
- values is an empirical argument. It is also perhaps the most
- common. It is intended not to rule out the possibility of real
- values from the start, but rather to demonstrate that even if their
- possibility is admitted, we have no reason to believe that there
- are any. The claim is that if we consider the wide cultural variation
- in normative beliefs, the importance of social pressure and
- other psychological influences to their formation, and the difficulty
- 116 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
- of settling moral disagreements, it becomes highly implausible
- that they are anything but pure appearances.
- Anyone offering this argument must admit that not every
- psychological factor in the explanation of an appearance shows
- that the appearance corresponds to nothing real. Visual capacities
- and elaborate training play a part in explaining the physicist’s perception
- of a cloud-chamber track, or a student’s coming to believe
- a proposition of geometry, but the path of the particle and the
- truth of the proposition also play an essential part in these explanations.
- So far as I know, no one has produced a general account
- of the kinds of psychological explanation that discredit an appearance.
- But some skeptics about ethics feel that because of the way
- we acquire moral beliefs and other impressions of value, there are
- grounds for confidence that no real, objective values play a part
- in the explanation.
- I find the popularity of this argument surprising. The fact
- that morality is socially inculcated and that there is radical disagreement
- about it across cultures, over time, and even within
- cultures at a time is a poor reason to conclude that values have
- no objective reality. Even where there is truth, it is not always
- easy to discover. Other areas of knowledge are taught by social
- pressure, many truths as well as falsehoods are believed without
- rational grounds, and there is wide disagreement about scientific
- and social facts, especially where strong interests are involved
- which will be affected by different answers to a disputed question.
- This last factor is present throughout ethics to a uniquely high
- degree: it is an area in which one would expect extreme variation
- of belief and radical disagreement however objectively real the
- subject actually was. For comparably motivated disagreements
- about matters of fact, one has to go to the heliocentric theory, the
- theory of evolution, the Dreyfus case, the Hiss case, and the
- genetic contribution to racial differences in I.Q.
- Although the methods of ethical reasoning are rather primitive,
- the degree to which agreement can be achieved and social
- [NAGEL] The Limits of Objectivity 117
- prejudices transcended in the face of strong pressures suggests that
- something real is being investigated, and that part of the explanation
- of the appearances, both at simple and at complex levels, is
- that we perceive, often inaccurately, that certain reasons for action
- exist, and go on to infer, often erroneously, the general form of
- the principles that best accounts for those reasons.
- The controlling conception that supports these efforts at
- understanding, in ethics as in science, is realism, or the possibility
- of realism. Without being sure that we will find one, we look for
- an account of what reasons there really are, an account that can
- be objectively understood.
- I have not discussed all the possible arguments against realism
- about values, but I have tried to give general reasons for skepticism
- about such arguments. It seems to me that they tend to be
- supported by a narrow preconception of what there is, and that
- this is essentially question-begging.
- 10. Let me close this lecture by indicating what I plan to discuss
- next week. So far I have been arguing against skepticism,
- and in favor of realism and the pursuit of objectivity in the
- domain of practical reason. But if realism is admitted as a possibility,
- one is quickly faced with the opposite of the problem of
- skepticism. This is the problem of over-objectification: the temptation
- to interpret the objectivity of reasons in too strong and unitary
- a way.
- In ethics, as in metaphysics, the allure of objectivity is very
- great: there is a persistent tendency in both areas to seek a single,
- complete objective account of reality - in the area of value that
- means a search for the most objective possible account of all reasons
- for action: the account acceptable from a maximally detached
- standpoint.
- This idea underlies the fairly common moral assumption that
- the only real values are agent-neutral values, and that someone can
- really have a reason to do something only if there is an agent-neutral
- 118 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
- reason for it to happen. That is the essence of consequentialism:
- the only reason for anyone to do anything is that it would be
- better in itself, considering the world as a whole, if he did it.
- (The idea also finds a reflection in Professor Hare’s view about
- the only kind of judgment that moral language can be used to
- express: for his claim that moral judgments are universally prescriptive
- means that they depend on what one would want to
- happen, considering the question from all points of view - rather
- than on what one would think people had reason to do, considering
- the question in this way. Consequently, any principle that was
- moral in his sense would have to be agent-neutral.)
- In the next lecture I shall try to explain why ethics has to be
- based not only on agent-neutral values like those that attach to
- pleasure and pain. We can no more assume that all reasons are
- agent-neutral than that all reality is physical. I argued earlier that
- not everything there is can be gathered into a uniform conception
- of the universe from nowhere within it. If certain perspectives
- evidently exist which cannot be analyzed in physical terms, we
- must modify our idea of objective reality to include them. If that
- is not enough, we must admit to reality some things that cannot
- be objectively understood. Similarly, if certain reasons for action
- which appear to exist cannot be accommodated within a purely
- agent-neutral system - or even perhaps within a general but agentrelative
- system - then we may have to modify our realist idea of
- value and practical reason accordingly. I don’t mean to suggest
- that there is no conflict here. The opposition between objective
- reasons and subjective inclinations may be severe, and may require
- us to change our lives. I mean only that the truth, if there is any,
- will be arrived at by the exploration of this conflict rather than by
- the automatic victory of the most transcendent standpoint. In the
- conduct of life, of all places, the rivalry between the view from
- within and the view from without must be taken seriously.
