SMS Schlesien soviet side story

The text is borrowed from Miroslav Morozov's book "Torpedo bombers of the Great Patriotic War. They were called "deaths", photos - from the network
On April 16, troops of the 1st and 2nd Belarusian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts began the Berlin operation. The seaside flank was provided by the 2nd Belarusian Front, parts of which crossed the Oder and took Stettin on April 25. By May 1, Stralsund had fallen, and we met with the allies. The port of Swinemünde, located on the islands at the mouth of the Oder, remained unoccupied. The enemy was not going to surrender it, and we weren't going to put up with it. Just as it happened on the shores of Danzig Bay, German troops pressed against the sea desperately resisted. They and the numerous refugees behind them had no doubt that Siberia would expect all of them if surrender. The only hope remained the evacuation by sea - this time to Danish Copenhagen. Again, the German command used large surface ships to support its troops from the sea. These included the heavy cruiser Lyuttsov, severely damaged by British aircraft on April 16, and a small unit formed around the training ship of the line (old battleship) Schlesien...

... Although our ground troops launched the offensive on May 2, the weather conditions on May 2-3 (cloudiness 9-10 points 200-300 m high, visibility up to 2 km, strong haze) did not favor massive aviation actions. Weather improvement began only in the evening of May 3, in connection with which the 51st Mtup and 7th Gshap sent several strike groups for "free hunting" on enemy ships. Only one of the groups of attack aircraft managed to detect and attack the battleship and nearby ships (the destroyer "Z 38" was slightly damaged as a result of a close explosion of the air bomb), and six torpedo bombers and topmastviks reported the sinking of a small vessel off the coast of Rügen Island. Nevertheless, on this day, the situation underwent quite important changes. Lyuttsov shot their last shells and was blown up by the crew in the evening.

At 03.01, Schlesien, located in the western part of Pomeranian Bay, exploded on a British bottom mine. The battleship suffered severe damage to the underwater part and began to sink slowly.
On the tug of the destroyer "Z 39" (the same one that damaged the topmcaster of the 51st Mstap 23.6.1944 in Paldiski), he returned to Swinemünde's external raid, where he was deployed so that the stern tower (the bow was apparently out of order after the explosion) could keep the The trouble for the Germans did not end there. At 22.13, the torpedo boat "T 36" hit the battleship with air defense.

The ship was seriously damaged, its bow went underwater to the 1st gun. All these losses made a rather heavy impression, especially since the next day the German command decided to completely evacuate Swinemünde. To carry out this activity, each ship was counted, while the damaged ones, on the contrary, took away attention and strength. "Schlesien", however, no longer demanded anything - after his bow sat on the ground in the evening, it became obvious that his watch was numbered. At dawn on May 4, the evacuation of the crew of the battleship began, except for the crews of anti-aircraft guns (in 1944, the battleship was re-equipped, after which its anti-aircraft artillery consisted of four 105 mm universal guns, seven 40 mm and 18 20-mm automatic guns), which had to strengthen the air defense of the anchorage during the day.

Naturally, the Air Force didn't know anything about it. Morning air reconnaissance showed that weather conditions have improved significantly, and Swinemünde's external raid is teeming with enemy ships. Scouts counted a battleship, four transports, a hospital ship, a tanker and seven guard ships there - three destroyers, two minesweepers and a watchman each. In addition, a significant number of ships and vessels were directly in the port, but they were of little interest to Shuginin, who set a task of striking a torpedo bomb attack on the battleship in cooperation with the attack aircraft. On the go, the Thunder plan was adjusted. If it was originally planned to allocate only two six IL-2s to suppress the air defense of the security ships, now the outfit of the supporting forces was doubled due to the refusal to attract attack aircraft to the strike on the main target and the elimination of the topmmactvik exit group from the attack.

In this situation, such a decision can be considered quite justified. Another thing is unclear: according to the plan, the main blow was to be struck by four four "Bostons" in the topmact version.


In fact, only ten aircraft were allocated for the strike, two of which carried torpedoes. The success of the use of this ammunition on a road at a depth of 10-12 m, to put it mildly, was doubtful. To this should be added two top masts that returned to the airfield shortly after takeoff due to material problems. The eleventh A-20, piloted by the commander of the best squadron in the regiment, Captain Makarihim, did not carry a combat load at all. Its function was to manage all groups of aircraft in the air, which was done in the practice of our mine-torpedo aviation for the first time.

