felconrtrol

Emerging research on self-control reveals that one important factor
in determining whether or not people sustain control is their experiences of effort while exerting control. In three studies, we examined
how these experiences of effort might also have broader effects in terms
of altering people's fundamental beliefs about the nature of self-control.
Results of all three studies indicated that self-control experiences
characterized by high versus low perceived effort were associated with
stronger endorsement of lay theories that self-control is limited and can
be exhausted through continuous use.
Two studies experimentally manipulated whether participants reflected on a high-effort or low-effort experience of self-control (Study 1)
or engaged in a high- or low-effort self-control task (Study 2); in both
studies, participants endorsed lay theories of self-control as more limited in the high-effort condition. Furthermore, Study 2 indicated that
the effects of condition on lay theories were uniquely mediated by
perceived effort. Study 3 assessed the degree of effort and fatigue participants experienced during a two-week period of performing an assigned self-control task and examined its association with changes in
lay theories of self-control following this period. Results similarly
showed that participants who experienced more effort and fatigue also
endorsed lay theories of self-control as more limited, regardless of what
their initial lay theory had been. Thus, across three different paradigms,
two that prioritized experimental control (Studies 1–2) and one that
prioritized ecological validity (Study 3), we found converging evidence
of the relation between perceived effort and lay theories of self-control.
In addition, Study 3 provided further evidence for the downstream effects of increased experiences of effort during self-control on subsequent self-control performance. Consistent with prior research on lay
theories of self-control (Bernecker & Job, 2015; Job et al., 2010; Job,
Walton, et al., 2015; Miller et al., 2012), the shifts toward lay theories
of self-control as limited further mediated reduced self-control performance following such experiences. Moreover, also consistent with
previous research, the mediational pathway was only observed for the
final self-control-related task in the experimental session when cumulative demands for control were relatively high.
Interestingly, the effects of perceived effort on lay theories of selfcontrol were largely specific to the type of self-control experience that
was salient. In Studies 1 and 3, in which self-control was defined for and
experienced by participants as being primarily about resisting temptations, effort was related most strongly to lay theories of resisting
temptation, not mental exertion. In contrast, in Study 2, in which selfcontrol was defined for participants as being primarily about mental
exertion, perceived effort was related to lay theories of mental exertion,
but not to lay theories of resisting temptation. These contrasting patterns of results suggest that individuals may be relying on effort signals
to draw more narrow and specific inferences about their capacity in
particular self-control situations, not about their self-regulatory capacity more broadly. Although more systematic research will be necessary
to confirm the specificity of such inferences, our findings indicate that
there is potential value in examining different lay theories about self




