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Re: US Bank - Dirty Money

Feb 27th, 2012
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  1.  
  2. Re: US Bank - Dirty Money
  3. Email-ID 1115826
  4. Date 2011-05-05 22:12:26
  5. From friedman@att.blackberry.net
  6. To kevin.stech@stratfor.com
  7. I have a cost. It is money spent on something and that has a profit.
  8.  
  9. Sent via BlackBerry by AT&T
  10.  
  11. ----------------------------------------------------------------------
  12.  
  13. From: "Kevin Stech"
  14. Date: Thu, 5 May 2011 15:07:13 -0500 (CDT)
  15. To: ; 'Karen Hooper';
  16. 'Sean Noonan'; 'Secure
  17. List'
  18. Subject: RE: US Bank - Dirty Money
  19.  
  20. What do you mean by "flow through effect"
  21.  
  22.  
  23.  
  24. From: George Friedman [mailto:friedman@att.blackberry.net]
  25. Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2011 15:05
  26. To: Kevin Stech; Karen Hooper; Sean Noonan; Secure List
  27. Subject: Re: US Bank - Dirty Money
  28.  
  29.  
  30.  
  31. Those numbers assume a profit margin of 25 percent which is absurdly low.
  32. Moreover it fails to take into account that the primary cost is labor
  33. which has a massive flow through effect.
  34.  
  35. The likely profit margin on drugs is about 80 percent for the primary
  36. transporter. No one is going to risk his life on a 25 percent margin deal.
  37. Youre better investing in other things without risk.
  38.  
  39. Dying for a 25 percent return doesnt happen. Smuggle drugs is dramarically
  40. more profitable.
  41.  
  42. Sent via BlackBerry by AT&T
  43.  
  44. --------------------------------------------------------------------------
  45.  
  46. From: "Kevin Stech"
  47.  
  48. Date: Thu, 5 May 2011 14:58:49 -0500 (CDT)
  49.  
  50. To: 'Karen Hooper'; ;
  51.  
  52.  
  53. Subject: RE: US Bank - Dirty Money
  54.  
  55.  
  56.  
  57. The $40 bn estimate is revenues, not profits. The common profit estimates
  58. you see are in the $10 bn range.
  59.  
  60.  
  61.  
  62. From: Karen Hooper [mailto:hooper@stratfor.com]
  63. Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2011 12:30
  64. To: sean.noonan@stratfor.com; secure@stratfor.com
  65. Subject: Re: US Bank - Dirty Money
  66.  
  67.  
  68.  
  69. WF bought wachovia, and yeah, the case was settled last year with no
  70. criminal charges pursued. Sounds like Fred's contact is doing a follow up
  71. investigation. I'm less interested in the laundering so much as the size
  72. of it and where it ends up. The exit of that much money from Mexico is no
  73. small thing. We're never going to get a full picture of how the drug trade
  74. affects the financial system in Mex, but it's worth tracking the pieces.
  75. Also, the $40 bn estimate of drug profits has always seemed low, and these
  76. data points reinforce that.
  77.  
  78. Sent from my iPhone
  79.  
  80. On May 5, 2011, at 13:11, "Sean Noonan" wrote:
  81.  
  82. Btw, if this is new it is wells fargo not wachovia.
  83.  
  84. WF already paid fines for some of these shenanigans
  85.  
  86. --------------------------------------------------------------------------
  87.  
  88. From: Karen Hooper
  89.  
  90. Date: Thu, 5 May 2011 11:55:57 -0500 (CDT)
  91.  
  92. To: 'Secure List'
  93.  
  94. Subject: Re: US Bank - Dirty Money
  95.  
  96.  
  97.  
  98. Two different things here: 1) The Wachovia bust detailed in the article
  99. I sent out said that Wachovia handled $378.4 bn in transfers from casas
  100. de cambio (CDC) in 2004-2007 that they're calling shady (though they
  101. haven't verified just HOW shady all of it is). 2) Fred's contact says
  102. his contact has seen $70 bn laundered as a part of an ongoing
  103. investigation, but we don't know yet know over what timeframe.
  104.  
  105. Could be that the CDC transfers are majority legitimate, but why
  106. transfer cash TO the United States? Usually the flow of legitimate
  107. remittances goes the other way, and that's the amount the DEA case
  108. sanctioned Wachovia for failing to properly monitor under money
  109. laundering laws.
