inspiration

Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of Islam and home to Islam's two holiest shrines in Mecca and Medina. The king's official title is the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques. The government bases its legitimacy on its interpretation of sharia (Islamic law) and the 1992 Basic Law, which specifies that the rulers of the country shall be male descendants of the founder King Abdulaziz bin Abdulrahman Al Saud. The Basic Law sets out the system of governance, rights of citizens, and powers and duties of the government, and it provides that the Koran and Sunna (the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad) serve as the country’s constitution.
Islamic Sharia’a is the law of the land in Saudi Arabia. The country has no penal code. One of the main sources of Islamic law is the hadith or ascribed sayings of the Prophet Mohamed. Saudi officials base this on their interpretation of hadith and state that this is what is expected of them as the country that hosts the two holiest mosques in Islam, in Mecca and Medina.
The Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (CPVPV), a semiautonomous agency--referred to by some as the “religious police" --has the authority to monitor social behavior and enforce morality subject to the law and in coordination with law enforcement authorities. Its members have been accused of beating, whipping, detaining, and otherwise harassing individuals. As of June 2014 the CPVPV had 12 branch offices, 129 subcommission offices, and 345 information centers throughout the kingdom.

Continuing its consistent decades-long record, Saudi Arabia received the lowest possible marks for civil and political freedoms in the annual Freedom House rankings in 2014. The countries placed alongside it were North Korea, Turkmenistan, and smattering of the most brutal African dictatorships. Among the punishments distributed is anything from hands and feet being chopped off for theft, lashes for adultery and other “social" misdemeanors, to beheading, which can be handed down for crimes as varied as sedition, carjacking, sorcery and drug smuggling.
The regime’s disregard for any accountability to its people is brazen. There are no national elections, no parties, and no parliament – only a symbolic advisory chamber, known as Majlis al-Shura.

Tribal factors and longstanding traditions continued to dictate many individual appointments to positions. Unofficially, government authorities will not appoint a Bedouin tribesman to a high-ranking cabinet-level position, and Bedouins can only reach the rank of major general in the armed forces. All members of the cabinet who were tribal were not members of Bedouin tribes but urbanized “Hamael" tribes. Exceptions are sometimes made when a person marries into the Al Saud family.

In 1962, then-King Faisal abolished slavery in Saudi Arabia by royal decree. Decades later, migrant workers in the purportedly modern society that the kingdom has become continue to suffer extreme forms of labor exploitation that sometimes rise to slavery-like conditions. Their lives are further complicated by deeply rooted gender, religious, and racial discrimination. Employers or sponsors controlled the departure of foreign workers and residents from the country; employers/sponsors were responsible for processing residence permits and exit visas on their behalf. Sponsors frequently held their employees’ passports against the desires of the employees, despite a law specifically prohibiting this practice. Typically, foreign workers provide sponsors with their residence permit (iqama) before traveling in exchange for their passport to ensure the worker’s return to their employer after their travel.

There were Baloch, West Africans, and Rohingya Muslims from Burma; however, only a portion of these communities was stateless. For example, many Rohingya had expired passports their home government refused to renew. The UNHCR estimated there were between 250,000 to 500,000 Rohingya in the kingdom; some of these individuals benefited from a program to correct their residency status during the year; the government issued approximately 200,000 four-year residency permits by the end of 2014. Only an estimated 2,000 individuals of Rohingya origin had Saudi citizenship. There also were between 300,000 and 400,000 Palestinian residents not registered as refugees, as well as between 750,000 and one million Syrian nationals in the kingdom, although most of these arrived prior to the 2011 outbreak of the conflict in Syria.

The Basic Law establishes absolute monarchy as the political system. The goal of the House of Saud has been to make every Saudi citizen in some way dependent on the royal family in order to convince the citizenry that their own personal well-being is tied up with the existing political system. Riyadh's continued inability to provide the standard of living expected by Saudi citizens has encouraged opponents of the regime to push for a greater say in the way affairs in the Kingdom are conducted. These calls for greater political participation are exacerbated by the moves of Saudi Arabia's neighbors, particularly Bahrain, to liberalize their political systems and encourage participation from their citizens.

Because the House of Saud is a weak regime, it is highly distrustful of its own citizens. Principal human rights issues include abuse of prisoners and incommunicado detention; prohibitions or severe restrictions on freedom of speech, press, peaceful assembly and association, and religion; denial of the right of citizens to change their government; systematic discrimination against women and ethnic and religious minorities; and suppression of workers' rights.

According to the family monarchy system enshrined in the Basic Law, only a few members of the ruling family have a voice in the choice of leaders, the composition of the government, or changes to the political system. The 2006 succession law created the Allegiance Commission, comprising 34 senior princes appointed by the king and responsible for selecting a king and crown prince upon the death or incapacitation of either. The king serves as prime minister and his crown prince serves as deputy prime minister. The king appoints all other ministers, who appoint subordinate officials with cabinet concurrence. The Consultative Council (Majlis as-Shura), a royally appointed 150-member body, advises the king.

Citizens do not have the right to change their government peacefully. The Basic Law states that the government is established on the principle of consultation (shura) and requires the king and crown prince to hold majlis meetings, open-door events where in theory any male citizen or foreigner may express an opinion or a grievance. A prince or other important national or local official can also hold a majlis. The Basic Law states that all individuals have the right to communicate with public authorities on any issue. The government interpreted this provision as a right to be exercised within traditional nonpublic means, not by the use of mass media.

Political parties are illegal. The Green Party continues to operate illegally. There was no media coverage of the party's activities. The Basic Law does not provide for freedom of association, and the government strictly limited this right in practice. The government prohibited the establishment of political parties or any group it considered as opposing or challenging the regime. All associations must be licensed by the MOI and comply with its regulations. Groups that hoped to change some element of the social or political order reported that their licensing requests went unanswered. The MOI reportedly used arbitrary means, such as requiring unreasonable types and quantities of information, to effectively deny associations licenses.

There are no laws that prevent minorities from participating in political life on the same basis as other citizens, but the dominant societal norms marginalize the Shia population. The Consultative Council included only five Shia members. There were no religious minorities in the cabinet. There were some Shia judges.

Criticism is strictly forbidden: in 2014, prominent opposition activist Abd al-Kareem al-Khoder joined hundreds of the country’s political prisoners, when he was sentenced to eight years for demanding the changeover to a constitutional monarchy. Just days before King Abdullah’s death, blogger Raif Badawi was given the first 50 of his 1,000 lashes – for calling for free speech on his blog.

The courts continue to use corporal punishment as a judicial penalty, almost always in the form of floggings, a practice government officials defended as dictated by sharia. According to local human rights activists, police conducted the floggings according to a set of guidelines determined by local interpretation of sharia. The police official administering the punishment must place a book under his arm that prevents raising the hand above the head, limiting the ability to inflict pain on the person subjected to the punishment, and instructions forbid police from breaking the skin or causing scarring when administering the lashes. Courts sentenced several individuals convicted of theft to be punished by amputation, and there was one confirmed case of judicially administered amputation during 2014.

The law does not provide for freedom of association, and the government strictly limited this right. The government prohibited the establishment of political parties or any group it considered as opposing or challenging the regime. All associations must be licensed by the Ministry of Labor and Social Development and comply with its regulations. Some groups that advocated changing elements of the social or political order reported their licensing requests went unanswered for years, despite repeated inquiries.

The law requires a government permit for an organized public assembly of any type. The government categorically forbids participation in political protests or unauthorized public assemblies, and security forces reportedly arrested demonstrators and detained them for brief periods. Security forces, nonetheless, allowed a small number of unauthorized demonstrations throughout the country, despite a 2011 Ministry of Interior statement that demonstrations were banned and that it would take “all necessary measures" against those seeking to “disrupt order."

There are severe restrictions on foreign travel, including for women and members of minority groups. No one may leave the country without an exit visa and a passport. Women, minors (men younger than 21), and other dependents or foreign citizen workers under sponsorship require a male guardian’s consent to travel abroad. According to Ministry of Interior regulations, a male guardian must apply for and collect a passport for women and minors.

Saudi Arabia has frequently used arbitrary travel bans and detentions of Saudis over the years. In many cases the Saudi interior ministry did not inform citizens that they were on a travel ban list or the reasons for the restrictions. Some learned when they attempted to travel abroad. The government reportedly confiscated passports on occasion for political reasons and revoked the rights of some citizens to travel, often without providing them notification or opportunity to contest the restriction. Most travel bans reportedly involved individuals in court cases relating to financial and real estate disputes. During the year 2016 the government banned several individuals engaged in human rights activism or political activities from foreign travel, in addition to hundreds of other travel bans promulgated by the courts.

The number of political prisoners, including detainees who reportedly remained in prolonged detention without charge, could not be reliably ascertained. In many cases it was impossible to determine the legal basis for incarceration and whether the detention complied with international norms and standards. Those who remained imprisoned after trial, including persons who were political activists openly critical of the government, were often convicted of terrorism-related crimes, and there was not sufficient public information about the alleged crimes to judge whether they had a credible claim to being political prisoners.

King Abdallah, who died in 2015, started the reform movement by allowing Saudi women to run for the country’s consultative “Shoura" council and to enter the work force, becoming lawyers, bankers and salespeople. Some recent moves to change the status of women have angered parts of the kingdom’s mostly conservative population. Traditionalists, were not used to such quick change and many were afraid, because things are moving too fast for them.

In clashes with conservative clerics back in the 1960s, after King Faisal opened a school for girls in Riyadh, and when the king opened the first TV station in Riyadh in 1965, the government prevailed. Whenever the state clashes with the (conservative) clerical establishment, the state emerges victorious.

On 05 November 2017 numerous Saudi royals and top government officials were arrested as part of an apparent anti-corruption campaign, quickly nicknamed the "Game of Tobes". The moves consolidated Prince Mohammed's control of the Kingdom's internal security and military institutions, which had long been headed by separate, powerful branches of the ruling family. The arrests were conducted mere hours after Saudi ruler King Salman announced the creation of a powerful new anticorruption committee led by his son and heir, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. Well-known billionaire investor Prince Alwaleed bin Talal was among those who have been detained in connection with newly-opened corruption probes.

According to Washington Post, this move was carried out during "a time of unprecedented political, social and economic upheaval in Saudi Arabia" as the kingdom seeks to reform its economy and decrease its dependence on oil exports. This development led some analysts to speculate that it was part of the crown prince’s plan to secure his power base.

"Knowledgeable observers of Saudi internal politics point to the many arrests of prominent clerics and intellectuals this summer as a sign of tensions inside the kingdom… The latest round of arrests only reinforces the sense that the succession debate is more difficult than the king and his son want," Bruce Riedel, director of the Intelligence Project at the Brookings Institution, wrote for Al-Monitor.

