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  1.  
  2.  
  3. Saved July 1st, 2012
  4.  
  5. ==============================================================
  6.  
  7.  
  8. Project Mayhem 2012 Artistic Disclaimer: http://pastebin.com/Ux0Uk2em
  9.  
  10.  
  11.  
  12. IMPORTANT: To anonymize your IPs, you are strongly advised to access this Pad via TOR or buy a VPN (pay with bitcoins), OR get a b0x so that you can tunnel your traffic through an SSH connection.
  13.  
  14.  
  15.  
  16. The BACKUP PADs are available at:
  17.  
  18. https://ttbmov2dezfs2fln.onion/p/TYLER (via TOR)
  19. http://pad.fnordig.de/p/ TYLER
  20. http://piratenpad.de/p/TYLER
  21. http://notes.occupy.net/p/TYLER
  22. http://wuselpad.ironhide.de/p/TYLER
  23. http://pad.tihlde.org/p/TYLER
  24. http://brownbag.me:9001/p/TYLER
  25. http://pad.tn/p/TYLER
  26. http://dev.ardupad.cc/pad/p/TYLER
  27. http://qikpad.co.uk/p/TYLER
  28. http://beta.publishwith.me/p/TYLER
  29. https://pad.lqdn.fr/p/TYLER
  30. http://pad.planka.nu/p/TYLER
  31. http://typewith.me/p/TYLER
  32. http://beta.primarypad.com/p/TYLER
  33. http://pad.factor.cc/p/TYLER
  34.  
  35. Latest BACKU@pastebin:
  36. Saved July 1st, 2012 - http://pastebin.com/3yFJU5nA
  37.  
  38. As an extra security layer, please feel free to keep encrypted local copies of this pad in your PC.
  39.  
  40. ********************************************************************************************************
  41. ********************************************************************************************************
  42. *** IF YOU INTERPRET *** ANYTHING *** YOU READ ON THE FOLLOWING PAGES *** *** AS BEING ILLEGAL/forbidden IN YOUR COUNTRY or in your local jurisdiction, then *** DO NOT DO IT | DO NOT DO IT | DO NOT DO IT ***
  43. ********************************************************************************************************
  44. ********************************************************************************************************
  45.  
  46. Also,
  47.  
  48. |=----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------=|
  49. |=----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------=|
  50. |=--------=[ ]=--------=|
  51. |=--------=[ « Never do anything against Conscience even ]=--------=|
  52. |=--------=[ if the State demands it. » ]=--------=|
  53. |=--------=[ Albert Einstein ]=--------=|
  54. |=----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------=|
  55. |=----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------=|
  56.  
  57. The ideally non-violent state will be an ordered anarchy.
  58. That State is the best governed which is governed the least.
  59. — Mahatma Gandhi, Collected works of Mahatma Gandhi, Vol. 79 (PDF), p. 122
  60.  
  61. ordered anarchy here means:
  62.  
  63.  
  64. BEE Kind to all and make sure we all leave our egos aside.
  65.  
  66.  
  67.  
  68. Keep the PAD strictly technical. We do NOT discuss beliefs/politics here.
  69.  
  70.  
  71.  
  72. It is preferred that you do NOT choose a nickname but just edit anonymously or as "PM+random number" each time.
  73.  
  74.  
  75.  
  76. The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
  77.  
  78. See http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc2119.html
  79.  
  80.  
  81. If you AGREE on an item/idea, add a +1 next to it. 1
  82.  
  83. I disagree with this
  84.  
  85.  
  86.  
  87. If you DISAGREE on an item/idea, do NOT delete it (this is the main purpose of BRAINSTORMING): EXPLAIN why you disagree and OFFER an alternate solution to it.
  88.  
  89. I disagree with this because sometimes you just don't need a reason...
  90.  
  91.  
  92.  
  93. tl;dr:
  94.  
  95. Universal Cryptographic Wrapper (Tor/I2P/Freenet...APIs) +
  96.  
  97. a temporary Trust Authority aka HiveMind [that follows an Ethical c0de] to keep informational noise to the minimum +
  98.  
  99. a distributed Wiki to sort out and crowdsource all leaks from Conscientious Insiders (C.I.) worldwide =
  100.  
  101. ____________________
  102. TYLER
  103.  
  104. Remember : There won't be only ONE TYLER, but MANY #TYLERCANDIDATES.
  105. BEE AWARE: it *IS* EXPECTED that @DHSgov, @DARPA, @CYBER, #NSA, #MOSSAD...and related 'side players', WILL release one or several subtly trojanized #TYLERCANDIDATES, for obvious reasons.
  106. Obviously, the cipherhacking community will audit all and decide which one is the SIMPLEST and SAFEST.
  107. Consider this the most challenging SUMMER OF CODE ever.
  108.  
  109. Resources:
  110.  
  111. TYLER as described by PM2012: http://pastebin.com/Wt15GXTn
  112. #LETSCODETYLER Call to Hackzion! Code TYLER!:
  113. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XnR8wo-1utI - (UPRISING soundtrack)
  114. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fKfX9SN0p44&hd=1 - (Golden Ratio Re-Evolution)
  115. Project Mayhem 2012 'Dangerous Ideas #1 and #2': http://pastebin.com/sLLwJbtz
  116. Dangerous Idea #1 video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EGxDqpOxDkw
  117. Dangerous Idea #1 mp3: http://soundcloud.com/pm2012/dangerous-idea-number-one
  118. Dangerous Idea #3 video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eZnVWH0Ilo0
  119. rEVOLUTIONART2012 vids: http://www.youtube.com/user/rEVOLUTIONART2012/videos
  120. All "Project Mayhem 2012" vids:
  121. http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=%22Project+Mayhem+2012%22
  122. #OpMINDFUCK: http://PM2012.tumblr.com
  123. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Mindfuck
  124. Project Mayhem 2012 Artistic Disclaimer: http://pastebin.com/Ux0Uk2em
  125.  
  126. Tags :
  127. #TYLER
  128. #LETSCODETYLER
  129. #INTYLERWETRUST
  130. #PROJECTMAYHEM2012
  131. #PM2012
  132. #PM2012art
  133.  
  134.  
  135. Plan :
  136. - Before June 2012 : Dev' begining
  137. -
  138. -
  139. - November 5th, 2012 :
  140.  
  141.  
  142. All TYLER CANDIDATES get out of Beta version and their source code, network design diagrams & documentation MUST be released ANONYMOUSLY & into the Public Domain.
  143.  
  144. This (=this Pad's) one is supposed to be just one TYLER CANDIDATE.
  145.  
