Caspar Bowden on Cypherpunks 1996-98

From [email protected]  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Caspar Bowden <[email protected]>
Date: Sun, 27 Oct 1996 04:46:46 -0800 (PST)
Subject: ANNOUNCE: Scientists for Labour encryption and escrow conf, Nov 14th,"Liberty on the Line"
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
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Full details: http://www.shef.ac.uk/~sfl/meetings/itconf.html

		PLEASE DISTRIBUTE AND LINK TO YOUR WEB-SITE:

	Scientists for Labour - IT & Communications Group
	  Conference on Information Superhighway Policy

---------------------------------------------------------------------
"Liberty on the Line : Opportunities and Dangers of the Superhighway"
---------------------------------------------------------------------

	Chaired by Geoff Hoon MP, Shadow Minister for IT

	Thursday 14th November 1996, 9am - 5:30pm

	MSF Centre, 33-37 Moreland Street, London EC1 (Angel tube)
---------------------------------------------------------------------

For further details or to reserve a place contact:
Caspar Bowden, SfL IT & Comms co-ordinator ([email protected])


The debate over Internet regulation in the UK has focused mainly on
censorship, but the standards for control of "encryption keys", currently
being formulated nationally and internationally, will lay the permanent
foundations on which the Information Society is built. The long-term
implications for civil liberties have received little public attention
outside the Internet community.

Scientists for Labour is hosting a conference to look at the data protection
and economic issues arising from the integration of digital signatures,
electronic copyright management, and digital cash. What kind of regulatory
apparatus will allow rapid growth of an information economy, but prevent
misuse of personal data ?

*) New government proposals on "Trusted Third Parties", which aim to preserve
   law enforcement and national security capabilities for warranted
   interception of communications (to fight crime and terrorism), place only
   procedural not technical limits on the scope of Superhighway surveillance.

*) Super-computers have the potential to conduct random electronic "fishing
   expeditions" against the whole population. Telephone and letter
   interception cannot be automated : digital monitoring can.

Will legal safeguards against abuse offer adequate protection in perpetuity,
or can cryptographic protocols be designed which make Superhighway mass-
surveillance impossible, while still allowing criminals to be targeted ?

Computer and legal policy experts will explain the principles of the
different technologies, and the international and commercial context, in a
search for interdisciplinary solutions.

The attendance fee is ?5 (?2 unwaged ; SfL members free)

For press information please contact :
Bobbie Nicholls, SfL Press Officer, Fax: 01235 529172

The Scientists for Labour home page (http://www.shef.ac.uk/~sfl/)
has information on how to join SfL, or contact the Secretary :
Dr Robin Walters ([email protected])


					Programme
					---------

9.00-9.30	Registration	SfL members free, non-members ?5 (?2 unwaged)

9.30-9.45	Geoff Hoon MP 	Introduction

9.45-10.45	Dr.John Leach 	Cryptography and developments in Trusted Third
					Party policy

10.45-11.45	Dr.Ross Anderson	Some problems with the Trusted Third Party
					programme

11.45-12.00	Coffee

12.00-12.30	Simon Davies 	Escrow and the hidden threat to human rights
 					and privacy

12.30-1.00	Elizabeth France (Data Protection Registrar)

1.00-2.00	Buffet lunch

2.00-2.45	Prof. Charles 	Public policy and legal aspects of Intellectual
		Oppenheim 		Property Rights

2:45-3.30	Alistair Kelman 	Electronic Copyright Management :
					Possibilities and Problems
3.30-3.45	Tea

3:45-4:45	Andrew Graham 	Will the Information Superhighway enhance or
					diminish democracy ?

4.45-5.30	Panel Session	Discussion (inc. Robert Schifreen)
---------------------------------------------------------------------

-----

From [email protected]  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Adam Back <[email protected]>
Date: Wed, 21 May 1997 06:21:11 +0800
To: [email protected]
Subject: LSE UK crypto politics conference
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



I went to the conference in London on Monday organised by PI (Privacy
Intl.) and GILC (Global Internet Liberty Campaign.)  Speakers were
DTI representatives, Whit Diffie, Phil Zimmermann, Ross Anderson, Carl
Ellison, IBM UK representative, a few people from LSE (London School
of Economics, who hosted the conference).

I don't take notes, but here's a list of points I considered
interesting.  If you want details on any issues I can give more detail
as required.  If anyone else reading went and did take notes they
might be able to attribute quotes a little more accurately.  I
understand there's supposed to be an audio transcript on the web
http://www.privacy.org/pi/conference/dti might be a good place to look.