The targeting of Saudi Arabia's long-standing elite represents a shift from family rule to a more authoritarian style of governance based around one man, according to Durham University academic Christopher Davidson. "Going after such 'big fish' is intended by MBS and his allies in Abu Dhabi as a signal of MBS' newly-established sultanistic powers," he said, using the widely-used acronym for Mohammed bin Salman and referring to his close ties to the leaders of the United Arab Emirates. "By going after the richest, whether fellow princes or media moguls and construction magnates, MBS is demonstrating that nobody is outside his control, as he is now at the top of a more authoritarian, 'one-man regime', with the old consensus-based, dynastic monarchy of the past century having effectively collapsed at some point earlier this year."

Former CIA officer Bob Baer credited the Saudi royal family's consensus-based approach to rule for preventing a war with Iran up until now, warning Mohammed bin Salman's purge made the country's future stability less certain. "The Al Saud [ruling family of Saudi Arabia] have survived all these years, thanks to a remarkable and unbreakable consensus among their ranks and has avoided war with Iran," said Baer.

Others however considered this development a sign of actual reforms and a message to the country’s elite. "Cynics are calling this a power play but it's actually a message to the people that an era of elite indulgence is coming to an end," Ali Shihabi, executive director of the Arabia Foundation think tank cited by WaPo, said, adding that this move “will have a wide resonance with the masses since elite indulgence has been a sore issue for decades."

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Defense Expenditures
Military expeditures have grown to 12.6% of GDP (2015 planned) from a level of 7.98% of GDP in 2012. At oil prices around $30-35 p/b this year, Saudi Arabia will lose another $55 billion in 2016 addition to $110 billion loss in 2015. Without expenditure cuts, it would exhaust its reserves by the end of the decade. The IMF reported that Saudi cash reserves are in freefall, due in large part to the fall in oil prices". Saudi Arabia has lost about half of its 2015 fiscal revenues following the price drop from USD 96 in 2014 to USD 53 in 2015, equivalent to USD 110 billion or about 15 percent of GDP. With spending at a high level, a deficit of USD 140 billion is projected in 2015. Since Saudi Arabia generates 90 percent of its income from oil, the slump in global energy prices represents a potential crisis for the regime, both economic and political.

Approximately 35 percent of Saudi government expenditures are set aside for defense and homeland security (Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, National Guard and Royal Guard). Industry experts estimate that Saudi defense and security expenditures exceeded $80 billion in 2015. Saudi Arabia has surpassed India to become the world’s largest importer of defense equipment. The increasing involvement of the Saudi military in regional conflicts is reinforcing demand for defense imports while at the same time shifting priorities to acquiring new equipment to counter unconventional, asymmetric threats from sub-state actors and militias.
Saudi military spending increased to meet the Iranian threat, but it is difficult to say by what amount. According to a 2013 report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Saudi Arabia’s military spending increased to $67 billion, making the kingdom the world’s fourth largest military spender after the US, China and Russia.

For the year 2011 SIPRI estimated the Saudis were devoting 10.1% of their GDP to military and security spending, which would yield a PPP budget of $69.4 Billion. This would place Saudi Arabia fifth place, behind only the US, China, Russia and India. The Kingdom's total military spending in 2011 was $46.2 billion, by SIPRI's estimate. US arms sales to Saudi Arabia in 2011 included purchase of 84 advanced F-15 fighters, upgrades of 70 of the F-15 fighters in the current fleet, a variety of ammunition, missiles and logistics support, dozens of Apache and Black Hawk helicopters, all contributing to a total Saudi weapons deal from the United States of $33.4 billion. The CIA estimated purchasing power parity GDP at $687.7 billion in 2011, but the most recent military expenditure estimate from CIA was from 2005, at which time it was estmated at 10% of GDP by CIA, but only 8% by SIPRI.
During the 1980s, Saudi Arabia's outlays on national security were among the highest in the world in spite of its relatively small population. In 1989 its expenditures of US$14.7 billion ranked eleventh among countries of the world. Nonetheless, this level of spending reflected a declining trend from a peak of US$24.8 billion reached in 1983. Budgeted defense expenditures maintained this gradual decline between 1988 and 1990. Actual defense expenditures rose dramatically in 1990, however, to almost US$31.9 billion to meet the costs of additional arms and the contributions to United States and British military expenditures necessitated by the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait. The defense budget of US$26.8 billion in 1991 included more than US$13.7 billion in contributions to the United States, French, and British war efforts, but did not include projected heavy additional arms purchases. Saudi Arabia also contributed to the costs of other non-Western members of the coalition forces acing Iraq.

In early 1991, Saudi officials estimated that during the first five months of the gulf crisis the country had earned roughly US$15 billion in windfall oil profits arising from increased production and higher market prices, while assuming an additional US$30 billion in commitments related to the crisis. The latter figure included US$13.6 billion in new arms and equipment, US$2.7 billion in extra mobilization and deployment costs and civil defense, with the remainder consisting of grants and loans to other governments to offset the economic effects of the crisis.

During 1983, when defense spending reached a peak, military expenditures per capita were at an annual level of nearly US$2,500. This amount was more than twice the per capita defense spending in the United States, and was not approached by any other country except Israel, Iraq, and the other oil-exporting states of the Persian Gulf. As a consequence of the reduced rate of defense spending after 1983, military expenditures per capita had declined to US$897 by 1989.

The share of gross national product (GNP) originally earmarked for defense in 1990 was 16.9 percent, materially below the peak of 22 percent reached in 1983 but still about twice as high as the Middle East as a whole. Defense outlays constituted 35.5 percent of central government expenditures in 1989, which was also higher than the Middle East average of 32 percent.

The declining rate of defense spending between 1984 and 1990 resulted largely from reductions in oil revenues that produced a negative growth rate for the entire economy. A secondary factor may have been the completion of several large-scale infrastructure projects. Arms imports, which accounted for 16 percent of the defense budget in 1983, had risen to 25 percent by 1988. The major contracts for weaponry placed with Britain, the United States, and France since 1988, the extraordinary expenses of the Persian Gulf War, and plans for expansion of the armed forces during the 1990s seemed certain to impose pressure on the defense budget for years to come.

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Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)
North Korea has been ruled by one of the most repressive totalitarian regimes on earth. Millions of North Koreans have been starved to death and sent to concentration camps to die in inhumane ways not seen since the days of Hitler or Stalin. The extent of human rights abuses, a list too long to go into great detail, are deliberate and calculated actions utilized by the Kim regime to quell dissent and maintain ultimate control.

Exposure to and desire for other cultures is spreading throughout the poplulace and armed forces. As people begin to see how other cultures live, they find their current situation less appealing and question huge defense expenditures like missile launches. Kim Jung Un is not only aware of the increasing dissatisfaction and desertion within the ranks of the NKPA, but also understands how a weakening of the military threatens his national defense strategy and the stability of his regime. He is quoted as saying “If the military deteriorates and collapses, our fatherland will be blown away like sand."
Kim Jong Un rebuked the military for having many political schools that practice “Hailing Yang, while practicing Yin." This phrase means that they “pretend to obey but secretly betray."Kim Jong Un ordered the eradication of “aberrant lifestyles," in which people view and listen to “impure materials," but according to a North Korean source, interest in and desire for different cultures is spreading in the country.
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea or DPRK) is a Communist state with an underdeveloped economy, but a powerful military, situated on the Korean peninsula between northeast China and the Republic of Korea (South Korea). North Korea limits trade and transportation links with other countries and tightly restricts the circumstances under which foreigners may enter the country and interact with local citizens. Telephone and fax communications are unavailable in many areas of the country, and foreigners can expect their communications to be monitored by DPRK officials. In recent years, North Korea has experienced intermittent famine, chronic fuel and electricity shortages, and outbreaks of disease. Many countries, including the United States, have contributed to international relief efforts to assist the people of North Korea.
The DPRK adopted Marxism-Leninism as its ruling philosophy when it proclaimed its establishment in 1948, but in a Constitutional revision in 1972, supplemented it with the juche ideology, or national self-reliance. The two philosophies were combined into one as "the juche idea of the Worker's Party of Korea, a creative application of Marxism-Leninism to the conditions of our country". In 1980, the official ideology was simplified as "the juche thought of the Great Leader, Kim Il-Sung". According to the DPRK Constitution, juche is "a revolutionary ideology with a people-centred view of the world that aims to realise the independence of the masses, the guiding principle of its actions". Juche consists of two parts: the philosophical theory that claims the masses are the masters of history and the revolution, and the principle that the masses need the guidance of a leader (Kim Il-Sung and his son, Kim Jong-Il) to fulfil their destiny.

In practice, juche resulted in an inward looking economic and political system that ostensibly rejected international trade, but in reality became heavily dependent on the provision of goods on favourable terms from fraternal socialist states. With the demise of the communist bloc, the difficulties of this position soon became apparent. Shortages in spare parts, fuel, and food have grown but the isolationist ideology of juche continues to underlie all government policies and emphasis remains in advancing an independent road to national development. The population is motivated to pursue juche through an intensive ideological campaign and a pervasive programme of political indoctrination. Since its inception, juche has primarily stressed independence from external powers, but the regime now faces the dilemma of how to expand trade and investment with the outside world in order to resuscitate the economy, without jeopardising its political stability.

The "Military First" orientation has always been the heart and soul of the North Korean regime. It provides the only conceivable means by which the regime can survive and achieve its ultimate security through reunification. The military continues to grow in both conventional and asymmetrical forces with increasing emphasis on the latter. The military provides deterrence, defense, and a massive offensive threat, as well as leverage in international negotiations. The army is much more than just a military organization; it is North Korea's largest employer, purchaser, and consumer, the central unifying structure in the country, and the source of power for the regime.

In August 1945, the Japanese in Korea surrendered to the former Soviet Union, which gained control of the Korean peninsula south to the 38th parallel. In August 1948, supposedly following general elections throughout the peninsula, the DPRK was established, with Kim Il-song heading the central government. These factitious elections are the basis for Pyongyang's claim as the only legitimate government of Korea, and Pyongyang has made a national goal of reunifying the country on its terms. In pressing this claim, the DPRK has engaged in a political, economic, and military competition with the Republic of Korea (ROK). However, in any comparison except military power, Pyongyang is a poor second.

On Saturday, 24 June 1950, DPRK forces invaded the ROK. The United States, acting with a mandate from the UN, took the lead in defending the ROK. The Chinese entered into the fighting, and the war's inconclusive end led to a return to the status quo at the 38th parallel. An armistice, signed in July 1953, was followed 2 months later by the signing of a mutual defense treaty between the United States and the ROK.