  146. The more TYLER CANDIDATES coded by different coders/groups in STEALTH mode, the better resilience the Project gets.
  147.  
  148. Remember: a potential Conscientious Insider (CI) has to be able to trust TYLER with his life before deciding to leak sensitive data [through/with/to] it. Hence total transparency code wise is not just a desired feature: TRUST is the CORE of TYLER. Hence the motto: 'In TYLER we TRUST.'
  149.  
  150.  
  151.  
  152.  
  153. Once TYLER be on the wild and Truths be revealed:
  154.  
  155. 1. You DO ask questions.
  156. 2. You DO ask questions.
  157. 3. No excuses.
  158. 4. No lies.
  159. 5. You HAVE to trust TYLER: for YOU are the Watchmen."
  160.  
  161.  
  162. - 12-21-2012 11:11: The End of Fear. [Doesn't the end of fear require change? Isn't change scary?]
  163. Not all change is scary
  164.  
  165. Scholarly Resources:
  166.  
  167. http://scholar.googleb' from all countries, pa.com/
  168.  
  169. P2P resources:
  170. http://crypto.stanford.edu/~miron Conscientious Insiders worldwideov/p2p/
  171. List of Anonymous Networks:
  172. http://kpvz7ki2v5agwt35.onion (TOR)
  173. hb' from all countries, pattp://kpvz7ki2b' from all countries, pav5agwt35.onion.to/wiki/index.php/List_of_Anonymous_Networks (clearnet)
  174. https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Anonymous_P2P
  175. https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Category:Anonymity_networks
  176.  
  177. The 'kpvz' links are The Hidden Wiki right? That things down all the time: Mirrors: http://www.reddit.com/r/onions/comments/qm2cw/hidden_wiki_down_here_are_the_mirrors/
  178.  
  179. Anonymity resources:
  180.  
  181. Selected Papers in Anonymity
  182. http://freehaven.net/anonbib/date.html
  183.  
  184. Handbook of Peer-to-Peer Networking
  185. Shen, X.; Yu, H.; Buford, J.; Akon, M. (Eds.)1st Edition., 2010, XLVIII, 1500 p.
  186. "Handbook of Peer-to-Peer Networking-rwt911.pdf"
  187. Torrent hash: C3BA97707C9E3C80019DD55E2207529AB876700D
  188.  
  189. Crypto Anarchy, Cyber States, And Pirate Utopias, by Peter Ludlow
  190. http://www.scribd.com/doc/44385837/Crypto-Anarchy-Cyber-States-And-Pirate-Utopia
  191. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peter_Ludlow
  192.  
  193. Whistleblowing resources:
  194.  
  195. Brian Martin, The Whistleblower's Handbook: How to Be an Effective Resister
  196. (Charlbury, UK: Jon Carpenter; Sydney: Envirobook, 1999). Out of print from 2008.
  197. The Whistleblower's Handbook in pdf, 89 pages, 1.6MB
  198. http://wwb' from all countries, paw.bmartin.cc/pubs/99wh.pdf
  199. http://www.bmartin.cc/pubs/99wh.html
  200.  
  201. Related projects (TYLER CANDIDATES too?):
  202.  
  203. The Amnesic Incognito Live System (Tails):
  204.  
  205. "Tails is a live system that aims at preserving your privacy and anonymity. It helps you to use the Internet anonymously almost anywhere you go and on any computer but leave no trace using unless you ask it explicitly.
  206. It is a complete operating-system designed to be used from a DVD or a USB stick independently of the computer's original operating system. It is Free Software and based on Debian GNU/Linux.
  207. Tails comes with several built-in applications pre-configured with security in mind: web browser, instant messaging client, email client, office suite, image and sound editor. Tails relies on the Tor anonymity network to protect your privacy online: all software are configured to connect through Tor, and direct (non-anonymous) connections are blocked."
  208. https://tails.boum.org/about/index.en.html
  209.  
  210.  
  211. OpenRelay
  212.  
  213. OpenRelay is a p2p (peer to peer) based web hosting solution. OpenRelay is free (as in freedom), which means it is currently licensed under the GNU GPLv3. The goal of OpenRelay is to decentralize hosting, create an alternative to paid hosts, and to allow anyone (with a few friends) to be able to host a site. OpenRelay builds upon the BitTorrent Protocol developed by Bram Cohen, as well as other projects like Twitter's Bootstrap, Werzeug, Django, Python-gnupg, PyCrypto, and AutonomoTorrent.
  214. http://peer.to/peer/about
  215.  
  216.  
  217. Freehaven (MIT):
  218.  
  219.  
  220. "The Free Haven Project aims to deploy a system for distributed data storage robust against attempts by powerful adversaries to find and destroy stored data. Free Haven uses a secure mixnet for communication, and it emphasizes distributed, reliable, and anonymous storage over efficient retrieval. Some of the problems Free Haven addresses include providing sufficient accountability without sacrificing anonymity, building trust between servers based entirely on their observed behavior, and providing user interfaces that will make the system easy for end-users. "
  221. http://freehaven.net/overview.html
  222.  
  223.  
  224. Globaleaks:
  225.  
  226.  
  227. http://globaleaks.org/ & http://wiki.globaleaks.org
  228. https://github.com/globaleaks/
  229.  
  230. According to ProjectPlan-08.05.2012.pdf ( See: https://github.com/globaleaks/advocacy/blob/master/ProjectPlan-08.05.2012.pdf?raw=true )
  231.  
  232. "Effort estimation: The total effort to fully implement the overall project is forecasted to be 1292 days of activity (a couple of solar years at least)."
  233.  
  234. (note: unless pushed really hard, Globaleaks wouldn't make it by November 5th, 2012)
  235.  
  236. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GlobaLeaks
  237.  
  238.  
  239. TELEX:
  240.  
  241.  
  242. "Telex is a new approach to circumventing Internet censorship that is intended to help citizens of repressive governments freely access online services and information. The main idea behind Telex is to place anticensorship technology into the Internet's core network infrastructure, through cooperation from large ISPs. Telex is markedly different from past anticensorship systems, making it easy to distribute and very difficult to detect and block."
  243.  
  244. Paper: Telex: Anticensorship in the Network Infrastructure
  245. By Eric Wustrow, Scott Wolchok, Ian Goldberg and J. Alex Halderman
  246. To appear in Proc. of the 20th USENIX Security Symposium, August 2011.
  247.  
  248. https://telex.cc/
  249.  
  250. (note: TELEX has a very interesting approach on using Public Key Steganography to circumvent censorship.