- III. ETHICS
- 1. In this lecture I want to take up some of the problems that
- must be faced by any defender of the objectivity of ethics who
- wishes to make sense of the actual complexity of the subject.
- There will be some parallels between what I say here and what I
- said in the first lecture, about the interpretation of objectivity with
- regard to the mind. Here also the treatment will be rather general
- and very incomplete. Essentially I shall discuss some examples in
- order to give grounds for believing that the enterprise is not
- hopeless.
- In the second lecture I distinguished between agent-relative and
- agent-neutral values. Agent-neutral values, if there are any, are the
- values of things good or bad in themselves, things that there is
- reason for anyone to want or not to want. Agent-relative values, on
- the other hand, while they are also general, are defined relatively.
- They are specified by reference to the agent for whom they provide
- reasons. For example, if there were a reason for everyone to
- want the world to be a happier place, independently of the effect
- of this on him, that would be an agent-neatral value. If on the
- other hand each person had reason to want only his own happiness
- and the happiness of others whom he cared for, that would
- be an agent-relative value.
- This contrast is central to an important set of issues about
- moral objectivity and its limits. Certain ethical positions, those
- sometimes called consequentialist, admit only agent-neutral values.
- That is, they hold that ethics is concerned only with what should
- happen, and never independently with what people should do.
- But the hegemony of agent-neutral values is challenged by two
- broad types of reasons that appear to be agent-relative in form, and
- 120 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
- whose existence seems to be independent of agent-neutral values.
- It is these that I propose to discuss today.
- The first type of reason stems from the desires, projects, commitments,
- and personal ties of the individual agent, all of which
- give him reasons to act in the pursuit of ends that are his own.
- These I shall collect under the general heading of reasons of
- auton om y.
- The second type of reason stems from the claims of other
- persons not to be maltreated in certain ways. What I have in mind
- are not agent-neutral reasons for everyone to want it to be the case
- that no one is maltreated, but agent-relative reasons for each individual
- not to maltreat others himself, in his dealings with them
- (e.g., by violating their rights, breaking his promises to them, etc.).
- These I shall collect under the general, ugly, and familiar heading
- of deontology. Autonomous reasons would limit what we are
- obliged to do in the service of agent-neutral values. Deontological
- reasons would limit what we are permitted to do in the service of
- either agent-neutral or autonomous ones.
- I am not sure whether all these agent-relative reasons actually
- exist. The autonomous ones are fairly intelligible; but while the idea
- behind the deontological ones can, I think, be explained, it is an
- explanation which throws some doubt on their validity. The only
- way to find out what limits there are to what we may or must do
- in the service of agent-neutral values is to see what sense can be
- made of the apparent limits, and to accept or reject them according
- to whether the maximum sense is good enough.
- Taken together, autonomous, agent-neutral, and deontological
- reasons cover much of the territory of unreflective bourgeois
- morality. Common sense suggests that each of us should live his
- own life (autonomy), have some significant concern for the general
- good (agent-neutral values), and treat the people he deals
- with decently (deontology). It also suggests that these aims may
- produce serious inner conflict. Common sense doesn’t have the
- last word in ethics or anywhere else, but it should be examined
- [NAGEL] The Limits of Objectivity 121
- before it is discarded.
- Attempts have been made to find room for some version of
- both these types of apparent exception to agent-neutral ethics in a
- more complex agent-neutral system, using developments of consequentialism
- like rule-utilitarianism and motive-utilitarianism.
- I shall not try to show that these reductions of the agent-relative to
- the agent-neutral fail. Instead I shall present an alternative account
- of how the exceptions might make sense independently. The account
- in both cases depends on certain discrepancies between what can
- be valued from an objective standpoint, and what can be seen
- from an objective standpoint to have value from a less objective
- standpoint.
- 2. Let me begin with autonomy.
- Not all the sources of subjective reasons are as simple as
- sensory pleasure and pain. These simply evoke an awareness of
- their value, without thought, choice, or deliberation, and I argued
- earlier that this makes it reasonable to affirm their value directly
- from an objective standpoint by judging that they are impersonally
- good or bad. Difficult as it may be to carry out, each of us has
- reason to give significant weight to the simple sensory pleasure or
- pain of others as well as to his own. I believe that when these
- values occur in isolation, the results can be rather demanding. If
- you and a stranger have both been injured, for example, and you
- have one dose of painkiller, and his pain is much more severe
- than yours, you should give him the painkiller. Not for any complicated
- reasons, but simply because of the relative severity of the
- two pains, which provides an agent-neutral reason to prefer the
- relief of the more severe. The same may be said of other basic
- elements of human good and evil.