  110.  
  111. I'll try to dig up more details from the Wachovia investigation.
  112.  
  113.  
  114.  
  115. On 5/5/11 12:43 PM, scott stewart wrote:
  116.  
  117. Wait, so it was way more than $70B?
  118.  
  119.  
  120.  
  121. Maybe not all of that was cartel cash...
  122.  
  123.  
  124.  
  125. From: Karen Hooper [mailto:hooper@stratfor.com]
  126. Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2011 12:24 PM
  127. To: 'Secure List'
  128. Subject: Re: US Bank - Dirty Money
  129.  
  130.  
  131.  
  132. Right. What i'm saying is that Wachovia ALONE handled ~$125 billion per
  133. year in shady cash from Mexico from 2004-2007. And that doesn't even
  134. count the money that stayed in cash, went to the Bahamas or stayed in
  135. Mexico.
  136.  
  137. That makes the $40 bn per year stat seem pretty miniscule, no?
  138.  
  139.  
  140.  
  141.  
  142. On 5/5/11 12:00 PM, scott stewart wrote:
  143.  
  144. That is $40B a year. Not all of it was laundered by one institution.
  145. Some is still physically hauled as bulk cash.
  146.  
  147.  
  148.  
  149. From: Karen Hooper [mailto:hooper@stratfor.com]
  150. Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2011 11:45 AM
  151. To: Secure List
  152. Subject: Re: US Bank - Dirty Money
  153.  
  154.  
  155.  
  156. Any word on the rate of flow? $70 bn is much bigger than the $40 billion
  157. estimates that we've seen over the years.
  158.  
  159.  
  160.  
  161. The volume of cash handled in the Wachovia case also suggests something
  162. on the order of $125 bn per year being laundered by a single method.
  163. That's a LOT of money, and a lot more than we've discussed.
  164.  
  165. --------------------------------------------------------------------------
  166.  
  167. From: burton@stratfor.com
  168. To: "Karen Hooper" , "Secure List"
  169.  
  170. Sent: Thursday, May 5, 2011 11:25:50 AM
  171. Subject: Re: US Bank - Dirty Money
  172.  
  173. The money laundered was new, framed as exposing next week or words to
  174. that effect.
  175.  
  176. Sent via BlackBerry by AT&T
  177.  
  178. --------------------------------------------------------------------------
  179.  
  180. From: Karen Hooper
  181.  
  182. Date: Thu, 5 May 2011 09:39:12 -0500 (CDT)
  183.  
  184. To: Secure List
  185.  
  186. Subject: Re: US Bank - Dirty Money
  187.  
  188.  
  189.  
  190. Over what timeframe did your contact handle that $70 billion?
  191.  
  192. On 5/5/11 10:31 AM, burton@stratfor.com wrote:
  193.  
  194. The GOM has hired the ex-CIA group to find additional monies laundered
  195. by Wachovia. Same group are being used against British Tobacco.
  196.  
  197. Sent via BlackBerry by AT&T
  198.  
  199. --------------------------------------------------------------------------
  200.  
  201. From: Karen Hooper
  202.  
  203. Date: Thu, 5 May 2011 09:27:48 -0500 (CDT)
  204.  
  205. To: Secure List
  206.  
  207. Subject: Re: US Bank - Dirty Money
  208.  
  209.  
  210.  
  211. Here's a good one:
  212.  
  213. How a big US bank laundered billions from Mexico's murderous drug gangs
  214. Ed Vulliamy
  215. The Observer, Sunday 3 April 2011
  216. http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/03/us-bank-mexico-drug-gangs
  217.  
  218. A soldier guards marijuana that is being incinerated in Tijuana, Mexico.
  219. Photograph: Guillermo Arias/AP
  220. On 10 April 2006, a DC-9 jet landed in the port city of Ciudad del
  221. Carmen, on the Gulf of Mexico, as the sun was setting. Mexican soldiers,
  222. waiting to intercept it, found 128 cases packed with 5.7 tons of
  223. cocaine, valued at $100m. But something else - more important and
  224. far-reaching - was discovered in the paper trail behind the purchase of
  225. the plane by the Sinaloa narco-trafficking cartel.
  226.  