  251. http://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=public+key+steganography
  252. See also:
  253. http://www.phrack.org/issues.html?id=6&issue=49 - Project LOKI
  254. http://www.phrack.org/issues.html?issue=51&id=6 - Project LOKI2. The Implementation.)
  255.  
  256. Distributed wikis:
  257.  
  258.  
  259. See "Distributed-wiki" project http://trac.i2p2.de/wiki/gsoc/ideas/apps/distributed-wiki
  260.  
  261. See: Wooki Wiki: decentralized wiki on P2P network http://wooki.sourceforge.net/
  262.  
  263. See: Wiki over Freenet https://wiki.freenetproject.org/Wiki_over_Freenet
  264.  
  265. See: freekiwiki Official Page http://freekiwiki.sourceforge.net/
  266.  
  267. See: Fniki
  268.  
  269. (http://127.0.0.1:8888/USK@Gq-FBhpgvr11VGpapG~y0rGFOAHVfzyW1WoKGwK-fFw,MpzFUh5Rmw6N~aMKwm9h2Uk~6aTRhYaY0shXVotgBUc,AQACAAE/fniki/30/ )
  270. Wiki over Mercurial over Freenet using python scripts for editing and FMS for it's WoT and commit notification.
  271.  
  272. See: Jfniki
  273.  
  274. (http://127.0.0.1:8888/USK@UB0RPdoXvA61bfDbpvIVFyft1JiqUPhTLONHsWVGU0k,gFG9I3679g-1dUZvOorUuudr~JvSgRemmMdfiPxxcY8,AQACAAE/freenetdocwiki_mirror/61/jfniki.html )
  275. Jfniki is a port to Java that does not depend on having Mercurial installed.
  276.  
  277. See: ikiwiki http://ikiwiki.info/ is a wiki backed by git.
  278.  
  279.  
  280. What :
  281.  
  282. TYLER is described as a:
  283. "Massively Distributed Uncensorable & Collaborative Wiki-P2P Cipherspace Structure"
  284. Reference: http://pastebin.com/Wt15GXTn
  285.  
  286. Why :
  287.  
  288.  
  289. "[Any leaking platform dependant of easyly identifiable human beings] puts the role of the Editor in great personal danger and in risk of being 'totally incapacitated' —CIA's term to refer to Daniel Ellsberg— by potential enemies while it dramatically slows down the
  290.  
  291. release process.
  292.  
  293.  
  294. By its own nature, WikiLeaks mirror servers are limited in numbers, and
  295.  
  296. very much resource-hungry during media peaks.
  297.  
  298. Being limited in numbers means that they are prone to attack, DDoS,
  299. international IP bans, governmental inclusion in blacklists... etc. etc.
  300. These are single point of failure that threaten the infrastructure of the
  301. whole system.
  302.  
  303. TYLER aims to circumvent these issues."
  304.  
  305.  
  306. To help Mr. Obama to fulfill his promises and to make them extensible to the whole of society. World. Wide.
  307.  
  308.  
  309. The Obama-Biden Ethics Plan, November 2008 read like this:
  310. ____________________________________________________________________
  311.  
  312. Protect Whistleblowers:
  313.  
  314. "Often the best source of information about waste, fraud, and abuse in
  315. government is an existing government employee committed to public
  316. integrity and willing to speak out. Such acts of courage and patriotism,
  317. which can sometimes save lives and often save taxpayer dollars, SHOULD
  318. BE ENCOURAGED rather than stifled. We need to empower federal employees
  319. as watchdogs of wrongdoing and partners in performance.
  320. Barack Obama will strengthen whistleblower laws to protect federal workers who expose waste, fraud, and abuse of authority in government. Obama will ensure
  321. that federal agencies expedite the process for reviewing whistleblower
  322. claims and whistleblowers have full access to courts and due process."
  323.  
  324. Via: http://change.gov/agenda/ethics_agenda/
  325. ____________________________________________________________________
  326.  
  327. Reference: http://pastebin.com/Wt15GXTn
  328.  
  329. How[Principles] :
  330.  
  331. --> We have to propose some constant "laws" for TYLER :
  332.  
  333. - EVERYONE SHOULD BE ABLE TO SEND data throught the network
  334. - EVERYONE SHOULD BE ABLE TO READ data throught the network
  335. - ALL data SHOULD BE sent ANONYMOUSLY
  336. - ALL data SHOULD BE read ANONYMOUSLY
  337. - ALL data MUST pass an ETHICAL CODE VALIDATION by a majority (3 out of 5 OR 4/7 OR 5/9 OR 6/11?) of positive KARMA JUDGES randomly chosen within those currently logged on and available within the HIVEMIND (=random, distributed & temporary TRUST 'AUTHORITY', hence no risk of being abused by 'permanent' powers, hence the "Power corrupts; absolute power corrupts absolutely" common to hierarchies is successfully solved.)
  338. - ALL data sent SHOULD BE stored somewhere in the network, even if no verification was procedeed.
  339. - ALL data belongs to everyone/nobody after sending
  340. - ALL trusted/accepted data* SHOULD PERSIST in the network, even if a people of a small group of people wants to delete it.
  341. - ALL trusted/accepted data* SHOULD BE EASILY REACHABLE, using keywords, a public key / Secure Hash Algorithm / Magnet URI scheme.
  342. - ALL trusted/accepted data* SHOULD BE EASILY CONTEXTUALIZED within a distributed Wiki that mimics Wikipedia structure. i.e.: [TYLER]/wiki/Company_Name
  343. See "Distributed-wiki" project http://trac.i2p2.de/wiki/gsoc/ideas/apps/distributed-wiki
  344. See: Wooki Wiki: decentralized wiki on P2P network http://wooki.sourceforge.net/
  345.  
  346.  
  347. KISS Principle: Keep It Simple, Stupid!
  348.  
  349. "We need to design an USER-FRIENDLY software, so with a really simple interface that anyone non-computer-savvy can use and which works on all operating systems (including Android, ou iOS)."
  350. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KISS_principle
  351.  
  352.  
  353. Main goals for TYLER: SIMPLICITY, SAFETY & TRUST.
  354.  
  355. A Conscentious insider has to be able to trust TYLER with his life before deciding to use it to leak their sensitive information on corruption and illegal deeds.
  356. If a choice between Anonymity & speed has to be made, speed will always come second.
  357. TYLER is also described as an "EXTREMELY SIMPLE interface, so that anyone can do it."
  358.  
