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- diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
- index c08e174e6ff4..b87e283b5670 100644
- --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
- +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
- @@ -524,17 +524,6 @@
- nosocket -- Disable socket memory accounting.
- nokmem -- Disable kernel memory accounting.
- - checkreqprot [SELINUX] Set initial checkreqprot flag value.
- - Format: { "0" | "1" }
- - See security/selinux/Kconfig help text.
- - 0 -- check protection applied by kernel (includes
- - any implied execute protection).
- - 1 -- check protection requested by application.
- - Default value is set via a kernel config option.
- - Value can be changed at runtime via
- - /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot.
- - Setting checkreqprot to 1 is deprecated.
- -
- cio_ignore= [S390]
- See Documentation/s390/common_io.rst for details.
- clk_ignore_unused
- @@ -3604,6 +3593,11 @@
- the specified number of seconds. This is to be used if
- your oopses keep scrolling off the screen.
- + extra_latent_entropy
- + Enable a very simple form of latent entropy extraction
- + from the first 4GB of memory as the bootmem allocator
- + passes the memory pages to the buddy allocator.
- +
- pcbit= [HW,ISDN]
- pcd. [PARIDE]
- diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
- index 1d56a6b73a4e..59b1ee24aed4 100644
- --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
- +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
- @@ -860,6 +860,8 @@ with respect to CAP_PERFMON use cases.
- >=1 Disallow CPU event access by users without ``CAP_PERFMON``.
- >=2 Disallow kernel profiling by users without ``CAP_PERFMON``.
- +
- +>=3 Disallow use of any event by users without ``CAP_PERFMON``.
- === ==================================================================
- @@ -1383,6 +1385,26 @@ If a value outside of this range is written to ``threads-max`` an
- ``EINVAL`` error occurs.
- +tiocsti_restrict
- +================
- +
- +This toggle indicates whether unprivileged users are prevented from using the
- +``TIOCSTI`` ioctl to inject commands into other processes which share a tty
- +session.
- +
- += ============================================================================
- +0 No restriction, except the default one of only being able to inject commands
- + into one's own tty.
- +1 Users must have ``CAP_SYS_ADMIN`` to use the ``TIOCSTI`` ioctl.
- += ============================================================================
- +
- +When user namespaces are in use, the check for ``CAP_SYS_ADMIN`` is done
- +against the user namespace that originally opened the tty.
- +
- +The kernel config option ``CONFIG_SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT`` sets the default
- +value of ``tiocsti_restrict``.
- +
- +
- traceoff_on_warning
- ===================
- diff --git a/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst b/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst
- index 3feb5e565b1a..805c656e223a 100644
- --- a/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst
- +++ b/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.rst
- @@ -685,6 +685,24 @@ tcp_comp_sack_nr - INTEGER
- Default : 44
- +tcp_simult_connect - BOOLEAN
- + Enable TCP simultaneous connect that adds a weakness in Linux's strict
- + implementation of TCP that allows two clients to connect to each other
- + without either entering a listening state. The weakness allows an attacker
- + to easily prevent a client from connecting to a known server provided the
- + source port for the connection is guessed correctly.
- +
- + As the weakness could be used to prevent an antivirus or IPS from fetching
- + updates, or prevent an SSL gateway from fetching a CRL, it should be
- + eliminated by disabling this option. Though Linux is one of few operating
- + systems supporting simultaneous connect, it has no legitimate use in
- + practice and is rarely supported by firewalls.
- +
- + Disabling this may break TCP STUNT which is used by some applications for
- + NAT traversal.
- +
- + Default: Value of CONFIG_TCP_SIMULT_CONNECT_DEFAULT_ON
- +
- tcp_slow_start_after_idle - BOOLEAN
- If set, provide RFC2861 behavior and time out the congestion
- window after an idle period. An idle period is defined at
- diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
- index ecfd3520b676..0bf7e9464665 100644
- --- a/arch/Kconfig
- +++ b/arch/Kconfig
- @@ -865,7 +865,7 @@ config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
- int "Number of bits to use for ASLR of mmap base address" if EXPERT
- range ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX
- default ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_DEFAULT if ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_DEFAULT
- - default ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN
- + default ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX
- depends on HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
- help
- This value can be used to select the number of bits to use to
- @@ -899,7 +899,7 @@ config ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS
- int "Number of bits to use for ASLR of mmap base address for compatible applications" if EXPERT
- range ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX
- default ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_DEFAULT if ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_DEFAULT
- - default ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN
- + default ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX
- depends on HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS
- help
- This value can be used to select the number of bits to use to
- diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
- index dfdc3e0af5e1..ae1cf0385cb5 100644
- --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
- +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
- @@ -1214,6 +1214,7 @@ config RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED
- config ARM64_SW_TTBR0_PAN
- bool "Emulate Privileged Access Never using TTBR0_EL1 switching"
- + default y
- help
- Enabling this option prevents the kernel from accessing
- user-space memory directly by pointing TTBR0_EL1 to a reserved
- @@ -1795,6 +1796,7 @@ config RANDOMIZE_BASE
- bool "Randomize the address of the kernel image"
- select ARM64_MODULE_PLTS if MODULES
- select RELOCATABLE
- + default y
- help
- Randomizes the virtual address at which the kernel image is
- loaded, as a security feature that deters exploit attempts
- diff --git a/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig b/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig
- index d612f633b771..e9d6d250224b 100644
- --- a/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig
- +++ b/arch/arm64/configs/defconfig
- @@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
- -CONFIG_SYSVIPC=y
- CONFIG_POSIX_MQUEUE=y
- CONFIG_AUDIT=y
- CONFIG_NO_HZ_IDLE=y
- diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h
- index 8d1c8dcb87fd..32c1609a1158 100644
- --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h
- +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/elf.h
- @@ -124,14 +124,10 @@
- /*
- * This is the base location for PIE (ET_DYN with INTERP) loads. On
- - * 64-bit, this is above 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address
- + * 64-bit, this is raised to 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address
- * space open for things that want to use the area for 32-bit pointers.
- */
- -#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_FORCE_52BIT
- -#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (2 * TASK_SIZE_64 / 3)
- -#else
- -#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (2 * DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW_64 / 3)
- -#endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_FORCE_52BIT */
- +#define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE 0x100000000UL
- #ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
- @@ -189,10 +185,10 @@ extern int arch_setup_additional_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
- /* 1GB of VA */
- #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
- #define STACK_RND_MASK (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ? \
- - 0x7ff >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12) : \
- - 0x3ffff >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12))
- + ((1UL << mmap_rnd_compat_bits) - 1) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12) : \
- + ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12))
- #else
- -#define STACK_RND_MASK (0x3ffff >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12))
- +#define STACK_RND_MASK (((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1) >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12))
- #endif
- #ifdef __AARCH64EB__
- diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
- index 861b1b794697..e4f9dc676bc8 100644
- --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
- +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
- @@ -1187,8 +1187,7 @@ config VM86
- default X86_LEGACY_VM86
- config X86_16BIT
- - bool "Enable support for 16-bit segments" if EXPERT
- - default y
- + bool "Enable support for 16-bit segments"
- depends on MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
- help
- This option is required by programs like Wine to run 16-bit
- @@ -2307,7 +2306,7 @@ config COMPAT_VDSO
- choice
- prompt "vsyscall table for legacy applications"
- depends on X86_64
- - default LEGACY_VSYSCALL_XONLY
- + default LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE
- help
- Legacy user code that does not know how to find the vDSO expects
- to be able to issue three syscalls by calling fixed addresses in
- @@ -2403,8 +2402,7 @@ config CMDLINE_OVERRIDE
- be set to 'N' under normal conditions.
- config MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
- - bool "Enable the LDT (local descriptor table)" if EXPERT
- - default y
- + bool "Enable the LDT (local descriptor table)"
- help
- Linux can allow user programs to install a per-process x86
- Local Descriptor Table (LDT) using the modify_ldt(2) system
- diff --git a/arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig b/arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig
- index b60bd2d86034..e1102b8e7653 100644
- --- a/arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig
- +++ b/arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig
- @@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
- # CONFIG_LOCALVERSION_AUTO is not set
- -CONFIG_SYSVIPC=y
- CONFIG_POSIX_MQUEUE=y
- CONFIG_AUDIT=y
- CONFIG_NO_HZ=y
- diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c
- index 825e829ffff1..e51496cc2a70 100644
- --- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c
- +++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vma.c
- @@ -298,55 +298,9 @@ static int map_vdso(const struct vdso_image *image, unsigned long addr)
- }
- #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- -/*
- - * Put the vdso above the (randomized) stack with another randomized
- - * offset. This way there is no hole in the middle of address space.
- - * To save memory make sure it is still in the same PTE as the stack
- - * top. This doesn't give that many random bits.
- - *
- - * Note that this algorithm is imperfect: the distribution of the vdso
- - * start address within a PMD is biased toward the end.
- - *
- - * Only used for the 64-bit and x32 vdsos.
- - */
- -static unsigned long vdso_addr(unsigned long start, unsigned len)
- -{
- - unsigned long addr, end;
- - unsigned offset;
- -
- - /*
- - * Round up the start address. It can start out unaligned as a result
- - * of stack start randomization.
- - */
- - start = PAGE_ALIGN(start);
- -
- - /* Round the lowest possible end address up to a PMD boundary. */
- - end = (start + len + PMD_SIZE - 1) & PMD_MASK;
- - if (end >= TASK_SIZE_MAX)
- - end = TASK_SIZE_MAX;
- - end -= len;
- -
- - if (end > start) {
- - offset = get_random_int() % (((end - start) >> PAGE_SHIFT) + 1);
- - addr = start + (offset << PAGE_SHIFT);
- - } else {
- - addr = start;
- - }
- -
- - /*
- - * Forcibly align the final address in case we have a hardware
- - * issue that requires alignment for performance reasons.
- - */
- - addr = align_vdso_addr(addr);
- -
- - return addr;
- -}
- -
- static int map_vdso_randomized(const struct vdso_image *image)
- {
- - unsigned long addr = vdso_addr(current->mm->start_stack, image->size-image->sym_vvar_start);
- -
- - return map_vdso(image, addr);
- + return map_vdso(image, 0);
- }
- #endif
- diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
- index 9224d40cdefe..b944f0d8551a 100644
- --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
- +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/elf.h
- @@ -247,11 +247,11 @@ extern int force_personality32;
- /*
- * This is the base location for PIE (ET_DYN with INTERP) loads. On
- - * 64-bit, this is above 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address
- + * 64-bit, this is raised to 4GB to leave the entire 32-bit address
- * space open for things that want to use the area for 32-bit pointers.