- But most human values are not like this. Though some human
- interests give rise to agent-neutral values (and not only pleasure and
- pain) I now want to argue that not all of them do. If I have
- a bad headache, anyone has a reason to want it to stop. But if for
- 122 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
- instance I badly want to become a first-rate pianist, not everyone
- has a reason to want me to practice. I have a reason to want to
- practice, and it may be just as strong as my reason for wanting my
- headache to go away. But other people have very little reason,
- if any, to care whether I become a first-rate pianist or not. Why
- is this?
- I think it is easier to believe in this distinction than to explain
- it.
- There are two ways in which a value may be conditional on a
- desire: the value may lie either outside or inside the conditional,
- so to speak. In the former case, a person’s having X if he desires
- X has agent-neutral value: satisfaction of the desire has objective
- utility that everyone has reason to promote. In the latter case, if a
- person desires X, his having X has agent-relative value for him:
- ‘having’ the value is conditional on having the desire, and satisfaction
- of the desire does not have agent-neutral utility.
- Roughly, (and I really mean roughly) I think involuntary
- desires belong in the first category and desires that are adopted
- belong in the second. Most of the things we pursue, if not most
- of the things we avoid, are things we choose. Their value to us
- depends on our individual aims, projects, and concerns, including
- particular concerns for other people that reflect our relations with
- them, and they acquire value only because of the interest we
- develop in them and the place this gives them in our lives.
- When we look at such desires objectively, from outside, we
- can acknowledge the validity of the reasons they give for action,
- without judging that there is an agent-neutral reason for any of
- those things to be done. That is because, when we move to the
- objective standpoint, we are not occupying the perspective from
- which these values have to be accepted. Their diversity and their
- dependence on the history and circumstances of the agent insures
- this. From a point of view outside the perspective of my ambition
- to become a first-rate pianist, it is possible to recognize and understand
- that perspective and so to acknowledge the reasons that arise
- [NAGEL] The Limits of Objectivity 123
- inside it; but it is not possible to accept those reasons as one’s
- own, unless one adopts the perspective rather than merely recognizing
- it.
- So objective understanding of such reasons does not imply
- objective acceptance of them; because in order to have and act on
- them one must occupy the perspective of a particular life and its
- aims. Whether you are subject to their value depends on what
- your values are. A bad headache, on the other hand, can be
- recognized as bad independently of the values of the person whose
- headache it is: it has nothing to do with his personal values. So
- you do not have to be him to have reason to want it to go away.
- Its badness is agent-neutral, and you have a reason to want it to stop
- whatever your values are.
- There is nothing incoherent in wanting to be able to play all
- the Beethoven piano sonatas by heart, while thinking that impersonally
- it doesn’t matter whether one can do this. In fact one
- would have to be deranged to think it did matter impersonally.
- It doesn’t even matter much impersonally that if someone wants
- to play all the Beethoven sonatas by heart, he should be able to.
- It matters a little, so that if he is incapable of achieving it, it
- would be better if he didn’t want to. This is because the realization
- of a personal ambition is pleasant and its frustration is painful,
- so the agent-neutral values of pleasure and pain come into
- effect here. But even that is a rather weak agent-neutral value, since
- it is not the impersonal correlate of the agent-relative reasons deriving
- directly from the ambition, whose object is not pleasure. If an
- interest is developed by the agent himself through his choices and
- actions, then the objective reasons it provides are primarily agentrelative.
- Any agent-neutral reasons stemming from it must express
- values that are independent of the particular perspective and system
- of preferences of the agent.
- The general values of pleasure and pain, satisfaction and
- frustration, fill this role to some extent, as I have said, though
- only to the extent that they can be detached from the value of the
- 124 The Tanner Lectures on HumanValues
- object of desire whose acquisition or loss produces the feeling.
- This, incidentally, explains the appeal of hedonism to consequentialists:
- it reduces all value to the impersonal common denominator
- of pleasure and pain.
- But what there is not, I believe, is a general agent-neutral value
- of the satisfaction of desires and preferences. The strength of an
- individual’s personal preferences in general determines what they
- give him reason to do, but they do not determine the agent-neutral
- value of his getting what he wants. That is because their satisfaction
- has value only from the standpoint of the values expressed in
- those preferences. There is no independent value of preferencesatisfaction
- per se which preserves its force even from an impersonal
- standpoint.
- This rather harsh position can be modified somewhat by admitting
- that there is another, more general, level at which agent-neutral
- values do appear when one considers the area of personal preferences
- objectively. That is the level of the background of choice,
- liberty, and opportunity which makes the development and pursuit
- of voluntary concerns possible. Someone’s having the freedom
- and the means in a general way to lead his life is not a good that
- can be appreciated only through the point of view of the particular
- set of concerns and projects he has formed. It is a quite
- general good, like the goods of health, food, physical comfort,
- and life itself, and if agent-neutral value is going to be admitted at
- all, it will naturally attach to this. People have reason to care
- about the liberty and general opportunities of others as they have
- reason to care about their physical comfort. This is not equivalent
- to assigning agent-neutral value to each person’s getting whatever
- he wants.