Government Presentation of proposal

1) David Hendon and Nigel Hickson from DTI presented the DTIs arguments.
They argued that this is a green paper only, the government has
changed, the document was partly the views of the previous government
and partly the views of the DTI.  This I viewed as an attempt to
deflect criticisms, as they could not specify what has changed, and
were not planning to change the document.  (The new government have
not looked at the issue at all).  The labour party had a much more
reasonable policy they published before they got in power; but it
remains to be seen whether they will stick to this or whether the
CESG/GCHQ will lobby them to adopt GAK/TTPs etc., which are in the
CESGs interests.

They claimed to not want to escrow signature keys, but only to escrow
encryption keys.  (The wording in the document clearly states that
they wish to escrow all keys as a condition of being a TTP).  They
said they had many comments on this issue.  (Clearly the only use for
escrowing signature keys is to allow forgeries.  Why would the
government want to forge messages from citizens?  To provide law
enforcement access they only need access to private encryption keys.)

The DTI said much of licensing requirements for TTPs were modelled
after banking regulations.

Architectural and Technical

2) Ross Anderson gave the example of the health service's experience
with CESG/GCHQ foisting flawed cryptography solution CASM on it
(complete with key escrow and secret algorithm Red Pike).  The BMA
(British Medical Assoc), and even DoH (Dept of Health) rejected this
`offer'.  Ross is a computer security advisor to the BMA.  He also
debunked many of the lies spread by GAK proponents, and gave a potted
history of the behind the scenes GAK activities in the UK and Europe.
He also said that CASM was now the laughing stock of Europe in the
crypto community, and that in response the CESG had allocated a new
project manager and given CASM a cosmetic name change to CLOUD COVER.

3) Whit Diffie argued about the importance of privacy in the
information society.  Explained how PK crypto removed the previous
problems with centralised key distribution services.

4) Phil Zimmermann gave his usual talk about the ethical case for free
use of crypto.  Civil rights workers, resistance fighters against
governments with poor civil rights records, etc.  Also made the point
that the backdoor into crypto the DTI appeared to be pushing would
allow the current government to abuse it's power to stay in
government.

Legal and Commercial

5) Peter Sommer, LSE made some points on legal topics digital signature
legislation, etc.

6) Carl Ellison, Cybercash argued against the centralised trust model,
and against X509.  Arguing instead for distributed trust models
particulary Rivest's SDSI and his own work on distributed trust.  Carl
argued that trust should represent permissions, and be administered by
the interested parties.  (eg your bank gives you a key with permission
to draw money from your bank account, not some government licensed
TTP).

7) IBM (in the form of Peter Dare, IBM UK) sold out to GAK.  Peter
Dare's presentation started with a list of things he liked about the
DTI proposal, then a few minor criticisms (very respectfully put), and
as a punchline to his talk presenting IBM GAKware (forget the product
name) and his talk finished with a sales pitch for this product.  At
the end of which Whit Diffie shouted out from the audience can Carl
Ellison have equal time for a cybercash sales pitch!

International

8) John Dryden representing the OECD gave a presentation of the OECD
guidelines.  (T-shirt and jeans odd the rest of the government and
business types wore suits.)  He explained the guidelines as a
significant relaxation.  The guideline referring to key escrow was
changed to a `may' escrow keys rather than a `should' escrow keys.
Said most of the time spent during the OECD SOGIS discussions was
spent arguing about key escrow.  He considered the guidelines a
significant step forward.  The guidelines are non-binding
recommendations.  He said 28 countries signed up, which should
indicate that their countries representatives found the guidelines
consistent with national laws.

9) Alistair Kelman, visiting position at LSE

Made the point (as several others had) that a general principle should
be that trust should mirror existing user trust relationships.  People
do not trust government, nor the sort of large organisations the DTI
is clearly envisaging as suitable TTPs.  He argued that GPs (General
Practitioners, family doctors) would be suitable candidates as trusted
members of the local community.  Kelman also seemed to be arguing that
keys should handed to the user, and not generated by the user.  I
queried him about this afterwards, as it is clearly a bad security
model, and he said he considered it a usability issue, generating keys
being too difficult for the user.  I don't agree, the usability is a
matter to be solved by good software, not by centralising key
generation.