- */
- #define ELF_ET_DYN_BASE (mmap_is_ia32() ? 0x000400000UL : \
- - (DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW / 3 * 2))
- + 0x100000000UL)
- /* This yields a mask that user programs can use to figure out what
- instruction set this CPU supports. This could be done in user space,
- @@ -331,8 +331,8 @@ extern bool mmap_address_hint_valid(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len);
- #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
- -#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) (0x7ff)
- -#define STACK_RND_MASK (0x7ff)
- +#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1)
- +#define STACK_RND_MASK ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1)
- #define ARCH_DLINFO ARCH_DLINFO_IA32
- @@ -341,7 +341,11 @@ extern bool mmap_address_hint_valid(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len);
- #else /* CONFIG_X86_32 */
- /* 1GB for 64bit, 8MB for 32bit */
- -#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) ((is32bit) ? 0x7ff : 0x3fffff)
- +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
- +#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) ((is32bit) ? (1UL << mmap_rnd_compat_bits) - 1 : (1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1)
- +#else
- +#define __STACK_RND_MASK(is32bit) ((1UL << mmap_rnd_bits) - 1)
- +#endif
- #define STACK_RND_MASK __STACK_RND_MASK(mmap_is_ia32())
- #define ARCH_DLINFO \
- @@ -403,5 +407,4 @@ struct va_alignment {
- } ____cacheline_aligned;
- extern struct va_alignment va_align;
- -extern unsigned long align_vdso_addr(unsigned long);
- #endif /* _ASM_X86_ELF_H */
- diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
- index 1e576cc831c1..a99597869bc8 100644
- --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
- +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
- @@ -399,6 +399,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(native_write_cr4);
- void cr4_update_irqsoff(unsigned long set, unsigned long clear)
- {
- unsigned long newval, cr4 = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4);
- + BUG_ON(cr4 != __read_cr4());
- lockdep_assert_irqs_disabled();
- diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
- index 9c214d7085a4..629151fe58b5 100644
- --- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
- +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
- @@ -43,6 +43,8 @@
- #include <asm/io_bitmap.h>
- #include <asm/proto.h>
- #include <asm/frame.h>
- +#include <asm/elf.h>
- +#include <linux/sizes.h>
- #include "process.h"
- @@ -596,6 +598,7 @@ void speculation_ctrl_update_current(void)
- static inline void cr4_toggle_bits_irqsoff(unsigned long mask)
- {
- unsigned long newval, cr4 = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4);
- + BUG_ON(cr4 != __read_cr4());
- newval = cr4 ^ mask;
- if (newval != cr4) {
- @@ -905,7 +908,10 @@ unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp)
- unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm)
- {
- - return randomize_page(mm->brk, 0x02000000);
- + if (mmap_is_ia32())
- + return mm->brk + get_random_long() % SZ_32M + PAGE_SIZE;
- + else
- + return mm->brk + get_random_long() % SZ_1G + PAGE_SIZE;
- }
- /*
- diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c
- index 660b78827638..abf366019da6 100644
- --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c
- +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sys_x86_64.c
- @@ -52,13 +52,6 @@ static unsigned long get_align_bits(void)
- return va_align.bits & get_align_mask();
- }
- -unsigned long align_vdso_addr(unsigned long addr)
- -{
- - unsigned long align_mask = get_align_mask();
- - addr = (addr + align_mask) & ~align_mask;
- - return addr | get_align_bits();
- -}
- -
- static int __init control_va_addr_alignment(char *str)
- {
- /* guard against enabling this on other CPU families */
- @@ -116,10 +109,7 @@ static void find_start_end(unsigned long addr, unsigned long flags,
- }
- *begin = get_mmap_base(1);
- - if (in_32bit_syscall())
- - *end = task_size_32bit();
- - else
- - *end = task_size_64bit(addr > DEFAULT_MAP_WINDOW);
- + *end = get_mmap_base(0);
- }
- unsigned long
- @@ -196,7 +186,7 @@ arch_get_unmapped_area_topdown(struct file *filp, const unsigned long addr0,
- info.flags = VM_UNMAPPED_AREA_TOPDOWN;
- info.length = len;
- - info.low_limit = PAGE_SIZE;
- + info.low_limit = get_mmap_base(1);
- info.high_limit = get_mmap_base(0);
- /*
- diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c
- index da31c2635ee4..ae05197fd7c6 100644
- --- a/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c
- +++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_32.c
- @@ -533,9 +533,9 @@ static void __init pagetable_init(void)
- #define DEFAULT_PTE_MASK ~(_PAGE_NX | _PAGE_GLOBAL)
- /* Bits supported by the hardware: */
- -pteval_t __supported_pte_mask __read_mostly = DEFAULT_PTE_MASK;
- +pteval_t __supported_pte_mask __ro_after_init = DEFAULT_PTE_MASK;
- /* Bits allowed in normal kernel mappings: */
- -pteval_t __default_kernel_pte_mask __read_mostly = DEFAULT_PTE_MASK;
- +pteval_t __default_kernel_pte_mask __ro_after_init = DEFAULT_PTE_MASK;
- EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__supported_pte_mask);
- /* Used in PAGE_KERNEL_* macros which are reasonably used out-of-tree: */
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(__default_kernel_pte_mask);
- diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
- index b5a3fa4033d3..c3d771ffc178 100644
- --- a/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
- +++ b/arch/x86/mm/init_64.c
- @@ -97,9 +97,9 @@ DEFINE_ENTRY(pte, pte, init)
- */
- /* Bits supported by the hardware: */
- -pteval_t __supported_pte_mask __read_mostly = ~0;
- +pteval_t __supported_pte_mask __ro_after_init = ~0;
- /* Bits allowed in normal kernel mappings: */
- -pteval_t __default_kernel_pte_mask __read_mostly = ~0;
- +pteval_t __default_kernel_pte_mask __ro_after_init = ~0;
- EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__supported_pte_mask);
- /* Used in PAGE_KERNEL_* macros which are reasonably used out-of-tree: */
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(__default_kernel_pte_mask);
- diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
- index 569ac1d57f55..044d88da4aee 100644
- --- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
- +++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
- @@ -1066,6 +1066,7 @@ STATIC_NOPV void native_flush_tlb_global(void)
- raw_local_irq_save(flags);
- cr4 = this_cpu_read(cpu_tlbstate.cr4);
- + BUG_ON(cr4 != __read_cr4());
- /* toggle PGE */
- native_write_cr4(cr4 ^ X86_CR4_PGE);
- /* write old PGE again and flush TLBs */
- diff --git a/block/blk-mq.c b/block/blk-mq.c
- index 6a982a277176..a9b18a0dcdd2 100644
- --- a/block/blk-mq.c
- +++ b/block/blk-mq.c
- @@ -576,7 +576,7 @@ static void blk_complete_reqs(struct llist_head *list)
- rq->q->mq_ops->complete(rq);
- }
- -static __latent_entropy void blk_done_softirq(struct softirq_action *h)
- +static __latent_entropy void blk_done_softirq(void)
- {
- blk_complete_reqs(this_cpu_ptr(&blk_cpu_done));
- }
- diff --git a/drivers/ata/libata-core.c b/drivers/ata/libata-core.c
- index 61c762961ca8..02a83039c25b 100644
- --- a/drivers/ata/libata-core.c
- +++ b/drivers/ata/libata-core.c
- @@ -4540,7 +4540,7 @@ void ata_qc_free(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
- struct ata_port *ap;
- unsigned int tag;
- - WARN_ON_ONCE(qc == NULL); /* ata_qc_from_tag _might_ return NULL */
- + BUG_ON(qc == NULL); /* ata_qc_from_tag _might_ return NULL */
- ap = qc->ap;
- qc->flags = 0;
- @@ -4557,7 +4557,7 @@ void __ata_qc_complete(struct ata_queued_cmd *qc)
- struct ata_port *ap;
- struct ata_link *link;
- - WARN_ON_ONCE(qc == NULL); /* ata_qc_from_tag _might_ return NULL */
- + BUG_ON(qc == NULL); /* ata_qc_from_tag _might_ return NULL */
- WARN_ON_ONCE(!(qc->flags & ATA_QCFLAG_ACTIVE));
- ap = qc->ap;
- link = qc->dev->link;
- diff --git a/drivers/char/Kconfig b/drivers/char/Kconfig
- index d229a2d0c017..2fd45f01e7a2 100644
- --- a/drivers/char/Kconfig
- +++ b/drivers/char/Kconfig
- @@ -327,7 +327,6 @@ config NSC_GPIO
- config DEVMEM
- bool "/dev/mem virtual device support"
- - default y
- help
- Say Y here if you want to support the /dev/mem device.
- The /dev/mem device is used to access areas of physical
- @@ -391,7 +390,6 @@ config MAX_RAW_DEVS
- config DEVPORT
- bool "/dev/port character device"
- depends on ISA || PCI
- - default y
- help
- Say Y here if you want to support the /dev/port device. The /dev/port
- device is similar to /dev/mem, but for I/O ports.
- diff --git a/drivers/tty/Kconfig b/drivers/tty/Kconfig
- index e15cd6b5bb99..930be8d5d81d 100644
- --- a/drivers/tty/Kconfig
- +++ b/drivers/tty/Kconfig
- @@ -122,7 +122,6 @@ config UNIX98_PTYS
- config LEGACY_PTYS
- bool "Legacy (BSD) PTY support"
- - default y
- help
- A pseudo terminal (PTY) is a software device consisting of two
- halves: a master and a slave. The slave device behaves identical to
- diff --git a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
- index adbcbfa11b29..b9a698fe4ee8 100644
- --- a/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
- +++ b/drivers/tty/tty_io.c
- @@ -171,6 +171,7 @@ static void free_tty_struct(struct tty_struct *tty)
- put_device(tty->dev);
- kfree(tty->write_buf);
- tty->magic = 0xDEADDEAD;
- + put_user_ns(tty->owner_user_ns);
- kfree(tty);
- }
- @@ -2299,11 +2300,19 @@ static int tty_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on)
- * FIXME: may race normal receive processing
- */
- +int tiocsti_restrict = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT);
- +
- static int tiocsti(struct tty_struct *tty, char __user *p)
- {
- char ch, mbz = 0;
- struct tty_ldisc *ld;
- + if (tiocsti_restrict &&
- + !ns_capable(tty->owner_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
- + dev_warn_ratelimited(tty->dev,
- + "Denied TIOCSTI ioctl for non-privileged process\n");
- + return -EPERM;
- + }
- if ((current->signal->tty != tty) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- return -EPERM;
- if (get_user(ch, p))
- @@ -3159,6 +3168,7 @@ struct tty_struct *alloc_tty_struct(struct tty_driver *driver, int idx)
- tty->index = idx;
- tty_line_name(driver, idx, tty->name);
- tty->dev = tty_get_device(tty);
- + tty->owner_user_ns = get_user_ns(current_user_ns());
- return tty;
- }
- diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/Makefile b/drivers/usb/core/Makefile
- index 18e874b0441e..fc7a3a9aa72a 100644
- --- a/drivers/usb/core/Makefile
- +++ b/drivers/usb/core/Makefile
- @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ usbcore-y += phy.o port.o
- usbcore-$(CONFIG_OF) += of.o
- usbcore-$(CONFIG_USB_PCI) += hcd-pci.o
- usbcore-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += usb-acpi.o
- +usbcore-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += sysctl.o
- obj-$(CONFIG_USB) += usbcore.o
- diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
- index 6ebb8bd92e9d..90ce433cb277 100644
- --- a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
- +++ b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
- @@ -5117,6 +5117,12 @@ static void hub_port_connect(struct usb_hub *hub, int port1, u16 portstatus,
- goto done;
- return;
- }
- +
- + if (deny_new_usb) {
- + dev_err(&port_dev->dev, "denied insert of USB device on port %d\n", port1);
- + goto done;
- + }
- +
- if (hub_is_superspeed(hub->hdev))
- unit_load = 150;
- else
- diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/sysctl.c b/drivers/usb/core/sysctl.c
- new file mode 100644
- index 000000000000..3fa188ac8f67
- --- /dev/null
- +++ b/drivers/usb/core/sysctl.c
- @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
- +#include <linux/errno.h>
- +#include <linux/init.h>
- +#include <linux/kmemleak.h>
- +#include <linux/sysctl.h>
- +#include <linux/usb.h>
- +
- +static struct ctl_table usb_table[] = {
- + {
- + .procname = "deny_new_usb",
- + .data = &deny_new_usb,
- + .maxlen = sizeof(int),
- + .mode = 0644,
- + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin,
- + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
- + .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
- + },
- + { }
- +};
- +
- +static struct ctl_table usb_root_table[] = {
- + { .procname = "kernel",
- + .mode = 0555,
- + .child = usb_table },
- + { }
- +};
- +
- +static struct ctl_table_header *usb_table_header;
- +
- +int __init usb_init_sysctl(void)
- +{
- + usb_table_header = register_sysctl_table(usb_root_table);
- + if (!usb_table_header) {
- + pr_warn("usb: sysctl registration failed\n");
- + return -ENOMEM;
- + }
- +
- + kmemleak_not_leak(usb_table_header);
- + return 0;
- +}
- +
- +void usb_exit_sysctl(void)
- +{
- + unregister_sysctl_table(usb_table_header);
- +}
- diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/usb.c b/drivers/usb/core/usb.c
- index a566bb494e24..b305e25d94f8 100644
- --- a/drivers/usb/core/usb.c
- +++ b/drivers/usb/core/usb.c
- @@ -71,6 +71,9 @@ MODULE_PARM_DESC(autosuspend, "default autosuspend delay");
- #define usb_autosuspend_delay 0
- #endif
- +int deny_new_usb __read_mostly = 0;
- +EXPORT_SYMBOL(deny_new_usb);
- +
- static bool match_endpoint(struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *epd,
- struct usb_endpoint_descriptor **bulk_in,
- struct usb_endpoint_descriptor **bulk_out,
- @@ -1010,6 +1013,9 @@ static int __init usb_init(void)
- usb_debugfs_init();
- usb_acpi_register();
- + retval = usb_init_sysctl();
- + if (retval)
- + goto sysctl_init_failed;
- retval = bus_register(&usb_bus_type);
- if (retval)
- goto bus_register_failed;
- @@ -1044,6 +1050,8 @@ static int __init usb_init(void)
- bus_notifier_failed:
- bus_unregister(&usb_bus_type);
- bus_register_failed:
- + usb_exit_sysctl();
- +sysctl_init_failed:
- usb_acpi_unregister();
- usb_debugfs_cleanup();
- out:
- @@ -1067,6 +1075,7 @@ static void __exit usb_exit(void)
- usb_hub_cleanup();
- bus_unregister_notifier(&usb_bus_type, &usb_bus_nb);
- bus_unregister(&usb_bus_type);
- + usb_exit_sysctl();
- usb_acpi_unregister();
- usb_debugfs_cleanup();
- idr_destroy(&usb_bus_idr);
- diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
- index d7c4187ca023..505427f7bc4f 100644
- --- a/fs/exec.c
- +++ b/fs/exec.c
- @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
- #include <linux/swap.h>
- #include <linux/string.h>
- #include <linux/init.h>
- +#include <linux/sched.h>
- #include <linux/sched/mm.h>
- #include <linux/sched/coredump.h>
- #include <linux/sched/signal.h>
- @@ -65,6 +66,7 @@
- #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
- #include <linux/io_uring.h>
- #include <linux/syscall_user_dispatch.h>
- +#include <linux/random.h>
- #include <linux/uaccess.h>
- #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
- @@ -281,6 +283,8 @@ static int __bprm_mm_init(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
- mm->stack_vm = mm->total_vm = 1;
- mmap_write_unlock(mm);
- bprm->p = vma->vm_end - sizeof(void *);
- + if (!(current->personality & ADDR_NO_RANDOMIZE) && randomize_va_space)
- + bprm->p ^= get_random_int() & ~PAGE_MASK;
- return 0;
- err:
- mmap_write_unlock(mm);
- diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c
- index a047ab306f9a..c60c118da90f 100644
- --- a/fs/inode.c
- +++ b/fs/inode.c
- @@ -116,6 +116,10 @@ int proc_nr_inodes(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
- }
- #endif
- +/* sysctl */
- +int device_sidechannel_restrict __read_mostly = 1;
- +EXPORT_SYMBOL(device_sidechannel_restrict);
- +
- static int no_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
- {
- return -ENXIO;
- diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
- index 48a2f288e802..4426e7b2bd4d 100644
- --- a/fs/namei.c
- +++ b/fs/namei.c
- @@ -992,10 +992,10 @@ static inline void put_link(struct nameidata *nd)
- path_put(&last->link);
- }
- -int sysctl_protected_symlinks __read_mostly = 0;
- -int sysctl_protected_hardlinks __read_mostly = 0;
- -int sysctl_protected_fifos __read_mostly;
- -int sysctl_protected_regular __read_mostly;
- +int sysctl_protected_symlinks __read_mostly = 1;
- +int sysctl_protected_hardlinks __read_mostly = 1;
- +int sysctl_protected_fifos __read_mostly = 2;
- +int sysctl_protected_regular __read_mostly = 2;
- /**
- * may_follow_link - Check symlink following for unsafe situations
- diff --git a/fs/nfs/Kconfig b/fs/nfs/Kconfig
- index 14a72224b657..080a8027c6b1 100644
- --- a/fs/nfs/Kconfig
- +++ b/fs/nfs/Kconfig
- @@ -195,7 +195,6 @@ config NFS_DEBUG
- bool
- depends on NFS_FS && SUNRPC_DEBUG
- select CRC32
- - default y
- config NFS_DISABLE_UDP_SUPPORT
- bool "NFS: Disable NFS UDP protocol support"
- diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/Kconfig b/fs/overlayfs/Kconfig
- index dd188c7996b3..f1f14808bc8f 100644
- --- a/fs/overlayfs/Kconfig
- +++ b/fs/overlayfs/Kconfig
- @@ -124,3 +124,19 @@ config OVERLAY_FS_METACOPY
- that doesn't support this feature will have unexpected results.