  359. A Conscentious insider has to be able to trust TYLER with his life before deciding to use it to leak their sensitive information on corruption and illegal deeds. +2
  360.  
  361.  
  362. Kerckhoffs's principle:
  363.  
  364. In cryptography, Kerckhoffs's principle (also called Kerckhoffs's Desiderata, Kerckhoffs's assumption, axiom, or law) was stated by Auguste Kerckhoffs in the 19th century:
  365.  
  366. A cryptosystem should be secure even if everything about the system, except the key, is public knowledge.
  367.  
  368. Kerckhoffs's principle was reformulated (perhaps independently) by Claude Shannon as:
  369. "The enemy knows the system."
  370. In that form, it is called Shannon's maxim. In contrast to "security through obscurity," it is widely embraced by cryptographers.
  371.  
  372. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kerckhoffs%27s_principle
  373.  
  374. ERRORISM is fine: Goal is not "perfection" but to MOVE UPWARDS the spiral.
  375.  
  376. "To avoid stalling, we won't aim at 'perfection': errors happen...Everything is OK!
  377.  
  378. 'Almost good enough' might be MORE than a 'good enough' mentality. Less Syntactics, More Semantics.
  379.  
  380. 'Evolutionary Computing', 'Adaptative Thinking', 'Dynamically Adhocratic' and 'Mutating problem solving' are key elements here.
  381.  
  382. We don't aim to find the 'best' solution, as there might be infinite ways to achieve a single goal: we aim to MOVE UPWARDS the spiral.
  383.  
  384. Or, in Herman Hesse's words:
  385.  
  386. "We have learned a lot, Siddhartha, there is still much to learn. We are not going around in circles, we are moving UP, the circle is a SPIRAL, we have already ascended many a level."
  387.  
  388. Taken from: http://pastebin.com/Wt15GXTn
  389.  
  390. How[Technical] :
  391.  
  392. - How to ensure that a content is not a bullshit ?+2
  393.  
  394. Coding a crowdsourced & karma based "TRUST AUTHORITY" into TYLER's HiveMind.
  395.  
  396. The users that the HiveMind TRUSTS the most will be those whom be awarded with the most karma. Karma = TRUST.
  397.  
  398. How do you earn good Karma?
  399.  
  400.  
  401. By proving that you are a Conscientious Insider (CI).
  402.  
  403. - How?
  404. - By providing semantical authentication:
  405.  
  406. "publish some kind of internal info that only people who might have actually worked in that Company might know, in order to semantically AUTHENTICATE you towards fellow leakers and colleagues.
  407.  
  408. "Then other workers would know that you have actually been there, so your level of TRUST for anything you might have to say about the company would be thumbed up by the very internal people to that company. External people to that company could thumb you up or down, but that wouldn't mean much, for their votes would have much less weight, unless they can prove they have actually worked there by providing a NEW type of environmental/semantical information."
  409. "the users with the highest karma, as they have proved to be reliable, might have more weight in the system, towards thumbing up or down other users"
  410.  
  411. "The karma based "Trust Authority" should be based in "epistemic reliability". That is to say: any leak would pass the filter and be published by default. Yet, there would be an internal karma based ranking for each WikiTYLER contributor that would allow anybody completely foreign to that Company to quickly sort out the leaks based on the "trustability" karma.
  412.  
  413. A leaker would not only provide the internal evidence on corruption/fraud but would it would be upon them to also disclose if they worked there, for how long and so on. They could also provide information regarding the physical environment / the servers rooms and so on, so that other Conscentious leakers can spot that information and verify it as TRUSTED. They would get, say 100 karma points for each member in the Hivemind that trusts them.
  414.  
  415. This could be abused by bots / Artificial Intelligence agents / etc., of course. DARPA has been heavyly busy building "social armies". Google their project called "Social Media in Strategic Communication (SMISC)".
  416. See also: Revealed: US spy operation that manipulates social mediaMilitary's 'sock puppet' software creates fake online identities to spread pro-American propaganda.
  417. http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/mar/17/us-spy-operation-social-networks
  418.  
  419. More brainstorming here: a possible solution might be to issue semantical challenge-response queries in the way of CREATIVE tasks, in a peer-to-peer way. In other words:
  420.  
  421. TYLER might include a Hivemind of "validators" that challenge potential leakers to pass
  422. a quick Turing test. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turing_test
  423. A candidate leaker might have to solve a certain creative task in order to tell them from a machine. Say, compose a two line poem with the words "lurk" "evolve" and "countdown". Machines cannot understand/solve that. Humans do."
  424. Also: CAPTCHAS challenges can be maliciously proxied to other humans, (i.e.: setup a free image hosting and use the humans that use it to upload images to solve CAPTCHAS that TYLER might present to potential leakers. Hence we MUST NOT trust them to be able to tell the difference between a human and an AI.
  425. Challenges can be CONTEXT based ((= compose a surrealist poem about Fight Club with the words "lurk" "evolve" and "countdown", tell me a joke about TYLER or draw a simple picture of a lion, etc., so that they cannot be meaningfully (=semantically meaningful, context wise) proxied to other humans. Obviously the goal is not that the poem be aesthetically beautiful but that a human can judge that it was actually CREATED by another human. (== #DARE2KREATE)
  426.  
  427.  
  428. By providing good information (=TRUSTABLE & VERIFIABLE) into TYLER.
  429.  
  430.  
  431. Reddit-like importance rating?
  432.  
  433. > The system could choose 5 "judges" randomly:
  434. - Step 1 : A judge receive a query (give query to another if no decision within amount of time?). "Wants to be judge for this doc ?"
  435. - Yes (Goto Step 2)
  436. - No, or timeout (Another judge is choosen randomly)
  437. - Step 2: Chosen person judges the document, YES/NO
  438. - Yes (If 3/5 judges say YES, go to step 3A)
  439. - No (If 3/5 judges say NO, go to step 3B)
  440. - Step 3:
  441. - 3A:
  442. Majority of judges voted yes. Document is accepted, now general users can vote YES or NO in case judges were wrong. Enough negative votes (~100?) remove the document from the main list.
  443. - 3B:
  444. Document is rejected, placed into pile of rejected docs. General users can vote YES or NO in case judges were wrong. Enough positive votes (~100?) make it accepted to the main list. --> Good solution if malicious people suceeds to reject a good document in the rejected list.
  445.  
  446. See:
  447. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reputation_system
  448. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collaborative_filtering
  449. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reputation_management
  450. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Honor_system
  451.  
  452. - How is "bullshit"=informational noise defined?
  453.  
  454.  