The rise of shock groups took place at 10.38-10.40. The planes rounded Swinemünde from the south and west, after which they set on the target from the northwest. Contrary to expectations, it turned out to be well covered with enemy anti-aircraft artillery. Makarikhin only managed to give the command to the attackers to attack the escort ships, as with the first explosions of anti-aircraft shells, the control of the connection was disrupted. As a result, only torpedo bombers and one of the top mastovites attacked the battleship, and the rest chose other targets. Lieutenant Kulinich reported on the hit of the FAB-1000 in 6000-ton transport, which allegedly quickly sank. Another vessel with a displacement of 8,000 tons was struck by Jr. Lieutenant Smolyakov (his seriously damaged A-20 landed on a fuselage on the coast), and Lieutenant Gorbushkin - minesweeper.

The main goal of the strike remained unharmed. Both torpedo bombers dropped their shells from a distance of 500-700 m, but despite the fact that the ship stood still, they did not achieve hits. Most likely, torpedoes simply buried themselves in the ground or were damaged when making a "bag". Lieutenant Linik, Jr. Lynic, who went into the attack at the same time, was shot down by anti-aircraft fire. Despite the fact that the crew did not have time to make any report before the death, the pilots of both torpedo bombers claimed to have seen one of its FAB-500 hit Schlesien. The Germans categorically deny this, and you can believe in their honesty in this case. It was almost impossible for Boston, the only near-range attacker, to get in such conditions. The real victim of the raid was the training artillery ship (former auxiliary cruiser) "Orion".

This ship, converted at the beginning of the war from the ship "Kurmark" (7,021 BRT), operated in the Atlantic and Pacific from April 1940 to August 1941, sinking and capturing 12 allied vessels (including five together with the auxiliary cruiser Comet), In 1942-1943 the ship was used as a floating workshop, and from January 1944 it was renamed He took an active part in the evacuation from Danzig Bay, and on May 4 he had the task of taking over the crew of Schlesien. Before that, he had taken several hundred soldiers on board in Swinemünde. The commission investigating the dead ships after the end of the war concluded that Orion was killed by one FAB-500 (apparently, the results of the FAB-500 explosion were taken as a torpedo from a German destroyer), two FAB-250 and three FAB-100, some of which were undoubtedly dropped by Bostons. After the first explosions, a fire broke out on the ship, and it lost its course.

Evacuees, who were at least a thousand, began to leave the ship, but not everyone managed to do so. According to German data, the losses in the death of Orion amounted to about 50 people, but these are only the dead crew members. Our commission found many corpses on board, but their accurate calculation was not made because the holds were flooded. The flaming Orion drifted through the raid until dark, until it was finished by artillery fire, depth charges and a torpedo from the destroyer "Z 38" and the destroyer "T 33".

Although this blow is difficult to recognize as successful, for the Germans it became a signal that it is necessary to hurry up with the evacuation. More and more ships came out from Swinemünde to an external raid, anti-aircraft guns were removed from the battleship, leaving only subversive parties. Work on the preparation of the explosion came to an end when in 16.04-16.07 our aircraft attacked the raid again. The raid was built on the same principle as the previous one, although the number of aircraft participating in it decreased - only 16 IL-2 and 7 A-20 (including Makarikhin's aircraft). Although the density of anti-aircraft fire decreased and none of the cars was seriously damaged, only half of the Bostons attacked the battleship. Hero of the Soviet Union Bogachev dropped the torpedo, but no one watched its course. Kosenko and Fomenko dropped the bombs, but they lay down with shortfall - obviously because of fears of being shot down, the pilots dropped their cargo prematurely.

According to the report, only one FAB-250 exploded near the port side, allegedly damaging the underwater part of the battleship, which was already sitting on the ground. Junior Lieutenants Petrov and Martynov added another bomb hit in Orion, and Jr. Lieutenant Kozlov missed a smaller displacement vessel. About 20 minutes after our planes flew away, the Germans blew up Schlesien. The explosions destroyed the foremast on which radar installations stood, then the main caliber artillery turrets.
A heavy fire broke out on the skeleton.

Despite the fact that our reconnaissance aircraft was constantly hung over the raid, the VPU learned nothing about the "suicide" of the main goal. On the contrary, with acute dissatisfaction, the command was preparing a third blow. It fell on 20.02-20.05, just before German ships, having built in convoys, were going to leave the raid. Assault aircraft attacking four fours finished off the heavily damaged destroyer "T 36" and sank the air defense ship "Hummel" (it is possible that it was sunk by IL-2 bombs in the very first raid).
The "Bostons" are divided again. Torpedo bomber Makarikhin and topmatchtovik Kulinich attacked Orion, but since the ship was already shrouded in smoke, they could not confidently report that they had caused him new damage. The rest of the topmastviks, with the exception of Jr. Lieutenant Kozlov, who "involuntarily dropped bombs into the sea", struck "Schlesien". Despite the fact that the target did not fire defensively, only one FAB-1000 hit it, after which a fire was noticed in the aft part. At dusk in the evening, a reconnaissance aircraft removed the skeleton of the battleship from a small height, and in the photo shown, the colossal destruction of the former participant in the Battle of Jutland could not but catch the eye.