These findings provide new insights into how the experience of selfcontrol as effortful and exhausting may affect not only proximal, but
also distal, self-control outcomes. Although recent motivational accounts of self-control (e.g., Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012; Kurzban et al.,
2013; Molden et al., 2016, 2018) vary in a number of details, there is
general recognition that whereas signals of exhaustion and effort may
not reflect a literal state of resource depletion, they may still function as
key signals about how much to continue to invest in goal pursuit. The
current studies extend this idea further by suggesting that people may
make important inferences about the nature of self-control based on
these feelings of effort and exhaustion. These inferences can then influence people's lay theories about self-control and affect self-control
performance in unrelated situations. The present results thus provide
some initial evidence that high-effort cues can impact self-control well
beyond the immediate situation. In particular, they suggest that the
experience of high effort and exhaustion during self-control can itself
lead to reduced self-control performance in new situations where regulatory demands are high.
These results are particularly interesting in light of the conclusions
drawn by Vohs, Baumeister, and Schmeichel (2012) concerning the
effects of “severely depleting” experiences and the evidence this provides for the limited capacity of self-control. Vohs et al. presented a
study in which they first temporarily activated either more limited or
non-limited lay theories of self-control by having people rate their
agreement with statements biased toward one of the two theories (see
Job et al., 2010). Temporarily increasing endorsement of a non-limited
versus a limited theory of self-control in this manner bolstered subsequent performance on self-control tasks when participants were presented with two consecutive self-control tasks, which was presumably
experienced as moderately taxing; however, this manipulation did not
affect performance when participants were presented with four consecutive self-control tasks, which was presumably experienced as extremely taxing. Vohs et al. concluded that these findings confirm that,
although perceptions and interpretations of effort during self-control
might affect such control in some cases, there is still a limited capacity
that will be depleted if people have to sustain self-control for a long
enough period of time or at high enough levels. In the context of studies
reviewed earlier (Bernecker & Job, 2015; Job et al., 2010; Job, Walton,
et al., 2015; Miller et al., 2012), these findings could be interpreted as
suggesting that under conditions of extremely high demand, lay theories are no longer influential.
The present findings, however, question the necessity of this conclusion. If the lengthier and more taxing condition of the Vohs et al.
(2012) experiment was indeed experienced as more effortful and fatiguing, then these experiences could readily have shifted people's lay
theories back toward a more limited view of self-control, counteracting
any influence of the initial manipulation. That is, we would argue (see
also Molden et al., 2016) that whatever temporary accessibility for nonlimited theories of self-control was created at the beginning of the experiment could have been overridden by the more recent and prolonged
experience of effort and fatigue involved with completing four consecutive self-control-relevant tasks (see Higgins, 1996). Indeed, it is
even possible that the violation of expectations experienced by participants who were encouraged to endorse non-limited theories of selfcontrol but then experienced high levels of effort and fatigue from the
prolonged series of tasks they performed made the implications of these
later experiences more salient. This would explain the particularly low
performance observed in this condition of the experiment. Thus,
overall, complementing previous findings on the role of people's perceptions and experiences in explaining results previously interpreted as
a depleted capacity for self-control (e.g., Clarkson et al., 2010; Laran &
Janiszewski, 2011; Moller et al., 2006; Muraven et al., 2008), the



results presented here suggest that even apparent instances of “severe
depletion” can be understood in terms of people's perceptions and experiences of effort rather than as the exhaustion of some self-control
resource.
A broader question concerning the influences of effort on sustained
self-control that is important for future research is whether experiences
of effort during self-control are directly equivalent to experiences of
fatigue. Although, colloquially, the two terms are often used interchangeably and we did not have adequate measures to distinguish these
constructs in the present studies, they could be theoretically distinct in
critical ways. For instance, prior work has shown that effort can—but
does not necessarily—produce fatigue (e.g., Brehm & Self, 1989;
Csikszentmihalyi, 1997). Indeed, Molden et al. (2016, 2018) argue that
effort (i.e., sustained attention) itself may simply be one input to determining fatigue. Specifically, in their motivated effort-allocation
(MEA) model of self-regulation, the relationship between effort and
fatigue further depends on the perceived progress toward some desired
outcome produced by the effort exerted. It is only when people's efforts
are not perceived to be producing sufficient progress—i.e., when this
effort does not seem to be entirely worthwhile—that fatigue is proposed
to arise. Indeed, there might be cases when experiences of effort actually lead to less limited theories if perceived effort is positively correlated with perceptions of worth; under these conditions, it is possible
that individuals might actually infer that effort is energizing and that
their capacity for regulation is expanding or limitless (see Mrazek et al.,
2018). Thus, it will be important in future research to develop effective
means of separately assessing effort versus fatigue. This could involve
the development of both more sensitive self-report measures as well as
the use of physiological indicators of self-regulatory effort and fatigue
(e.g., Hui et al., 2009; Segerstrom & Nes, 2007).
In addition, although our account of how the experience of effort
influences lay theories is based on the inferences people make, the
studies did not directly test the mechanism by which perceptions of
effort affects lay theories. Experiences of effort might also affect what
factors are most salient when reflecting on lay beliefs, may change the
perceived value of effort, or may more generally affect individuals'
confidence about their self-regulatory capabilities, leading them to
make more conservative estimates of what they (and perhaps even
others) are capable of doing. In future work it will be interesting to
directly examine potential mechanisms, of which we recognize that the
inference account we have proposed is only one possibility.