  227. During a 22-month investigation by agents from the US Drug Enforcement
  228. Administration, the Internal Revenue Service and others, it emerged that
  229. the cocaine smugglers had bought the plane with money they had laundered
  230. through one of the biggest banks in the United States: Wachovia, now
  231. part of the giant Wells Fargo.
  232.  
  233. The authorities uncovered billions of dollars in wire transfers,
  234. traveller's cheques and cash shipments through Mexican exchanges into
  235. Wachovia accounts. Wachovia was put under immediate investigation for
  236. failing to maintain an effective anti-money laundering programme. Of
  237. special significance was that the period concerned began in 2004, which
  238. coincided with the first escalation of violence along the US-Mexico
  239. border that ignited the current drugs war.
  240.  
  241. Criminal proceedings were brought against Wachovia, though not against
  242. any individual, but the case never came to court. In March 2010,
  243. Wachovia settled the biggest action brought under the US bank secrecy
  244. act, through the US district court in Miami. Now that the year's
  245. "deferred prosecution" has expired, the bank is in effect in the clear.
  246. It paid federal authorities $110m in forfeiture, for allowing
  247. transactions later proved to be connected to drug smuggling, and
  248. incurred a $50m fine for failing to monitor cash used to ship 22 tons of
  249. cocaine.
  250.  
  251. More shocking, and more important, the bank was sanctioned for failing
  252. to apply the proper anti-laundering strictures to the transfer of
  253. $378.4bn - a sum equivalent to one-third of Mexico's gross national
  254. product - into dollar accounts from so-called casas de cambio (CDCs) in
  255. Mexico, currency exchange houses with which the bank did business.
  256.  
  257. "Wachovia's blatant disregard for our banking laws gave international
  258. cocaine cartels a virtual carte blanche to finance their operations,"
  259. said Jeffrey Sloman, the federal prosecutor. Yet the total fine was less
  260. than 2% of the bank's $12.3bn profit for 2009. On 24 March 2010, Wells
  261. Fargo stock traded at $30.86 - up 1% on the week of the court
  262. settlement.
  263.  
  264. The conclusion to the case was only the tip of an iceberg, demonstrating
  265. the role of the "legal" banking sector in swilling hundreds of billions
  266. of dollars - the blood money from the murderous drug trade in Mexico and
  267. other places in the world - around their global operations, now bailed
  268. out by the taxpayer.
  269.  
  270. At the height of the 2008 banking crisis, Antonio Maria Costa, then head
  271. of the United Nations office on drugs and crime, said he had evidence to
  272. suggest the proceeds from drugs and crime were "the only liquid
  273. investment capital" available to banks on the brink of collapse.
  274. "Inter-bank loans were funded by money that originated from the drugs
  275. trade," he said. "There were signs that some banks were rescued that
  276. way."
  277.  
  278. Wachovia was acquired by Wells Fargo during the 2008 crash, just as
  279. Wells Fargo became a beneficiary of $25bn in taxpayers' money.
  280. Wachovia's prosecutors were clear, however, that there was no suggestion
  281. Wells Fargo had behaved improperly; it had co-operated fully with the
  282. investigation. Mexico is the US's third largest international trading
  283. partner and Wachovia was understandably interested in this volume of
  284. legitimate trade.
  285.  
  286. Jose Luis Marmolejo, who prosecuted those running one of the casas de
  287. cambio at the Mexican end, said: "Wachovia handled all the transfers.
  288. They never reported any as suspicious."
  289.  
  290. "As early as 2004, Wachovia understood the risk," the bank admitted in
  291. the statement of settlement with the federal government, but, "despite
  292. these warnings, Wachovia remained in the business". There is, of course,
  293. the legitimate use of CDCs as a way into the Hispanic market. In 2005
  294. the World Bank said that Mexico was receiving $8.1bn in remittances.
  295.  
  296. During research into the Wachovia Mexican case, the Observer obtained
  297. documents previously provided to financial regulators. It emerged that
  298. the alarm that was ignored came from, among other places, London, as a
  299. result of the diligence of one of the most important whistleblowers of
  300. our time. A man who, in a series of interviews with the Observer, adds
  301. detail to the documents, laying bare the story of how Wachovia was at
  302. the centre of one of the world's biggest money-laundering operations.
  303.  