- If unsure, say N.
- +
- +config OVERLAY_FS_UNPRIVILEGED
- + bool "Overlayfs: turn on unprivileged user namespace mounts"
- + default n
- + depends on OVERLAY_FS
- + help
- + When disabled, unprivileged users will not be able to create
- + new overlayfs mounts. This cuts the attack surface if no
- + unprivileged user namespace mounts are required like for
- + running rootless containers.
- +
- + Overlayfs has been part of several recent local privilege
- + escalation exploits, so if you are security-conscious
- + you want to disable this.
- +
- + If unsure, say N.
- diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/super.c b/fs/overlayfs/super.c
- index 787ce7c38fba..9eff43cc6482 100644
- --- a/fs/overlayfs/super.c
- +++ b/fs/overlayfs/super.c
- @@ -2133,7 +2133,9 @@ static struct dentry *ovl_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type, int flags,
- static struct file_system_type ovl_fs_type = {
- .owner = THIS_MODULE,
- .name = "overlay",
- +#ifdef CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS_UNPRIVILEGED
- .fs_flags = FS_USERNS_MOUNT,
- +#endif
- .mount = ovl_mount,
- .kill_sb = kill_anon_super,
- };
- diff --git a/fs/proc/Kconfig b/fs/proc/Kconfig
- index c930001056f9..6a0a51b3f593 100644
- --- a/fs/proc/Kconfig
- +++ b/fs/proc/Kconfig
- @@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ config PROC_KCORE
- config PROC_VMCORE
- bool "/proc/vmcore support"
- depends on PROC_FS && CRASH_DUMP
- - default y
- help
- Exports the dump image of crashed kernel in ELF format.
- diff --git a/fs/stat.c b/fs/stat.c
- index 1fa38bdec1a6..cac8d4d0cfd9 100644
- --- a/fs/stat.c
- +++ b/fs/stat.c
- @@ -51,8 +51,13 @@ void generic_fillattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
- stat->gid = i_gid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode);
- stat->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
- stat->size = i_size_read(inode);
- - stat->atime = inode->i_atime;
- - stat->mtime = inode->i_mtime;
- + if (is_sidechannel_device(inode) && !capable_noaudit(CAP_MKNOD)) {
- + stat->atime = inode->i_ctime;
- + stat->mtime = inode->i_ctime;
- + } else {
- + stat->atime = inode->i_atime;
- + stat->mtime = inode->i_mtime;
- + }
- stat->ctime = inode->i_ctime;
- stat->blksize = i_blocksize(inode);
- stat->blocks = inode->i_blocks;
- @@ -101,9 +106,14 @@ int vfs_getattr_nosec(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat,
- STATX_ATTR_DAX);
- mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(path->mnt);
- - if (inode->i_op->getattr)
- - return inode->i_op->getattr(mnt_userns, path, stat,
- - request_mask, query_flags);
- + if (inode->i_op->getattr) {
- + int retval = inode->i_op->getattr(mnt_userns, path, stat, request_mask, query_flags);
- + if (!retval && is_sidechannel_device(inode) && !capable_noaudit(CAP_MKNOD)) {
- + stat->atime = stat->ctime;
- + stat->mtime = stat->ctime;
- + }
- + return retval;
- + }
- generic_fillattr(mnt_userns, inode, stat);
- return 0;
- diff --git a/include/linux/cache.h b/include/linux/cache.h
- index d742c57eaee5..f0222c070458 100644
- --- a/include/linux/cache.h
- +++ b/include/linux/cache.h
- @@ -37,6 +37,8 @@
- #define __ro_after_init __section(".data..ro_after_init")
- #endif
- +#define __read_only __ro_after_init
- +
- #ifndef ____cacheline_aligned
- #define ____cacheline_aligned __attribute__((__aligned__(SMP_CACHE_BYTES)))
- #endif
- diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
- index 65efb74c3585..7fca4dd7f3b1 100644
- --- a/include/linux/capability.h
- +++ b/include/linux/capability.h
- @@ -208,6 +208,7 @@ extern bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap);
- extern bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
- struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
- extern bool capable(int cap);
- +extern bool capable_noaudit(int cap);
- extern bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
- extern bool ns_capable_noaudit(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
- extern bool ns_capable_setid(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
- @@ -234,6 +235,10 @@ static inline bool capable(int cap)
- {
- return true;
- }
- +static inline bool capable_noaudit(int cap)
- +{
- + return true;
- +}
- static inline bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
- {
- return true;
- diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
- index ec8f3ddf4a6a..6c00f06d962c 100644
- --- a/include/linux/fs.h
- +++ b/include/linux/fs.h
- @@ -3590,4 +3590,15 @@ static inline int inode_drain_writes(struct inode *inode)
- return filemap_write_and_wait(inode->i_mapping);
- }
- +extern int device_sidechannel_restrict;
- +
- +static inline bool is_sidechannel_device(const struct inode *inode)
- +{
- + umode_t mode;
- + if (!device_sidechannel_restrict)
- + return false;
- + mode = inode->i_mode;
- + return ((S_ISCHR(mode) || S_ISBLK(mode)) && (mode & (S_IROTH | S_IWOTH)));
- +}
- +
- #endif /* _LINUX_FS_H */
- diff --git a/include/linux/fsnotify.h b/include/linux/fsnotify.h
- index f8acddcf54fb..7b109980327f 100644
- --- a/include/linux/fsnotify.h
- +++ b/include/linux/fsnotify.h
- @@ -83,10 +83,14 @@ static inline void fsnotify_dentry(struct dentry *dentry, __u32 mask)
- static inline int fsnotify_file(struct file *file, __u32 mask)
- {
- const struct path *path = &file->f_path;
- + struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
- if (file->f_mode & FMODE_NONOTIFY)
- return 0;
- + if (mask & (FS_ACCESS | FS_MODIFY) && is_sidechannel_device(inode))
- + return 0;
- +
- return fsnotify_parent(path->dentry, mask, path, FSNOTIFY_EVENT_PATH);
- }
- diff --git a/include/linux/gfp.h b/include/linux/gfp.h
- index 8572a1474e16..703d25523e1d 100644
- --- a/include/linux/gfp.h
- +++ b/include/linux/gfp.h
- @@ -582,9 +582,9 @@ static inline struct page *alloc_pages(gfp_t gfp_mask, unsigned int order)
- extern unsigned long __get_free_pages(gfp_t gfp_mask, unsigned int order);
- extern unsigned long get_zeroed_page(gfp_t gfp_mask);
- -void *alloc_pages_exact(size_t size, gfp_t gfp_mask);
- +void *alloc_pages_exact(size_t size, gfp_t gfp_mask) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
- void free_pages_exact(void *virt, size_t size);
- -void * __meminit alloc_pages_exact_nid(int nid, size_t size, gfp_t gfp_mask);
- +void * __meminit alloc_pages_exact_nid(int nid, size_t size, gfp_t gfp_mask) __attribute__((alloc_size(2)));
- #define __get_free_page(gfp_mask) \
- __get_free_pages((gfp_mask), 0)
- diff --git a/include/linux/highmem.h b/include/linux/highmem.h
- index 44170f312ae7..7f149ca78988 100644
- --- a/include/linux/highmem.h
- +++ b/include/linux/highmem.h
- @@ -204,6 +204,13 @@ static inline void clear_highpage(struct page *page)
- kunmap_atomic(kaddr);
- }
- +static inline void verify_zero_highpage(struct page *page)
- +{
- + void *kaddr = kmap_atomic(page);
- + BUG_ON(memchr_inv(kaddr, 0, PAGE_SIZE));
- + kunmap_atomic(kaddr);
- +}
- +
- /*
- * If we pass in a base or tail page, we can zero up to PAGE_SIZE.
- * If we pass in a head page, we can zero up to the size of the compound page.
- diff --git a/include/linux/interrupt.h b/include/linux/interrupt.h
- index 967e25767153..8bd848becd73 100644
- --- a/include/linux/interrupt.h
- +++ b/include/linux/interrupt.h
- @@ -563,13 +563,13 @@ extern const char * const softirq_to_name[NR_SOFTIRQS];
- struct softirq_action
- {
- - void (*action)(struct softirq_action *);
- + void (*action)(void);
- };
- asmlinkage void do_softirq(void);
- asmlinkage void __do_softirq(void);
- -extern void open_softirq(int nr, void (*action)(struct softirq_action *));
- +extern void __init open_softirq(int nr, void (*action)(void));
- extern void softirq_init(void);
- extern void __raise_softirq_irqoff(unsigned int nr);
- diff --git a/include/linux/kobject_ns.h b/include/linux/kobject_ns.h
- index 2b5b64256cf4..8cdce21dce0f 100644
- --- a/include/linux/kobject_ns.h
- +++ b/include/linux/kobject_ns.h
- @@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ struct kobj_ns_type_operations {
- void (*drop_ns)(void *);
- };
- -int kobj_ns_type_register(const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *ops);
- +int __init kobj_ns_type_register(const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *ops);
- int kobj_ns_type_registered(enum kobj_ns_type type);
- const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_child_ns_ops(struct kobject *parent);
- const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_ns_ops(struct kobject *kobj);
- diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
- index 18b8373b1474..257b7ec62322 100644
- --- a/include/linux/mm.h
- +++ b/include/linux/mm.h
- @@ -779,7 +779,7 @@ static inline int is_vmalloc_or_module_addr(const void *x)
- }
- #endif
- -extern void *kvmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node);
- +extern void *kvmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
- static inline void *kvmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
- {
- return kvmalloc_node(size, flags, NUMA_NO_NODE);
- @@ -914,10 +914,15 @@ static inline void set_compound_page_dtor(struct page *page,
- page[1].compound_dtor = compound_dtor;
- }
- -static inline void destroy_compound_page(struct page *page)
- +static inline compound_page_dtor *get_compound_page_dtor(struct page *page)
- {
- VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(page[1].compound_dtor >= NR_COMPOUND_DTORS, page);
- - compound_page_dtors[page[1].compound_dtor](page);
- + return compound_page_dtors[page[1].compound_dtor];
- +}
- +
- +static inline void destroy_compound_page(struct page *page)
- +{
- + (*get_compound_page_dtor(page))(page);
- }
- static inline unsigned int compound_order(struct page *page)
- diff --git a/include/linux/percpu.h b/include/linux/percpu.h
- index 5e76af742c80..9a6c682ec127 100644
- --- a/include/linux/percpu.h
- +++ b/include/linux/percpu.h
- @@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ extern int __init pcpu_page_first_chunk(size_t reserved_size,
- pcpu_fc_populate_pte_fn_t populate_pte_fn);
- #endif
- -extern void __percpu *__alloc_reserved_percpu(size_t size, size_t align);
- +extern void __percpu *__alloc_reserved_percpu(size_t size, size_t align) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
- extern bool __is_kernel_percpu_address(unsigned long addr, unsigned long *can_addr);
- extern bool is_kernel_percpu_address(unsigned long addr);
- @@ -131,8 +131,8 @@ extern bool is_kernel_percpu_address(unsigned long addr);
- extern void __init setup_per_cpu_areas(void);
- #endif
- -extern void __percpu *__alloc_percpu_gfp(size_t size, size_t align, gfp_t gfp);
- -extern void __percpu *__alloc_percpu(size_t size, size_t align);
- +extern void __percpu *__alloc_percpu_gfp(size_t size, size_t align, gfp_t gfp) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
- +extern void __percpu *__alloc_percpu(size_t size, size_t align) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
- extern void free_percpu(void __percpu *__pdata);
- extern phys_addr_t per_cpu_ptr_to_phys(void *addr);
- diff --git a/include/linux/perf_event.h b/include/linux/perf_event.h
- index 3d478abf411c..576ce489d5e7 100644
- --- a/include/linux/perf_event.h
- +++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h
- @@ -1317,6 +1317,14 @@ static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void)
- return sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1;
- }
- +static inline int perf_allow_open(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
- +{
- + if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 2 && !perfmon_capable())
- + return -EACCES;
- +
- + return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_OPEN);
- +}
- +
- static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
- {
- if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !perfmon_capable())
- diff --git a/include/linux/slab.h b/include/linux/slab.h
- index 7ae604076767..56c3a5b432fb 100644
- --- a/include/linux/slab.h
- +++ b/include/linux/slab.h
- @@ -181,7 +181,7 @@ int kmem_cache_shrink(struct kmem_cache *);
- /*
- * Common kmalloc functions provided by all allocators
- */
- -void * __must_check krealloc(const void *, size_t, gfp_t);
- +void * __must_check krealloc(const void *, size_t, gfp_t) __attribute((alloc_size(2)));
- void kfree(const void *);
- void kfree_sensitive(const void *);
- size_t __ksize(const void *);
- @@ -388,7 +388,7 @@ static __always_inline unsigned int kmalloc_index(size_t size)
- }
- #endif /* !CONFIG_SLOB */
- -void *__kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags) __assume_kmalloc_alignment __malloc;
- +void *__kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags) __assume_kmalloc_alignment __malloc __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
- void *kmem_cache_alloc(struct kmem_cache *, gfp_t flags) __assume_slab_alignment __malloc;
- void kmem_cache_free(struct kmem_cache *, void *);
- @@ -412,7 +412,7 @@ static __always_inline void kfree_bulk(size_t size, void **p)
- }
- #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
- -void *__kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) __assume_kmalloc_alignment __malloc;
- +void *__kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node) __assume_kmalloc_alignment __malloc __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
- void *kmem_cache_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *, gfp_t flags, int node) __assume_slab_alignment __malloc;
- #else
- static __always_inline void *__kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node)
- @@ -537,7 +537,7 @@ static __always_inline void *kmalloc_large(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
- * Try really hard to succeed the allocation but fail
- * eventually.
