Dear Barbara, I just talked with Corinne Goldstein, one of our firm’s top sanctions experts, and she said that she and several other of our sanctions attorneys cannot find any reference to the 5 year/8 year extension of the conventional weapons/missile ban in the Agreement or annexes, although the President again mentioned it today, stating that he got more from Iran since the lifting of UN sanctions would automatically lift this ban. Corinne said that the agreement simply indicates that once a new UNSC resolution is passed, the ban terminates period. If the Administration cannot pinpoint a part of the agreement that refers to this, it could cause a problem with Congress. Best wishes, Stu From: Eizenstat, Stuart
Sent: Wednesday, July 15, 2015 4:04 PM
To: 'Barbara Slavin'; seizenstat@gmail.com
Cc: Frederick Kempe (fkempe@acus.org); Natascha Braumann
Subject: RE: task force statement
Dear Barbara, I have substituted this version for your short, supportive statement. I welcome your views. Stu From: Barbara Slavin [mailto:bas131@aol.com]
Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 11:52 AM
To: Eizenstat, Stuart; seizenstat@gmail.com<mailto:seizenstat@gmail.com>
Subject: task force statement
appreciate quick edit of this so i can send out to others: The Iran Task Force of the Atlantic Council has worked for XXX years on Iran-related issues, from internal political developments to the impact of sanctions on the Iranian economy, and with a special focus on the challenges raised by Iran’s nuclear program. We have held XXX seminars and conferences with a wide-range of experts on every aspect of Iranian society and policy, and published XXX reports. We have put out statements on the progress of past negotiations, including the April 2015 interim agreement. We believe it is critical to view the Agreement announced in Vienna in a clear-eyed, realistic perspective, in which we may wish for the best outcome--full Iranian compliance with its terms; Iran turning away from a desire to acquire a nuclear weapon, not just during the term of the Agreement, but after its expiration; the channeling of the huge sums that will come to Iran with the lifting of US, EU, and UN sanctions for internal development and the betterment of its citizens, not for further support for terrorism; that its conduct will moderate as its economic isolation is ended and western investment takes hold-- but to be prepared for the worst scenario, which is at least as likely, if not more so--Iranian cheating on its explicit terms and obstructing the IAEA inspections necessary to verify the Agreement; the difficulty of sanctions “snapping-back” if there are violations; a patient willingness to wait until the expiration of the Agreement and then to rush headlong into a nuclear weapons program; the use of some of the funds obtained from the lifting of sanctions for even more aggressive support for the terrorist groups who look to it for leadership, from Hezbollah and Hamas to the radical Shiite militias in Iraq and Yemen, and to further support the Iranian support for the Assad regime in Syria; that its revolutionary zeal will not be curbed, but enhanced with new revenues; and that Iran will be left, with all the restrictions in the Agreement as a nuclear threshold state; the arms embargo on conventional weapons and missiles will be ended in five and eight years, respectively. We believe it is likewise critical that the US government recognize and take actions to deal with the signficant opposition to this Agreement from our closest Arab allies in the Middle East and from Israel, which views an Iranian nuclear weapon as an existential threat to its existence. The US government must act urgently to assure that this Agreement does not ignite a new nuclear arms race in the volatile Middle East. We come to the conclusion, even in a worst or most likely a mixed case scenario, that this Agreement is better than the alternatives if the Agreement is rejected. We would be left with only a military option, which may be necessary if Iran actually marches forward for a nuclear weapon, but would be difficult to justify after Iran has agreed to signficant curbs on its nuclear appetite. We believe that additional sanctions are not likely to produce a significantly improved Agreement. The reason is that we already have the most extensive, comprehensive sanctions ever exacted against a country in peacetime, and there are few others available to the US. Moreover, it is highly doubtful the EU, whose cooperation in imposing sanctions has been critical to getting Iran to seriously negotiate and make the signficant compromises embodied in the Vienna Agreement, would support additional sanctions. Even during the sanctions period, Iran continued to increase the number of centrifuges, to work on more advanced centrifuges, and to begin a plutonium facility at Arak. Most significant, with no agreement, there would no significant reduction in its 19,000 centrifuges; no dismantlement of its Arak plutonium plant; no intrusive IAEA inspections; no elongation of its breakout period from several months to a year. The Atlantic Council’s Iran Task Force believes the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), if faithfully implemented, will restrict Iran’s nuclear program for at least a decade in return for sanctions relief. While substantial differences remain between the United States and Iran, preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons for a prolonged period eases concerns about the most alarming aspect of Iranian policy and could contribute to a desperately needed easing of tensions in the region. There are important curbs on Iran’s nuclear ambitions: --The number of operating centrifuges at its Natanz facility will be reduced from 9500 to 5060 for 10 years; --Iran will limits enrichment to 3.7%, far below weapons grade (90%) and below the 20% level to which it has enriched some of its uranium. --Iran’s stockpile of low-enriched uranium will be cut from 10,000 kilograms to 300 kilograms, less than needed for one nuclear bomb for 15 years, a reduction of 98%; --For a period of 25 years there will be extensive monitoring by the