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The inside story of how Lykos’ MDMA research went awry

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Feb 27th, 2025
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  1. The inside story of how Lykos’ MDMA research went awry
  2.  
  3. At a heated advisory committee meeting convened by the Food and Drug Administration last week, regulators
  4. repeatedly expressed frustration that Lykos, a company seeking approval of MDMA-assisted therapy to treat
  5. PTSD, failed to follow instructions and track positive feelings such as “euphoria” that could be used to inform
  6. understanding of the drug’s addiction potential.
  7.  
  8. The missing data, said clinical reviewer David Millis, were “a major concern.”
  9. Lykos executives said they’d simply misunderstood the FDA’s instructions, but three former employees told a
  10. different story. The company was long aware it was required to collect such data, they said, and simply failed to
  11. do what was needed amid widespread disorganization. Employees described waiting in vain for a protocol to
  12. collect the data to be approved, while executives seemed distracted dealing with other problems.
  13.  
  14. The lapses were part of a pattern of failings at Lykos, according to several former employees, who described a
  15. culture in which complaints were often ignored, and hype around MDMA interfered with a rigorous scientific
  16. process.
  17.  
  18. Christina Faulk, a former data management associate at Lykos, said she was “relieved” the FDA advisory
  19. committee asked so many questions about patient safety and data integrity. “I had similar questions and concerns during my employment that I felt were not resolved before my departure,” she added. Another former employee,
  20. research scientist Emmett Henderson, said he too shared concerns expressed by the advisory committee panel.
  21. “I’m not surprised most voted ‘no’ and I think that was the right call,” said Henderson.
  22.  
  23. In a statement to STAT, Lykos said that the company stands by the rigor of its studies and that accusations of
  24. activist hype and dismissal of concerns were unfounded. “The studies were conducted with the appropriate
  25. checks and balances in place,” spokesperson Caroline Rigdon wrote in an email. “Any reports of misconduct are
  26. investigated and addressed as appropriate.” Although the company did not collect data on so-called “positive
  27. adverse events,” like euphoria, for the Phase 3 studies, it did add such data to subsequent protocols, Rigdon said.
  28. Ahead of last week’s meeting, there was mounting excitement about MDMA’s forthcoming review. Lykos
  29. sponsored two successful Phase 3 trials, both with research protocols overseen by the FDA, and researchers were
  30. optimistic that the drug would be the first Schedule I psychedelic to get approval by the FDA come August. That
  31. hope largely fizzled last week, as advisory committee members asked question after question, often scrutinizing
  32. the conduct of Lykos researchers and therapists, rather than MDMA itself.
  33.  
  34. Lykos, previously known as MAPS PBC (public benefit corporation), was originally formed as a subsidiary of
  35. the Multidisciplinary Association for Psychedelic Studies (MAPS), a nonprofit led by drug activist Rick Doblin
  36. for close to 40 years. The organization was formed in 1986 shortly after the use of MDMA was first criminalized,
  37. and Doblin, who has advocated for world leaders to take MDMA to help further peace talks, was outspoken about
  38. his plans to use research as a pathway to wider psychedelic approval.
  39.  
  40. These activist origins have been hard to shake, according to interviews with more than half a dozen former
  41. MAPS and Lykos employees, some of whom spoke on condition of anonymity. Although Doblin stepped down as
  42. MAPS executive director last year, he’s stayed on as president of the organization and part of Lykos’s board of
  43. directors. And while Lykos has attempted to distinguish itself from MAPS, former employees say those roots
  44. infiltrated and interfered with scientific research. “The more we tried to make it a scientific company, the more
  45. we got disparaged by the cult side,” said one former Lykos employee. Amid an evangelist culture, several former
  46. Lykos employees voiced concerns about inappropriate access to trial data and a willingness to gloss over
  47. concerns, including one instance of potential trial misconduct.
  48.  
  49. In a statement to STAT, MAPS said that the organization has “no comment on hearsay” and that Lykos is “fully
  50. and solely responsible” for drug development. “MAPS is an organization with a multi-pronged approach to social
  51. change. It is inherent to such efforts that differences of opinion are welcome, so we embrace differences of
  52. opinion as a critical part of developing and evolving strategies to achieve the mission,” spokesperson Betty
  53. Aldworth added in an email.
  54.  
  55. The enthusiasm of both MAPS and Doblin helped MDMA advance to the forefront of psychedelic research.
  56. Having got so close, said former employees, those same characteristics then undermined the professionalism.
  57. “I don’t think Lykos likes to be associated with those early stories,” said Jerry Rosenbaum, director of the Center
  58. for the Neuroscience of Psychedelics at Massachusetts General Hospital, who spoke about the clinical need for a
  59. new PTSD treatment at the advisory committee meeting. “As first movers, they had to be exemplary.”