- If this hypothesis of two levels of objectification is correct,
- then there is not a significant reason for something to happen
- corresponding to every reason for someone to do something. Each
- person has reasons stemming from the perspective of his own life
- which, though they can be publicly recognized, do not in general
- [NAGEL] The Limits of Objectivity 125
- provide reasons for others and do not correspond to reasons that
- the interests of others provide for him. He has some agent-neutral
- reasons to consider the interests of others, but the personal claims
- of autonomy, if they have significant weight, will allow him to
- pursue his own aims to some extent at the expense of those others.
- Since agent-relative reasons are general and not purely subjective,
- he must acknowledge that the same is true of others with respect
- to him.
- All this is based on the assumption that an agent-neutral objectification
- of this large category of individualistic subjective reasons
- does not make sense. But of course that doesn’t entail that an agentrelative
- objectification is correct, instead. There is a radical
- alternative: it could be that these reasons have no objective validity
- at all, agent-relative or agent-neutral. That is, it might be said by
- some utilitarian extremist that if there isn’t an agent-neutral reason
- for me to learn the Beethoven sonatas by heart — if it wouldn’t
- be a good thing in itself; if the world wouldn’t be a better place
- for my being able to play all the Beethoven sonatas — then I have
- no reason of any kind to learn them, and I had better get rid of my
- desire to do so as soon as possible.
- That is a logically possible move, but not, I think, a plausible
- one. It results from the aim of eliminating perspective from the
- domain of real value to the greatest possible extent, and that aim
- is not based on anything, so far as I can see. We should certainly
- try to harmonize our lives to some extent with how we think the
- world should be. But there is no necessity, I believe, to abandon
- all values that do not correspond to anything desirable from an
- impersonal standpoint, even though this may be possible as a
- personal choice — a choice of self-transcendence.
- If there are, objectively, both agent-relative and agent-neutral
- reasons, this raises a problem about how life is to be organized so
- that both can be given their due. Just to offer a footnote about the
- relation between ethics and political theory, one way of dealing
- with this problem is to put much of the responsibility for securing
- 126 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
- agent-neutral values into the hands of an impersonal institution like
- the state. A well designed set of political and social institutions
- should function as a moral buffer to protect personal life against
- the ravenous claims of impersonal good, and vice versa.
- 3. Let me turn now to the obscure topic of deontological constraints.
- These are agent-relative reasons which depend not on the
- aims or projects of the agent but on the claims of others. Unlike
- autonomous reasons, they cannot be given up at will. If they exist,
- they restrict what we may do in the service of either agent-relative
- or agent-neutral goals.
- Whatever their explanation, they are conspicuous among the
- moral appearances. Here is an example to focus your intuitions.
- You have an auto accident one winter night on a lonely road.
- The other passengers are badly injured, the car is out of commission,
- and the road is deserted, so you run along it till you find
- an isolated house. The house turns out to be occupied by an old
- woman who is looking after her small grandchild. There is no
- phone, but there is a car in the garage, and you ask desperately
- to borrow it and explain the situation. She doesn’t believe you.
- Terrified by your desperation, she runs upstairs and locks herself
- in the bathroom, leaving you alone with the child. You pound
- ineffectively on the door and search without success for the car
- keys. Then it occurs to you that she might be persuaded to tell you
- where they are if you were to twist the child’s arm outside the
- bathroom door. Should you do it?
- It is difficult not to see this as a serious dilemma, even though
- the child’s getting his arm twisted is a minor evil compared with
- your friends’ not getting to a hospital. The dilemma must be due
- to a special reason against doing such a thing. Otherwise it would
- be obvious that you should choose the lesser evil, and twist the
- child’s arm.
- Common moral intuition recognizes several types of deontological
- reasons - limits on what one may do to people or how
- [NAGEL] The Limits of Objectivity 127
- one may treat them. There are the special obligations created by
- promises and agreements; the restrictions against lying; the prohibitions
- against violating various individual rights, rights not
- to be killed, injured, imprisoned, threatened, tortured, coerced,
- robbed; the restrictions against imposing certain sacrifices on
- someone simply as means to an end; and perhaps the special claim
- of immediacy, which makes distress at a distance so different from
- distress in the same room. There may also be a deontological
- requirement of fairness, of evenhandedness or equality in one’s
- treatment of people. (This is to be distinguished from any agentneutral
- value thought to attach to equality in the distribution of
- benefits, considered as an aspect of the assessment of states of
- In all these cases it appears that the special reasons, if they
- exist, cannot be explained simply in terms of agent-neutral values,
- because the particular relation of the agent to the outcome is
- essential. Deontological constraints may be overridden by agentneutral
- reasons of sufficient strength, but they are not themselves
- to be understood as the expression of agent-neutral values of any
- kind. It is clear from the way such reasons work that they cannot
- be explained by the hypothesis that the violation of a deontological
- constraint has high negative agent-neutral value. Deontological
- reasons have their full force against your doing something - not
- just against its happening.