The country is facing insurmountable internal problems and is unstable politically, economically, and socially. The Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) continues to commit serious human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests and detention, forced labor, and torture. Many of these abuses are committed in the country’s political prison camps (kwanliso), which hold an estimated 80,000 -120,000 prisoners, including children and family members of the accused. The government also maintains an extensive system of forced labor through its rigid controls over workers, and restricts the exercise of freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly, association, religion or belief, and movement.

There are no independent media in the country; all media are strictly censored and no deviation from the official government line is tolerated. The government allows no editorial freedom; all stories are centrally directed and reviewed to ensure that they are in line with the state ideology. The government also controls academic and cultural content. Authorities prohibit listening to foreign media broadcasts and take steps to jam foreign radio broadcasts. Various ministries are responsible for modifying television and radio equipment to prevent users from accessing material from overseas and other material deemed illegal by the government. Individuals accused of viewing foreign films are reportedly subject to imprisonment or even execution.

Various political setbacks have further isolated the DPRK and include the 1990 formal recognition of the ROK by the former Soviet Union, and the 1991 entrance of both Koreas to the UN. The DPRK lost one of its major supporters with the demise of the Soviet Union. Moreover, although the People's Republic of China (PRC) remains the only credible supporter of the DPRK, economic and political rapprochement between the PRC and the ROK continues. The DPRK will continue to be both economically and socially repressed and will become increasingly isolated. The DPRK will likely cling to its outmoded style of communism and political change will not occur until the current leaders are gone.

On June 19, 2000, the US eased economic sanctions against North Korea. Imports from North Korea are allowed, subject to an approval process. Direct personal and commercial financial transactions are allowed between US and North Korean citizens. Restrictions on investment have also eased. Commercial US ships and aircraft carrying US goods are allowed to call at North Korean ports with prior clearance. Although modified periodically since 1995 as a result of commitments made to begin normalization of relations, US economic and financial sanctions against North Korea -- administered by the US treasury department -- remain in force. They affect all US citizens and permanent residents wherever they are located, all people and organizations physically in the united states, and all branches, subsidiaries and controlled affiliates of US organizations throughout the world.

Negative economic growth, chronic shortages of raw materials (especially oil), ineffective centralized economic planning, and an emphasis on military power contributed to the economic failure of North Korea. The requirement by Russia and the PRC that materials exported to the DPRK be paid for with cash further degraded North Korea's economic viability. The DPRK can no longer generate sufficient electrical power to meet industrial needs, social services have been severely degraded, and segments of society have been reduced to one meal a day. There are chronic shortages of many of the basic commodities required for subsistence and industrial production. Critical resources continue to be dedicated to the military with increasing detriment to the economy.

There will be no relief from the severe shortages, which could foster growing dissatisfaction among the intelligentsia, workers, students, and bureaucrats. The DPRK's management of its economy provides no freedom of action for producers, real incentives for individuals to excel, or a government responsive to scientific and technological progress. If the DPRK keeps its emphasis on its military and does not reform its eco-nomic system, the country could eventually be in grave danger of imploding. The DPRK is, and will likely remain, one of the most dangerous countries in the world.


With its external reputation for worst-case socialism, in the 1990s most observers thought North Korea would go the way of the Stalinist states of Eastern Europe and collapse. Some thought East Germany would be the model, with North Korea folding up and embracing a new unity with the South. Others suggested the example of Romania, where Nikolae Ceausescu had modeled his dictatorial rule on Kim Il Sung’s. The “revolution of 1989" was so unexpected as to breed humility into all observers of socialist states, but, so far, North Korea has not followed the East German path.

It was Mikhail Gorbachev who reined in the military there; amid the widespread demonstrations against Erich Honnecker’s regime, Gorbachev kept the 360,000 Soviet Army troops in their barracks. North Korea, however, has an independently controlled army estimated at 1.2 million strong, and most of the pressure the Soviets could exert had been applied (overall Soviet aid to P’yongyang declined precipitously after Gorbachev took power, although military aid continued). In the early twenty-first century, the North reportedly has trafficked in illegal narcotics and counterfeit currency.

Korea’s main difference from Eastern Europe was that it suffered a terrible civil war, with some 4.5 million killed, in recent memory. The North probably suffered nearly 2 million casualties. There also were 1 million Chinese casualties. It was very hard to believe that military commanders who fought the South in a bloody civil war would allow South Korea to overwhelm North Korea, by whatever means. If North Korea’s socialist system collapses under intense international pressure, probably the apparatchiks will declare themselves to have been nationalists all along (with some measure of truth) and try to keep their hold on power.

In April 2016 the Government called on the citizens to prepare for a new "arduous march." The term was first coined by the North Korean leadership in 1993 as a metaphor for the four-year famine that decimated the nation from 1994. The famine - in which as many as 3.5 million of the nation's 22 million people died - was brought on by economic mismanagement, natural disasters, the collapse of the Soviet bloc, and the consequent loss of aid, combined with the regime's insistence on putting the military first.

Acute respiratory disease common cold, flu and bronchitis may be more dominant during winter seasons. (December ~ February) No human case of SARs and Avian Influenza has been reported so far in DPRK. Diarrheal Disease is also common during summer months. The main casuses being poor water quality, lack of sanitary facilities and poor food storage. However, Pyongyang city and the hotel facilities strictly observe the sanitation standards, causing no harms to the foreigners. Only boiled water should be used for drinking, bottled water is also available in most cities.

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DPRK Government
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) is an authoritarian state led by the Kim family for more than 60 years. North Korea is a communist state under the one-man leadership of Kim Jong Un, chairman of the National Defense Commission—the nation’s “highest administrative authority," supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army (KPA), and general secretary of the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP). The constitution was adopted in 1948, completely revised in December 1972, and revised again in April 1992 and September 1998.
The position of president ceased to exist with the elder Kim’s death in 1994. The premier is head of government (since April 2007) and is assisted by three vice premiers and a cabinet of 27 ministers, all of whom are appointed by the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA). A twenty-eighth minister, the minister of the People’s Armed Forces, is not subordinate to the cabinet but answers directly to Kim Jong Un.
The Three Revolution Teams These teams, created to pursue the ‘Three Revolutions Movement’ stated by the 1972 Socialist Constitution, were dispatched to production facilities at all levels. The teams consisted of 20~50 party members, university students, and scientists. From the 1980s on, the teams came under the direct supervision of Kim Jong-il and were dispatched to all institutional schools to lead the ‘Three Revolutions Movement’. Considering the fact that the dominant post-war generational members from the teams were appointed en masse as SPA members in the 6th KWP meeting in October 1980, it seems the teams were actually created for the purpose of supporting Kim Jong-il’s succession to power. The Three Revolution Teams have shown little activity following the 1990s.

The Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) of North Korea unanimously adopted the ordinance of the SPA On Revising and Supplementing the Socialist Constitution of the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea" on April 9, 2009. When last revised in September 1998, the Constitution contained three references to “communism," but the new revision has deleted the word. The new revision includes six clauses stating the role and authority of the Chairman of the National Defense Commission as “supreme leader" of the country. Kim Jong Il was re-elected as the Chairman of the National Defense Commission, “reflecting the unanimous will of the whole Party and army and all the people," on the same day the new constitution was approved.
In July 2012 Kim Jong Un was named marshal of the DPRK and supreme commander of the Korean People’s Army. Kim Jong Un’s grandfather, the late Kim Il Sung, remains “eternal president." Authorities maintained effective control over the security forces. Security forces committed human rights abuses.

Citizens did not have the right to change their government. The Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) is the ruling party of North Korea. The secretary general of the KWP is Kim Jong Un, and he runs the party with few formal meetings. North Korea wrapped up its seventh Workers’ Party of Korea Congress with a massive parade and a mass rally, on 10 May 2016 at the Kim Il-sung Square in Pyongyang. Thousands of North Koreans cheered and applauded when their leader Kim Jong-un appeared at a podium at the square.

The government subjected citizens to rigid controls over many aspects of their lives, including denial of the freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association, religion, movement, and worker rights. Reports continued of a vast network of political prison camps in which conditions were often harsh and life threatening and included forced and compulsory labor.

Despite the consolidation of party, state, and military structures under the leadership of one man, some analysts see these three power centers as rivals for power, with the military in the ascendant.

Kim Jong Il was first appointed to the National Defense Commission by his father, President Kim Il Sung, in April 1993, and he was reelected to this position in 1998 and 2003. In true dynastic fashion, Kim Jong Il groomed one or the other of his sons — Kim Jong Chul and Kim Jong Un — as his successor. Signs of possible change in the leadership structure and succession scenario — or at least a reduction in Kim’s personality cult — emerged in the summer and fall of 2004, when reports were received that portraits of Kim Jong Il were being removed from public sites, but nothing came of this.

Traditionally, Koreans never conceived of society as merely an aggregate of individuals, each pursuing private ends, but as a harmonious and collective whole; more important than the individuals composing it. This emphasis on harmony has justified the DPRK government's paternalistic intervention in the lives of the people. In the DPRK today, the dominant ideology is Marxist-Leninist, strongly influenced by traditional Confucian values and Kim Il-song's chuche (self-reliance) ideology.

By Western standards, life in the DPRK is regimented and grim. The centralized party state maintains tight control over all aspects of daily life, and citizens must dedicate their lives to state-defined goals rather than personal interests. Proper attitudes and correct human relations are stressed. It would be a mistake to assume that North Koreans see their lives as harsh and colorless, since the majority have spent their entire life under a totalitarian regime.

While the total number of political prisoners and detainees remained unknown, the current year’s KINU white paper reported that the state detained between 80,000 and 120,000 in the kwanliso. Guards held political prisoners separately from other detainees. NGOs and the media reported that political prisoners were subject to harsher punishments and fewer protections than other prisoners and detainees. The government considered critics of the regime to be political criminals.

"Systematic, widespread and gross human rights violations have been, and are being, committed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, its institutions and officials. In many instances, the violations of human rights found by the Commission constitute crimes against humanity. These are not mere excesses of the state. They are essential components of a political system that has moved far from the ideals on which it claims to be founded. The gravity, scale and nature of these violations reveal a state that does not have any parallel in the contemporary world."

------
Revolutionary View of the Leader
While Confucian principles have remained enmeshed in Korean culture, in the North they were in many ways instrumentalized by Kim Il-sung in the effort to consolidate his authority and that of the Workers’ Party of Korea under his control. The relationship between sovereign and subject that is enunciated as a mutually binding one under traditional Confucian precepts has been stretched to one of absolute obedience to the leader as articulated in the suryong, or Supreme Leader, system established by Kim Il-sung and carried on under Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un.