  304. Martin Woods, a Liverpudlian in his mid-40s, joined the London office of
  305. Wachovia Bank in February 2005 as a senior anti-money laundering
  306. officer. He had previously served with the Metropolitan police drug
  307. squad. As a detective he joined the money-laundering investigation team
  308. of the National Crime Squad, where he worked on the British end of the
  309. Bank of New York money-laundering scandal in the late 1990s.
  310.  
  311. Woods talks like a police officer - in the best sense of the word:
  312. punctilious, exact, with a roguish humour, but moral at the core. He was
  313. an ideal appointment for any bank eager to operate a diligent and
  314. effective risk management policy against the lucrative scourge of high
  315. finance: laundering, knowing or otherwise, the vast proceeds of
  316. criminality, tax-evasion, and dealing in arms and drugs.
  317.  
  318. Woods had a police officer's eye and a police officer's instincts - not
  319. those of a banker. And this influenced not only his methods, but his
  320. mentality. "I think that a lot of things matter more than money - and
  321. that marks you out in a culture which appears to prevail in many of the
  322. banks in the world," he says.
  323.  
  324. Woods was set apart by his modus operandi. His speciality, he explains,
  325. was his application of a "know your client", or KYC, policing strategy
  326. to identifying dirty money. "KYC is a fundamental approach to anti-money
  327. laundering, going after tax evasion or counter-terrorist financing. Who
  328. are your clients? Is the documentation right? Good, responsible banking
  329. involved always knowing your customer and it still does."
  330.  
  331. When he looked at Wachovia, the first thing Woods noticed was a
  332. deficiency in KYC information. And among his first reports to his
  333. superiors at the bank's headquarters in Charlotte, North Carolina, were
  334. observations on a shortfall in KYC at Wachovia's operation in London,
  335. which he set about correcting, while at the same time implementing what
  336. was known as an enhanced transaction monitoring programme, gathering
  337. more information on clients whose money came through the bank's offices
  338. in the City, in sterling or euros. By August 2006, Woods had identified
  339. a number of suspicious transactions relating to casas de cambio
  340. customers in Mexico.
  341.  
  342. Primarily, these involved deposits of traveller's cheques in euros. They
  343. had sequential numbers and deposited larger amounts of money than any
  344. innocent travelling person would need, with inadequate or no KYC
  345. information on them and what seemed to a trained eye to be dubious
  346. signatures. "It was basic work," he says. "They didn't answer the
  347. obvious questions: 'Is the transaction real, or does it look synthetic?
  348. Does the traveller's cheque meet the protocols? Is it all there, and if
  349. not, why not?'"
  350.  
  351. Woods discussed the matter with Wachovia's global head of anti-money
  352. laundering for correspondent banking, who believed the cheques could
  353. signify tax evasion. He then undertook what banks call a "look back" at
  354. previous transactions and saw fit to submit a series of SARs, or
  355. suspicious activity reports, to the authorities in the UK and his
  356. superiors in Charlotte, urging the blocking of named parties and large
  357. series of sequentially numbered traveller's cheques from Mexico. He
  358. issued a number of SARs in 2006, of which 50 related to the casas de
  359. cambio in Mexico. To his amazement, the response from Wachovia's Miami
  360. office, the centre for Latin American business, was anything but
  361. supportive - he felt it was quite the reverse.
  362.  
  363. As it turned out, however, Woods was on the right track. Wachovia's
  364. business in Mexico was coming under closer and closer scrutiny by US
  365. federal law enforcement. Wachovia was issued with a number of subpoenas
  366. for information on its Mexican operation. Woods has subsequently been
  367. informed that Wachovia had six or seven thousand subpoenas. He says this
  368. was "An absurd number. So at what point does someone at the highest
  369. level not get the feeling that something is very, very wrong?"
  370.  
  371. In April and May 2007, Wachovia - as a result of increasing interest and
  372. pressure from the US attorney's office - began to close its relationship
  373. with some of the casas de cambio. But rather than launch an internal
  374. investigation into Woods's alerts over Mexico, Woods claims Wachovia
  375. hung its own money-laundering expert out to dry. The records show that
  376. during 2007 Woods "continued to submit more SARs related to the casas de
  377. cambio".
  378.  