  455. "DOXA" = Beliefs & opinions. Doxa (δόξα) is a Greek word meaning common belief or popular opinion. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Doxa
  456.  
  457. Any information that that doesn't correspond to verifiable and factual data.
  458.  
  459. Scientific method refers to a body of techniques for investigating phenomena, acquiring new knowledge, or correcting and integrating previous knowledge. To be termed scientific, a method of inquiry must be based on gathering empirical and measurable evidence subject to specific principles of reasoning. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scientific_method
  460.  
  461. - Should TYLER be abided by an ETHICAL CODE that the random judges in TYLER's karma based TRUST AUTHORITY will be guided by?
  462.  
  463. Yes.
  464.  
  465. With much power comes much responsibility.
  466.  
  467. Also:
  468.  
  469. "Every news organization has only its credibility and reputation to rely on."
  470.  
  471. - What should be TYLER's ETHICAL CODE?
  472.  
  473. To respect citizens PRIVACY by rejecting to publish information that invades the privacy of individuals.
  474.  
  475. "Privacy protects us from abuses by those in power, even if we're doing nothing wrong at the time of surveillance." Bruce Schneier
  476.  
  477. Also, this privacy requirement for citizens MAY not apply precisely to those in power:
  478.  
  479. "When a man assumes a PUBLIC TRUST,
  480. he should consider himself as PUBLIC PROPERTY."
  481. Thomas Jefferson
  482.  
  483. See: The Philosophy behind Freenet, by Ian Clarke
  484. https://freenetproject.org/philosophy.html
  485.  
  486. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privacy
  487. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_privacy
  488. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_privacy
  489.  
  490. See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Objectivity_%28journalism%29
  491. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Journalism_ethics_and_standards
  492. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Media_ethics
  493.  
  494. - How to avoid robots/scripts ?
  495. CAPTCHA or other difficult challenges for machines
  496. Maybe you have to have some sort of invite code or something, that only RATs know?
  497.  
  498. - How to make data available everytime ?
  499. - Duplicate !
  500. - Divide (and conquer)
  501.  
  502. May be there should be some sort of sub-system that is run by m0ds where people with leaks can request an invite code where they can input to upload
  503. WE DON'T WANT SHITTY/NON-VALID LEAKS, the fuck is the point of that?
  504.  
  505. Not trying to create a difference in power or anything, but it is important that the leaks are legitimate. Maybe some sort of proof/logs of the origin of the leaks? Only trusted members should be mods, this system can and will fail if we do not choose wisely.-1
  506.  
  507. Something else to consider: who gets to be a mod? What if mods become corrupt? Non-mods moderate the mods in that case?-1
  508.  
  509. Nobody should get to be a mod but, at much, a temporary jury.
  510.  
  511. Reason: in order to minimize abuses by 'Power', we shouldn't rely on 'permanent mods' or in 'trusted members', for, as someone has rightly pointed out, Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.
  512.  
  513. A nice way to minimize 'corruption by power' would be by making that power/authority temporary. I.e.: to issue a temporary ticket/token to a random set of validated humans to act as a temporary jury whose limited mission is to temporarily approve that a certain leak submission passes TYLER's Ethical Code, in order to flag it accordingly.+2
  514.  
  515.  
  516. What happens if leaks cannot be traced to proof? For example, no photo/video/audio/transcribed docs to indicate legitimacy.
  517. That would be fine, yet, that would be flagged in the leak entry, and that would be reflected in a kind of karma for the corresponding TRUST for each leak, according to the validations of the HiveMind.
  518.  
  519. How [Dev]
  520.  
  521. Laws :
  522. - Portable (should work without system install)
  523. - Lightweight (30 MB MAX with potential plugins)-1
  524. 30 Mb might be too much. We should consider TYLER to fit steganographically hidden in a non suspicious JPG/PNG or an MP3 (see "Plausible deniability" below) that a potential leaker could either carry with her or download from the net (successfully bypassing all firewall security policies like this), and then unwrap it locally, execute it (inside a sandbox?) and then, once the leaks be uploaded, it would securely delete itself forever. If TYLER is going to be an "extremely simple interface" then it might be only a matter of coding a sort of universal wrapper + a Trust Authority + a distributed Wiki to sort all leaks. So, let's say, 500kb-1Mb MAX? <-- way too small, may not be possible.
  525. See discussion below.
  526.  
  527. - For people without admin (Windows7) i suggest that a guest/normal should be able to use this. ie two points above this one, no sysinstall.
  528.  
  529. - ! Use I2P : http://www.i2p2.de/ (SAM seems good to easily open anonymous communcations, so I can create/adapt a C/C++ library for V3)
  530. i2p , i think we on t expect I2p
  531. - ? Use Tahoe-LAFS for more large files (video/audio) : https://tahoe-lafs.org
  532. --> But need to preserve anonymity (when i2p is used as the transport layer with tahoe-lafs that solves it more or less [i2p+tahoe exists and is implemented, and deployed]) --> Interesting
  533. http://killyourtv.i2p/tahoe-lafs/ (currently have about 20 nodes inside i2p would be nice to see tyler use it and / or syndie too, see below)
  534. [disagree] Tahoe-LAFS is only anonymous when combined with i2p. Why not just use i2p if we want this?
  535.  
  536. See also : Syndie -> http://syndie.i2p2.de/
  537.  
  538. - Or ... from scratch ? --> IMO it's better to unify what is existing already with "application layer glue" instead of reinventing cryptographic transports and fragmenting cypherspace further. That would be the case if we use Tor/I2P/Freenet APIs <--- syndie does that for us (or rather it attempts to do so)
  539.  
  540. Maybe a TOR/i2p network that forces the leaker's ip to be hidden/spoofed. No one should know where the leak came from, only whether it is a real leak of not.
  541.  
  542. Specifications :
  543.  
  544. Features :
  545. - ability to run live, leaving no forensic trace. (conceal & carry)+1
  546.  
  547. Consider the possibility of the WHOLE system running in RAM memory.
  548.  
  549. See note on TELEX above: they have a very interesting approach on using Public Key Steganography to circumvent censorship.
  550.  
  551. http://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=public+key+steganography
  552. -have self-destruct mode (instant dban of the device it runs off of. (if discovered)
  553. -should masquarade as a common process, as to not alert authorities. (injection technique)
  554. -language translator (global standing)
  555. -have self-check mode upon startup - checks against the source code for a specific number of online users (5 or so). Ensures that the version is not modified, hacked, or a trojan before being allowed onto the hivemind. Automatic hivemind rejection system which will block any modified TYLER. +2
  556.  