The “Mandate of Heaven”, a Confucian principle, is the right to rule granted to ancient Korean rulers by the gods. This mandate conveyed obligations on rulers to rule justly and fairly and for the benefit of all the people.

In 1949, Kim Il-sung secured his designation as Suryong, Supreme Leader. In order to eliminate any opposition to his rule, he established a system of governance built on an elaborate guiding ideology, a single mass party led by a single person, a centrally-planned economy, a monopoly on the means of communication, and a system of security that employed violence and a political police.

The Suryong system positioned Kim Il-sung (and his heir apparent) as unchallenged rulers due to their proclaimed wisdom and benevolence under which the general population would live in a prosperous and righteous society. In this way, the suryong system has facilitated the unchecked violation of human rights in the DPRK.

Kim Jong Il and Kim Il Sung are revered for their embodiment of national virtues, including "sobak ham," a Korean term that might be translated as "spontaneity" [The Obsessions of Kim Jong Il By B. R. MYERS, The New York Times, May 19, 2003]. Such spontaneity, especially a tendency to violence, is seen as one of the North's strengths. North Korean propaganda frequently depicts the hero in a fit of wild, sometimes suicidal, rage against the enemy. North Koreans tolerate high levels of violence in daily life.

The first phrase North Korean parents are instructed to teach to their children is "Thank you, Father Kim Il Sung". From birth to death, North Korean citizens are surrounded by the all-encompassing presence of the "Great Leader" and his son, the "Dear Leader" Kim Jong Il. The Kim dynasty is far more than an authoritarian government; it is presented as the ultimate source of power, virtue, spiritual wisdom, and truth for the North Korean people. Heterodoxy and dissent are repressed, quickly and efficiently, with punishments meted out to successive generations of the dissident's family.

Juche ideology consists of the philosophical theory, which maintains that the masses are the masters of history and revolution, and the guiding principle, or the "Revolutionary View of the Leader", which asserts that "nonetheless the masses are not able to take up spontaneously any revolutionary course unless they are organized into revolutionary forces and are led by the Suryong (the Leader)."

North Korea's goal of tight unity at home produced a remarkable organicism, unprecedented in any existing communist regime. Kim Il Sung was not just the "iron-willed, ever-victorious commander," the "respected and beloved Great Leader"; he also is the "head and heart" of the body politic (even "the supreme brain of the nation"!). The flavor of this politics can be demonstrated through quotations taken from KWP newspapers in the spring of 1981: "Kim Il Sung ... is the great father of our people....Long is the history of the word father being used as a word representing love and reverence ... expressing the unbreak-able blood ties between the people and the leader. Father. This familiar word represents our people's single heart of boundless respect and loyalty.... The love shown by the Great Leader for our people is the love of kinship. Our respected and beloved Leader is the tender-hearted father of all the people.... Love of paternity ... is the noblest ideological sentiment possessed only by our people. His heart is a traction power attracting the hearts of all people and a centripetal force uniting them as one.... Kim Il Sung is the great sun and great man ... thanks to this great heart, national independence is firmly guaranteed."

This type of language was especially strong when the succession of Kim Jong Il was publicly announced at the Sixth Party Congress in 1980. The KWP often is referred to as the "Mother" party, the mass line is said to provide "blood ties," the leader always is "fatherly," and the country is one big "family." Kim Il Sung is said to be paternal, devoted, and benevolent, and the people presumably respond with loyalty, obedience, and mutual love.

In the 1980s Kim Jong-il developed the concept of the "Revolutionary View of the Leader" into a more theoretical and systemized form by presenting the "Theory of the Immortal Socio-Political Body." It says that the Suryong, the Party, and the masses are integrated into an immortal socio-political body, the brain (center) of which is the Suryong, and that physical life, which is mortal, is given by the parents, but political life, which is immortal, is given by this socio-political body, and therefore, the masses are only required to obey unconditionally the brain of the body, which is the Suryong

"To expect victory in a revolution without a leader is as good as wishing for a flower where there is no sun" is a saying of leader Kim Jong Il that tells the central North Korean official belief that the victory of a revolution depends entirely on the correct leadership of an outstanding leader. In this view, it is simply a law of the nature that everything on the earth is alive and blossoms under the sun. Without the sun, any blossom can neither grow up nor bloom, and much the same is the fate of a revolution. The DPRK's ideology is that only under the wise leadership of a prominent leader, the broad sections of the people can awaken and organize themselves into a political force, take part in the revolutionary struggle and win victory. The North Korean regime preceeds from the premise that their revolution has proved the truth that the revolutionary cause of the working class can be pioneered and promoted victoriously only under the leadership of prominent leaders.

The term Wiedeahan Suryong ["Great Leader"] was introduced in the late 1940s and initially it was applied only to Stalin and Lenin, the two "great leaders" of communism. In 1952 Kim Il-sung was promoted to the rank of Wiedeahan Suryong as well. In the 1970s, as Kim Jong-il began to consolidate power, he was enigmatically called the "Party Center" - but eventually he acquired a title of his own: "chinaehanun chidoja" or "Dear Leader." After his father's death Kim Jong-il changed the first part of his official appellation, becoming "great" instead of "dear" -- but the second part remains the same: Kim Jong-il is "chidoja" or "ryongdoja" but never "suryong." The deceased Kim Il Sung, formerly Great Leader (widaehan, "great", yongdoja, "leader"), is now remembered in North Korea as widaehan suryong, "major chieftain, big boss."

The KWP has a special regulation protecting the images of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. All citizens are required by this regulation to protect from damage any likeness of the two Kim's. Beginning in the 1970's, the "10 Great Principles of Unique Ideology" directed that anyone who tore or otherwise defaced a newspaper photo of either of the two Kim's was a political criminal and punished as such. Defectors have reported families being punished because children had accidentally defaced photographs of one of the two Kim's. Families must display pictures of the two Kim's in their homes, and if local party officials found the family had neglected its photos, the punishment was to write self-criticism throughout an entire year.

Rodong Sinmun, in a signed article 31 August 1997, said that "The Korean people regard it as their most worthwhile life to uphold Secretary Kim Jong Il and live and work in perfect harmony with him... The Korean people absolutely worship, trust and follow the General as god. These noble ideological feelings are ascribable to the fact that they have keenly felt the greatness of the General from the bottom of their hearts. He is the great teacher who teaches them what the true life is, a father who provides them with the noblest political integrity and a tender-hearted benefactor who brings their worthwhile life into full bloom."

A commentary in Rodong Shinmun [Pyongyang], 4 December 2000 noted that "The Suryong (Leader), who leads the revolution in this era, should be a soldier-type leader. The Ryongdoja (Leader), to whom we entrust ourselves and the fate of our revolution and our nation, should be a great ideologist and concurrently an army soldier, and an outstanding politician and concurrently an army soldier..."

Chuch'e is the core of North Korean national solipsism. National solipsism expresses an omnipotent theme found in North Korean written materials: an assumption that Korea is the center of the world, radiating outward the rays of chuch'e, especially to Third World countries that are thought by the North Koreans to be ready for chuch'e. The world tends toward Korea, with all eyes on the Leader.

As Kim Jong Il himself noted, "Throughout the whole world I'm the object of criticism. But I think about it this way: if I'm talked about I'm going about things the right way." [in "Orient Express" by Konstantin Pulikovsky]

The presence of such an attitude is perhaps the most bizarre aspect of North Korea, but also one of the most noticeable. The model of ever-widening concentric circles -- at the center of which was Kim Il Sung, next his family, next the guerrillas who fought with him, and then the KWP elite -- is profoundly Korean and has characterized North Korea since 1946. This core circle controls everything at the top levels of the regime. The core moves outward and downward concentrically to encompass other elements of the population and provides the glue holding the system together. As the penumbra of workers and peasants is reached, trust gives way to control on a bureaucratic basis and to a mixture of normative and remunerative incentives.

Family background, in terms of political and ideological criteria, is extremely relevant to one's social status and standard of living. Sons and daughters of revolutionaries and those who died in the Korean War are favored for educational opportunities and advancement. For these children, a special elite school, the Mangyngdae Revolutionary Institute, was established near P'yongyang at the birthsite of Kim Il Sung. South Korean scholar Lee Mun Woong wrote that illegitimate children are also favored because they are raised entirely in state-run nurseries and schools and are not subject to the corruption of traditionally minded parents.

Conversely, the children and descendants of "exploiting class" parents--those who collaborated with the Japanese during the colonial era, opposed agricultural collectivization in the 1950s, or were associated with those who had fled to South Korea- -are discriminated against. They are considered "contaminated" by the bad influences of their parents and have to work harder to acquire reputable positions. Relatives of those who had fled to South Korea are especially looked down on and considered "bad elements." Persons with unfavorable political backgrounds are often denied admission to institutions of higher education, despite their intellectual qualifications.

The family remains the model for societal organization. An outer circle distinguishes the Korean from the foreign, a reflection of the extraordinary ethnic and linguistic unity of Koreans and Korea's history of exclusionism. Yet the circle keeps on expanding, as if to encompass foreigners under the mantle of Kim and his chuch'e idea.

P'yongyang has devoted considerable resources to organizing chuch'e study societies around the world and bringing foreign visitors to North Korea for national celebrations--for example, 4,000 persons were invited to attend Kim Il Sung's eightieth birthday celebrations.

The base of the Tower of the Juche Idea on the bank of the Taedong River includes a display of choice stones sent by prominent personages and adherents to the Juche idea of different countries. These stones were sent from different countries "in praise of President Kim Il Sung and leader Kim Jong Il who creditably succeeds to the revolutionary cause of Juche. The wall is adorned with 252 choice stones sent by 80-odd countries and international organizations. People of south Korea donated many stones including those inscribed with the letters "Juche idea guides the era of independence," "Rays brightening the world" and "Long live Comrade Kim Jong Il, great sun of guidance." A choice stone was also sent from China on the occasion of the 80th birthday of President Kim Il Sung and the 50th birthday of leader Kim Jong Il, which is inscribed with 80 Kimilsungia flowers and 50 Kimjongilia flowers and the letters "Long live the great Juche idea!" The stones from across the world reflect the world people's reverence for President Kim Il Sung."

Inter-Korean relations have not fullfilled the apparent promise of the June 2000 summit. Kim Jong Il has not made his reciprocal visit to South Korea promised at the time of the summit, which caused no small embarrassment and opposition criticism for Kim Dae Jung. But, given the assumption that North Korea is the center of the world, and that Kim Jong-Il is the center of North Korea, it made perfect sense for Kim Dae Jung to come to Pyongyang to meet Kim Jong-Il, and it would make no sense for Kim Jong-Il to go to South Korea.