Civil Rights and Privacy

10) Simon Davies, PI argued that case for commonality of interests
between business and privacy issues.

11) David Banisar, EPIC talked about the history of the US clipper
series, and raised the topic of digital telephony bill (where the
government requested access to first 1% and then reduced simultaneous
wiretaps).

Following up from this someone from the floor claimed that the
telephone networks are tappable without the phone company (BT, British
Telecom's) cooperation.  Indeed the person making this claim (who
claimed comprehensive experience and knowledge of phone routing
hardware) said that BT would not even be aware that the tap had taken
place.  Several others in the audience confirmed this was the case.
Whit Diffie said that he had not heard this claim, and that it was not
the case to his knowledge in the US.  The person making the claim said
that he knew the switches used in the US were the same (and quoted the
switch model), and so he didn't see why not.  The question was raised
as to why digital telephony was necessary at all with this type of
phone switch being used in the US.

Law Enforcement

12) The guy from NCIS (National Criminal Intelligence Service) didn't
turn up because he had to go to hospital due to an eye problem.  The
chair, Prof Ian Angell, LSE suggested this might have been due to
looking through too many keyholes :-)

Panel and Open Discussion

Panel: Carl Ellison, legal advisor to GLIC (forget name), Nigel
Hickson DTI, someone from TIS (?) who spoke too quitely.  Chair was
Caspar Bowden, Scientists for Labour.

Most of the panel session consisted of arguments directed at the DTI
and questions for Nigel Hickson representing the DTI.  Hickson had
made jokes about the hostility he was expecting.  He appeared quite
competent at avoiding answering questions directly where this suited
him.

Each panelist was given the opportunity to summarise their position.
Nigel Hickson claimed the main motivation for the proposal was to
encourage user and business confidence in digital signatures for
business purposes, and thereby to promote electronic commerce.  He
used this as justification for the banning of un-licensed TTPs.
Several comments from the floor that it would be better to let the
market decide, and to allow unlicensed certification authorities, key
servers etc to continue unmolested, and in competition with GAKked
government licensed services.

Hickson also claimed key escrow was a small part of their
consideration.  (I'm sure it's true that this is the part they wish to
downplay as this is the part which causes the majority of resistance.)

The question was raised as to whether the DTI understood that the TTP
system could be trivially bypassed by the criminals it was supposedly
designed to catch.  An example given was that anyone wishing to bypass
could use the sigature key helpfully certified by the TTP to
authenticate non escrowed keys they generated outside the TTP system.
The point that there were many other subliminal channels was raised
also.  Nigel Hickson acknowledged this, but said in defence that some
criminals are stupid, that criminals must talk to non-criminals.

Someone put it to Hickson "What is the worst thing that could possibly
happen if the government did nothing?"  ie what if the government
didn't legislate anything, ie why doesn't the government get the fuck
out of the way so that business can get on with commerce unimpeded.
Several business people put it to the DTI that they didn't need any
`help', and that the regulations had held up electronic commerce for
too long already.

Several people argued that business is most interested in
authentication, and not in confidentiality.  So for business purposes
(which what after all the DTI claim is the main reason for the paper,
and the DTI being after all the `Department of Trade and Industry' and
having a mandate to further the interests of UK businesses), they
could achieve what they wanted without bringing escrow into the
argument at all, as they have acknowledged that they will now not be
requiring copies of secret part of signature keys.

People argued against the high cost of becoming a TTP.  The point was
raised that it should be SME (Small to Medium-sized Enterprises) which
are encouraged in electronic commerce.  Also that many internet
innovations start as small or even one man consultancies.

Several asked whether the paper should be re-written as a result of
comments before being presented to the new government, as the comments
if listened to would remove most of the current content.  Also the
question was asked as to whether the deadline for comments could be
extended beyond end of May.  No substantive answer was given to either
of these two questions.

My conclusions

The DTI didn't really clarify their position much, most of the
contentious stuff (mandatory licensing, key escrow, financial barriers
to becoming a TTP) there were no substantive replies to from the DTI,
other than that they were collating the comments.  They said they
would present the Labour science minister/labour government with the
green paper unmodified together with the comments.  (And one presumes
a few spooks from GCHQ/CESG will get the opportunity to present the
four horsemen/spook special interest perspective).  The only clear
statement I noticed the DTI spokespersons make was that they wouldn't
hold the private halves of signature keys.

On the positive side, the labour statement on encryption prior to
coming to office was no where near as draconian as the DTI paper.