- */
- -static __always_inline void *kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
- +static __always_inline __attribute__((alloc_size(1))) void *kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
- {
- if (__builtin_constant_p(size)) {
- #ifndef CONFIG_SLOB
- @@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ static __always_inline void *kmalloc(size_t size, gfp_t flags)
- return __kmalloc(size, flags);
- }
- -static __always_inline void *kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node)
- +static __always_inline __attribute__((alloc_size(1))) void *kmalloc_node(size_t size, gfp_t flags, int node)
- {
- #ifndef CONFIG_SLOB
- if (__builtin_constant_p(size) &&
- diff --git a/include/linux/slub_def.h b/include/linux/slub_def.h
- index dcde82a4434c..6cf113695267 100644
- --- a/include/linux/slub_def.h
- +++ b/include/linux/slub_def.h
- @@ -114,6 +114,11 @@ struct kmem_cache {
- unsigned long random;
- #endif
- +#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY
- + unsigned long random_active;
- + unsigned long random_inactive;
- +#endif
- +
- #ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
- /*
- * Defragmentation by allocating from a remote node.
- diff --git a/include/linux/sysctl.h b/include/linux/sysctl.h
- index 51298a4f4623..b835c57330f2 100644
- --- a/include/linux/sysctl.h
- +++ b/include/linux/sysctl.h
- @@ -53,6 +53,8 @@ int proc_douintvec(struct ctl_table *, int, void *, size_t *, loff_t *);
- int proc_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *, int, void *, size_t *, loff_t *);
- int proc_douintvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buffer,
- size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
- +int proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
- + void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos);
- int proc_dointvec_jiffies(struct ctl_table *, int, void *, size_t *, loff_t *);
- int proc_dointvec_userhz_jiffies(struct ctl_table *, int, void *, size_t *,
- loff_t *);
- diff --git a/include/linux/tty.h b/include/linux/tty.h
- index 95fc2f100f12..b5f4d9cd20a0 100644
- --- a/include/linux/tty.h
- +++ b/include/linux/tty.h
- @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
- #include <uapi/linux/tty.h>
- #include <linux/rwsem.h>
- #include <linux/llist.h>
- +#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
- /*
- @@ -340,6 +341,7 @@ struct tty_struct {
- /* If the tty has a pending do_SAK, queue it here - akpm */
- struct work_struct SAK_work;
- struct tty_port *port;
- + struct user_namespace *owner_user_ns;
- } __randomize_layout;
- /* Each of a tty's open files has private_data pointing to tty_file_private */
- @@ -349,6 +351,8 @@ struct tty_file_private {
- struct list_head list;
- };
- +extern int tiocsti_restrict;
- +
- /* tty magic number */
- #define TTY_MAGIC 0x5401
- diff --git a/include/linux/usb.h b/include/linux/usb.h
- index d6a41841b93e..f7f3d138b4e6 100644
- --- a/include/linux/usb.h
- +++ b/include/linux/usb.h
- @@ -2037,6 +2037,17 @@ extern void usb_led_activity(enum usb_led_event ev);
- static inline void usb_led_activity(enum usb_led_event ev) {}
- #endif
- +/* sysctl.c */
- +extern int deny_new_usb;
- +#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
- +extern int usb_init_sysctl(void);
- +extern void usb_exit_sysctl(void);
- +#else
- +static inline int usb_init_sysctl(void) { return 0; }
- +static inline void usb_exit_sysctl(void) { }
- +#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
- +
- +
- #endif /* __KERNEL__ */
- #endif
- diff --git a/include/linux/vmalloc.h b/include/linux/vmalloc.h
- index df92211cf771..52f9134e1d13 100644
- --- a/include/linux/vmalloc.h
- +++ b/include/linux/vmalloc.h
- @@ -95,18 +95,18 @@ static inline void vmalloc_init(void)
- static inline unsigned long vmalloc_nr_pages(void) { return 0; }
- #endif
- -extern void *vmalloc(unsigned long size);
- -extern void *vzalloc(unsigned long size);
- -extern void *vmalloc_user(unsigned long size);
- -extern void *vmalloc_node(unsigned long size, int node);
- -extern void *vzalloc_node(unsigned long size, int node);
- -extern void *vmalloc_32(unsigned long size);
- -extern void *vmalloc_32_user(unsigned long size);
- -extern void *__vmalloc(unsigned long size, gfp_t gfp_mask);
- +extern void *vmalloc(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
- +extern void *vzalloc(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
- +extern void *vmalloc_user(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
- +extern void *vmalloc_node(unsigned long size, int node) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
- +extern void *vzalloc_node(unsigned long size, int node) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
- +extern void *vmalloc_32(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
- +extern void *vmalloc_32_user(unsigned long size) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
- +extern void *__vmalloc(unsigned long size, gfp_t gfp_mask) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
- extern void *__vmalloc_node_range(unsigned long size, unsigned long align,
- unsigned long start, unsigned long end, gfp_t gfp_mask,
- pgprot_t prot, unsigned long vm_flags, int node,
- - const void *caller);
- + const void *caller) __attribute__((alloc_size(1)));
- void *__vmalloc_node(unsigned long size, unsigned long align, gfp_t gfp_mask,
- int node, const void *caller);
- diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h
- index 963cd86d12dd..06c953fa4701 100644
- --- a/include/net/tcp.h
- +++ b/include/net/tcp.h
- @@ -245,6 +245,7 @@ void tcp_time_wait(struct sock *sk, int state, int timeo);
- /* sysctl variables for tcp */
- extern int sysctl_tcp_max_orphans;
- extern long sysctl_tcp_mem[3];
- +extern int sysctl_tcp_simult_connect;
- #define TCP_RACK_LOSS_DETECTION 0x1 /* Use RACK to detect losses */
- #define TCP_RACK_STATIC_REO_WND 0x2 /* Use static RACK reo wnd */
- diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
- index 5f5c776ef192..70786b32d6a6 100644
- --- a/init/Kconfig
- +++ b/init/Kconfig
- @@ -423,6 +423,7 @@ config USELIB
- config AUDIT
- bool "Auditing support"
- depends on NET
- + default y
- help
- Enable auditing infrastructure that can be used with another
- kernel subsystem, such as SELinux (which requires this for
- @@ -1177,6 +1178,22 @@ config USER_NS
- If unsure, say N.
- +config USER_NS_UNPRIVILEGED
- + bool "Allow unprivileged users to create namespaces"
- + depends on USER_NS
- + default n
- + help
- + When disabled, unprivileged users will not be able to create
- + new namespaces. Allowing users to create their own namespaces
- + has been part of several recent local privilege escalation
- + exploits, so if you need user namespaces but are
- + paranoid^Wsecurity-conscious you want to disable this.
- +
- + This setting can be overridden at runtime via the
- + kernel.unprivileged_userns_clone sysctl.
- +
- + If unsure, say N.
- +
- config PID_NS
- bool "PID Namespaces"
- default y
- @@ -1407,9 +1424,8 @@ menuconfig EXPERT
- Only use this if you really know what you are doing.
- config UID16
- - bool "Enable 16-bit UID system calls" if EXPERT
- + bool "Enable 16-bit UID system calls"
- depends on HAVE_UID16 && MULTIUSER
- - default y
- help
- This enables the legacy 16-bit UID syscall wrappers.
- @@ -1438,14 +1454,13 @@ config SGETMASK_SYSCALL
- If unsure, leave the default option here.
- config SYSFS_SYSCALL
- - bool "Sysfs syscall support" if EXPERT
- - default y
- + bool "Sysfs syscall support"
- help
- sys_sysfs is an obsolete system call no longer supported in libc.
- Note that disabling this option is more secure but might break
- compatibility with some systems.
- - If unsure say Y here.
- + If unsure say N here.
- config FHANDLE
- bool "open by fhandle syscalls" if EXPERT
- @@ -1596,8 +1611,7 @@ config SHMEM
- which may be appropriate on small systems without swap.
- config AIO
- - bool "Enable AIO support" if EXPERT
- - default y
- + bool "Enable AIO support"
- help
- This option enables POSIX asynchronous I/O which may by used
- by some high performance threaded applications. Disabling
- @@ -1858,7 +1872,7 @@ config VM_EVENT_COUNTERS
- config SLUB_DEBUG
- default y
- - bool "Enable SLUB debugging support" if EXPERT
- + bool "Enable SLUB debugging support"
- depends on SLUB && SYSFS
- help
- SLUB has extensive debug support features. Disabling these can
- @@ -1868,7 +1882,6 @@ config SLUB_DEBUG
- config COMPAT_BRK
- bool "Disable heap randomization"
- - default y
- help
- Randomizing heap placement makes heap exploits harder, but it
- also breaks ancient binaries (including anything libc5 based).
- @@ -1915,7 +1928,6 @@ endchoice
- config SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT
- bool "Allow slab caches to be merged"
- - default y
- help
- For reduced kernel memory fragmentation, slab caches can be
- merged when they share the same size and other characteristics.
- @@ -1930,6 +1942,7 @@ config SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT
- config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM
- bool "Randomize slab freelist"
- depends on SLAB || SLUB
- + default y
- help
- Randomizes the freelist order used on creating new pages. This
- security feature reduces the predictability of the kernel slab
- @@ -1938,6 +1951,7 @@ config SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM
- config SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED
- bool "Harden slab freelist metadata"
- depends on SLAB || SLUB
- + default y
- help
- Many kernel heap attacks try to target slab cache metadata and
- other infrastructure. This options makes minor performance
- @@ -1946,6 +1960,23 @@ config SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED
- sanity-checking than others. This option is most effective with
- CONFIG_SLUB.
- +config SLAB_CANARY
- + depends on SLUB
- + depends on !SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT
- + bool "SLAB canaries"
- + default y
- + help
- + Place canaries at the end of kernel slab allocations, sacrificing
- + some performance and memory usage for security.
- +
- + Canaries can detect some forms of heap corruption when allocations
- + are freed and as part of the HARDENED_USERCOPY feature. It provides
- + basic use-after-free detection for HARDENED_USERCOPY.
- +
- + Canaries absorb small overflows (rendering them harmless), mitigate
- + non-NUL terminated C string overflows on 64-bit via a guaranteed zero
- + byte and provide basic double-free detection.
- +
- config SHUFFLE_PAGE_ALLOCATOR
- bool "Page allocator randomization"
- default SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM && ACPI_NUMA
- diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
- index 551a394bc8f4..a01c6f5c2277 100644
- --- a/kernel/audit.c
- +++ b/kernel/audit.c
- @@ -1693,6 +1693,9 @@ static int __init audit_enable(char *str)
- if (audit_default == AUDIT_OFF)
- audit_initialized = AUDIT_DISABLED;
- + else if (!audit_ever_enabled)
- + audit_initialized = AUDIT_UNINITIALIZED;
- +
- if (audit_set_enabled(audit_default))
- pr_err("audit: error setting audit state (%d)\n",
- audit_default);
- diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
- index 952d98beda63..b17c1043a7fe 100644
- --- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
- +++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
- @@ -526,7 +526,7 @@ void bpf_prog_kallsyms_del_all(struct bpf_prog *fp)
- /* All BPF JIT sysctl knobs here. */
- int bpf_jit_enable __read_mostly = IS_BUILTIN(CONFIG_BPF_JIT_DEFAULT_ON);
- int bpf_jit_kallsyms __read_mostly = IS_BUILTIN(CONFIG_BPF_JIT_DEFAULT_ON);
- -int bpf_jit_harden __read_mostly;
- +int bpf_jit_harden __read_mostly = 2;
- long bpf_jit_limit __read_mostly;
- static void
- diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
- index 250503482cda..159df7e0a739 100644
- --- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
- +++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
- @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(map_idr_lock);
- static DEFINE_IDR(link_idr);
- static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(link_idr_lock);
- -int sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled __read_mostly;
- +int sysctl_unprivileged_bpf_disabled __read_mostly = 1;
- static const struct bpf_map_ops * const bpf_map_types[] = {
- #define BPF_PROG_TYPE(_id, _name, prog_ctx_type, kern_ctx_type)
- diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
- index 46a361dde042..f0c387f421a0 100644
- --- a/kernel/capability.c
- +++ b/kernel/capability.c
- @@ -449,6 +449,12 @@ bool capable(int cap)
- return ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap);
- }
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
- +
- +bool capable_noaudit(int cap)
- +{
- + return ns_capable_noaudit(&init_user_ns, cap);
- +}
- +EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_noaudit);
- #endif /* CONFIG_MULTIUSER */
- /**
- diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
- index 67237fc43923..a1dd11dfbcfe 100644
- --- a/kernel/events/core.c
- +++ b/kernel/events/core.c
- @@ -412,8 +412,13 @@ static cpumask_var_t perf_online_mask;
- * 0 - disallow raw tracepoint access for unpriv
- * 1 - disallow cpu events for unpriv
- * 2 - disallow kernel profiling for unpriv
- + * 3 - disallow all unpriv perf event use
- */
- +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT
- +int sysctl_perf_event_paranoid __read_mostly = 3;
- +#else
- int sysctl_perf_event_paranoid __read_mostly = 2;
- +#endif
- /* Minimum for 512 kiB + 1 user control page */
- int sysctl_perf_event_mlock __read_mostly = 512 + (PAGE_SIZE / 1024); /* 'free' kiB per user */
- @@ -11816,7 +11821,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
- return -EINVAL;
- /* Do we allow access to perf_event_open(2) ? */
- - err = security_perf_event_open(&attr, PERF_SECURITY_OPEN);
- + err = perf_allow_open(&attr);
- if (err)
- return err;
- diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
- index 0c1d93552137..40d2e65f1e61 100644
- --- a/kernel/fork.c
- +++ b/kernel/fork.c
- @@ -82,6 +82,7 @@
- #include <linux/perf_event.h>
- #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
- #include <linux/user-return-notifier.h>
- +#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
- #include <linux/oom.h>
- #include <linux/khugepaged.h>
- #include <linux/signalfd.h>
- @@ -1872,6 +1873,10 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
- if ((clone_flags & (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS)) == (CLONE_NEWUSER|CLONE_FS))
- return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
- + if ((clone_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) && !unprivileged_userns_clone)
- + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- + return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
- +
- /*
- * Thread groups must share signals as well, and detached threads
- * can only be started up within the thread group.