Revolutionary View of the Leader
While Confucian principles have remained enmeshed in Korean culture, in the North they were in many ways instrumentalized by Kim Il-sung in the effort to consolidate his authority and that of the Workers’ Party of Korea under his control. The relationship between sovereign and subject that is enunciated as a mutually binding one under traditional Confucian precepts has been stretched to one of absolute obedience to the leader as articulated in the suryong, or Supreme Leader, system established by Kim Il-sung and carried on under Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un.

The “Mandate of Heaven”, a Confucian principle, is the right to rule granted to ancient Korean rulers by the gods. This mandate conveyed obligations on rulers to rule justly and fairly and for the benefit of all the people.

In 1949, Kim Il-sung secured his designation as Suryong, Supreme Leader. In order to eliminate any opposition to his rule, he established a system of governance built on an elaborate guiding ideology, a single mass party led by a single person, a centrally-planned economy, a monopoly on the means of communication, and a system of security that employed violence and a political police.

The Suryong system positioned Kim Il-sung (and his heir apparent) as unchallenged rulers due to their proclaimed wisdom and benevolence under which the general population would live in a prosperous and righteous society. In this way, the suryong system has facilitated the unchecked violation of human rights in the DPRK.

Kim Jong Il and Kim Il Sung are revered for their embodiment of national virtues, including "sobak ham," a Korean term that might be translated as "spontaneity" [The Obsessions of Kim Jong Il By B. R. MYERS, The New York Times, May 19, 2003]. Such spontaneity, especially a tendency to violence, is seen as one of the North's strengths. North Korean propaganda frequently depicts the hero in a fit of wild, sometimes suicidal, rage against the enemy. North Koreans tolerate high levels of violence in daily life.

The first phrase North Korean parents are instructed to teach to their children is "Thank you, Father Kim Il Sung". From birth to death, North Korean citizens are surrounded by the all-encompassing presence of the "Great Leader" and his son, the "Dear Leader" Kim Jong Il. The Kim dynasty is far more than an authoritarian government; it is presented as the ultimate source of power, virtue, spiritual wisdom, and truth for the North Korean people. Heterodoxy and dissent are repressed, quickly and efficiently, with punishments meted out to successive generations of the dissident's family.

Juche ideology consists of the philosophical theory, which maintains that the masses are the masters of history and revolution, and the guiding principle, or the "Revolutionary View of the Leader", which asserts that "nonetheless the masses are not able to take up spontaneously any revolutionary course unless they are organized into revolutionary forces and are led by the Suryong (the Leader)."

North Korea's goal of tight unity at home produced a remarkable organicism, unprecedented in any existing communist regime. Kim Il Sung was not just the "iron-willed, ever-victorious commander," the "respected and beloved Great Leader"; he also is the "head and heart" of the body politic (even "the supreme brain of the nation"!). The flavor of this politics can be demonstrated through quotations taken from KWP newspapers in the spring of 1981: "Kim Il Sung ... is the great father of our people....Long is the history of the word father being used as a word representing love and reverence ... expressing the unbreak-able blood ties between the people and the leader. Father. This familiar word represents our people's single heart of boundless respect and loyalty.... The love shown by the Great Leader for our people is the love of kinship. Our respected and beloved Leader is the tender-hearted father of all the people.... Love of paternity ... is the noblest ideological sentiment possessed only by our people. His heart is a traction power attracting the hearts of all people and a centripetal force uniting them as one.... Kim Il Sung is the great sun and great man ... thanks to this great heart, national independence is firmly guaranteed."

This type of language was especially strong when the succession of Kim Jong Il was publicly announced at the Sixth Party Congress in 1980. The KWP often is referred to as the "Mother" party, the mass line is said to provide "blood ties," the leader always is "fatherly," and the country is one big "family." Kim Il Sung is said to be paternal, devoted, and benevolent, and the people presumably respond with loyalty, obedience, and mutual love.

In the 1980s Kim Jong-il developed the concept of the "Revolutionary View of the Leader" into a more theoretical and systemized form by presenting the "Theory of the Immortal Socio-Political Body." It says that the Suryong, the Party, and the masses are integrated into an immortal socio-political body, the brain (center) of which is the Suryong, and that physical life, which is mortal, is given by the parents, but political life, which is immortal, is given by this socio-political body, and therefore, the masses are only required to obey unconditionally the brain of the body, which is the Suryong

"To expect victory in a revolution without a leader is as good as wishing for a flower where there is no sun" is a saying of leader Kim Jong Il that tells the central North Korean official belief that the victory of a revolution depends entirely on the correct leadership of an outstanding leader. In this view, it is simply a law of the nature that everything on the earth is alive and blossoms under the sun. Without the sun, any blossom can neither grow up nor bloom, and much the same is the fate of a revolution. The DPRK's ideology is that only under the wise leadership of a prominent leader, the broad sections of the people can awaken and organize themselves into a political force, take part in the revolutionary struggle and win victory. The North Korean regime preceeds from the premise that their revolution has proved the truth that the revolutionary cause of the working class can be pioneered and promoted victoriously only under the leadership of prominent leaders.

The term Wiedeahan Suryong ["Great Leader"] was introduced in the late 1940s and initially it was applied only to Stalin and Lenin, the two "great leaders" of communism. In 1952 Kim Il-sung was promoted to the rank of Wiedeahan Suryong as well. In the 1970s, as Kim Jong-il began to consolidate power, he was enigmatically called the "Party Center" - but eventually he acquired a title of his own: "chinaehanun chidoja" or "Dear Leader." After his father's death Kim Jong-il changed the first part of his official appellation, becoming "great" instead of "dear" -- but the second part remains the same: Kim Jong-il is "chidoja" or "ryongdoja" but never "suryong." The deceased Kim Il Sung, formerly Great Leader (widaehan, "great", yongdoja, "leader"), is now remembered in North Korea as widaehan suryong, "major chieftain, big boss."

The KWP has a special regulation protecting the images of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. All citizens are required by this regulation to protect from damage any likeness of the two Kim's. Beginning in the 1970's, the "10 Great Principles of Unique Ideology" directed that anyone who tore or otherwise defaced a newspaper photo of either of the two Kim's was a political criminal and punished as such. Defectors have reported families being punished because children had accidentally defaced photographs of one of the two Kim's. Families must display pictures of the two Kim's in their homes, and if local party officials found the family had neglected its photos, the punishment was to write self-criticism throughout an entire year.

Rodong Sinmun, in a signed article 31 August 1997, said that "The Korean people regard it as their most worthwhile life to uphold Secretary Kim Jong Il and live and work in perfect harmony with him... The Korean people absolutely worship, trust and follow the General as god. These noble ideological feelings are ascribable to the fact that they have keenly felt the greatness of the General from the bottom of their hearts. He is the great teacher who teaches them what the true life is, a father who provides them with the noblest political integrity and a tender-hearted benefactor who brings their worthwhile life into full bloom."

A commentary in Rodong Shinmun [Pyongyang], 4 December 2000 noted that "The Suryong (Leader), who leads the revolution in this era, should be a soldier-type leader. The Ryongdoja (Leader), to whom we entrust ourselves and the fate of our revolution and our nation, should be a great ideologist and concurrently an army soldier, and an outstanding politician and concurrently an army soldier..."

Chuch'e is the core of North Korean national solipsism. National solipsism expresses an omnipotent theme found in North Korean written materials: an assumption that Korea is the center of the world, radiating outward the rays of chuch'e, especially to Third World countries that are thought by the North Koreans to be ready for chuch'e. The world tends toward Korea, with all eyes on the Leader.

As Kim Jong Il himself noted, "Throughout the whole world I'm the object of criticism. But I think about it this way: if I'm talked about I'm going about things the right way." [in "Orient Express" by Konstantin Pulikovsky]

The presence of such an attitude is perhaps the most bizarre aspect of North Korea, but also one of the most noticeable. The model of ever-widening concentric circles -- at the center of which was Kim Il Sung, next his family, next the guerrillas who fought with him, and then the KWP elite -- is profoundly Korean and has characterized North Korea since 1946. This core circle controls everything at the top levels of the regime. The core moves outward and downward concentrically to encompass other elements of the population and provides the glue holding the system together. As the penumbra of workers and peasants is reached, trust gives way to control on a bureaucratic basis and to a mixture of normative and remunerative incentives.

Family background, in terms of political and ideological criteria, is extremely relevant to one's social status and standard of living. Sons and daughters of revolutionaries and those who died in the Korean War are favored for educational opportunities and advancement. For these children, a special elite school, the Mangyngdae Revolutionary Institute, was established near P'yongyang at the birthsite of Kim Il Sung. South Korean scholar Lee Mun Woong wrote that illegitimate children are also favored because they are raised entirely in state-run nurseries and schools and are not subject to the corruption of traditionally minded parents.

Conversely, the children and descendants of "exploiting class" parents--those who collaborated with the Japanese during the colonial era, opposed agricultural collectivization in the 1950s, or were associated with those who had fled to South Korea- -are discriminated against. They are considered "contaminated" by the bad influences of their parents and have to work harder to acquire reputable positions. Relatives of those who had fled to South Korea are especially looked down on and considered "bad elements." Persons with unfavorable political backgrounds are often denied admission to institutions of higher education, despite their intellectual qualifications.

The family remains the model for societal organization. An outer circle distinguishes the Korean from the foreign, a reflection of the extraordinary ethnic and linguistic unity of Koreans and Korea's history of exclusionism. Yet the circle keeps on expanding, as if to encompass foreigners under the mantle of Kim and his chuch'e idea.

P'yongyang has devoted considerable resources to organizing chuch'e study societies around the world and bringing foreign visitors to North Korea for national celebrations--for example, 4,000 persons were invited to attend Kim Il Sung's eightieth birthday celebrations.

The base of the Tower of the Juche Idea on the bank of the Taedong River includes a display of choice stones sent by prominent personages and adherents to the Juche idea of different countries. These stones were sent from different countries "in praise of President Kim Il Sung and leader Kim Jong Il who creditably succeeds to the revolutionary cause of Juche. The wall is adorned with 252 choice stones sent by 80-odd countries and international organizations. People of south Korea donated many stones including those inscribed with the letters "Juche idea guides the era of independence," "Rays brightening the world" and "Long live Comrade Kim Jong Il, great sun of guidance." A choice stone was also sent from China on the occasion of the 80th birthday of President Kim Il Sung and the 50th birthday of leader Kim Jong Il, which is inscribed with 80 Kimilsungia flowers and 50 Kimjongilia flowers and the letters "Long live the great Juche idea!" The stones from across the world reflect the world people's reverence for President Kim Il Sung."