  557. - Maybe we should make a whole package that includes:
  558. - a live CD boot for people who need to access files which they wouldn't necessarily be able to access in normal circumstances.
  559. - Maybe we should just make our own distribution of linux aswell, one with TOR/i2p/TYLER etc etc, from that Linux one should be able to access all of the Windows sys files.
  560.  
  561. I you guys want, i can help with this... (I'm not brilliant at network programming.)
  562.  
  563. Think about self discovery. Think about self expression. Think about self sacrifice.
  564.  
  565. Most important: EVERYTHING IS A DOUBLE EDGED SWORD.+1
  566. -
  567.  
  568. Communications:
  569.  
  570. If a potential leaker inside a protected & firewalled network cannot carry in or out of the company a USB key, the leaker could try to upload it straight to TYLER from inside the company network. But the leaker might have difficulties bypassing firewalls/IDS security policies and so on. Even worse, if he tried to "test" communicating with TYLER, he might be setting off the alarms as a potential leaker about to leak.
  571.  
  572. There are several ways to bypass firewalls & IDS:
  573.  
  574. 1. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Covert_channel
  575. "a covert channel is a type of computer security attack that creates a capability to transfer information objects between processes that are not supposed to be allowed to communicate by the computer security policy. "
  576. 2. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timing_channel
  577. "A timing channel is one example of a covert channel for passing unauthorized information, in which one process signals information to another process by modulating its own use of system resources (e.g., central processing unit time) in such a way that this manipulation affects the real response time observed by the second process."
  578. 3. PUBLIC KEY STEGANOGRAPHY. This is a novel and extremely interesting approach. Basically, the client and TYLER negotiate a certain "code" (i.e.: I'm going to send you 11 ICMP packets: that means the firewall is not going to inspect unsuspiciously looking traffic. You only check one every three ICMPs for a certain flag, and we can build and arrange a certain binary code from there. Then we start communicating. (Just a simple example).
  579. No IDS/Firewall can check for this. If implemented properly, this should be virtually undetectable: total stealth mode on.
  580. For a very interesting approach on using Public Key Steganography, check TELEX, already cited above and now here too:
  581.  
  582.  
  583. TELEX:
  584.  
  585.  
  586. "Telex is a new approach to circumventing Internet censorship that is intended to help citizens of repressive governments freely access online services and information. The main idea behind Telex is to place anticensorship technology into the Internet's core network infrastructure, through cooperation from large ISPs. Telex is markedly different from past anticensorship systems, making it easy to distribute and very difficult to detect and block."
  587.  
  588. Paper: Telex: Anticensorship in the Network Infrastructure
  589. By Eric Wustrow, Scott Wolchok, Ian Goldberg and J. Alex Halderman
  590. To appear in Proc. of the 20th USENIX Security Symposium, August 2011.
  591.  
  592. https://telex.cc/
  593.  
  594. (note: TELEX has a very interesting approach on using Public Key Steganography to circumvent censorship.
  595. http://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=public+key+steganography
  596. See also:
  597. http://www.phrack.org/issues.html?id=6&issue=49 - Project LOKI
  598. http://www.phrack.org/issues.html?issue=51&id=6 - Project LOKI2. The Implementation.)
  599.  
  600.  
  601.  
  602. Possible "simple solution" for TYLER (following the OSI Model):
  603. Piggyback Syndie
  604.  
  605. (Application Layer) Tyler, the top layer UI, is in charge of being what the user sees and interacts with, user submits content via the UI and it gets passed to the Presentation Layer where it is packed and prepared for transport
  606. (Presnetation Layer) standardized format with cyptographic signatures, checksums etc used to package content, implementation details, format is not important YET, must be a standardized format.
  607. Details aren't important, but this layer is "our" layer, so the quality of Tyler will depend mainly on theses decisions.
  608.  
  609. (Session Layer) no real need for one?
  610. (Transport Layer) syndie, it is by nature meant to be network agnostic, using the syndie protocol would take away from the hardships of implementing new transports, let syndie care about interfacing with tor, mixmaster, i2p etc.
  611.  
  612.  
  613. tl;dr for yellow stuff:
  614. decide on a common cryptographic format for messages and piggyback on syndie.
  615.  
  616. Tyler would be the UI that would package and unpackage data in a common cryptographic format that would be transported via syndie
  617.  
  618.  
  619. --> Study Syndie : Someone has the source code ?
  620.  
  621. HOW TO GET SYNDIE SOURCE CODE :+1
  622.  
  623. Prerequistes :
  624. - Have I2P installed on your computer.
  625. - Download "mtn" (Google it, or check-it with your Package management system : apt, pacman, etc)
  626. - Start "mtn" tunnel on your pannel (http://127.0.0.1:7657/i2ptunnel/)
  627.  
  628. mtn is a CVS-like (like git and svn)
  629.  
  630. mtn -d i2p.mtn db init
  631. mtn genkey <mail_or_fake>@mail.i2p
  632.  
  633. SYNDIE source code is on I2P mtn repo :
  634. With I2P installed (and mtn relay activated) :
  635.  
  636. mtn -d i2p.mtn pull 127.0.0.1:8998 i2p.syndie
  637. mtn -d i2p.mtn co --branch=i2p.syndie
  638.  
  639.  
  640. Data format :
  641.  
  642. (ideas) We can distinguish two data formats :
  643. - Plain text/html (light)
  644. - Binary files (pdf, videos, audio, etc)
  645.  
  646. - Use PGP signed and encrypted file that can be mounted locally as a file system (TrueCrypt+GPG?) <-- sounds like redundant encryption, multilayer maybe but in the end you'd need to figure out a way to package the keys for multilayer crypto.
  647.  
  648. I.E. vfat partition as a file that was encrypted by gpg.
  649. - Possible problem: cross platform compatibility, (need a good filesystem that every OS can mount. maybe FAT32 since things will not be too large and message size will be an issue due to using transport layers that are slow)
  650.  
  651. rProxy might be useful aswell
  652.  
  653. Features of RProxy:
  654.  
  655.  
  656. HTTP pipe-lining to reduce connection overhead to a downstream (this reduces latency of a full handshake per-request to a downstream)
  657.  
  658. Easily take downstream servers out of rotation.
  659.  
  660. Various methods of load-balancing client-requests to a downstream.
  661.  
  662. Full SSL support:
  663.  
  664. TLS False start
  665.  
  666. x509 verification
  667.  
  668. Certificate caching
  669.  
  670. Session caching
  671.  
  672. All other commonly used SSL options
  673.  