- @@ -2971,6 +2976,12 @@ int ksys_unshare(unsigned long unshare_flags)
- if (unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWNS)
- unshare_flags |= CLONE_FS;
- + if ((unshare_flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) && !unprivileged_userns_clone) {
- + err = -EPERM;
- + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- + goto bad_unshare_out;
- + }
- +
- err = check_unshare_flags(unshare_flags);
- if (err)
- goto bad_unshare_out;
- diff --git a/kernel/rcu/tiny.c b/kernel/rcu/tiny.c
- index aa897c3f2e92..d8976886fd68 100644
- --- a/kernel/rcu/tiny.c
- +++ b/kernel/rcu/tiny.c
- @@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static inline bool rcu_reclaim_tiny(struct rcu_head *head)
- }
- /* Invoke the RCU callbacks whose grace period has elapsed. */
- -static __latent_entropy void rcu_process_callbacks(struct softirq_action *unused)
- +static __latent_entropy void rcu_process_callbacks(void)
- {
- struct rcu_head *next, *list;
- unsigned long flags;
- diff --git a/kernel/rcu/tree.c b/kernel/rcu/tree.c
- index 33bdbe0629d5..353a04bfaf87 100644
- --- a/kernel/rcu/tree.c
- +++ b/kernel/rcu/tree.c
- @@ -2801,7 +2801,7 @@ static __latent_entropy void rcu_core(void)
- queue_work_on(rdp->cpu, rcu_gp_wq, &rdp->strict_work);
- }
- -static void rcu_core_si(struct softirq_action *h)
- +static void rcu_core_si(void)
- {
- rcu_core();
- }
- diff --git a/kernel/sched/fair.c b/kernel/sched/fair.c
- index 572f312cc803..04856e3b5328 100644
- --- a/kernel/sched/fair.c
- +++ b/kernel/sched/fair.c
- @@ -10746,7 +10746,7 @@ static int newidle_balance(struct rq *this_rq, struct rq_flags *rf)
- * run_rebalance_domains is triggered when needed from the scheduler tick.
- * Also triggered for nohz idle balancing (with nohz_balancing_kick set).
- */
- -static __latent_entropy void run_rebalance_domains(struct softirq_action *h)
- +static __latent_entropy void run_rebalance_domains(void)
- {
- struct rq *this_rq = this_rq();
- enum cpu_idle_type idle = this_rq->idle_balance ?
- diff --git a/kernel/softirq.c b/kernel/softirq.c
- index 9908ec4a9bfe..2152d09b7b18 100644
- --- a/kernel/softirq.c
- +++ b/kernel/softirq.c
- @@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU_ALIGNED(irq_cpustat_t, irq_stat);
- EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL(irq_stat);
- #endif
- -static struct softirq_action softirq_vec[NR_SOFTIRQS] __cacheline_aligned_in_smp;
- +static struct softirq_action softirq_vec[NR_SOFTIRQS] __ro_after_init __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
- DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct task_struct *, ksoftirqd);
- @@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __softirq_entry __do_softirq(void)
- kstat_incr_softirqs_this_cpu(vec_nr);
- trace_softirq_entry(vec_nr);
- - h->action(h);
- + h->action();
- trace_softirq_exit(vec_nr);
- if (unlikely(prev_count != preempt_count())) {
- pr_err("huh, entered softirq %u %s %p with preempt_count %08x, exited with %08x?\n",
- @@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ void __raise_softirq_irqoff(unsigned int nr)
- or_softirq_pending(1UL << nr);
- }
- -void open_softirq(int nr, void (*action)(struct softirq_action *))
- +void __init open_softirq(int nr, void (*action)(void))
- {
- softirq_vec[nr].action = action;
- }
- @@ -531,8 +531,7 @@ void __tasklet_hi_schedule(struct tasklet_struct *t)
- }
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(__tasklet_hi_schedule);
- -static void tasklet_action_common(struct softirq_action *a,
- - struct tasklet_head *tl_head,
- +static void tasklet_action_common(struct tasklet_head *tl_head,
- unsigned int softirq_nr)
- {
- struct tasklet_struct *list;
- @@ -572,14 +571,14 @@ static void tasklet_action_common(struct softirq_action *a,
- }
- }
- -static __latent_entropy void tasklet_action(struct softirq_action *a)
- +static __latent_entropy void tasklet_action(void)
- {
- - tasklet_action_common(a, this_cpu_ptr(&tasklet_vec), TASKLET_SOFTIRQ);
- + tasklet_action_common(this_cpu_ptr(&tasklet_vec), TASKLET_SOFTIRQ);
- }
- -static __latent_entropy void tasklet_hi_action(struct softirq_action *a)
- +static __latent_entropy void tasklet_hi_action(void)
- {
- - tasklet_action_common(a, this_cpu_ptr(&tasklet_hi_vec), HI_SOFTIRQ);
- + tasklet_action_common(this_cpu_ptr(&tasklet_hi_vec), HI_SOFTIRQ);
- }
- void tasklet_setup(struct tasklet_struct *t,
- diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
- index 62fbd09b5dc1..36470990b2e6 100644
- --- a/kernel/sysctl.c
- +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
- @@ -106,23 +106,26 @@
- #ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
- #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
- #endif
- +#if defined CONFIG_TTY
- +#include <linux/tty.h>
- +#endif
- #if defined(CONFIG_SYSCTL)
- /* Constants used for minimum and maximum */
- #ifdef CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR
- -static int sixty = 60;
- +static int sixty __read_only = 60;
- #endif
- -static int __maybe_unused neg_one = -1;
- -static int __maybe_unused two = 2;
- -static int __maybe_unused four = 4;
- -static unsigned long zero_ul;
- -static unsigned long one_ul = 1;
- -static unsigned long long_max = LONG_MAX;
- -static int one_hundred = 100;
- -static int two_hundred = 200;
- -static int one_thousand = 1000;
- +static int __maybe_unused neg_one __read_only = -1;
- +static int __maybe_unused two __read_only = 2;
- +static int __maybe_unused four __read_only = 4;
- +static unsigned long zero_ul __read_only;
- +static unsigned long one_ul __read_only = 1;
- +static unsigned long long_max __read_only = LONG_MAX;
- +static int one_hundred __read_only = 100;
- +static int two_hundred __read_only = 200;
- +static int one_thousand __read_only = 1000;
- #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_MUQSS
- static int zero = 0;
- static int one = 1;
- @@ -134,20 +137,20 @@
- extern int hrtimeout_min_us;
- #endif
- #if defined(CONFIG_PRINTK) || defined(CONFIG_SCHED_MUQSS)
- -static int ten_thousand = 10000;
- +static int ten_thousand __read_only = 10000;
- #endif
- #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
- -static int six_hundred_forty_kb = 640 * 1024;
- +static int six_hundred_forty_kb __read_only = 640 * 1024;
- #endif
- /* this is needed for the proc_doulongvec_minmax of vm_dirty_bytes */
- -static unsigned long dirty_bytes_min = 2 * PAGE_SIZE;
- +static unsigned long dirty_bytes_min __read_only = 2 * PAGE_SIZE;
- /* this is needed for the proc_dointvec_minmax for [fs_]overflow UID and GID */
- -static int maxolduid = 65535;
- -static int minolduid;
- +static int maxolduid __read_only = 65535;
- +static int minolduid __read_only;
- -static int ngroups_max = NGROUPS_MAX;
- +static int ngroups_max __read_only = NGROUPS_MAX;
- static const int cap_last_cap = CAP_LAST_CAP;
- /*
- @@ -155,7 +158,7 @@
- * and hung_task_check_interval_secs
- */
- #ifdef CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK
- -static unsigned long hung_task_timeout_max = (LONG_MAX/HZ);
- +static unsigned long hung_task_timeout_max __read_only = (LONG_MAX/HZ);
- #endif
- #ifdef CONFIG_INOTIFY_USER
- @@ -198,19 +201,19 @@
- #endif
- #if defined(CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG) && !defined(CONFIG_SCHED_MUQSS)
- -static int min_sched_granularity_ns = 100000; /* 100 usecs */
- -static int max_sched_granularity_ns = NSEC_PER_SEC; /* 1 second */
- -static int min_wakeup_granularity_ns; /* 0 usecs */
- -static int max_wakeup_granularity_ns = NSEC_PER_SEC; /* 1 second */
- +static int min_sched_granularity_ns __read_only = 100000; /* 100 usecs */
- +static int max_sched_granularity_ns __read_only = NSEC_PER_SEC; /* 1 second */
- +static int min_wakeup_granularity_ns __read_only; /* 0 usecs */
- +static int max_wakeup_granularity_ns __read_only = NSEC_PER_SEC; /* 1 second */
- #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
- -static int min_sched_tunable_scaling = SCHED_TUNABLESCALING_NONE;
- -static int max_sched_tunable_scaling = SCHED_TUNABLESCALING_END-1;
- +static int min_sched_tunable_scaling __read_only = SCHED_TUNABLESCALING_NONE;
- +static int max_sched_tunable_scaling __read_only = SCHED_TUNABLESCALING_END-1;
- #endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
- #endif /* CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG && !CONFIG_SCHED_MUQSS */
- #ifdef CONFIG_COMPACTION
- -static int min_extfrag_threshold;
- -static int max_extfrag_threshold = 1000;
- +static int min_extfrag_threshold __read_only;
- +static int max_extfrag_threshold __read_only = 1000;
- #endif
- #endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
- @@ -900,8 +903,27 @@
- return err;
- }
- -#ifdef CONFIG_PRINTK
- -static int proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
- +/**
- + * proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin - read a vector of integers with min/max values
- + * checking CAP_SYS_ADMIN on write
- + * @table: the sysctl table
- + * @write: %TRUE if this is a write to the sysctl file
- + * @buffer: the user buffer
- + * @lenp: the size of the user buffer
- + * @ppos: file position
- + *
- + * Reads/writes up to table->maxlen/sizeof(unsigned int) integer
- + * values from/to the user buffer, treated as an ASCII string.
- + *
- + * This routine will ensure the values are within the range specified by
- + * table->extra1 (min) and table->extra2 (max).
- + *
- + * Writing is only allowed when root has CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
- + *
- + * Returns 0 on success, -EPERM on permission failure or -EINVAL on write
- + * when the range check fails.
- + */
- +int proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
- void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
- {
- if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
- @@ -909,7 +931,6 @@
- return proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
- }
- -#endif
- /**
- * struct do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv_param - proc_dointvec_minmax() range checking structure
- @@ -1595,6 +1616,12 @@
- return -ENOSYS;
- }
- +int proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
- + void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
- +{
- + return -ENOSYS;
- +}
- +
- int proc_dointvec_jiffies(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
- void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
- {
- @@ -1992,6 +2019,15 @@
- .proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
- },
- #endif
- +#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
- + {
- + .procname = "unprivileged_userns_clone",
- + .data = &unprivileged_userns_clone,
- + .maxlen = sizeof(int),
- + .mode = 0644,
- + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
- + },
- +#endif
- #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL
- {
- .procname = "tainted",
- @@ -2350,6 +2386,26 @@
- .extra2 = &two,
- },
- #endif
- +#if defined CONFIG_TTY
- + {
- + .procname = "tiocsti_restrict",
- + .data = &tiocsti_restrict,
- + .maxlen = sizeof(int),
- + .mode = 0644,
- + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin,
- + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
- + .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
- + },
- +#endif
- + {
- + .procname = "device_sidechannel_restrict",
- + .data = &device_sidechannel_restrict,
- + .maxlen = sizeof(int),
- + .mode = 0644,
- + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin,
- + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
- + .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
- + },
- {
- .procname = "ngroups_max",
- .data = &ngroups_max,
- @@ -3530,6 +3586,7 @@
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(proc_dointvec_jiffies);
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(proc_dointvec_minmax);
- EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(proc_douintvec_minmax);
- +EXPORT_SYMBOL(proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin);
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(proc_dointvec_userhz_jiffies);
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(proc_dointvec_ms_jiffies);
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(proc_dostring);
- diff --git a/kernel/time/hrtimer.c b/kernel/time/hrtimer.c
- index 5c9d968187ae..80156280360f 100644
- --- a/kernel/time/hrtimer.c
- +++ b/kernel/time/hrtimer.c
- @@ -1605,7 +1605,7 @@ static void __hrtimer_run_queues(struct hrtimer_cpu_base *cpu_base, ktime_t now,
- }
- }
- -static __latent_entropy void hrtimer_run_softirq(struct softirq_action *h)
- +static __latent_entropy void hrtimer_run_softirq(void)
- {
- struct hrtimer_cpu_base *cpu_base = this_cpu_ptr(&hrtimer_bases);
- unsigned long flags;
- diff --git a/kernel/time/timer.c b/kernel/time/timer.c
- index f475f1a027c8..ff43cfc99f71 100644
- --- a/kernel/time/timer.c
- +++ b/kernel/time/timer.c
- @@ -1751,7 +1751,7 @@ static inline void __run_timers(struct timer_base *base)
- /*
- * This function runs timers and the timer-tq in bottom half context.
- */
- -static __latent_entropy void run_timer_softirq(struct softirq_action *h)
- +static __latent_entropy void run_timer_softirq(void)
- {
- struct timer_base *base = this_cpu_ptr(&timer_bases[BASE_STD]);
- diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug
- index 5c9f528dd46d..2fada078d7f7 100644
- --- a/lib/Kconfig.debug
- +++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug
- @@ -412,6 +412,9 @@ config DEBUG_FORCE_FUNCTION_ALIGN_32B
- It is mainly for debug and performance tuning use.
- +config DEBUG_WRITABLE_FUNCTION_POINTERS_VERBOSE
- + bool "Enable verbose reporting of writable function pointers"
- +
- #
- # Select this config option from the architecture Kconfig, if it
- # is preferred to always offer frame pointers as a config
- @@ -526,7 +529,7 @@ config DEBUG_FS
- choice
- prompt "Debugfs default access"
- depends on DEBUG_FS
- - default DEBUG_FS_ALLOW_ALL
- + default DEBUG_FS_ALLOW_NONE
- help
- This selects the default access restrictions for debugfs.
- It can be overridden with kernel command line option
- @@ -955,6 +958,7 @@ menu "Debug Oops, Lockups and Hangs"
- config PANIC_ON_OOPS
- bool "Panic on Oops"
- + default y
- help
- Say Y here to enable the kernel to panic when it oopses. This
- has the same effect as setting oops=panic on the kernel command
- @@ -964,7 +968,7 @@ config PANIC_ON_OOPS
- anything erroneous after an oops which could result in data
- corruption or other issues.