Anyway, we'll see.

Adam
--
Have *you* exported RSA today? --> http://www.dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/rsa/

print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<>
)]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`

-----

From [email protected]  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: Carl Ellison <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 23 May 1997 15:48:53 +0800
To: Adam Back <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: LSE UK crypto politics conference
In-Reply-To: <[email protected]>
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


At 11:03 PM 5/20/97 +0100, Adam Back wrote:
>Panel: Carl Ellison, legal advisor to GLIC (forget name), Nigel
>Hickson DTI, someone from TIS (?) who spoke too quitely.  Chair was
>Caspar Bowden, Scientists for Labour.

The person from TIS was Brian Gladman.
BTW, he wrote an open letter response to the DTI proposal which
is on the web from one of the standard Privacy sites.

 - Carl


+------------------------------------------------------------------+
|Carl M. Ellison  [email protected]   http://www.clark.net/pub/cme |
|CyberCash, Inc.                      http://www.cybercash.com/    |
|207 Grindall Street   PGP 2.6.2: 61E2DE7FCB9D7984E9C8048BA63221A2 |
|Baltimore MD 21230-4103  T:(410) 727-4288  F:(410)727-4293        |
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-----

From [email protected]  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: John Young <[email protected]>
Date: Mon, 1 Jun 1998 11:26:58 -0700 (PDT)
To: [email protected]
Subject: Foundation for Information Policy Research
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain


Source: http://www.ntk.net/fipr/

Subject: URGENT: press release - FIPR
Date: Thu, 28 May 1998 16:52:16 +0100
From: Ross Anderson


    Title: New Independent Research Foundation Backed by Microsoft

                Embargoed until 11.00 Friday 29th May

Too often, policy issues relating to information technology are
seperately debated by two distinct grouups: technology experts and
those focused on social concerns.  Policy makers face the challenge of
reconciling the seperate debates in areas where technology is often
evolving very quickly. A new research foundation aims to provide clear
advice that spans this gap and is independent of vested interests.

The Foundation for Information Policy Research will fund research into
how information technology affects society. It is launched at a press
conference on Friday 29th May at 11.00 am. (1)

Microsoft has contributed a six-figure sum to cover the launch costs.
Internet service providers Poptel and Demon are also supporting the
Foundation. Its independence will be guaranteed, however, by a board
of trustees. (2) In the medium term it will be supported by
subscriptions from a range of firms in commerce and industry.

The goal of the Foundation is to promote research and understanding of
the effects, and the likely future effects, of IT on society. Its
areas of investigation include: (3)

 * the regulation of electronic commerce;
 * consumer protection;
 * data protection and privacy;
 * copyright;
 * law enforcement;
 * evidence and archiving;
 * electronic interaction between government, businesses and individuals;
 * the extent to which various information technologies discriminate
   against the less advantaged members of society; and
 * the new risks that computer and communication systems pose to
   life, health and economic well-being

The Foundation will also provide a valuable resource for the press as
it will be able to put journalists in touch with a wide range of
experts who can explain IT issues as they arise.

Contact: Caspar Bowden (Director of the Foundation) 0171 837 8706
         Ross Anderson (Chair of the Foundation)    01223 334733

QUOTES

The Director of the Foundation, Caspar Bowden, said: ``The IT policies
(and failures) which the current government inherited, and the
decisions which will be made by them in the future, will have
far-reaching effects on who society's winners and losers will be.  We
have a duty to prevent technological innovation and development taking
place at the expense of the poor, the old, the sick and the disabled.
We believe that so long as we understand the social and policy
implications of new technical innovations, we can make IT into a means
to facilitate social inclusion. The Foundation's mission will be to
achieve and to spread that understanding.''

The Managing Director of Microsoft UK, David Svendsen, said: ``It's
important that we contribute to a broad and informed public discussion
on these information society issues.''

The Chair of the Foundation, Ross Anderson of Cambridge University,
said: ``We welcome this new source of funding for IT related
research. An increase in the diversity of funding sources is almost
always a good thing, and the Foundation will be particularly valuable
as much of the available IT funding is directed to very short-term and
narrowly technical agendas.''

NOTES

(1) The press conference is at the "Scrambling for Safety"
conference, at the Bloomsbury Theatre, University College, London.
URL:

(2) The Foundation's Director and full-time CEO, Caspar Bowden, has
for the last three years been running Qualia, a consultancy business
specialising in internet implementations. Before that he was a
financial strategist with Goldman Sachs. He also researched IT and
communications issues for Scientists for Labour.