Inter-Korean relations have not fullfilled the apparent promise of the June 2000 summit. Kim Jong Il has not made his reciprocal visit to South Korea promised at the time of the summit, which caused no small embarrassment and opposition criticism for Kim Dae Jung. But, given the assumption that North Korea is the center of the world, and that Kim Jong-Il is the center of North Korea, it made perfect sense for Kim Dae Jung to come to Pyongyang to meet Kim Jong-Il, and it would make no sense for Kim Jong-Il to go to South Korea.


----

Kim Il Sung formulated what is known as the Monolithic Ideological System, which encompassed the thought of self-reliance in ideological stance, independence in political work, self-sustenance in economic endeavors, and self-defense in military affairs. The idea is also known as Kim Il Sung Thought. In May 1967 the 15th session of the Korean Worker's Party Central Committee Meeting adopted the thesis "Establishing the Party's Monolithic Ideological System." The Fifth Party Congress in 1970 proclaimed the transformation of Juche Ideology into Monolithic Ideology. And the "Ten Principles in Establishing Party's Monolithic Ideological System" aka "Ten Principles for the Establishment of One Ideology" [authored by Kim Jong Il] was announced on 14 April 1974 [ie, the day before Kim Il-Sung's birthday]. Kim Jong Il also authored "Let Us Establish More Firmly the Monolithic Ideological System in the Whole Party and Society".

Kim Jong Il's "The Workers' Party of Korea is the Party of the Great Leader Comrade Kim Il Sung" (October 2, 1995) notes that "The monolithic ideological system of the party is the leader's ideological system and his leadership system. Establishing the monolithic ideological system is the basic way to build theparty as the leader's party. Only when the monolith of ideology and leadership is ensured through the establishment of the leader's ideo-logical system and his leadership system is it possible to achieve the ideological unity and organizational cohesion of the party ranks and make the party play its role satisfactorily as apolitical leadership body.... Our Party's struggle to establish the monolithic ideological system has been a struggle toequip Party members thoroughly with the leader's ideas and unite them firmly behind the leader in ideology and purpose; at the same time, it has been a struggle to overcome theheterogeneous ideas and factional elements which conflict with the leader's idea and guidance and disturb unity and cohesion."

Juche also is referred to as "the unitary ideology" or as "the monolithic ideology of the Party." It is inseparable from and, for all intents and purposes, synonymous with Kim Il Sung's leadership and was said to have been "created" or "fathered" by the great leader as an original "encyclopedic thought which provides a complete answer to any question that arises in the struggle for national liberation and class emancipation, in the building of socialism and communism." Chuch'e is viewed as the embodiment of revealed truth attesting to the wisdom of Kim's leadership as exemplified in countless speeches and "on-the-spot guidance."

As defined by Kim Il Sung, juche is a quasi-mystical concept in which the collective will of the people is distilled into a supreme leader whose every act exemplifies the State and society's needs. Opposition to such a leader, or to the rules, regulations, and goals established by his regime is thus in itself opposition to the national interest. The regime therefore claims a social interest in identifying and isolating all opposition.

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Kangsong Taeguk (strong and prosperous state)
Kangsong Taeguk [Kangsong Buguk] -- "rich nation, strong army" -- refers to a nation that is militarily powerful and economically prosperous, and seems to be modeled after Deng Xiaoping's 'Four Great Strategies for Modernization,' especially in Kim Jong-il's attachment of great importance to the military. This slogan may also reflect the fact that Kim Jong Il may want both economic reforms and enhanced military power through nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. The September 1998 Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) meeting that elevated Kim Jong Il to the DPRK's "highest post" also embraced the new objective of becoming a "powerful and prosperous state" [Kangsong Taeguk]. The following month Pyongyang declared that "defense capabilities are a military guarantee for national political independence and the self-reliant economy," and that "the nation can become prosperous only when the barrel of the gun is strong."
------------------------------------
Ideology
To understand North Korean society, it is essential to look at it from the North Korean point of view, searching for what dictates people's lives. North Korean decision-makers operate under conditions of bounded rationality, created by their ideology. Given the intense and complete immersion in this ideology, North Korean elites do not consider all possible alternatives that might be available to decision-makers in other countries. Although North Korea's political doctrines may appear exotic to Westerners, they represent a contemporary expression of strains of thought that are deeply embedded in Korean history.

Confucianism had been both the religion and ideology of the state for centuries. Yi Dynasty Confucianism was not only a philosophical and ethical system but also a cult of the family. Everyone was expected to show filial piety towards their parents, ancestors and the king. Participation in family sacrifices helped link the individual to the monarch, who was considered the 'father' of the national community. Traditional Korea, in other words, was a 'Family-State' that equated loyalty to the king (patriotism) with filial piety.

Neo-Confucianism, the dominant value system of the Chosn Dynasty (1392-1910), combines the social ethics of the classical Chinese philosophers Confucius (Kong Zi, 551-479 B.C.) and Mencius (Meng Zi, 372-289 B.C.) with Buddhist and Daoist metaphysics. One of neo-Confucianism's basic ideas is that the institutions and practices of a properly ordered human community express the immutable principles or laws that govern the cosmos. Through correct social practice, as defined by Confucian sages and their commentators, individuals can achieve self-cultivation and a kind of spiritual unity with heaven (although this was rarely described in mystic or ecstatic terms).

Neo-Confucianism defines formal social relations on all levels of society. Social relations are not conceived in terms of the happiness or satisfaction of the individuals involved, but in terms of the harmonious integration of individuals into a collective whole, which, like the properly cultivated individual, mirrors the harmony of the natural order.

Neo-Confucianism in Korea became quite rigid and conservative by the mid-sixteenth century. In practice, the doctrine emphasized hierarchy in human relations and self-control for the individual. The Five Relationships (o ryun in Korean; wu lun in Chinese), formulated by classical Chinese thinkers such as Mencius and subsequently sanctified by Zhu Xi and other neo-Confucianist metaphysicians, governed proper human relations: that "between father and son there should be affection; between ruler and minister there should be righteousness; between husband and wife there should be attention to their separate functions; between old and young there should be proper order; and between friends there should be faithfulness." Only the last was a relationship between equals; the others were based on authority and subordination.

Throughout traditional Korean society, from the royal palace and central government offices in the capital to the humblest household in the countryside, the themes of hierarchy and inequality were pervasive. There was no concept of the rights of the individual. In the context of the wider society, a welldefined elite of scholar-officials versed in neo-Confucian orthodoxy was legitimized in terms of the traditional ethical distinction between the educated "superior man" or "gentleman," who seeks righteousness, and the "small man," who seeks only profit. This theme was central in the writings of both Confucius and Mencius.

Confucianism and neo-Confucianism as political philosophies proposed a benevolent paternalism: the masses had no role in government, but the scholar-officials were supposed to look after them as fathers look after their children. In the Chosn Dynasty, status and power inequalities, defined precisely within a vertical hierarchy, were generally considered both natural and good. The hierarchy extended from the household relationships of fathers and children through the intermediary relationships of ruler and ruled within the kingdom, to Korea's subordinate status as a tributary of China.

Following Ch'oe Su-un's Tonghak movement in 1860, countless new religions appeared in Korea. Tonghak means "Eastern Learning" and as the name implies, it was an Eastern religion embodying the Korean spirit, in opposition to Christianity which had come from the West. Tonghak's central teaching was embodied in its Kaebyok (Opening) ideology. Kaebyok was a cosmic chronology which claimed that a new era was beginning. In the West, cosmic changes typically signaled a conclusion, but in the East, they represented a new creation or "iKaebyok."

The Tonghak Movement provided a Korean version of the East-West polarity. Ever since gunboat diplomacy forced Asian states to open ports to Western trade, many East Asian's have tended to view modernity as a cataclysmic clash of civilizations. When viewed through the prism of the "East-West polarity," recent history was a struggle for domination by two diametrically opposite forces, the West (America and Western Europe) and East Asia. In the indigenous Tonghak religious movement "reject the foreign (West)" became a rallying cry for a Confucian-style reform of the state and society. The Tonghak definition of the West included a rapidly modernizing Japan that was beginning to encroach on Korean sovereignty.

According to Tonghak, Kaebyok heralded the advent of a new utopia which would be centered around the Korean Peninsula and its people. Tonghak ideology thus fostered a nationalistic faith that culminated in the Tonghak Rebellion - a defining event in Korea's modernization. Moreover, Tonghak played a pivotal role in maintaining this nationalistic consciousness, leading up to the March First Independence Movement of 1919.

Taking President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points as an article of faith, the March 1, 1919, Movement staged one of the world's first and largest non-violent demonstrations against the Japanese occupation. Japanese colonial authorities responded to these demonstrations with characteristic brutality. America refused to become involved, and many Korean intellectuals turned away from liberal democracy to Marxism as the only hope for Korean liberation.

Tonghak's Kaebyok ideology later became the philosophical model for Korea's new indigenous religions, such as Chungsan-gyo and Won Buddhism. During the 1930s, these religions were already referring to themselves as "Korean Folk Religions," and they continue to do so even today.

After Korea was colonized by Japan in 1910, Korea's ancient culture and national identity reappeared in the guise of these nationalistic religious movements. These became the central forces in the struggle against the occupation. The Tonghak religion, which had by then been renamed Ch'londo-gyo, headed the March First Independence Movement, and thus became the fundamental domestic force behind the anti-Japanese struggle.

Another new religion by the name of Taejonggyo moved its headquarters to Manchuria where it became the main procurer of recruits and funds for anti-Japanese guerrilla forces. In fact, Taejonggyo coordinated the famous Ch'ongsan-ri attack in south-east Manchuria in which resistance fighters crushed a vastly superior Japanese force. It was also the leading organization in Korea's provisional government in Shanghai. In his Kaebyok teachings concerning the advent of a new cosmic order, Kang Chung-san had predicted the eventual downfall of the Japanese. His followers, having faith in his religious prophecies, were thus able to find courage in the face of Japanese tyranny.

Academic circles, centered around so-called Korean studies (i.e. Korean history and language), traditional arts and mass media, formed the second force behind Korean nationalism. By the late-Choson period, a national enlightenment movement, which combined nationalist ideologies and faiths, had already formed outside the scope of Confucianism. This movement first manifested itself as a religious movement, but then appeared as a diverse intellectual movement promoting awareness of Korean culture's unique identity. Key spokesmen for this movement were Shin Cha'e-ho (1880-1936), who promoted an enlightened, nationalistic perspective within historical studies, and Chu Shi-gyong, who promoted Korean language studies.