  60.  
  61. he evangelist attitude of MDMA researchers was repeatedly criticized both during a public hearing portion of
  62. the advisory committee meeting and in a report issued by the Institute for Clinical and Economic Review (ICER),
  63. a think tank, ahead of the meeting. Psychedelics were treated more like “a religious movement than like
  64. pharmaceutical products,” read the ICER report. Researchers told a Phase 3 trial participant Sarah McNamee she
  65. was “helping make history” and was “part of a movement,” she wrote in a public letter to the advisory committee.
  66.  
  67. This attitude was rooted in MAPS’s fervent activism, said three former MAPS employees. “‘We already know it
  68. works, we just need to prove it in some way’ — that’s a common sentiment in the community,” Ifetayo Harvey,
  69. founder of the POC Psychedelic Collective, who previously worked at MAPS as Rick Doblin’s assistant, told
  70. STAT. “There’s a part of MAPS that relies on new age spirituality and the hype machine.” Another former
  71. employee, who was a member of a cult in her twenties, said there were cult-like tendencies at MAPS:
  72. “Psychedelics lead to that because it’s messianic,” she said.
  73.  
  74. Deep-seated enthusiasm spurred Doblin through four decades of advocacy. Efforts to stop the criminalization of
  75. MDMA in the ’80s was “almost single-handedly orchestrated, promoted, and financed by a 31-year-old
  76. University of South Florida undergraduate named Rick Doblin,” New York Magazine reported in 1985. When
  77. this initial effort failed, Doblin got his public policy doctorate at Harvard University’s Kennedy School, and
  78. decided to work toward legalization by proving the medical benefits of MDMA. Although MAPS’ research
  79. focused on the drug as a treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder, Doblin’s goals were loftier, heralding “net
  80. zero trauma” and “a more spiritualized humanity.”
  81.  
  82. Three former employees said excitement around MDMA often led criticisms to be dismissed as evidence of
  83. stigma or prohibitionist tendencies. “I think a lot of the psychedelics world is like that where people have an
  84. underlying sense that psychedelics are this inherent good for humanity and anything you can do to bring
  85. psychedelics to the world is beneficial,” said former MAPS communications director Jag Davies.
  86. Concerns about lack of diversity in clinical trials, and sexual abuse by therapists involved in the administration of
  87. psychedelics — both problems that were raised during the advisory committee meeting — were similarly
  88. overlooked, former employees said. “If people engaged in good faith rather than shutting people down, they
  89. could have had a chance to re-assess their work before going into Phase 3 and improve their science,” said
  90. Harvey. “These critiques have been happening for years now.”
  91.  
  92. Doblin and MAPS were successful at pushing boundaries for decades, said another former employee. But that
  93. doesn’t necessarily make the organization well-suited for above-ground research. “You can see that historically in
  94. movements. Folks who lead underground, are not necessarily the same as who will lead legally,” she said.
  95. n recent years, MAPS executives realized they needed to disentangle the scientific research from more activist
  96. tendencies and worked to separate MAPS PBC, now known as Lykos Therapeutics, from the wider organization.
  97. The company hired several employees from more conventional research backgrounds, including Michael
  98. Mullette, who came from Moderna to be chief operating officer, to help ensure the research went smoothly.
  99. Jennifer Mitchell, a neurology professor at the University of California, San Francisco, who led the Phase 3
  100. MDMA studies, said she only agreed to do so thanks to these new boundaries. “I do think [Doblin] has an
  101. agenda,” she said. “I was concerned that agenda could impact the science.”
  102.  
  103. Former Lykos employees said that activist tendencies continued to shape the company’s culture. “There was a lot
  104. of tension between the people who were there for more emotional reasons versus more science reasons,” said one.
  105. The “old guard” similarly seemed uncomfortable in the more “cold and corporate” environment, said another,
  106. who also described “cult-like dynamics,” at Lykos.
  107.  
  108. Several Lykos’ employees were skeptical about the company’s approach to therapy, including a MAPS training
  109. manual that encouraged physical touch. Those who tried to push back were often cut out of decision-making, said
  110. a former employee: “I was like, we need to button this up.... Why hire us for our expertise?”
  111.  
