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  1. I'll just leave this here.
  2.  
  3. #fuckfrifriday
  4.  
  5. --
  6.  
  7. Subject: [iacis-l] pastebin.com contact
  8. Date: Thu, 10 Nov 2011 10:08:30 -0600
  9. From: Brian mize <[email protected]>
  10. Reply-To: [email protected]
  11. All,
  12.  
  13. Does anyone have a contact with pastebin.com? A hacker recently posted info on this site. It appears they use Domains by Proxy to register the domain.
  14.  
  15. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/10/us-protests-hacking-stlouis-idUSTRE7A90C420111110
  16.  
  17. Thanks
  18.  
  19. Brian Mize
  20. RCCEEG Forensic Examiner
  21. FBI Cyber Crime Task Force
  22. 314-889-4289
  23.  
  24. --
  25.  
  26. Subject: [iacis-l] Re: Sony PSN Contact & Info Request
  27. Date: Wed, 16 Nov 2011 15:07:52 -0800
  28. From: Mark Posler <[email protected]>
  29. Reply-To: [email protected]
  30. Hi Shane-
  31. This contact info was posted to the list last year for the Sony Playstation Network, don't know if it is still valid.
  32. Andy Lamoureux
  33. Security Supervisor
  34. 919 East Hillsdale Blvd.
  35. Foster City, California 94404
  36. Phone: (650) 655-5988
  37. Fax: (650) 655-8088
  38. Good Luck! Mark
  39. --
  40. Special Agent Mark Posler [CFCE, EnCE]
  41. Oregon Department of Justice
  42. Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force
  43. Salem, Oregon USA
  44. On Wed, Nov 16, 2011 at 2:51 PM, Shane Derekson <[email protected]> wrote:
  45. Good afternoon,
  46.  
  47. I am seeking a LE contact person/number for the Sony Playstation Network. I am also curious as to what account information they retain, and what I need to be asking for. Feel free to contact me off-list.
  48.  
  49. Thank you,
  50.  
  51.  
  52. Special Deputy Shane Derekson
  53. Marion County Sheriff's Office
  54. Salem, OR
  55. 503.566.6998
  56.  
  57. --
  58.  
  59. Subject: Re: [IACIS-L] Rebutting the wireless hacker defense
  60. Date: Fri, 17 Aug 2007 12:19:42 -0400
  61. From: Greg Norman <[email protected]>
  62. Reply-To: [email protected]
  63. Jimmy,
  64. Okay, let's say that all is true. The SW needed to be executed on
  65. that house if for no other reason than to obtain the wireless router.
  66. Logging may have been turned on, and if it was it would tell us what
  67. computer IPs the router was assigning and what corresponding MACs are
  68. listed. Since we are there and because of exigent circumstances we
  69. need to seize all computers on the property to exclude them as being
  70. the culprit machine.
  71. This is just an idea off the top of my head.
  72. Later,
  73. Greg
  74. Gregory N. Norman, CFCE
  75. Digital Evidence Examiner
  76. U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory
  77. 4930 North 31st St
  78. Forest Park, GA 30297-5205
  79. (404) 469-3490; DSN 797-3490
  80. On 8/16/07, Weg, Jimmy <[email protected]> wrote:
  81. >
  82. >
  83. > I've been asked to help in a case where an agent obtained a search warrant
  84. > based upon a P2P investigation in which a semi-static IP (cable) was traced
  85. > to the suspect's account. Prior to the search, no one swept the area for a
  86. > wireless signal, but that's not unusual. The defense points out that the
  87. > suspect could have had a wireless network linking any number of machines to
  88. > a router and ultmately the cable modem. True. More importantly, they claim
  89. > that anyone could have accessed the modem through a hijacked signal, used
  90. > the suspect's IP, employed LimeWire to offer c-p, and have led the agents to
  91. > the right account, but wrong location. In sum, the defense states that the
  92. > SW application was misleading for not pointing out those possibilities, and
  93. > that there really wasn't PC to search the home.
  94. >
  95. > This seems kind of straightforward, but maybe I'm naive. Regardless,
  96. > suggestions are always helpful. It seems to me that the bottom line is that
  97. > you can't prove a negative. Martians could have hijacked the IP. I'd argue
  98. > that we knew that the homeowner had the account. We also knew that the
  99. > cable access is physically connected to the house. So, I think there's PC
  100. > to search the house, as it's very likely that a computer inside the house
  101. > accessed the Net through the modem (IP). Still, we've all heard of cases in
  102. > which a signal was in fact stolen leading to a search of the wrong computer.
  103. > There's also the argument that an unencrypted access point is asking for
  104. > trouble. If the defense argument flies, should it be a practice to sweep
  105. > for signals (not capturing content) before applying for any SW based on
  106. > traced an IP? Even that isn't fail safe. Thanks.
  107. >
  108. > Jimmy Weg, CFCE
  109. > Agent in Charge, Computer Crime Unit
  110. > Montana Division of Criminal Investigation
  111. > 2225 11th Ave.
  112. > Helena, MT 59601
  113. > 406.444.6681
  114. > 406.439.6185 (cell)
  115. >
  116. --
  117.  
  118.  
  119. On 1/11/11 9:54 PM, [email protected] wrote:
  120. > I use Digital DNA and other HB Gary products on a daily basis. Digital DNA is a product made by HB Gary. You can purchase it as a bundle with Responder Pro and Fast Dump Pro (its not cheap). It basically looks at a live memory image and assesses the behavior traits of objects found running in memory. It gives a score based on the severity of the behavior. It is not always correct and produces more fa
  121. lse hits than positive. It will rank some objects it finds as severe simply because it is often used in certain malicious code. However much of what it ranks high is also used in legitimate processes. Its the new "Push Button" memory examiner tool. You still need to thoroughly research what was ranked high and see if it is actually legitimate or malicious.
  122. >
  123. > In general signature analysis of malware is dead. Scanning a box with Norton, McAfee or other basic virus detection software can miss up to 80% of the malware used by experienced hackers (aka. The Advanced Persistent Threat). Mandiant published a paper about the APT last year. Its a good read for those new to memory analysis and how hackers are stealing data. HB Gary's website is also good and contain
  124. s several papers about memory analysis and their tools. If a hacker is good he can design code that changes, sleeps or hooks legitimate code and the basic virus detection applications will never find it. On the other hand -- simply because an expensive software says a specific object exhibits malware behavior does not mean its malicious. It still takes a detailed examination to assess the totality of th
  125. e circumstance.
  126. >
  127. > Get use to it -- live memory analysis will be a key aspect of future examinations. If you are not imaging live memory before you shut down a computer you are missing a great deal of potential evidence (P2P Search Criteria, Private Browsing Internet History, Passwords, Gmail Artifacts. etc).
  128. >
  129. > Rich Peacock
  130. > EnCE, CFCE, CEECS
  131. > Baltimore County Police Department
  132. > Detective - Vice / Narcotics Section (Retired)
  133. > Digital Analyst
  134. > DHS - Focused Operations Unit
  135.  
  136.  
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