POPLA Appeal

POPLA reference number:
Civil Enforcement Ltd PCN:

Dear POPLA Assessor,

As the registered keeper, I am appealing the Parking Charge Notice issued by Civil Enforcement Ltd. for an alleged breach of the terms and conditions at Beech Hill Conservative Club, on 18th January 2025. For clarity, I am not identifying the driver in this appeal, and this statement is solely on behalf of the registered keeper.

Summary of Case:
I wish to challenge this Parking Charge Notice on the following grounds:

1.Non-compliance with the Protection of Freedoms Act (PoFA) 2012
2.Inadequate signage and insufficient notice of the sum of the parking charge
3.Lack of evidence of Landowner Authority

1. Non-compliance with PoFA 2012
The Notice to Keeper (NtK) issued in this case is non-compliant with the requirements set out in schedule 4 of The Protection of Freedoms Act (PoFA) 2012. This is because the NtK incorrectly starts the 28-day period for transferring liability one day too early.

PoFA Requirements:
Under paragraph 9(2)(f), the NtK must include the following wording:

"The notice must state that the creditor does not know both the name of the driver and a current address for service for the driver and invite the keeper to pay the unpaid parking charges or, if the keeper was not the driver of the vehicle, to provide the name of the driver and a current address for service for the driver and to pass the notice on to the driver."
It must also state:
"(i) that the creditor will (if all the applicable conditions under this Schedule are met) have the right to recover from the keeper so much of that amount as remains unpaid; and
(ii) the period of 28 days beginning with the day after that on which the notice is given."

Under paragraph 9(6), the notice is deemed to have been 'given' to the keeper on the second working day after the date it was issued. The 28-day period then starts the day after that.

For example:

The NtK was issued on Monday 27th January.
The NtK is presumed to be 'given' to the keeper on Wednesday 29th January (the second working day).
The 28-day period should then begin on Thursday 30th January (the day after the second working day).

Where the NtK's Wording is Non-Compliant:
The wording on the back of the NtK attempts to transfer liability to the keeper one day early by stating that the 28-day period starts “from the second working day after the date of this Parking Charge," rather than the day after the second working day.

Why This Matters:
Incorrectly starting the 28-day period is significant because PoFA requires full and strict compliance with its wording to hold the registered keeper liable. By attempting to transfer liability one day too early, the operator has not met the legal requirements of PoFA, meaning that the keeper cannot be held liable for the parking charge.

The mistake in the NtK effectively cuts short the keeper’s response period and breaches PoFA’s clear requirements, which unfairly prejudices the keeper. POPLA must recognise that this premature attempt to start the liability transfer invalidates the notice, making it non-compliant with PoFA, and as a result, the parking charge should be cancelled.

Reference to Previous POPLA Decisions:

Successful POPLA Decision (December 2024)

I would like to draw POPLA’s attention to a recent decision regarding a similar case involving Horizon Parking (POPLA code 3762434330, decision date 17/12/2024), which was allowed on the basis of the same non-compliance with PoFA. The assessor in that case ruled as follows:

“The appellant has presented a technical challenge to the parking operator’s application of PoFA. The parking operator is reliant on the correct application of PoFA in this case as driver liability cannot be established. As such, in respect of the 28-day period given for the PCN to be paid or for the driver’s details to be provided, I must note that Notice to Keeper in this case does state: ‘the period of 28 days from the second working day after the date of this Parking Charge’. However, PoFA stipulates (at paragraph 9 subparagraph (2)(f)) that this period must be given from: ‘the period of 28 days beginning with the day after that on which the notice is given’. In respect of the presumed date of issue, paragraph 9 subparagraph (6) of PoFA advises: ‘A notice sent by post is to be presumed…to have been delivered (and so ‘given’ for the purposes of sub-paragraph (4)) on the second working day after the day on which it is posted’. As such, I must uphold the appellant’s grounds in respect of the wording used by the parking operator in this case, as this sets the 28-day timescale from the presumed date of issue, whereas PoFA stipulates this must begin from the day after. Accordingly, I must allow this appeal.”

