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McDonald v Georgia
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MCDONALD v. CHICAGO
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Case Basics
Docket No.
08-1521
Petitioner
Otis McDonald, et al.
Respondent
City of Chicago
Decided By
Roberts Court (2009-2010)
Opinion
561 U.S. ___ (2010)
Granted
Wednesday, September 30, 2009
Argued
Tuesday, March 2, 2010
Decided
Monday, June 28, 2010
Advocates
Alan Gura
(for the petitioners)
Paul D. Clement
(for respondents National Rifle Association et al. in support of the petitioners)
James A. Feldman
(for the respondents)
Term: 2000-20092009
Location: 41.850033, -87.650052
Facts of the Case
Several suits were filed against Chicago and Oak Park in Illinois challenging their gun bans after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller. In that case, the Supreme Court held that a District of Columbia handgun ban violated the Second Amendment. There, the Court reasoned that the law in question was enacted under the authority of the federal government and, thus, the Second Amendment was applicable. Here, plaintiffs argued that the Second Amendment should also apply to the states. The district court dismissed the suits. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.

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Question
Does the Second Amendment apply to the states because it is incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities or Due Process clauses and thereby made applicable to the states?

Argument
McDonald v. Chicago - Oral Argument
McDonald v. Chicago - Opinion Announcement
Conclusion
Decision: 5 votes for McDonald, 4 vote(s) against
Legal provision: U.S. Constitution, Amendment 2
The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit, holding that the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense applicable to the states. With Justice Samuel A. Alito writing for the majority, the Court reasoned that rights that are "fundamental to the Nation's scheme of ordered liberty" or that are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" are appropriately applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court recognized in Heller that the right to self-defense was one such "fundamental" and "deeply rooted" right. The Court reasoned that because of its holding in Heller, the Second Amendment applied to the states. Here, the Court remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit to determine whether Chicago's handgun ban violated an individual's right to keep and bear arms for self-defense.

Justice Alito, writing in the plurality, specified that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller. He rejected Justice Clarence Thomas's separate claim that the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment more appropriately incorporates the Second Amendment against the states. Alito stated that the Court's decision in the Slaughterhouse Cases -- rejecting the use of the Privileges or Immunities Clause for the purpose of incorporation -- was long since decided and the appropriate avenue for incorporating rights was through the Due Process Clause.

Justice Antonin Scalia concurred. He agreed with the Court's opinion, but wrote separately to disagree with Justice John Paul Stevens' dissent. Justice Clarence Thomas concurred and concurred in the judgment. He agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment against the states, but disagreed that the Due Process Clause was the appropriate mechanism. Instead, Justice Thomas advocated that the Privileges or Immunities Clause was the more appropriate avenue for rights incorporation. Justice John Paul Stevens dissented. He disagreed that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment against the states. He argued that owning a personal firearm was not a "liberty" interest protected by the Due Process Clause. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor, also dissented. He argued that there is nothing in the Second Amendment's "text, history, or underlying rationale" that characterizes it as a "fundamental right" warranting incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment.

Gregg v. Georgia
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Term: 1970-19791975
Location: Georgia State Capitol
Facts of the Case
A jury found Gregg guilty of armed robbery and murder and sentenced him to death. On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence except as to its imposition for the robbery conviction. Gregg challenged his remaining death sentence for murder, claiming that his capital sentence was a "cruel and unusual" punishment that violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.

This case is one of the five "Death Penalty Cases" along with Jurek v. Texas, Roberts v. Louisiana, Proffitt v. Florida, and Woodson v. North Carolina.

Question
Is the imposition of the death sentence prohibited under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as "cruel and unusual" punishment?

