Dec 28th, 2014
- "The fact that a group of hacker kidz, likely hacking Playstation and Xbox for the lulz, can pose a serious threat to the anonymity of Tor is very not good."
- This statement is in error. It has been pointed out that new relays added to the Tor
- network are not passed traffic immediately.
- "Likewise last week, when Tor’s founder admitted that government agents would only need to seize five Tor directory authority servers to completely hickack[sic] the network"
- Misleading. Carr says "government agents", to imply that one government can seize the
- five Tor dirauths. Carr's article lists the dirauth IP addresses in his own
- publication (https://archive.today/9gqLp):
- 184.108.40.206 Cambridge, MA, US
- 220.127.116.11 San Francisco, CA, US
- 18.104.22.168 Washington, DC, US
- 22.214.171.124 Seattle, WA, US
- 126.96.36.199 Vienna, AT
- 188.8.131.52 The Hague, NL
- 184.108.40.206 Amsterdam, NL
- 220.127.116.11 Erlangen, GB
- 18.104.22.168 Hamburg, GB
- 22.214.171.124 Stockholm, SE
- No one government can seize five dirauths, and so no one government can completely
- hijack the network.
- "the growing paranoia of Tor exit node hosts that at any moment the cops are going to come crashing through the door and shut them down."
- This has nothing to do with Tor's security. While some exit operators may be
- paranoid, this doesn't mean Tor is insecure.
- "seizing the servers would potentially expose every single user of the network until they download an updated version of the Tor software."
- False. We've already established the fact that five dirauths would need to be seized
- for this to happen. Suppose one or two dirauths were seized? The dirauths participate
- in a voting mechanism. To skew the election, you'd need to seize a majority of them.
- Five out of the nine.
- "the maths required to destroy Tor’s ability to keep information secret is far
- simpler. There are nine directory authorities which direct all of Tor’s traffic.
- Hijacking more than half of those would allow a government agency to redirect all of
- Tor’s traffic anywhere it likes."
- A government agency, on its own, cannot hijack more than half of these.
- "Nine plus one, divided by two equals Tor is completely screwed."
- No, the integer part of nine (directory authorities) divided by two, plus one (to force a majority), equals Tor is screwed.
- "Did the leaked NSA documents lull them into a false sense of security that no one
- could take over enough exit nodes to undermine the network, leaving the way clear for
- today’s hackers?"
- I'm pretty sure that that the directory authority system was designed before Snowden did his thing.
- "a network that we now understand can easily be compromised by a small group of hackers or a handful of G-men with a warrant."
- Wrong, as claimed above.
- "Moreover, no one in the Tor community seems to fully understand where the network’s vulnerabilities lay, nor do they have any concrete plan for fixing them."
- The fact that the consensus list is not as geographically diverse as it ought to be is not something that the Tor community is exactly ignorant of.
- "even tried to smear other Pando writers as child rapists"
- "Russian women, especially on the first date, expect you to rape them," said Mr. Ames. http://observer.com/2000/06/from-russia-with-lust/ '"Dude do you realize…do you know how old that Natasha is?" he said. [...] "No! No, she’s fif-teen. Fif-teen." Right then my pervometer needle hit the red. I had to have her, even if she was homely' http://baruffio.com/docs/ames.html 'I took Natasha back home with me... After sex, she confessed to me that she had a three-month-old baby, and the father had abandoned her. In the "work of non-fiction" _Sex, Drugs, and Libel in the New Russia_, by Mark Ames (writer for Pando Daily) and Matt Taibbi.
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