- - Say N if unsure.
- + Say Y if unsure.
- config PANIC_ON_OOPS_VALUE
- int
- @@ -1539,6 +1543,7 @@ menu "Debug kernel data structures"
- config DEBUG_LIST
- bool "Debug linked list manipulation"
- depends on DEBUG_KERNEL || BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION
- + default y
- help
- Enable this to turn on extended checks in the linked-list
- walking routines.
- @@ -1578,6 +1583,7 @@ config DEBUG_NOTIFIERS
- config BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION
- bool "Trigger a BUG when data corruption is detected"
- select DEBUG_LIST
- + default y
- help
- Select this option if the kernel should BUG when it encounters
- data corruption in kernel memory structures when they get checked
- @@ -1733,6 +1739,7 @@ config STRICT_DEVMEM
- config IO_STRICT_DEVMEM
- bool "Filter I/O access to /dev/mem"
- depends on STRICT_DEVMEM
- + default y
- help
- If this option is disabled, you allow userspace (root) access to all
- io-memory regardless of whether a driver is actively using that
- diff --git a/lib/irq_poll.c b/lib/irq_poll.c
- index 2f17b488d58e..b6e7996a0058 100644
- --- a/lib/irq_poll.c
- +++ b/lib/irq_poll.c
- @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ void irq_poll_complete(struct irq_poll *iop)
- }
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(irq_poll_complete);
- -static void __latent_entropy irq_poll_softirq(struct softirq_action *h)
- +static void __latent_entropy irq_poll_softirq(void)
- {
- struct list_head *list = this_cpu_ptr(&blk_cpu_iopoll);
- int rearm = 0, budget = irq_poll_budget;
- diff --git a/lib/kobject.c b/lib/kobject.c
- index ea53b30cf483..5343bbeea5f8 100644
- --- a/lib/kobject.c
- +++ b/lib/kobject.c
- @@ -1023,9 +1023,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kset_create_and_add);
- static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(kobj_ns_type_lock);
- -static const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_ns_ops_tbl[KOBJ_NS_TYPES];
- +static const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *kobj_ns_ops_tbl[KOBJ_NS_TYPES] __ro_after_init;
- -int kobj_ns_type_register(const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *ops)
- +int __init kobj_ns_type_register(const struct kobj_ns_type_operations *ops)
- {
- enum kobj_ns_type type = ops->type;
- int error;
- diff --git a/lib/nlattr.c b/lib/nlattr.c
- index 1d051ef66afe..4dd3c165d1da 100644
- --- a/lib/nlattr.c
- +++ b/lib/nlattr.c
- @@ -790,6 +790,8 @@ int nla_memcpy(void *dest, const struct nlattr *src, int count)
- {
- int minlen = min_t(int, count, nla_len(src));
- + BUG_ON(minlen < 0);
- +
- memcpy(dest, nla_data(src), minlen);
- if (count > minlen)
- memset(dest + minlen, 0, count - minlen);
- diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
- index 9d6722199390..717a62154f87 100644
- --- a/lib/vsprintf.c
- +++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
- @@ -847,7 +847,7 @@ static char *ptr_to_id(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr,
- return pointer_string(buf, end, (const void *)hashval, spec);
- }
- -int kptr_restrict __read_mostly;
- +int kptr_restrict __read_mostly = 2;
- static noinline_for_stack
- char *restricted_pointer(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr,
- diff --git a/mm/Kconfig b/mm/Kconfig
- index 24c045b24b95..db91dbc2a65a 100644
- --- a/mm/Kconfig
- +++ b/mm/Kconfig
- @@ -321,7 +321,8 @@ config KSM
- config DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
- int "Low address space to protect from user allocation"
- depends on MMU
- - default 4096
- + default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT)
- + default 65536
- help
- This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
- from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages
- diff --git a/mm/Kconfig.debug b/mm/Kconfig.debug
- index 1e73717802f8..4a023b575370 100644
- --- a/mm/Kconfig.debug
- +++ b/mm/Kconfig.debug
- @@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ config DEBUG_WX
- depends on ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_WX
- depends on MMU
- select PTDUMP_CORE
- + default y
- help
- Generate a warning if any W+X mappings are found at boot.
- diff --git a/mm/kfence/report.c b/mm/kfence/report.c
- index e3f71451ad9e..a5468a199a00 100644
- --- a/mm/kfence/report.c
- +++ b/mm/kfence/report.c
- @@ -260,6 +260,10 @@ void kfence_report_error(unsigned long address, bool is_write, struct pt_regs *r
- lockdep_on();
- +#ifdef CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION
- + BUG();
- +#endif
- +
- if (panic_on_warn)
- panic("panic_on_warn set ...\n");
- diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c
- index 3f287599a7a3..a2ef50c85c3e 100644
- --- a/mm/mmap.c
- +++ b/mm/mmap.c
- @@ -230,6 +230,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(brk, unsigned long, brk)
- newbrk = PAGE_ALIGN(brk);
- oldbrk = PAGE_ALIGN(mm->brk);
- + /* properly handle unaligned min_brk as an empty heap */
- + if (min_brk & ~PAGE_MASK) {
- + if (brk == min_brk)
- + newbrk -= PAGE_SIZE;
- + if (mm->brk == min_brk)
- + oldbrk -= PAGE_SIZE;
- + }
- if (oldbrk == newbrk) {
- mm->brk = brk;
- goto success;
- diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c
- index 382af5377274..31bd45f8eae3 100644
- --- a/mm/page_alloc.c
- +++ b/mm/page_alloc.c
- @@ -72,6 +72,7 @@
- #include <linux/padata.h>
- #include <linux/khugepaged.h>
- #include <linux/buffer_head.h>
- +#include <linux/random.h>
- #include <asm/sections.h>
- #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
- @@ -138,6 +139,15 @@ struct pcpu_drain {
- static DEFINE_MUTEX(pcpu_drain_mutex);
- static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct pcpu_drain, pcpu_drain);
- +bool __meminitdata extra_latent_entropy;
- +
- +static int __init setup_extra_latent_entropy(char *str)
- +{
- + extra_latent_entropy = true;
- + return 0;
- +}
- +early_param("extra_latent_entropy", setup_extra_latent_entropy);
- +
- #ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY
- volatile unsigned long latent_entropy __latent_entropy;
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(latent_entropy);
- @@ -1552,6 +1562,25 @@ static void __free_pages_ok(struct page *page, unsigned int order,
- local_irq_restore(flags);
- }
- +static void __init __gather_extra_latent_entropy(struct page *page,
- + unsigned int nr_pages)
- +{
- + if (extra_latent_entropy && !PageHighMem(page) && page_to_pfn(page) < 0x100000) {
- + unsigned long hash = 0;
- + size_t index, end = PAGE_SIZE * nr_pages / sizeof hash;
- + const unsigned long *data = lowmem_page_address(page);
- +
- + for (index = 0; index < end; index++)
- + hash ^= hash + data[index];
- +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY
- + latent_entropy ^= hash;
- + add_device_randomness((const void *)&latent_entropy, sizeof(latent_entropy));
- +#else
- + add_device_randomness((const void *)&hash, sizeof(hash));
- +#endif
- + }
- +}
- +
- void __free_pages_core(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
- {
- unsigned int nr_pages = 1 << order;
- @@ -1571,7 +1600,6 @@ void __free_pages_core(struct page *page, unsigned int order)
- }
- __ClearPageReserved(p);
- set_page_count(p, 0);
- -
- atomic_long_add(nr_pages, &page_zone(page)->managed_pages);
- /*
- @@ -1638,6 +1666,7 @@ void __init memblock_free_pages(struct page *page, unsigned long pfn,
- {
- if (early_page_uninitialised(pfn))
- return;
- + __gather_extra_latent_entropy(page, 1 << order);
- __free_pages_core(page, order);
- }
- @@ -1729,6 +1758,7 @@ static void __init deferred_free_range(unsigned long pfn,
- if (nr_pages == pageblock_nr_pages &&
- (pfn & (pageblock_nr_pages - 1)) == 0) {
- set_pageblock_migratetype(page, MIGRATE_MOVABLE);
- + __gather_extra_latent_entropy(page, 1 << pageblock_order);
- __free_pages_core(page, pageblock_order);
- return;
- }
- @@ -1736,6 +1766,7 @@ static void __init deferred_free_range(unsigned long pfn,
- for (i = 0; i < nr_pages; i++, page++, pfn++) {
- if ((pfn & (pageblock_nr_pages - 1)) == 0)
- set_pageblock_migratetype(page, MIGRATE_MOVABLE);
- + __gather_extra_latent_entropy(page, 1);
- __free_pages_core(page, 0);
- }
- }
- @@ -2305,6 +2336,12 @@ inline void post_alloc_hook(struct page *page, unsigned int order,
- kernel_unpoison_pages(page, 1 << order);
- set_page_owner(page, order, gfp_flags);
- + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_SANITIZE_VERIFY) && want_init_on_free()) {
- + int i;
- + for (i = 0; i < (1 << order); i++)
- + verify_zero_highpage(page + i);
- + }
- +
- if (!want_init_on_free() && want_init_on_alloc(gfp_flags))
- kernel_init_free_pages(page, 1 << order);
- }
- diff --git a/mm/slab.h b/mm/slab.h
- index 440133f93a53..271fc26d0253 100644
- --- a/mm/slab.h
- +++ b/mm/slab.h
- @@ -414,9 +414,13 @@ static inline struct kmem_cache *virt_to_cache(const void *obj)
- struct page *page;
- page = virt_to_head_page(obj);
- +#ifdef CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION
- + BUG_ON(!PageSlab(page));
- +#else
- if (WARN_ONCE(!PageSlab(page), "%s: Object is not a Slab page!\n",
- __func__))
- return NULL;
- +#endif
- return page->slab_cache;
- }
- @@ -450,10 +454,15 @@ static inline struct kmem_cache *cache_from_obj(struct kmem_cache *s, void *x)
- return s;
- cachep = virt_to_cache(x);
- - if (WARN(cachep && cachep != s,
- - "%s: Wrong slab cache. %s but object is from %s\n",
- - __func__, s->name, cachep->name))
- + if (cachep && cachep != s) {
- +#ifdef CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION
- + BUG();
- +#else
- + WARN(1, "%s: Wrong slab cache. %s but object is from %s\n",
- + __func__, s->name, cachep->name);
- +#endif
- print_tracking(cachep, x);
- + }
- return cachep;
- }
- @@ -478,7 +487,7 @@ static inline size_t slab_ksize(const struct kmem_cache *s)
- * back there or track user information then we can
- * only use the space before that information.
- */
- - if (s->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_STORE_USER))
- + if ((s->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_STORE_USER)) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY))
- return s->inuse;
- /*
- * Else we can use all the padding etc for the allocation
- @@ -601,8 +610,10 @@ static inline void cache_random_seq_destroy(struct kmem_cache *cachep) { }
- static inline bool slab_want_init_on_alloc(gfp_t flags, struct kmem_cache *c)
- {
- if (static_branch_unlikely(&init_on_alloc)) {
- +#ifndef CONFIG_SLUB
- if (c->ctor)
- return false;
- +#endif
- if (c->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_POISON))
- return flags & __GFP_ZERO;
- return true;
- @@ -612,9 +623,15 @@ static inline bool slab_want_init_on_alloc(gfp_t flags, struct kmem_cache *c)
- static inline bool slab_want_init_on_free(struct kmem_cache *c)
- {
- - if (static_branch_unlikely(&init_on_free))
- - return !(c->ctor ||
- - (c->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_POISON)));
- + if (static_branch_unlikely(&init_on_free)) {
- +#ifndef CONFIG_SLUB
- + if (c->ctor)
- + return false;
- +#endif
- + if (c->flags & (SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU | SLAB_POISON))
- + return false;
- + return true;
- + }
- return false;
- }
- diff --git a/mm/slab_common.c b/mm/slab_common.c
- index ba2f4b01920f..8943c57ccb27 100644
- --- a/mm/slab_common.c
- +++ b/mm/slab_common.c
- @@ -32,10 +32,10 @@
- #include "slab.h"
- -enum slab_state slab_state;
- +enum slab_state slab_state __ro_after_init;
- LIST_HEAD(slab_caches);
- DEFINE_MUTEX(slab_mutex);
- -struct kmem_cache *kmem_cache;
- +struct kmem_cache *kmem_cache __ro_after_init;
- #ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY
- bool usercopy_fallback __ro_after_init =
- @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ static DECLARE_WORK(slab_caches_to_rcu_destroy_work,
- /*
- * Merge control. If this is set then no merging of slab caches will occur.
- */
- -static bool slab_nomerge = !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT);
- +static bool slab_nomerge __ro_after_init = !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_MERGE_DEFAULT);
- static int __init setup_slab_nomerge(char *str)
- {
- diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
- index 602f9712ab53..8b4b142cfce2 100644
- --- a/mm/slub.c
- +++ b/mm/slub.c
- @@ -129,6 +129,12 @@ static inline bool kmem_cache_debug(struct kmem_cache *s)
- return kmem_cache_debug_flags(s, SLAB_DEBUG_FLAGS);
- }
- +static inline bool has_sanitize_verify(struct kmem_cache *s)
- +{
- + return IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_SANITIZE_VERIFY) &&
- + slab_want_init_on_free(s);
- +}
- +
- void *fixup_red_left(struct kmem_cache *s, void *p)
- {
- if (kmem_cache_debug_flags(s, SLAB_RED_ZONE))
- @@ -444,6 +450,55 @@ static inline bool cmpxchg_double_slab(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
- return false;
- }
- +#if defined(CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG) || defined(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY)
- +/*
- + * See comment in calculate_sizes().
- + */
- +static inline bool freeptr_outside_object(struct kmem_cache *s)
- +{
- + return s->offset >= s->inuse;
- +}
- +
- +/*
- + * Return offset of the end of info block which is inuse + free pointer if
- + * not overlapping with object.