Its chair, Ross Anderson, is a faculty member at Cambridge University
Computer Laboratory and has done extensive research on topics related
to electronic commerce.

BACKGROUND

The "Millennium Bug" - the problem that many computers cannot deal

correctly with the date roll-over from 1999 to 2000 - threatens to
cause havoc with many systems and has been declared a national
emergency by the Prime Minister.

Another problem that has worried policymakers and concerned citizens
is that new developments in IT may discriminate against the less well
off members of society.  For example, the current mechanisms for
electronic commerce depend on consumers using their credit cards to
order goods and services over the net. They often get a big discount
for buying this way; but people without credit cards may lose out.

The first task that the Foundation has set itself is to examine the
underpinnings of electronic commerce. The European Commission has
recently published a draft Directive on this subject and will launch a
period of public consultation at the same conference at which the
Foundation itself will be launched. (The draft directive is at
[missing].)

Other topics which the Foundation plans to investigate include:

* the maintenance of public records in electronic form. We do not
 fully understand how to ensure that word processor files and other
 electronic documents created today can be safely stored for many
 years, and reliably made available in the future. This affects not
 just the new Freedom of Information Act, but also the work of future
 librarians and historians.

* the development of copyright law. There are some industry proposals
 which would restrict the ability of libraries to lend out digital
 works. Will this mean the end of the public library, as more and more
 books, videos and other material become digital? What are the
 implications for schools and universities? What are the implications
 for the public, if all major sports events in future are pay-per-view?
 Are these developments inevitable, or is there something we can do
 about them?

* the introduction of electronic communication between the citizen and
 the government has the potential to cut queues and the frustration of
 dealing with people on the phone. However, are these changes
 intrinsically more likely to favour the articulate, and to bring the
 most benefit to well-off people with their own computers? What
 technical developments are reasonably possible to ensure that all
 citizens get a fair deal?

* the previous government's proposal for a "personal signature card"
 that would give access to all government services had a distinct
 flavour of an ID card. Are such developments necessary, or can we
 find workable alternatives?

* the police are concerned about the spread of prepaid mobile phones,
 which are increasingly used by stalkers and extortionists. However, if
 they are banned, then how would people without credit cards obtain a
 mobile phone service?

* there have been many disputes in the past over "phantom withdrawals"
 from bank cash machines, and banks have defended themselves by
 claiming that their computers cannot be wrong. How can this approach
 work when millions of merchants are selling services through a wide
 variety of computer systems? What will consumer rights amount to in
 the information age?

* the failure of government computer systems - whether spectacular
 failure due to the millennium bug, or the continuing sporadic
 failures in the NHS - does most harm to pensioners, the disabled,
 single mothers, the unemployed and people on NHS waiting lists (who
 are typically elderly, female and working class). How can we
 encourage best engineering practice in the public sector?

- - - ends - -

Thanks to Danny O'Brien, UK Crypto

Story: http://www.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/12624.html

Web site under construction: http://www.fipr.org

-----

From [email protected]  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: John Young <[email protected]>
Date: Sat, 5 Dec 1998 04:18:32 +0800
To: [email protected]
Subject: Wassenaar Addendum
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



Caspar Bowden in the UK says by telephone that a Wassenaar
spokesman told him today that the WA org will issue next week a
detailed "template"  which specifies terms of the recent agreement
to control encryption.

It will go well beyond what has been heretofore generally agreed to
by the member states under which there was a good bit of latitude
for each to determine its own policy. This is an unprecedented united
front by the members, and the paper will be a first for detailed export
controls issued by the Wassenaar org rather than by each nation.

When ready it will be put on the Wassenaar Web site:

   http://www.wassenaar.org.

We've made a request to DoC for elaboration of the press release
yesterday which featured David Aarons' general claims, but no
response yet. The USG may not comment until the WA paper is
issued.

Caspar posted a capsule of his infor on UK Crypto:

From: "Caspar Bowden" <[email protected]>
To: <[email protected]>
Subject: News from Wassenaar Secretariat
Date: Fri, 4 Dec 1998 16:23:58 -0000
Message-ID: <000101be1fa2$9da127e0$dc77e4d4@cpsb>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Priority: 3 (Normal)
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal

Just talked to Dirk Weicke, Senior Adviser to Wassenaar Organisation.
(Tel:+43 1 516360)

No written details will be issued until next week, but gist is:

*) No alteration to question of whether Wassenaar covers intangible exports.
Up to signatory states to interpret and legislate.