  379. In July 2007, all of Wachovia's remaining 10 Mexican casa de cambio
  380. clients operating through London suddenly stopped doing so. Later in
  381. 2007, after the investigation of Wachovia was reported in the US
  382. financial media, the bank decided to end its remaining relationships
  383. with the Mexican casas de cambio globally. By this time, Woods says, he
  384. found his personal situation within the bank untenable; while the bank
  385. acted on one level to protect itself from the federal investigation into
  386. its shortcomings, on another, it rounded on the man who had been among
  387. the first to spot them.
  388.  
  389. On 16 June Woods was told by Wachovia's head of compliance that his
  390. latest SAR need not have been filed, that he had no legal requirement to
  391. investigate an overseas case and no right of access to documents held
  392. overseas from Britain, even if they were held by Wachovia.
  393.  
  394. Woods's life went into freefall. He went to hospital with a prolapsed
  395. disc, reported sick and was told by the bank that he not done so in the
  396. appropriate manner, as directed by the employees' handbook. He was off
  397. work for three weeks, returning in August 2007 to find a letter from the
  398. bank's compliance managing director, which was unrelenting in its tone
  399. and words of warning.
  400.  
  401. The letter addressed itself to what the manager called "specific
  402. examples of your failure to perform at an acceptable standard". Woods,
  403. on the edge of a breakdown, was put on sick leave by his GP; he was
  404. later given psychiatric treatment, enrolled on a stress management
  405. course and put on medication.
  406.  
  407. Late in 2007, Woods attended a function at Scotland Yard where
  408. colleagues from the US were being entertained. There, he sought out a
  409. representative of the Drug Enforcement Administration and told him about
  410. the casas de cambio, the SARs and his employer's reaction. The Federal
  411. Reserve and officials of the office of comptroller of currency in
  412. Washington DC then "spent a lot of time examining the SARs" that had
  413. been sent by Woods to Charlotte from London.
  414.  
  415. "They got back in touch with me a while afterwards and we began to put
  416. the pieces of the jigsaw together," says Woods. What they found was - as
  417. Costa says - the tip of the iceberg of what was happening to drug money
  418. in the banking industry, but at least it was visible and it had a name:
  419. Wachovia.
  420.  
  421. In June 2005, the DEA, the criminal division of the Internal Revenue
  422. Service and the US attorney's office in southern Florida began
  423. investigating wire transfers from Mexico to the US. They were traced
  424. back to correspondent bank accounts held by casas de cambio at Wachovia.
  425. The CDC accounts were supervised and managed by a business unit of
  426. Wachovia in the bank's Miami offices.
  427.  
  428. "Through CDCs," said the court document, "persons in Mexico can use hard
  429. currency and ... wire transfer the value of that currency to US bank
  430. accounts to purchase items in the United States or other countries. The
  431. nature of the CDC business allows money launderers the opportunity to
  432. move drug dollars that are in Mexico into CDCs and ultimately into the
  433. US banking system.
  434.  
  435. "On numerous occasions," say the court papers, "monies were deposited
  436. into a CDC by a drug-trafficking organisation. Using false identities,
  437. the CDC then wired that money through its Wachovia correspondent bank
  438. accounts for the purchase of airplanes for drug-trafficking
  439. organisations." The court settlement of 2010 would detail that "nearly
  440. $13m went through correspondent bank accounts at Wachovia for the
  441. purchase of aircraft to be used in the illegal narcotics trade. From
  442. these aircraft, more than 20,000kg of cocaine were seized."
  443.  
  444. All this occurred despite the fact that Wachovia's office was in Miami,
  445. designated by the US government as a "high-intensity money laundering
  446. and related financial crime area", and a "high-intensity drug
  447. trafficking area". Since the drug cartel war began in 2005, Mexico had
  448. been designated a high-risk source of money laundering.
  449.  
  450. "As early as 2004," the court settlement would read, "Wachovia
  451. understood the risk that was associated with doing business with the
  452. Mexican CDCs. Wachovia was aware of the general industry warnings. As
  453. early as July 2005, Wachovia was aware that other large US banks were
  454. exiting the CDC business based on [anti-money laundering] concerns ...
  455. despite these warnings, Wachovia remained in business."
  456.  
  457. On 16 March 2010, Douglas Edwards, senior vice-president of Wachovia
  458. Bank, put his signature to page 10 of a 25-page settlement, in which the
  459. bank admitted its role as outlined by the prosecutors. On page 11, he
  460. signed again, as senior vice-president of Wells Fargo. The documents
  461. show Wachovia providing three services to 22 CDCs in Mexico: wire
  462. transfers, a "bulk cash service" and a "pouch deposit service", to
  463. accept "deposit items drawn on US banks, eg cheques and traveller's
  464. cheques", as spotted by Woods.