Argument
Gregg v. Georgia - Oral Argument
Gregg v. Georgia - Opinion Announcement
Conclusion
Decision: 7 votes for Georgia, 2 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Amendment 8: Cruel and Unusual Punishment
No. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that a punishment of death did not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under all circumstances. In extreme criminal cases, such as when a defendant has been convicted of deliberately killing another, the careful and judicious use of the death penalty may be appropriate if carefully employed. Georgia's death penalty statute assures the judicious and careful use of the death penalty by requiring a bifurcated proceeding where the trial and sentencing are conducted separately, specific jury findings as to the severity of the crime and the nature of the defendant, and a comparison of each capital sentence's circumstances with other similar cases. Moreover, the Court was not prepared to overrule the Georgia legislature's finding that capital punishment serves as a useful deterrent to future capital crimes and an appropriate means of social retribution against its most serious offenders.

Hana v Hana
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HANA FINANCIAL, INC. v. HANA BANK
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Case Basics
Docket No.
13-1211
Petitioner
Hana Financial, Inc.
Respondent
Hana Bank
Granted
Monday, June 23, 2014
Argued
Wednesday, December 3, 2014
Advocates
Paul W. Hughes
(for the petitioner)
Carlo F. Van den Bosch
(for the respondent)
Sarah E. Harrington
(Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, for the United States as amicus curiae supporting the respondent)
Term: 2010-20192014
Location: U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals
Facts of the Case
In the spring of 1994, Hana Bank, a Korean entity, began to extend its services to the United States under the name Hana Overseas Korean Club. In advertisements distributed during the summer of 1994, Hana Bank included the name “Hana Overseas Korean Club” in English as well as “Hana Bank” in Korean. The advertisements also included Hana Bank’s logo, known as the “dancing man.” A second, distinct entity, Hana Financial, Inc. (HFI) was founded in California in the fall of 1994. In 1996, HFI obtained a federal trademark for their logo, a pyramid, with the words “Hana Financial” for use in financial services. Hana Bank officials were aware of HFI’s use of the name Hana Financial but did not see the need to take any action because the entities did not directly compete with each other.

In 2007, HFI filed a complaint against Hana Bank alleging trademark infringement. The district court jury found that Hana Bank had used the “Hana Bank” trademark in the United States continuously since before HFI began using the “Hana Financial” trademark in 1995 and that Hana Bank’s trademark could be “tacked” to their 1994 advertisements, which included a similar, but distinct use of the phrase “Hana Bank.” HFI appealed, claiming that the determination of whether a trademark may be “tacked” to a prior mark is a question of law that must be determined by the court, not a question of fact that may be decided by a jury. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the affirmed the jury’s decision.

Question
Is the determination of whether a trademark may be tacked to an earlier mark a question of law which a court must decide, or a question of fact for the jury?

DHS v MacLean
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Facts of the Case
In July 2003, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) learned of a potential plot to hijack US planes and briefed the Federal Air Marshals accordingly. Not long after that briefing, the TSA notified the Marshals that all missions on flights from Las Vegas would be cancelled until August. Federal Air Marshal Robert J. MacLean became concerned that the TSA was not appropriately responding to the threat and creating a danger to the flying public, so he contacted an MSNBC reporter about the situation in an attempt to create a public controversy. MSNBC published an article, and several members of Congress joined in criticizing the decision to cancel the missions. That decision was then rescinded. In 2004, MacLean appeared disguised on NBC Night News, and some TSA employees recognized his voice. During the course of the investigation that followed, MacLean revealed his role in the 2003 MSNBC article. This contact was deemed to be an unauthorized disclosure of sensitive security information, and MacLean was removed from his position.

MacLean challenged the determination that he disclosed sensitive security information before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. MacLean argued that the information about the cancellation of missions was not classified at the time he received it and could not be retroactively classified. The Court of Appeals held that the TSA had simply applied regulations already in force in 2003 to determine that information should fall under that classification. MacLean also challenged his removal before the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board) and argued that his actions were protected under the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA). The Board determined that MacLean’s actions did not fall under the WPA because they were explicitly prohibited by law. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s ruling and held that MacLean’s actions were not explicitly prohibited by law under the WPA.

Question
Does the Whistleblower Protection Act bar an agency from taking enforcement action against an employee who intentionally discloses sensitive security information?