Advertisement
Not a member of Pastebin yet?
Sign Up,
it unlocks many cool features!
- This is my understanding of Hoppe's argument (it may not be his argument accurately, but I still think it's
- internally consistent/correct). I'll see if I can bullet-point for clarity’s sake:
- - Begin with a dialectical epistemology (so, we recognize that certain statements are irrefutable because
- they are performative contradictions: supporting a given thesis necessitates the truth of its antithesis.
- If I say “We cannot establish statements as true”, I assume as a norm of argumentation that we can establish
- the truth of at least some statements… ).
- - Epistemological questions aside, I first want to start off with defining “property” vs. “property rights”.
- Property is ‘descriptive’ in Hoppean ethics – that is, property describes an empirically verifiable state in
- which an individual maintains exclusive use of a resource. “Property”, then, is inevitable (resources are
- scarce, human beings make use of them, “property” will always exist if human beings do). “Property rights”
- are an ethical term/normative statement: they are “inviolable” (well, violations of property rights cannot
- be “justified”) moral boundaries.
- - So, Hoppe begins by noting that resources are scarce (at least, some resources are. Under present conditions
- for most human beings, air is the example resource that isn’t scarce, though there are conditions in which,
- theoretically, this would not be true. Things like land, an automobile, coal, etc. are all scarce).
- - If something is scarce, it is also “rivalrous” – there are multiple moral agents acting for control of the
- same item.
- - This is a problem – that’s not a “value” judgment: it’s not as if I’m uncomfortable with this situation:
- this is a logical problem that must be resolved. If a good is rivalrous, then more than one individual
- contends for control over it, but, factually speaking, only one individual (or at least fewer than the number
- who demand this resource) can exert exclusive use over the resource (hence, the definition of what is
- “rivalrous”).
- - So there is an inherent conflict over scarce resources that exists when multiple agents are interacting.
- Social order/ethics is just the inevitable means of resolving this conflict (whatever ethical norm – or no
- “norm” – is adopted as the means to conflict resolution, there will still be some sort of ethic, even a
- nihilistic one, to answer this question: as Rand said, we have the power to choose, but not to escape the
- necessity of choice).
- - So the real question of ethical philosophy is to determine what sort of ethical theory can be justified,
- and Hoppe notes that only one ethical theory can be sustained in argument without an inherent contradiction
- (a “dialectical/performative” contradiction) in which the substance of our argument contradicts the norms
- underlying our argument.
- - Argumentation is a means of conflict resolution. It’s really only here that the question of “justification”
- arises: we cannot logically justify violence (aggression) as a form of conflict resolution. I cannot say that
- “individuals ought to use violence to resolve conflicts” without falling into an internal contradiction –
- because, in the course of engaging in an argument over a logical conflict (“how ought individuals to behave?”)
- with you, I implicitly concede that argumentation is preferable to violence, because I am resolving this
- conflict through argumentation. In much the same way, I cannot say that “We ought not to resolve conflicts
- through argumentation” to you without also falling into the same contradiction. Attempting to justify force
- is like saying that “My words have no meaning” or “It is true that truth cannot be established”. It is
- internally inconsistent – it contradicts the norms underlying and substance of my argument.
- - Having proven some form of voluntarism, the only last step is why “private property”. That is, we need a
- norm to decide how conflicts over scarce resources can be resolved in a way that is rationally justifiable.
- - Over one’s own body, the solution is simple: only a norm that states that each individual is the owner of
- his own body is justifiable, because the act of justification requires the use of one’s own body in
- argumentation. Other circumstances would be absurd: my argumentation would require another individual
- (my master/owner) to exercise his will through me and permit me to argue, or I would need joint permission
- of all members of society to argue (and, because norms are universalizable, this would also fall into
- absurd internal contradictions, because every individual would require every other individuals’ permission
- in order to grant permission for other individuals to act/grant permission; it creates a cycle of infinite
- logical regression that essentially abolishes any form of action… these positions of slavery norms are
- untenable in an argument).
- - Over external resources (we have already determined that exclusive use is inevitable and that violence is
- unjustifiable), we only have to determine how we know who owns what. Subjective (subject-dependent) norms
- have some difficulties – two individuals could consistently make a claim to the same resource and both be
- “right” (and wrong) at the same time, because these claims have no logical justifications (they’re just
- based in subjective preferences). So only objective claims are justifiable, and the only objective claim
- that is justifiable is that a resource belongs to whoever first appropriated it (of course, it would be
- the first person to establish such a link: if we were to say something like “the second person to
- appropriate the resource should be the first who appropriates it”/gains property, we’re obvious
- contradicting ourselves… in this instance, the “second” person to appropriate the good would be the first
- person to do so, and this norm justifies an infinite cycle of the third/”second”, fourth/”second”, etc.
- claiming the same resource).
- -I agree with previous users: Hoppe transcends the is-ought dichotomy. His ethic doesn’t establish a system
- of values – it makes no value judgments (on whether or not aggression is “good” or “bad”) because these
- judgments are meaningless (“good” and “bad” aren’t just subjective – they don’t mean anything at all, other
- than perhaps what you /want/ to happen). Hoppeanism is a method of ethical reasoning that establishes what
- behavior is “just” (what can be justified) and what is unjust (what cannot be rationally justified). So
- it’s not a matter of men being “good or evil”, or answering the question “why should I /want/ to be moral
- in your Hoppean world?”. Hoppeanism establishes a true, undeniable structure of ethics that is precisely
- that: TRUE. Hoppean ethics are rational, verifiable, justifiable, reasonable, true, etc… denying them and
- breaking them is just the opposite: unjustifiable, “wrong”, irrational, unreasonable, etc. The norms that
- violate Hoppeanism are false, not just “bad”. As I said in another thread, Hoppeanism is like the
- scientific method: by all means, you may act as if it isn’t /correct/, but that doesn’t change anything.
- Nothing will happen to you (I mean, private law might chase after you, but it’s not like you get zapped by
- lightning, unless DROs invent something like that ) – your behavior is just /wrong/.
- By A. Beddow, edited by MH
Advertisement
Add Comment
Please, Sign In to add comment
Advertisement