  465.  
  466. "For the time period of 1 May 2004 through 31 May 2007, Wachovia
  467. processed at least $$373.6bn in CDCs, $4.7bn in bulk cash" - a total of
  468. more than $378.3bn, a sum that dwarfs the budgets debated by US state
  469. and UK local authorities to provide services to citizens.
  470.  
  471. The document gives a fascinating insight into how the laundering of drug
  472. money works. It details how investigators "found readily identifiable
  473. evidence of red flags of large-scale money laundering". There were
  474. "structured wire transfers" whereby "it was commonplace in the CDC
  475. accounts for round-number wire transfers to be made on the same day or
  476. in close succession, by the same wire senders, for the ... same
  477. account".
  478.  
  479. Over two days, 10 wire transfers by four individuals "went though
  480. Wachovia for deposit into an aircraft broker's account. All of the
  481. transfers were in round numbers. None of the individuals of business
  482. that wired money had any connection to the aircraft or the entity that
  483. allegedly owned the aircraft. The investigation has further revealed
  484. that the identities of the individuals who sent the money were false and
  485. that the business was a shell entity. That plane was subsequently seized
  486. with approximately 2,000kg of cocaine on board."
  487.  
  488. Many of the sequentially numbered traveller's cheques, of the kind dealt
  489. with by Woods, contained "unusual markings" or "lacked any legible
  490. signature". Also, "many of the CDCs that used Wachovia's bulk cash
  491. service sent significantly more cash to Wachovia than what Wachovia had
  492. expected. More specifically, many of the CDCs exceeded their monthly
  493. activity by at least 50%."
  494.  
  495. Recognising these "red flags", the US attorney's office in Miami, the
  496. IRS and the DEA began investigating Wachovia, later joined by FinCEN,
  497. one of the US Treasury's agencies to fight money laundering, while the
  498. office of the comptroller of the currency carried out a parallel
  499. investigation. The violations they found were, says the document,
  500. "serious and systemic and allowed certain Wachovia customers to launder
  501. millions of dollars of proceeds from the sale of illegal narcotics
  502. through Wachovia accounts over an extended time period. The
  503. investigation has identified that at least $110m in drug proceeds were
  504. funnelled through the CDC accounts held at Wachovia."
  505.  
  506. The settlement concludes by discussing Wachovia's "considerable
  507. co-operation and remedial actions" since the prosecution was initiated,
  508. after the bank was bought by Wells Fargo. "In consideration of
  509. Wachovia's remedial actions," concludes the prosecutor, "the United
  510. States shall recommend to the court ... that prosecution of Wachovia on
  511. the information filed ... be deferred for a period of 12 months."
  512.  
  513. But while the federal prosecution proceeded, Woods had remained out in
  514. the cold. On Christmas Eve 2008, his lawyers filed tribunal proceedings
  515. against Wachovia for bullying and detrimental treatment of a
  516. whistleblower. The case was settled in May 2009, by which time Woods
  517. felt as though he was "the most toxic person in the bank". Wachovia
  518. agreed to pay an undisclosed amount, in return for which Woods left the
  519. bank and said he would not make public the terms of the settlement.
  520.  
  521. After years of tribulation, Woods was finally formally vindicated,
  522. though not by Wachovia: a letter arrived from John Dugan, the
  523. comptroller of the currency in Washington DC, dated 19 March 2010 -
  524. three days after the settlement in Miami. Dugan said he was "writing to
  525. personally recognise and express my appreciation for the role you played
  526. in the actions brought against Wachovia Bank for violations of the bank
  527. secrecy act ... Not only did the information that you provided
  528. facilitate our investigation, but you demonstrated great personal
  529. courage and integrity by speaking up. Without the efforts of individuals
  530. like you, actions such as the one taken against Wachovia would not be
  531. possible."
  532.  
  533. The so-called "deferred prosecution" detailed in the Miami document is a
  534. form of probation whereby if the bank abides by the law for a year,
  535. charges are dropped. So this March the bank was in the clear. The week
  536. that the deferred prosecution expired, a spokeswoman for Wells Fargo
  537. said the parent bank had no comment to make on the documentation
  538. pertaining to Woods's case, or his allegations. She added that there was
  539. no comment on Sloman's remarks to the court; a provision in the
  540. settlement stipulated Wachovia was not allowed to issue public
  541. statements that contradicted it.