- + */
- +static inline unsigned int get_info_end(struct kmem_cache *s)
- +{
- + if (freeptr_outside_object(s))
- + return s->inuse + sizeof(void *);
- + else
- + return s->inuse;
- +}
- +#endif
- +
- +#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY
- +static inline unsigned long *get_canary(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object)
- +{
- + return object + get_info_end(s);
- +}
- +
- +static inline unsigned long get_canary_value(const void *canary, unsigned long value)
- +{
- + return (value ^ (unsigned long)canary) & CANARY_MASK;
- +}
- +
- +static inline void set_canary(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, unsigned long value)
- +{
- + unsigned long *canary = get_canary(s, object);
- + *canary = get_canary_value(canary, value);
- +}
- +
- +static inline void check_canary(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object, unsigned long value)
- +{
- + unsigned long *canary = get_canary(s, object);
- + BUG_ON(*canary != get_canary_value(canary, value));
- +}
- +#else
- +#define set_canary(s, object, value)
- +#define check_canary(s, object, value)
- +#endif
- +
- #ifdef CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG
- static unsigned long object_map[BITS_TO_LONGS(MAX_OBJS_PER_PAGE)];
- static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(object_map_lock);
- @@ -555,26 +610,6 @@ static void print_section(char *level, char *text, u8 *addr,
- metadata_access_disable();
- }
- -/*
- - * See comment in calculate_sizes().
- - */
- -static inline bool freeptr_outside_object(struct kmem_cache *s)
- -{
- - return s->offset >= s->inuse;
- -}
- -
- -/*
- - * Return offset of the end of info block which is inuse + free pointer if
- - * not overlapping with object.
- - */
- -static inline unsigned int get_info_end(struct kmem_cache *s)
- -{
- - if (freeptr_outside_object(s))
- - return s->inuse + sizeof(void *);
- - else
- - return s->inuse;
- -}
- -
- static struct track *get_track(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
- enum track_item alloc)
- {
- @@ -582,6 +617,9 @@ static struct track *get_track(struct kmem_cache *s, void *object,
- p = object + get_info_end(s);
- + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY))
- + p = (void *)p + sizeof(void *);
- +
- return kasan_reset_tag(p + alloc);
- }
- @@ -724,6 +762,9 @@ static void print_trailer(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, u8 *p)
- off = get_info_end(s);
- + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY))
- + off += sizeof(void *);
- +
- if (s->flags & SLAB_STORE_USER)
- off += 2 * sizeof(struct track);
- @@ -832,8 +873,9 @@ static int check_bytes_and_report(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
- * Meta data starts here.
- *
- * A. Free pointer (if we cannot overwrite object on free)
- - * B. Tracking data for SLAB_STORE_USER
- - * C. Padding to reach required alignment boundary or at mininum
- + * B. Canary for SLAB_CANARY
- + * C. Tracking data for SLAB_STORE_USER
- + * D. Padding to reach required alignment boundary or at mininum
- * one word if debugging is on to be able to detect writes
- * before the word boundary.
- *
- @@ -851,6 +893,9 @@ static int check_pad_bytes(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page, u8 *p)
- {
- unsigned long off = get_info_end(s); /* The end of info */
- + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY))
- + off += sizeof(void *);
- +
- if (s->flags & SLAB_STORE_USER)
- /* We also have user information there */
- off += 2 * sizeof(struct track);
- @@ -1585,6 +1630,8 @@ static inline bool slab_free_freelist_hook(struct kmem_cache *s,
- object = next;
- next = get_freepointer(s, object);
- + check_canary(s, object, s->random_active);
- +
- if (slab_want_init_on_free(s)) {
- /*
- * Clear the object and the metadata, but don't touch
- @@ -1595,8 +1642,12 @@ static inline bool slab_free_freelist_hook(struct kmem_cache *s,
- : 0;
- memset((char *)kasan_reset_tag(object) + s->inuse, 0,
- s->size - s->inuse - rsize);
- -
- + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_SANITIZE_VERIFY) && s->ctor)
- + s->ctor(object);
- }
- +
- + set_canary(s, object, s->random_inactive);
- +
- /* If object's reuse doesn't have to be delayed */
- if (!slab_free_hook(s, object)) {
- /* Move object to the new freelist */
- @@ -1604,6 +1655,18 @@ static inline bool slab_free_freelist_hook(struct kmem_cache *s,
- *head = object;
- if (!*tail)
- *tail = object;
- + } else if (slab_want_init_on_free(s) && s->ctor) {
- + /* Objects that are put into quarantine by KASAN will
- + * still undergo free_consistency_checks() and thus
- + * need to show a valid freepointer to check_object().
- + *
- + * Note that doing this for all caches (not just ctor
- + * ones, which have s->offset >= object_size)) causes a
- + * GPF, due to KASAN poisoning and the way
- + * set_freepointer() eventually dereferences the
- + * freepointer.
- + */
- + set_freepointer(s, object, NULL);
- }
- } while (object != old_tail);
- @@ -1617,8 +1680,10 @@ static void *setup_object(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page,
- void *object)
- {
- setup_object_debug(s, page, object);
- + if (!is_kfence_address(object))
- + set_canary(s, object, s->random_inactive);
- object = kasan_init_slab_obj(s, object);
- - if (unlikely(s->ctor)) {
- + if (unlikely(s->ctor) && !has_sanitize_verify(s)) {
- kasan_unpoison_object_data(s, object);
- s->ctor(object);
- kasan_poison_object_data(s, object);
- @@ -2901,10 +2966,30 @@ static __always_inline void *slab_alloc_node(struct kmem_cache *s,
- maybe_wipe_obj_freeptr(s, object);
- - if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_alloc(gfpflags, s)) && object)
- + if (has_sanitize_verify(s) && object) {
- + /* KASAN hasn't unpoisoned the object yet (this is done in the
- + * post-alloc hook), so let's do it temporarily.
- + */
- + kasan_unpoison_object_data(s, object);
- + BUG_ON(memchr_inv(object, 0, s->object_size));
- + if (s->ctor)
- + s->ctor(object);
- + kasan_poison_object_data(s, object);
- + } else if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_alloc(gfpflags, s)) && object) {
- memset(kasan_reset_tag(object), 0, s->object_size);
- + if (s->ctor) {
- + kasan_unpoison_object_data(s, object);
- + s->ctor(object);
- + kasan_poison_object_data(s, object);
- + }
- + }
- out:
- + if (object && !is_kfence_address(object)) {
- + check_canary(s, object, s->random_inactive);
- + set_canary(s, object, s->random_active);
- + }
- +
- slab_post_alloc_hook(s, objcg, gfpflags, 1, &object);
- return object;
- @@ -3302,7 +3387,7 @@ int kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, size_t size,
- void **p)
- {
- struct kmem_cache_cpu *c;
- - int i;
- + int i, k;
- struct obj_cgroup *objcg = NULL;
- /* memcg and kmem_cache debug support */
- @@ -3358,11 +3443,37 @@ int kmem_cache_alloc_bulk(struct kmem_cache *s, gfp_t flags, size_t size,
- local_irq_enable();
- /* Clear memory outside IRQ disabled fastpath loop */
- - if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_alloc(flags, s))) {
- + if (has_sanitize_verify(s)) {
- int j;
- - for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
- + for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
- + /* KASAN hasn't unpoisoned the object yet (this is done
- + * in the post-alloc hook), so let's do it temporarily.
- + */
- + kasan_unpoison_object_data(s, p[j]);
- + BUG_ON(memchr_inv(p[j], 0, s->object_size));
- + if (s->ctor)
- + s->ctor(p[j]);
- + kasan_poison_object_data(s, p[j]);
- + }
- + } else if (unlikely(slab_want_init_on_alloc(flags, s))) {
- + int j;
- +
- + for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
- memset(kasan_reset_tag(p[j]), 0, s->object_size);
- + if (s->ctor) {
- + kasan_unpoison_object_data(s, p[j]);
- + s->ctor(p[j]);
- + kasan_poison_object_data(s, p[j]);
- + }
- + }
- + }
- +
- + for (k = 0; k < i; k++) {
- + if (!is_kfence_address(p[k])) {
- + check_canary(s, p[k], s->random_inactive);
- + set_canary(s, p[k], s->random_active);
- + }
- }
- /* memcg and kmem_cache debug support */
- @@ -3580,6 +3691,8 @@ static void early_kmem_cache_node_alloc(int node)
- init_object(kmem_cache_node, n, SLUB_RED_ACTIVE);
- init_tracking(kmem_cache_node, n);
- #endif
- + if (!is_kfence_address(n))
- + set_canary(kmem_cache_node, n, kmem_cache_node->random_active);
- n = kasan_slab_alloc(kmem_cache_node, n, GFP_KERNEL);
- page->freelist = get_freepointer(kmem_cache_node, n);
- page->inuse = 1;
- @@ -3753,6 +3866,9 @@ static int calculate_sizes(struct kmem_cache *s, int forced_order)
- s->offset = ALIGN_DOWN(s->object_size / 2, sizeof(void *));
- }
- + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY))
- + size += sizeof(void *);
- +
- #ifdef CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG
- if (flags & SLAB_STORE_USER)
- /*
- @@ -3826,6 +3942,10 @@ static int kmem_cache_open(struct kmem_cache *s, slab_flags_t flags)
- #ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_HARDENED
- s->random = get_random_long();
- #endif
- +#ifdef CONFIG_SLAB_CANARY
- + s->random_active = get_random_long();
- + s->random_inactive = get_random_long();
- +#endif
- if (!calculate_sizes(s, -1))
- goto error;
- @@ -4143,6 +4263,9 @@ void __check_heap_object(const void *ptr, unsigned long n, struct page *page,
- offset -= s->red_left_pad;
- }
- + if (!is_kfence)
- + check_canary(s, (void *)ptr - offset, s->random_active);
- +
- /* Allow address range falling entirely within usercopy region. */
- if (offset >= s->useroffset &&
- offset - s->useroffset <= s->usersize &&
- @@ -4176,7 +4299,11 @@ size_t __ksize(const void *object)
- page = virt_to_head_page(object);
- if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page))) {
- +#ifdef CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION
- + BUG_ON(!PageCompound(page));
- +#else
- WARN_ON(!PageCompound(page));
- +#endif
- return page_size(page);
- }
- diff --git a/mm/swap.c b/mm/swap.c
- index 31b844d4ed94..e1f9ee51f6e1 100644
- --- a/mm/swap.c
- +++ b/mm/swap.c
- @@ -99,6 +99,8 @@ static void __put_single_page(struct page *page)
- static void __put_compound_page(struct page *page)
- {
- + compound_page_dtor *dtor;
- +
- /*
- * __page_cache_release() is supposed to be called for thp, not for
- * hugetlb. This is because hugetlb page does never have PageLRU set
- @@ -107,7 +109,15 @@ static void __put_compound_page(struct page *page)
- */
- if (!PageHuge(page))
- __page_cache_release(page);
- - destroy_compound_page(page);
- + dtor = get_compound_page_dtor(page);
- + if (!PageHuge(page))
- + BUG_ON(dtor != free_compound_page
- +#ifdef CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
- + && dtor != free_transhuge_page
- +#endif
- + );
- +
- + (*dtor)(page);
- }
- void __put_page(struct page *page)
- diff --git a/mm/util.c b/mm/util.c
- index 54870226cea6..46ce65234d84 100644
- --- a/mm/util.c
- +++ b/mm/util.c
- @@ -348,9 +348,9 @@ unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm)
- {
- /* Is the current task 32bit ? */
- if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_64BIT) || is_compat_task())
- - return randomize_page(mm->brk, SZ_32M);
- + return mm->brk + get_random_long() % SZ_32M + PAGE_SIZE;
- - return randomize_page(mm->brk, SZ_1G);
- + return mm->brk + get_random_long() % SZ_1G + PAGE_SIZE;
- }
- unsigned long arch_mmap_rnd(void)
- diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c
- index a8c89cad1ca4..e0021f950824 100644
- --- a/net/core/dev.c
- +++ b/net/core/dev.c
- @@ -4936,7 +4936,7 @@ int netif_rx_any_context(struct sk_buff *skb)
- }
- EXPORT_SYMBOL(netif_rx_any_context);
- -static __latent_entropy void net_tx_action(struct softirq_action *h)
- +static __latent_entropy void net_tx_action(void)
- {
- struct softnet_data *sd = this_cpu_ptr(&softnet_data);
- @@ -7071,7 +7071,7 @@ static int napi_threaded_poll(void *data)
- return 0;
- }
- -static __latent_entropy void net_rx_action(struct softirq_action *h)
- +static __latent_entropy void net_rx_action(void)
- {
- struct softnet_data *sd = this_cpu_ptr(&softnet_data);
- unsigned long time_limit = jiffies +
- diff --git a/net/ipv4/Kconfig b/net/ipv4/Kconfig
- index 87983e70f03f..d1584b4b39f9 100644
- --- a/net/ipv4/Kconfig
- +++ b/net/ipv4/Kconfig
- @@ -267,6 +267,7 @@ config IP_PIMSM_V2
- config SYN_COOKIES
- bool "IP: TCP syncookie support"
- + default y
- help
- Normal TCP/IP networking is open to an attack known as "SYN
- flooding". This denial-of-service attack prevents legitimate remote
- @@ -742,3 +743,26 @@ config TCP_MD5SIG
- on the Internet.
- If unsure, say N.
- +
- +config TCP_SIMULT_CONNECT_DEFAULT_ON
- + bool "Enable TCP simultaneous connect"
- + help
- + Enable TCP simultaneous connect that adds a weakness in Linux's strict
- + implementation of TCP that allows two clients to connect to each other
- + without either entering a listening state. The weakness allows an
- + attacker to easily prevent a client from connecting to a known server
- + provided the source port for the connection is guessed correctly.
- +
- + As the weakness could be used to prevent an antivirus or IPS from
- + fetching updates, or prevent an SSL gateway from fetching a CRL, it
- + should be eliminated by disabling this option. Though Linux is one of
- + few operating systems supporting simultaneous connect, it has no
- + legitimate use in practice and is rarely supported by firewalls.
- +
- + Disabling this may break TCP STUNT which is used by some applications
- + for NAT traversal.
- +
- + This setting can be overridden at runtime via the
- + net.ipv4.tcp_simult_connect sysctl.
- +
- + If unsure, say N.