This could be the summed up of the operation

In general, its result was recognized as satisfactory. The commission surveying the Schlesien Corps in June believed that the battleship was hit by two FAB-1000s, one FAB-500 in the central and aft parts, one FAB-500 in the bow superstructure and a torpedo in the bow. At the same time, the possibility of damage to the ship before our raids or as a result of the explosion by the crew itself was not considered at all. However, this approach is not surprising, since the commission consisted of representatives of the Air Force headquarters and the units involved in the raid.

Only one place in the report was said that "based on a personal inspection and eyewitness testimony and comparing them with the combat reports of crews and photos of the operation period, the commission concluded that the battleship Schlesien, having some damage, was on an external raid". Such was the reaction to the picture of the battleship by our scout before the first plaque, where a strong nose differential simply could not but catch the eye. However, the compilers of the report immediately noted: "Presumably, the ship of the line was damaged 3.5.45 g in the bomb attack of the IL-2 group of the 9th Shad." Elsewhere in the report, damage to the bow was attributed to a torpedo hit or a close FAB-1000 explosion on the ground. But on May 3, no one attacked the ship with such ammunition! Similarly, the attribution of the destruction of the nasal mast to the FAB-500 hit was a gross stretch. At what height from the water should this bomb have flown to hit the battleship mast? In fact, only one, maximum two bombs hit the ship, and even then only after it was thrown and detonated by the crew. This is fully confirmed by the losses of his crew: if two German sailors were killed in the explosion on a British bottom mine, then in the afternoon of May 4 directly on board the battleship - not a single one. But there could be no losses when a direct hit of large-calibre air bombs!

The apparent success well covered the obvious shortcomings made during the operation. Only after the war in the "Collection of Materials" No. 13, along with "relatively high efficiency of hostilities", it was recognized: "2. Combat control of the actions of groups in the air, despite the appointment for this purpose of Captain Makarikhin, commander of the 51st Mst Mstap (on the A-20-D0 aircraft without combat load), was actually lost with the entry of attacking groups into the anti-aircraft fire zone of enemy ships, i.e. at the most critical moment. In the first strike, out of 10 bombers and torpedo bombers, only three attacked the battleship, and the rest of the crews chose the targets themselves. There was no concentrated attack on the battleship in the first blow. 3. The actions of torpedo bombers on the Schlesien linear ship should be considered unsatisfactory... 4. Lack of forces did not allow to allocate the necessary number of attack aircraft to suppress a large group of enemy warships and vehicles at the time of anti-aircraft artillery strike. Only a part of the ships were assaulted in each attack, while the rest could freely fire anti-aircraft fire on attacking aircraft. This explains the loss of one topmam and damage to 3 A-20-DO and 4 Il-2. 5. In general, the KBF Air Force operation to destroy enemy warships and transports on the Swinemünde raid showed that despite the experience gained during the war, combined strikes involving various types of aircraft were not sufficiently worked out. Control of the actions of groups during the strike is lost, purposefulness and perseverance of actions are insufficient, strike groups are poorly provided for by the actions of auxiliary groups, especially in terms of suppressing enemy anti-aircraft artillery, and often the planned action plan (attack scheme) is violated without sufficient good reason. And if we add to this the miscalculation of the division headquarters, which imposed the use of useless torpedoes in shallow water, the reduction of the composition of the strike group by half relative to the planned headquarters of the regiment and the obvious reluctance of pilots to attack the battleship, which the report traditionally was silent about, the assessment of the operation is difficult to "satisfactory".

In fact, the main component of the success achieved was the actions of the Red Army, whose troops forced the Germans to leave the port in a hurry, without worrying about saving damaged warships.

Our last thesis - regarding the reluctance of pilots - would like to be revealed in more detail. It's not about cowardice at all. Many of the pilots we called have previously established themselves as brave and courageous aviators. Nobody just wanted to die a few days before the Victory. Slogans operated on by commanders and political workers, such as "Let's not let fascist criminals escape to the West!" did not find a proper response from the personnel. If it were about saving the Motherland! And so there are more hundred fascists, a hundred fewer, and one of their lives. One way or so many have reasoned in recent weeks, and we, who know that not only war criminals fled to the West, but also ordinary Germans, whose guilt compared to the Germans in the Soviet zone of occupation was only that they managed to retreat with the troops, does not turn the tongue to condemn anyone. On the contrary, the command tried every day to launch increasingly active hostilities..." (c)

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