- For example, if there really are such constraints, the following
- things seem to be true. It seems that you shouldn’t break a
- promise or tell a lie for the sake of some benefit, even though you
- would not be required to forego a comparable benefit in order
- to prevent someone else from breaking a promise or telling a lie.
- And it seems that you shouldn’t twist the arm of a small child
- to get its grandmother to do something, even if the thing is quite
- important — important enough so that it would not be reasonable
- to forego a comparable benefit in order to prevent someone else
- from twisting a child’s arm. And it may be that you shouldn’t
- affairs.)
- 128 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
- engage in certain kinds of unfair discriminatory treatment (in an
- official role, for example) even to produce a good result which
- it would be unreasonable to forego in order to prevent similar
- unfairness by others.
- Some may simply deny the plausibility of such moral intuitions.
- Others may say that their plausibility can be subtly
- accounted for in terms of agent-neutral values, and that they appear
- to involve a fundamentally different type of reason for action
- only if they are inadequately analyzed. As I have said, I don’t
- want to take up these alternative accounts here. They seem to me
- essentially revisionist, and even if from that point of view they
- contain a good deal of truth, they do not shed light on the deontological
- conceptions they are intended to replace. Sometimes, particularly
- when institutions and general practices are involved in
- the case, there may be an agent-neutral justification for what looks
- initially like an agent-relative restriction on action. But I am convinced
- there are many cases that evoke a different type of moral
- intuition. Right or wrong, it is this type of view that I want to
- explore and understand. There is no point in trying to show in
- advance that the controversy does not exist.
- One reason for the resistance to deontological constraints is
- that they are formally puzzling, in a way that the other reasons
- we have discussed are not. We can understand how autonomous
- agent-relative reasons might derive from the specific projects and
- concerns of the agent, and we can understand how agent-neutral
- reasons might derive from the interests of others, giving each of us
- reason to take them into account. But how can there be agentrelative
- reasons to respect the claims of others? How can there be
- a reason not to twist someone’s arm which is not equally a reason to
- prevent his arm from being twisted by someone else?
- The agent-relative character of the reason cannot come simply
- from the character of the interest that is being respected, for that
- alone would justify only an agent-neutral reason to protect the
- interest. And the agent-relative reason does not come from an aim
- [NAGEL] The Limits of Objectivity 129
- or project of the individual agent, for it is not conditional on what
- the agent wants. Deontological restrictions, if they exist, apply to
- everyone: they are mandatory and may not be given up like personal
- ambitions or commitments.
- There is no doubt that ideas of this kind form an important
- part of common moral phenomenology. Yet it is tempting to think
- that the whole thing is a kind of moral illusion resulting either
- from innate psychological dispositions or from crude but useful
- moral indoctrination. But this hypothesis faces problems in explaining
- what the illusion is. It may be a good thing if people
- have a deep inhibition against torturing children even for very
- strong reasons, and the same might be said of other deontological
- constraints. But that does not explain why we cannot come to
- regard it as a mere inhibition which it is good to have. An illusion
- involves a judgment or a disposition to judge, and not a mere
- motivational impulse. The phenomenological fact that has to be
- accounted for is that we seem to apprehend in each individual case
- an extremely powerful agent-relative reason not to torture a child.
- This presents itself as the apprehension of a truth, not just as a
- psychological inhibition. And the claim that such an inhibition is in
- general very useful does nothing to justify or explain the conviction
- of a strong reason in every individual case. That conviction
- is what has to be analyzed and accounted for, and accepted
- or rejected according to whether the account gives it an adequate
- justification.
- 4. I believe that the traditional principle of double effect,
- despite problems of application, provides a rough guide to the
- extension and character of deontological constraints, and that
- even after the volumes that have been written on the subject in
- recent years, this remains the right point of convergence for efforts
- to capture our intuitions.6 The principle says that to violate
- 6 A good statement of a view of this type is found in Charles Fried's recent
- book, Right and Wrong (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978).
- 130 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
- deontological constraints one must maltreat someone else intentionally.
- The maltreatment must be something that one does or
- chooses, either as an end or as a means, rather than something
- one’s actions merely cause or fail to prevent, but that one doesn’t
- aim at.
- It is also possible to foresee that one’s actions will cause or
- fail to prevent a harm that one does not intend to bring about or
- permit. In that case it is not, in the relevant sense, something one
- does, and does not come under a deontological constraint, though
- it may still be objectionable for impersonal reasons. (One point
- worth stressing: the constraints apply to intentionally permitting
- as well as to intentionally doing harm. Thus in our example,
- there would be the same kind of objection if with the same end in
- view you permitted someone else to twist the child’s arm. You
- would have let it happen intentionally, and that would be different
- from a failure to prevent such an occurrence because you were
- too engaged in doing something else which was more important.)
- So far this is just moral phenomenology: it does not remove
- the paradox. Why should we consider ourselves far more responsible
- for what we do (or permit) intentionally than for consequences
- of action that we foresee and decide to accept but that
- do not form part of our aims (intermediate or final) ? How can
- the connection of ends and means conduct responsibility so much
- more effectively than the connection of foresight and avoidability ?