*) mass-market software, symmetric key length limited to 56-bits

*) software generally available, but with other restrictive tests on
end-user re-configurability, symmetric key length limited to 64-bits

*) Assymetric key lengths (not sure how relates to above) limited to:

RSA & Digital logarithm: 512 bits
Elliptic curve : 112 bits


--
Caspar Bowden                    http://www.fipr.org
Director, Foundation for Information Policy Research
Tel: +44(0)171 354 2333      Fax: +44(0)171 827 6534

----------

-----

From [email protected]  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: John Young <[email protected]>
Date: Mon, 7 Dec 1998 23:57:14 +0800
To: [email protected]
Subject: Wassenaar News
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



We spoke with Igor at the WA today to ask about the implementation
report Caspar Bowden said would be coming shortly. It seems that
Dirk Weicke, the person preparing it (whom Caspar queried),
is out sick and won't return to work until Thursday.

Another person working on the report, a Mr. Sidbitt (?) is also
out sick but should be back at work tomorrow.

At the moment there is no plan to offer the report on the WA
Web site. Each member will decide how to publicize it.

Igor, a friendly, reminded that the WA staff has no authority,
indeed has an evanescent existence, and is subject to vanishing
without explanation. The paranoid WA members, my words, cut
no slack, cut-throat control of perfidious news is their modus
operandi.

Still, Igor chuckled at my reporting that the perfidious USG will not
anwser my inquiries, being unable to trust its terrifying citizenry.
He refused my plea to send a purloined report, a report which,
on the evidence, appears to be quite sickening.

-----

From [email protected]  Wed Dec 17 23:17:14 2003
From: John Young <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 10 Dec 1998 00:37:51 +0800
To: [email protected]
Subject: Wassenaar/Crypto News
Message-ID: <[email protected]>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain



A BXA spokesperson said today that the text of the recent
Wassenaar agreement had been received yesterday and it is
now being prepared for release on the BXA website
(www.bxa.doc.gov) maybe by the end of the week but maybe
not until next week. She said she expected the US to be the
first to publish the doc, after I cited the WA message below
from Caspar Bowden.

She also said that the Practising Law Institute (www.pli.edu)
session on encryption controls yesterday was taped and inquiries
should be made to PLI (a continuing legal ed org; )
1-(800) 260-4PLI. And that Bill Reinsch did not participate in
the session, only gave the speech on Dec 7 noted here
yesterday:

  http://jya.com/war120798-2.htm

An inquiry to PLI (Betty Gray) has not been returned.

>From UK Crypto:

From: "Caspar Bowden" <[email protected]>
To: "Ukcrypto (E-mail)" <[email protected]>
Subject: More from Wassenaar Secretariat
Date: Wed, 9 Dec 1998 09:19:09 -0000
Message-ID: <000401be2355$07529ec0$dc77e4d4@cpsb>
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain;
	charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
X-Priority: 3 (Normal)
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal

-----Original Message-----
From: Wassenaar Secretariat [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Tuesday, December 08, 1998 16:54
To: Caspar Bowden
Subject: Re: Attn: Dirk Weicke

Mr. Weicke is still away, however, I can assure you that the Secretariat has
been recently authorized by all member states to publish the new Lists on
the web site.  This will be done as soon as possible.  Please be patient, we
are a very small Secretariat.

Glenn Sibbitt
Special Advisor
WA Secretariat

Caspar Bowden wrote:

> Dear Mr.Weicke,
>
> We spoke by telephone on Fri afternoon.
>
> You mentioned that the text and details of the new agreement would be
> published on the Wassenaar website this week.
>
> I understand that you have been away sick for a few days (my
> commiserations), but there have been reports from your colleagues
> that there will in fact be no publication on your Website.
>
> I'd be most grateful if you could just confirm when publication of
> details will take place, in particular the "Cryptography Note" detailing
> key-length limits, and definitions of categories.
>
> Kind regards
> --
> Caspar Bowden                    http://www.fipr.org
> Director, Foundation for Information Policy Research
> Tel: +44(0)171 354 2333      Fax: +44(0)171 827 6534

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http://cryptome.org/2015/07/caspar-bowden-cpunks-1996-98.txt