  112. Two former employees said Lykos also had an unprofessional approach to data, where nearly everyone in the
  113. company had access to results coming in from the trials. They described how one executive, director of clinical
  114. operations Charlotte Harrison, would periodically download the data to create her own rudimentary graphs,
  115. which she broadcast internally to others at Lykos as evidence that MDMA was performing well, helping to fuel a
  116. heightened sense of confidence.
  117.  
  118. “I saw MAPS and Lykos get ahead of themselves.... If you raised concerns, they weren’t taken seriously because
  119. everything just seemed to be going well,” said a former Lykos employee.
  120.  
  121. Trial sites did not have the same open access to data, said Mitchell, who added that data were always locked on
  122. her end. “I don’t know what to say about anyone on the Lykos side taking a peek,” she said.
  123. Lykos denied the claims Harrison downloaded data, saying they were “unfounded” and the company had
  124. “appropriate controls in place with the clinical data.”
  125.  
  126. A similar lack of professionalism and rigor contributed to Lykos’ failure to collect data on positive adverse events
  127. that were requested to help inform data on MDMA’s addiction potential. “They simply didn’t do it. People argued
  128. about it round and round at the company,” said one former employee, who said they were denied the chance to
  129. see what the FDA had requested. Mitchell, the researcher who ran the Phase 3 trials, said Lykos never told her of
  130. the need to collect this data, even when her team explicitly asked if they needed to record positive events. “We
  131. were very surprised to hear all of this [the FDA’s request],” she said.
  132.  
  133. Concerns about disorganization and lack of rigor were often dismissed, said former Lykos employees. On one
  134. occasion, a trial participant hadn’t completed a questionnaire and, without the full set, none of the data could be
  135. entered into the system. Lykos researchers suggested entering a value, and simply noting that one of the numbers
  136. was entered at random. The plan reflected a lack of competence rather than an intentional desire to skew results,
  137. said three former employees with knowledge of the event, but was still inappropriate, as the random value would
  138. distort evidence.
  139.  
  140. A colleague who warned this was trial misconduct and tried to file a complaint was then shut out of the
  141. discussion and wasn’t told of how their concerns were resolved, said three former employees. Lykos investigated
  142. and addressed reports of misconduct “as appropriate,” Rigdon wrote to STAT.
  143.  
  144. Issues over rigor and culture weren’t the only problems. Members of the advisory committee also expressed
  145. concern about the lack of “functional blinding” — that is, both patients and likely therapists knew who received
  146. MDMA as opposed to placebo — and the difficulty in disentangling the effects of the drug from the therapy. Both
  147. those problems are inherent to psychedelic research and trial designs that had already been approved by the FDA.
  148. As the first Schedule I psychedelic to go up for FDA review, MDMA faced more intense scrutiny than most
  149. drugs, said both Rosenbaum and Mitchell. Rosenbaum said he felt many of the concerns could be addressed
  150. through post-approval research, and Mitchell said she’s repeatedly asked for federal funding for a study that
  151. would include arms focused on MDMA alone and therapy alone, but has been denied the funds.
  152.  
  153. Although the advisory committee didn’t hear directly from former Lykos employees, the conversation at the
  154. hearing reflected shared concerns about Lykos’ research lapses. “It seems like there are so many problems with
  155. the data. Each one alone might be OK,” said Melissa Barone, a staff psychologist for the VA Maryland Health
  156. Care System Trauma Recovery Program and member of the advisory committee. “But when you pile them on top
  157. of each other...there’s just a lot of questions I would have about how effective the treatment is.”
  158. Questions about how Lykos responded to criticism also shaped the discussion, with UCLA psychiatrist and
  159. advisory committee member Walter Dunn asking Lykos executives if the company investigated concerns laid out
  160. in the ICER report. At the meeting, senior medical director Alia Lilienstein said the allegations were investigated,
  161. but didn’t provide any detail. In a later interview with STAT, lead trial investigator Mitchell said she thought it
  162. was a “very good” question, but had “no idea” if the allegations were investigated. Lykos told STAT a third-party
  163. law firm carried out the investigation.
  164.  
  165. Even while voicing critiques, both former MAPS and Lykos employees said they believed MDMA therapy could
  166. ultimately be beneficial. Veterans make up a large proportion of trial participants, and several former service
  167. members spoke at the advisory committee’s public hearing about the treatment’s ability to ease trauma. Faulk,
  168. who is also a Navy veteran, said she “firmly” believes in the potential of psychedelics as medical treatment, and
  169. hopes to see more funding for research. Only those studies should be at a higher standard, she added: “It is
  170. imperative that we approach their integration into clinical practice with caution and diligence, ensuring that
  171. rigorous standards are upheld at every stage.”
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