The central objective of the nationalist movement was not so much a rejection of Westernization, but the advancement of national identity. Hence, its primary objective was to achieve independence from Japan. Yet the movement knew that in order to obtain political autonomy, it first had to promote Korea's cultural independence. For this reason, the nationalist movement demanded, before anything else, the preservation and restoration of Korea's traditional culture. Within this context, the religious movement, which emphasized the sacred character of Korean culture, and the intellectual movement, which sought to advance Korean studies, formed a complementary relationship. Thus, theories of ancient Korean history as exposed by nationalist historians became the philosophical foundation of the indigenous religious movements of the early twentieth century.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is a dictatorship under the absolute rule of the Korean Workers' Party (KWP). Kim Il Sung led the DPRK from its inception until his death in 1994. Since then his son Kim Jong Il appears to have had unchallenged authority. Kim Jong Il was named General Secretary of the KWP in October 1997. In September 1998, the Supreme People's Assembly reconfirmed Kim Jong Il as Chairman of the National Defense Commission and declared that position the "highest office of state." The presidency was abolished leaving the late Kim Il Sung as the DPRK's only president.

Both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il continue to be the objects of intense personality cults. Even after Kim Il Sung's death, his cult of personality and the glorification of his family and the official juche ideology remained omnipresent. The cult approaches the level of a state religion. In 1997 the Nodong Shinmun newspaper announced that the class indoctrination program would be intensified after Kim Jong Il assumed the office of General Secretary of the KWP. The program was being administered by the KWP's basic-level organizations in all areas of the country. The program stressed two points: That the Kim Jong Il leadership blesses the people, and that the people must do their best for the economy.

The cadre began to crack from within, as seen with the defection on 12 February 1997 of Hwang Jang-yup, an intellectual architect of the North's Juche ideology. North Korea undertook successive efforts at nationwide mobilization, as exemplified by events such as the "Arduous March, "the "Desperate March for Socialism," and the "Second Round of Chollima Movement."

The goal of indoctrination remains to ensure loyalty to the system and leadership, as well as conformity to the State's ideology and authority. The necessity for the intensification of such indoctrination is repeatedly stressed in the writings of Kim Jong Il, who attributes the collapse of the Soviet Union largely to insufficient ideological indoctrination, compounded by the entry of foreign influences.

Indoctrination is carried out systematically, not only through the mass media, but also in schools and through worker and neighborhood associations. Kim Jong Il has stated that ideological education must take precedence over academic education in the nation's schools, and he has also called for the intensification of mandatory ideological study and discussion sessions for adult workers.

North Korea is potentially the most volatile part of the world, propelled by concepts as Juche (self-reliance), Kibun (spirit), and Cheymyon (saving face). There is great diversity in Korean character as expressed in day-to-day human relations. There is, on the one hand, the image of Koreans as self-controlled, deferential, and meticulous in the fulfillment of their social obligations; on the other hand, there is the Korean reputation for volatility and emotionalism.

An important value is known as the concept of "face." The concept of face is an extremely important and means "I am not going to do anything to embarrass anyone else." In the concept of "face," individuals who disagree with someone will not argue face to face. They will get an intermediary, who will intermediate between two people, so the disagreement can be resolved to avoid direct conflict. Any personal failure is a loss of chemyeon both to the individual and to those groups in which he is embedded. But there is no civic obligation to an anonymous community which does not engage their chemyeon.

A Korean value is the concept of "Kibun." "Kibun" is based on a Korean word which means "to feel." This concept is very similar the Chinese value of "face." It's basically they will not do or say anything to make another person upset. The close equivalents of Kibun in English are mood, feelings, and state of mind. The maintenance of one's Kibun produces an inner, peaceful environmen. Other persons are required to assess a person's Kibun so they can meet their needs and communicate effectively. This unique assessment is called nunchi [Neunchi]. Kibun is easily disturbed, as when a young person shows irreverence to an elder.

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Juche [Self-Reliance or Self-Dependence]
The regime emphasizes Juche [Juché, Chuch'e], a national ideology of self-reliance. The regime justifies its dictatorship with arguments derived from concepts of collective consciousness and the superiority of the collective over the individual, appeals to nationalism, and citations of "the juche idea." The authorities emphasize that the core concept of juche is "the ability to act independently without regard to outside interference." Originally described as "a creative application of Marxism-Leninism" in the national context, juche is a malleable philosophy reinterpreted from time to time by the regime as its ideological needs change and used by the regime as a "spiritual" underpinning for its rule.

The “spirit of self-reliance” has been the battle cry of North Korean industrial policy since the late 1950s. The North Koreans use four characters of Chinese origin to describe this policy, officially known as Charyok Kaengsaeng. As everyone with even the most cursory knowledge of the Chinese language and history would instantly realize, this slogan, as well as the policy itself, was plagiarized wholesale from Mao’s China. However, the vast majority of North Koreans are completely sure that it was originally invented by the Great Leader, Kim Il Sung himself.

After failing in the Korean War (1950-53) to conquer the US-backed republic in the southern portion by force, North Korea under its founder President Kim Il Sung adopted a policy of ostensible diplomatic and economic "self-reliance" as a check against excessive Soviet or Communist Chinese influence and molded political, economic, and military policies around the core ideological objective of eventual unification of Korea under Pyongyang's control.

Chuch'e was proclaimed in December 1955, when Kim underlined the critical need for a Korea-centered revolution rather than one designed to benefit, in his words, "another country." Chuch'e is designed to inspire national pride and identity and mold national consciousness into a potentially powerful focus for internal solidarity centered on Kim and the KWP.

According to Kim, chuch'e means "the independent stance of rejecting dependence on others and of using one's own powers, believing in one's own strength and displaying the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance." Chuch'e is an ideology geared to address North Korea's contemporary goals--an independent foreign policy, a self-sufficient economy, and a self-reliant defense posture. Kim Il Sung's enunciation of chuch'e in 1955 was aimed at developing a monolithic and effective system of authority under his exclusive leadership. The invocation of chuch'e was a psychological tool with which to stigmatize the foreign-oriented dissenters and remove them from the center of power. Targeted for elimination were groups of pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese anti-Kim dissenters.

Chuch'e did not become a prominent ideology overnight. During the first ten years of North Korea's existence, MarxismLeninism was accepted unquestioningly as the only source of doctrinal authority. Nationalism was toned down in deference to the country's connections to the Soviet Union and China. In the mid-1950s, however, chuch'e was presented as a "creative" application of Marxism-Leninism. In his attempt to establish an interrelationship between Marxism-Leninism and chuch'e, Kim contended that although Marxism-Leninism was valid as the fundamental law of revolution, it needed an authoritative interpreter to define a new set of practical ideological guidelines appropriate to the revolutionary environment in North Korea.

Kim's practical ideology was given a test of relevancy throughout the mid-1960s. In the late 1950s, Kim was able to mobilize internal support when he purged pro-Soviet and proChinese dissenters from party ranks. During the first half of the 1960s, Kim faced an even more formidable challenge when he had to weather a series of tense situations that had potentially adverse implications for North Korea's economic development and national security. Among these were a sharp decrease in aid from the Soviet Union and China; discord between the Soviet Union and China and its disquieting implications for North Korea's confrontation with the United States and South Korea; P'yongyang's disagreements with Moscow and apprehensions about the reliability of the Soviet Union as an ally; and the rise of an authoritarian regime in Seoul under former General Park Chung Hee (1961-79).

These developments emphasized the need for self-reliance--the need to rely on domestic resources, heighten vigilance against possible external challenges, and strengthen domestic political solidarity. Sacrifice, austerity, unity, and patriotism became dominant themes in the party's efforts to instill in the people the importance of chuch'e and collective discipline. By the mid-1960s, however, North Korea could afford to relax somewhat; its strained relations with the Soviet Union had eased, as reflected in part by Moscow's decision to rush economic and military assistance to P'yongyang.

North Korean ideology buried Marxism-Leninism under the ubiquitous, always-trumpeted chuch'e idea. By the 1970s, chuch'e had triumphed fundamentally over Marxism-Leninism as the basic ideology of the regime, but the emphases were there from the beginning.

Since 1974 it has become increasingly evident, however, that the emphasis is on the glorification of chuch'e as "the only scientific revolutionary thought representing our era of Juche and communist future and the most effective revolutionary theoretical structure that leads to the future of communist society along the surest shortcut." This new emphasis was based on the contention that a different historical era, with its unique sociopolitical circumstances, requires an appropriately unique revolutionary ideology. Accordingly, Marxism and Leninism were valid doctrines in their own times, but had outlived their usefulness in the era of chuch'e, which prophesies the downfall of imperialism and the worldwide victory of socialism and communism.

During the 1970s, Kim Jong Il suggested that chuch'e ideology be renamed Kim Il Sung Chuui (Kim Il Sungism). Kim Il Sungism, epitomizing chuch'e, was described as superior to all other systems of human thought, including (apparently) Marxism.

As the years have passed, references to Marxism-Leninism in party literature have steadily decreased. By 1980 the terms Marxism and Leninism had all but disappeared from the pages of K lloja. An unsigned article in the March 1980 K lloja proclaimed, "Within the Party none but the leader Kim Il Sung's revolutionary thought, the chuch'e ideology, prevails and there is no room for any hodgepodge thought contrary to it." The report Kim Il Sung presented to the Sixth Party Congress in October 1980 did not contain a single reference to Marxism-Leninism, in marked contrast to his report to the Fifth Party Congress in November 1970. In the 1980 report, Kim declared: "The whole party is rallied rock-firm around its Central Committee and knit together in ideology and purpose on the basis of the chuch'e idea. The Party has no room for any other idea than the chuch'e idea, and no force can ever break its unity and cohesion based on this idea."

Chuch'e is instrumental in providing a consistent and unifying framework for commitment and action in the North Korean political arena. It offers an underpinning for the party's incessant demand for spartan austerity, sacrifice, discipline, and dedication. Since the mid-1970s, however, it appears that chuch'e has become glorified as an end in itself.

In his annual New Year's message on January 1, 1992, Kim Il Sung emphasized the invincibility of chuch'e ideology: "I take great pride in and highly appreciate the fact that our people have overcome the ordeals of history and displayed to the full the heroic mettle of the revolutionary people and the indomitable spirit of chuch'e Korea, firmly united behind the party . . . . No difficulty is insurmountable nor is any fortress impregnable for us when our party leads the people with the ever-victorious chuch'e-oriented strategy and tactics and when all the people turn out as one under the party's leadership."

North Korea's communist ideology has been based on the concept of "juche," or self-reliance, but severe economic problems have forced the country to accept international food aid and embark on a series of limited market reforms. Famine in North Korea has reportedly killed hundreds of thousands of people over the last decade. Several governments, including the United States, have provided funding to the United Nations' World Food Program (WFP) for emergency food aid to North Korea.