- diff --git a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
- index 60465f077497..253eb350bd86 100644
- --- a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
- +++ b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
- @@ -588,6 +588,15 @@ static struct ctl_table ipv4_table[] = {
- .mode = 0644,
- .proc_handler = proc_do_static_key,
- },
- + {
- + .procname = "tcp_simult_connect",
- + .data = &sysctl_tcp_simult_connect,
- + .maxlen = sizeof(int),
- + .mode = 0644,
- + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
- + .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO,
- + .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE,
- + },
- { }
- };
- diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
- index e567fff1d1a6..5b1c8cea9ec4 100644
- --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
- +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
- @@ -82,6 +82,7 @@
- #include <net/mptcp.h>
- int sysctl_tcp_max_orphans __read_mostly = NR_FILE;
- +int sysctl_tcp_simult_connect __read_mostly = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_TCP_SIMULT_CONNECT_DEFAULT_ON);
- #define FLAG_DATA 0x01 /* Incoming frame contained data. */
- #define FLAG_WIN_UPDATE 0x02 /* Incoming ACK was a window update. */
- @@ -6214,7 +6215,7 @@ static int tcp_rcv_synsent_state_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
- tcp_paws_reject(&tp->rx_opt, 0))
- goto discard_and_undo;
- - if (th->syn) {
- + if (th->syn && sysctl_tcp_simult_connect) {
- /* We see SYN without ACK. It is attempt of
- * simultaneous connect with crossed SYNs.
- * Particularly, it can be connect to self.
- diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.modpost b/scripts/Makefile.modpost
- index 4ca5579af4e4..32873f0cb4f5 100644
- --- a/scripts/Makefile.modpost
- +++ b/scripts/Makefile.modpost
- @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ MODPOST = scripts/mod/modpost \
- $(if $(CONFIG_MODVERSIONS),-m) \
- $(if $(CONFIG_MODULE_SRCVERSION_ALL),-a) \
- $(if $(CONFIG_SECTION_MISMATCH_WARN_ONLY),,-E) \
- + $(if $(CONFIG_DEBUG_WRITABLE_FUNCTION_POINTERS_VERBOSE),-f) \
- $(if $(KBUILD_MODPOST_WARN),-w) \
- -o $@
- diff --git a/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig b/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig
- index ab9eb4cbe33a..2870588ef733 100644
- --- a/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig
- +++ b/scripts/gcc-plugins/Kconfig
- @@ -53,6 +53,11 @@ config GCC_PLUGIN_LATENT_ENTROPY
- is some slowdown of the boot process (about 0.5%) and fork and
- irq processing.
- + When extra_latent_entropy is passed on the kernel command line,
- + entropy will be extracted from up to the first 4GB of RAM while the
- + runtime memory allocator is being initialized. This costs even more
- + slowdown of the boot process.
- +
- Note that entropy extracted this way is not cryptographically
- secure!
- diff --git a/scripts/mod/modpost.c b/scripts/mod/modpost.c
- index 10c3fba26f03..164d7ad688b6 100644
- --- a/scripts/mod/modpost.c
- +++ b/scripts/mod/modpost.c
- @@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ static int warn_unresolved = 0;
- /* How a symbol is exported */
- static int sec_mismatch_count = 0;
- static int sec_mismatch_warn_only = true;
- +static int writable_fptr_count = 0;
- +static int writable_fptr_verbose = 0;
- /* ignore missing files */
- static int ignore_missing_files;
- /* If set to 1, only warn (instead of error) about missing ns imports */
- @@ -982,6 +984,7 @@ enum mismatch {
- ANY_EXIT_TO_ANY_INIT,
- EXPORT_TO_INIT_EXIT,
- EXTABLE_TO_NON_TEXT,
- + DATA_TO_TEXT
- };
- /**
- @@ -1108,6 +1111,12 @@ static const struct sectioncheck sectioncheck[] = {
- .good_tosec = {ALL_TEXT_SECTIONS , NULL},
- .mismatch = EXTABLE_TO_NON_TEXT,
- .handler = extable_mismatch_handler,
- +},
- +/* Do not reference code from writable data */
- +{
- + .fromsec = { DATA_SECTIONS, NULL },
- + .bad_tosec = { ALL_TEXT_SECTIONS, NULL },
- + .mismatch = DATA_TO_TEXT
- }
- };
- @@ -1295,10 +1304,10 @@ static Elf_Sym *find_elf_symbol(struct elf_info *elf, Elf64_Sword addr,
- continue;
- if (!is_valid_name(elf, sym))
- continue;
- - if (sym->st_value == addr)
- - return sym;
- /* Find a symbol nearby - addr are maybe negative */
- d = sym->st_value - addr;
- + if (d == 0)
- + return sym;
- if (d < 0)
- d = addr - sym->st_value;
- if (d < distance) {
- @@ -1433,7 +1442,13 @@ static void report_sec_mismatch(const char *modname,
- char *prl_from;
- char *prl_to;
- - sec_mismatch_count++;
- + if (mismatch->mismatch == DATA_TO_TEXT) {
- + writable_fptr_count++;
- + if (!writable_fptr_verbose)
- + return;
- + } else {
- + sec_mismatch_count++;
- + }
- get_pretty_name(from_is_func, &from, &from_p);
- get_pretty_name(to_is_func, &to, &to_p);
- @@ -1555,6 +1570,12 @@ static void report_sec_mismatch(const char *modname,
- fatal("There's a special handler for this mismatch type, "
- "we should never get here.");
- break;
- + case DATA_TO_TEXT:
- + fprintf(stderr,
- + "The %s %s:%s references\n"
- + "the %s %s:%s%s\n",
- + from, fromsec, fromsym, to, tosec, tosym, to_p);
- + break;
- }
- fprintf(stderr, "\n");
- }
- @@ -2487,7 +2508,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
- struct dump_list *dump_read_start = NULL;
- struct dump_list **dump_read_iter = &dump_read_start;
- - while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "ei:mnT:o:awENd:")) != -1) {
- + while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "ei:fmnT:o:awENd:")) != -1) {
- switch (opt) {
- case 'e':
- external_module = 1;
- @@ -2498,6 +2519,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
- (*dump_read_iter)->file = optarg;
- dump_read_iter = &(*dump_read_iter)->next;
- break;
- + case 'f':
- + writable_fptr_verbose = 1;
- + break;
- case 'm':
- modversions = 1;
- break;
- @@ -2596,6 +2620,11 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
- }
- free(buf.p);
- + if (writable_fptr_count && !writable_fptr_verbose)
- + warn("modpost: Found %d writable function pointer%s.\n"
- + "To see full details build your kernel with:\n"
- + "'make CONFIG_DEBUG_WRITABLE_FUNCTION_POINTERS_VERBOSE=y'\n",
- + writable_fptr_count, (writable_fptr_count == 1 ? "" : "s"));
- return error_occurred ? 1 : 0;
- }
- diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
- index 7561f6f99f1d..ccae931a1c6c 100644
- --- a/security/Kconfig
- +++ b/security/Kconfig
- @@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ source "security/keys/Kconfig"
- config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
- bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog"
- - default n
- + default y
- help
- This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel
- syslog via dmesg(8).
- @@ -19,10 +19,34 @@ config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
- If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
- +config SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT
- + bool "Restrict unprivileged use of performance events"
- + depends on PERF_EVENTS
- + default y
- + help
- + If you say Y here, the kernel.perf_event_paranoid sysctl
- + will be set to 3 by default, and no unprivileged use of the
- + perf_event_open syscall will be permitted unless it is
- + changed.
- +
- +config SECURITY_TIOCSTI_RESTRICT
- + bool "Restrict unprivileged use of tiocsti command injection"
- + default y
- + help
- + This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users injecting commands
- + into other processes which share a tty session using the TIOCSTI
- + ioctl. This option makes TIOCSTI use require CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
- +
- + If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced
- + unless the tiocsti_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1).
- +
- + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
- +
- config SECURITY
- bool "Enable different security models"
- depends on SYSFS
- depends on MULTIUSER
- + default y
- help
- This allows you to choose different security modules to be
- configured into your kernel.
- @@ -48,6 +72,7 @@ config SECURITYFS
- config SECURITY_NETWORK
- bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks"
- depends on SECURITY
- + default y
- help
- This enables the socket and networking security hooks.
- If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
- @@ -154,6 +179,7 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY
- bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace"
- depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
- imply STRICT_DEVMEM
- + default y
- help
- This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when
- copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and
- @@ -166,7 +192,6 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY
- config HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK
- bool "Allow usercopy whitelist violations to fallback to object size"
- depends on HARDENED_USERCOPY
- - default y
- help
- This is a temporary option that allows missing usercopy whitelists
- to be discovered via a WARN() to the kernel log, instead of
- @@ -191,6 +216,7 @@ config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN
- config FORTIFY_SOURCE
- bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows"
- depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
- + default y
- help
- Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions
- where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes.
- diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening
- index a56c36470cb1..ea4c4aeed9cd 100644
- --- a/security/Kconfig.hardening
- +++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening
- @@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ config STACKLEAK_RUNTIME_DISABLE
- config INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON
- bool "Enable heap memory zeroing on allocation by default"
- + default yes
- help
- This has the effect of setting "init_on_alloc=1" on the kernel
- command line. This can be disabled with "init_on_alloc=0".
- @@ -202,6 +203,7 @@ config INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON
- config INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON
- bool "Enable heap memory zeroing on free by default"
- + default yes
- help
- This has the effect of setting "init_on_free=1" on the kernel
- command line. This can be disabled with "init_on_free=0".
- @@ -217,6 +219,21 @@ config INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON
- touching "cold" memory areas. Most cases see 3-5% impact. Some
- synthetic workloads have measured as high as 8%.
- +config PAGE_SANITIZE_VERIFY
- + bool "Verify sanitized pages"
- + default y
- + help
- + When init_on_free is enabled, verify that newly allocated pages
- + are zeroed to detect write-after-free bugs.
- +
- +config SLAB_SANITIZE_VERIFY
- + bool "Verify sanitized SLAB allocations"
- + default y
- + depends on !KASAN
- + help
- + When init_on_free is enabled, verify that newly allocated slab
- + objects are zeroed to detect write-after-free bugs.
- +
- endmenu
- endmenu
- diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig
- index 9e921fc72538..ae851a826c26 100644
- --- a/security/selinux/Kconfig
- +++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig
- @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX
- bool "NSA SELinux Support"
- depends on SECURITY_NETWORK && AUDIT && NET && INET
- select NETWORK_SECMARK
- - default n
- + default y
- help
- This selects NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux).
- You will also need a policy configuration and a labeled filesystem.
- @@ -70,29 +70,6 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
- /sys/fs/selinux/avc/cache_stats, which may be monitored via
- tools such as avcstat.
- -config SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE
- - int "NSA SELinux checkreqprot default value"
- - depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
- - range 0 1
- - default 0
- - help
- - This option sets the default value for the 'checkreqprot' flag
- - that determines whether SELinux checks the protection requested
- - by the application or the protection that will be applied by the
- - kernel (including any implied execute for read-implies-exec) for
- - mmap and mprotect calls. If this option is set to 0 (zero),
- - SELinux will default to checking the protection that will be applied
- - by the kernel. If this option is set to 1 (one), SELinux will
- - default to checking the protection requested by the application.
- - The checkreqprot flag may be changed from the default via the
- - 'checkreqprot=' boot parameter. It may also be changed at runtime
- - via /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot if authorized by policy.
- -
- - WARNING: this option is deprecated and will be removed in a future
- - kernel release.
- -
- - If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 0.
- -
- config SECURITY_SELINUX_SIDTAB_HASH_BITS
- int "NSA SELinux sidtab hashtable size"
- depends on SECURITY_SELINUX
- diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
- index ddd097790d47..d26efee67c3b 100644
- --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
- +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
- @@ -136,21 +136,7 @@ static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
- __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
- #endif
- -static unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot_boot =
- - CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE;
- -
- -static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
- -{
- - unsigned long checkreqprot;
- -
- - if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) {
- - selinux_checkreqprot_boot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0;
- - if (checkreqprot)
- - pr_warn("SELinux: checkreqprot set to 1 via kernel parameter. This is deprecated and will be rejected in a future kernel release.\n");
- - }
- - return 1;
- -}
- -__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
- +static const unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot_boot;
- /**
- * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
- diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
- index fff6babeeae6..9ef382e89176 100644
- --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
- +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
- @@ -721,7 +721,6 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_checkreqprot(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
- static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
- size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
- {
- - struct selinux_fs_info *fsi = file_inode(file)->i_sb->s_fs_info;
- char *page;
- ssize_t length;
- unsigned int new_value;
- @@ -745,18 +744,9 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
- return PTR_ERR(page);
- length = -EINVAL;
- - if (sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value) != 1)
- + if (sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value) != 1 || new_value)
- goto out;
- - if (new_value) {
- - char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
- -
- - memcpy(comm, current->comm, sizeof(comm));
- - pr_warn_once("SELinux: %s (%d) set checkreqprot to 1. This is deprecated and will be rejected in a future kernel release.\n",
- - comm, current->pid);
- - }
- -
- - checkreqprot_set(fsi->state, (new_value ? 1 : 0));
- length = count;
- out:
- kfree(page);
- diff --git a/security/yama/Kconfig b/security/yama/Kconfig
- index a810304123ca..b809050b25d2 100644
- --- a/security/yama/Kconfig
- +++ b/security/yama/Kconfig
- @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
- config SECURITY_YAMA
- bool "Yama support"
- depends on SECURITY
- - default n
- + default y
- help
- This selects Yama, which extends DAC support with additional
- system-wide security settings beyond regular Linux discretionary
- diff --git a/tools/perf/Documentation/security.txt b/tools/perf/Documentation/security.txt
- index 4fe3b8b1958f..a7d88cc23a70 100644
- --- a/tools/perf/Documentation/security.txt
- +++ b/tools/perf/Documentation/security.txt
- @@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ Perf tool provides a message similar to the one below:
- >= 0: Disallow raw and ftrace function tracepoint access
- >= 1: Disallow CPU event access
- >= 2: Disallow kernel profiling
- + >= 3: Disallow use of any event
- To make the adjusted perf_event_paranoid setting permanent preserve it
- in /etc/sysctl.conf (e.g. kernel.perf_event_paranoid = <setting>)
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