- It is as if each action produced a special perspective on the
- world, determined by intention. When I twist the child’s arm
- intentionally I incorporate that evil into what I do: it is my creation
- and the reasons stemming from it are magnified from my
- point of view so that they tower over reasons stemming from
- greater evils that are more ‘distant’ because they do not fall within
- the range of intention.
- That is the picture, but how can it be correct ?
- I believe that this is one of those cases in which the removal
- of paradox is not a philosophical advance. Deontological reasons
- [NAGEL] The Limits of Objectivity 131
- are essentially problematic, and the problem is an instance of the
- collision between subjective and objective points of view. The
- issue is whether the special, personal perspective of agency has
- fundamental significance in determining what people have reason
- to do. The question is whether, because of this perspective, I can
- have sufficient reason not to do something which, considered
- from an external standpoint, it would be better if I did. That is,
- things would be better, what happened would be better, if I
- twisted the child’s arm than if I did not. But I would have done
- something worse. If considerations of what I may do, and the
- correlative claims of my victim, can outweigh the substantial impersonal
- value of what will happen, that can only be because the
- perspective of the agent has an importance in practical reasoning
- that resists domination by a conception of the world as a place
- where good and bad things happen, and have their value without
- perspective.
- I have already claimed that the dominance of this agent-neutral
- conception of value is not complete. It does not swallow up or
- overwhelm the agent-relative reasons arising from those individual
- ambitions, commitments, and attachments that are in some sense
- chosen. But the admission of what I have called autonomous
- agent-relative reasons does not imply the possibility of deontological
- reasons. The two are very different. The special paradox of
- deontological reasons is that although they are agent-relative, they
- do not express the subjective autonomy of the agent at all. They are
- demands. The paradox is that this partial, perspectival respect
- for the interests of others should not give way to an impersonal
- respect free of perspective. The deontological perspective seems
- primitive, even superstitious, by comparison: merely a stage on the
- way to full objectivity. How can what we do in this narrow sense
- be so important?
- 5. Let me try to say where the strength of the deontological
- view lies. We may begin by considering a curious feature of
- 132 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
- deontological reasons on which I have not yet remarked. Intention
- appears to magnify the importance of evil aims by comparison
- with evil side effects in a way that it does not magnify the
- importance of good aims by comparison with good side effects.
- We are supposed to avoid using evil means to produce a good
- end, even though it would be permissible to produce that good
- end by neutral means with comparably evil side effects.
- On the other hand, given two routes to a legitimate end, one
- of which involves good means and neutral side effects, and the
- other of which involves neutral means and slightly better side
- effects, there is no reason to choose the first route. Deontological
- reasons tell us only not to aim at evil; they don’t tell us to aim at
- good, as a means. Why should this be? What is the relation
- between evil and intention, or aiming, that makes them clash in a
- special and intense way?
- The answer emerges if we ask ourselves what is the essence
- of aiming, what differentiates it from merely producing a result
- knowingly ?
- The difference is that action intentionally aimed at a goal is
- guided by that goal. Whether the goal is an end in itself or only
- a means, action aimed at it must follow it and be prepared to
- adjust its pursuit if deflected by altered circumstances. Whereas
- an act that merely produces an effect does not follow it, is not
- guided by it, even if the effect is foreseen.
- What does this mean? It means that to aim at evil, even as a
- means, is to have one’s action guided by evil. One must be prepared
- to adjust it to insure the production of evil: a falling off in
- the level of the desired evil must be grounds for altering what one
- does so that the evil is restored and maintained. But the essence
- of evil is that it should repel us. If something is evil, our actions
- should be guided, if they are guided by it at all, toward its elimination
- rather than toward its maintenance. That is what evil
- means. So when we aim at evil we are swimming head-on against
- the normative current. Our action is guided by the goal at every
- [NAGEL] The Limits of Objectivity 133
- point in the direction diametrically opposite to that in which the
- value of that goal points. To put it another way, if we aim at evil
- we make what we do in the first instance a positive rather than
- a negative function of evil. At every point, the intentional function
- is simply the normative function reversed, and from the point
- of view of the agent, this produces the acute sense of doing something
- awful.
- If you twist the child’s arm, in our example, your aim is to
- produce pain. So when the child cries, “Stop, it hurts!” his objection
- corresponds in perfect diametrical opposition to your intention.
- What he is pleading as your reason to stop is precisely your
- reason to go on. If it didn’t hurt, you would twist harder, or try
- the other arm. You are pushing directly and essentially against the
- normative force intrinsic to your goal, for it is the production of
- pain that guides you. It seems to me that this is the essence of
- deontological constraints. What feels peculiarly wrong about
- doing evil intentionally even that good may come of it is the headlong
- striving against value that is internal to one’s aim.