Acknowledgment of Error in Unsuccessful POPLA Decision (January 2025)

In another case where an appeal on this same point was initially rejected, the POPLA Complaints Team has since confirmed that the assessor’s judgment was incorrect. While the decision could not be reversed, the complaints handler explicitly acknowledged the error, stating:

“I acknowledge that the assessor has incorrectly stated that the given date… I would like to apologise for this error… As PoFA 2012 states that motorists must be given 28 days from the day after the notice is given, you are correct in stating that the 28 days should have begun from [the correct date].”

This acknowledgment highlights the importance of adhering to PoFA requirements and avoiding repeated errors in the interpretation of the legislation. I respectfully request that the assessor for this appeal carefully reviews both the successful December 2024 decision and the Complaints Team acknowledgment to ensure a correct and fair decision is made in this case.

In Summary:
PoFA states that the NtK is presumed 'given' on the second working day after issuance.
The 28-day period to transfer liability then begins the day after the second working day.
The NtK incorrectly starts the 28-day period from the second working day itself, which is one day too early.
As PoFA requires exact compliance, this error invalidates the attempt to transfer liability to the keeper.
This is a crucial challenge that POPLA should uphold, as it directly affects the legality of the operator’s attempt to hold the keeper liable.




2. Inadequate Signage and Insufficient Notice of the sum of the Parking Charge

The signs in this car park are not prominent, clear or legible from all parking spaces and there is insufficient notice of the sum of the parking charge itself.

I note that within the Protection of Freedoms Act (POFA) 2012 it discusses the clarity that needs to be provided to make a motorist aware of the parking charge. Specifically, it requires that the driver is given 'adequate notice' of the charge. POFA 2012 defines 'adequate notice' as follows:

''(3) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (2) 'adequate notice' means notice given by: (a) the display of one or more notices in accordance with any applicable requirements prescribed in regulations under paragraph 12 for, or for purposes including, the purposes of sub-paragraph (2); or (b) where no such requirements apply, the display of one or more notices which: (i) specify the sum as the charge for unauthorised parking; and (ii) are adequate to bring the charge to the notice of drivers who park vehicles on the relevant land''.

Even in circumstances where POFA 2012 does not apply, I believe this to be a reasonable standard to use when making my own assessment, as appellant, of the signage in place at the location. Having considered the signage in place at this particular site against the requirements of Section 18 of the BPA Code of Practice and POFA 2012, I am of the view that the signage at the site - given the minuscule font size of the £sum, which is illegible in most photographs and does not appear at all at the entrance - is NOT sufficient to bring the parking charge (i.e. the sum itself) to the attention of the motorist.

There was no contract nor agreement on the 'parking charge' at all. It is submitted that the driver did not have a fair opportunity to read about any terms involving this huge charge, which is out of all proportion and not saved by the dissimilar 'ParkingEye Ltd v Beavis' case.

In the Beavis case, which turned on specific facts relating only to the signs at that site and the unique interests and intentions of the landowners, the signs were unusually clear and not a typical example for this notorious industry. The Supreme Court were keen to point out the decision related to that car park and those facts only:

http://imgur.com/a/AkMCN

In the Beavis case, the £85 charge itself was in the largest font size with a contrasting colour background and the terms were legible, fairly concise and unambiguous. There were 'large lettering' signs at the entrance and all around the car park, according to the Judges.

Here is the 'Beavis case' sign as a comparison to the signs under dispute in this case:

http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-eYdphoIIDgE/VpbCpfSTaiI/AAAAAAAAE10/5uFjL528DgU/s640/Parking%2Bsign_001.jpg

This case, by comparison, does not demonstrate an example of the 'large lettering' and 'prominent signage' that impressed the Supreme Court Judges and swayed them into deciding that in the specific car park in the Beavis case alone, a contract and 'agreement on the charge' existed.