  674. Transparent URI rewriting.
  675.  
  676. Various X-Header configurations including options for added extended TLS fields.
  677.  
  678. Upstream and downstream thresholding (to reduce memory for slow/blocking downstream connections)
  679.  
  680. Per-downstream backlog, and backlog timeout management.
  681.  
  682. Flexible logging configuration.
  683.  
  684. Optional memory optimizations on systems which support mallopt()
  685.  
  686. Very low memory usage with optimal configuration.
  687.  
  688. It’s really @#$@#$r* fast.
  689.  
  690.  
  691. source code for Rproxy here https://github.com/mandiant/RProxy/downloads
  692.  
  693. Talk to TYLER when you have an idea so dangerous you can't share it with anyone else
  694. Register TellTyler.com -5
  695. Reason: TYLER doesn't need to depend upon any one site/person, specially not on any dotcom = certainly would be censored. "Distributed" means precisely that.
  696. centralized = bad idea
  697.  
  698. SPECIFICATIONS :
  699.  
  700. Interesting eMule specs : http://www.cs.huji.ac.il/labs/danss/presentations/emule.pdf
  701. (good thing to keep in mind with eMule is that they have it on i2p as well)
  702.  
  703. Use cases (ideas) :
  704.  
  705. Offline mode :
  706. When an user wants to grab some data, he will launch TYLER from its USB key (ie), and he will choose files/folders to grab.
  707. Files and folder will be locally stored in the USB key (ie), but encrypted by a user-defined password.
  708. Files SHOULD never be unencrypted.
  709.  
  710.  
  711. Online mode :
  712. When TYLER is in online mode file sharing is enabled via P2P protocols (we have to abstract I2P/Tor/Freenet layers).
  713. Files or chunks should also be encrypted during transfers.
  714. Example with an I2P transport :
  715. - Local grabbed files/leaks are encrypted with the user password (in a local db)
  716. - When file is sent to another peer, it will be decrypted using user password but immedialty reencrypted depending on the protocol (here, with I2P public key).
  717. - When the receiver receive chunks/file he will decrypt it with peer public key (sender) a immediatly reencrypt it locally with his own password
  718.  
  719. Any user can choose to decrypt one or some local files with his own password, but I can be dangerous, and should be done only on HIS computer.
  720. TYLER should provide user-friendly interfaces to decrypt files and display them in RAM (not on hard drive disk) for better security.
  721.  
  722.  
  723. Proposed cryptogaphic container specs:
  724.  
  725.  
  726. PGP signed (optionally encrypted) tar.xz archive with structure as follows:
  727. message/ -- contains the origional file(s) that are sent
  728. manafest.json -- manafest file, contains checksums and metadata(? maybe not needed ?)
  729. reply/ -- holds the pgp signature of each file that is "agreed with"
  730. comments/ -- holds general comments of the origonal files
  731.  
  732. how it could work:
  733. ~ files can be targeted to a specific set of users if needed
  734. ~ to post a tyler message you post in the given format on the syndie network or any other network.
  735. ~ public key identities can be tallied and tracked, a leaderboard of "identity newness" can be established to keep track of karma.
  736. ~ any user can compute the current karma of a user given that all the posts are still archived.
  737. ~ to +1 a post you'd replay the message and append a pgp signature of each file in the original message that you agree with in the reply folder of the new archive
  738.  
  739. it now looks more like automating a cryptogarphic format with a gui. basically a gpg wrapper using anonymity networks (just like it should be done). It could be done in bourne shell at this point. +1+1
  740.  
  741. It is good that this be the case, for this way it can benefit from years-long tested projects and technologies such as I2P, Tor, GPG, etc. Actually most of the really delicate work security wise (=cryptography implementation) has been developed already.
  742.  
  743. If we want TYLER to be an "extremely simple interface" then it might be only a matter of coding a sort of universal wrapper + a Trust Authority + a distributed Wiki to sort all leaks.
  744.  
  745. This has the added benefit that it could potentially be extremely lightweight. Not only it could fit in a USB key: our goal SHOULD be that it could EVEN fit steganographically hidden inside a non suspicious PNG/JPG image or inside an MP3 that a potential Conscientious Insider (CI) might either carry with her or download from any non-suspicious hosting site and then unwrap locally, execute (inside a sandbox, so that it be untraceable?), leak data and then securely delete forever.+9001
  746.  
  747. Plausible deniability
  748.  
  749. i.e.:
  750.  
  751. "In cryptography and steganography, deniable encryption is encryption that allows its users to convincingly deny that some specific encrypted data exists, that a given piece of data is encrypted, or that they are able to decrypt a given piece of encrypted data[citation needed]. Such denials may or may not be genuine. For example, although suspicions might exist that the data is encrypted, it may be impossible to prove it without the cooperation of the users. If the data is encrypted, the users genuinely may not be able to decrypt it. Deniable encryption serves to undermine an attacker's confidence either that data is encrypted, or that the person in possession of it can decrypt it and provide the associated plaintext.
  752. Normally ciphertexts decrypt to a single plaintext and hence once decrypted, the encryption user cannot claim that he encrypted a different message. Deniable encryption allows its users to decrypt the ciphertext to produce a different (innocuous but plausible) plaintext and insist that it is what they encrypted. The holder of the ciphertext will not have the means to differentiate between the true plaintext, and the bogus-claim plaintext."
  753.  
  754. See:
  755. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plausible_deniability
  756. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deniable_encryption
  757. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubberhose_%28file_system%29
  758.  
  759. What about using and adapting OpenPuff steganography tool
  760.  
  761. http://embeddedsw.net/OpenPuff_Steganography_Home.html
  762.  
  763. Supported formats : Images, audios, videos, flash, adobe.
  764. Layers of security : Data, before carrier injection, is encrypted (1), scrambled (2), whitened (3) and encoded (4).
  765. Layer 1 - Modern multi-cryptography : A set of 16 modern 256bit open-source cryptography algorithms (chosen from AES Process [1997-2000], NESSIE Process [2000-2003] and CRYPTREC Process [2000-2003]) has been joined into a doublepassword multi-cryptography algorithm (256bit+256bit) : AES / Anubis / Camellia / Cast-256 / Clefia / FROG / Hierocrypt3 / Idea-NXT / MARS / RC6 / Safer+ / SC2000 / Serpent / Speed / Twofish / Unicorn-A
  766. Layer 2 - CSPRNG based scrambling : Encrypted data is always scrambled to break any remaining stream pattern. A new cryptographically secure pseudo random number generator (CSPRNG) is seeded with a third password (256bit) and data is globally shuffled with random indexes.