  542.  
  543. But the settlement leaves a sour taste in many mouths - and certainly in
  544. Woods's. The deferred prosecution is part of this "cop-out all round",
  545. he says. "The regulatory authorities do not have to spend any more time
  546. on it, and they don't have to push it as far as a criminal trial. They
  547. just issue criminal proceedings, and settle. The law enforcement people
  548. do what they are supposed to do, but what's the point? All those people
  549. dealing with all that money from drug-trafficking and murder, and no one
  550. goes to jail?"
  551.  
  552. One of the foremost figures in the training of anti-money laundering
  553. officers is Robert Mazur, lead infiltrator for US law enforcement of the
  554. Colombian Medellin cartel during the epic prosecution and collapse of
  555. the BCCI banking business in 1991 (his story was made famous by his
  556. memoir, The Infiltrator, which became a movie).
  557.  
  558. Mazur, whose firm Chase and Associates works closely with law
  559. enforcement agencies and trains officers for bank anti-money laundering,
  560. cast a keen eye over the case against Wachovia, and he says now that
  561. "the only thing that will make the banks properly vigilant to what is
  562. happening is when they hear the rattle of handcuffs in the boardroom".
  563.  
  564. Mazur said that "a lot of the law enforcement people were disappointed
  565. to see a settlement" between the administration and Wachovia. "But I
  566. know there were external circumstances that worked to Wachovia's
  567. benefit, not least that the US banking system was on the edge of
  568. collapse."
  569.  
  570. What concerns Mazur is that what law enforcement agencies and
  571. politicians hope to achieve against the cartels is limited, and falls
  572. short of the obvious attack the US could make in its war on drugs: go
  573. after the money. "We're thinking way too small," Mazur says. "I train
  574. law enforcement officers, thousands of them every year, and they say to
  575. me that if they tried to do half of what I did, they'd be arrested. But
  576. I tell them: 'You got to think big. The headlines you will be reading in
  577. seven years' time will be the result of the work you begin now.' With
  578. BCCI, we had to spend two years setting it up, two years doing
  579. undercover work, and another two years getting it to trial. If they want
  580. to do something big, like go after the money, that's how long it takes."
  581.  
  582. But Mazur warns: "If you look at the career ladders of law enforcement,
  583. there's no incentive to go after the big money. People move every two to
  584. three years. The DEA is focused on drug trafficking rather than money
  585. laundering. You get a quicker result that way - they want to get the
  586. traffickers and seize their assets. But this is like treating a sick
  587. plant by cutting off a few branches - it just grows new ones. Going
  588. after the big money is cutting down the plant - it's a harder door to
  589. knock on, it's a longer haul, and it won't get you the short-term
  590. riches."
  591.  
  592.  
  593.  
  594. The office of the comptroller of the currency is still examining whether
  595. individuals in Wachovia are criminally liable. Sources at FinCEN say
  596. that a so-called "look-back" is in process, as directed by the
  597. settlement and agreed to by Wachovia, into the $378.4bn that was not
  598. directly associated with the aircraft purchases and cocaine hauls, but
  599. neither was it subject to the proper anti-laundering checks. A FinCEN
  600. source says that $20bn already examined appears to have "suspicious
  601. origins". But this is just the beginning.
  602.  
  603. Antonio Maria Costa, who was executive director of the UN's office on
  604. drugs and crime from May 2002 to August 2010, charts the history of the
  605. contamination of the global banking industry by drug and criminal money
  606. since his first initiatives to try to curb it from the European
  607. commission during the 1990s. "The connection between organised crime and
  608. financial institutions started in the late 1970s, early 1980s," he says,
  609. "when the mafia became globalised."
  610.  
  611. Until then, criminal money had circulated largely in cash, with the
  612. authorities making the occasional, spectacular "sting" or haul. During
  613. Costa's time as director for economics and finance at the EC in
  614. Brussels, from 1987, inroads were made against penetration of banks by
  615. criminal laundering, and "criminal money started moving back to cash,
  616. out of the financial institutions and banks. Then two things happened:
  617. the financial crisis in Russia, after the emergence of the Russian
  618. mafia, and the crises of 2003 and 2007-08.