Implications for improving self-control
Another way to consider the present findings that experiencing selfcontrol as effortful may produce more limited lay theories of control
and impair subsequent performance is the reverse: that experiencing
self-control as low effort may support more non-limited theories of
control and bolster performance in the face of high regulatory demands.
The studies reported here do not speak directly to whether experiences
of high versus low effort and exhaustion are relatively more influential
in shifting lay theories, which is an interesting direction for future research to address. Nevertheless, these findings confirm the potential of
methods to bolster self-control by directly altering how people experience and interpret the effort involved.
Indeed, the present findings could help further explain why proactive strategies of self-control, in which people alter their environments
and behaviors so as to minimize their potential of actually having to
engage in effortful control, are often so effective (see Ent, Baumeister, &
Tice, 2015; Fujita, 2011; Hofmann, Baumeister, Förster, & Vohs, 2012;
Trope & Fishbach, 2000; Wertenbroch, 1998). If effort and fatigue are
not frequently experienced, then people's broader lay theories of selfcontrol may remain more non-limited, further bolstering whatever efforts they may need to make in the future. Our findings could also help
explain why strategies of engaging in consistent self-control “practice,”
in contrast, may not always be effective and could sometimes even


backfire. Although this type of intervention has shown some promise
for improving self-control (e.g., Job, Friese, & Bernecker, 2015;
Muraven, 2010a; Muraven, 2010b), the cumulative evidence for its
effectiveness is less certain (Inzlicht & Berkman, 2015; Miles et al.,
2016). This mixed evidence could arise because the experiences that
people have during self-control practice may determine how well such
an intervention succeeds. Difficult self-control tasks that have a high
likelihood of being experienced as effortful and exhausting may actually undermine self-control performance in the future. For instance, one
study found that participants who practiced controlling their moods
over a two-week period actually showed a subsequent decrease (from
baseline) in self-control performance (Muraven, Baumeister, & Tice,
1999). In contrast, practice tasks such as keeping good posture (Sultan,
Joireman, & Sprott, 2012) and using one's non-dominant hand for
certain tasks (Denson, Capper, Oaten, Friese, & Schofield, 2011), instead improved self-control. These latter tasks may, on average, have
been experienced as less effortful and exhausting compared to a practice task like controlling one's moods. Investigating the influence of
different types of practice, and the role of the effort and fatigue they
evoke, is thus an interesting direction for future work.
Beyond the actual experience of effort itself, another important
point made by the present research is that it would benefit any proposed method to improve self-control to take into account its implications for people's broader lay theories of control. That is, to develop
effective interventions for self-control, it may ultimately be important
to understand how people's repeated experiences of exerting self-control in the context of the interventions themselves shape the development of their lay theories. The present findings illustrate the potential
connection between these types of experiences and lay theories, but
leave many other questions still unanswered. For example, it is not clear
how long any changes in people's lay theories brought about by their
experiences endure. Study 3 evaluated people's experiences over a twoweek period, but only assessed the influence of these experiences several days later. Presumably more prolonged and consistent experiences
of effort and fatigue produce more prolonged and stable changes to
people's lay theories, but these broader developmental questions need
to be assessed in future research.
In addition, more research is needed to understand the extent to
which people connect the various experiences of effort and fatigue they
have in their daily lives to their exertion of self-control. That is, in all
three studies, participants were directly prompted to interpret their
experiences in terms of self-control; we explicitly defined what we
meant by self-control and, in Studies 2 and 3, emphasized that their
assigned tasks would involve self-control. But, the question still remains
under what conditions individuals spontaneously link experiences of
effort and exhaustion on a given task to the exertion of self-control in
their everyday life; and indeed, answering this question is an important
step in developing effective interventions to improve self-control.
In conclusion, the studies presented here provide new insights into
how the experiences of effort and exhaustion influence people's
thoughts about and enactment of self-control. Not only may experiencing high levels of fatigue serve as a signal for how to allocate one's
effort and attention, as suggested by previous research (Brehm & Self,
1989; Clarkson et al., 2010; Kivetz & Zheng, 2006; Muraven et al.,
2008), but these experiences may also have broader consequences
concerning the lay theories people form about self-control as something
that is limited and must be conserved when the demands for it get too
high. The present work thus helps to further our understanding of why
self-control may be so difficult to sustain over time, and suggests important new directions for exploring methods for reducing this difficulty and bolstering self-control