Irvine Valley College



Embodiment in VR
in Relation to John Russon’s Human Experience


















Alvin Lo
Humanities 1
Professor Steve Felder
2/26/2017


In the “Human Experience” by John Russon, the body defined as a “self-developing reality…that allows us to enter into ever more sophisticated ways of experiencing ourselves and the world” (Russon 5). In relatively recent times, in the world of video and computer gaming have made advancements such that the way one experiences oneself is able to be changed. In particular, this concept of “embodiment” as defined by Russon is now utilized in various ways to alter and enhance one’s gaming experience. With relatively new tools in technological advancements such as the commercialization of VR, we explore how game creators are able to manipulate the one’s “body” (body defined in the context of Russon’s embodiment) to shape a unique experience, as well as potentially even modifying behavior of the user.
	In order to understand how this relates to gaming, we must first understand what Russon’s concept of embodiment is. He starts with identifying the most common view point among the majority: the idea that mind and body are separate. One’s body is merely a vessel for the mind, which in turn acts as a pilot for the body. For an action of the body to occur, the mind must first process incoming information, and then issue a command to the body to perform an action. This, however, is what Russon describes as a “conceptual absurdity” (Russon 23). By subscribing to this train of thought—that the mind and body are completely separate from each other, then it impossible to define human existence through this thought pattern, because it is “precisely the relationship of the mind and the body that is definitive of our experience and that needs to be explained” (Russon 24).
	Rather than treating the mind and body as separate, the concept of embodiment defines the human body as both the mind and body, as well as the meaningful objects around us. Coined the “Subject-Object” by Russon, the body is not something tangible. Instead, our physical bodies, mind, expectations of what is around us for objects and people alike, expectations of what we are from others: all these things come together in tandem to form the identity of the individual, or the “body”.  He prefaces this by describing the ability of the body’s state to affect the mind through things like use of drugs or one’s reception and sensitivity during sex (Russon 24). The former shows that the body can alter one’s mind and the latter shows that the mind can alter the body’s perception to physical stimuli. This shows that the body and mind’s state can not only be altered by each other, but also from other people or objects.  The part about other people and objects are of particular importance in the application into VR because it draws upon these ideas to alter one’s experience. To elaborate, first we take a look at Russon’s nominalized “I can” (Russon 31). He states that “to be an object can only be meaningful in terms of our bodily possibilities” (Russon 31).  What this means is that an object’s purpose can only have said purpose because of its predetermined use by a person. Without that predetermined method of usage, the object would be merely an object that serves no purpose. In his example provided, a chair is only defined as such because we are able to sit in it. Additionally, a chair is only a chair because when others also view it as such (Russon 32). This is important, as the concept of one’s own existence, much like the chair, must be validated through the views of others, to actually exist. We exist because we observe and are observed. So, how does this concept of existence apply to Virtual Reality?
	Virtual Reality (VR) should be a relatively well known concept now, but for those that are not familiar, VR is the use of computer technology and associated equipment to simulate a fake 3D environment for its user. However, the result is an experience in which many people say feels “real”.  This leads to the question: How can something that is not real, feel real to the user experiencing VR? To answer this, we revisit Russon’s concept of the chair. A chair in VR is simply data created by an imaging program from a computer—technically it does not “exist”, and yet the user recognizes it as a chair. While the chair does not physically exist, this data, can be recognized as a chair because other people have already predetermined the “I can” of this item outside of this virtual world. Now that how something can “exist” in VR is established, we can see how one’s experience could be enhanced through this technology. Since VR does not carry the same physical limitations as the real world, one could perhaps experience the concept of flying. While not possible in the real world, the concept still exists, and thus can exist in VR. Basically, VR expands the “I can” beyond what is normally capable by a person. By doing so, it may even be possible to modify behavior by changing the observed “I Can” of an individual.
	To explain how this is accomplished, first we must briefly dig a little deeper into Russon’s concept of the human experience by looking at his thoughts on memory—particularly what he has to say about mood. Elaborating on the idea of embodiment, one’s emotions also attributes to what comprises the “body”, and “just as we cannot get away from our bodies, we cannot get away from our moods” (Russon 43). Our moods according to Russon affect how we perceive the objects around us.  On top of that, through the process of habituation, through each individual’s “familiar immediacy” of a situation, we have certain preconceptions about how the situation will play out (Russon 46). In other words, our mood can be set by the situation and our expectations of how that situation will play out. With this information we will explore how VR can change one’s expectations thus affecting ones mood by looking at the use of avatars.
	While not a new concept to VR, avatars are heavily utilized when using it. Avatars is the term coined for the “digital body” that one inhabits when engaging in VR. Going back to the concept of moods and their ability to affect their immediate perception of objects, if we treat one’s own physical body as an object, then it can be so that moods can be set by one’s own physical body. A common example of this is the many various studies on self confidence in relation to being overweight. Now, normally to change one’s body and perception of it would require much time and physical exertion. However, just like in the case with objects like the chair, in VR, even one’s own physical body can be freely manipulated. By inhabiting an avatar that is different than one’s own physical body, we are directly changing the perception of the body and thus changing the expectations of the “I can” which in turn can affect mood. In a paper published by Jakki O. Bailey, Jeremy N. Bailenson, and Daniel Casasanto from both Stanford and Chicago University, people who were assigned to a taller body in VR “behaved more assertively during negotiations compared to people assigned to a shorter body” (Bailey, Bailenson, Casasanto 8-9). In a taller body, the expectations that we have, and also the expectations of others of ourselves, could possibly expand what the perceived “I can” of the individual is.
	By removing the physical limitations that are placed on the “I can” of an individual through the use of VR, we are now able to experience a broader scope of embodiment by playing around with the perception of objects around us. It also may be possible to utilize such technology for the treatment of mental health. Regardless of the possibilities, what makes it all possible though is this concept of embodiment and the human’s ability to perceive and assign something meaningful towards the objects around them. In any case, It’s certainly entertaining to think of the “I can” more than the “I can’t”.






Works Cited

1)	Russon, John Edward. Human Experience: Philosophy, Neurosis, and the Elements of Everyday Life (SUNY series in contemporary continental philosophy). N.p.: State U of New York Press, 2003. Print.

2)	Bailey, Jakki O., Jeremy N. Bailenson, and Daniel Casasanto. "When Does Virtual Embodiment Change Our Minds?" (2016): n. pag. 2 Oct. 2016. Web. 26 Feb. 2017. < https://vhil.stanford.edu/pubs/2016/when-does-virtual-embodiment-change-our-minds/ >