North Korea has not compensated for the loss of the economic, political, and ideological pillars on which it had previously relied. Its former major allies, Russia and China, have turned away from the social and economic systems that North Korea espouses, though the PRC continues to provide economic support in the form of food and fuel to prevent a North Korean economic collapse. The juche philosophy of self-reliance has been eroded by a permanent dependency on the outside world for roughly a quarter of its food. The country had to shelve its strategic ambitions of reuniting the Peninsula on its terms and is reduced to making desperate and dangerous tactical displays of military power to threaten its neighbors.

---Songun Chongch'i [Army First]
The Songun Chongch'i [Army First, or army-centered] politics is in essence, a "politics which solves all problems arising in the revolution and construction on the principle of giving priority to the military affair and advances the overall cause of socialism relying on the army as the pillar of the revolution." After President Kim Il Sung's death, leader Kim Jong Il adopted Songun politics. The Songun politics was formalized and enforced in full-dress since leader Kim Jong Il, Chairman of the National Defence Commission, visited the Dabaksol post in 1995.

The Songun politics began when Chairman Kim Jong Il visited an army unit on 01 January 1995. As north Koreans have the slogan "Let us hold fast the gun to carry out the revolutionary cause pioneered with the gun!" the Songun politics has its deep root, and it is not exaggeration to say that north Korea is unthinkable apart from the Songun politics.

The "Military First Policy" has several purposes. It serves to deter US-ROK aggression. Nationwide conscription is a critical tool for the regime to socialize its citizens to maintain the Kim family in power. The large military allows Pyongyang to use threats and bravado in order to limit US-ROK policy options. Suggestions of sanctions, or military pressure by the US or ROK are countered by the North with threats that such actions are "an act of war" or that it could "turn Seoul into a sea of fire." Inertia, leadership perceptions that military power equals national power and the inability for the regime to change without threatening its leadership also explains the continuing large military commitment.

Even in 1995 to the early 1997 when the Songun politics was enforced in full-swing, the official documents and the press introduced the Songun politics as "a revolutionary idea of attaching great importance to the army", "a politics emphasizing the perfect unity and the single-hearted unity of the Party, Army and people, and the role of the army as the vanguards" without any special definition of the concept. And then, since 1998, terms "the Songun revolutionary idea", "the Songun revolutionary leadership", "the Songun politics", etc, were circulated.

The Songun [Army First] policy has become increasingly promiment over time, since it was first enunciated by Kim Jong Il in January 1995. On January 1, 1995, he addressed a letter to them. It reads: "Let us all work vigorously with one mind and one purpose to live up as befits the soldiers and disciples of the great leader to make our homeland and our country richer and stronger then ever."

Songun means regarding the military affair as the greatest state affair, and strengthening the main agent of the revolution and promoting national defense and socialist construction as a whole with the people's army as the mainstay. The essence of Kim Jong Il's Songun policy is to defend security of the country and the revolutionary gains by strengthening the People's Army as an invincible revolutionary armed forces and build up the driving force of revolution and conduct all activities for socialist construction in a revolutionary and militant manner with the People's Army as a core and a main agent.

Some people ask: "Why do north Koreans pay priority to the military affairs while going hungry" and "Can the gun feed people". As they say, the gun cannot give people food. But the essence of the Songun idea is that Even though the gun of the revolutionary army cannot make meal, it can create more valuable thing, and those who have the guns of revolution can create ideological and political life.

Whether to hold up or put down the gun is not a problem related merely to the military strategy but a supreme political issue deciding the fate of socialism.

The Juche-based view on arms is quite different from the general view. In a word, it gives more importance to the military power than the economic power and evaluates the power of a country with the military power as a key factor. Of course, the military power is not merely the physical power of arms. It is the power that has ideological and spiritual power of the arms and its physical capacity. Leader Kim Jong Il said that "a military power is the first power of the country in the struggle against the imperialism and for independence and socialism and, if the country overpowers the enemy in the military front, it can emerge victorious in all other fronts."

Kim Jong Il opened the Songun era, a new era in the development of the Juche idea and elucidated the course and strategy for accomplishing the cause of the nation. The army is put up as a driving force of the reform and the main force of the reform is consolidated with the army as its pillar. The Songun idea forms the guideline for all the fields such as party and government building, economy and culture. The structure of the state institutions, attaching great importance to the military affairs, remarkably enhanced the status and authority of the National Defence Commission. Kim Jong Il reorganized the political structure of the state into that of Songun politics with the DPRK National Defence Commission as its pivot to conform with the requirements of the Songun era. The strategic line of the economic construction that implies the preferential development of the military industry.

The fundamental foundation of the Songun politics fathered by leader Kim Jong Il is " the do-or-die spirit of anti-imperialism to counter with super toughness the consistent aggressive moves of imperialism to obliterate the Juche revolution. The do-or-die spirit means the spirit of sacrificing oneself without fearing death. ... Kim Jong Il was born during the period of the bloody anti-Japanese war and had grown up in the forest of bayonets, hearing sound of guns as a lullaby. During these periods, he had experienced the spirit of gun that the only way for an empty-handed man is death before the armed enemy and one should hold the gun to fight against enemy in order to carry out the revolution."

Leader Kim Jong Il has pointed out: "Our revolution was carved out with arms, national liberation was achieved with arms, and the US imperialist aggressors were defeated and the dignity and sovereignty of the country were also defended with arms."

The Songun idea is said to be "... a source of unprecedently enhancing the absolute worship of the army men and people toward the leader, a decisive factor to enable the transformation of the ranks of the reform movement to a mighty whole of the devoted defense of the leader, a factor that makes it possible to realize the total oneness of the army and people in the ideo-spiritual and moral features, and a political mode that enables the strengthening of the driving force for the accomplishment of the socialist cause by all means."

The Songun idea is described as "based on the Juche idea in the new situation in which the sovereignty of many countries is tragically violated and the cause of human independence as a whole has met with serious challenges under the policy of extreme arbitrariness and domination pursued by the US that has become the "only superpower" of the world after the Cold War."

According to a North Korean analysis, "Love for arms is predominant as noble ethics in the revolutionary families of soldiers. What is regarded as of great importance in home life is the kernel of family tradition. The noblest and loftiest family tradition in the Songun era is the one mainly based on love for arms. Songun politics of the Workers' Party of Korea is a precious sword which firmly defends the independence of the country and the nation and ushers in the heyday of national prosperity. .... The families of soldiers under arms, the revolutionary families of soldiers, are the mainstay taking the lead in upholding the WPK's Songun politics. The revolutionary families of soldiers are bases for bringing up ardent patriots generation after generation. If the patriotic family tradition is to be inherited children should take over the revolutionary spirit of their parents. The revolutionary families of soldiers bring up patriots who reliably guard the revolutionary posts through successive generations."

According to the North Koreans, "The WPK's theory of building a great prosperous powerful nation contains the profound truth that the power of a nation is based on its military strength and its dignity and sovereignty, too, are guaranteed by arms. The theory also elucidates the fundamental method of bringing about a great upsurge in all fields of the economy and culture by giving priority to building up military strength. Arms guarantee peace, socialism and the people's happy life...."

One North Korean account states that "To wield a sword if the enemy approaches with a dagger, to face the enemy with a gun if he takes out a rifle - this is Kim Jong Il's offensive spirit, and victorious faith and courage that is precisely the source of the Korean people's pride and indomitability to get through any ordeals undauntedly."

According to one North Korean analysis, "The people's safety and happiness can hardly be thinkable apart from arms.... The independent right and interests of a nation are by no means defended spontaneously. They can be guaranteed only by powerful arms of a nation itself. In the world today when the military high-handedness and despotism of imperialism are rampant sovereignty can hardly be thinkable apart from arms. Daredevil pluck, great national pride and dignified independent diplomacy result from all-conquering arms. Songun politics relies on invincible revolutionary armed forces.... Giving prominence to the military affairs in socialist society is the most warrantable measure for defending the destiny of the people and guaranteeing their livelihood. Therefore, there is no more powerful mode of politics than Songun politics under the socialist political power which strives for the independent and creative life of the people.... At present the imperialists' manoeuvres for stifling the Democratic People's Republic of Korea by dint of force at any cost have reached a more dangerous stage. However, their high-handed politics and military threat have no effect in the DPRK where Songun politics is being embodied.... "

Another North Korean analysis explains that "Songun is a Science. Peace and Socialism can be safeguarded only when force of arms is powerful, and the army is the Party, the State and the people. This Songun principle is based on a scientific analysis of changed socio-class relations. ... The important change brought about in the position and role of the social collectives today is that the revolutionary army is the main and core force of the revolution. In the past the working class took charge of and played the role of the main force of the revolution. Putting forward the working class as the core and main force was regarded as an inexorable law. However, the times have advanced far and socio-historical circumstances have changed.... The practical experience of the Korean revolution brings everyone the poignant realization that a country, whichever it may be, must fight on in reliance upon its own powerful military deterrent against the aggressor, US imperialists, who frantically pounces upon it, swaying their guns and nuclear weapons, and that only by strengthening the army and relying on it can the Party, the State and the people be defended and all problems arising in the revolution and construction be solved correctly in the present world."

While Kim Jong-il bestowed immense power to the military during a famine in the 1990s, the young Kim shifted command back to the party. During the Kim Jong-un era, operations within the party have been normalized. The military has been placed under the party, no longer a special class, enjoying special favors.

The Songun Military First doctrine survived the death of Kim Jong-il and the ascendancy of his son Kim Jong-un as his successor. On 25 August 2013, Kim Jong-un elaborated at length on the Songun doctrine during the Day of Songun celebration 25 April 2013:

"Songun was the General’s [Kim Jong-il] revolutionary idea, his practice in the revolution, his political ideal and his political mode…. Regarding the strengthening of the KPA [Korean People’s Army] as the most important of affairs in the Songun revolution, he raised the KPA as the buttress, the main force, of our revolution and achieved the historic victory in the grim anti-imperialist, anti-US showdown in defence of the country’s security and socialism by training the KPA to be the army of the leader boundlessly faithful to the cause of the WPK (Workers’ Party of Korea), to be an invincible revolutionary army. He defined the spirit of defending the leader unto death, the spirit of implementing his instructions at any cost and the self-sacrificing spirit displayed by the service personnel as a revolutionary spirit symbolic and representative of the Songun era, as the revolutionary soldier spirit, and led all the service personnel and people to live and struggle in that spirit, thus ensuring that a great turn and changes were brought about in all sectors of the revolution and construction. In order to consolidate the successes of his Songun-based leadership and administer Songun politics in a comprehensive way, he saw to it that the First Session of the Tenth Supreme People’s Assembly of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea adopted the Socialist Constitution that embodies the idea and principles of the Songun revolution and established a new state administration structure, whose backbone is the National Defence Commission, and led all state affairs to be conducted on the principle of giving precedence to military affairs. "

In keeping with the Songun orientation, the DPRK embarked on a quest to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.