Here, the signs are sporadically placed, indeed obscured and hidden in some areas. They are unremarkable, not immediately obvious as parking terms and the wording is mostly illegible, being crowded and cluttered with a lack of white space as a background. It is indisputable that placing letters too close together in order to fit more information into a smaller space can drastically reduce the legibility of a sign, especially one which must be read BEFORE the action of parking and leaving the car.

It is vital to observe, since 'adequate notice of the parking charge' is mandatory under the POFA Schedule 4 and the BPA Code of Practice, these signs do not clearly mention the parking charge which is hidden in small print (and does not feature at all on some of the signs). Areas of this site are unsigned and there are no full terms displayed - i.e. with the sum of the parking charge itself in large lettering - at the entrance either, so it cannot be assumed that a driver drove past and could read a legible sign, nor parked near one.

This case is more similar to the signage in POPLA decision 5960956830 on 2.6.16, where the Assessor Rochelle Merritt found as fact that signs in a similar size font in a busy car park where other unrelated signs were far larger, was inadequate:

''the signage is not of a good enough size to afford motorists the chance to read and understand the terms and conditions before deciding to remain in the car park. [...] In addition the operators signs would not be clearly visible from a parking space [...] The appellant has raised other grounds for appeal but I have not dealt with these as I have allowed the appeal.''

From the evidence I have seen so far, the terms appear to be displayed inadequately, in letters no more than about half an inch high, approximately. I put the operator to strict proof as to the size of the wording on their signs and the size of lettering for the most onerous term, the parking charge itself.

The letters seem to be no larger than .40 font size going by this guide:

http://www-archive.mozilla.org/newlayout/testcases/css/sec526pt2.htm

As further evidence that this is inadequate notice, Letter Height Visibility is discussed here:

http://www.signazon.com/help-center/sign-letter-height-visibility-chart.aspx

''When designing your sign, consider how you will be using it, as well as how far away the readers you want to impact will be. For example, if you are placing a sales advertisement inside your retail store, your text only needs to be visible to the people in the store. 1-2' letters (or smaller) would work just fine. However, if you are hanging banners and want drivers on a nearby highway to be able to see them, design your letters at 3' or even larger.''

...and the same chart is reproduced here:

http://www.ebay.co.uk/gds/Outdoor-Dimensional-Sign-Letter-Best-Viewing-Distance-/10000000175068392/g.html

''When designing an outdoor sign for your business keep in mind the readability of the letters. Letters always look smaller when mounted high onto an outdoor wall''.

''...a guideline for selecting sign letters. Multiply the letter height by 10 and that is the best viewing distance in feet. Multiply the best viewing distance by 4 and that is the max viewing distance.''

So, a letter height of just half an inch, showing the terms and the 'charge' and placed high on a wall or pole or buried in far too crowded small print, is woefully inadequate in an outdoor car park. Given that letters look smaller when high up on a wall or pole, as the angle renders the words less readable due to the perspective and height, you would have to stand right in front of it and still need a stepladder (and perhaps a torch and/or magnifying glass) to be able to read the terms.

Under Lord Denning's Red Hand Rule, the charge (being 'out of all proportion' with expectations of drivers in this car park and which is the most onerous of terms) should have been effectively: 'in red letters with a red hand pointing to it' - i.e. VERY clear and prominent with the terms in large lettering, as was found to be the case in the car park in 'Beavis'. A reasonable interpretation of the 'red hand rule' and the 'signage visibility distance' tables above and the BPA Code of Practice, taking all information into account, would require a parking charge and the terms to be displayed far more transparently, on a lower sign and in far larger lettering, with fewer words and more 'white space' as background contrast. Indeed in the Consumer Rights Act 2015 there is a 'Requirement for transparency':

(1) A trader must ensure that a written term of a consumer contract, or a consumer notice in writing, is transparent.
(2) A consumer notice is transparent for the purposes of subsection (1) if it is expressed in plain and intelligible language and it is legible.