  619.  
  620. "With these crises," says Costa, "the banking sector was short of
  621. liquidity, the banks exposed themselves to the criminal syndicates, who
  622. had cash in hand."
  623.  
  624. Costa questions the readiness of governments and their regulatory
  625. structures to challenge this large-scale corruption of the global
  626. economy: "Government regulators showed what they were capable of when
  627. the issue suddenly changed to laundering money for terrorism - on that,
  628. they suddenly became serious and changed their attitude."
  629.  
  630. Hardly surprising, then, that Wachovia does not appear to be the end of
  631. the line. In August 2010, it emerged in quarterly disclosures by HSBC
  632. that the US justice department was seeking to fine it for anti-money
  633. laundering compliance problems reported to include dealings with Mexico.
  634.  
  635.  
  636.  
  637. "Wachovia had my resume, they knew who I was," says Woods. "But they did
  638. not want to know - their attitude was, 'Why are you doing this?' They
  639. should have been on my side, because they were compliance people, not
  640. commercial people. But really they were commercial people all along.
  641. We're talking about hundreds of millions of dollars. This is the biggest
  642. money-laundering scandal of our time.
  643.  
  644. "These are the proceeds of murder and misery in Mexico, and of drugs
  645. sold around the world," he says. "All the law enforcement people wanted
  646. to see this come to trial. But no one goes to jail. "What does the
  647. settlement do to fight the cartels? Nothing - it doesn't make the job of
  648. law enforcement easier and it encourages the cartels and anyone who
  649. wants to make money by laundering their blood dollars. Where's the risk?
  650. There is none.
  651.  
  652. "Is it in the interest of the American people to encourage both the drug
  653. cartels and the banks in this way? Is it in the interest of the Mexican
  654. people? It's simple: if you don't see the correlation between the money
  655. laundering by banks and the 30,000 people killed in Mexico, you're
  656. missing the point."
  657.  
  658. Woods feels unable to rest on his laurels. He tours the world for a
  659. consultancy he now runs, Hermes Forensic Solutions, counselling and
  660. speaking to banks on the dangers of laundering criminal money, and how
  661. to spot and stop it. "New York and London," says Woods, "have become the
  662. world's two biggest laundries of criminal and drug money, and offshore
  663. tax havens. Not the Cayman Islands, not the Isle of Man or Jersey. The
  664. big laundering is right through the City of London and Wall Street.
  665.  
  666. "After the Wachovia case, no one in the regulatory community has sat
  667. down with me and asked, 'What happened?' or 'What can we do to avoid
  668. this happening to other banks?' They are not interested. They are the
  669. same people who attack the whistleblowers and this is a position the
  670. [British] Financial Services Authority at least has adopted on legal
  671. advice: it has been advised that the confidentiality of banking and
  672. bankers takes primacy over the public information disclosure act. That
  673. is how the priorities work: secrecy first, public interest second.
  674.  
  675. "Meanwhile, the drug industry has two products: money and suffering. On
  676. one hand, you have massive profits and enrichment. On the other, you
  677. have massive suffering, misery and death. You cannot separate one from
  678. the other.
  679.  
  680. "What happened at Wachovia was symptomatic of the failure of the entire
  681. regulatory system to apply the kind of proper governance and adequate
  682. risk management which would have prevented not just the laundering of
  683. blood money, but the global crisis."
  684.  
  685. On 5/4/11 9:29 PM, Sean Noonan wrote:
  686.  
  687. this is in OS.
  688.  
  689. Many big stories on it.
  690.  
  691. On 5/4/11 7:53 PM, Fred Burton wrote:
  692.  
  693. One of my trusted former CIA cronies reports Wachovia laundered $70
  694.  
  695. billion (yes billion) for the MX drug cartels per an on-going
  696.  
  697. investigation. His company has been hired by the MX govt to look for
  698.  
  699. drug money.
  700.  
  701.  
  702.  
  703.  
  704.  
  705.  
  706.  
  707. --
  708.  
  709. Sean Noonan
  710.  
  711. Tactical Analyst
  712.  
  713. Office: +1 512-279-9479
  714.  
  715. Mobile: +1 512-758-5967
  716.  
  717. Strategic Forecasting, Inc.
  718.  
  719. www.stratfor.com
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