- Some corroboration of this diagnosis may be found by asking
- what would be the corresponding principle governing the relation
- between intention and good, as opposed to evil ? I have said that
- there is no deontological requirement to aim at good-only a
- requirement not to aim at evil. But the analogue of the requirement
- not to aim at evil would be a requirement not to aim away
- from good. To aim to prevent something good as a means to a
- worthy end would have a similar quality of normative reversal,
- though less acute than that of aiming at evil. And I believe there
- may be deontological constraints, though not such conspicuous
- ones, against deliberately preventing something good, in order
- that good may come of it. (Think for example of someone who
- resists ameliorating the condition of the poor because he thinks
- it will reduce their anger and diminish the long-term chance of a
- social revolution.) I mention the point, but will not pursue it.
- But all this still leaves unsettled the question of justification.
- 134 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
- For it will be objected that if one aims at evil as a means only,
- then one’s action is not really being guided by evil but by overall
- good, which includes a balance of goods and evils. So when you
- twist the child’s arm, you are guided by the aim of rescuing your
- injured friends, and the good of that aim dominates the evil of
- the child’s pain. The immediacy of the fact that you must try to
- produce evil as a subsidiary aim is phenomenologically important,
- but why should it be morally important?
- Here I think we have come down to a fundamental clash
- between perspectives. The question is whether to disregard the
- resistance encountered by my immediate pursuit of evil, in favor
- of the overall value of the results of what I do. When I view my
- act from outside, and think of it as resulting from a choice of the
- impersonally considered state of the world in which it occurs, this
- seems rational. In thinking of the matter this way, I abstract my
- will and its choices from my person, as it were, and even from my
- actions, and decide directly among states of the world, as if I were
- taking a multiple-choice test. If the choice is determined by what
- on balance is impersonally best, then I am guided by good and not
- by evil.
- But the self that is so guided is the objective self which regards
- the world impersonally, as a place containing TN and his actions,
- among other things. It is detached from the perspective of TN:
- for it views the world from nowhere within it. It chooses, and
- then TN, its instrument, or perhaps one could say its agent, carries
- out the instructions as best he can. He may have to aim at evil,
- for the impersonally best alternative may involve the production
- of good ends by evil means. But he is merely following orders.
- To see the matter in this light is to see both why the appeal of
- agent-neutral, consequentialist ethics is so great and why the contrary
- force of agent-relative, deontological ethics is so powerful
- The detached, objective view takes in everything and provides a
- standpoint of choice from which all choosers can agree about what
- should happen. But each of us is not only an objective self but a
- [NAGEL] The Limits of Objectivity 135
- particular person with a particular perspective; we act in the world
- with that perspective, and not only from the point of view of a
- detached will, selecting and rejecting world-states. So our choices
- are not merely choices of states of the world, but of actions. From
- this point of view, the pursuit of evil in twisting the child’s arm
- looms large. The production of pain is the immediate aim, and
- the fact that from an external perspective you are choosing a
- balance of good over evil does not cover up the fact that this is the
- kind of action you are undertaking.
- This account of the force of deontological reasons applies with
- special clarity to the constraint against doing harm as a means
- to your ends. A fuller deontological theory would have to explain
- the different types of normative grain against which one acts in
- breaking promises, lying, discriminating unfairly, and denying
- immediate emergency aid. It would also have to deal with problems
- about what exactly is being aimed at in cases of action that
- can be described in several different ways. But I believe that the
- key to understanding any of these moral intuitions is the distinction
- between the internal viewpoint of the agent in acting and an
- external, objective viewpoint which the agent can also adopt.
- Reasons for action look different from the first point of view than
- from the second.
- So we are faced with a choice. For the purposes of ethics,
- should we identify with the detached, impersonal will that chooses
- world-states, and act on reasons that are determined accordingly ?
- Or is this an evasion of the full truth about who we really are
- and what we are doing, and an avoidance of the full range of
- reasons that apply to creatures like us? If both personal and
- impersonal perspectives are essential to us, then it is no wonder
- that the reasons for action deriving from them do not fit comfortably
- together.
- 6. I believe this is a true philosophical dilemma which has no
- natural resolution. It arises out of our nature, which includes
- 136 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
- different points of view on the world. In ethics the contest between
- objective detachment and the individual perspective is
- acute. We feel it in the dilemma between deciding on the basis
- of action and deciding on the basis of outcome; in the dilemma
- between living one’s private life and serving the general good; in
- the dilemma between concern for what is actually happening and
- concern for what is timeless. When we ask ourselves how to live,
- the complexity of what we are makes a unified answer difficult.
- It is conceivable that this may change, for we are at a very
- primitive stage of moral development. Even the most civilized
- human beings have only a haphazard understanding of how to
- live, how to treat others, how to organize their societies. The idea
- that the basic principles of morality are known, and that the problems
- all come in their interpretation and application, is one of the
- most fantastic conceits to which our conceited species has been
- drawn. (The idea that, if we cannot easily know it, there is no
- truth here, is no less conceited.) Not all of our ignorance in these
- areas is ethical, but a lot of it is. And the idea of the possibility
- of moral progress is an essential condition of moral progress.
- None of it is inevitable.