The Beavis case signs not being similar to the signs in this appeal at all, I submit that the persuasive case law is in fact 'Vine v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2000] EWCA Civ 106' about a driver not seeing the terms and consequently, she was NOT deemed bound by them.

This judgment is binding case law from the Court of Appeal and supports my argument, not the operator's case:

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2000/106.html

This was a victory for the motorist and found that, where terms on a sign are not seen and the area is not clearly marked/signed with prominent terms, the driver has not consented to - and cannot have 'breached' - an unknown contract because there is no contract capable of being established. The driver in that case (who had not seen any signs/lines) had NOT entered into a contract. The recorder made a clear finding of fact that the plaintiff, Miss Vine, did not see a sign because the area was not clearly marked as 'private land' and the signs were obscured/not adjacent to the car and could not have been seen and read from a driver's seat before parking.

So, for this appeal, I put this operator to strict proof of where the car was parked and (from photos taken in the same lighting conditions) how their signs appeared on that date, at that time, from the angle of the driver's perspective. Equally, I require this operator to show how the entrance signs appear from a driver's seat, not stock examples of 'the sign' in isolation/close-up. I submit that full terms simply cannot be read from a car before parking and mere 'stock examples' of close-ups of the (alleged) signage terms will not be sufficient to disprove this.

3. Lack of Evidence of Landowner Authority

No evidence of Landowner Authority - the operator is put to strict proof of full compliance with the BPA Code of Practice

As this operator does not have proprietary interest in the land then I require that they produce an unredacted copy of the contract with the landowner.

The contract and any 'site agreement' or 'User Manual' setting out details - such as any 'genuine customer' or 'genuine resident' exemptions or any site occupier's 'right of veto' charge cancellation rights, and of course all enforcement dates/times/days, and the boundary of the site - is key evidence to define what this operator is authorised to do, and when/where.

It cannot be assumed, just because an agent is contracted to merely put some signs up and issue Parking Charge Notices, that the agent is authorised on the material date, to make contracts with all or any category of visiting drivers and/or to enforce the charge in court in their own name (legal action regarding land use disputes generally being a matter for a landowner only).

Witness statements are not sound evidence of the above, often being pre-signed, generic documents not even identifying the case in hand or even the site rules. A witness statement might in some cases be accepted by POPLA but in this case I suggest it is unlikely to sufficiently evidence the definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement.

Nor would it define vital information such as charging days/times, any exemption clauses, grace periods (which I believe may be longer than the bare minimum times set out in the BPA CoP) and basic but crucial information such as the site boundary and any bays where enforcement applies/does not apply. Not forgetting evidence of the only restrictions which the landowner has authorised can give rise to a charge, as well as the date that the parking contract began, and when it runs to, or whether it runs in perpetuity, and of course, who the signatories are: name/job title/employer company, and whether they are authorised by the landowner to sign a binding legal agreement.

Paragraph 7 of the BPA CoP defines the mandatory requirements and I put this operator to strict proof of full compliance:

7.2 If the operator wishes to take legal action on any outstanding parking charges, they must ensure that they have the written authority of the landowner (or their appointed agent) prior to legal action being taken.

7.3 The written authorisation must also set out:

a the definition of the land on which you may operate, so that the boundaries of the land can be clearly defined

b any conditions or restrictions on parking control and enforcement operations, including any restrictions on hours of operation

c any conditions or restrictions on the types of vehicles that may, or may not, be subject to parking control and enforcement

d who has the responsibility for putting up and maintaining signs

e the definition of the services provided by each party to the agreement



I respectfully request that POPLA reject this charge and uphold my appeal based on these grounds.

Thank you for considering my appeal.

Kind regards,