  767. Layer 3 - CSPRNG based whitening : Scrambled data is always mixed with a high amount of noise, taken from an independent CSPRNG seeded with hardware entropy.
  768. Layer 4 - Adaptive non-linear encoding : Whitened data is always encoded using a non-linear function that takes also original carrier bits as input. Modified carriers will need much less change and deceive many steganalysis tests (e.g.: chi square test).
  769.  
  770. Features of OpenPuff
  771. OpenPuff is a professional steganography tool:
  772.  
  773. HW seeded random number generator (CSPRNG)
  774.  
  775. Deniable steganography
  776.  
  777. Carrier chains (up to 256Mb of hidden data)
  778.  
  779. Carrier bits selection level
  780.  
  781. Modern multi-cryptography (16 algorithms)
  782.  
  783. Multi-layered data obfuscation (3 passwords)
  784.  
  785. X-squared steganalysis resistance
  786.  
  787. Unique layers of security and obfuscation:
  788.  
  789. 256bit+256bit symmetric-key cryptography with KDF4 password extension
  790.  
  791. 256bit symmetric-key data scrambling (CSPRNG-based shuffling)
  792.  
  793. Data whitening (CSPRNG-based noise mixing)
  794.  
  795. Adaptive non-linear carrier bit encoding
  796.  
  797. OpenPuff supports many carrier formats:
  798.  
  799. Images (BMP, JPG, PCX, PNG, TGA)
  800.  
  801. Audio support (AIFF, MP3, NEXT/SUN, WAV)
  802.  
  803. Video support (3GP, MP4, MPG, VOB)
  804.  
  805. Flash-Adobe support (FLV, SWF, PDF)
  806.  
  807. OpenPuff is a portable/stealth software:
  808.  
  809. Native portable structure (no installation, registry keys, .ini files)
  810.  
  811. Runs in user mode with DEP on
  812.  
  813. Multithread support (up to 16 CPUs) = Faster processing
  814.  
  815. OpenPuff is freeware!
  816.  
  817. Spyware/adware-free
  818.  
  819. Fully redistributable
  820.  
  821. OpenSource core crypto-library (libObfuscate)
  822.  
  823.  
  824. Source Code
  825. http://embeddedsw.net/libObfuscate_Cryptography_Home.html
  826. Source
  827. http://embeddedsw.net/OpenPuff_Steganography_Home.htmlhttp://embeddedsw.net/OpenPuff_Steganography_Home.html
  828.  
  829.  
  830.  
  831.  
  832.  
  833.  
  834. Syndie route:
  835. PGP Signed archives -> distributed wiki (how)? [disagree] Freenet already does this with hg. We don't need another distributed wiki. Then what IS Tyler if not a distributed wiki? I assumed that is what is being worked on, as that is what is being advertised.
  836.  
  837.  
  838. IDEA 1: TYLER as an anonymous DVCS
  839.  
  840. Possible suggestions:
  841. ~ patch files for text ( could mean that tyler could be used to do more than just a wiki it could be a dvcs that holds a wiki)
  842. ~ placing media could be done via inline/included base64 datablobs (could include encryption but that would be client side)
  843. [disagree] Freenet already lets you use hg and insert into the network
  844.  
  845. IDEA:
  846. - We need a way to stop trolls from trolling the pads.
  847. Time tested interwebz way of dealing with trolls: IGNORE & focus.
  848. Keep local copies of the Pad, rebuild and keep going with 108% commitment, STEALTH mode on. http://i.imgur.com/PT2b3.jpg +1+1
  849. "No Fear. No distractions.
  850. The ability to let that which does not matter truly slide."
  851. http://i.imgur.com/E61is.jpg
  852.  
  853.  
  854.  
  855.  
  856. We are Anonymous
  857. We are Legion
  858. We do not Forgive
  859. We do not Forget
  860. It is to late to Expect Us
  861.  
  862.  
  863. Attention all anons:
  864.  
  865. I2P has had an anonymous non shitty version of tyler deployed since jan/feb 2012
  866. the setup is not SUPER simple or SUPER hard but it is miles more robust and expandable
  867. most importantly it does NOT have the flaws that RS does with non anoynmous f2f.
  868. you don't NEED a vpn but if you choose to you can if that makes you feel better.
  869.  
  870. i2p + tahoe is anonymous distributed redundant fault tolerant storage of data
  871. perfect for leaking relatively small files like html documents docx pdf and png/jpg
  872. NOT huge mp4 videos and such, use i2p torrent system for that.
  873.  
  874. it is using PROVEN TO WORK GOOD software https://tahoe-lafs.org/
  875. working inside a pretty damn good p2p anonymizer https://www.i2p2.de/
  876.  
  877. Why not Retroshare?
  878.  
  879. * Retroshare's F2F provides 0 anonymity, in theory it sounds good, in practice it's hell VPNs make a papertrail and you go to jail if they want to find you
  880. ( think facebook style social mapping + bittorrent + financial records of you having a vpn == you go to jail )
  881. * Retroshare (2006) is relatively under developed compared to i2p (2003) and tahoe-lafs ( a riff off of mojo nation, 1980s and before )
  882. * Retroshare isn't geared towards revolutionary type users like tor and other anonymizers
  883. * Bots
  884.  
  885. pre-requsites:
  886. * ubuntu or other linux / unix
  887. * i2p
  888. * brain
  889.  
  890.  
  891. guide:
  892. http://killyourtv.i2p/tahoe-lafs/install
  893. clearnet link:
  894. http://killyourtv.i2p.in/tahoe-lafs/install
  895.  
  896. for additional (possibly live) assitance:
  897. while i2p router is on connect to localhost port 6668 with irc client
  898. channels: #tahoe-lafs #i2p #i2p-chat #torrents #anonops (for faggotry)
  899.  
  900.  
  901. and yes, i2p's ui sucks balls, and yes, it's getting worked on.
  902. and no you can't have any pot brownies they are ALL MINE!
  903.  
  904. once tahoe+i2p is set up visit this link:
  905. http://127.0.0.1:3456/uri/URI%3ADIR2-RO%3Aixlxe44vhuzeqbrpghqzivnh64%3Ak24e35hdhiuv4wzhv7s4ydapjjdu5hyii6uu56e2muflmksp7f2a/index.html
  906. it has much info about this project and other softwares that go with it that enhance the user experiance
  907.  
  908. be warey of non anonymous networks with their non-existant promises of hope and security
  909. be sure to also hate me for exposing some inconvienant truths at a very bad time for you guys
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