IAEA on the supply chain of Iran’s nuclear program, from mining and milling of uranium, all the way to the enrichment of uranium hexafluoride (UF6), and the IAEA will have the right to continuous surveillance of centrifuge manufacturing and storage facilities); --The core of the heavy-water reactor at Arak will be removed, precluding its production of weapons grade plutonium (Pu-239), which is the most efficient fuel to make a nuclear weapon, and reprocessing will be prohibited, and its spent fuel will be sent out of Iran, and it will not build another heavy-water plant for 15 years; --Iran will transform its deeply buried facility at Fordo into a center for science research; --Although Iran has long-since signed the Additional Protocol of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it will now be obligated to implement this, and to permit intrusive inspections by the IAEA of its civilian and military facilities “anywhere in the country”. Many of the inspection provisions will last for 20 or 25 years, and some permanently, making it more difficult to develop a nuclear weapon. --Only the support of five of eight countries could find a violation by Iran that would lead to snap-back sanctions, meaning that Russia, China and Iran together could not block their reimposition if there is a violation of the terms of the Agreement by Iran. --The lifting of sanctions, which Iran had wanted to occur immediately upon signing, will come only when the IAEA certifies that Iran has complied with the terms of the Agreement, likely by the end of 2015. --The IAEA and Iran have entered into a separate agreement in which Iran will be required to answer the full 12 questions put to it regarding the Possible Military Dimensions (PMDs) of their past nuclear program, including interviews of their scientists and other nuclear officials, in order for the IAEA to make the positive certification necessary for sanctions relief. --There are restrictions for 15 years on Iran’s development of advanced centrifuges, which can produced enriched fuel five to six times faster than the current models. At the same time, there are significant shortcomings the Task Force sees, that will require a willingness by the US and its allies to call Iran to task if there are violations or refusals to cooperate: --The IAEA cannot initiate inspections of undeclared nuclear sites anywhere-anytime, but must present evidence of why it wishes to have access to the sites, and Iran has up to 24 days before they must comply, giving it the time to “clean-up” any suspect sites; --The snap-back sanctions would not be able to capture commercial contracts which have been entered into before the violations are discovered, which are grandfathered, thereby encouraging companies to enter into long-term contracts with Iran; --The conventional arms embargo would be ended in five years, giving Iran additional capabilities to provide arms to its radical, anti-western surrogates; and eight years for ballistic missiles, which would provide a delivery system for possible nuclear weapon; --It is inconceivable that Iran would not provide some of the $150 billion in frozen assets it will get after an IAEA certification, as early as the end of this year, to its radical supporters, giving it the capacity to further destabilize the region. The most troubling feature of the agreement, is that after 10 years, there are essentially no limits on Iran’s capacity to move rapidly to a nuclear weapon, shortening its breakout time for a nuclear weapon from a year, under the agreement, to a few months, where it is now. It is this feature that is of the gravest concern to our allies, and should be to the US. Even now, with the restrictions, Iran is a nuclear threshold state. Therefore, our Task Force would urge that the US make clear now to Iran that it is no more acceptable for Iran to have a nuclear weapon after the expiration of a nuclear weapon after the Agreement expires than now; that Iran understand in clear terms that the US will use all means necessary, including military force, to prevent it obtaining a nuclear weapon; that we provide additional security guarantees to our allies in the region, including Israel, and the means to defend themselves. Our allies in the region must also be assured that the US will not use this Agreement as a basis for agreements with Iran that threaten their security. The Task Force also urges that the Administration work now with the EU to reach agreement that targeted sanctions could be imposed if there are violations and if Iran increases its funding of terrorist groups with the new funds it will obtain after sanctions are removed. But the Task Force also believes that rejecting this Agreement will produce the worst of all possible worlds: the EU will almost certainly abandon its sanctions; the reductions in Iran’s nuclear program may not be realized, and he IAEA inspections will be curtailed or eliminated. -----Original Message----- From: Eizenstat, Stuart <seizenstat@cov.com<mailto:seizenstat@cov.com>>
To: 'Barbara Slavin' <bas131@aol.com<mailto:bas131@aol.com>>
Sent: Tue, Jul 14, 2015 11:21 am
Subject: RE: Iran Nuclear Agreement
OK
Stu
From: Barbara Slavin [mailto:bas131@aol.com<mailto:bas131@aol.com?>]
Sent: Tuesday, July 14, 2015 11:19 AM
To: Eizenstat, Stuart
Subject: Re: Iran Nuclear Agreement
i have read the document and am working on a statement. unfortunately cannot change the time for our event tomorrow which is from 9:30-11... albest Barbara -----Original Message----- From: Eizenstat, Stuart <seizenstat@cov.com<mailto:seizenstat@cov.com>>
To: Barbara Slavin (bas131@aol.com<mailto:bas131@aol.com>) <bas131@aol.com<mailto:bas131@aol.com>>
Cc: Frederick Kempe (fkempe@acus.org<mailto:fkempe@acus.org>) <fkempe@acus.org<mailto:fkempe@acus.org>>; Natascha Braumann <nbraumann@acus.org<mailto:nbraumann@acus.org>>
Sent: Tue, Jul 14, 2015 11:12 am
Subject: Iran Nuclear Agreement
Dear Barbara,
Please do a “deep dive” into the Agreement, with the pluses and minuses (gaps), so we are ready with a response. I have a client meeting tomorrow from 9:30 am to 11:30 am in Arlington. Can we move the Task Force meeting later in the day? Stu