- It would be foolish to try to lay down in advance the outlines
- of a correct method for ethical progress; but I believe that the
- general direction that it is reasonable to follow at present is connected
- to the awkward pursuit of objectivity that we have been
- discussing. This does not mean that greater detachment always
- takes us closer to the truth. Sometimes, to be sure, objectivity will
- lead us to regard our original inclinations as mistaken, and then
- we will try to replace them or bracket them as ineliminable but
- illusory. But it would be a mistake to try to eliminate perspective
- from our conception of ethics entirely — as much of a mistake
- as it would be to try to eliminate perspective from the universe.
- Though it may be equally tempting, it would be no more reasonable
- to eliminate all those reasons for action that cannot be assimilated
- to the most objective, impersonal system of value than it
- [NAGEL] The Limits of Objectivity 137
- would be to eliminate all facts that cannot be assimilated to
- physics.
- At the same time, I believe that the agent-relative values of individual
- autonomy and of deontology are severely challenged
- when we look at our lives from outside.
- One sign of this is that the most common form of subjective
- resistance to objective dominance is just badness. I have not discussed
- this familiar phenomenon so far because while it is part of
- the struggle between subjective and objective standpoints in practical
- reason, it has to do neither with the content nor with the
- reality of ethics. To be bad is to recognize the claims of morality
- from an objective standpoint but to refuse to submit to them.
- One may not admit that this is what one is doing — may offer
- fake justifications or rationalizations — but recognition of the
- general principles that one is defying can show up in other ways:
- in one’s reaction when subjected to comparable treatment by
- others, for example. Badness is not the same as amorality. On
- the contrary, it shows that one accepts the reality and objectivity
- of ethics. It is the most direct form of subjective resistance to that
- objective standpoint that forms a part of each of us, and whose
- demands can be so exhausting.
- Since the subjective-objective struggle can take this form, there
- is room for considerable self-deception. It is not always easy to
- tell, for example, whether a morality that leaves extensive free
- space in each individual life for the pursuit of personal interests is
- not just a disguise for the simplest form of badness: selfishness
- in the face of the legitimate claims of others. It is hard to be
- good, as we all know.
- I suspect that if we try to develop a system of reasons which
- harmonizes personal and impersonal claims, then even if it is
- acknowledged that each of us must live in part from his own point
- of view, there will be a tendency for the personal components to
- be altered. As the claims of objectivity are recognized, they may
- come to form a larger and larger part of each individual’s con-
- 138 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values
- ception of himself, and will influence the range of personal aims
- and ambitions, and the ideas of his particular relations to others.
- I do not think it is utopian to look forward to the gradual development
- of a greater universality of moral respect, an internalization
- of moral objectivity analogous to the gradual internalization of
- scientific progress that seems to be a feature of modern culture.
- On the other hand, there is no reason to expect progress to be
- reductive, though here as elsewhere progress is too easily identified
- with reduction and simplification. Distinct individuals are
- still the clients of ethics, and their variety guarantees that pluralism
- will be an essential aspect of any adequate morality, however
- advanced.
- There have to be principles of practical reason that allow us
- to take into account values that we do not share, but whose force
- for others we must acknowledge. In general, the problem of how
- to combine the enormous and disparate wealth of reasons that
- practical objectivity generates, together with the subjective reasons
- that remain, by a method that will allow us to act and choose in
- the world, is dauntingly difficult.
- And this brings us to a final point. There can be no ethics
- without politics. A theory of how individuals should act requires
- a theory — an ethical theory, not just an empirical one — of the
- institutions under which they should live: institutions which substantially
- determine their starting points, the choices they can
- make, the consequences of what they do, and their relations to
- one another. Since the standpoint of political theory is necessarily
- objective and detached, it offers strong temptations to simplify,
- which it is important to resist. A society must in some sense be
- organized in accordance with a single set of principles, even
- though people are very different.
- This is inconvenient: it may seem that political theory must be
- based on a universal human nature, and that if we cannot discover
- such a thing we have to invent it, for political theory must
- exist. To avoid such folly, it is necessary to take on the much
- [NAGEL] The Limits of Objectivity 139
- more difficult task of devising fair uniform social principles for
- beings whose nature is not uniform and whose values are legitimately
- diverse. If they were diverse enough, the task might be
- impossible — there may be no such thing as intergalactic political
- theory — but within the human species the variation seems to fall
- within bounds that do not rule out the possibility of at least a
- partial solution. This would have to be something acceptable
- from a standpoint external to that of each particular individual,
- which at the same time acknowledges the plurality of values and
- reasons arising within all those perspectives. Even though the
- morality of politics is rightly more agent-neutral than the morality
- of private life, the acknowledgment of agent-relative values and
- autonomy is essential even at the level that requires the greatest
- impersonality.
- There is no telling what kinds of transcendence of individuality
- will result over the long term from the combined influence
- of moral and political progress, or decline. At the moment, however,
- a general takeover of individual life from the perspective of
- the universe, or even from the perspective of humanity, seems
- premature — even if some saints or mystics can manage it. Reasons
- for action have to be reasons for individuals, and individual
- perspectives can be expected to retain their moral importance so
- long as diverse human individuals continue to exist.
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